therefore you were content not to quote the place in Austin but onely to say that it is somewhere and indeed so it is and that somewhere is in his Enchirid. cap. 103. And in the Chapter immediately going before he professrth Deo procul dubio quà m facile est quod vult facere tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsam nostrae fidei confessionis initium quo nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere consitemur Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens nisi quia quicquid vult potest nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus That looke how easie it is unto God to doe what he will so easie is it not to suffer that to bee which hee willeth not Vnlesse we beleeve this the very first Article of our Creed will be shaken whereby we professe to beleeve in God the Father Almighty For he is not truly called Omnipotent in any other respect then because he can bring to passe whatsoever he will have to be neither can the effect of will omnipotent be hindred by the wit of any creature So that herein we have both the authority of so great a Father and manifest reason also directly opposite to your discourse To avoid the brunt whereof you juggle and consider his restraint there where he doth not use it And here you tell us magnificently that if any man will lay this restraint upon this place the scanning of the words following the fitting of the matter contained in both with the reason of the exhortation and other reall circumstances will shake off this or other like restriction with greater ease then it can be laid upon it Here we have a great deale of cry if the wooll be answerable wee shall speed a great deale better then he in Aelian that shore his hogs But the mischiefe is S. Austin doth use no restraint in this place but conceives the Apostles commandement to be this ut oraretur pro singulis So that your paines is like to bee well bestowed in shaking of Austines restriction from this place whereupon he laid no restriction at all It seemes you came to this discourse as a man should come to play at putfinger in the darke We grant we are to pray for the salvation of no other then whose salvation we are unfainedly to desire and we are to desire the salvation of every man of what condition soever or fort or nation provided that wee know him For doe you thinke it a sober course for me to desire and pray for the salvation of I know not whom If so I see no reason but I may pray also for I know not what Any malignant and persecuting enemy of mine I am bound to pray for and I shall bee sure to take notice of such a one for I shall bee sure to feele him And as well for meane persons as for Kings that I have any thing to doe withall albeit I may have greater cause to pray for the conversion of Kings then others and that without accepting of persons because by the good affection of Kings to Gods Church the Church of God is like to prosper farre better then by the conversion of meane persons And the Apostle gives this reason of praying for Kings that under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all godlinesse and honestie And therefore I hope you will beare with mee if I pray with greater devotion for Gods grace upon the Kings heart and Gods blessing upon his head then for meaner persons because the gracious disposition of a King is of far greater importance for the advancing of Gods glory in the liberty and prosperity of his Church then the gracious disposition of meaner persons And herein I hope I shall not be censured for an accepter of persons a conceit of yours quite besides the Apostles text you treat of But yet the Apostle doth not command every congregation to pray for all kings wherunto you drive it devising circumstances to fill the scale For what have I to doe to pray for the king of Bungo if any such king or kingdome there be or for the kings in Terra Australis incognita discovered by Ferdinand de Quit yet his relations are of so little efficacy that hitherto hee hath made no mens mouthes water after them It is enough for us to pray for the fulnesse of the Gentiles that it may come i◠so to make way for the calling of the Iewes But by vertue of the Apostles exhortation every Christian congregation is bound to pray for their owne king Like as Darius though an heathen Prince desired the prayers of Gods people that lived under him Ezr. 6. 10. Let them have to offer sweet odours to the God of heaven and pray for the Kings life and for his sonnes When I pray for the comming in of the fulnesse of the Gentiles and the calling of the Iewes I except none as likewise when I pray for the ruine of Antichrist I except none I finde you doe not much satisfie your selfe in the weight of this your discourse you are still casting about for somewhat more to make up the totall of your account Wee must desire you say the spirituall good of all men not as they fall under our indefinite but under our universall consideration So that belike you are still jealous lest we draw all men to an indefinite and not to an universall consideration I desire to deale as plainly as you would wish name any man throughout the world unto me try mee whether I will not pray God blesse him and convert his heart and save his soule And yet to my thinking you should not urge mee to pray for one with whom I have nothing to doe onely I heare a relation of him perhaps dwelling in the I le of Iapan For though I am bound to love my neighbour as my selfe and by neighbour I must comprehend a Iew although my selfe bee a Samaritane yet this is in case we meet together and I see him to have need to make use of my charity Otherwise to my judgement generall prayers should serve the turne as I shewed for the fulnesse of the Gentiles to come in for the calling of the Iewes for the ruine of Babylon Neither doe wee finde any practice of the Saints to the contrary and herein I assure you I except none But because I see you travaile to bee delivered of somewhat and I take pity of you tell me I pray is not your meaning this that we must pray for all and every one that liveth in the world If this be your meaning and it did not satisfie you to say we must pray for all or desire the salvation of all you do as much as confess hereby that to pray for al doth not include the praying for every one consequently the Apostle in exhorting to pray for all doth not exhort to pray for
acknowledged by all Nay the Learned est Men that ever were out of the Church of God as Aristotle and his Followers have utterly denyed the World to have had a beginninge as you well knowe And therfore unles the contrary be prooved these Philosophers confuted we have herby nothing profited in convicting Mens consciences of this truthe by the light of reason That there is a God and so are farre enoughe from baptizinge Atheists into the name of God the Father Much more from baptizinge them into the name of the Father of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost And therfore I am persuaded that your proposition is not delivered in this sense but rather you extende the word limites or boundes to a greater generalitie of signification in which sense you woulde have it supposed that All thinges besides God himselfe have limite and boundes of beinge not in regard only that they had a beginninge which is questionable but in regard that they are Entia finita which is out of question In like sort the woord being is of ambiguous signification For it may be taken eyther for beinge of essence or for beinge of existence The limits of existence or duration are such as wherby thinges are sayde to have a beginninge or an ende and that at such a time or other But the limits boundes of thinges according to their essence are such in respect wherof Entia are sayde to be finiâ—a or infinita Nowe in this latter sense your proposition hathe bene very questionable amongst the most learned Philosophers that have bene For Aristotle and his Peripatericks never doubted but that this visible World was finite Yet that he did acknowledge a cause of it is no where evident Nay he opposethe Plato the rest before him who maynteyned that the World was made so accordingly that it had a beginninge wherby it seemes that he denyinge the creation of the World denyed therwithall that the World had any efficient cause And indeede whosoever maynteynes that the world had a beginning by creation must therwithall maynteyne that eyther it was made of somethinge or of nothinge You will not say that t is a thing evident that the World was made of some preexistent matter which matter had existence without creation For that is unto us Christians a manifest untruthe Therfore you must be driven to maynteyne that it is a truthe evident of it selfe that the World was made originally out of nothinge or at least that it may be immediately concluded evidently by a principle which is evident of it selfe thus Whatsoever hath boundes of beinge hath bene made the World hath boundes of beinge therfore it hath bene made and seing it was not made of any thing pre-existent therfore it was made of nothing Now what Wise man will acknowledge this discourse to be evident considering howe many Learned Philosophers conceaved it to be a thing impossible that any thing coulde be made out of nothinge as allso consideringe that the H. Ghost imputethe the acknowledgement herof not to any naturall evidence but only unto faithe as where the Apostle saythe by faithe we believe that the World was made so that things which we see were made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not of things that doe 2. You proceede to the enlargement of this position tell us that this maxime is simply convertible thus Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge because it hathe beginninge of beinge For omnis causa principium omne causatum principiatum There is litle soundnes eyther of Logicke or Philosophy in all this For to say that a proposition is simply convertible is in a Logicall phrase to say that it is a good consequence which is drawne from the proposition converted to the convertent that is to the proposition wherinto the conversion is made But this is untrue of the proposition convertible which you speake of For an affirmative universall cannot be thus converted by simple conversion but only an Vniversall negative a particular affirmative But I leave your wordes and take your meaninge You say it is allso true that Whatsoever hath cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge Nowe bothe this proposition is naught and the reason worse For the Sonne of God the second person in Trinity hathe cause of beinge from his Father for he is begotten of him And the H. Ghost hathe cause of beinge bothe from the Father and from the Sonne For he proceedethe from them bothe Yet neyther God the Sonne nor God the holy Ghost have any limits of their beinge If you say the Persons are limited thoughe the nature of the Godhead be not I woulde gladly knowe howe the Person of the Sonne and of the H. Ghost are more limited then the Person of the Father For of the Sonne and H. Ghost I knowe no other limitation then this that the Sonne is not the Father nor the H. Ghost Likewise the H. Ghost is neyther the Father nor the Sonne And in this sense the Father is limited as much as eyther For as the Sonne is not the Father so the Father is not the Sonne and as the H. Ghost is not the Father so the Father is not the H. Ghost You shoulde have sayde All thinges that have cause of beinge by creation have allso limits or bounds of being Or thus All thinges that have cause of beinge in time and not from everlastinge have limits and boundes of beinge Or if you woulde apply it to generation thus All things that have cause of being by generation of sinite Agents have limits and boundes of beinge Yet none of these is to the purpose save the first And that first proposition supposethe the creation which yet is not evident but unto faithe So then you see howe weake this proposition is Yet the reasons you bring for the proofe of it are much woorse Your first reason is this because it hathe beginninge of beinge Nowe if by limits of beinge you meane limits of existence such as is the beginninge of duration then your proofe is merely identicall But if you meane by limits of beinge limits of essence wherby a thing is sayde to be Ens sinitum the consequence is true I confesse but nothing more evident is the conclusion by this reason then it was before of it selfe For that it hathe a cause efficient which producethe it dothe as well argue a finite condition of the thing produced then that it hathe a beginninge Yet neyther dothe the havinge of an efficient cause sufficiently argue that the effect produced is finite unles the efficient cause be finite For to say that a finite thinge coulde produce an effect infinite is to maynteyne that a cause in workinge shoulde exceede the spheare of his activity But there is no place for this exception in case the efficient cause be infinite And I have knowne some inferre herehence that the World is infinite Otherwise say they there shoude be no effect of God
suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent And consider finite thinges are able to produce finite thinges equall unto themselves why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite It may be answeared that the experience of producinge equalls to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation And so God allso in the way of eternall and incomprehensible generation producethe a Sonne equall to himselfe yea the same with himselfe as touching his nature But this is grounded upon a mystery of faithe which hathe no evidence unto reason naturall For allthoughe by reason meditation on Gods woorkes we may atteyne to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature yet can we not therby atteyne to the knowledge of God as touchinge the Trinity of persons Adde unto this that diverse have not only believed but undertaken to proove allso that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension eyther in quantitie continuall or discrete And Hurtado de Mendosa a Spanishe Iesuite and a late Writer is most eager in the mayntenance of this So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent For you suppose that whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge of beinge and that in time But this is notably untrue unto us Christians For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hathe a cause of his beinge to witt the Father Likewise the H. Ghost hathe not only a cause but causes of his beinge to witt bothe the Father and the Sonn for he proceedethe from them bothe yet hathe he not such beginninge of beinge as you speake of For bothe he and the Sonne are everlasting like unto the Father Your second reason is woorst of all as when you say For omnis causa est principium omne causatum est principiatum For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium are taken for voces synonymae woordes of the same signification not signifying two thinges the one wherof is consequent unto the other And what sober Scholer would affirme that omnis causa est principium as principium signifiethe the beginninge of beinge wheras indeede it is the cause of beginninge of beinge to its effect rather then formally to be stiled the beginninge of beinge it selfe That which followethe of the limits of thinges more easily or more hardly discerned accordinge as the cause is founde to be preexistent in time or no is an assertion as wilde as the similitude wherby you illustrate it and all nothing to the purpose to proove that whatsoever hathe cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge thoughe still you proceede ambiguously without distinction eyther of beinge or of the limits therof For first where the cause is not preexistent in time as in things risinge by concomitance or resultance yet the effects are as easily seene to be limited as when the cause is preexistent in time as for example the light of the Sunne and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by naturall emanation was as easily seene to be limited the first time it was as after the light is a long time hid from us and afterward appeares agayne unto us Secondly what if the limits be not seene what I say is that to the purpose Angells are invisible yet we knowe their natures are limited Thirdly what thinke you of the World hathe it limits or no You thinke no doubt it hathe yet was not God the cause therof preexâ—stent in time but only in eternitie For before the World no time had any existence Agayne suppose the Wolrd had bene made from everlasting which some Scholemen have helde to be possible in this case God shoulde have no preexistence eyther as touching time actuall or as touchinge time possible Yet I hope that limits of the World even in that case had bene as discernable to Aristotle as nowe they are to you As for the similitude wherby you illustrate it that rather sheweth howe in such cases when effects doe rise by way of concomitance or resultance they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernable Yet what shoulde moove you thus to amplify howe hard it is to discerne such effects from their causes I knowe not For what hardnes I pray is there in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sunne that gives it or from the body of a Candle or of a Glowewoorme or of some kinde of rotten wood or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the darke Yet is all this nothinge pertinent to the confirmation or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you Howe farre dependance upon a cause dothe inferre limits of beinge upon the thinge dependinge I have allready spoken What meant you to distinguishe of the consideration of effects and causes accordinge to the consideration of them eyther distinctly or in grosse unles it be to puzle the Reader as much as you confound your selfe when eftsoones you manifest that you speake of them bothe as they have causes which is to consider them only as effects For that notion alone hathe reference to a cause But whether this dothe inferre that they are limited I have allready therupon delivered my minde 3. Hence you proceede to the solution of newe problemes and that as a mere naturalist Why men in these dayes are not Gyants why Gyants in former times were but men And the reason you give is because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables of man especially from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation is lesse nowe then it hathe bene at least before the flood The latter of your two questions is wilde For what doe we understand by Gyants but men of a Gyantlike stature is it a sober question to aske howe it commethe to passe that men of an huge stature are but men For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor sett up in the playne of Dura or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes shoulde not men notwithstandinge be men still and neyther Angells nor beasts much lesse eyther inferior to the one or superior to the other If the heavens were infinite as some conceave that an infinite body may be made by God yet shoulde those heavens be heavens still and a body still Neyther dothe it followe that therfore those Gyants were men still because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite limited For thoughe they had bene turned into Woolves or other beastes the matter of nutrition had bene limited still yet in such a case they had ceassed to be men As touchinge the stature of men so much lessened in these dayes in comparison unto former times I no way like the reason therof assigned by you First because it caryethe no evidence with it you give
to the purpose partly as questionable as ever where it is to the purpose For that that which is infinite in essence must be one and not many I thinke is without question even amongst Atheists nowadayes that have any learning in them allthough a man may fayle in the demonstration of it as here you doe For to be infinite in essence is to comprehend all specificall entities not numericall For such as such differ not in essence And for it to be multiplied according to numericall differences only seemes nothing prejudiciall to the infinitie of the essence save only as infinity of essence is corruptly conceaved to imply quantitie Infinity of power dothe more evidently include opposition to numericall pluralitie then infinity of essence in my judgement But be it not only without question but allso supposed to have bene made evident by some demonstration of yours yet is it nothing to the present question For the question in present is not whether there may be two Gods but only whether in the one nature of God there be not thinges different to witt whether Gods wisdome be not different from his power and both these different from his goodnes that is in a word whether there be not any accident in God And yet unto this question you are arrived but in a very indecent and incongruous manner For wheras before you had undertaken to proove that all thinges were in God accordinge to ideall perfections by all thinges understandinge substances cheifly as of Angells and men and beasts of all sorts And in this chapter doe undertake to shewe that all things thus being in God are not in him by way of pluralitie but drawne to unitie and accordingly should herby proove that the essence of an Angell and the essence of a man yea and the essence of a beast and of every base thing is so in God as one with him and one with every thinge You shift of from this and in the place therof only mention how Gods life and wisedome and power and goodnes are all one in God And this you proove only from this that God is illimited which is as sory a consequence as that wherby you prooved his illimited condition to witt from this that he is independent and receaved not his being from any thinge Which consequence of yours is so farre from naturall evidence that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of olde who maynteyned eyther the World or the first matter not to speake of Intelligences to be independent of any efficient cause and without all makinge yet did never conceave that herehence it must followe that eyther of them should be infinite No lesse inconsequent is that which followeth allso as when you say Whersoever it can be truly sayde this is one and that another or this is and is not that each hath distinct limits I say this is untrue For suppose a body were infinite In this case bothe lengthe and bredthe and thicknes were infinite yet lengthe were only lengthe and not bredthe yet never a whit the lesse infinite Neyther is infinity in thicknes any hinderance to infinity in breadthe though breadthe be not thicknes nor infinity in breadthe any hinderance to infinity in lengthe thoughe lengthe be not breadthe In like sort the infinity of Gods power shoulde be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisedome though his wisedome be not his power Nor the infinitie of his goodnes any prejudice to the infinitie of his power and wisedome thoughe his power and wisedome and goodnes were different in themselves But to come nearer what thinke you of the Persons in the Trinitie The Father is the Father and neyther is he the Sonne nor the Holy Ghost will you herehence conclude that he is not infinite The Sonne is the Sonne but he is neyther the Father nor the Holy Ghost will you therfore say he is not infinite The Holy Ghost is the Holy Ghost but neyther the Father nor the Sonne will you hence inferre that he hathe limits and is not infinite And is it not confessed not only by great Schoolemen but even by our divines allso that the Sonne is produced of the Father per modum intellectus Is he not the wisedome of the Father and what difference betweene the wisedome of God and the understanding of himselfe And doe they not allso confesse that the H. Ghost proceedes from bothe per modum voluntatis And as we say Gods understanding is not his will though it be no different thing from his will and Gods will is not his understandinge thoughe it be no different thinge from his understandinge so we may adore the indivisible unitie of the Godhead notwithstanding the Trinity of the Persons thoughe we are not able to comprehended the mystery herof It is true our understanding is such as that oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari imaginatio non transcendit continuum Yet notwithstandinge we atteyne by discourse to the acknowledgment of thinges immateriall as of our soules yea and of Angells yea and of the God both of men Angells yet not by materiall thinges as by the pictures of them as you phrasify it but rather as in the effects wherein as it were in glasses doe shine the causes of them Thus Aristotle from the motions of the heavens hathe inferred the existence of immateriall and abstract substances as the moovers of them And we commonly say that the World is as a glasse wherein the glory of God is represented His eternall power and Godhead being made manifest by his workes as the Apostle speakethe Rom. 1. 20. Of Gods illimited beinge we make no question but well we may question the soundnes of your arguments wherby you proove it as allso the soundnes of those consequences which you make from it And farre better it is to content our selves with the simplicitie of our Christian faithe in believinge of God what Gods word teachethe us then to depend upon weake reason for the confirmation therof For weake reasons doe rather betray a cause then justify it We believe that God is one and that there is no pluralitie of natures in him but only of Persons And we must take heede that the Metaphysicall extract of vis unita fortior which you speake of doe not so farre possesse us with the contemplation of Gods unity as to deny the Trinity And touchinge the attributes of God as neyther distinct from the essence of God nor from themselves we doe not much affect curiosity of demonstration but if any man voluntarily undertake such a taske we looke for substance of sound proofes and are not content to have our mouthes filled with emty spoones You seeme to gratify God with your hyperboles but surely he dothe not put us to tell any untruthes for him as man dothe for man to gratify him You enterteyne a conceyte of Gods power above all conceyte of infinite power of Gods wisedome above all conceyte of infinite wisedome of Gods goodnes above all conceyte of infinite
coaction and naturall necessitation though now you divert from this unto civill liberty which is onely liberty from subjection As touching the lawes of men it is fit there should be a Court of Chancery for mitigation because men cannot foresee all cases that may fall out and by too strict observation of lawes summum jus may prove summa injuria But this cannot without great absurdity be applyed unto the decrees of God who from everlasting was ignorant of nothing but foresaw all things that were to come And by the way what doe you manifest hereby but a strange fancy that in some respects it were fit Gods decrees should be alterable lest otherwise hee might be deprived of liberty in taking opportunity of doing good implying withall that God in course of time takes notice of something whereof from everlasting hee was not conscious And though the Pope in reserving to himselfe power and liberty to send them forth or call them in againe doth take upon him more authority then is fit because hee hath neither wisedome nor integrity answerable to so great authority yet seeing God wants neither wisedome nor integrity it seemes fit in your judgement as may appeare by the tenour of this sentence that he should make decrees and recall them at his pleasure And so though at the first entrance upon this discourse and since also you professed that Gods decrees were unalterable yet here you plainly signifie that Gods wisedome and integrity may well beare him out in exercising such authority as the Pope usurpes to wit in making grants at pleasure and at pleasure to revoke them Which I confesse the Pope doth with a great deale more ease then he doth draw in the same breath which once hee hath breathed out which if he doth yet certainly it is more then it is in his power to doe at his pleasure unlesse hee hath some extraordinary device that I know not of I doubt your mysteries are not yet full you seeme to commend the condition of mutability as a condition befitting the wisedome and integrity of God it remaines that you doe as much disgrace immutability and count it an impotent condition that so with the better grace you may reject it as unbeseeming the nature of God In the next sentence you utterly forsake your text and whereas in congruity to the precedent discourse you should shew how alteration of decrees is no signe of a fickle disposition you nothing to the purpose tell us that the alteration of awards is no signe of a fickle disposition For by the same decree may different awards be executed without any revocation or alteration of the decree It was long agoe the saying of Gregory that Deus mutat sententiam consilium nunquam But by the way you signifie that the former practice of Popes in making grants and recalling of them is no signe of mutability A manifest untruth Nay your selfe laboured to justifie such a change as to make grants and to revoke them as an apparant change but you justified it by the opportunity to doe the greater good thereby provided that wisedome and integrity bee answerable So that though it be no vicious change as you would have it yet apparantly there is a change But the administration sometimes of rewards sometimes of punishments doth argue I confesse no mutability in decrees One and the selfe same lawes of men doe cause the different administration of rewards and punishments to divers persons yea and to the selfe same persons at different times without all colour of change in the lawes themselves Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which went before I will not enquire for what doe I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets But in my judgement you doe not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by lawes then by the wils of men For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good lawes as from governing well by will and pleasure But if men are to chuse the reason in my opinion why they will chuse to be governed by lawes is because by lawes they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice and accordingly judge thereof and if they like and approve it they may the better submit unto it But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute they cannot judge of executions before they come because they know them not they being left to the pleasure of men and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them if they prove evill And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give lawes and to execute justâ—ce thereby then to bee trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure because such men come indifferent to the making of lawes which may bee particularly interested in the manner of execution For executions are only in particular cases which particular cases may in speciall cencerne them that have the execution of justice As for example the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himselfe or a brother or neare of kâ—nne which is a shrewd tentation to provoke him though otherwise vncorrupt and fit enough to mak generall lawes in this particular case to strain a good conscience and by partialitie to corrupt the course of justice Secondly in case government is by succession lawes are most necessary because the most wise and uncorrupt Prince is not sure to beget one like to himselfe or if hee should yet is it not in his power to leave it unto him at such a time as by ripenes of age and experience he shall be fit for government and by experience wee finde that many times good government in the father doth degenerate into tyrannie in the sonne And it is true that good Princes as true fathers of their countrie and people have sometimes remitted off their absolutenesse the better to enjoy the heartes of their subjects which is the best maintenance of perpetuity then by force to compell them Yet by your leave every Act wherunto princes passe their consent doth not restraine them of their former liberty or abate something of their present greatnes For unto all acts of Parliament the King consents yet in consenting to give him 5. Subsidies in a yeare or restoring and confirming unto him the customes called runnage and poundage I doe not find that hereby he either remitts of his former liberty or abates any thing of his present greatnes It is true the lawes of men can have no greater perfection then men that make them and therfore they are sayd non cavere de particularibus for it is impossible that they should comprehend all occurrences yet in this case there is an helpe in Christian states having a court of chancery established for the remedying of such inconveniences without so much as taking any notice of the Pope as the Chancelor of Christendome For if S. Peter himselfe were alive and Bishop of Rome yet what
What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love Of the distinction of Singula generum and Genera singulorum Of the distinction of Voluntas signi and Voluntas beneplaciti WHat you meane by a course of Compromising contentions betweene some other reformed Churches in certaine points of religion I know not neither am I acquainted with any such course I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative as of Gods grace effectuall to every good action so of his soveraignetie in electing whom he will according to his good pleasure and passing by others as any Church in Christendome which I do not speake upon snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the litturgie of our Church whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I thinke good as your fashion is but this I speake upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set downe in the articles of religion manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England Yet you would perswade your Readers the Church of England concurreth with you in extending the love of God towards all But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause by walking in the cloudes of generalities as if you feared to come to the light and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him You talke of Gods unspeakable love towards mankinde but you define not in what kinde but keepe your selfe a loose off for all advantages Wee acknowledge Gods love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal and that in an unspeakable manner But the question onely is whether God doth bestow or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all or salvation upon all If Gods love in these respects in your opinion doth extend to all say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus and predestinated all For predestination in Austines divinity is but praeparatio gratiae gloriae Now the Church of England in her publicke and authorized doctrine plainly professeth that God hath predestinated none but those whom he hath chosen in Christ as vessells of honour If you say that the reason why God did not predestinate all nor elect all in Christ proceeds not from the meere pleasure and free disposition of God but that onely upon the foresight of the obedience of the one and disobedience of the other he elected those and reprobated these for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you though you are loath in plaine termes to professe as much let any man judge whether this bee suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church whereupon Rogers in his Analesis thereof published by authority and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft observes in his fifth proposition that In Christ Jesus of the meere will and purpose of God some are elected and not others unto salvation And he just fieth it by holy Scripture Rom. 9. 11. that the purpose of God might remaine according to election not of works but of him that calleth Ephes. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us according to the good pleasure of his will 2 Tim. 1. 9. Not according to our workes but according to his owne purpose and grace Exod. 33. 19. Rom. 9. 15. I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himselfe even the wicked against the day of evill Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay to make of the same lumpe one vessell to honour and another to dishonour But consider the Article it selfe They which are indued with so excellent a benefit to wit as election and predestination is are called according to Gods purpose by his spirit working in due season they through grace obey their calling they be justified freely they be made sonnes of God by adoption they be made like the image of his onely begotten Sonne Jesus Christ they walke religiously in good workes and at length by Gods mercy they attaine to everlasting felicity Whereby it appeares that election and predestination is made the fountaine and cause of obedience and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination rather then our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance Againe consider these alone whom God hath elected in Christ and predestinated are noted to bee made in due time the sonnes of God by adoption But you make all to bee the sonnes of God and Gods infinite love in unspeakable maner to be enlarged towards all and every one even towards them that have hated God all their life Lastly onely the elect are here noted to bee those vessels whom God hath made unto honour not that any others are made unto honour which is nothing answerable to your tenet But proceed we along with you You undertake to prove that Gods love is extended to mankinde which no Christian ever called in question but your meaning is that it extends to all and every one of mankinde and that so farre forth as to will the salvation of all and every one as appeares by the sequele and all this out of the publique and authorized doctrine of our Church And yet you insist onely upon certaine passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church The Liturgie I hope is not the doctrine of our Church though it be not contradictory to our doctrine But therein wee have beene content to conforme unto the practice of the Chuch so farre forth as it might seeme tolerable and such as might be performed with a good conscience which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion it is rather to receive correction from the Articles then the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy But consider wee what is that which you plead for your selfe You enter upon it after your course with great state discovering unto us a wonderfull providence of God in drawing those Articles for you tell us that No Nationall Councell though assembled for that purpose could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love then the Church our Mother even from the beginning of reformation hath done as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point for preventing schismes or distractions of opinions amongst her sonnes Here we have a pretty Comedy towards and you have a poeticall wit for fiction Had our Church foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point where I pray was it fit that she should doe this but in the Articles of Religion But you finde no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of Gods love but in the Liturgy and Catechisme Was that think you a fit place to fit
touched with ignorance in assoiling them For the truth whereof I appeale to every mans conscience that reades your writings of whom I am perswaded not one of a thousand if Schollers doth deny but that this Maxime holds universally yet you take upon you to give a reason why we extend it not so farre as naturally it would reach and that you say is our proneness to extend our owne power to the utmost even farther then true goodnesse can accompany it So then the honester men are the more apt they are to extend this Maxime to the utmost and consequently lesse apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed and lesse ignorant to assoile them and the reason why men doe conceive difficulties in your writings or are not able to assoile them is for want of honestie And you in the meane time would not be supposed to shew any want either of wit or honestie in your discourses Well this article of your naturall Creed is observable They that doe things unjustifiable they doe not extend this Maxime Both parts of contradiction cannot be true so farre as naturally it would reach which is a mysterie unto me and whereof I can devise no reason neither doe you give any For although our natures are humorous unconstant and wee finde contradiction and are enraged with contradiction and arme power against that which doth contradict us yet herehence it followeth not that we limit or restraine the rules of contradiction unlesse out of some such curious sophistrie and subtiltie as this you dispute in this manner We oppose them that contradict us therefore we doe restraine the rules of contradiction I doubt my reader would scarce thinke me sober if I should goe about to dissolve this sophistry yet the face of your discourse lookes no other way then this And I confesse the law of God and rules of good manners shall never faile to contradict him that is of a dishonest disposition And though passions turne commonly into their contraries yet notwithstanding all such inconstancy true morality will alwaies be an opposite to him that is dishonest But yet I finde no propension herehence to maintain that both parts of contradiction are true or both false Power you say is for the execution of will and so is wit too and no marvell if sometimes both of them are in knaves keeping This is stuffe serving to fill paper And if S. Paul complained of a law in his members rebelling against the law of his minde and leading him captive to the law of sinne no marvell if naturall men esteemed good and sober doe sometimes yeeld to things unfit but that it is out of such mature deliberation as you speake to prevent forsooth the enraging of carnall appetites which why you should call upstarts I know not unlesse you deny them to bee as old as the fall of Adam I see no reason I give a theefe my purse lest I should lose my purse and somewhat else also But if I give over unto my passions my honesty to be defiled by them alas what have we more or greater to lose And let them rage while they will wee can but lose our honesty therefore in reason we will not stop passions mouth at the first with our honesty we will rather tugge and pull for it and keepe more adoe then Michah for his gods Yee have taken away my gods and the Priest and goe your waies and what have I more The motions of the flesh must needs offend the spirit for they are lustings against the spirit But there is no proportion between this contradiction and that which is betweene paine and pleasure For paine and pleasure are not felt at once as this contradiction is Love as not alike set on divers objects is brought in by way of adversative whereas the sentence is no other then that which went before touching the contradiction between carnall desires and vertuous motions Yet to betray some quaint straine of learning by way of parenthesis you make question whether Love be one simple and indivisible quality or an aggregation or cluster of divers inclinations rooted in one center neither doe you determine it but leave your reader to gaze upon it as a childe doth upon a cluster of grapes first ripe and the more like to be first rotten you might make the same question of hatred also For Quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum tot modis dicâ—tur alterum It was wont to be said of love that it was as the weight of the soule Anima amore quasi pondere fertur quocunque fertur But it hath different acceptions For there is amor amicitiae and there is amor concupiscentiae And this amor concupiscentiae is either ordinate or inordinate ordinate love becomes morall vertue and inordinate morall vice And S. Iohn divides this inordinate concupiscence into three kindes concupiscence of the flesh concupiscence of the eie and pride of life And will you put all these into one cluster or posie rather consisting partly of garden flowers partly of stinking flowers of the field The two originals you speak of if subordinate they are not two originals there is but one and the love of the world and the flesh carie men on even in despite of judgement and conscience to the contrary into manifest impiâ—ties iniquities impurities I doe not finde it strange that things seeme not impossible to us if they are within our power yet though they be within our power one way I see no cause but they may seeme unpossible and be unpossible another way And bee our variousnesse never so great yet I see no reason to justifie you in saying that what cannot be admitted to day will be allowed of to morrow For the vicious person Qui non est hodie cras minus aptus erit to that which is good And Absolom two yeares together watched opportunity to revenge himselfe on his brother Amnon and afterwards continued as setled in his course os aspiring to the kingdome And therefore herein certainly you reckon without your hoast Yet it is most true that the better men are the more hardly are they drawne to unjust courses this I say is as true as that all this is nothing to the purpose yet hereupon you commend unto us by way of consequence a truth in great state and scored in the margent as verie remarkable and yet you call it an experienced truth That if any mans judgement in matters of equitie and justice were infallible and his love to justice constant and invincible it would be unpossible for him to transgresse in judgement and indeed if this were not true both parts of contradiction manifestly should prove true For t is unpossible to transgresse but either by errour in judgement or corruption in will And therefore where judgement is infallible and will incorruptible t is not possible for such a one to transgresse This is as true as one of Euclides elements But it depends upon