of the causes CHAP. IX De effectis Effectum est quod e causis existit siveigitur gignatur sive c. NOw we come to see a thing made up it is worth the consideration to see how we begin at the farthest thing and at the first There are four esses distinct which we must look at distinctly and orderly if we â—ill see things aâ—ight First the efficients then the matters c. now then let us see effectum Effectum for the name it seems to be nominated onely from the efficient for it comes of efficior which comes oâ— efficio whence efficiens comes and howbeit it might be denominated materiatum formatum or finitum yet he rather names it of the efficient but we are to understand that it hath reference to all the causes even materiatum formatum finitum Object Why should there not be as many several kinds of effects as there are of causes Answ Because no one cause alone can make an effect for it is existent from them all the causes are distinct in nature and their forces are their own ergo their doctrine must be distinct but because essectum must be made of the composition of the four esses ergo it can be but one so that I cannot say effectum efficientis effectum materiae effectum formae or effectum finis ergo we must see effectum alone in one lump as it is in nature Now because it hath all the esses of the causes ergo good reason that the efficient that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and worketh generally quite through with every other cause matter form and end should have the effect denominated from it so that this child brought forth by the four causes is denominated from the efficient Est All things are effects but God alone ergo effectum est therefore whereas all things are made lyable to our eye of reason it is requisite that as we see the causes that make up the thing so the effect which is a quinta essentia arising from them Quod. He means argumentum absolute consentancum now we see plainly how the causes are absolutely agreeing to the effect but how is the effect absolutely a-agreeing to them yes for if the effect be from them it will vouchsafe to acknowledge it self to be from them and we see in nature that if an effect be then all the causes are contra again that we may see it plainly if we take away the efficient the effect will be imperfect so put the effect and we put the matter and form substantially and the esses of the other so take away the effect and you take away them Now if the efficient be rotten yet it is an effect as this Logick is Ramus his effect though he be dead and rotten for here we respect not time but the esse Again he puts efficiens generally a qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cujus gratia and here effectum quod the reason why he used quod so often is because he would tell us that Logick is general to every thing Existit Esse is of any one cause existere is a compound of them all not that existere hath respect of time and place as some teach true it is time and place attend every thing when it doth existere but they are not of the esse of the thing but are onely complemental est is a causa qualibet existere ex omnibus subsistere ex modo quodam consentaneis Existere comes of ex and sto now it doth stand upon its feet and doth estare out from all the causes being a fift thing from them Ecausis Here e is as much as a ex per and gratia ecausis that is ab efficiente ex materi per formam gratia finis Causis not causa and therefore it is that all four causes must absolutely concurre or else the thing cannot existere as the first matter did not ergo if Angels do existere they must have all the causes so the soules of men after they be out of the body they cannot per se existere without they have all the causes for if any one cause be wanting they will be incomplete Sive igitur gignatur sive corrumpatur Ramus doth here commorari upon this doctrine of effectum because the common Aristotelians referre the doctrine of motus not to Logick but to natural Philosophy but Ramus teacheth it here in Logick in the doctrine of effectum sive igitur gignatur sive corrumpatur c whether it be made or corrupted sive modo quodam moveatur quidlibet that is whether it be augmented or diminished c. generatio and corruptio are substantial motus augmentatio and diminutio quantitatis alteratio and loci mutatio qualitatis and all these are effects then again whereas the Aristotelians teach that distruens causa is not causa Ramus teacheth that it is for whether a man doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the same rule he doth both ergo both of them are motus of his act to the opus ergo causa distruens is a motus and a cause as well as opus destructum is an effect and privations though they be privations in respect of their habits yet they are effects in respect of their causes ergo they are causes both alike they teach as if a man had done nothing when he did sin whereas he spoiles the Image of God in him ergo whilst they are more nice than wise they become foolish If the Lord should bring to nothing that which he hath done it would be his effect at least the corruption of nothing Now the effect is double motus and res motu facta every thing is made motu God onely is sine motu and doth not move when he works for else he should not be primus movens but motus but if we resolve all things it must needs bring us in the end to that which is immoveable for so Aristotle found out most things by motus now again there are those that sever motus and res motu facta as the Aristotelians which makes Ramus to commorari they say somethings rest motu onely without a res motu facta but that is not so for there is nothing that God hath made which doth movere but there is a res motu facta of that motus they conceit that some Arts motion hath no opus post se relictum as when one playes on the Virginals they say there is nothing left behind Answ What care I for that Logick looks not to that but as there is playing so there is something playd which is res motu facta and as there is writing so there is something written These namely motus and res motu facta are never distinct asunder one without another but onely in that the one is not the other Hujus loci sunt laudes vituperationes As if Ramus should say if you would commend
though it be true that there was but one Tongue from the beginning of the World till the destruction of Babel yet in Gods decree all the rest are eternal and so is the rule of Speech and they were in the eternal notion of God Again their words do vary continually therefore they were not eternal for if one that died 500 years ago were now alive and should speak we could not understand him Answ Though it be true that words by reason of many sounds do daily change yet the rule is eternal though they be not spoken from eternal yet the variety of Speech doth not change the rule of Grammer as in reason this axiome homo est animal was true before homo was and will be for ever So in Grammer is the rule eternal as likewise is the rule of generation and corruption eternal and ever true and the same though men daily be generated and corrupted so is Grammers rule external though c. and 't is because God would shew his mighty power and wisdom that there are as many several Grammers as there are several ages and more too and there is nothing more wonderful under heaven then to consider the great variety oâ—â—â—ands and colours and complexions of things which all are from their contrary forms Ars. In Latin some think the word comes from artus a sâ—new others of arx a tower ab arcendo and both wâ—ll well agree to our purpose for artus a sinew we know the strength of those things that have sinews liâ—th in them yet they are stronger then the bones for the bones by reason of their hardness will break wâ—ereas sinews will rather give back and bend and are more tough So the rules of art are most strong anâ— sinewy If we derive the word from arx a tower it my be very well so for as there is both great streâ—gth and much beauty both in the matter and form so the rules of Grammer are most strong and make a most sweet harmony Generalis Because though it be not everywhere as Logick is yet it may be now Logick is everywhere because every thing was made for man therefore he must have an eye to see every thing for otherwise he could not use them aright But Grammer because when I see a thing by Logick I may keep it to my self therefore it is general only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 secundùm quid therefore it is taught after Logick Again wheresoever there is Grammer there is also Logick where there is Logick there is not alwayes Grammer for Logick may be only in mente therefore it is more general Orationis This general art of Speech is twofold both Grammer and Rhetorick but the difference is this that Grammer carrieth the matter in a budget neither too big nor too little like one of these Irishmen with Breeches without pockets Rhetorica carrieth it in a fine bag full of laces yet not altogether full for there are more words then matter therefore both Grammer Rhetorick and Poetry are all equally general for subject but not for use For Grammers use is before the use of them and may be without them even as a garment may be without a lace or jag But here by the way because these are general Arts therefore they have no proper subject but their use may be everywhere and therefore Keckerman whilst he maketh Rhetorick a special art telleth me he never knew the right distribution of the arts for it is the art of Speech and that may be every-where therefore Rhetorick is general and may be used in any thing therefore Tropes upon due consideration may be used in any art Now if it be demanded whether it be better to use Grammer or Rhetorick in teaching of Children I Answ Grammer is better 1. Because it is more general than Rhetorick 2. Because it keeps us more close to the matter which is a very good thing in teaching yet not withstanding sometime Rhetorick is better because it delivers the proper word together with some sweetness for Tropes do arise from some arguments in Logick so that we cannot condemne Rhetorick neither is it possible we should alwayes use Grammer seeing there be many more things then proper names for God making all things and Man being to name them and had not names sufficient for them therefore for want of words gave the same name to divers things by Tropes and therefore Talaeus saith necessitas tropum genuit Yet at the beginning one thing had but one name but afterwards the same word came to signifie many things as we see in Hebrew where one word signifieth twenty things and but one properly and Grammatically and all the rest Tropically And I find that words are used improperly these wayes First in respect of the Trope Secondly when we deliver the same things in divers languages there they use divers phrases which must be compared together as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is good in Greek in Latin it is to make Children which is not usual Now if you will know whether is better bring them to Logick and there see which phrase is more special that is to be prefer'd to make it general to the efficient cause in general to beget or procreate Children is proper to the first modus of the efficient therefore it is the better phrase So vaccas agere in English is to drive Kine though they say in some parts do the Kine into the field And there is another kind of Trope which is caused by reason of the phrase therefore one that teacheth young Scholars must have a special care That first his Scholar knwo the nature of the thing and then the name of it which stands by this rule vâ—x est nota quâ unumquodque vocatur and by this means we shall teach them first what every word signifieth in propriety and then the thing as it is named in other tongues and then the phrase and then compare one phrase with another and thus by the way we shall estimate which phrase in every language standeth with best reason As that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and in English to beget Children where to beget is peculiar to nature and belongeth to those things which have only a vegetative life and therefore our English phrase is better So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to put to the hand and in Latin is agreed to put to the foot or to go to which is more general therefore the Greek phrase is better So in English we say to go to and to go in hand with which phrase neither the Greeks nor the Latins have It is a Metaphor fetched from the motion of the hand which is the chief organ of motion is as much as I should say put our hands to this is more special so that bring them to Logick and â—here you shall be able to judge which phrase in every language is best and so consequently which Tongue is best And this way I can prove our English
true of the last end of all things which is God for he is as we may say finis communissimus ergo optimus Efficiens est causa a qua res est We have heard of causa and of his kinds and that they are disjoyned by which means there is made two couple of causes the two first working joyntly even as the other do Efficiens materia here is a second distribution and here the efficient is first for it is first eujus vi res est again by the rule of method it is first in nature because it giveth light to that which followeth and that the efficient moves first we see it in every thing he layes hold on the matter which in respect of the efficient is moved and by a natural appetite moves and runs to make an effect of it self and doth effect the effect as well as the effiâ—â—ent and that from the natural appetite it hath to the effect but the mover or efficient is before the thing moved and before the effect also Efficiens Efficiens quasi exfaciens moving quite through for besides his first moving as being the first cause he moveth also together with the matter form and end and his working with the rest is the cause of his name Est Every cause is required to the effect efficiens est causa ergo again first there must needs be a mover to move the matter before there can be a table wrought this appears plainly by the creation of the world and because every thing is an effect therefore the efficient is the first cause for take any thing and you shall see the vis of the efficient to run quite through the same so look into the world and every part thereof and you shall see Gods finger in every thing without which they could not be so that efficiens est causa and because an effect cannot be without its esse ergo it is of the esse of it a qua from whom it is as if he should say it is terminus a quo c. so as the world began with God so in every thing in nature the beginning of motion is first from the next cause so that efficiens est causa a qua telling us that this is the first being the effect hath Res. Here res is general as before to all the Arts and it is the subject of the general Arts. Ramus doth not here break the rule of method not defining what res is Again if he had said a qua est we should have had reference to res again if he had named effectum it had been a posteriore not having learned what effectum est Res est this is general to every cause ergo it is taught in the definition of causa in general but that he may not be so obscure he borroweth some thing that went before for else the perfect definition had been efficiens est a qua Now this teacheth us to look first at the efficient in every thing for Logick tels us not onely of an esse in general but of four several esses from which existere doth arise as efficiens est causa a qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cujus gratia why doth he not say causa est cujus vi res sit because something may be a cause and yet is not but if it do causare then it is a cause So if I say will do a thing and yet do it not yet am I an efficient for est doth here commend to us the adsignification of time but the essence that so soon as it beginneth to move so soon it is an efficient though the effect be not till the matter form and end be there Cujus et si vera genera c. Here Ramus doth commorari telling us that those many species which the Aristotelians make are not species but modi efficientis because more of them may be in one and the same efficient as one man may be causa precreans and conservans sola and cum aliis per se per accidens because they may be in the same efficient Even as actio and passio do not distinguish the thing but are divers modi of the same thing Here Ramus will find no species of efficiens neither are there any of the other three for the matter that is lowest ergo it hath nothing under it but examples and so is the efficient ergo he needed not say Cujus etsi vera genera c. for how could rhat appear to him that is not we know the effect is single ergo as the single matter form and end make that so the thing efficient makes it neither hath it any species Vbertas tamen per magna c. There is great and plentiful use of the efficient and as it is first of all so is it most general of all for matter cannot be a matter till the efficient move it and so of all other arguments now these make cause the efficient to be commended or discommended and according to these modi is the effect more or less argued as if a child kill his father it is parricide so if it be a good thing that is wrought by one alone he is more to be commended than if he had done it cum aliis aut contra Again if a thing be done well natura it is better than if it had been done necessitate and more commendable when a thing is done by counsel than fortuna now because these modi doe urge and press the effect more or less ergo there is reason in them and therefore they belong to Logick modi that is adjuncts not making these effects species but onely distinguished by accidents that fallacian non causa pro causa is general to causa and it is also particular to efficiens making that causa efficiens which is not as the Hereticks in Divinity were deceived which said that the Angels did make the world Primo quod procreat qut tueatur These are first because they are more general than the rest and also they are more in use for we shall have this first modus in use twenty times for one to the other modi so we respect God as causa procreans and tueans before we respect him alone then again this procreant cause brings the thing first to his esse and the preserving cause is the Keeper of the thing in his esse Now in reason he that is the procreating cause should also be the preserving cause as God is not onely causa procreans of the World but also causa conservans and so should parents as they procreant children so should they in like sort preserve them The procreant cause is first because things must needs have a being before they can be preserved now they are distinguished because when a thing is procreated it is not preserved aut contra and the modi are joyned with the cause not with the effect because they are first in the
which worketh an effect but non sua facultate but is moved by some other thing and yet notwithstanding it works after a sort sua facultate but not sua facultate if we respect the effect as fire drieth a cloth by removing the moisture and so leaves the cloath dry which drought is in the cloth Vt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum Here we see a necessity in invention which is all one with coaction By fortuna we are to understand the special providence of God or ignorance of the next cause for ignorance of the providence of God in all things and of the next cause hath caused that men say what fortune had I when they are crossed in play or such like Now necessity answereth to nature cum efficiens cogitur so that this necessity here is a coaction and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur cogitur when as the work of it per se is rather of some other thing now the same thing in one respect may be causa per se and in another respect causa per accidens for they are but modi vi externa ad effectum so that it doth it not natura or consilio Object Why saith he effectum rather than res Answ All comes to one for he means res neither doth he define effectum here Here he means violence not that vis in causa this vis doth not work the effect but works upon the cause and is that facultas whereof he spake before Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio At mihi quidem ait Orator si proprium verum nomen c. Before he said he was causa consilio of going with Pompey against Caesar he saith he was compelled fatali necessitate and hither belongs fatum in Schools Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter c. Our Author before did tell us of fortuna in the ablative case here he puts it in the nominative because fortune is a principal cause of that effect that another doth per accidens the arguing we ascribe it to fortune and say fortune did it so that our Author would have us consider first that it was fortune did it secondly that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it Per accidens That is working externa facultate now whereas he saith he doth it per accidens he meanes fortune as it is commonly taken when we make her blind not seeing what she doth for hence it doth arise when we doe not a thing by counsel but â—ab nab as they say that causeth us to make fortune blind Quando aliquid accidit That is happeneth for here it is principal the improvidence as it were he neither sees himself a cause neither doth he see who is the cause and therefore he saith accidit not efficit for he saith I did it not so again ask him who did it and â—e will say I know not so that accidere is the special efficere of this modus Praeter scopium efficientis Fortune may seem to be opposed to counsel which evermore hath a scope whereat it levels now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum it is fortuna we say Now things in nature may have a scope which is beyond their nature and then it is fortuna so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should have said praeter scopum fortunae if it be causa fortuna or praeter scopum naturae if it be causa natura Sic Pheraeo Jasoni profuit hostis c. here his enemy going about to kill him healed him In hoc genere causarnm imprudentia connumerari solet Imprudentia is one modus of fortune as here Cur aliquid vidi cur noxia lumina feci Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est c. I unawares have seen that which hath done me harm Then Ovid was causa per accidens of working that effect he should not So Acteon was causa inscius of seeing Diana washing her self and here Ovid reasons a simile as Acteon was torn in peices of his dogs for seeing Diana unawares so am I banished for seeing that I would Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est c. He means Augustus So if a man go forth and a tile fall from an house and break his head this is causa fortuna it is natura as it break his head being harder than his head and fortuna as it hit him and consilio it breaks his head if it be flung for it hath a scope true it is nothing but counsel hath his end in its intendment yet there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it worketh Hinc sumitur deprecatio c. For our Author said before accidit therefore we are causes ergo it ought to be pardoned deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna so they will say he is a proper man but hath no luck Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit c. Here Ramus doth commorari in the name lest he should be mistaken it is an unchristian word it is ignorance not onely as it is opposed to counsel but as it is unknown to the thing that worketh by fortune Many other modi there are among other Logicians all which may be brought hither as causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either causa necessitate or efficiens in genere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is causa per se if he shall say anger did it then there is a trope in it as when I say he writes I mean his pen writes if I say he writes with his pen then I make him causa cum aliis if I say he writes he is efficiens Now for the order of causes one efficient may be cause of another efficient c. and so causa causae be causa causati but this will fail as when I look at a child and commend him from his grandfather not respecting the mean causes there is not causa causae but causa causati So when I say he came of Scipio c. Hactenus de efficiente and this we must alwayes look at first in artificio rei moreover observe here in every thing the manner of working for so God is said to do some thing necessitate as when we say he doth that he would not though he would it in another sense and fortuna as mans fall was praeter scâ—pum Legis CHAP. VI. De Materia Materia est causa ex qua res est VVE have heard of the efficient cause and his manner of moving in that work of his now these are essential to Logick because in the very manner there lyeth the force of the argument and whatsoever hath reason belongeth to Logick many distinctions there are among the Logicians all which may be brought to these that of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they say is that efficient cause that worketh internally the
c. that is when special causes may be given to one common effect for as integrum though it be singular yet is it totum because it is made of the portions of the matter and form of the members so here the effects are made of their genus Now he sayes distributio ex effectis because it ariseth ex effectis for there are the causes distributing and the parts distributed so that here we may see why these arguments are rightly called orta quando partes sunt effecta so as the whole doth symbolice contain the causes so the parts do symbolice contain the effect as if he should say effecta we heard of in the first invention but effecta here sunt partes this is the second invention God as he made all things so hath he ranged and ordered them one under another so that in this definition this is all the parts are the effects and the cause is the whole Marriners are general causes but they have special effects for some climbe the shroud some run up and down some pump c. here are the effects of the efficient cause so we may distribute from the matter as of wood is made a wooden chest or table or stool c. so from the form as we may from the genus but this alwayes consider in general that the parts be part of the whole and that they be homogenie parts for if we shall divide a whole into parts and particles there will be no distribution as if a mans body be anatomized because the particles will agree with the parts Distributio generis in species hic excellit He doth here hasten to genus as being the principal thing in this place and it is as if he should say that distribution which we usually hear of and which we have so often in Schools of genus and species they are but modi of a distribution ex effectis and it is true and whilst the common Logâ—cians see not this they know not the truth of them nor their original and this makes them to begin with genus and species in their Logick so they know them not in their cause but onely in their second nature Hic excellit As if he should say this is the chiefest modus in this distribution Genus Genus signifieth firstly a stock or kinred now because all the species come from one root as a family cometh from one stock ergo it is called genus or as the parents are causes of their children so is genus cause of the species so the Hiraclides are they that come of Hiracles Species This signifieth in the original the countenance of a thing nâ—w we come to see nothing but singulars ergo individua and species infimae are properly species it comes of an old verb specio or spicio species it is that which is looked on excellit that is of principal use and this is the reason thereof the Lord hath ranged all things under his own general but this kind of ranging is more general than the rest and the genus giving essence to the species it draweth the species with it wheresoever it goeth hence it is that wheresoever the genus of any thing is taught there a so must the species be taught and this was the father of predicaments so that there is nothing but is under a genus but genus generalissimum Genus est totum partibus essentiale Totum est quod continet partes for the parts we heard were holden together in the whole for before whilst the members did contribute every one a portion of matter and form they made up the whole now genus is totum but contrary to integrum for there the integrum had his whole matter and form from the members but the genus comprehends the species in a common matter and in a common form Totum essentiale By this we are to understand that which gives essence that is matter and form so that integrum did contain all that the members had but the genus doth not contain all that the species have so that though all the essence of the genus be in the species yet the whole essence of the species is not in the genus when I say totum essentiale I say two things first that genus is a totum secondly that there is nothing in the genus but is also in the species Object But how can it be said that genus gives essence to the species whereas they have more in them than the genus Answ To contain is to hold together now because the species agree in one common matter and a common form as in uno puncto ergo genus doth contain them so that reciprocation here is to be understood so far forth as by their hypostatical union the specius are made one in their genus hence it is that whatsoever is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the genus must agree with the species therefore if any in distributing shall make any part as large as the genus as Logicians distribute genus into perfectum and imperfectum they make species totum and not genus so ens is substantia or accidens will not come into any Art for the parts are consentanies inter se being subjectum and adjunctum Partibus Pars est quae continetur non in toto sed a toto tâ—tâ—m est quod continet as being the common punctum wherein the parts meet together he saith also partibus non parti Species est pars generis Pars we heard before generis so that as membrum was pars integri not generis so species est pars generis not integri so that they which divide parts into integral or simular understand not Logick for a part simular is nothing but species which is pars generis as a pan of water a drop of water is genus species a bone and a part of a bone is also genus and species now they call it simular because they have the same denomination Why so genus doth predicare re et nomine as they say pars generis here observe that species hath reference onely to genus and so genus to species even as causa is effecti causa and subjectum adjuncti subjectum for they are relates ergo can repeat no other thing but one another So again genus is totum not speciei but specierum ergo when we give a double face to him we make him like Janus with a double fore-head for they make the same species to be species to two things species therefore is generis species as one son is but son of one father Now this is their trouble that they cannot distribute a species into individua because say they individua do but differre numero what is that Differre numero is properly to reckon up or make an induction of the individua to make up the species again when we distribute that species into all his individua there is a distribution for there is a totum and
method there comes to be contiguity of every thing so that there cannot be vacuum for then the world should not be one and so we should make two worlds and make nothing something And though Gods wisdom Power and other Attributes be and in God yet he would have them appear instar omnium and to be sufficient for all things and so he made them many to shew the variety of this wisdom Now again as they are many in themselves yet they must be but one to shew that the variety of this wisdom is but one in him And they are in one method and so make one world So we say in Logick and 't is sometimes true That the cause and the effect be like and so is God and the world So the world is but one and is round as being the most capacious figure of all now 't is one not in continuity for then it should but have one quantity and so one forme but as before in contiguity as it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. an heap but an orderly heap and so is but one in method And hence every thing desireth its place and order by the rule of method which commands that naturâ prior must praecedere ergo the outmost things must first be made and ergo they must have more forme than matter that they may ascend and so by order from the highest nature goeth down to the lowest And for those Philosophers which make Nature to be God I doubt it and methinks 't is like their opinion which made the God-head the form of every thing But we must not wrong God but acknowledge the principia to be causes of things and give them their effects for they say in that such qualities such a thing 't is from God But as a man doth write with pen so God hath made a creature which worketh of it self even as the Pen writeth but is governed by God even as the pen by the writer So that natures work is when the two causes do work according to Gods Logicum artificium and Nature is the cause of natural effects and is to be distinguished from God So that here we see the disposition and order of every thing So when I see a Tree bring forth fruit I conclude there is Logick and yet neither tree nor fruit hath reason ergo there is one greater that hath reason which methinks were sufficient to convert any Atheist And from this order of things comes contiguity for there must be no vacuum as before since that would be a breach of method So we see Water and Earth will go up even into the element of Fire for the preservation of the unity of this world And if there should be a vacuum it must needs be something or nothing then in the world or out of the world if out of the world then it were not all things if in the world then a part of the world then as before in ens it should be ens if in the world and not ens then the world must be two And from method 't is that the Load-stone desireth to stand North and South and so doth every thing yea naturally not guided by counsel desire natale solum And when we do transplant trees 't is a monster and against nature and so that one woman should nurse an other womans child And one woman may have three children though she have but two dugs so that she have milk for them And from sympathy it is that the iron goeth to the load-stone for 't is his food ergo his preserving cause and the stone may act through a Table For descensus What is the reason that fire cometh down Common Philosophers ascribe it to plate which belongeth to subjectum but 't is place which is order and belongeth to method and that is the next cause though the final cause be as before ne detur vacuum So when I cast a stone that it flies 't is propria forma the reason why it flies from me is that it doth pati and ergo doth flie his enemy The common Philosophers ascribe it to the air which in very deed doth hinder it as themselves shall confess for cast a stone upward and when it falleth down again what is the reason it moveth faster when 't is near the center than when t is farther off but because when t is near the center there is less resistance of the air than there was above So what is the reason we take force to strike with an Ax and that goes farther than if we set it upon a thing and lay great weight on it because the wood can resist the Ax well enough Now we lift up our hands because all the vital spirits in the legs and other parts of the body come to inable that part which acteth most and the higher it goeth the more forciblly it cometh for that it is more able to resist the air as also there is a double motion natural and violent and it will come down more easily because it is a natural motion not upward so well because t is violent unto it So a thing that hangs down that part moveth most which is farthest from the center for that it suffereth violence So what 's the reason that put salt Beef into the Sea and it will be fresh but put fresh in and it will be salt because t is the nature of salt to constringe and that 's the reason salt Beef occupieth less place than fresh doth now its pores being filled with salt the salt water cannot get in but only the fine water pierceth in and so takes away the salt but if it be fresh the pores be so open that the salt water entreth in and so it becometh salt Materiale est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in naturâ primum substratum and this is fons passionis Formale est essentia in naturâ prîmum superstratum as before and this is fons actionis And from these principia many things in nature may be made manifest As from hence things natural have finitness of essence which belongeth to every nature and thence limits of quantity as the Angels have and thence they are alwayes under some figure thence also have they limits of place and so Zanchius saith an Angel is in his own place Again if every natural thing have these principia then t is principiatum ergo tis in tempore and had a beginning hence nature must have an efficient ergo not eternal and this efficient only can turn the constant nature into nothing but they are not resolvable per se because they are proxima to nothing in their kind otherwise if nature should resolve them it could work a miracle which is above nature for nature found them created and must so leave them for creatio and annihilatio are not effects of nature but above it Hence the soul of man could not be created by nature for then either of something or nothing not of nothing
had an efficient and an end ergo was created then again he is seipso ergo he must be uncreated hence also he cannot be annihilated neither generated nor corrupted again hence he is independe aliunde and therefore supremum again hence he is without matter Now if he be without matter therefore he is without genus ergo is not a species either subalterna or specialissima Again if he be without form as without genus then he cannot be defined ergo he must be without limitation of essence ergo without limitation of quantity ergo without limitation of place and because he is without beginning from any other thing therefore he is without any duration and because he is without any matter ergo he is truly spiritual for so we account things spiritual according to the subtleness of their matter but he hath no matter at all Again he being without matter and form ergo can be no membrum because every member containeth a portion of matter and form neither can he be an integrum because that consisteth of members which contain part of matter and form Now in that he is absolutely first therefore he can be but unum for else there should be more again if there should be more than one then the one would say as well as the other I am as forward as thee and so none could be absolutely first Again he is no genus for that is an universal or Synopsis of many together whereas he is but one so that now he is not properly an ens but an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and above our Logick again in that he is absolutely first he must needs be without accidents to use their term without adjuncts for they are second things arising from their substances and in absolute primo ente there must be nothing but that which is absolute primum so that here we see his most simple being and that he is beyond our Logick Now if he be without all potentia both essentialis and accidentalis he is pure act so that this act now of his must needs be his esse because he is pure act for if he be agere then his esse and agere are the same so that if any one doth any thing as every ens a primo doth by potentia it is not pure act some say the Angels do agere per essentiam but it is false unless they mean that they act first by potentia now indeed there is nothing but it doth act per faoultatem essentiae First the form that is the beginner of act and when it acts upon matter internal that is habitual or a faculty when it acts by the matter upon some external object that is an act for first there is the essence the matter and the form then the faculty the forms act upon the matter internally lastly the act which is of the form by the matter externally now these are not in God but are his very essence Now we find then that this primum ens must be actus and purus actus because there is no potentia in him at all ergo it must needs be that he is primus actus ergo optimus actus for primus actus and optimus actus are all one Again hence it must needs follow that if there be any act of other things it must needs be from him and therefore if there be any thing actu it must be from him so then thus we have found him absolute in every thing Ens a primo Now to return to the first Syllogism If there be reason there must be an adaequatum subjectum of it ergo ens a primo for we have heard that ens primum is beyond our reason so that there must be ens a primo which is adequatum subjectum rationi and that now is liable to all our Logick for it hath causes effects subjects adjuncts c. and thus we will go on and see all the subjects of the Arts in the concretion of ens a primo which the Philosophers say cannot be demonstrated That we might dig deep and lay our foundation of Arts sure I have shewed that there is a being and that it is double the one from whom Art is the other in whom it shines now we heard that ens est quod est which is nothing but the true notation of ens resolved by Grammer quod est Now for the continual succession of things which some dream of this it is if all things be effects there must be so many causes ergo in the end we shall come to a first cause that is not effectum Further we heard that ens primum was quod est seipso that is without any other so that in propriety be is neither essentia nor ens but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hence he neither hath causes neither is any argument that doth arise from causes ergo is an individuum but not a species he is without end ergo he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hence he therefore was never made ergo he made all things he is without definition distribution and properties because he is without causes ergo there can be no art of him but he must be the Author of art as we shall hear hereafter He is merus Actus because he is without all potentia both substantialis and accidentalis again he is primus actus ergo optimus actus ergo whatsoever is well done of any thing is first from him again he is infinitus actus ergo able to do any finite thing yea and infinite Eâ—s a primo est quod ut est a primo sie est ex nihilo proter primum First we proved before that there is ens a primo for proprium adaequatum subjectum rationis est at ens a primo est proprium adaequatum objectum rather than subjectum rationis ergo Est a primo that we heard before for it cannot be of it self for then it should be absolutely first ergo not the subject of our reason ergo it is aliunde ergo it is in the end for him that is not aliunde Propter primum every ens a primo is made ergo for an end ergo at last propter primum as propter finem Again optimus actus must do nothing in vain It is a rule of Nature in schools that God and Nature nihil agunt frustra which indeed is a general rule of Logick applied to two special Arts natural Philosophy and Divinity Now then at last we shall find every thing to be made for that which was never made ergo propter primus ens Object But some things might be made for things that are made Answ I suppose mediately yet when all things are effects ergo made for an end at length we shall come to an end that is not an effect as all creatures are made for man and man also being made is therefore for an end ergo for God Hence therefore we see that ens a prima is propter
must constare for in the frame of the thing the subjects of the Arts do constare ergo this wisdom following them must constare in his parts and as one thing hath his frame and another his differing from the other hence the precepts of Arts must be various and must constare one with another hence it follows that in Art we must have no rules but those that will constare and are essential to it So that if we bring a rule of Grammar into Logick or econtra or if we leave out of Logick some essential rule to it it will not constare again if the rules of Art be disordered they will not stand together therefore when I say constare I say two things first that every Art must have all the rules that are essential to it and no more and secondly that every precept must be placed in his due order and rank For as a Painter that makes the picture of a man would make it very deformed if he should set the head where the feet should be or contra so were it as absurd for an Artist to disorder his Art Constant praeceptis Every thing hath his special acts before it can work that main act for which it was made as reason must have two parts it must see the simple causes effects subjects adjuncts c. and Axiomes Syllogismes and Method that it may bene disserere therefore there are many petty acts of reason to be performed which though they all conspire in one main act yet are they not one another and here we see that as Arts did arise from the frame of the thing so the precepts of Art are from the Acts of things so that thus Arts constant praeceptis or regulis all is one both are good and regere is as large as regula and praeceptum as praecipere But my reason why I rather chuse praeceptum is this because regula is tropical for it is often taken for a Square or Ruler whereby we rule any thing and this is a grand Synecdoche And again because the Lord hath created and governeth his creatures by the precepts of Arts as by so many Statutes or Commandements of the things act for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as at the Creation when the Lord said Let there be light by this rule as by a Precept did the Lord create light and also governs it It is a Law as God governs reason speech quantity c. by the rule of Logick Grammar Mathematicks and even as a King governeth his Dominions by his Laws so the Lord governeth his Creatures by the rules of Arts and because the Creation began with Commandements therefore we will still hold it and they may be called Laws Statutes or Commandements c. even as the Lord calleth his Laws for man Commandements Again I rather call the rules of Arts praecepta than regulae because they being shortly delivered are as so many short directions for the guiding of the thing to the end thereof Prime verissimeque scientificis Every Precept of Art must be scientificum that is making knowledge scientia saith our Logick is the judgement of a necessary Axiome and therefore must be so true so just and so wise as nothing can be more true more just more wise Why so are the Precepts of Art both in God and in the Creature for as for deductions the Lord hath shut them up in a brief rule of Art for look how many uses there may be of a rule of Art in the thing whose rule it is so many deductions will there arise from that rule Now man not being able to take this wisdom from God which is most simple therefore it hath pleased the Lord to place it in the things and as flowers do send out a scent or odor that doth affect our sense of smelling so every precept of Art doth spirare a sweet science to our glass of Understanding which is indeed that irradiation which we heard of in Divinity in the Creation of things but it is called scientia by a Trope for as the scent of a flower is not properly odor but that that doth affect the sense and as when we see a strange thing we say look what a sight is yonder whereas sight is properly of the eye so we call Art a scientia or sweet savour in respect of our knowledge of it which is a metonimy of the adjunct for the Subject Quest Now how do they scientificare how are they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Answ We have heard how they are in the things and from thence they do come by an irradiation to the Glass of our understanding and as the Sun beams coming through a red or blew glass c. will bring the colour of the glass with them to our sense so doth the irradiation of Art from the thing bring the colour of the thing with it to our understanding I mean that this irradiation doth bring the frame of the thing with it according to which we see it Now then first it is called the wisdom of God as it is one in him then is it called ars as it is in the thing and when it is brought by an irradiation to our understanding the first Act of it is to see the simples in the things and this is called our intelligentia for it is that perspicacie whereby we look at the invention that is in the thing so that it is the first Act of our intellectus As it is received in an axiome we call it scientia It is our sapientia as we can discourse with it syllogistically and as we apply it rightly in time and place so it is prudentia And it is Ars as we can execute it and practise it in Analysi or Genesi as Ars is rightly an intellectual vertue as we teach it to another it is doctrina and his learning is disciplina lastly as we set it down in writing or printing it is liber And every rule of Art is true as when I say Râ—sa est flos Socrates est homo though there be never a Rose or Socrates in the world because the rule is eternal for it is in the eternal Idea of God though the thing be not Now some Meta-Physitians not distinguishing aright hereof say the thing is eternal that is say they the thing was in Gods eternâ—â— Idea nay the Idea of God is eternal but not the thing I but Kickerman saith the thing is eternal quoad essentiam not quoad existentiam but that is false for existere belongs to effectum in Logick and every effect must have all the causes ergo matter and form and these are not eternal Prime For there is no rule of Art but is a necessary Axiome in its own place and so is firstly true Now deductions are true but at the first second third or fourth hand according as they are drawn from the first rule at the second third or fourth hand and are so far forth true as the first rule is
is accidental to an axiome for it may be subjectum as well and both are accidental ad arguendum Why ad arguendum because the end of an argument is to argue to play the argument as the eye to see ad arguendum because evermore when we fetch an argument to shew any thing that is the arguens and doth agere the aliquid is also an argument but it doth pati so that as quod was general that is arguens or does argue so it tels me that any thing may be argued so hâ—mo est aliquid here homo is the aliquid and is argued by his genus which chargeth homo therefore there is nothing in the world but is an argument and may argue or be argued but remember that both quod and the aliquid that is both the arguens and argutum do arguere but the one firstly the other secondly the one doth agere the other doth pati and so reagere The aliquid tels me it is the first and then quod comes and argues it now would you argue then evermore look first and that carefully whether your quod will argue your aliquid as will you build an house with sand that will not serve the turn for it is not affectum to it neither hath it that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it so that by any meanes let us keep close to our rule and we shall not doe wrong The fallacian of the common Logicians of Coxismus or petitio principii or Cuculi cantus for they are all one As the Cuckow cries Cuckow the Cuckow is Cuckow ergo the Cuckow cries Cuckow for here is no third argument and this is commonly the womans reason because it hath so little reason in it as they will say it is so because it is so So that simplex conversio among Logicians is a breach of this rule as omnis homo est animal ergo aliquod animal est homo other Logicians as Polanus cals argumentum Thema which is too special for thema is taken among Schools for a question to be judged by way of oration again every argument is not taken as thema then he sayes thema est simplex which is argumentum or compositum which is quaestio and thus we see how our Logick goes most orderly and that it looks at ens as it is simmonted with another thing Quales sunt singulae rationes solae per se consideratae We have heard what argumentum is and the first thing that we are to look at in simples is this the glue to be affectioned as if we should look for a cause see whether it be affected to be so we have heard the fallacians in part before as first where there is no argument but petitio principii and that either where there is no petitio principii and that either where there is no petitio at all or where the same thing is uttered in a synonymie or to the same purpose Again it is a breach of this rule when that is brought for an argument which is no argument as baculus stat in angulo or when the third Argument is more obscure and doubtful then the arguments of the question these and all other petitiones principii are breaches of this rule in general and not of any special ones Again it is a breach of the definition of an argument when we mistake the aliquid though the argument be good and so that Heterozetesis is a fallace of argumentum in genere as when I talk of Chalk he talks of Cheese Now we come to the commoration after argumentum quales sunt fingula rationes solae c. He hath defined argumentum from that affection that is continually in it for the act is accidental and may be wanting for potentia as we hear in nature ariseth from the act of the form upon the matter Now he saith singulae that is argument by argument the cause alone the effect alone and so all the arguments from the beginning to the end He saith rationes rather than argumenta first because there is an equivocation in that word many have thought it to belong to a syllogisme onely and so when we say I deny your reason there it is taken for an axiome Now it is taken sometimes for the faculty of reason sometimes for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in things Here he shews that it is taken for the same with argumentum Solae that is as they are to be considered in invention without judgement and that he explains further per se that is they are in their definitions not respected with some thing externally these are tales that is such as I have defined unto you so that he doth here commorari because of difference with Aristotle or rather with the Aristotelians even as he stayed before upon the definition of Dialectica for they thought there was no argument but in judgement and therefore have question with Ramus whether an argument be to be taught before we come to a syllogisme Ramus here propounds it and determines it for his own part that it may be without judgement and look at others and you shall see them define all arguments from their use in a syllogisme as we may see in all topick places of Aristotle so that it is not so strait as they take it and Ramus would teach us here that to argue is accidental to an argument and disposition to so that their mistaking makes him here to demurre and stay upon it Now indeed there must of necessity be a simple consideration of argumentum for though things in nature are disposed together yet they were severed at the first and again we are to consider them so still though they be together Consideratae he useth this word because thought invention and judgement are joyned together in nature yet he would here tell us that we are to sever them by our consideration as thus I can see heat without fire cold without water c. So that singulae rationeâ— are solae per se consideratae non in usu for so they cannot be but they are solae per se consideratae in consideration for so they be he saith quales because argumentum was defined from his quality or property of affection and properties are qualities Argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale This affection or glue is artificiale or inartificiale as if he should say argumâ—ntum hath this affection ex sese and it is in artificio rei or it is not ex sese but from some other thing so that every argument is affected but two wayes one as an artificial argument the other as an inartificial now the reason of this distribution is this God hath made all things for man and at the beginning for one man and they are to conduce to one but all things cannot come under one mans eye of reason therefore that he may be better furnished herein God hath provided these two the one whereby he may see by himself
the other whereby he may see by another mans eye Again that which we are to see is either in artificio rei or not in artificio rei so that all things are seeable but not to be seen with one mans eye but by many This word artificiale teacheth us these things first there is no artificial argument but you shall see it in fabrica rei therefore belongs to some Art because Art delivers the frame of the thing therefore there is no axiom that consisteth of artificial arguments but it belongs to some Art Now though we hear no arguments in Arts but the causes and properties yet notwithstanding we have all arguments indeed for there is no quality but is proton in some general thing as heat in fire cold in water now this gives us great light yet effects must be there if they be proper and the effect belongs to that rule where the property is taught and dissentanies belong to Art too as nature is constans or inconstans argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale so that there are no axioms affirmed or denyed true or false but we shall find them in some Art either as a first rule or a deduct by consequence necessary so that hence is the greatest light that can be to a Scholler to analyse his example and bring every thing to his Art where he shall see it in causa so that if one would make a common place book let him make the Rules of Arts his heads and let him take any example and see whether argument is more special and so carry the axiom to that Art and to that rule of the Art whether it belongs As homo est justus homo belongs to nature justitia to moral Philosophy ergo this axiom belongs to the doctrine of justice so that moral Philosophy boâ—rows man from nature to deliver it self The use of this is unspeakable I cannot deliver it unto you the use it self will better testifie it for thus may a man try every thing whatsoever yea though it be a contingent axiom as audentes fortuna juvat audacia belongs to Ethicks fortuna to Logick and in audacia we shall find this for it is that which thrusteth a man desperately and here we may see what a true predicament is not the predicaments but the Arts are the store-houses for whatsoever is in artificio rei we may see there not onely genus species c. but all other arguments for they are too narrow and false too for that distribution substantia est creata or increata will not fail in any Art and the three first predicaments as we heard before are nothing but practises of method Now if it be objected we must not have those things before we see them no we must first see them that we may lay them up in store We have our eye first and then things appointed for us to see Artificiale est quod ex sese arguit Now here is that affection that is in this kind of arguments that glue that was before is here quod ex se so that this makes that more special which before was more general so that we shall still see what our eye of reason sees we heard before that we see the thing as it is an argument here we see it as it is affectioned to argue ex se Ex se what is that as if he should say look into the artificium of the thing there shall you see his artificial arguing ex se that is it argues natura or it is causa natura of its arguing so that these arguments concurre for the being of the thing So wood is affected to argue a chest ex se that is it is in the artificio of wood to argue a chest made of wood ex se so then this artificial argument ariseth from nature from a vis ingenita that is in artificio rei so the efficient argues ex se as if I should say if there were not that cunning in the efficient of a chest to make it it would not be one So that it is thus defined quodex sese arguit Argumentum was the next genus and he doth not express it but understand it here because we heard of it so lately before then again he hath it here but after another manner because he could not deliver the form of it without the genus for arguit is not here taken for act but for potentia as we say animal vidit though he doth not actually see but have the faculty of it so we say Does he eat or drink meaning can he eat or drink For if it were taken for the act of arguing then it should not be no where but in judgement so that quod arguit is as much as argumentum and ex se is the form if he had said artificiale est argumentum ex sese he had said the same that ex sese arguit but it had not been so plain to a young Schollar and he had also newly done with argumentum before so that this is the second thing that our eye of reason is to look at namely an artificial argument which can ex sese arguere Now fallaces may be in every rule In the first as if any abuse it to deceive and abuse reason for the second if any go about to judge before he see the invention it is a fallace and a preposterous course So argumentum is artificiale or inartificiale they break this rule that will give testimony of a thing whose artificial arguments they have not seen so do the Papists in their implicite faith when they beleive as the Church beleives not knowing what the Church beleiveth So Schollers that take any thing that their Authors deliver them without any examination at all of the things they read Kiekerman saith an inartificial argument may be received before an artificial I do not deny it but yet you must examine it afterward Gods testimonies onely are undeniable because he cannot lye but no mans Artificiale est primum aut ortum We are farther to look at this glue whereby a thing is put to another thing in artificio rei it is there firstly or secondly this affection or going to the act is there at the first hand or at the second hand now it is the same still but is looked at as it is originally or as it is arising from the first as to make up me there goes a soul and a body and of the formes of the four elements is the form of my body made and of their matter the matter of my body made now the elements are firstly there as making my body and secondly my body is in me as a part in me so a man is first consisting of body and soul and then is animal now this wisdom of God is wonderful to consider how he makes things first of causes effects c. and then ranketh them under a general head And if we go to the Creation we shall see them evidently first
he made a first matter then the first forms and then mists that had their complements and did differ one from another then they might be compared together then they had names and were ranked under general heads as a part to a whole c. and then they might be defined and their limits shewed how farre they reach for here our Author leads us to see every thing there and to see how it is there the reason of this distribution we shall see in every thing whatsoever as in an ink-horn there must be the matter of it then it self and it must have his adjuncts c. and then will it hold your ink then when it is this it is not a tree or a stone though it may be compared and be equal or unequal like or unlike so that first we see what is in it firstly then we may call it round deep made of horn then range it under a head then lay it out in its limits and then give testimony of it Primum quod est suae originis This definition doth somewhat stick in my teeth before it come out for it is a far fetched trope and onely one is suae originis namely God but he means this clamminess or glue that is suae originis is first there the ortum is not as the son hath the nature of his father but is another thing than his father but first argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum then artificiale est affectum ex sese so primum is argumentum artificiale primitus so that we must look at the argument as it doth argue not as it is suae originis but quod originaliter arguit he meanes that is there first as we shall see by the nature of the thing as homo justus here justitia is firstly in homine as an adjunct for he must first have that vertue before he can be denominated justus then secondly it is in him as he is denoninated from it so a chest is made of wood here is the cause and effect and this is firstly then from hence I may say a woodden chest and this is secondly arising from the first Quod est suae originis As if he should have said that hath this affection to argue ex se primitus now then we may go wonderful deep if we will go by these degrees what may we not see if we would make a breef Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est artificiale ex se primum primitus The fallacians are many as they that think they are conjugates that are in name as he hath vertue ergo he is studiosus so homo dormit quia somnit here is nothing but causes and effects and so synonimies for conjugata are nomina so again when orta are taken for prima or taught before aut contra so do the common Logicians in the predicables when they teach genus species differentia proprium accidens First see the orta contain the prima whence they arise symbolice as it were in a cognizance Here we learn this we must first look at the affection of an argument then we must be ex sese then primitus now ortum contains the same nature that primum doth and some say the effect ariseth from the causes and the subject and adjunct from the effect But doth the effect argue with the affection of causa it doth not or doth the subject or adjunct argue with the affection of an effect No. Estque simplex aut comparatum We have heard what the end of Logick is and all shoots at this mark to reason well that is that we may handle our reason well now that we may doe thus we must have invention first afterward judgement Invention teacheth us to find out simples Judgement teacheth us how to lay them together we may compare invention or arguments to the hook and nails in a thing judgement to the fastening of them together Now invention beholds arguments Argumentum in Logick is a concrete as the Schools call it signifying the thing together with the affection that is in it to argue another thing as a Taylor is a Taylor quatenus he hath that affection in him to make a garment so that invention intends immediately the affection and mediately the thing for ens quatenus ens is general to ars quatenus ars but ens quatenus it is affected ad arguendum so it belongs to Logick alone and thus we go by degrees for the Lord doth not let us see any thing immediately now the very name invention tels us what we must doe namely seek out it tels us the Lord hath hid things secret in nature and we must labour for the simples and so find them now we seek argumentum which we heard to be of two sorts artificiale or inartificiale artificiale is that which is in artificio rei whereas the inartificiale doth but cary to us what other men have seen by the artificials and because none can testifie of a thing before he have seen it himself ergo artificiale is before inartificiale and also because he that seeth inartificialiter can but testifie so far forth as he sees the thing which is not at all ergo they that give testimony of that thing whose artificial arguments they have not seen are sophisters and break this rule and this is a sophisme of the Papists in their implicite faith which do beleive as the Church beleiveth neither knowing the artificial arguments of the thing nor the thing it self that they beleive Now the artificial arguments are in the artificio of the thing ergo we must of necessity know all the artificial arguments in things if we will know the things themselves wholly And here by the way artificiale tels me that every thing must be in some predicament that is in some Art quod ex sese arguit this affection is in the thing and it is ex se drawn out of the thing as it were so that this hook whereby it layes hold on another thing is natural to it for so he means Artificiale est primo or secundo in artificio rei as if the thing had a second kind of making nature or being so a thing is made of matter and form primitus but when we consider how first singular parts are made of that matter then organically are made of the singulars and the whole made of the organical here is the second invention and here the matter is considered immediately in the parts mediately in the whole This is something subtle but yet evident and plain as first imagine that thing justice in a man here is subjectum and adjunctum and this is the first invention then from that quality in him I can denominate him a just man and this is the second invention so I look at a thing whose matter is made of wood and can conjugate a name to it wooden as a wooden chest c. so when I say a man is made ab
modo quodam is as if one should ask a definition of animal ratione Absolute ut causa effectum The causes give esse to the effect therefore without these esses the thing cannot existere ergo there are absolutely required In like sort in the existere of the effect you may see the concurrence of all the esses of all the causes therefore these are absolute consentanea Hence we learn that all the causes must go to the making up of the effect And again if any effect then there must be all the causes so then we see how the ones being depends necessarily upon the other ut causa effectum therefore the cause must first be looked at as if I would look at ens or any thing whatsoever therefore our Author taking this course takes the very way of God in his creatures Can any man see any thing throughly and not see the causes first he cannot and is there any thing to be seen in a thing before the causes there is not therefore that is alwayes first in nature and therefore first also in reason Now here are fallacians as to think an effect may be from some causes and to think the causes may be removed from the effect which is a common fallace Aristotles organon Tullies offices c. here is Aristotles and Tullies casuality still though they be dead Now we see how orderly we go to work if we had not done so we could not have come to causa all the arguing of them before as of artificiale primum absolutum consentaneum simplex are here in causa and effectum So that there are many clasp◠as it were as the cause is in artificio of the effect it is also there primitus and absolute and consentanie and simpliciter so that this discent doth very much clear truth we have our flesh bloud bones from causa then afterward we have our complements from modo quodam consentanea then we may see we are not this or that See an imperfect garment at the Taylors and you may ask what it is but let the Taylor make it up compleat with all its cuts and jagges then you may see it your self and need not ask what it is for further knowledge of it De efficiente procreante conservante CHAP. I. Causa est cujus vires est REmember the purpose of Logick is to direct man to see the wisdom of God which that reason may do well it acts doubly first by taking at simples then by laying them together that which we take with the first eye is argumentum that is any thing so farre as it hath the affection to argue first as it is in artificio rei which therefore is in an Art now it is firstly there or secondly first it is there absolute by way of consention respecting the thing wherein it is or dissenting from the thing wherein it is not those that consent are absolutely consenting or modo quodam absolute as the causes and effect that proceeds from the causes here we must begin because the first thing that cometh to mans reason is the cause so if we take the world or any part thereof let us resolve it and in the end we shall come to the first causes a first efficient c. So God is the first cause of all things and himself without all causes ergo the cause is first of all things then the first matter is first in his kind the first form in his kind and the first end in his kind So Aristotle saith God is primum intelligibile so then if we will see the wisdom of God in the creatures we shall see the cause the beginner then again Aristotle doth confess that causa is primum motus Again what is the initium of every thing but his being and that is from the causes therefore they are first again the next cause is the farthest thing we can go unto as if we work any thing now if we take causes and look into them then we make them effects not causes as if I look at the causes of a garment I find the Taylor to be the cause but if I look at his cause I make him an effect yet I cannot make the first efficient an effect c. The Greeks call causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 peto because it is that which is first granted or required as the Geometricians require a petitum or as our Author should say there can be no demonstration of the first cause Est argumentum absolute consentaneum c. causa est if a cause be absolutely required for the effect then there is a cause then again Logick serves us to behold the wisdom of God and himself also through the creature now all things but God are made and are composed ergo they must have causes est absolute consentaneum because they are essential to the effect No shipwright no ship no wood no ship no form no effect no end no effect and all these together an effect contra Cujus vires est First here he tels us of a vis then he sayes it is vis essendi then vis essendi rei so that as there are four words so four things causa is here a concrete signifying the thing causing as argumentum was before signifying the thing arguing for our Logick that brings us to the first cause doth but shew him as he argueth not as he is in his being causa is the thing arguing cujus that is est res causans cujus vi this vis and vertue is of the thing but Logick looks at it as it is in the thing and then at the thing for if the thing had not vim esseficandi an effect it could not be a cause as wood will not make a gown so that it is here secondly required that the thing causans have vim causandi and against this word is that common fallacian of non causa pro causa as he that will lay to the charge of a childe that which a man can onely doe so when we ascribe to Nature that it cannot doe as the making of a World which is peculiar to God est Est Esse is a general term and may signifie the essence of a thing or the tying of some thing to some thing that is not of the essence as first when I say vir est secondly vir est doctus where I do not respect homo from his causes but as he hath this adjunct doctrina and the reason why est is so general is because this esse is from the causes which are most general for nothing can be said to be this or that before it be which is from the causes by this vis we must understand that power and faculty in the thing that causeth another thing as if he should say the cause is affected to argue the effect forcibly for vis is here the same that affectio is in argumentum
Esse indeed is general to all the causes and existere is from them all which appears by this we say mundus est a Deo est ex nihilo est formata c. so that est is nothing but the act of the cause to make the effect so we shall see in a knife there are all the four causes to be in it and the three former for the end and therefore if we will not be deceived here see that whatsoever is de esse of a thing that is a cause res not effectum for we have heard what res est that is the subject of Art but if we had said effectum it had bene a posteriore for we have not the effect wrought Again we are but yet in causa in general by res he meanes res efficienda not yet effecta Now another fallacie is of non causa pro causa when we take that to be the cause which hath the potentia efficiendi but doth not efficere but is causa quatenus it hath an hand in that effect so that if one bring a cause that is not a cause though it have vim efficiendi yet is it not causa Itaque primus hic locus fons est omnis scientiae This is a deduction out of the first rule following this if the thing be causae vi then this is primus locus inventionis for it is first in the cause before it be in the effect then again it is primus locus in respect it is the first argument we must look at Locus here Ramus tels us closely that the Aristotelians topick places are these arguments the first whereof is causa Fons We know the fountain is the first place where waters spring so all things spring from the causes yea subjects adjuncts c. Fons scientiae For if we know the causes then we know the effects because they arise from them and subjects c. and again that is the principal part of knowledge Scirique demum creditur c. For till we know the causes we know but the outside of a thing and that which may be removed from the thing without destroying the thing but knowing the causes of a thing we know it as it is the things being arising from the causes and thus knowing the thing we know it intus and in cute Here Ramus doth commorare telling us what Aristotle meant by these words And again too tels us that Aristotles demonstration is nothing but the scientia of an axiome consisting of causa and effectum and he teacheth it to every cause in general efficient matter form and end No Aristotle saith that a demonstration concludes the property of a subject by the definition because that layes forth the essence of a thing but it doth not tell us all the esse ergo not all the scientia for the esses of the efficient and end do not go into a definition Vt merito dicatur a Poeta c. Here he prefers the Poets authority before Aristotle for Aristotle being more imployed in this doctrine might speak of it as a private man but the Poet as a publike man foelix meaning a contemplative happiness not a practick Causa est efficiens materia aut forma finis Every cause yeelds an esse but all together make the effect now it is of two sorts efficiens materia aut forma finis for he cannot give it to us in two words but makes a distinct axiom and couples the parts with a conjunction copulative by reason whereof they have a community but where lyes it this it is I may call the two first potential causes the other two acting causes this the Schools tels us when they call materia potentia and the form actus and this is Ramus meaning as we shall see in many examples as when a Taylor sets buttons on a doublet with thread they are not done till all the causes are there so a house is not an house so soon as it hath an efficient and matter but when it hath also a form and end Now our Author would not use potentia and actus first because they are barbarous words secondly they are improper because they cannot be called potentia and actus but potentiating and acting then again the form and end are potentia as well as efficiens and materia contra therefore he makes two couple of causes for so we see the efficient is the first mover moving quite through with the matter singly and the form and end move them inseparably together therefore they are thus distinguished efficiens est motus a quo in a line the matter ex qua and form per quem finis ad quem but because there is a scope at matter therefore there is a distinction For as the efficient and end terminate the thing so the form and matter mediate the thing running quite through the same So God made a matter and gave it a form and so an end ergo reason must see them thus The same order there is also in Gods providence so man also doth imitate God when he doth any thing orderly the first care is for a workman then a matter then a form and then an end though we may have cloth before a Taylor yet it is not a matter till it begin with the Taylor to bring an effect to pass So then the efficient is in nature before the matter and the matter before the form for the form is an adjunct to the matter and the form before the end the end being an adjunct to the form and again a thing must be formed before it can have an end The first efficient had the first matter and forms effect to him the second forms are adjuncts to the matter Now the first efficient is absolutely first for it hath nothing before it the first matter is not res prima nor causa prima but first for matter ergo it is from the first efficient onely ergo never hath any existency in the world but is ens incompletum so the first form is from the first efficient not of the first matter but onely in it ergo it is ens also completum hence our soules are not our forms for then our forms should be res incomplâ—tae Now the end is last and the first end is the last end it is first because it is most general last because it is not made for another end ergo it followeth of necessity that the last end is not made so that the end as it is last as the thing is acted so it is first as it is most general for all the former causes work to effect the end As we say in Schools finis est primus in intentione posterius in executione so God made all things for his glory here his glory is first in intention of him that works by counsel but is acted last of all by all things that he made And here Aristotles bonum quo communius eo melius is
efficient as essential for actio is before passio so that here mark that next after we see the efficient we are to look at these modi As we are saved by faith alone here is efficiens sola Our Author brings in an example of Ovids the 4. remedii and Kickerman hath a fling at Ramus for his examples and would have him bring his examples out of Divinity But first Logick being a general Art it is therefore best to fetch his examples out of the most common and general Writers as out of Poets and Historians which the Gentiles and Turks may receive these being more generally known to the world than are the Scriptures and again Divinity is the most special Art of all And so Ramns findeth fault but justly with Aristotle for fetching his examples out of Geometry which is too obscure for it is a fallace to fetch examples to prove any thing if the examples be not as well or better known to them to whom we demonstrate any thing as to our selves As they say in Geometry A is not B c. for so they say in Geometry angulus A and angulus B. c. Now Logick is a general Art ergo it is best to fetch examples out of Poetry c. which belongs to Rhetorick a general Art the example is this first proper otia are proper and conserving causes of love then tropical causa est procreans cibus the cherisher Otia si tollas c. Thus â—e reasons otia are the causes of love for take them away and love is gone hence it appeares they were of the essence of love so that because causa is of the essence of the effect ergo put idleness and you must put love aut contra for the essence will be wanting and we have a rule sublata causa tollitur effectum and it is general to all causes for they are all necessary to the esseficating of the effect all the rules of causa in common Logicians you shall have here as posita causa ponitur effectum yet not one cause but all the causes must concurre many other rules they have all which are inwrapt in the definition of causa now it holds contingently in every cause for if we put one cause we put all the causes and so it holds in the special causes that posita causa ponitur effectum contra as take away otium from Egistus and you take away love so that sublata causa a tertio tollitur effectum so in judgement it is also true as give otium to Egistus and you may give him love which argues from the efficient Sic pater mater procreant nutrix tuetur Before he shewed us an example out of an Author he wils us to look for the use of them out of Authors The matter of the first belongs to Ethicks the matter of the second to History Logick is a general Art ergo his examples are best out of Poetry and Oratory wherein the use of all Art is Now the aliquid before is love which we should have heard of against which Ovid makes a medicine In this example Dido is the aliquid for here the aliquid is the causa Dardanus had two sons Assaracus and Anchises and of him came Aeneas now here she takes away the true causes and sayes Caucasus begot thee so there Caucasus in duris cantibus is causa procreans and Hyrcanae tigres are preserving causes but this is false for here is non causa pro causa Object But doth he well to bring fallaces Answ Yes out of Poets for here non ens or ens fictum hath the nature of ens in it neither are all fables lyes but by continued allegories they teach us notable truths now she challengeth Aeneas with this for his manners because he forsook her Sic Romulus conditor Romanae urbis c. He makes examples of his own and there is genesis teaching us that though genesis be before analysis yet genesis imitativa is nothing but the imitating of a former analysis Again our Author makes choice of such examples as may be paradigmaes and whereunto any other example may be brought as in the first he makes an accident to be the cause of an accident in the second he makes a substantial effect to be from substantial causes naturally but fainedly in the last he brings substantial causes working substantial effects ordinarily in artificial things and here we may see who first shot the arrow before we can see where it lights or through what it flew or whence CHAP. IV. Secundo causa efficiens sola efficit aut cum aliis VVE are still in the efficient the first thing that we can see in the artificio of any thing is the efficient and the modi of it rhe most general modi was procreans and conservans before now we come to the second modi sola aut cum aliis which are more general than per se and per accidens in use but not so generall as the first Secundo sola c. this is next ergo next after the first sola that is where this modus efficiendi is considered and the force and vertue of this argument from the efficient cause stands in this modus sola for so we are to consider always when any efficient is brought to argue any thing see which modus is brought with it as in the example before the effect is pressed with the modus of procreans and with the modus of conservans as you would take away love take away idleness for it is the procreant and conserving cause of love Now as God is the procreant and conserving cause of all things so he is causa sola first ergo that is before causa â—um aliis afterward he is causa cum aliis working together with the creatures and we finding this in the first efficient we may also find it in the first in the second and in every one because all things are simulacra of the first Now these belong to Logick for there is reason in them and any thing deserveth more or less praise or dispraise as he doth good or evil sola aut cum aliis Earumque omnium saepe alia principalis alia adjuvans ministra That is earum omnium quae cum aliis efficiunt saepe alia principalis alia adjuvans ministra for so saepe here is part of the axiom and thus often it fals out that one among the rest in doing of things is principal and as we say ring-leader to the rest though sometimes likewise all be hail fellows So that as the Lord did at the first work all things alone and then with others so likewise do the creatures in nature and here again as the Lord is principal when he worketh with others so also when creatures work together one for the most part is principal Alia adjuvans ministra That is as it were a minister and an instrument Here we are to understand there
Physitians call it causa evidens and meat and drink is causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a disease 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is that cause that worketh externally the Physitians call it causa continens but here is no distinction of cause neither have these quatenus causae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any force to argue the effect but onely quatenus efficiens whereas we hear in every special modus of Ramus that they did press the effect strongly as didst thou kill thy father or didst thou it alone c. so also in causa per se and per accidens there is great difference in arguing a conclusion if he did it natura there is no rebuking of that for it was from his nature if he sinned by counsel the punishment is so much the greater if he did it well consilio he deserves the more praise Fortuna indeed is such a cause as it is not a cause by Ramus definition for fortune is but Gods providence unknown now if there be any other respect of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it will fall to the same with causa cum aliis Now we come to materia that as we have heard had a community with the efficient which community was to move with it a great while before the form and end come so soon as the efficient moves presently the matter moves but the form and end move not a good while after Now because this difference which causeth the distribution of causa appears in greater things ergo it is also in less things but our Logick tels us that the efficient must go before the matter and how agreeable doth our Logick go to Gods work in the creatures if we shall take a thing and resolve it into his causes and make them effects and look at their causes for so when we look at their causes we make them effects so that absurd is that definition of causa to be either going before or concomitans to the effect at last we shall come to a first efficient that hath nihil prius to him ergo he was not made ergo he ever was ergo all other things once were not for they were made ergo they now being were from the first ergo the first matter was not eternal as Aristotle dreamed but indeed he would cross Plato in what he could yet one may confute him by his own rules for he grants there is a primus motor ergo he is movens but not moved for then he should have some thing to move him and so not be first ergo it is easie to make Aristotle beleive he is immoveable because he is first ergo he must move others onely for he is infinite ergo without limits of place ergo in every place ergo nusquam inclusus or exclusus ergo unmoveable Now the first matter is first in his kind namely the first matter but not the first thing and we may conclude from this that the first efficient was before the first matter for if both were first neither were first for if the one should say he were first the other would say nay I am as forward as thee and so there would be none absolutely first and again one is before two ergo he that is absolutely first can be but one Materia For his name as efficiens was extrafaciens moving all the rest and not moved of them but as it were pater so materia is quasi mater out of which the thing springs as out of a mother so that we may see the name to be given a simili but yet with very good reason as the child is not a patre but of the mother so the effect is from the efficient but springs out of the matter Now that there is such a matter thus it may appear there is nothing composed but its essence and it self a distinct for to make essentia and ens to be the same is peculiar to God Again whatsoever is finite that may be limited in his essence now God onely is infinite and every other thing finite ergo may be defined ergo it self and its essence are distinct ergo it must have a matter Again if every thing have not essence as they speak of Angels why are not they finite ergo they may be defined ergo their essence and themselves are distinct again if they have not a matter what have they nothing but an efficient and an end then they should be imperfect and be either the first matter or the first form again if they have a form and no matter then this form must be another thing from them and how is that possible for if the form and they be all one then the cause and effect will be the same But Logick is a general Art and because every thing hath a matter ergo materia belongs hither and the first matter had not a matter for then it should not have been first but was incomplete Materia est For it gives esse and as the force of the efficient was requisite for the esseficating of the thing so the matter much more for not onely its esse but its nature and self couches in the effect and makes a bulk and if the vis of the efficient were essential because there could be no essefication of the effect without it much more must the matter be essential for if we take away the matter we take away both the force and the thing it self Now we must understand that ens and non ens are the subject of Logick and as argumentum was concretum and also causa so when I say materia I mean a thing that was made of a matter Ex qua That is out of which it is raised it is the mother of every thing as we often speak of the earth because every thing indeed is made of the four elements but more especially nourished of the earth Now the matter doth not onely by his vertue cause the effect but is interessed in it and the effect riseth out of it as if it were a child springing out of the mother onely it goes further in that its essence goes to the making up of the effect now though the essence be from â—atter and form yet the ens it self is from all the causes Res est That effect as we shall hear hereafter for in this doctrine of causa effectum is the aliquid which we must call res till we come to it Est Every cause gives an esse to the effect and this esse is the bulk of it and from whence ariseth the greatness or littleness of the effect by the form now it is a great question in Schools whether the matter doth any thing indeed in respect of the efficient it is patiens but in respect of the effect it doth causare and so doth agere For if it be an effect in respect of every cause then every cause is after a sort the efficient of that
effect and if you ask me what his action is I answer it doth materia or substantiare the effect as the efficient did efficere the effect It is also passive in regard of the form but both together co-work to make the effect though forma be principium motus in the thing by the matter Now this is the next thing to be inquired after we see who made it then whereof it was made both which we see in every thing and see them as they are done Now the common Logicians bring in distinctions of Materia As Kickerman saith it is proxima or remota but he may say so of every argument as well as of materia he saith man is made of the first matter then of the elements which are more remote but ex semine that is nearer alas we do not here consider priority or posteriority neither do these any more press the effect here is no Logick still but materia est causa ex qua ergo this will not fall in Logick and if you mark it presently when he comes to materia prima and to the elements he is in natural Philosophy ergo here is no distinction of materia in Logick but of the particular thing that belongs to a particular Art Hoc argumento ficto apud Ovid. 2. Metam Solis domus auro pyropo ebore argento componitur Regia Solis erat sublimibus alta columnis Clara micante auro flammasque imitante pyropo c. Here Ramus brings an example out of Ovid which is a common School book and here a fained cause argues a fained effect ens and non ens are the subject of Logick but non ens gratia entis for so Logick looks at them first and gives entity to ens fictum and therefore Grammar and Rhetorick must follow it for they are attendants on it The Regia Solis is here distributed into his parts and they are argued by their matter it had his pillars of gold for their matter and pyropus another matter of the columnes the covering or seeling of Ivory the leaves of the doors made of silver Observe how these causae cum aliis in the matter do not force the effect any thing at all ergo he doth not teach them here for whether they be made of one matter or of more matters all is one ergo there is no Logick in that ergo it doth not belong to Logick Caesar 1. belli civilis Imperat militibus Caesar ut c. Here milites are the efficient causes of the ships then he distributes the ship into his parts keels ribs Carinae primum and statumina ex leui materia the rest was viminibus contextum lined within with leather so that here is distributio integri in membra and every part is argued by the material cause CHAP. VII Causae primum genus est inefficiente materia secundum sequitur VVE have heard of the efficient and of the matter and this is the conclusion of it now we come to the second which is in forma fine so that whilest he saith Causae primum genus ejusmodi est c. he tels me it was a distribution before where the genus is subsistent in speciebus efficientis materiae for so genus is totum partibus essentiale and is never but in speciebus so that the genus of them is comprehended in the doctrine of them two parts Secundum sequitur in forma fine he doth not say Secundus est forma fine now as the efficient and matter were combined together as moving together a while without the form and end so the form and end though the form be before yet the end comes presently after and is as it were the pedissequa to the form and indeed where we cannot find the form of a thing we put the end as being next to it and best expressing it So bene disserere the end of Logick is put for the form of Logick now as this distinction of the motion of the causes is seen in greater matters so is it also in less for there is a co-operation of the efficient and end together first then of the form and end together also though not without the efficient and matter In forma fine for the form is before the final cause for before the form be induced or ingenerated in the matter it cannot be good for his end and the end is causa in respect of the effect not of the efficient So we say a coat hath a form before it have an end for it may be a coat and yet not fit to serve me now then as the efficient began the motion and the motion redounded out of the matter so it runs per formam finem Forma est causa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same that forma is in Latine there is but a transposition of the letters and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the face and fas and facies in Latine comes of facio because when it is made it hath the face of a thing so a thing when it hath its form it hath a face it will seem something so that the efficients esse is not facies rei nor the matters esse for they might be otherwhere ergo the efficient and matter are common causes this is a particular one which is one reason why the efficient and matter go before being more general so that when once he hath the face of a man then is he a man this word forma both in Latine and Greek is taken abusive for the outward figure of a thing it is a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct for figuration is not forma as we may see in water put in a round glass or in a square glass the same water having the same form will have a round figure or square figure according to the glass wherein it is now because the figure is adjoyned to the form ergo they say it is forma and in Schooles they call it forma accidentalis now the figure follows the form but it is not so essential but it may be changed and yet the water is the same because the water is variable into divers figures as we heard before in water The Schooles say that no artificial thing hath any other form ergo ask them in what predicament any artificial thing is and they will answer in quality but thus they will make Geometry to give the formes of things Figura is a quality ergo to make quality a form is very absurd again as before one and the same thing had divers figures and onely one form that makes the thing one again is the figure of a table the form of it then the table belongs to Geometry not to the Joyners Art again whether doth the matter of the table belong to substantia ergo the form too or else it is in divers predicaments again figura is an accident but forma is a cause and gives essence to the thing
first the other followeth yet both move together and as two hands laid together do move together and yet one before the other so is it with the formal cause and effect the formal cause moves and the effect also but the effect follows it in every step and the final cause follows the form as the shadow follows the body and the effect comes last again this is a property ergo an adjunct ergo is after the subject for the form is an effect before it be a subject so that the efficient doth as it were make the form and the effect still follows as we may see in artificial things so that so far forth as the form is ingenerated so farre forth the effect is accomplished Anima rationalis est forma hominis c. Here our Author doth commorari and stay upon the doctrine of forma for it is so deep and subtil as that it can hardly be perceived This example is not true because anima rationalis may subsist from the body now as there can be no matter without a form so there can be no form without a matter therefore this example will not serve his turn yet he brings that he could get many in Schools have stumbled at this and have gone about to mend it but indeed they have marred it Some say ratio belongs to Angels ergo it is not the proper form of homo and therefore they have added mortale and say homo is animal rationale mortale Now if they joyn mortale to ratio it is not mortalis Again animal ratione mortale doth detract from man unless we speak of his body Et distinguitur a caeteris omnibus naturis That is not so for the Angels though they be animae and so have not animam rationalem yet they have rationem again doth not the body of man distinguish him from other thing so I suppose we admit of the Pythagorians metam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A mans soul in a bird will not make it a man Geometricarum figurarum in triangulis quadrangulis sua forma est He brings such examples as he could find and those whereof greatest question might be made it hath been a question among Logicians that this forma is peculiar to substances not accidents and hence have made a distinction of forma to be substantialis or accidentalis but they are deceived for Logick is a general Art and every thing that is made hath causes ergo may be defined ergo hath matter and form for otherwise we could not have a perfect definition in Grammar Rhetorick and Arithmetick or in any other Arts that have accidents for their subjects ergo accidents behold a form as well as an efficient ergo he saith in Geometry take a triangle it consists of three lines with three angles which by their unition in their angles make up one form as well as one matter Phisicarum rerum coeli terrae arborum piscium sua forma est He doth commorari here long for two causes first in respect the form is deep and needs illustration Secondly to confute other Logicians that say accidents have no forms unde praecipua rerum ut natura est c. if it be causa per quam res est id quod est then it is praecipua rerum natura Nature proper is res nata that is that springeth principiis that is matter and form so that the whole nature consisteth of them and this is the proper signification of it afterward it comes to signifie the principia themselves hence is materia and forma called natuâ—ae so that in natural Philosophy when you read of nature they tell you commonly some tale of materia or forma then again by a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject it signifieth the qualities natural in things all this shews forma to be praecipua rei natura Praecipua first because it makes the thing to be id quod est so doth not the matter again forma why it is principium actus from whence the qualities principally arise for as the Philosophers teach though not truly in every point materia is principium passionis forma actionis and actio is better than passio ergo the form more excellent than the matter but both matter and form do agere for they are causa yet the forms begin and the matter is but the sustentation of it and the forms act is the stronger by the matter not onely as it acts internally but when it acts upon external things by resistance by the way Now as it hath chief interest in esseficating the effect so it is praecipua rei natura so also there is of it praecipua rei explicatio si possit inveniri Si possist inveniri He saith it neither can be found out nor that it cannot be found out Si possit inveniri sure it is findable I prove it thus it is lyable to Logick if it be objected to the eye then the eye may see it it may but hardly be found because it doth not descry it self to the outward senses by qualities as bodies do again the form in nature is so subtil that we can hardly find it but see as it were the shadow of it ergo divers have thought the forms of things to be divine Some have gone so farre as to think them to be influences but subtile it is indeed and harder to find out then either the efficient or matter ergo we commonly call that the matter which contains the form too because it is rather seen as it hath a material cause than as it hath a formal Vt in artificiofis rebus facilius occurrit That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning than any man can trace his wisdom as we may see in the elements ergo no man can make a thing in nature man may further nature but he cannot make any thing again the parts are so fine in the mixture of things as it is beyond the acies of mans eye to see them In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit Why because artificial things are the works of men and one man may trace another though every man cannot Caesar 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici c. As for example in artificial things this very description will declare how hard a thing it is to find out the form but we use to point at it by the matter and by the position of it There stood great beams all along two foot asunder put into the earth the distances between them were stuffed with great stones when these were so fastned then there was a new order begun where they laid the beams against those stones that were laid before and filled likewise the distances with stones which were against the first lay of beams but what hath he told us now why saith he I am a French-man and I will tell you the form of a French wall where if you do but look at the forms of every part and of them
you shall see a composed form so that the Logician doth not look at the outward face of a thing but at the inward essence here he is fain to deliver the form by many other arguments and indeed it is a description of forma Est in secessu longo locus ensula portum c. Here he hath by the position of the parts of the haven told us the form of it CHAP. VIII De fine Finis est causa cujus gratia res est VVE have gone through the esse of a thing we have but heard of three when the fourth comes that makes up the perfection of the thing namely finis Finis for the name it is borrowed from Geometry for that that is terminus there is here called finis and it is brought hither to signifie that final cause that serveth to make up the effect so that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if we keep the proportion of the esses but it is not the last part and member thereof as they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last member of some whole as Method is the last member of Logick Finis is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the esse of a thing not of the members of it Now it is called finis because it limits the thing for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for his essence and it is the last thing that limits it ergo it is called finis Est causa Because with force thereof the thing is and the end though it do not enter into the essence of the effect by it own essence yet by it vertue it doth efficere as doth the efficient Cujus gratia Therefore the final cause is that that graceth the effect and thence hath the thing his commendation cujus gratia for whose grace for gratia here signifieth not onely for whose sake but for whose grace as if the final cause were that which doth grace the effect and so indeed it doth For as bonum quo communius eo melius so communior finis hath more grace than finis specialio◠for that cause that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent then that which is more remote Hence man is more excellent than any other creature because he is made immediately for God So then the end graceth it evermore and the more excellent the end is the more excellent is that effect This then is the esse that the final cause doth give to the effect namely that which is good for that effect so that the goodness of a thing is that vis in the effect that it hath from the end As in a knife the efficient may be a slave the matter likewise naught the form though that be something yet were it not for the end neither the efficient matter or form would move ergo the final cause is said to be the happiness of the thing so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be serviceable to that end for which it was made A garment well made as touching the skill of the efficient and of good stuffe for the matter and fit for a garment and so of a good form yet not fitting him for whom it was made it wanteth his end or happiness and so is not perfect Again this shews the difference between the formal cause and the end for the form may be as we see and not the end Again we know there are many things that have not their perfection but by growth and yet have all the causes yet notwithstanding the end presently follows after the form so man was made by God here God is the efficient earth the matter reason the form yet here is not his end namely fitness to serve God And thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded Physicis rebus finis homo propositas est homini Deus Of natural things man is the end the grace of man is God and God makes him good not as an efficient but as an end Omnium artium est aliquod summom bonum finis extremus That is that end which they reach unto but that is not the summum bonum of all things for Logicks end is bene disserere Grammars bene loqui c. these are the furthest ends of Logick and Grammar but not the furthest end of all they are indeed the proper end of them but not the summum bonum so that he means by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them and the end of Logick lies in the precepts of it as they act bene disserere This is the difference between the end and the effect A house is made to dwell in though it never be dwelt in so for a garment to be worn is one thing and to be fit to wear another So if I go forth to speak with one and he be gone yet I obtain my end they commonly say he was frustrate of his end but not frustrate of finis quatenus finis but quatenus effectum Juno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur solatii scilicet prolisque gratia Sunt mihi his septem praestanti corpore Nymphae c. Here Juno perswades Eolus to let his wind out and she would give him one of her Nymphs which she presseth upon him by final causes first that she may spend all her years with him and secondly that she may make him the father of a fair off-spring In defensione Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusatorem urget c. Et certe ait contra ipsum Caesarem est congressus armatus c. As if he should say Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawn at the battle of Pharsalio thou didst strike his side mark the variety of the phrases and so of the ends What meant thy sword what was thy mind here was the propositum What meantst thou to have done even to have killed Caesar So that the final cause is not accidental to the thing but even substantial and therefore we have it so often in the definition of Arts used for the form and that for this reason because it is the next argument to it and presupposeth the form so that this is the use of the final cause in the definition of Arts. As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi here bene disserere is the end and it is as if he should say Dialectica hath such a soul as that it is able to perform and execute this or that thing for which it was made So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of all Arts I but what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in general why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the effect of all Arts Answ But as every thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of it ergo if a man will do any Logicum opus he must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thus we have heard the doctrine
rich or poor yet he is honest here is a diversity for so a discreet axiom may be affirmed they are divers because riches commonly make unhonest and also poverty so we may make diversity between the cause and effect or in giving many causes to one effect aut contra or one subject to an adjunct aut contra or many subjects to one adjunct aut contra and according to these wayes also there may be several modi thereof CHAP. XIII De disperatis Opposita sunt dissentanea que ratione re dissentiunt IN looking at things we first see the causes that give esse then the complements that give bene esse to the thing then we see what it is not and easily do by seeing them arguments that give esse and first we are to see the diversity which though they be conformable yet they do divert somewhat one from another and they are first because they give light to all the rest that follow Now we come to see their opposition that is those things which have their causes effects subjects and adjuncts are not onely dissenting in a logical respect but are distinct reals Opposita gain sets it cometh of ob and pono as it were set against ob is as it were a bolt to bar one thing from another so that their nature is to be barred not onely ratione but it is principally in their realty and herein do diversa differ from opposites Diversa are made to disagree in that wherein they might agree whereas opposites dissent in their nature Sunt dissentanea We heard they were called dissentanea by reason of their disagreeing they do not sentire idem but quot capita tot sensus sunt among them whereas consentanies are of the same judgement and these names do well fit arguments because they are as it were the senses of things Dissentanea that is such as think asunder are severed and distract our thoughts Que ratione re dissentiunt Ratione that is as diversa did because they do not onely disagree quatenus argumenta that is as they have logical respect in them but quatenus they are res as black is not white they are opposites and there is a barre that black cannot be white contra which opposition is in their dissention being clean of another judgement so that there is dissention betwixt them in sensu nostro in beholding of them Re. As if we say black is not white we say not onely that black is not the cause not the effect subject or adjunct of white but that they are divers things in nature ergo this must be observed that the bar is not onely the bar of rational respect but of reality Itaque eidem attribui secundum idem ad idem c. Surely if they be bar'd from coming one at another and that in nature then non possunt eidem attribui As first when I say blackness is not whiteness and again when as I say blackness and whiteness cannot be given to the same subject here the one dissention is in essence the other is in accident ergo this idem must be understood of the essence it self and likewise the subject Non possunt takes away all possibility of joyning in one ergo whatsoever make◠them consent breaks this rule for whereas this rule saith sunt dissentanea they make them consentanea and again whereas this rule saith non possunt eidem attribui they say they may Attribui The attribute is alwayes the consequent part of the axiom so that if we give them to subjects they cannot be given to one and the same subject they may be the consequent but not the antecedent part so that contraries must be attributed for when I say homo est animal aut brutum I give them both to animal but not eidem Now antecedent contraries will have contrary consequents est enim par ratio now they do dissentire ratione re ergo cannot any wayes be consentanies ergo cannot be made by any means to agree Secundum idem According to the same divers think this is put in in respect of relates because of the example that follows pater filius ejusdem but it hath a more general respect of opposites in their whole nature else it should have been taught more specially in the doctrine of relates Now two contraries may be given eidem but not secundum idem adidem eodem tempore eidem that is eidem genere not eidem specie as a man may be well and a man may be sick but not the same man so that secundum idem hath respect to the same individuality as it were or species so homo may be aeger and sanus but not secundum idem for that identity cannot be now ratio is given homini secundum idem for herein omnis homo est idem ad idem still there is idem for if we consider them not about idem they are not opposites then again there must be the same respect and also ad idem that is the very same point for whiteness in the wall and whiteness in my hand are neither attributed eidem nor secundum idem eodem tempore for if they be diversis temporibus then they may both agree eidem as homo nunc sedens potest deinceps ambulare so all these respects came from being dissentanea ratione re so that all these must be respected so that black and white in general are not opposites but as they are considered in their dissenting and opposite nature so that this is the true nature of opposites If ex indocto fit doctus here is a difference of time and by this rule we may answer almost all the fallations that are made that fallation a divisione is from hence therefore this is a consequution from the definition going before and principally from the word re Sic Socrates albus ater eadem parte esse non potest Itaque ex altero affirmato alterum negatur e contra Et e contra follows from hence for Ramus left it in his edition and if econtra be not put in the rule is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for if we have an example where ex altero negato alterum affirmatur that hath otherwise no rule here ergo we must say e contra for they that leave it out as most have done since Ramus here is their mistaking because they think it is not a necessary consequution but contingent Now Ramus doth not teach us consequution that belongs to syllogisms but arguments use if it be but contingently true yet it may belong to Logick as well as if it were necessary and it is very common in speech to say it is not this or that but another thing again the meaning of these two is this ex altero affirmato alterum negatur that is they both cannot be affirmed for he teacheth invention here and not judgement e contra that is they cannot
husband and wife bound children and servants c. but now the husband and wife are not relates because the bound and free are relates all these are special examples of relates containing nothing under them so that relates cannot possibly be a predicament according to their own doctrine no more than causa and effectum and by that course that they take I can prove that Socrates est genus in going backward and saying he is substantia he is genus c. Now because the whole relation stands in their mutual causation for that cause they are called relates Vt pater qui filium habet c. So we say is he such a mans son here is a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject son put for man when I say Paul is a servant of Christ here I mean Pauls calling servant hath a double respect in it one as it is in Oeconomy another as it hath logical relation which we may see thus for if he be Christs servant then Christ is his master Relata dicuntur simul esse natura The reason stands in this the whole being of the one relate is contained in the other ergo they are simul for if they be mutual causes they must be mutual effects ergo as one is the cause so the other is the effect contra ergo they must be simul Natura Because their nature springs from them mutually for nature is arising from causes here we may see in the Trinity that one person is not before another there is no respect of priority or posteriority in the rest of contraries because there is no force of arguing from thence we heard before that all of them were aeque manifesta that is aeque intelligibiâ—ia and not as consentanies where the cause cleareth the effect more then contra because the causes are more simple and single so likewise the subject is not beholding to the adjunct but contra again the â—ause and subject did more argue the effect and adjunct than contra Again from hence it is that qui alterum perfecte norit norit reliquum for they are mutual causes and our scientia est e causis Pro Marcello Ex quo profecto intelligis quanta in dato beneficio sit laus cum in accepto tanta sit gloria Dare and accipere are relates as if he should say if it be glorious to receive then it is much more glorious to give now his principal driâ—t of arguing is a minore but yet the arguments are relates so that a thing is not given till it be received and again he that knows the one knows the other Tum serum sis tâ— genitum blandeque fateris Cum dicis dominum Sosibiane patrem Sosibian is a servant to his father because he is his master Sic portorum Rhodiis locare honestum est Her macreonti conducere If it be honest to let out then it is honest to hire for they are mutual causes and in usury I think both taking on usury and letting out to usury are unlawful by reason of this relation as Jeremy speaks So discere and docere are relates Jamilla inquit matura uxor generi noverca filii filiae pellex Here he playeth with the names and indeed all names of kinreds are relates Ovidius 1. Metamorphosios Non hospes ab hospite tutus Non socer a generâ— fratrum quoque gratia rara est c. Atque argumentum talis relationis contrarium nihil habet c. Indeed here is no contrariety in these examples neither consention in that respect but they are paria happily he could find no example of them in their disagreeing nature and so would here commend unto us their use to be more often in the consentany affection then in their dissentany nature as when we say how could that be why he was his son CHAP. XV. De adversis Adversa sunt contraria affirmantia quae inter se velâ—ti e regione perpetuo adversantur VVE have heard what a thing is that is what goes to the being and what to the well-being of it and how thereby it dissenteth from other things by a diversity or opposition divers might consent between themselves but they are made to divert one from another Again for opposition it is re ratione dissenting either by a disparate nature or by a contrary nature Contraries are either of one thing to another thing or of one thing to nothing the former kind also is of things that might agree or of them that will never be at peace now therefore we come to adversa and these have their name of turning not aside as diversa or as one to many as disparates neither as relates which have a double aspect a conjunct aspect being set face to face and an opposite aspect being set back to back But adversa are in an oppsite aspect hence a line drawn from the point of the one aspect through the center to the point of the other aspect will be a right line so that here is no peace they are overthwart neighbours continually Sunt contraria contraries were opposed one to one so that a thing is not an adverse but as it is opposed to some other thing Sunt affirmantia That is they are things positive whereof the one thing is not nothing but both are something Contraria quorum utrumque affirmat sunt affirmantia id est vere entia At haec contraria hujusmodi sunt Ergo adversa sunt contraria affirmantia Adversantur That is according to their nature set one against another by a right line Perpetuo 2. Relates might be friends though they would be foes but adversa can never be reconciled this dissention of adversa doth arise from a particular form for homo is adverse to brutum as brutum is animale irrationale and as man is animale rationale and these can never be reconciled and every thing hath his contrary though we cannot see by reason of the forms subtilty for contrarieties arise from the forms Inter se This sheweth that contraries are not opposite but when they are set one against another as blackness in a shooe is not opposite to whiteness in a band Veluti e regione As if he should say if one stand here or there the other will face him and if the one remove the other also will remove so that they are two overthwart neighbours directly opposed one to another continually Disparates were behind one another or on the one side one of another never before one another Relates also might be friends but these will alwayes be foes In that he saith veluti e regione he sheweth that they differ from disparates and perpetuo sheweth that they differ from relates Virgilius Aeneidos 11. Nulla salus bello pacem te poscimus omnes Salus and bellum are adversa Sic albor niger calidum frigidum virtus vitium opponuntur Indeed we make them things though their original be defects for vice
it were by the roots and makes that something to be an absolute nothing Privantia They are so called because of the privant that pulls the habit out of his house as it were In eo tantum subjecto He doth not mean that privantia are alwayes adjuncts to some subject for they may be of the same thing as when I say sight is not blindness but this he means that the habit is denyed and the denyer takes away the very same thing without leaving any deputy thereof as cecity denies the very entity of visus where it should be and plucks up as it were the first causes of it Suapte natura inest He doth not understand by nature as if it were a thing considered in naturall Philosophy but in that thing where unto it might be consentany ergo by nature is to be considered that that any way or by any Rule of Art should agree to the thing so that simplex natura is as much as consentaneum or that which is confentanie as a cause effect c. to the thing At que hic affirmatum dicitur habitus negatum autem privatio He keeps the common terms it is called habitus because it should be habituall to the thing whereunto it is given Negatum autem privatio because it pulls out the habit by the roots Sic motus quies sic ebrius et sobrius Our Author brings such examples as are received in Schools otherwise ebrietas is a vice and indeed all vices are privantia So sin is a habit as it causeth the subject to act imperfectly so non es ebrius quia sobrius he takes away the privant by putting the habit Sic cecum esse et videre Existat igitur ex hac familia aliquis ac potissimum caecus ille Let blind Appius come because whilest he cannot see he will take the lesse grief at her So pauper and dives mors and vita and indeed this shews what sin is that brought death a privant cause a privant effect Item tacere et loqui so mortalitas is the privation of immortality though it seem to make it a privant Sed dissentaneorum categoria sic est c. Our Author told us before that there was a categorie of consentanies shewing us where Aristotles ten categories are and here are categoremata of dissentanie also and a categoria of them Now because we cannot see categoria or arguing without we first see the arguments ergo we are here first taught the categoremata for the categorias sake Vnde quidvis ab altero differre quolibet modo potest Vnde quidvis that is any thing as if he should say there is nothing that is not another thing or nothing but it is some of these wayes CHAP. 18. De paribus Argumenta simplicia it a fuerunt in consentaneis et disentaneis comparata sunt quae inter se comparantur c. VVE have heard of a thing as it is in it self compleat and as it is first in the causes and afterward with his complements and seeing it thus we see how it is not another thing Notwithstanding we come now to see that there may be a comparison betwixt it and another thing happily to match it or to be unequall like or unlike now whilest we see things thus we see the inside outside of them The arguments are called comparates for this afection in them resteth as it were to argue so soon as they are sundred as for example lay one thing to another it may be greater though less to another c. so that these doe not look at things as they are absolute but as they are laid together The reason of these arguments in nature is this there are more things in nature than there are degrees of quantity or resemblance of similitude ergo some of them must be matches some greater some lesse and as the reason of that question one being asked whether there were any two men in the world that had a like number of hairs upon their head He said yes because there were more men in the world than any man had hairs on his head so it is here there are more things in nature than there are degrees of quantity and they are finite ergo some have the same quantity and some have not and again because some things are like others and some unlike ergo there must be a looking at that Argumenta simplicia c. Here is a transition containing the doctrine of that which went before and this is the conclusion Comparata sunt c. Therefore it is imperfect wanting the proposition the name comes of con and paro to bring together or lay together so that howbeit the denomination of Comparates may seem to rise principally from paritie yet we must take them more generally because imparia similia and dissimilia are also compared but are unmatches for as our English word Matches may be taken for equall matches or unequall so may the Latine word comparata be taken for paria or imparia c. Quae compar antur So that this word delivereth the reference that one thing not being another hath to it by way of reference Inter se That is the one being compared with the other and the other with that and both comparates the cause was of the effect the subject of the adjunct et contra dissentanies had one denomination too but comparates though they have the same denomination yet we doe not consider them absolut ely as dissentanies are but as they are laid one to another and the other to it Quae tamet si ipsa comparationis natura aeque nota sunt attamen alterum altero c. Here he tells us that comparats are like unto dissentanies in this that they are aeque nota natura as dissentanies are aeque manifestae but though they be so yet herein they dissent from dissentanies that the one in respect of one man may be more known and more notable than the other so that though they be aeque nota natura yet quoad nos the one may be better known to a man than the other ergo here we must alwayes take heed that when we make comparisons which do not conclude but illustrate as they say that we take our comparison from a thing as well or better known to him to whom it is made than the thing we go about to prove otherwise we teach sophistically and break this Rule Saepeque notis brevius judicantur aliquande partibus plenius distinguntur Again this is generall to all comparats judicantur that is declared shewed painted ergo he saith rather judicantur than demonstrantur Notis He means this comparats use is double they are either shorter either with notes or made full with parts Quae propositio redditioque nominantur The parts of a full comparison are these where the proposition is the argument arguing and the redditio the aliquid Atque omnino comparata etiam ficta arguunt fidemque
give the thing a name arising from some property in it so that it be not common to other things neither is the name and the thing the same as we heard in conjugates justitia justus and juste were the same onely they were delivered diversly Est nominis interpretatio That is not the laying out of the name but the reason of the name so that the arguments arguing are nomen and notatio nominis Notatio is after conjugata because it ariseth from dissentanies also and comparats whereas conjugates arise onely from consentanies Nomina siquidem sunt nota rerum So saith our Grammar vox est nota qua unumquodque vocatur Now as there are nomina so ratio reddi potest si vera notatione fiant The denomination comes from something as homo ab humo for as humus signifieth the earth so homo names not man earthy but it is a new name drawn from humus So terra is called vesta a vi stando And fire is called focus a fovendo Cicero 4. in Verrem O Verrea plaeclara Quo enim accessisti quo non attuleris tecum istum diem Etenim quam tu domum quam urbem adiisti quod favum denique quod non eversum atquâ— extersum reliquiris c. They made a holy day in Sicily for the honour of my Lord Boar-pig now he was a sweep-stake ergo his holy day was named of his manners Verres a verendo because he swept all where he came Ovid 1. Fastorum Prima dies tibi Carna datur dea cardinis hac est c. Carna was so called quasi dea cardinis because she was conversant about doores and hinges Tu conjugis bonae foeminae locupletis quidem certâ— Bambalio quidem pater c. As Bambalio was so called because he used to stammer and stutter in his speech Ex dissentaneis autem est notatio Vt Lucus quia umbra opacus parum luceat ludus qui est longissime à lusu Dis quia minime dives Et comparatio autem est notatio Vt Pyropus quod flammam ignis imittitur Est vero ut notationi ad suum nomen sic nomini ad notationem sua affectio Ramus doth commorari here and shews how the name may argue the notation as well as the notation may the name though that be not so common as animi plenus ergo animosus et contra And thus we have heard how nomina belong to Logick CHAP. XXV De Distributione Reliquum est ex ortis aliunde argumentis argumentum distributionis definitionis NOw we come to second orta which arise manifoldly from more arguments and this he desired to deliver unto us when he said distributio and definitio Now distributio must come after conjugata notatio in respect of his double arising then again it is requisite that after we have seen the first arguments in things that we next name them from some thing in them and then that we see a thing as it is common with another and again when we see the distribution of it into his parts we may soon see the limits of it and how far it reacheth and so give testimony thereof Now a distribution doth arise from any consentany arguments or common because that a cause may be common to more effects contra and a subject to more adjuncts contra Hence it comes to passe that a thing may be distributed a common cause into speciall effects aut contra a common subject into special adjuncts contra And this we see to be very true in nature by many examples so that distributio is nothing but taking a common cause or subject dividing it into special effects or adjuncts aut contra Reliquum est c This is an imperfect transition and indeed containeth a distribution as if he should say ortum is reliquum or primum A distribution is from common causes and a speciall cause and that is perfect or from some conflux of other Arguments which the Schools call properties and that is descriptio In qua utraque pars affectio reciprocationis est That is this is a property to them Now he saith affectio because argumentum est quod affectum est ad arguendum As if he should say these arguments are affected to argue with a mutuall receiving of themselves as the whole contains just as much as the parts et contra the definition as the definite et contra So that this reciprocation for all the world is like unto two Juglers pots where the one will hold just as much water as the other and neither more nor less so then the whole is not the parts nor the definitum the dâ—finitio onely there is this mutuall affection of reciprocation betwixt them that is they have that affection as that the parts simul sumptae will reach no further than the totum aut contra the definition than the definite aut contra as when I say a man is sick or well here the parts may agree to other things than to man Answer True but we must understand it as if it were said homo is either homo aeger or homo sanus now this reciprocation in a distribution is of all the parts together with the whole Distributio est cum totum in partes distribuitur Having shewed the generall affection he now comes to tell what distribution is it is called distribution in the active signification in respect of the parts now distribution is the categoria and the parts and the whole are the categoremata Cum totum in partes distribuitur Here is first a totum which shewes that it is alwayes some common thing and the parts are speciall things contained in the whole so that that which is new here common as a common cause a common effect subject or adjunct c. and here this comon is called a totum as it contains the parts then again this distribution is as it were a pulling the parts in pieces and not a joyning or gathering of them together though iuductio be an inversa distributio but he rather useth this word distributio because it is more generall and more in use and the arguing from the whole to the parts is more in use than contra Totum est quod continet partes It is that which holdeth together the parts continet because all the parts are in the whole as in one as being the common head wherein they are Pars est quae continetur à toto For the container is the totum and the parts the contained so that the doctrine of distributio is but to teach us how to range and carry every thing to his home It is a great question among the Physicians whether a wen be a part of a mans body or no. Answer It is morbus ergo no part it is in toto but not contained à toto for the whole contains the members by reason of its form if we speak of integrum but the form reacheth
not to this Atque ut distinctio totius in partes distributio sic collectio partium c. Many Logicians have made this to belong to argumentatio but they are deceived for they belong hither and it is the same to doe and undoe to divide the whole into parts and to colligere the parts to make up the whole Distributio sumitur ex argumentis toti quidem consentaneis inter se autem dissentaneis Here he sheweth from whence distribution ariseth namely from consentanies in respect of the parts with the whole and also from dissentanies either disparates or contraries in respect of the parts between themselves Itaque tanto accuratior erit quanto partium c. This is a deduction from that that went before for if the former be true then this also now the greatest dissention is of contraries and the greatest of all is between something and nothing ergo to distribute into tricotomies and quadricotomies c. is to skip over something that should be taught And thus much for distribution in generall CHAP. XVI De distributione ex causis Distributio prima est ex absolute consentaneis causis nempe effectis COncerning this doctrine of distributio we have heard the generalitie the ground from whence a distribution doth arise is for that the first arguments are common as a common cause may be distributed by the effects in like sort a common effect may be distributed into speciall causes and so for the subject and adjunct so that beside that community there is nothing new in this second invention In a distribution we observed a whole and a part the whole contains the parts and the parts are contained of the whole ergo if either the whole contain not all the parts or all the parts be not contained of the whole there will be no distribution Now these arguments did arise from consentanies in respect of the whole but from dissentanies inter se Itaque tanto accuratior erit c. ergo a distribution into a dicotomy which is of contraries is the best yet if it cannot be had we must be fain to make a tricotomy Now we come to the species of Distribution Distributio prima est ex absolute consentaneis causis nempe effectis A distribution is a derivative argument from cause or from modo quodam consentaneorum ut subjectorum et adjunctorum Now the use of distribution is this that we may range every thing in his own order and place for when we have seen a thing in his esse and bene esse and then that it is not this or that and have also compared it with other things to see whether it be equall or unequall like or unlike and likewise have given it a name in the next place it is requisite that we set it in his rank for so the Lord hath ranged every thing in the world as man under his genus animal for the Lord hath made all things liable to our Logick ergo they must be ranged under some head that we may see how they agree and how they disagree Distributio prima est c. Distributio is double as I said before ex absolute consentaneis et modo quodam consentaneis so that he calls that distribution which ariseth from a generall cause and a generall effect Distributio prima It is prima in a double respect first because causa and effectum are prima secondly as they are before subjectum and adjunctum He takes distributio here in the active signification and according thereunto must the species be prosecuted for he doth define them from the parts dividing For the notation of the word which gives great light it comes of tribuo and dis as if it signified that distribution that justice gives it is a term belonging to Law as many of our Logicall terms doe and here it signifieth a severing of the parts and a giving to every part his due as when a common cause is distributed and then to every speciall effect his own cause is given so that here is nothing in this new invention but this distribution the rest is the first invention as when I say a man is sick and a man is well here are two subjects and two adjuncts but when I say of men some are sick and some are well here is a distribution Now the reason why he joyneth both causa and effectum together saying ex absolute consentaneis causis nempe effectis is because that in a distribution as there are parts so there is a whole distributio being both active and passive though it be principally denominated from the parts so that where the cause is the whole there the effects must be parts Distributio ex causis est quando partes sunt causae totius So that here the effect is the whole and the causes are the parts now he prosecutes the doctrine of distribution by the parts because he goes according to the act of things and the parts here constitute the whole again a whole the very name doth deny a distribution for if it be whole it is not distributed but the parts shew a whole ergo we must apply distribution to the parts hence distributio ex causis is not when the cause is a whole but when the causes are parts Hence a Distributio ex integro is before a Distributio ex genere because there the parts are effects Distributio ex causis is here the first invention in that he saith ex causis the second invention in that he saith Distributio Again there is the first invention when he saith quando partes sunt causae the second invention when he saith quando partes sunt causae totius so that take the common effect and make it a whole the causes and make them parts and this is the second invention Hic distributio integri in sua membra praecipuè laudatur This now is a speciall modus of distributio ex causis there may be a distribution of the effect by the efficients by the materials by the formals and from the end but he doth not stay upon them but presently comes to the distributio integri in membrae because it is of greater use and of more practice Hic That is in the distributio ex causis so that membra are parts but all parts are not membra and integrum is totum but every totum is not integrum Praecipuè laudatur Why because it is of so great use secondly because it is more secret the other more familiar Integrum est totum cuipartes sunt essentiales The integrum the entire as we call it is totum that is quod continet partes ergo the membra must be contained of the integrum giving therunto both portion of matter and portion of form Hence nails and hairs are not membra of a mans body because they give not a portion of matter and form to it Cui partes sunt essentiales So then if the members be essentiall to the
the matter and form of every genus above him ergo it is universale in this respect having his peculiar form added to them Naturam Here we may see what nature is in things properly some make the form onely to be nature some the matter onely and some both form and matter here we see the essence and nature are all one in the first signification natura signifies res nata secondly it signifies res underes nata est that is the causes so that here know that the causes being put all things attending them follow for so natura is taken for the properties of a thing E qui dat formam dat formam consequentiam so that a perfect definition doth deliver whatsoever comes within the mame of nature Tales definitiones sunt artium No not tales if we should exactly try them by this rule but they are the best examples Now ars is not the next genus to Grammar neither is bene loqui the form but the end of Grammar but he tels us hereby that there is a soul of Grammar which is in every rule which is as it were the simular parts of the Art tending to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bene loqui CHAP. XXXI De Descriptiono Descriptio est definitio ex alliis etiam argumentis rem definiens THis we heard to be generally called definitio so that it doth quodam modo definire but as definitio in general before was a trope so descriptio is not a definition but as it doth explicate quid res sit not definiendo from the essence but describendo from the quantity so that the definitio layes out the flesh bones c. and descriptio layes out the complements The definition was internal the description is but external limiting the thing as it were with chalk The description may be compared to the Carpenters chalking the definition to the thing chalked and by how much the thing it self layes out the quiddity of it better than the chalking doth by so much is a perfect definition more excellent than a description so that here remember that howbeit a description cannot see the arguments laying out the essence of the thing yet the intendment of it is to do it Est definitio That is rem definiens that is quidditatem rei explicans Ex aliis etiam argumentis That is others beside the causis so that a description must have a genus with it if it be not a genus generalissimum that hath no genus again he saith ex aliis not telling us which because any of the arguments a foregoing may go into it even a distribution yea a testimonony also as we may see in the descrption of fama so that it may arise from in artificials yet must it not be taught after them because artificials must have nothing to do with inartificials Atque haec succincta brevitas non est in hac specie perpetua sed saepe illustriorem magnificentiorem explicationem desiderat Our Author doth commorari upon the use of a description shewing that it is not alwayes so brief as before but sometime we shall lay it out in all the simples in the thing Sed saepè illustriorem magnificentiorem c. That is when we deliver things that are magis illustriora et magnificentiora it is requisite we should lay them out more at large than those that are of less moment Sic gloria describitur in Miloniaena Sed tamen ex omnibus praemiis virtutis si esset habenda ratio praemiorum amplissimum esse praemium gloriam c. Glory is argued from his genus praemium praemium from his subject virtus then à comparatis amplissimum Lastly ab effectis Sic 4. Aeneid fama discribitur Extemplo Libyae magnas ut fama per urbes Fama malum quod non aliud velocius ullum c. Fama is the aliquid argued by her effect of going then the subject of place urbes and magnas an adjunct to urbes urbes Libya the integrum extemplo an adjunct of time malum a genus and malum is argued by an adjunct swiftness à minore Monstrum another genus horrendum an adjunct mirabile dictu a testimony nec dulci declinat somno a disparate Tales sunt descriptiones plantarum animalium in Physicis item fluminum c. That is when we lay out their whole quidditie at large and thus have we seen all the artificiall arguments that are in any thing and so have seen the thing both within and without Lastly we shal hear that having seen all in a thing that we have heard before then may we safely give testimony of it as we see occasion and not before CHAP. XXXII De testimonio Divino Exposito artificiali argumento sequitur inartificiale Argumentum inartificiale est quod non suae natura sed assumpta artificialis alicujus argumenti vi arguit VVE have heard of artificiall arguments and there can be nothing that shall be in the artificio of any thing but we have heard it so that if we look at any of the creatures of God to see the root the causes of it and then the whole circumference and limitation thereof we may by these arguments taught before see it throughly Now whereas one man cannot see all things though at the first all things were made for one man the Lord hath in wisdom ordained that we should receive somethings by reports from others for as the world was to increase both in men and other creatures it was impossible that one man should see all things intus incute so that whereas at the beginning all things being made for one man and he afterwards could not see them yet still it is so far forth true whilest all men see all things It is called inartificiale for the contrary reason that artificiale was so called namely of being in the thing whereas this is not in the nature of the thing but externè altogether so that we may see his force by this having no farther to doe with the thing then onely by witnessing of it Exposito artificiali argumento c. This transition contains the conclusion of all that went before and the proposition of that which follows and here again we may see how artificiall arguments go before inartificials because inartificiall arguments have no ground but as they are backt with artificials And this doctrine we may see to be true by the practise of common people for if a man give testimony of that he knowes not others will say he doth he knowes not what For as no man can give testimony of that he knowes not so no man ought to receive a testimony but as it is backt with artificials otherwise he knowes not the thing sufficiently as he should and if he first hear a testimony of a thing and afterward come to see the thing he will then say he knowes it not because one testified so much but because himself saw it to be so It
is called Argumentum inartificiale because it never comes into Art to make up a Rule though it may come in as a commoration to prove a rule syllogistically but method is the disposition of axioms not of syllogismes now a testimony of a thing belongs to that Art to which the thing witnessed doth belong as Aristotles authority against the creation of the world belongs to Divinity there to be confuted in the doctrine of the creation Argumentum inartificiale sequitur It is an Argument for it is effected ad arguendum but after a new manner for it is externè but as it is grounded upon the Artificials so it is effected to argue Argumentum inartificiale est quod non sua natura sed assumpta alicujus artificialis argumenti vi arguit It is of power to argue as we heard before but not vi sua For when a man beareth witness of a thing we receive it presuming that he is familiarly acquainted with the thing that he witnesseth so that arguit but not sua natura for alas what harmony is there between the witnesser considered in his own nature and the thing witnessed considered in its own nature None at all so that we must look at either of these for their natures Sed assumpta c. So that by the force of some artificiall Argument taken unto it it doth argue ergo this teacheth us not easily to receive every testimony hand over head but first to look whether the testis be well acquainted with the thing witnessed otherwise as it may be an error in him to give testimony of a thing he knows not so may it be no lesse error in us that receive such a testimony This we see reproved in common matters among men and it teacheth us to receive the testimony of a man not so much because ipse dixit but because we are sure he knowes the thing throughly Vi assumpta Nor that it is ortum argumentum for orta did argue with the same force that the first did from whence they did arise but a testimony doth not argue with the force of an artificiall be it primum or ortum though it be backed with artificiall The cause effect should be in the witnesser but they are not in the witness if the testis have seen any one argument we are so far to receive his testimony and no farther if he have seen more arguments or all of them then are we much more to receive his witnesse Itaque cum exquisita rerum veritas subtilius exquiritur per exiguam vim probationis habet This being the nature of an inartificial it hath little force to argue of it selfe for all his strength is aliunde Veritas Truth belongs to an axiome here he means if we would see it to be ens or the entity of it surely this argument can stand us in no great stead the testimony onely swims in our brain but we doe not see the thing in its subtile parts as if he should say the artificial arguments do argue subtilly the inartificiall more grosly In civilibus autem et humanis rebus plerumque hoc argumentum praecipuam fidem è moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus et benevolentia adfuerint He staies upon the use of an inartificiall argument In the matters of the Common-wealth or in matters concerning private men this argument hath his speciall credit because in this kind they are most received we know all the matters in our Courts pass by writings or testimonies of men and in these civill matters we look more after the men then after the thing there are Artificials here in these matters but we look not at them still we are to understand that the witnesses know the artificials the reason is because they are things done in time long before which therefore cannot be decided but by writings or mens testimonies Praecipuam fidem habet That is it doth urge most in respect of the subject whereto it is used E moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus et benevolentia adfuerint This inartificiall Argument hath not praecipuam fidem from it self but as it proceedeth from him that is prudent vertuous and benevolent Prudentia is that skill a man hath to bring his Rule or any deduct from his Rule to practice that is if he be not simple and silly to tattle and prattle he knows not what then praecipuam fidem habet so that prudentia doth require discretion and judgement to know and deliver a truth That commandement Thou shalt not bear false witness is here taught Again if he have not vertue joyned with his prudentia that is if he make not conscience of witnessing the truth when he knoweth it we ought not to receive it so that as he must be able to judge of the truth so must he have conscience to utter it Lastly because notwithstanding though he may be judicious and vertuous yet it may be that even the best man may be carried with an affection either of love or anger ergo he must have good will to speak the truth howsoever ergo it is left to a malefactor that if any of the Iury seem not to have these things he may except against him Id uno nomine testimonium dicitur Of the second part for testis and testimonium are the arguments arguing it is so called in respect of the thing witnessed because that is neerest Now some Logicians as Kickerman place testimonium in judgement not in invention for saith he it is an axiome but he is decived for the testis and the testimonie are arguments and make but one axiome why one argument may be an axiome as a wise man is worthy respect here a wise man is an axiome but when it is a testimony it is not an axiome True it is that the testis speaks rem testatam axiomatically most commonly and that is the reason our Author speaks so often of veritas here in this chapter but as it is a testimony it is no axiome Est divinum vel humanum Here is a distinction of testimonies I dare not call it a distribution for these parts belong not to a testimony but as divers modi we know that divinum testimonium is given from him from whom nothing is hid but that he sees all things the humane is not so so that testimonium comes to be respected these two wayes Now if question be made that divinum testimonium is beyond all controversie surely if God say it we are to receive it for God is good and knowes all and no evill dwells with him neither doth he wish evill to his Man may say with the Academicks hoc tantum sâ—io me nihil scire ergo if a divine and humane testimony be compared together the humane is to give place to the divine neither is there any divine testimony but if we look after it we shall see it in the thing so that a divine testimony is most absolute not quatenus testimonium
or be united because they are opposite sine ullo medio Cujus conjunctio est disjunctiva Disjoyning or pulling in pieces the things disposed as there is either day or night these are privantia ergo contraries ergo opposites De Fato Omnis enunciatio est vera aut falsa This is a disjunct in like sort where veritas and falsitas are disjoyned now for the judgement of this axiom here one part onely is true and not both which ariseth from the nature of opposites Itaque eidem attribui c. but if we consider the affection between the whole and the parts there both will be true as argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale but because the whole with the form make up the species therefore we say in effect argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale and if there composite axioms be disposed in a simple syllogisme then the verb will be the band for we have nothing to do with the dissention of the parts but to see how the parts of the question are disposed with the third argument Hâ—c significatur è disjunctis uni um verum esse In a distinct axiom one part onely is true because they are dissentanea as homo est bonus aut non bonus these paâ—ts are but contingent separated buâ— the disjunction is necessary Cujus negatio Non omnis enunciatio est vera aâ—t falsa So that the denial taketh away the contradiction Et contradictione significatur non necessâ—rio alterum verum esse So that though the parts may be contingently true yet the axiom may be necssary Veruntamen quamvis absolute vera disjunctio necessar a quoque sit tamen nihil necesse est partes separatim necessarias esse Therefore est is not the band for it doth tie but contingent truth but the conjunction is it because it ties necessary truth Itaque si disjunctio sit contingens non est absolute vera tantum opiniabilis est qualis est frequenter in hominum usu So that this disjunct contingent is not usual in common speech ut si quaeratur c. whereas both or neither of them might come Tantum opinabilis Because opinio is the judgement of a contingent axiom and thus we have heard all the kinds of disposition on two sides CHAP. IX De Syllogismo ejus partibus Atque ejusmodâ— judicium est axiomaticum axiomatis perse manifesti sequitur dianoeticum NOw we come to a disposition where there are three sides so that they play as it were at three hand ruffe Now mark the reason of this distribution of dispositio into axioma and syllogismus some things there are that are laid together in nature without a mean ergo we may see them at the first hand uno intuiti some things also have a mean which we must use before we can see them ergo according to the things in nature and according to the act of our reason in beholding these things so must our Logick proceed and as the medium shall either combine or sever them so we may conclude them affirmatively or negatively and herein stands the force of those rules though they be not alwayes true quae conveniunt in aliquo tertio conveniunt inter se contra because that medium is the holder of them two together aut contra for there the medium will be a bar to sever them as otiosus est amator Egistus est otiosus ergo est amatur because otium is as glue to pull on amor for it argues love as causa and it puls on Egstus as an adjunct So this rule sublata â—â—usa tollitur effectum contra and all these rules of consecution are because the effect brings the cause with it and any other argument as well as causa may be a mean whereby two things may be glued together for this third argument is not so much a medium in regard of the other two disposed with it but in respect of our seeing them and we may see as well by any other arguments as by causa Atque ejusmodi judicium est axiomaticum c. An axiom is such a thing as appears to be true at the first sight or at the second hand now our reason is to be so glued as that it may be able to see any truth ergo if the truth appear at the first sight an axiom will serve us else we must have a candle to make it clear so that here we may see the purpose of syllogistical judgement is not to make things more true or more false in themselves but to make the truth or falshood more manifest unto us so that clear per se belongs to an axiom but perspicuity in regard of us belongs to a syllogism and here we may also see that axioma probabile as they call it and axioma subtile belong hither so that all third arguments are not used to make the things more true in themselves but to make the truth more manifest to us ergo Cardan whilst he argued against Scaliger that he that disputed of subtilty might dispute of all things was in the right but when he would go about to prove that all things were to be taught in subtilty there he was out for after we have discoursed a point syllogistically we are fain to go back again to the rule of an axiom to judge the truth or falshood thereof ergo here we may see that axioms and syllogisms are confederate and not syllogism and method Now the same axiom may be manifest to one man but dark to another ergo syllogistical judgement waits upon man and if the truth or falshood be nice or fine that it cannot be seen with one act of our eye then we must use a third argument and subtil if we define it aright is axioma non adeo manifestum Sequitur dianoeticum Dianoia signifies reasons discourse the laying about by our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for when at first she doth not see a truth then she commands cogitation to coagitare that is to look after it so that dianoia is nothing but the running about of our reason for the finding out of truth Some Logicians have compared axiomatical judgement to a calm sea for there our reason is quiet being satisfied with the truth and syllogistical judgement to a troubled sea that is full of storms winds and tempests for there our reason beats every corner to conclude that which is doubtful and from this act it is called dianoia and the judgement of reason in such an Art is called dianoeticum it running after this or that but our Author divides it afterward into syllogismus and methodus which how it should be true I see not namely how method should be dianoia for the three internal senses in nature are distinct ergo these parts ought to be distinct according to them as we heard before Now method makes all things one and so we remember all things as one and the things be judged before I come here here
quidres sit We heard that the arguments arising manifoldly were distribution and definition now definition ariseth as it shall fall out either from agreers or disagreers comparates or orta ergo it arising from more arguments than any of the rest it is requisite that it should be after all the rest though in laying down an Art it will have the first place because if it be a perfect definition it layes out the essence of a thing immediately if it be a description it layes down the quantity c. A definition is as it were a box that layes up all the rules following in the Art even as the body doth the members Definitio For the name we know finis is terminus and belongs to Geometry we heard it borrowed from thence into Logick to signifie a cause here it signifies the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that definire is to set down the extreme or utmost points of a thing ergo it must be reciprocal with the thing defined else can it not define it for if the definitum be larger than the definitio then it out-reacheth the limits of the thing if it be less then it layeth not out the essence fully Cum explicatur So that definitio doth lay abroad explicatio is a laying abroad the quiddity of a thing In that he saith definitio doth explicare he means all the arguments before were clapt together in the thing confusedly but the definition doth lay them abroad as in this word Dialectica there is a Synopsis of all Logick but when I say it is ars bene disserendi here the definition layes out all more at large the definite is like a Pedlers pack wherein his points pins knives c. are shut up altogether and the definitio is like the laying of them out or shewing of them to the end that he may sell them The one may likewise be compared to a garment folded up the other to a garment spread abroad at large Quid. That is the essence for as in a perfect definition we may gather the other arguments of a thing from the causes so in a description we may gather the causes from other arguments this entity therefore or essence the definition alwayes looks at another difference of the definitum and the definitio is that the definitum is ens and the definitio is essentia Res. That is the ens the subject of the general Arts that is aliquid in the definition of argumentum Eaque vicissim definitio argui potest As the definite called before res may be argued a definitione so contra though the definitio be more often brought to argue the definite than contra ergo it hath the name definition not from definitum but from the definitio Object Kickerman saith Ramus will have definitio both an argument and an axiom Answ No we make it an argument when we speak properly we make it an axiom when we speak Synecdochichos Definitio est perfecta aut imperfecta This distribution is now to good purpose for the Schools have not agreed at any time of any perfect definition as they say homo est animal rationale this is not a perfect definition ergo some do add mortale some capax disciplinae some both so that indeed we cannot give a perfect definition of any thing ergo because it is so hard to find the special form it is requisite to have an imperfect one to grope out the form thereby else we should be undone if we could no way look at the essence of things and here by the way we see the quiddity laid out perfectly by a perfect definition and imperfectly by an imperfect definition Illa proprie definitio haec descriptio dicitur Where we may see that perfecta definitio is properly the species of this definition and that the definition before was synecdochichal now that explio catio of the thing is perfect or imperfect the one called definitio the other descriptio the one containing the limitation of the essence the other the limitation of the quantity so that whatsoever hath an essence distinct from it self must be limited ergo may be defined ergo have their perfect definition though we cannot see what their form is Definitio perfecta est definitio constance solis causis essentiam constituentibus The reason is because it stands of more parts namely the genus and form laying out the composition of the thing Ecausis As if he should say they do give existere to the definite Solis Because no other arguments come in a perfect definition Essentiam constituentibus That is materia and forma but materia is included in genere so that definitio is ortum doubly now there are four causes which give esse but two of them onely give essence so that the effect hath his substance from the matter and form not from the other causes Quales causa genere forma comprehenduntur Ramus doth commorari upon this doctrine shewing that a perfect definition doth lay out the substantial quiddity of a thing now the reason why he saith genere and not materia simply but materia as it is in genere is this because the genus containeth not onely the matter but also a portion of the form the general form ergo it must be the next genus that we must bring in a perfect definition for if the genus be more remote then the form of the next genus must be left out but if we take the next genus then we bring in all above it Et forma comprehenduntur That is the special form the reason in nature is this we find that the totum is not subsistent but in singularibus now we find moreover that singulars have that whereby they are singulars beside for else one singular could not be destinct from another ergo every singular must have his peculiar form and also his matter not as it is a first argument but as it is symbolice in genere Vt in aenimali pars formae He means of the general form for anima vegetativa and sensitiva are the forms of vivens and so of animal Totam formam hominis As if the form of man did consist of these as of parts but it is not so the truth is this there is in some things a simple life in some things more lives as anima vegetativa is firstly in planta now animal hath that and somewhat more namely sensitiva and man hath both them and also reason so that one of the species hath nothing but that which the genus hath namely vivens and planta for planta is vivens quae vivit vitam tantum vegetativam and so is vivens onely tantum makes the difference from others Now from this discourse he gathers that a definition is universale symbolum not that singulars cannot be perfectly defined as well as universals but he meanes it is a symbolum containing universally the causes constituting the essence so that the individuum hath