altered and the sense discernes this alteration Now many times the name of the sense and of the seats of the sense are confounded But sense is an apprehending of those things which are subject to sense Yet this seemeth not to bee the definition of sense it selfe but of the workings of the sense And therefore some define it thus Sense is a certaine intellectual spirit extended from the principall part of the minde unto the bodily instruments It is thus also defined Sense is a power of the soule which taketh hold of sensible things and the seat of the sense is the instrument whereby it layeth hold on such things as are sensible Plato sayes thus Sense is that wherein the Soule and the body communicate together concerning outward things For the very power it selfe belongs unto the soule but the instrument pertaines to the body and both together take hold of such outward things as may bee offered to imagination Some things in the soul were ordained to serve and be commanded othersome to rule and bear sway The part which hath in it understanding and knowledge was ordained to rule Those which appertaine to sense and to the motions by appetite as also our ability of speaking are made to serve and bee at command For our voice and our motion by appetite are obedient to reaon most speedily and almost in a momēt of time For wee Will and are moved together and at once so that we need no time to come betweene our Will and our motion as we may see in the moving of our fingers Some naturall things are placed under the command of Reason as those which wee call perturbations CAP. 7. SECT 1. I. Of the sense of sight and the opinions of Hipparchus of the Geometricians of Epicurus and Aristotle concerning the same II. The opinions of Plato and of Galen touching the same sense and of the cause of seeing III. The opinion of Porphyrie also touching that sense WE finde that this word fight hath a divers signification for sometime it signifieth the seat of the sight and some time the power of the sense it selfe Hipparchus affirmes that the beams being shot forth from the eyes take hold as it were of outward things with the farthest ends of them even as if a man should lay his hand on them and presents or yeelds those things whereof they have so taken hold to our sight But the Geometricians describe unto us Figures which are called Cones broad at the first and growing to a narrow top made by the meeting of the eye-beames in one point And they hold opinion that the beames of the right-eye being darted forth to the left-side and the beames of the left-eye toward the right-side the Figure CONOS is made by the uniting of them in one and that thereby it comes to passe that the sight comprehends many visible things together at one view and then more exactly perceives them when the beames are met closely one with another And this is the cause that oftentimes when we looke upon the pavement we see not a piece of money lying plainly visible thereupon though wee settle our eyes upon the same with diligence For untill it so fall out that the beames meet in that very place where the money lyeth wee still overlooke the same but then wee presently attaine the sight of it as if that had beene the beginning of our looking for it in that place The Epicures think that the shapes of such things as appeare unto us are brought to our eyes Aristotle is of opinion that it is not a bodily shape which appeares but a certaine quality rather conveyed from things visible unto the sight by an alteration of the aire which is round about Plato sayes that the sight is caused by the meeting of all the severall brightnesses together that is to say partly by the light of the eyes which flowing out some part of the way into the aire which is of like nature with it selfe partly by that which is retorted back againe from the bodies which are seene and partly by the force of that which is extended out together with the fierynesse of the eye affecting the aire which comes betweene them and easily spreading every way or turning to any side Galen agreeing with Plato speaketh of the sight here and there in some places of his seventh booke of the agreement of parts much to this purpose If saith hee any part or power or quality of bodies that are visible should come unto the eye wee could not know the quantity of the thing seen For if a very great mountaine were the object it were quite contrary to reason to imagine that the shape of so huge a thing should enter wholly into our eyes yea and the spirit belonging to the sight being darted forth could not bee able to collect together so much vigour as would bee requisite to comprehend the whole visible object It remaines therefore that the aire wherewith we are encompassed is after a sort such an instrument unto us when we see as the nerve which belongeth unto the sight is to the body and some such thing seemeth to happen to the aire which encloseth us round For the bright shining Sun having touched the upper limits of the aire distributes his power into the whole aire And the splendor which is caried through the sinewes called the optick nerves which belong unto the sight hath his essence of the nature of the spirits This falling into the aire which is dilated round about us makes an alteration even at the very first injection and shootes forth very farre yet so that it containes it self undispersed untill it happen upon a reflecting body For the aire is such an instrument unto the eye to discerne visible objects as the sinew is unto the braine and look in what case the braine is in respect of his sinew in like case is the eye in respect of the aire after it is quickned by the bright shining of the Sun Now that it is the nature of the aire to become like unto those things which enter into it appeares manifest by this that whensoever any bright thing be it red or blew or of the colour of silver shall bee conveyed through the aire when it is light the colour of the aire will bee changed according to that thing which is caried through the same But Porphyrie in his book which hee wrote of the senses affirms that neither the making of the Figure Conos neither any shape nor any other thing is cause of our seeing but only this that the soul her selfe meeting with such objects as are visible doth perceive and know that all those things which are seene be contained in her selfe because it is she only which holds them together to their preservation For as he saith whatsoever is in the world is nothing else but the soul holding together divers bodies And it were not untruly said that the soul commeth to the knowledge of it selfe by
the compasse of Place is not himselfe in every place where his light is but as fire in the wood or as the flame in a candle is confined to a certaine place It is not so with the soul For being void of all Body and not contained within the limits of any place it passeth all and whole through it own whole light and through the whole Body wherein it is neither is any part of it illuminated thereby wherein it is not fully and wholly present Neither is it in the body as in some bottle or other vessell nor compassed in by the same but the Body is rather in the soule and is thereby held in and fastned together For intelligible things such as the soul is are not hindred by bodily things but enter and pierce and passe through every corporeall thing and cannot possibly bee contained within the circumference of a bodily-place Things intellectuall have their being in places also intelligible yea they are either in themselves or else in such intellectuall things as are above themselves The soul is otherwhile in it selfe as when it reasoneth or considereth of things and otherwhile in the understanding as when it conceiveth any thing And when it is said to bee in the body it is not said to be there as in place but to be as it were in a certaine relation to the body and to bee present with it in such a sense as God is said to be in us For wee say that the soul is bound as it were by a certaine disposition and inclination as the lover is to his beloved not bound in place or as bodies are bound but by the habituall bands of affection And indeed seeing it hath neither magnitude nor massinesse nor parts how can it be enclosed by a speciall place Or within what place can that bee contained which hath no parts Where place is there must needs bee a massinesse because place is the Bound which compasseth another thing and hath it being in respect of that which it encloseth Now if any man shall thereupon conclude that his soule is in Alexandria and in Rome and in every place let him know that even in so saying hee includeth a Place For to be in Alexandria or generally to be here or there or any where pertaineth unto a place whereas the soul is no where no not in the body as in a place but habitually because as is aforesaid it cannot be contained within a place For this cause when things intellectuall have any habituall inclination to a place or to such things as are in place wee turne the word from his proper use and say abusively that such a thing is there or there by reason of the operation which it there hath taking the name of place for the inclination or working in a place And whereas we should rather say it there worketh we say There it is SECT 2. I. Of the union of the Godhead with the Man-hood how far forth it hath any similitude with the union of the Soule and Body and wherein it is unlike thereunto II. Arguments taken from Porphyrie confuting himselfe and others who deny the possibility of an union betweene the Godhead and the Man-hood and a disproofe of the opinion of the Eunomians concerning that union III. He proceeds to treat of the union of the soule and body and shewes that as it was meerely of Gods good pleasure to unite the Godhead to the Man-hood So it was also agreeable to the Nature of God that this union should be without mixture or confusion THat which is last aforesaid agrees more plainly and in more speciall manner to that union which is betweene GOD the WORD and the Man-hood by which union the two Natures being united remained neverthelesse without confusion and so also that the divinity was not comprehended by the Humanity And yet this uniting is not altogether such as is betweene the soul and the body For the soul being in the number of multiplied things suffers after a sort with the Body in such things as happen thereunto and by reason of their mutuall necessities and conversation together both holds it in and is also held in by the same But GOD the Word being himselfe nothing altered by that union which unites the divinity and humanity together nor by that communion which the soule and body have with each other imparts his God-head unto them without participating of their frailties and becommeth one with them still remaining in himselfe the same thing which hee was before such an uniting This is a strange and mysterious temperature uniting For Hee is tempered with them and yet he himselfe continues utterly without mixion without confusion without corruption and without change Neither suffering any thing with them but only helping and furthering them nor being corrupted nor altered by them but greatly encreasing them without any diminution in himselfe because hee is altogether without mutation without confusion and without possibility of changing Hereof may Porphyrie himselfe beare witnesse who hath moved his tongue against CHRIST for the testimonies of our Adversaries are the most undeniable proofes which may be brought against themselves This Porphyrie in the second Booke of his mixt questions uses these words It is not then saith he to be judged a thing impossible that some ESSENCE should be assumed to the perfiting of another ESSENCE and be part of that ESSENCE perfecting also the same and yet remaine still in it owne NATVRE both being ONE with that other thing and yet preserving the VNITY of it selfe yea and which is more then this changing those things wherein it is by the presence thereof and making it so to worke as it selfe worketh and yet nothing altered in it SELFE Now Porphyrie spake these things of the uniting of the SOUL and body and if his reason hold good in the SOUL in regard it is an incorporeall substance it holds true much rather in GOD the Word who is verily without bodie and also utterly void of composition And this doth mafestly shut the mouthes of them who endeavour to contradict the uniting of the God-head and the Man-hood as many of the Grecians have done Jeasting and deriding at it as impossible improbable and absurd that the Divine-nature should be joyned in a temperature and an unity with our mortall-nature for it is here discovered that they may be opposed in this argument by the testimony of such as are in most esteeme among themselves The opinion of some especially of the Eunomians is this that GOD the Word is united to the body not in substance but by the powers of either Nature For it is not say these their substances which are united and tempered together but the powers of the BODY are tempered with the Divine powers Now they affirme according to Aristotle that the Senses are the powers of the body meaning of all the body as it containes the instruments thereof and therefore in their judgement the Divine powers being tempered with the
ability we have spoken of the imagining faculty of the soule of the instruments thereof and of those things wherein they agree or differ To the cogitation these particulars are generally pertinent the judgement of things a consent unto them a refusall of them and a desire unto them But those which are specially pertinent are consideration vertues knowledges the reason of arts deliberation and choice This is that part wherby wee attaine the foresight of things to come in visions or dreames and therein onely the Pythagorean Philosophers following the Iewish opinions thinke true prophecying consisteth The instruments of cogitation are the middle-pan of the braine and the vitall spirits which are in it CAP. 13. I. Of the memorative part of the Soul and the definition of memory according to Origen and Plato II. The difference betwixt remembring of things contained in sense and of things contained in understanding as also what recordation is III. Of the instruments of the memory and demonstrations evidently shewing where the fountaines of the senses of the cogitation and memory are to be found THe seat of memory which the Greekes cal Mnemoneuticon is the cause and storehouse both of memorie and recordation or remembrance Memory as Origen saith is a certaine appearance left in the minde by some sense which had wrought actually before Plato taketh it to be a preservation of things both felt and considered For the minde takes hold of things which are subject unto sense by the seats of the sense and therof is opinion begotten But it layeth hold on things intelligible by understanding and thence ariseth consideration And when the minde retaines the Prints both of things in opinion and of those also which are in consideration we then say that it remembers them It is likely that Plato doth herein meane by the name of consideration not the principall consideration but a certaine cogitation For things contained in sense are remembred by themselves but things contained in understanding are accidentally remembred The remembrance of things thought upon by us doth remaine in us upon the heed of some appearance which was before in our imagination And we remember those things which are properly contained in our understanding in respect that wee have learned them and heard them but as for their substance wee have no memory thereof For indeed the apprehending of things contained in understanding proceeds not from any preceding imagination but commeth to us by learning and by a naturall notion If we be said to remember such things as we saw or heard or knew heretofore by some occasion or meanes This word heretofore having relation to the time past makes it plaine that such things as are made and destroyed againe and such as have their being in time are comprehended in memory and that our memory consisteth of things absent but is not procured or moved by those absent things Recordation or remembrance called by the Greekes Anamnesis is when forgetfulnesse hath interrupted our memory for it is a recovering of memory which was lost when it failed by forgetfulnesse Memory is lost either altogether and for ever or else for a space onely and when it faileth but for a space we call the recovery thereof remembrance But there is another kind of recordation which is not occasioned by the forgetfulness of such things as proceed from sense or understanding but from the forgetfulnesse of those things which wee have even by naturall notions By naturall notions or things naturally conceived I meane such as every man hath in him without any teacher as that there is a God This Plato calleth a recordation of Idea's and what is meant by Idea's I will hereafter shew Such things as appeare unto the imagining part are from thence conveyed unto the cogitation and the cogitation or discoursing part when it hath once apprehended such things judged of them sends them to bee stored up in that part of the soule wherein memory is resident The instruments used by the memory are the hinder braine-pan called by the Greekes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the vitall spirit there placed But seeing we have affirmed that the beginnings and roots of the senses are the former pans of the braine The seat of the cogitation the middle pan And of the memory the hinder-pan it will be necessary for us to prove evidently that these things are so Lest we seeme to give credit to that which hath been spoken without any reason to be rendred for the same A plaine demonstration thereof may bee taken from the parts themselves for if by any meanes the former braine-pan be hurt the senses are much hindred but the cogitation remaineth sound If only the middle-pan be harmed the cogitation is maymed but the seat of sense keepes the senses whole If any hurt befall both to the former and middle-pan both sense and cogitation decay If the hinder-pan be onely disordered the memory alone perisheth and neither sense nor cogitation receive harme But if the former the middle and the hinder braine-pans be all together out of order the party so disturbed is maimed in sense in cogitation and memory all at once and the whole living-creature is in danger of destruction This is made evident also by many diseases and accidents which are symptomes of diseases and especially in frantick men For in some of them their cogitation onely is hurt and their senses are preserved whole Such a frantick man is mentioned by Galen who being in a place wherein a wool-winder was at work by him rose up and taking certaine glasse vessels which hee found in the roome ran to the window and asked such as passed by whether they would have such or such glasses cast downe unto them calling every vessell by the right name And when they who stood below said they would have it so hee threw them all downe one after another Then hee asked them whether they would have the wool-winder throwne downe also they thinking he had but jested replyed yea whereupon he tooke up the wool-winder and hurled him headlong from a high place This man had his senses whole enough for hee knew which were the glasse-vessels and which was the wool-winder but his cogitation was diseased Others there be who deluded by a vaine imagination suppose that they see such things as indeed are not seene whereas in other things they are not without the direction of reason In such as these the former braine-pans are only diseased and the middle-pan uncrased For by those diseases which follow every part the course of their operation is accordingly hindred and the living-creature is hurt in respect of that operation to the working wherof the part diseased is naturally serviceable As for example if the feet bee hurt our walking is hindered for that is the work whereunto the foot serveth CAP. 14. I. Of the Reason from whence we have the denomination of reasonable-creatures II. Of our speech and of the severall instruments
the powers of the soule which are conversant about good or evill things are the faculties of some habits or other Therefore if pleasure bee a good thing and not an evill thing these are the onely things in which it can bee conversant But it cannot bee a habit neither is it as a vertue for then it could not be so easily changed into griefe which is contrary thereunto neither as it is contrary to privation seeing it is impossible that a habit and a privation should meet in the same subject as pleasure and griefe may For there bee some who take pleasure and are grieved both at once as they who are gently scratched when they itch therefore pleasure is not a habit Neither is pleasure an instrument For instruments are ordained in respect of other things not in respect of themselves now pleasure is not for any other thing but for it selfe only and therefore it cannot be an instrument Pleasure must be therefore an operatiō indeed Aristotle defines the same to be an operation of a habit that is agreeable unto nature but by this definition felicitie should bee pleasure seeing felicitie is such an operation as he defineth and so his definition is false Therefore Aristotle thus correcteth his definition pleasure saith hee is the end of the operations of a living-creature which are void of incumbrance and agreeable to nature So pleasure may bee as it were wrapped up and coexist together with felicity but felicity cannot be pleasure Now every operation is not a motion for some operation is practised without motion such was the operation which God used in the first creation for the first mover of all things is unmoveable such also is the operation of contemplation which man useth for it is exercised without motion because the subject of contemplation is alwayes one and the same and the minde of him that contemplates alwayes firmly setled upon that object of contemplation If then the pleasure that is in contemplation and which is the greatest the principall and the onely true pleasure be exercised without motion it is plaine that such pleasures as have the fewest motions are by so much the better and the greater as their motions are the fewer Pleasures together with their operations are diversly distinguished for there be so many pleasures as of their operations when the operations are good the pleasures are good also and if the operations bee naught such are the pleasures That there bee sundry sorts of pleasure in respect of every sense it is very manifest for there be many pleasures both in touching and tasting and great diversitie also in the pleasures of the sight of the hearing and of the smell and the purer senses are they which keepe the farthest distance from their objects which delight them as the slight the hearing and the smell There bee two sorts of the operations of the minde the one in practise the other in contemplation and therefore it is evident that there are two sorts of pleasure which follow these operations and that those which follow the contemplation are more pure then those which follow the practise The pleasures of the minde or understanding are proper to man as hee is man but they which pertaine to the sense are common to him with other living-creatures in respect of his being a living-creature Now seeing it is thus and that some are delighted with such pleasures as pertaine to sense and others with some other pleasures those pleasures onely are to be accounted good of their owne nature which are judged good not of evill men but of good men For in doubtfull matters every common fellow is not a competent judge but he that is both skilfull and regulateth himselfe according to the rule of undepraved nature CAP. 19. I. Of Griefe and the severall kindes thereof and how farre a good man may be subject thereunto II. Excesse chanceth only in bodily pleasures not in those which are mentall ALL Griefe is of one of these kindes namely astonishing griefe called by the greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 care tearmed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 envy and pitty Astonishing griefe is that which bereaveth us of the use of our voice care is a griefe burthenous unto us Envy is a griefe springing from the wel-fare of other men and pitty is a griefe arising from the adversity of others Every griefe is evill in respect of it owne nature for albeit a good man bee sometime grieved when hee seeth good men oppressed or his children or his country spoiled hee grieveth not for the sorrowes sake as if it were good in it selfe to grieve but for a respect unto other circumstances Hee that is a delighted in contemplation is not moved with such things because he hath altogether estranged his minde from earthly affaires and devoted himselfe wholly unto God And hee that is otherwise a good man is moved by the circumstance of grief in such a meane as never brings him into subjection thereunto but rather subdues them unto himselfe If you make the comparison betweene an evill thing and a good thing griefe is then contrary unto pleasure which is used measurably but if the comparison be betweene evill and evill griefe is the contrary to an immoderate pleasure But these Excesses happen onely in the pleasures of the body For the pleasure which is taken in contemplation even when it is in the highest degree and hath attained unto perfection admits no excesse neither is there any griefe set in a contrariety thereunto nor doth it serve to cure any preceding griefe CAP. 20. I. Of Feare and the sixe parts thereof with their definitions and differences II. The cause of feare and the instrument of that griefe NExt griefe in generall wee will describe Feare which is divided into sixe parts Sloth Bashfulnesse Shame Amazednesse Carefulnesse and Terror Sloth is when we feare lest we should be compelled to worke Amazednesse is a feare which ariseth in us when some huge and unusuall thing appeareth Terror is a trembling or shuddering occasioned by some dreadfull object Carefulnesse is when wee feare losing that which we have or of missing that which we desire for by the fear of these things wee are brought into a carefull agony Bashfulnesse is the feare of some rebuke or disgrace and is a very honest passion Shame is a feare begotten in us upon the remembrance of some evill which we have committed And where this is found there is remaining some hope of goodnesse and amendment And this is the difference betwixt bashfulnesse and shame he that is ashamed is troubled through feare of such things as hee hath done but he that is abashed feares lest some reproach may befall him But the old writers use the words indifferently calling shame bashfulnesse and bashfulnesse shame The cause of feare is a cold that generally surprizeth us by reason our whole heat by the sudden apprehension of some thing is driven unto the heart as to the principall part even as the
such things Moreover the praise or dispraise which followes such actions declare them to be voluntary for neither praise nor dispraise follow such things as are done absolutely by constraint It is not easie to discerne what things are to be chosen before others in some difficult cases But for the most part wee must choose rather to abide griefe then commit any shamefull act as did both Ioseph and Susanna and yet this holds not alwayes For doubtlesse Origen fell grossely when he chose to sacrifice unto Idols rather then to undergo that dishonestie which the Aethiopians would have put upon him We see therefore that the discerning of such things is not easie and we finde also that it is very hard for them that have chosen to continue in that which they have resolved upon because perills to come doe not so amaze or discourage us as those torments which are presently inflicted It so happeneth oftentimes that they who have chosen well doe depart from their owne choice by persecution as it hath happened unto some who when they should have suffered martyrdome fell back from their stout and resolute beginnings by being through tenderness unable to endure the trials and the torments of adversity when they were inflicted upon them Let no man imagine therefore that either an inconstant falling away from a well chosen resolution or an intemperate lust or an angry rage are to bee accounted among such offences as are to bee judged things done against our will by reason there is an efficient cause of those actions without our selves For though the beauty of an harlot made them that saw her to rush into the execution of an intemperate lust and though such as are furiously angry were so provoked thereunto by another man that the first beginnings therof may bee truly affirmed to have beene without themselves yet the actors of such things doe worke by themselves and by their instrumentall parts for which cause their actions come not within the definition of things done by constraint even in regard they offered unto themselves the occasions and beginnings of those actions and suffered themselves to bee easily incaptivated by passions through an evill conversation Therefore all they who doe such things are worthily reprehended as men voluntarily given to evill and the evill is manifested to be voluntary when they delight also in the deed because every thing done by constraint hath griefe annexed thereunto Thus much of things done against our will by force we will now treate of such involuntary actions as are done through ignorance CAP. 31. I. Of things done against our will through ignorance and of those actions which are or are not altogether involuntary II. The definition and markes of things done quite against our will and the difference between things done thorow ignorance and those which we doe being ignorant III. A catalogue of such particulars the ignorance wherof makes an action to be involuntary BY ignorance many things are done by us whereof we rejoyce after the deed As when a man killeth his enemy at unawares or against his will and yet is glad that he is slaine These such like things are neither accounted voluntary nor altogether involuntary Some things also are done through ignorance for which we grieve after they are done And those are usually called things done against our will after the doing wherof we become grieved for the act And by this it appeares that there be two sorts of things done by ignorance the one not volūtary the other quite against our will It is our purpose therefore to treat at this time of such things as are altogether against our will because that which wee call not voluntary as aforesaid may rather be reduced to those things which are voluntary in regard it is mixt of both For though it hath a beginning by constraint yet the end is voluntary because by the event that becomes voluntary which was first against our will Therefore a thing done against our will is defined in this manner That is an involuntary act which is not only against our wil but hath also griefe repentance annexed thereunto Moreover it is one thing to doe an act through ignorance and another thing to doe it being ignorant For if that thing which caused the ignorance be in our power we doe it being ignorant but not by ignorance For example he that is accustomed unto drunkennesse or to anger and in his wrath or drunkennesse committeth an evill he hath indeed drunkennesse or anger as a cause of those things which are done by him But neverthelesse those things were voluntary for it was in his power not to have beene drunke or so inraged and therefore in not suppressing those inordinate appetites hee himselfe was cause of his own ignorance and may in that regard be said to have done that evil being ignorant but cannot be truly said to have done it through ignorance Neither is his act to bee accounted as done by constraint but voluntarily for that cause he who doth commit such things is justly reprehended by good men Even because his drunkennesse which occasioned that act being voluntary makes the act which was therby occasioned to be voluntary also But we are said to doe things through ignorance when wee our selves gave no cause of that ignorance and when the deed was by chance As if a man should shoot in an usuall shooting place happen to hit and slay his father walking thereabout It is plaine by that which is aforesaid that the actions of such a man are not to bee accounted as done against his will who is ignorant of such things as it behooveth him to know or which reputes evill things to bee goo For this ignorance proceeds from his owne wickednesse and as his actions are vitious so his ignorance also is to be accounted as a vice for which he is worthy of reprehensiō And reprehension is due only to those things which are voluntarily done For the ignorance of generall or universall things or of such as are in choice is not accounted to bee a thing involuntary but the ignorance of particular things onely is esteemed such For we may be ignorant of particular things against our will But of universall things our ignorance is accounted voluntary because such an ignorance cannot bee in us without our owne fault except we are madmen or Idiots This being thus determined it now resteth to be declared what those particulars are of which we speake and they are the same which the Rhetoricians call the parts or circumstāces of things done To wit WHO WHOM WHAT WITH WHAT WHERE WHEN in WHAT MANER for WHAT CAUSE To which may bee added according to our English game used for an exercise of wit WHAT FOLLOVVED or the event of that which was done The persons are either he who did it or he to whom the thing was done as if the Sonne should smite his Father at unawares The thing done is the action it selfe as if I
doe or possesse are therefore offended at this opinion and not without cause But some there be having more acutenesse who bringing this text of Scripture to refute us namely The wayes of man are not in his own hand say thus unto us Good friends how is the will of man free seeing his way is not in his owne hands and seeing the thoughts of men are so vaine that they cannot bring to effect those things which they have devised Many such like things they object not knowing in what sense wee speake of freewill For we affirm not that it is in our power to be rich or poore or alwayes in health or of a strong constitution of nature or to rule or generally to have those good things which wee count as instruments to worke things by or such as are called the gifts of fortune neither doe wee account those to be at our dispose which have their event from Providence But wee affirme those actions onely to be in our power which are according to vice or vertue as also our motions or choice of things or else such things whereof wee may doe the contrary aswell as the things themselves For a certaine will or choice goeth before every action and not onely the deed but the affection also is condemned as may plainly appeare in that place of the Gospell which saith He who lookes upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery already w th her in his heart And we read that Iob sacrificed unto God for such offēces as his children might commit in thought For indeed the beginning either of sin or of doing uprightly is in our will whereas the doing of the thing it selfe is otherwhile permitted by Providence and otherwhile hindered For seeing there are some things in our power and a Providence beside it is necessary that such things as are done should bee done by them both Because if they were done by either of them alone the other should be to no purpose Therefore in regard all actions are mixt it will sometime happen that they shall be in our power another while that they shall bee as providence alone directeth and sometimes againe both according to Providence and as wee would also And whereas likewise there is sometimes a generall and sometimes a particular Providence it is necessary that the same should fall out in particular things as it doth in things generall For if the aire about us bee dry our bodies are dryed also though not all alike And if a mother be given to riotous fare or a distempered dyet even thereby shall her children become distempered in body and perverse in such things as they attempt It is plaine therefore by what hath beene said that men may fall into a distempered estate of body either by the generall distēperature of the aire or by the dyet of parents or when they spoil themselves by their owne voluptuousnesse and that they may be distempered sometime by such occasions as take their beginnings from themselves in such maner that Providence shall not altogether bee the cause of such things If then the Soul shall yeeld her selfe to be overswayed by the temperature of the body and give place to wrath or lust or bee pressed downe by outward things as poverty or lifted up by riches or the like if any evill commeth to the same thereby it so hapned thereunto by the selfe-will of that Soul Seeing if shee had not voluntarily yeelded her selfe to those distemperatures she might have overcome them and beene in good case For through well ordering the affections of the minde by a convenient dyet and a good conversation she might have altered that temperature rather then have beene perverted thereby This is manifest by the example of such as are in a good condition and that all such as are not in a good estate doe sin voluntarily and not by constraint And that it is in our power either to consent and yeeld our selves unto our bodily distemperatures or to resist and overcome them Neverthelesse there be many who pretend these distemperatures to bee the cause why we doe such or such things and so impute their wickednesse not unto their owne will but to necessity And therefore they cōclude though very absurdly that the vertues also are not in our power CAP. 41. I. Of the cause why man was made with free will and that if it had been otherwise he had neither beene capable of the contemplative nor practike faculty nor been a reasonable creature II. Of the mutability of men and Angels and of the causes thereof and of some inferences thereupon proving freewill III. It is not through any naturall defect that men are vicious but by their owne will And it is here shewne also that man without freewill could neither have any vice nor vertue SOmewhat remaines to be declared wherby it may bee manifest why man had freewill bestowed upon him We affirme that immediately together with reason this freewill entered into us and that together with nature there is ingraffed into created things a mutability and alteration especially in those things which are a subject made of matter For there is a mutation even in the very beginning of every thing which is made and all making proceedeth from an alteration of the materiall subject This is evident to any man who considerately beholds the plants and living-creatures which have their abiding either in the earth in the water or in the aire For there is in all those a continuall mutability Moreover that our freewill enters into us together with reason hath beene made plain enough by those things which we have said to prove that some thing is in our power as will appeare to them who have heeded what was delivered to that purpose But because the sequell of this treatise doth for some respects require the same perhaps it will not be impertinent to repeat some part of that which was formerly declared Our reason is divided into contemplation and practise Contemplative reason is that which concerneth universally the nature of things as they bee really and active reason is that whereby wee deliberate of things and sets downe the right way of putting them into execution The contemplative part is called the minde or the principall part of the soule and the active part is termed reason The one is likewise called wisdome and the other prudence Now every one that deliberates doth for this cause deliberate even for that the choice of such things as are to be done is in his power and to the intent that hee might by deliberation make choice of that which is most worthy and that after he hath so chosen he might execute the same It is therefore necessary that he which deliberates should have power over his owne deeds for if he have not power over his owne actions his consultation will be fruitlesse also unto him And if these things be so it will follow by a necessary consequence that wheresoever reason is