Regis Imperio Duo sunto iique Consules appellantur Let Two have Regal Power and let them be called Consuls Also the Judgment of Livy is that the Sovereign Power was translated from Consuls to Decemvirs as before from Kings to Consuls Yet in another Place our Learned Knight according to his usual Inconsistencies with himself tells us that but one of the Consuls had Regality for they govern'd by turns Which by his Favour I take it was only in the Wars which require but one General not at Rome However he confesses that all the Decemvirs had Regality for he pretends not that they govern'd by turns and he says they were chosen to make Laws and though some will question whether a Supream Gubernative implies a Legislative Power no Man will question but a Legislative takes in the other or at least may at the pleasure of him or them in whom it is vested But I would fain know which one of them had right to give Law to the rest or had the Soveraignty in him alone And for it to be in more than one Observ touching Forms of Gov. p. 47. is as we are inform'd by him quite contrary to the indivisible Nature of Soveraignty Yet he grants it may escheat to the Supream Heads of Families that is more than one within that which had been at least immediately before the same Community nay and that it may be exercised by many in other Acts besides the choice of one to head them which he owns in these words Ib. p. 60 61. Those Governments that seem to be popular are kinds of petty Monarchies which may thus appear Government is a Relation between the Governors and Governed the one cannot be without the other mutuò se ponunt auferunt Where a Command proceeds from a major part there those individual Persons that concurr'd in the Vote are the Governors because the Law is only their Will in particular Yet under correction though some of those alter their Wills and some which were against the Law become for it provided that the Ballance continue as 't was when the Law pass'd in this Case the Law cannot be chang'd by those very Persons which made it There can be no Obligation which takes state from the meer Will of him that promiseth the same Power of Kings Fol. 1. and therefore some things which receive Force from the meer Will of the Parties yet continue to oblige against their Wills and the Government is in the united Body not in those who made that Law for the Power cannot be derived from them who chang'd their Wills but out of the whole Body however no one of them were a Monarch and yet what hinders but that there was a Soveraign Power amongst them This Power it seems Sir Robert knows not how to distinguish from the Exercise or Act of Power The Supream Power being an indivisible Beam of Majesty he tells us cannot be divided or settled upon a Multitude God would have it fixt in one Person not sometimes in one part of the People and sometimes in another and sometimes and that for the most part no where as when the Assembly is Dissolv'd it must rest in the Air or in the Walls of the Chamber where they were assembled Agreeable to which he says elsewhere By this means one and the same Assembly may make at one Sitting several Forms of Common-Wealths So that he supposes the different Exercise to alter the form of Government and that it Dissolves when the Exercise ceases or is discontinued which Error is of kin to theirs whoever they are that make a Church barely to relate to Acts of Worship But to wave these Niceties as above their reach who cannot of themselves discern palpable Contradictions and wherein Sir Robert under pretence of Friendship serves them as Joab did Abner I shall take from his thoughts their artificial Dress and lay them open in their naked Deformity that every rational at least honest Man and good Subject may start from them the Devil cannot be so far transform'd into the shape of an Angel of Light but that his cloven Foot must appear Sure I am that he undermines the Right of all present Kings or Families and makes the Right of Succession as doubtful as the Event of War admitting none but Rebels within the possibility of Usurping and thereby yielding that any Foreign Prince may lawfully dispossess one in the Throne or interrupt the Succession And if any Subject can prosper in his Rebellion though the lawful Prince or Heir be alive and He that takes upon him the Power of a Superior sins sufficiently and to purpose Yet God's Providence having dispossess'd the former Anarchy p. 273. Many times by the Act of an Vsurper himself or of those that set him up the True Heir of the Crown is dispossest God using the Ministry of the wickedest Men for the removing and setting up of Kings in such Cases the Subjects Obedience to the Fatherly Power must go along with and wait upon God's Providence who only hath a Right to give and take away Kingdoms and to adopt the Subjects into the Obedience of another Fatherly Power and declar'd in favour of the Usurper the People if we believe him are adopted into the Obedience of another Fatherly Power and not having Right to cast off this Father rais'd up by God himself who only hath Right to give and take away Kingdoms By his Doctrine It was written Tempore Car. 2. all the Endeavours towards his Majesty's Restoration are condemn'd for that 't was against the Title made by the Almighty and any voluntary Act of the People being vain not obliging them any longer than they please as all the Force came from their own Wills Besides no Act of the People having any binding or moral Effect since they are to be meerly Passive they being always and unalterably as to Humane Causes under the Power of the Natural Fathers By these Principles the Usurping Powers would still have lawful Authority But to be sure For in Grants and Gifts that have their Original from God or Nature as the Power of the Father hath no inferior Power of Man can limit nor make any Law of Prescription against them Ibid. according to him any Prince had equal Right with the Ejected Monarch to try for the Kingdom For though Sir Robert in his Preface to his Observations on Mr. Hobbs asks the Question Power of Kings F. 1. How a Subject by Covenant can get a Right of Soveraignty by Conquest when neither he himself hath Right to Conquer or Subjects a Liberty to Submit Yet he has not one Objection against the Lawfulness of a Foreign Prince's conquering at any Time or with any Circumstances which shews that his Definition of Usurpation was intended to take in all unlawful usurpings of Power without which 't is very lame But thus it runs Vsurpation is the resisting and taking away the Power from him Directions for
Legislator left undetermin'd And yet afterwards when had he said enough to gain Credit stealing away a large share for the Clergy but yet he had given so much before that he could not leave any thing to the Clergy or the Laity either without manifest contradiction He tells us that in every Monarchy the Prince has Supream Power that this Supream Power is a Legislative Power and with us extends to Matters Ecclesiastical as well as Civil that a Legislative Power is Self-sufficient and Arbitrary and that that Prince who has a Legislative Power obliges his Subjects ferendo Leges by the exercise of this Power and that must be in what manner soever he exercises it otherwise 't is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yet in another place he says what the King commands has not the Force of a Law Pag. 189. that is does not oblige without some Consent of the People And whereas he places in the King the Sanction of Laws in general as being the principal Cause that introduces the Form and this he calls jus condendarum Legum this Right or Power he places in the Clergy for Matters Ecclesiastical and so wholly shuts out the King and Laity who have according to him neither the Proposing nor the Sanction And therefore that restraint of the Exercise which he yields to the Civil Power amounts to no more than a natural not moral Power Praelectio 7 ma de Obligatione legum humanarum ex parte causae efficientis And this appears farther in that this was under the Head of the efficient Cause of Humane Laws which he makes the Clergy to be in Matters Ecclesiastical and that without Aid of the Civil Power as he explains himself speaking of the Matter of Laws Prael 7 ma. p. 174. Leges autem Ecclesiasticas hìc intelligo non quae à personis Ecclesiasticis sine Magistratus civilis authoritate constitutae sunt quae schola non est hujus loci sed ad alterius generis causam efficientem scilicet pertinet c. I conceive he places the Authority of making Ecclesiastical Laws in the Clergy in the same manner that he does any Act of the Ministry the Power of which according to some Great Men remains though the Act may be restrain'd which some Men cannot understand for their Hearts for they suppose that one may always act according to a lawful Power But we are otherwise taught Ep. Wynton Resp ad 3 Ep. Pet. Moline p. 191. Post enim quà m dicunt degradationem manet potestas ad actum ordinis cujus potestatis usus prohiberi potest potestas ipsa tolli non potest To put an end to all these Disputes Doctor Heylin's perpetual Dictator in Politicks places a Power in Adam as Absolute and Arbitrary as all the Acts of his Will and does nothing if he goes not to prove that this his Power was to be obey'd in every Act of his Sovereign's Will relating to things Sacred as well as Civil for a right to Command without an Obligation upon others to obey is an empty insignificant Notion Well this being settled beyond dispute in Adam and in his Posterity by right of Fatherhood and in Cain by right of Birth though by the way he never was vested with such Power over his Brother Patriarcha p. 19. Patriarcha p. 12. Patriarcha p. 13. over whom we are told 't is promis'd for that Abel died in the Life-time of Adam though it were indivisible and of right an universal Monarchy settled upon the Eldest Parent yet it lawfully descended or came upon Sons in the Time of their Fathers as upon Judah who by virtue of his Patriarchal Power condemn'd Thamar to be burnt while his Father Jacob was in being Such as could set up for themselves in any of the divided Kingdoms of the Earth had in spight of contradiction just Shares in this still indivisible Monarchy and not only by consequence but expresly are we taught that Usurpers and Rebels have good Authority such as ought to be obey'd though the lawful Prince be alive But these besides many other Absurdities and Contradictions which Sir Robert is pleas'd to divert us with are but necessary Consequences upon the Supposition that every one who is Supream in Power Patriarcha p. 19. All Kings c. are to be reputed the next Heirs to those first Progenitors who were at first the natural Parents of the whole People however he come by it derives his Title to an indivisible Power that is all Power from Adam which holds not only as to all Power within any particular Division or Tract of Land but all over the World as it is suppos'd Adam's Power was If it be meant of the Father of the People within such a Tract of Land then he derives not his Title from the Eldest Parent and by Consequence entitles such an one only to a subordinate Power And therefore one would think that Sir Robert has heap'd together all the Absurdities flowing from such an Opinion with an intention to expose it to all Men of Judgment They that will say 't was otherwise surely are none of his Friends but expose him as they do themselves in contending so eagerly for the maintenance of what if he spoke his Judgment argues him to be none of the wisest if 't was not none of the honestest If as one of Sir Robert Filmer's pedantick Admirers flourishes Pref. to the Power of Kings All Readers are insensibly under his Command as if they were his Subjects and are his by right of natural Soveraignty and a Reason so far exalted above ours as his makes him appear like those Kings of old who were in Stature much superior to their Subjects and seem'd so far to over-top the rest as if Nature mark'd them out for Heads of all If still this exalted Genius be guilty of Self-contradictions and undermining his own Foundations what silly Creatures are they or what Slaves in their Understanding who are made Captives without Resistance and are Slaves by right of Conquest And if all Men fell under his Title either of natural Soveraignty or of Conquest how despicable were the Condition of Humane Nature But surely Contradictions will not down with all Men 't were in vain to shew such easy Wretches as are led captive by Sir Robert's false Reasonings wherein his Fallacies lie as in not distinguishing the Power whereby a Nation is govern'd from the Person or Persons invested with Power nor considering the Manner wherein it is enjoy'd whether Absolutely or with Limitation or whether the Administration or Exercise be according to the lawful manner which to them that are able to consider would evince to how little purpose 't is urg'd that Soveraignty is indivisible For an undivided Soveraignty may be in several in unequal manners and sometimes in equal As in the Roman Consuls or Decemvirs at least and that by Sir Robert's own confession The Law says he of the Twelve Tables affirms
especially till they leave off not only censuring but misrepresenting others who by a fair state of the Question are they alone who are directly contrary to them which himself is elsewhere sensible of when he says of the direct contraries in all probability one is true Pag. 35. but the direct contrary to what they hold is not that it is lawful for every Man to rebel when ever he thinks it necessary Pag. 2. much less when he pleases Pag. 37. Himself yeilds that non-assisting the late King was notoriously necessary for preservation of the Nation and what restrains others from judging when there is the like notoriety for resisting As he charges others with holding that they may resist when and whom they please they may say that he is for not assisting in the like latitude Pag. 37. and for cramping the Government if he has not the Courage to attempt against it We may resist when the Original Contract is notoriously broken and we must not resist when the Original Contract is notoriously broken are contrary and contradictory Propositions one of which I grant to be true But we must resist in no case and we may resist in any case Pag. 37. when every Man pleases or at least thinks it necessary are not Contraries Pag. 2. but Extreams and 't is odds but the Truth lies in the middle that we may resist in some case which cries aloud and justly stirs up a Nation as with the Voice of God This Gentleman does not observe that the Question is of one who ceases to be King according to that of Bracton non est Rex ubi dominatur voluntas non Lex which is not barely his Opinion but warranted by that noble Transcript of the Original Contract the Confessor's Law which shews that if a King does not answer the true end for which he was chosen he loses the Name or ceases to be King which was very vvell understood by J. 1. who told his Parliament Vid. J. 1. his Speech in Parl. March 21. Anno 1609. that every just King is bound to observe that Paction made vvith his People by his Laws framing the Government thereunto and a King leaves to be a King and degenerates into a Tyrant as soon as he leaves off to govern by Law And thus the Protestants in Germany vvho resisted the Emperor notwithstanding their Oaths of Fidelity to him Hornii orbis Polit. p. 18. pleaded that they resisted him not as Caesar but qua non fuit Caesar Our Author confesses that the late King notoriously subverted our Constitution Pag. 2. did not treat us like English-Men but Slaves and says all grant his design vvas certainly to extirpate the Protestant Religion Pag. 16. to enslave and consequently to extirpate the English Nation And I dare appeal to Dr. Falkner's Christian Loyalty to try ours by in such case Dr. Falkner's Christian Loyalty where there vvas a manifest Renunciation of the Government as an English King And surely no Man of Sense vvill say that such a liberty for resisting as this Lay-Gentleman imputes to the Williamites can be the Consequence of resisting such a Prince as he describes and of exploding that Sycophantry which did encourage and would support him or that the best of Princes can need the influence of that Doctrine vvhich hurried on the other to his Ruin the insinuation of this is the greatest Reflection which can be put not only upon the Friends of their present Majesties but upon their Majesties themselves Tho some would have been so ungrateful to have sent his Majesty back uncrowned after he had rescued them from their present Fright which might soon have been laid vvith a fevv flattering Caresses the English Nation abhors such a Reproach nor can their Majesties so far depart from their own Nature to violate that Constitution which they have restored nor yet can the confuting their slavish Doctrine of Passive Obedience Pag. 36. in the least derogate from that religious Awe and Reverence which is due to Crowned Heads tho it may remove that Bugbear and Mormo with which some would fright Mankind out of love with them Nor can any good Prince's Crown be unsecure by rejecting the deceitful Officiousness of others since nothing can hazard it but such extravagant Actions as a well-dispos'd Prince can never fall into and which by natural Consequence as well as Equity provoke a whole Nation The Laws make all Risings against the King punishable with Death and therefore single Persons or Companies in their sound Minds will not attempt them but when the Cause is so apparent that they who suffer them to stand alone in it do but invite and encourage Attempts upon the Lives and Liberties of all But if as often such there are hot Men over-valuing themselves or the Strength of their Adherents will endeavour to destroy a good Government to raise their Faction or accomplish some low Ends of their own the Prince has sufficient Security with the Laws and Hearts of his People on his side And how strict soever the Laws are 't is a vain thing to expect Safety from them alone when any part of that Authority from which they flow is render'd cheap or invaded with an high hand And they who think to get above all Law will find their open Violations to give the same Freedom to others which they take to themselves It ought says the Lord Clarendon Lord Clarendon's Survey of the Leviathan p. 48. prudently to be consider'd whether People may not be very naturally dispos'd to use that Force against him that declares himself to be absolv'd from all Oaths Covenants and Promises and whether any Obligation of Reason or Justice can establish the Government in him who founds it upon so unrighteous a Determination As a judicious Person has well observ'd The new Oath of Allegiance justified Edit An. 1689. sold by Ran. Taylor If single Persons or many together be injur'd by the Prince they are oblig'd to suffer quietly rather than disturb the Publick Peace and in this case Passive Obedience is a Christian Duty and is necessary to the Quiet of every Nation since the best Governours may by mistake injure some few and if they do so that doth not break the Compact because all the People collectively or representatively were but one Party in the Stipulation and therefore those Acts by which a King must forfeit are such as are likely to take away the Rights of the whole People or aim at changing the Form of the Government subverting the Laws In such case Passive Obedience is not the Duty of a Community who have Rights and Liberties secured by Law and for the whole People to stand by silent and see that done is the greatest Folly and the highest Treachery to their Country and Posterity Doctrine of Non-resistance p. 1. But as this Gentleman asks What can the Friends of their present Majesties pretend to palliate their
Preservation of the Constitution in vertue of which they might declare King William and Queen Mary King and Queen of England and Ireland with all their Dependencies tho J. 2. was alive at the time of such Declaration 2. That this rightful Power was duly exercis'd in the late Assembly of Lords and Commons and afterwards regularly confirmed by the same Body in full Parliament 1. As to the Nations rightful Power I shall not go about to refute the fond Notion of an absolute Patriarchal Power descending from Adam to our Kings in an unaccountable way because tho if this were true there could be no more Compact between Princes and their People than is between Fathers and Children for establishing the Rights of Fatherhood Patriarcha non Monarcha Ed. An. 1681. Two Treatises of Government In the former the false Princeples and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and his Followers are detected and overthrown Ed. Anno 1690. Heylyn 's Certamen Epistolare p. 386 387. yet the difference between a Patriarchal and Monarchical Authority is so well stated and prov'd by my Learned Friend Mr. Tyrril that few besides the unknown Author of the two late Treatises of Government could have gained Reputation after him in exposing the false Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and his Admirers one of which Dr. Heylyn in his Letter to Sir Edward Filmer the Son speaking of his Father says His eminent Abilities in these Political Disputes exemplified in his judicious Observations on Aristotle's Politicks as also in some Passages on Grotius Hunton Hobbs and other of our late Discoursers about Forms of Government declare abundantly how fit a Man he might have been to have dealt in this Cause which I would not willingly should be betrayed by unskilful handling and had he pleased to have suffer'd his excellent Discourse called Patriarcha to appear in publick it would have given such Satisfaction to all our great Masters in the Schools of Polity that all other Tractates in that kind had been found unnecessary This he says might have serv'd for a Catholicon or general Answer to all Discourses of this kind Since Sir Robert Filmer and Dr. Heylin were our late Observator's Predecessors in guiding the Inferior Clergy 't is not to be expected that they should nicely enquire into the Errors and Contradictions of their Leaders but the Doctor 's scandalous Reflections upon the Reformation in England and the Misfortunes of Charles the First in some measure at least occasion'd by the Countenance given to Sybthorpism Manwarism and Filmerism may justly raise a Prejudice against these Men and their Doctrines in the thinking Laity and those who are not able to think of themselves may take every Morning some Pages of the two Treatises of Government for an effectual Catholicon against Nonsense and Absurdities which have nothing to recommend them but Stile and Names cried up among a Party Vid. Dr. Heylyn's Stumbling-Block of Disobedience and Rebellion Wherefore I may well think that I may pass over the Stumbling-Blocks which such Men lay in the way to my Proof that the Power whereby this Nation is govern'd is originally under God derived from the People and was never absolutely parted with Hooker 's Ecclesiastical Polity lib. 1. f. 10. Many have cited the Authority of the Judicious Hooker till it is thread-bare to prove that it is impossible there should be a lawful Kingly Power which is not mediately or immediately from the Consent of the People where 't is exercised The present Bishop of Worcester whose Name will undoubtedly be held in no less esteem in future Ages Irenicum p. 132. is as express in his Irenicum That all civil Societies are founded upon CONTRACTS and COVENANTS made between them which saith he is evident to any that consider that Men are not bound by the Law of Nature to associate themselves with any but who they shall judg fit That Dominion and Propriety were introduced by free Consent of Men and so there must be Laws and Bonds fit Agreement made and Submission acknowledged to these Laws else Men might plead their natural Right and Freedom still which would be destructive to the very Nature of those Societies When Men then did part with their natural Liberties two things were necessary in the most express Terms to be declared 1. A free and voluntary Consent to part with so much of their natural Rights as was not consistent with the well-being of Society 2. A free Submission to all such Laws as should be agreed upon at their entrance into Society or afterwards as they see Cause But when Societies were already entered into and Children born under them no such express Consent was required in them being bound by virtue of the Protection which they find from Authority to submit to it and an implicit Consent is suppos'd in all such as are born under that Authority The Account which the Learned Cragius gives of the first Institution of Kingly Government seems to deserve not to be omitted Quum multa iracundè multa libidinosè multa avarè fierent c. Cragius de Feudis f. 2. Vid. The like account in Sir Will. Temple 's admirable Treatise of Monarchy among his Miscellanies So Bracton Rex à regendo non à regnando Jus dicebant When many things were acted wrathfully many things lustfully many things avariciously the best Man of a Society was chosen who might take Cognizance of the Offence or Injury and determine what was equal among Neighbours Thus were Judges constituted in every City for the sake of distributing Justice These were call'd Kings for Kings at the beginning were no more than Judges having their Denomination from ruling Each presided over his own City that is administred Justice Hence that multitude of Kings in Holy Writ To descend from generals to the Romans in particular whose Emperors were suppos'd to have been the most absolute and that the Obedience to Higher Powers required in the Gospel is to be taken from the measures of Subjection due to them Dr. Hicks Dr. Hicks his Jovian the great Maintainer of the Absolute Power of Monarchs takes a great deal of Pains to shew that the Empire was not Hereditary and by Consequence that their Power was immediately vested in the particular Emperors by the Consent of the Legions or other People who set them up Saravia as careful of the Rights of Princes owns Saravia de Imp. Author f. 159. That by the Roman Law the Crime of Laesa Majestas or Treason is defin'd to be that which is committed against the People of Rome and its Security Where he confines it to Crimes against the People only Vid. Tacitus p. which indeed agrees with the dying Speech of an old Roman in Tiberius his time But that in the Eye of our Law there may be a Laesa Majestas Vid. Glanv p. 1 Crimen quod in legibus dicitur crimen Laesae Majestatis ut de nece vel seditione
which Word was then of a large extent Wherefore I submit it to Consideration whether these are any Exceptions to the General Rule or are not at least such as confirm it 11 H. 7. c. 1. 9. The Parliament 11 H. 7. declares That it is against all Laws Reason and good Conscience that Subjects should lose or forfeit for doing their true Duty and Service of Allegiance to their Prince or Sovereign Lord for the time being that is to the King de facto as appears by the occasion of the Law which was to encourage the service of H. 7. who had no Title but from his Subjects And there is a Provision That any Act or Acts or other Process of Law to the contrary shall be void Which if it relates to Acts of Parliament being built upon the Supposition That according to the Fundamental Law the Peoples Choice gives sufficient Title perhaps is not vain and illusory Lord Bacon's Hist of H. 7. f. 145. as the Lord Bacon would have it but argues strongly that the Parliament then thought the Monarchy fundamentally Elective at least with that Restriction to the Blood which I yield And if this be part of the Fundamental Contract for which it bids very fair then perhaps no body of any other Stock may be King within this Statute But I take it not to be evident that the Acts here mention'd must needs be Acts of Parliament For they might and by the word other seem to be such Acts as are of the nature of ordinary Process or whereon such Process is grounded as Ordinances of the Lords in Parliament Orders of the Privy Council Judgments or Decrees in Courts of Law or Equity and the like However admit this Clause should be vicious and insignificant My Lord Bacon I am sure gives no countenance to a certain Dissenting Bishop's Argument in publick Discourse who undertook from hence to prove That the Statute it self is of no force Yet such sort of Arguments are of great service to men resolv'd upon a Conclusion nor can better be expected from them To what I have offer'd on this Head the following are all the Objections of seeming weight which have occurr'd to me Object 1 The Maxim in Law That the King never dies Or to use the words of Finch ' The Perpetuity which the Law ascribes to him Finch's Description of the Common Law French Edit An. 1613. f. 20. b. 21. a. The same made use of in Reflections upon our late and present Proceedings p. 10. having ' perpetual Succession and he never dies For in Law it is call'd the Demise of the King Answer To which I Answer 1. That neither that Book nor any Authority there cited is so ancient as the Settlement of the Crown above observ'd And that the Death of a King is but a Demise transferring the Right immediately to a Successor may be owing to the Settlement but is no Argument of any Right otherwise 2. Even where there is an Election Dyer f. 165. Anderson f. 44. He has it Le Successeur le Heir Elsewhere Heir on Successeur ib. f. 45. tho never so long after the Death of the Predecessor yet by way of Relation 't is as if there were a Demise or Translation of Interest without any Inter-regnum as it was resolved by all the Judges 1 Eliz. Of which the words of Lord Dyer are ' The King who is Heir or Successor may write and begin his Reign ' the same day that his Progenitor or Predecessor dies With which agrees the Lord Anderson But that to many intents a King dies in his Politick Capacity as well as Natural Vid. 1. E. 6. c. 7. 7 Rep. f. 30. appears by the discontinuance of Process in Criminal Causes and such in Civil as was not return'd in the Life of the former King till kept up by Statute the determination of Commissions and the like Agreement betwixt the present and former Government Suppos'd to be Doctor Fulwood's P. 42. A Learned Author that he may reconcile our present Settlement to this suppos'd Maxim which appears not to have any foundation in Antiquity will have it That by the Vacancy of the Throne no more was meant by the Convention than its being free from the former Possessor but that it was full of a Successor and that there was no Interregnum For says he such a Vacancy we have upon every Demise of the Crown And so there was a Vacancy of the Throne and no Vacancy at all For in ordinary Demises 't is manifest there is none Freedom from the last Possessor is not a Vacancy of the Throne Two Grounds this Doctor goes upon to justify his Equivocation in this for I can call it no better 1. That otherwise this would be inconsistent with the nature of our Ancient Hereditary Monarchy 2. That the Convention shew that they meant it no otherwise than in his Sense 1. As to the First It is observable 1. That the Notion which himself goes upon P. 40. is as inconsistent with the ordinary Rule For he makes the Heir to have only jus in re and to want Livery and Seisin And consequently till the Coronation there is an Interregnum Tho it may afterwards be supplied by relation to the Descent of the Right But herein the Doctor is certainly out For in ordinary Descents or Demises Hales's Pleas of the Crown p. 40. Treason may be committed against the Heir as in full possession before any Recognition or Coronation But since he will hardly affirm that it could have been so in our Case he must grant that there was a more absolute Vacancy than that for which he contends P. 54. It is his own Argument that our present Sovereigns are really King and Queen because Treason may be committed against them within the purview of the Statute 25 E. 3. And by the same Reason they were not King and Queen before they were declar'd so unless Treason could have been committed against them before such Declaration 2. But 2. The Doctor owns that though upon some extraordinary Revolution and some absolute necessary Reason of State for our common preservation a Stranger none of the Blood-Royal should be advanced to the Throne for one or more turns whilst that necessity continues the Constitution of the Government would not be alter'd And yet would suppose P. 56. V. p. 41. Where he speaks as his own Sense what in the other place is put by way of Objection that if our King and Queen come in otherwise than by Descent it would be a Design'd Alteration or Change of the Ancient Constitution of this Hereditary Monarchy And yet himself owns That by the Law of Nature Salus Populi is both the Supream and the first Law in Government and the scope and end of all other Laws and of Government it self Nay he yields That the Oath of Allegiance that Sign or Testimony between King and Subject is discharged or dispenced with when
Worship which though not contain'd in Scripture were us'd in the Primitive Church which is an Individium vagum which some confine to the Life-time of the Apostles some extend to the whole first three Centuries some even to this according to the Doctrine of Infallible Tradition Suppose for Example that in such Assemblies as are form'd with or without leave of the Civil Power the Sign of the Cross be used as a Symbol of dedicating to the Service of Christ those who are let into Catholick Communion and this they judg useful to the present and according to the Primitive Church it will be a Question Whether the retaining of this against a particular Interdict of the Civil Power which is supposable at least is to be justifi'd upon these Grounds Put this Argument into Form and you will find he has more or less in his Conclusion than in his Premises Rightly taken I conceive it lies thus If the Gospel contains a Divine Establishment of Publick Christian Service such Publick Christian Service as has therein Divine Establishment no Authority upon Earth hath any right to prohibit But the Gospel does contain a Divine Establishment of Publick Christian Service Therefore such Publick Christian Service as has therein Divine Establishment no Authority upon Earth has Power to prohibit This being taken for granted he proceeds What no Authority upon Earth has right to prohibit may be done or perform'd notwithstanding the Interdict of the Civil Power But such Service ut supra no Authority upon Earth hath right to prohibit therefore it may be perform'd notwithstanding the Interdict of the Civil Power But he concludes contrary to the Laws of Arguing That those Christians who rightly worship God in the True Catholick Communion according to the Apostolical and Primitive Church have a right to hold such Assemblies for the Christian Worship as appear useful for the Church's Good Now if hereby he means that they who worship God according to the Scriptures even though taking in the Practice of the Apostles have not this Right unless they do it in the manner us'd till or at the end of the first three hundred Years after Christ which is the modestest acceptation of Primitive Times Here by adding of Circumstances his Conclusion has really less than the Premises because it ties up them whom the Scripture has left free and takes from the Authority of Scripture where the Foundation was laid and undermines it by going to support it with the specious words of Apostolical and Primitive which still are of doubtful Acceptation Whereas some believe that no manner of Worship is to be term'd Primitive which was not truly Apostolical that is us'd by the Apostles themselves others call every thing within those three Centuries at least Primitive and therefore Apostolical But to be sure here is a very false way of Arguing if he uses any or else 't is gratis dictum But take it for an Argument and then to his purpose there is more in the Conclusion than in the Premises for the Premises are only of such Publick Service as is contain'd and establish'd in the Gospel and thence he would conclude that whatever has been practis'd in the Primitive Church in the Publick Service of God may be continued notwithstanding the Interdict Nay he would go farther That they may in their Assemblies practise according to their own Judgment of what is useful for the Church's Good If it be said that he means no more than that they may hold such Assemblies for Christian Worship as appear useful that is of Five besides a single Family 22 Car. 2. c. 1. or more as appears useful if he means not that they may assemble and worship in such a manner as appears useful he excludes the Worship out of the Assembly and then it may be a Silent Meeting if the Civil Power please and is less than his Premises warrant I must confess he seems to intend the amusing rather than satisfying his Readers by putting in the true Catholick Communion for he must mean either that what-ever Publick Service is according to the Apostolical and Primitive Church is in true Catholick Communion and so vice versa that what-ever is in true Catholick Communion is according to the Apostolical and Primitive Church so that the Church becomes the Rule to the supplanting of Scripture or else that to worship God rightly and warrantably notwithstanding a Civil Interdict 't is not enough to be according to the Apostolical and Primitive Church unless it be in the true Catholick Communion that is with such Terms of Communion as Christ himself or his Apostles made Catholick and universally obliging and indeed in this sense though he has not observ'd it he comes up fully to the Force of his Argument The great Sanderson whose Judgment where it was according to that lumen siccum the general want of which is to be deplored is of great Authority has gone about to split the Hair between two Extreams in relation to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and lays down what he says is most consentaneous to the Doctrine of the Church of England and moreover to the Laws of the Kingdom Sanderson de Obligatione Conscientiaa Pag. 209. Quod Doctrinae Ecclesiae Anglicanae Regni insimul Legibus maximè sit consentaneum Which by the way is an insinuation that the Church of England holds some Doctrine not consentaneous to Law and it may be the Canons of 1640 might be instanced in Now his Notion is that the jus condendi Leges Ecclesiasticas that is the Legislative Power in Ecclesiastical Affairs is in the Bishops Presbyters and other Persons duly elected by the Clergy of the whole Kingdom and duly assembled in a lawful Synod Upon this I would be bold to ask the Question Pag. 188. How this agrees with his Concession That the King is Supream Head and Governour over all Persons and Causes as well Ecclesiastical as Civil since his own Argument is That he who is Supream has the Power or Right to make Laws But the King is Supream wherefore P. 192. according to him the King and not the Clergy hath this Power This I think is the unforc'd Consequence from his other Assertion Potestatem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse potestatem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hoc est jus ferendi leges quae obligant totam communitatem esse penes eum solum Pag. 186. sive sit is singularis persona ut in statu Regiminis Monarchici sive plures ut in aliis qui cum summâ potestate toti communitati praest Nay he argues that it must needs be so in reason Praecipuus actus gubernationis praecipuam requiret potestatem c. Est autem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sive legum latio actus gubernationis supremus praecipuus Non ergo potest exerceri nisia persona habente aut saltem in virtute ex authoritate habentis supremam authoritatem jurisdictionem in communitatem sibi
Ed. for every Law must always have some present known Person in being whose Will it must be to make it a Law for the present If the Independent Heads or Nobles are instead of One Prince to make choice of an Head which is a Law to that end then a Law may flow from the Will of many as well as from that of One. But take Sir Robert's Notion of Supream or Independent Heads and Fathers in the most sensible meaning that is of Natural Fathers these where there is no division into Tribes as was amongst the Jews will be numerous Yet all in the Case presuppos'd are allow'd by Sir Robert to be invested with Kingly Power and therefore the parting with it must be by their choice as he himself yields and yet according to his Principles they can never so part with it but they may resume it I must confess in this he doubly contradicts himself for the End of his Writings being to prove that the Government ought always to be in One absolutely here he yields it to be in many And when before he said That Civil Power not only in general Patriarc p. 12. is by Divine Constitution but even the Assignment of it specifically to the Eldest Parent here he acknowledges it to be in several Parents not in the Eldest only But that every such Parent as was at any time vested with this Power may resume it is the plain Inference from his Doctrine for he tells us Patriar p. 54. That although a King do frame all his Actions to be according to the Laws yet he is not bound thereto but at his good Will and for good Example Those Laws which are the best or only means for the preservation of the Common-weal bind Princes Or so far forth as the general Law of the Safety of the Common-weal doth naturally bind him for in such sort only positive Laws may be said to bind the King not by being positive but as they are naturally the best or only Means for the preservation of the Common-weal Here still he opposes himself for he yields that Princes are bound to those Laws which are the best or only means for the preservation of the Common-weal and so asserts that exploded Sentence I will not call it Maxim Free-holders Grand Inq. p. 39 Anarchy p. 265 No Laws whatsoever bind Princes Salus Populi suprema Lex when at other times he tells us That 't was God's Ordinance that Supremacy should be unlimited in Adam and as large as all the Acts of his Will and as in him so in all others that have Supream Power That is as by Supream Power he means absolute every one that has Absolute Power ought to have Absolute Power But the Consequence from Adam's having had such Power is That the Right Heir from Adam in the natural course ought to inherit it But as he supposes several at the same time to be Heirs or to come into the stead of Adam's right Heir upon the Escheat of the Kingly Power these being so many Kings or at least making one King where however the Power is in many though they parted with their Power they might at any time resume it when they thought it for the Good of the Publick of which they as Princes should be Judges nay and their Heirs in Succession might Filmer's Power of Kings F. 2. And so Sir Robert's Maxim resteth That the Prince is not subject to his Laws nor the Laws of his Predecessors but well to his own just and reasonable Conventions Patriarc p. 97. Nay though they should swear to observe all the Laws of their Kingdoms yet no Man can think it Reason that Kings should be more bound by their voluntary Oaths than common Persons are by theirs I see not how upon his Principles an Answer can be given to his Question Patriarc p. 23. If Obedience to Parents be immediately due by a natural Law and Subjection to Princes but by mediation of an Humane Ordinance what Reason is there that the Laws of Nature should give place to the Laws of Men as we see the Power of the Father over his Child gives place and is subordinate to the Power of the Magistrate He affords no other Title to Princes than what Fathers have to be Princes each in his own Family nay he himself owns that the Kingly Power may escheat to all the Independent Fathers and that they may transfer it over to One. Now that 't is in this One not still in all or in some other must be of Humane Ordinance Upon which Grounds the answer to his Question is obvious which is that the Subjection due by Nature from Children to their Parents is not defeated by the Kingly Power 's being in One and therefore the Power of the Father over his Child does not give place to the Power of the Magistrate If it did this their natural Right the Parents may resume when 't is for the Good of their respective Families or thought so by them and indeed of one great Family they might resolve the Community into as many separate Governments as there are Families or Patres Familiâs at their Pleasures without any moral Obligation to the contrary If the Power whereby a Nation is govern'd were not wholly distinct from that whereby a private Family is and if both came by Nature since the true descent in Nature cannot now be made out for every Family to make a Kingdom by its self must be most natural and the only lawful Government unless Choice that is Humane Ordinance may warrantably cement them into one Government And this is very evident in the Case of Escheat and of any Translation of Kingly Power from Natural Fathers For the Kingly Power is in the Fathers before the transferring it over quatenus Fathers or it is not If it be in them quatenus Fathers then according to Sir Robert they may resume whatever is essential to the Soveraignty of Fathers being it was once lawfully vested in them at least they have a great deal of Latitude for their Claim because Power of Kings Fol. 2. Patriarcha p. 97. For the same Causes that a private Man may be relieved from his unjust and unreasonable Promise as for that it was so grievous or for that he was by Deceit or Fraud circumvented or induced thereunto by Error or Force or just Fear or by some great Hurt even for the same Causes the Prince or Princes may be restored in that which toucheth the diminishing of his or their Majesty It seems he grants that the Power once lawfully vested in any cannot be parted with but upon choice wholly free ex mero motu voluntate spontaneâ Yet being there was no Obligation upon them from God or Nature to devolve their Power upon one rather than another but purely what proceeded from their own wills this if he argues rightly they might resume when they list at least when they all agreed to the