is true that seeing the name of punnishment hath relation to the name of Crime there can be no punishment but for Crimes that might have been left undone but instead of punnishment if he had said affliction may not I say that God may afflict and not for sin doth he not afflict those Creatures that cannot sin and sometimes those that can sin and yet not for sin as Job and the Man in the Gospel that was born blind for the manifestation of his power which he hath over his Creature no less but more than hath the Potter over his Clay to make of it what he please But though God have power to afflict a man and not for sin without injustice shall we think God so cruel as to afflict a man and not for sin with extream and endlesse torment Is it not cruelty No more than to do the same for sin when he that so afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning But what Infallible evidence hath the Bishop that a man shall be after this life Eternally in torments and never die Or how is it certain there is no second death when the Scripture saith there is Or where doth the Scripture say that a second death is an endless life Or do the Doctors onely say it then perhaps they do but say so and for reasons best known to themselves There is no injustice nor cruelty in him that giveth life to give withit sicknesse pain torments and death nor in him that giveth life twice to give the same miseries twice also And thus much in Answer to the Inconveniences that are pretended to follow the Doctrine of Necessity On the other side from this Position that a man is free to will it followeth that the Prescience of God is quite taken away For how can it be known before hand what man shall have a will to if that will of his proceed not from necessary causes but that he have in his power to will or not will So also those things which are called future contingents if they come not to passe with certainty that is to say from necessary causes can never be foreknown so that Gods fâ—reknowing shall sometimes be of things that shall not come to passe which is as much to say that his foreknowledge is none which is a great dishonour to the All-knowing Power Though this be all the Inconvenient Doctrine that followeth Freewill for as much as I can now remember yet the defending of this opinion hath drawn the Bishop and other Patrons of it into many inconvenient and absurd conclusions and made them make use of an infinite number of Insignificant words whereof one conclusion is in Suarez that God doth so concurre with the Will of Man that if Man will then God concurres which is to subject not the will of Man to God but the will of God to Man Other inconvenient conclusions I shall then mark out when I come to my observations upon the Bishops reply And thus farre concerning the inconveniences that follow both Opinions The Attribute of God which he draweth into argument is his Justice as that God cannot be Just in punishing any man for that which he was necessitated to do To which I have answered before as being one of the Inconveniences pretended to follow upon the Doctrine of Necessity On the Contrary from another of Gods Attributes which is his Fore-knowledge I shall evidently derive that all Actions whatsoever whether they proceed from the will or from fortune were necessary from eternity For whatsoever God Fore-knoweth shall come to passe cannot but come to passe that is it is Impossible it should not come to passe or otherwise come to passe then it was fore-known But whatsoever was Impossible should be otherwise was necessary for the definition of Necessary is that which cannot possibly be otherwise And whereas they that distinguish between Gods Praescience and his Decree say the Fore-knowledge maketh not the Necessity without the Decree it is little to the purpose It sufficeth me that whatsoever was fore-known by God was necessary but all things were Fore-known by God and therefore all things were necessary And as for the distinction of Fore-knowledge from Decree in God Almighty I comprehend it not They are Acts coeternall and therefore one And as for the Arguments drawn from naturall reason they are set down at large in the end of my discourse to which the Bishop maketh his reply which how well he hath answered shall appear in due time For the present the Actions which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will must either be necessitated or proceed from fortune without any other cause for certainly to Will is Impossible without thinking on what he willeth But it is in no mans Election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on And this I take to be enough to clear the understanding of the Reader that he may be the better able to Judge of the Following Disputation I find in those that write of this Argument especially in the Schoolmen and their Followers so many words strangers to our Language and such Confusion and Inanity in the ranging of them as that a mans mind in the reading of them distinguisheth nothing And as things were in the beginning before the Spirit of God was moved upon the Abiss Tohu and Bohu that is to say Confusion and Emptiness so are their discourses To the Right Honourable the Marquis of NEWCASTLE c. SIR IF I pretended to compose a compleat treatise upon this subject I should not refuse those large recruites of reasons and authorities which offer themselves to serve in this cause for God and man Religion and Policy Church and Common wealth a against the blasphemous desperate and destructive opinion of fatall destiny But as b mine aim in the first discourse was onely to presse home hose things in writing which had been agitated between us by word of mouth a course much to be preferred before verball conferences as being freer from passions and tergiversations less subject to mistakes and misrelations wherein paralogismes are more quickly detected impertinencies discovered and confusion avoided So my present intention is onely to vindicate that discourse and together with it c those lights of the Schooles who were never sleighted but where they were not understood How far I have performed it I leave to the judicious and unpartiall Reader resting for mine own part well contented with this that I have fatisfied my self Your Lordships most obliged to love and serve you I. D. Animadversions upon the Bishops Epistle to my Lord of Newcastle a AGainst the Blasphemous Desperate and Destructive Opinion of fatal Destiny This is but choler such as ordinarily happeneth unto them who contend against greater difficulties than they expected b My aim in the first discourse was onely to press home those things in writing which had been agitated between us by word of mouth a course much to be preferred before verball Conferences
by the Event for from the Event we may inferre his Will But his revealed Will which is his Word must be foreknown because it ought to be the rule of our actions Therefore where it is said that God will have all men to be saved it is not meant of his Will internal but of his Commandements or Will revealed as if it had been said God hath given Commandements by following of which all men may be saved So where God saies O Israel how often would I have gathered thee c. as a Hen doth her Chickens but thou wouldest not It is thus to be understood How oft have I by my Prophets given thee such counsell as being followed thou had'st been gathered c. And the like interpretations are to be given to the like places For it is not christian to think if God had the purpose to save all men that any man could be damned because it were a sign of want of power to effect what he would So these words What could have been done more to my Vineyard that I have not done If by them be meant the Almighty power might receave this answer Men might have been kept by it from sinning But when we are to measure God by his revealed Will it is as if he had said What directions what lawes what threatnings could have been used more that I have not used God doth not will and command us to enquire what his Will and Purpose is and accordingly to do it for we shall do that whether we will or not but to look into his Commandements that is as to the Jewes the Law of Moses and as to other People the Lawes of their Country O Israel thy destruction is from thy self but in me is thy help Or as some English Translations have it O Israel thou hast destroyed thy self c. Is literally true but maketh nothing against me for the man that sins willingly whatsoever be the cause of his Will if he be not forgiven hath destroyed himself as being his own act Where it is said They have offered their sons unto Bâ—al which I commanded not nor spake it nor came it into my mind These words nor came it into my mind are by some much insisted on as if they had done it without the Will of God For whatsoever is done comes into Gods mind that is into his knowledge which implyes a certainty of the future action and that certainly an antecedent purpose of God to bring it to passe It cannot therefore be meant God did not will it but that he had not the will to command it But by the way it is to be noted that when God speaks to men concerning his Will and other Attributes he speaks of them as if they were like to those of men to the end he may be understood And therefore to the order of his Work the World wherein one thing followes another so aptly as no man could order it by Designe he gives the name of Will and Purpose For that which we call Designe which is reasoning and thought after thought cannot be properly attributed to God in whose thoughts there is no fore nor after But what shall we answer to the Words in Ecclesiasticus Say not thou it is through the Lord I fell away say not thou he hath caused me to erre If it had not been say not thou but think not thou I should have answered that Ecclesiasticus is Apocrypha and meerly humane authority But it is very true that such words as these are not to be said first because St. Paul forbids it Shall the thing formed saith he say to him that formed it why hast thou made me so Yet true it is that he did so make him Secondly because we ought to attribute nothing to God but what we conceave to be Honourable and we judge nothing Honourable but what we count so amongst our selves and because accusation of man is not Honourable therefore such words are not to be used concerning God Almighty And for the same cause it is not lawful to say that any Action can be done which God hath purposed shall not be done for it is a token of want of the power to hinder it Therefore neither of them is to be said though one of them must needs be true Thus you see how disputing of Gods nature which is incomprehensible driveth men upon one of these two Rocks And this was the cause I was unwilling to have my Answer to the Bishops Doctrine of Liberty published And thus much for comparison of our two opinions with the Scriptures which whether it favour more his or mine I leave to be judged by the Reader And now I come to compare them again by the Inconveniences which may be thought to follow them First the Bishop sayes that this very perswasion that all things come to passe by Necessity is able to overthrow all Societies and Common-wealths in the World The Lawes saith he are unjust which prohibit that which a man cannot possibly shunne Secondly that it maketh superstuous and foolish all Consultations Arts Armes Books Instruments Teachers and Medicines and which is worst Piety and all other Acts of Devotion For if the Event be necessary it will come to pass whatsoever we do and whether we sleep or wake This inference if there were not as well a necessity of the means as there is of the event might be allowed for true But according to my opinion both the event and means are equally necessitated But supposing the inference true it makes as much against him that denies as against him that holds this necessity For I believe the Bishop holds for as certain a truth what shall be shall be as what is is or what has been has been And then the ratiocination of the sick man If I shall recover what need I this unsavoury potion if I shall not recover what good will it do me is a good ratiocination But the Bishop holds that it is necessary he shall recover or not recover Therefore it followes from an opinion of the Bishops as well as from mine that Medicine is superstuous But as Medicine is to Health so is Piety Consultation Arts Armes Books Instruments and Teachers every one to its several â—nd Out of the Bishops opinion it followes as well as from mine that Medicine is superstuous to Health Therefore from his opinion as well as from mine it followeth if such ratiocination were not unsound that Piety Consultation c. are also superstuous to their respective ends And for the superstuity of Lawes whatsoever be the truth of the Question between us they are not superstuous because by the punnishing of one or of a few unjust men they are the cause of justic in a great many But the greatest inconvenience of all that the Bishop pretends may be drawn from this opinion is that God in justice cannot punnish a man with eternal torments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone It
If the Will do not suspend but assent then the act is necessary but because the Will may suspend and not assent therefore it is not absolutely necessary In the former case the Will is moved necessarily and determinately In the later freely and indeterminately The former excitation is immediate the later is mediaté mediante intellectu and requires the help of the understanding In a word so great a difference there is between natural and moral efficacy as there is between his opinion and mine in this Question There remains onely the last dictate of the understanding which he maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the determination of the Will and to the necessary production of the act as the last feather may be said to break an Horses back when there were somany laid on before that there wanted but that to do it I have shewed Numb 7. that the last dictate of the understanding is not alwaies absolute in it self nor conclusive to the Will and when it is conclusive yet it produceth no antecedent nor extrinsecal Necessity I shall only ad one thing more in present That by making the last judgement of right reason to be of no more weight then a single feather he wrongs the understanding as well as he doth the Will and endeavonrs to deprive the Will of its supreme power of application and to deprive the understanding of its supreme power of judicature and definition Neither corporeal agents and objects nor yet the sensitive appetite it self being an inferiour faculty and affixed to the Organ of the Body have any direct or immediate dominion or command over the rational Will It is without the sphear of their activity All the access which they have unto the Will is by the means of the understanding sometimes cleare and sometimes disturbed and of reason either right or mis-informed Without the help of the understanding all his second causes were not able of themselves to load the Horses back with so much weight as the least of all his feathers doth amount unto But we shall meet with his Horse load of feathers again Numb 23. These things being thus briefly touched he proceeds to his answer My argument was this If any of these â—rall these causes formerly recited do take away true liberty that is still intended from necessity then Adam before his fall had no true liberty But Adam before his fall had true liberty He mis-recites the argument and denies the consequence which is so clearly proved that no man living can doubt of it Because Adam was subjected to all the same causes as well as we the same decree the same prescience the same influences the same concourse of causes the same efficacy of objects the same dictates of reason But it is onely a mistake for it appears plainly by his following discourse that he intended to deny not the consequence but the assumption For he makes Adam to have had no liberty from necessity before his fall yea he proceeds so far as to affirm that all humane wills his and ours and each propension of our wills even during our deliberation are as much necessitated as any thing else whatsoever that we have no more power to forbear those actions which we do than the fire hath power not to burn Though I honour T. H. for his person and for his learning yet I must confess ingeniously I hate this Doctrine from my heart And I believe both I have reason so to do and al others who shall seriously ponder the horrid consequences which flow from it It destroyes liberty dishonours the nature of Man It makes the second causes outward objects to be the Rackets and Men to be but the Tennis-Balls of destiny It makes the first cause that is God Almighty to be the introducer of all evil and sin into the world as much as Man yea more than Man by as much as the motion of the Watch is more from the Artificer who did make it and wind it up than either from the spring or the wheels or the thred if God by his special influence into the second causes did necessitate them to operate as they did And if they being thus determined did necessitate Adam inevitably irresistably not by an accidental but by an essential subordination of causes to whatsoever he did Then one of these two absurdities must needs follow either that Adam did not sin and that there is no such thing as sin in the world because it proceeds naturally necssarily and essentially from God Or that God is more guilty of it and more the cause of evil than Man because Man is extrinsecally inevitably determined but so is not God And in causes essentially subordinate the cause of the cause is alwaies the cause of the effect What Tyrant did ever impose Lawes that were impossible for those to keep upon whom they were imposed and punish them for breaking those Laws which he himself had necessitated them to break which it was no more in their power not to break than it is in the power of the fire not to burn Excuse me if I hate this Doctrine with a perfect hatred which is so dishonourable both to God and Man which makes Men to blaspheme of necessity to steal of necessity to be hanged of necessity and to be damned of necessity And therefore I must say and say again Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulous odi It were better to be an Atheist to believe no God or to be a Manichee to believe two Gods a God of good and a God of evil or with the Heathens to believe thirty thousand Gods than thus to charge the true God to be the proper cause and the true Author of all the sins and evills which are in the world Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number XI aTHis Argument was sent forth only as an espie to make a more full discovery what were the true grounds of T. H. his supposed Necessity The Argument which he sendeth forth as an Espie is this If either the decree of God or the Fore-knowledge of God or the Influence of the Stars or the Concatenation which he saies falsly I call a Concourse of causes or the Physical or Moral Efficacy of objects or the last Dictate of the Understanding do take away true liberty then Adam before his fall had no true liberty In answer whereunto I said that all the things now existent were necessary to the production of the effect to come that the Fore-knowledge of God causeth nothing though the Will do that the influence of the Stars is but a small part of that cause which maketh the Necessity and that this consequence If the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect then Adam had no true liberty was false But in his words if these do take away true liberty then Adam before his fall had no true liberty the consequence is good but then I deny that Necessity takes away Liberty the reason
the Power he hath and exerciseth in distributing blessings and afflictions Justice is not in God as in man the observation of the Lawes made by his superiours Nor is Wisedom in God a logicall examination of the means by the end as it is in men but an incomprehensible Attribute given to an incomprehensible nature for to honour him It is the Bishop that erres in thinking nothing to be Power but Riches and High place wherein to dominere and please himself and vex those that submit not to his opinions d Thirdly this opinion of absolute Necessity destroyes the Truth of God making him to command one thing openly and to necessitate another privately c. It destroyes the goodness of God making him to be a hater of mankind c. It destroyes the Justice of God making him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act c. It destroyes the very Power of God making him to be the true Author of all the defects and evils which are in the world If the opinion of absolute necessity do all this then the opinion of Gods Prescience does the same for God foreknoweth nothing that can possibly not come to pass but that which cannot possibly not come to pass cometh to pass of necessity But how doth necessity destroy the Truth of God by commanding and hindering what he commandeth Truth consisteth in Affirmation and Negation not in commanding and hindering it does not therefore follow if all things be necessary that come to pass that therefore God hath spoken an untruth Nor that he professesseth one thing and intendeth another The Scripture which is his word is not the profession of what he intendeth but an indication of what those men shall necessarily intend whom he hath chosen to salvation and whom he hath determined to destruction But on the other side from the Negation of necessity there followeth necessarily the Negation of Gods Prescience which is in the Bishop if not ignorance impiety Or how destroyeth it the Goodness of God or maketh him to be an hater of mankind and to delight in the torments of his creatures whereas the very doggs licked the sores of Lazarus in pitty and commiseration of him I cannot imagine when living creatures of all sorts are often in torments as well as men that God can be displeased with it without whose will they neither are nor could be at all tormented Nor yet is he delighted with it but health sickness â—ase torments life and death are without all passion in him dispenced by him and he putteth an end to them then when they end and a beginning when they begin according to his eternal purpose which cannot be resisted That the necessity argueth a delight of God in the torments of his creatures is even as true as that it was pitty and commiseration in the doggs that made them lick the sores of Lazarus Or how doth the opinion of necessity destroy the Justice of God or make him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act If all afflictions be punishments for whose act are all other Creatures punished which cannot sin Why may not God make the affliction both of those men that he hath elected and also of those whom he hath reprobated the necessary causes of the conversion of those he hath elected their own afflictions serving therein as chastisements and the afflictions of the rest as examples But he may perhaps think it no injustice to punish the creatures that cannot sin with temporary punishments when nevertheless it would be injustice to torment the same creatures eternally This may be somewhat to Meekness and Cruelty but nothing at all to Justice and Injustice For in punishing the innocent the injustice is equall though the punishments be unequal And what cruelty can be greaner than that which may be inferred from this opinion of the Bishop that God doth torment eternally and with the extreamest degree of torment all those men which have sinned that is to say all mankind from the creation to the end of the world which have not believed in Jesus Christ whereof very few in respect of the multitude of others have so much as heard of his name and this when Faith in Christ is the gift of God himself and the hearts of all men in his hands to frame them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them to believe He hath no reason therefore for his part to tax any opinion for ascribing to God either cruelty or injustice Or how doth it destroy the Power of God or make him to be the Author of all the defects and evils which are in the world First he seemeth not to understand what Author signifies Author is he which owneth an Action or giveth a warrant to do it Doe I say that any man hath in the Scripture which is all the warrant we have from God for any Action whatsoever a Warrant to commit Theft Murder or any other sin Does the opinion of necessity inferre that there is such a warrant in the Scripture Perhaps he will say no but that this opinion makes him the cause of sin But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all Actions And are not sins of commission Actions Is Murder no Action And does not God himself say Non est malum in civitate quod ego non feci And was not murder one of those evils whether it were or not I say no more but that God is the cause not the Author of all Actions and Motions Whether sin be the Action or the Defect or the Irregularity I mean not to dispute Nevertheless I am of opinion that the distinction of Causes into Efficient and Deficient is Bohu and signifies nothing e How shall a man praise God for his Goodness who beleeves him to be a greater Tyrant than ever was in the world who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault to express his Power If Tyrant signifie as it did when it came first in use a King t is no dishonour to beleeve that God is a greater Tyrant than ever was in the world for he is the King of all Kings Emperours and Common-Wealths But if we take the word as it is now used to signifie those Kings onely which they that call them Tyrants are displeased with that is that Govern not as they would have them the Bishop is nearer the calling him a Tyrant than I am making that to be Tyranny which is but the exercise of an absolute Power For he holdeth though he see it not by consequence in withdrawing the Will of man from Gods dominion that every man is a King of himself And if a man cannot praise God for his Goodness who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault how can the Bishop praise God for his Goodness who thinks he hath created millions of millions to burn eternally when he could have kept them so easily from committing any fault And to his How shall a man hear
the Universal work of God and then it is absurd for the universe as one aggregate of things natural hath no intention His Doctrine that followeth concerning the generation of Monsters is not worth consideration therefore I leave it wholy to the Judgement of the Reader e Then he betakes himself to his old help that God may punish by right of omnipotence though there were no sin The question is not now what God may do but what God will do according to that Covenant which he hath made with Man Fac hoc vives Do this and thou shalt live T is plaine to let passe that he puts Punishment where I put Affliction making a true sentence false that if a man do this he shall live and he may do this if he will In this the Bishop and I disagree not This therefore is not the question but whether the will to do this or not to do this be in a mans own Election Whereas he adds He that wills not the death of a sinner doth much lesse Will the death of an innocent creature He had forgot for a while that both good and evil men are by the Will of God all mortall but presently corrects himself and says he means by Death Eternal torments that is to say eternal life but in torments To which I have answered once before in this Book and spoken much more amply in another Book to which the Bishop hath inclination to make an answer as appeareth by his Epistle to the Reader That which followeth to the end of this number hath been urged and answered already divers times I therefore passe it over J. D. BUT the Patrons of necessity being driven out of the Numb 18. plain field with reason have certain retreats or distinctions which they flye unto for refuge First they distinguish between Stoical necessity and Christian necessity between which they make a threefold difference First say they the Stoicks did subject Jupiter to destiny but but we subject destiny to God I answer that the Stoical and Christian destiny are one and the same fatum quasi effatum Jovis Hear Seneca Destiny is the necessity of all things and actions depending upon the disposition of Jupiter c. I add that the Stoicks left a greater liberty to Jupiter over destiny than these Stoicall Christians do to God over his decrees either for the beginnings of things as Euripides or for the progress of them as Chrysippus or at least of the circumstances of time and place as all of them generally So Virgil Sed trahere moras ducere c. So Osyris in Apuleius promiseth him to prolong his life Ultra fato constituta tempora beyond the times set down by the destinies Next they say that the Stoicks did hold an eternall flux and necessary connexion of causes but they believe that God doth act praeter contra naturam besides and against nature I answer that it is not much material whether they attribute necessity to God or to the Starrs or to a connexion of causes so as they establish necessity The former reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity but much more necessity it self upon what ground soever Either they must run into this absurdity that the effect is determined the cause remaining undetermined or els hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the Stoicks did Lastly they say the Stoicks did take away liberty and contingence but they admit it I answer what liberty or contingence was it they admit but a titular liberty and an empty shadow of contingence who do profess stifly that all actions and events which either are or shall be cannot but be nor can be otherwise after any other manner in any other Place Time Number Order Measure nor to any other end than they are and that in respect of God determining them to one what a poor ridiculous liberty or contingence is this Secondly they distinguish between the first cause and the second causes they say that in respect of the second causes many things are free but in respect of the first cause all things are necessary This answer may be taken away two wayes First so contraries shall be true together The same thing 1. at the same time shall be determined to one and not determined to one the same thing at the same time must necessarily be and yet may not be Perhaps they will say not in the same respect But that which strikes at the root of this question is this If all the causes were onely collateral this exception might have some colour but where all the causes being joined together and subordinate one to another do make but one totall cause if any one cause much more the first in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary it determines the rest and without doubt makes the effect necessary Necessity or Liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause but from all the causes joyned together If one link in a chain be fast it fastens all the rest Secondly I would have them tell me whether the second 2. causes be predetermined by the first cause or not If it be determined then the effect is necessary even in respect of the second causes If the second cause be not determined how is the effect determined the second cause remaining undetermined Nothing can give that to another which it hath not it self But say they nevertheless the power or faculty remaineth free True but not in order to the act if it be once determined It is free in sensu diviso but not in sensu composito when a man holds a bird fast in his hand is she therefore free to flie where she will because she hath wrings Or a man imprisoned or fettered is he therefore free to walk where he will because he hath feet and a loco-motive faculty Judge without prejudice what a miserable subterfuge is this which many men confide so much in T. H Certain distinctions which he supposing may be brought to his arguments are by him removed HE saith a man may perhaps answer that the necessity of things held by him is not a Stoical necessity but a Christian necessity c. but this dâ—stinction I have not used nor indeed have ever heard bâ—fore Nor do I think any man could make Stoical and Christian two kinds of necessitiâ—s though they may be two kinds of doctrin Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments from the authority of any Sect but from the nature of the things themselves But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this place as making against his own Tenet where all the causes saith he being jâ—yned together and subordinate one to another do make but one totall cause If any one cause much more the first in the whole series of subordination of causes be necessary it determines the rest and without doubt maketh the effect necessary For that which I call the necessary cause of
any effect is the joyning togethâ—r of all causes subordinate to the first into one totall cause If any oâ—â— of those saith he especially the first produce its effect necessarily thâ—n all the rest are determined and the effect also necessary Now it is manifest that the first cause is a necessary cause oâ— all thâ— effects that are next and immediat to it and therefore by hâ—â— own reason all effects are necessary Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the first cause and necessary in respect of second causes mine It does as he well notâ—th imply a contradiction J. D. BEcause T. H. disavowes these two distinctions I have joyned them together in one paragraph He likes not the distinction of necessity or destiny into Stoicall and Christian no more do I. We agree in the conclusion but our motives are diverse My reason is because I acknowledg no such necessity either as the one or as the other and because I conceive that those Christian writers who do justly detest the naked destiny of the Stoicks as fearing to fall into those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from thence do yet privily though perhaps unwittingly under another form of expression introduce it again at the backdoor after they had openly cast it out at the foredoor But T H. rusheth boldly without distinctions which he accounts but Jargon and without foresight upon the grossest destiny of all others that is that of the Stoicks He confesseth that they may be tâ—o kinds of doctrine May be Nay they are without all peradventure And he himself is the first who beares the name of a Christian that I have read that hath raised this sleeping Ghost out of its grave and set it out in its true colours But yet he likes not the names of Stoicall and Christian destiny I do not blame him though he would not willingly be accounted a Stoick To admit the thing and quarrel about the name is to make our selves ridiculous Why might not I first call that kind of destiny which is maintained by Christians Christian destiny and that other maintained by Stoicks Stoicall destiny But I am not the inventer of the tearm If he had been as carefull in reading other mens opinions as he is confident in setting down his own he might have found not only the thing but the name it self often used But if the name of fotâ—m Christi num do offend him Let him call it with Lipsius â—atum verum who divides destiny into four kinds 1. Mathematicall or Astrological destiny 2. Natural destiny 3. Stoical or violent destiny and 4. true destiny which he calls ordinarily nostrum our destiny that is of Christians and fatum pium that is godly destiny and defines it just as T. H. doth his destiny to be a series or order of causes depending upon the divine Counsel de const l 1. cap. 17. 18. 19. Though he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline those rocks which some others have made shipwrack upon Yet the Divines thought he came too neer them as appears by his Epistle to the Reader in a later Edition And by that note in the margent of his twentieth Chapter Whatsoever I dispute here I submit to the judgment of the wise and being admonished I will convert it One may convince me of error but not of obstinacy So fearfull was he to overshoot himself and yet he maintained both true liberty and true contingency T. H. saith he hath not sucked his answer from any Sect And I say so much the worse It is better to be the disciple of an old Sect than the ring-leader of a new Concerning the other destinction of liberty in respect of the first cause and liberty in respect of the second causes though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer like those old Lamiae which could put out their eyes when they list As namely that the faculty of willing when it is determined in order to the act which is all the freedom that he acknowledgeth is but like the freedom of a bird when she is first in a mans hand c. Yet he hath espied another thing wherein I contradict my self because I affirm that if any one cause in the whole series of causes much more the first cause be necessary it determineth the â—est But saith he it is manifest that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next I am glad yet it is not I who contradict my self but it is some of his manifest truths which I contradict That the first cause is a necessary cause of all effects which I say is a manifest falshood Those things which God wills without himself he wills freely not necessarily Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily doth act or work all that it can do or all that is in its power But it is evident that God doth not all things without himself which he can do or which he hath power to do He could have raised up children unto Abraham of the very stones which were upon the banks of Jordan Luk. 3. 8. but he did not He could have sent twelve Legions of Angels to the succour of Christ but he did not Matth. 26. 53. God can make T. H. live the yeers of Methuselah but it is not necessary that he shall do so nor probable that he will do so The productive power of God is infinite but the whole created world is finite And therefore God might still produce more if it pleased him But this it is when men go on in a confused way and will admit no distinctions If T. H. had considered the difference between a necessary being and a necessary cause or between those actions of God which are immanent within himself and the transient works of God which are extrinsecall without himself he would never have proposed such an evident error for a manifest truth Qui pauca considerat facile pronuntiat Animadversions upon the Reply Numb XVIII THE Bishop supposing I had taken my opinion from the Authority of the Stoick Philosophers not from my own Meditation falleth into dispute against the Stoicks whereof I might if I pleas'd take no notice but passe over to Number 19. But that he may know I have considered their doctrine concerning Fate I think fit to say thus much that their error consisteth not in the opinion of Fate but in faigning of a false God When therefore they say Fatum est effatum Jovis They say no more but that Fate is the word of Jupiter If they had said it had been the Word of the true God I should not have perceived any thing in it to contradict because I hold as most Christians do that the whole world was made and is now Governed by the Word of God which bringeth a necessity of all things and actions to depend upon the divine disposition Nor do I see cause to find fault with that as he does which is said by
drinking or gaming Jam. 1. 14. Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and entised Disordered passions of anger hatred lust if they be consequent as the case is here put by T. H. and flow from deliberation and election they do not only not diminish the fault but they aggravate it and render it much greater h He talks much of the motives to do the motives to forbear how they work upon and determine a man as if a reasonable man were no more than a Tennis-ball to be tossed to and fro by the Rackets of the second causes As if the will had no power to moove it self but were meerly passive like an artificiall Popingay remooved hither and thither by the bolts of the Archers who shoot on this side and on that What are motives but reasons or discourses framed by the understanding and freely mooved by the will What are the will and the understanding but faculties of the same soul and what is liberty but a power resulting from them both To say that the will is determined by these motives is as much as to say that the Agent is determined by himself If there be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will then there is no antecedent no extrinsecal necessitation at all i All the world knows that when the Agent is determined by himself then the effect is determined likewise in its cause But if he determined himself freely then the effect is free Motives determine not naturally but morally which kind of determination may consist with true liberty But if T. H. his opinion were true that the will were naturally determined by the Physical and special influence of extrinsecal causes not onely motives were vain but reason it self and deliberation were vain No saith he they are not vain because they are the means Yes if the means be superfluous they are vain what needed such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done when it is already determined extrinsecally what must be done k He saith that the ignorance of the true causes and their power is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty but when we seriously consider the causes of things we acknowledge a necessity No such thing but just the contrary The more we consider and the cleerer we understand the greater is the liberty and the more the knowledge of our own liberty The less we consider and the more incapable that the understanding is the lesser is the liberty and the knowledge of it And where there is no consideration nor use of reason there is no liberty at all there is neither moral good nor evil Some men by reason that their exteriour senses are not totally bound have a trick to walk in their sleep Suppose such an one in that case should cast himself down a pair of stairs or from a bridge and break his neck or drown himself it were a mad Jury that would find this man accessary to his own death Why because it was not freely done he had not then the use of reason l Lastly he tells us that the will doth choose of necessity as well as the fire burns of neoessity If he intend no more but this that election is the proper and natural act of the will as burning is of the fire or that the elective power is as necessarily in a man as visibility he speaks truly but most impertinently For the question is not now of the elective power in actu primo whether it be an essential faculty of the soul but whether the act of electing this or that particular object be free and undetermined by any antecedent and extrinsecal causes But if he intend it in this other sense that as the fire hath no power to suspend its burning nor to distinguish between those combustible matters which are put unto it but burns that which is put unto it necessarily if it be combustible So the will hath no power to refuse that which it wills nor to suspend its own appetite He erres grossely The will hath power either to will or nill or to suspend that is neither to will nor nill the same object Yet even the burning of the fire if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth m Two things are required to make an effect necessary First that it be produced by a necessary cause such as fire is Secondly that it be necessarily produced Protagoras an Atheist began his Book thus Concerning the Gods I have nothing to say whether they be or they be not for which his Book was condemned by the Athenians to be burned The fire was a necessary Agent but the sentence or the application of the fire to the Book was a free act and therefore the burning of his Book was free Much more the rational will is free which is both a voluntary agent and acts voluntarily n My second reason against this distinction of Liberty from Compulsion but not from necessitation is new and demonstrates cleerly that to necessitate the will by a Physical necessity is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of Compulsion and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner is the true cause of evil and ought rather to be blamed than the will it self But T. H. for all he saith he is not surprised can be contented upon better advise to steal by all this in silence And to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the Reader he makes an empty shew of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction between the elicite and imperate acts of the will first because the terms are improper secondly because they are obscure What Triviall and Grammatical objections are these to be used against the universal current of Divines and Philosophers Verborum ut Nummorum It is in words as it is in mony Use makes them proper and current A Tyrant at first signified a lawful and just Prince Now use hath quite changed the sense of it to denote either an Usurper or an Oppressor The word praemunire is now grown a good word in our English Laws by use and tract of time And yet at first it was meerly mistaken for a praemonere The names of Sunday Munday Tuesday were derived at first from those Heathenish Deities the Sun the Moon and the warlike God of the Germans Now we use them for distinction sake onely without any relation to their first original He is too froward that will refuse a piece of coin that is current throughout the world because it is not stamped after his own fancy So is he that rejects a good word because he understands not the derivation of it We see forrein words are daily naturalized and made free Denizons in every Country But why are the tearms improper Because saith he It attributes command and subjection to
voluntary It seems that he calleth Compulsion Force but I call it a fear of force or of dammage to be done by force by which fear a mans will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will before Force taketh away the sin because the Action is not his that is forced but his that forceth It is not alwayes so in Compulsion because in this case a man electeth the Lesse Evil under the notion of Good But his instances of the betrothed Damsel that was forced and of Tamar may for any thing there appeareth in the Text be Instances of Compulsion and yet the Damsel and Tamar be both innocent In that which immediately followeth concerninâ— how far fear may extenuate a sin there is nothing to be answered I preceive in it he hath some glimmering of the truth but not of the grounds thereof It is true that Just â—ear dispenceth not with the precepts of God or Nature for they are not dispensable but it extenuateth the fault not by diâ—â—inishing any thing in the Action but by being no transgressiâ—n For if the fear be allowed the Action it produceth is allowed also Nor doth it disp use in any case with the Law positive but by making the Action it self Lawful for thâ— breaking of a Law is alwayes sin and it is certain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive Precepts though with the losse of their lives unlesse the right that a man hath to preserve himself make it in case of a just Fear to be nâ— Law The omission of circumcision was no sin he says whilst the Israelites were travelling through the Wildernesse 'T is very true but this has nothing to do with Compulsion And the cause why it was no sin was this they were ready to obâ—y it whâ—nsoever God should give them leasure and rest from travel whereby they might be cured or at least when God that daily spake to their Conducter in the Desert should appoint him to renew that Sacrament g I will propose a case to him c. The case is this a Servant is robbed of his Masters money by the Highway but is acquit because he was forced Another Servant spends his Masters money in a Tavern Why is he not acquited also seeing he was necessitated Would hâ— saith he T. H. admit of this excuse I answer no But I would do that to him which should necessitate him to behave himself better anothâ—r time or at least necessitate another to behave himself better by his example h He talkes much of the motives to do anâ— the mâ—tives to forbear how they work upon and determine a man as if a reasonable man were no more then a Tennis-ball to be tossed to and fro by the Rackets of the second causes c. May not great things be produced by second causes as well as little And a Foot-ball as well as a Tennis-ball But the Bishop can never be driven from this that the Will hath power to move it self but says t is all one to say that an Agent can determine it self and that the Will is determined by motives extrinsical He adds that if there be no necessitation before the Judgment of right reason doth dictate to the Will then there is no Antecedent nor Extrinsecal necessitation at all I say indeed the effect is not produced before the last dictate of the understanding but I say not that the necessity was not before he knows I say it is from eternity When a Cannon is planted against a Wall though the battery be not made till the bullet arrive yet the necessity was present all the while the bullet was going to it if the Wall stood still and if it â—liâ—t away the hitting of somewhat else was necessary and that antecedently i All the World knows that when the Agent is determined by himself then the effect is determined likewise in its cause Yes whâ—n the Agent is dâ—termined by himself then the effect is determined likewise in its cause and so any thing else is what he will have it But nothing is determined by it self nor is there any man in the World that hâ—th any Conception answerable to those Words But Motives he says determine not naturally but Morally This also is insignificant for all Motion is Natural or Supernatural Moral motion is a meer Word without any Imagination of the mind correspondent to it I have heard men talk of a Motion in a Court of Justice perhaps this is it which he means by Moral Motion But certainly when the tongue of the Judg and the hands of the Clerks are thereby movâ—d the Motion is Natural and proceed from natural causes which causes also were Natural Motions of the tongue of the Advocate And whereas he adds that if this were true then not onely Motives but reason it self and deliberation were vain it hath been sufficiently answered before that therefore they are not vain because by them is produced the effect I must also note that oftentimes in citing my opinion he puts â—n instead of mine those terms of his own which upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity as here he makes me to say that which I did never say Special influence of extrinsical causes k He saith that the ignorance of the true causes and their Power is the reason why we ascribe the effect â—o Liberty but when we seriously consider the causes of things we acknowledge a necessity No such thing but just the contrary Iâ—â— understand the Authors which he readeth upon this point no better then he understands what I have here written it is no wonder he understandeth not the truth of the question I said not that when we consider the causes of things but when we see and know the strength that moves us we acknowledge necessity No such thing says the Bishop but just the contrary the more we consider and the clearer we understand the greater is the Liberty c. Is there any doubt if a man could foreknow as God foreknows that which is hereafter to come to passe but that he would also see and know she causes which shall bring it to passe and how they work and make the effect necessary for necessary it is whatsoever God foreknoweth But we that foresee them not may consider as much as wâ— will and understand as clearly as we will but are never the neerer to the knowledge of their necessity and that I said was the cause why we impute those events to Liberty and not to causes l Lastly he tels us that the Wil doth chose of necessity as well as the fire burns of necessity If he intend no more but this that Election is the proper and natural Act of the Wil as burning is of the fire c. He speaks truely but most impertinently for the question is not now of the Elective power in actu primo c. Here again he makes me speak non sense I said the man chooseth of necessity he says I say
proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of naturall causes First that there are free actions which proceed meerly from election without any outward necessitation is a truth so evident as that there is a Sun in the Heavens and he that doubteth of it may as well doubt whether there be a shell without the Nut or a stone within the Olive A man proportions his time each day and allots so much to his Devotions so much to his Study so much to his Diet so much to his Recreations so much to necessary or civil visits so much to his rest he who will seek for I know not what causes of all this without himself except that good God who hath given him a reasonable Soul may as well seek for a cause of the Egyptian Pyramides among the Crocodiles of Nilus c Secondly for mixt actions which proceed from the concurrence of free and natural Agents though they be not free yet they are not necessary as to keep my former instance a man walking though a street of a Citie to do his occasions a Tile falls from an House and breaks his head the breaking of his head was not necessary for he did freely choose to go that way without any necessitation neither was it free for he did not deliberate of that accident therefore it was contingent and by undoubted consequence there are contingent acâ—â—ons in the World which are not free Most certainly by the concurrence of free causes as God the good and bad Angels and men with natural Agents sometimes on purpose and sometimes by accident many events happen which otherwise had never hapned many effects are produced which otherwise had never been produced And admitting such things to be contingent not necessary all their consequent effects not onely immediate but medâ—ate must likewise be contingâ—â—â— that is to say such as do not proceed from a continued connexion and succession of necessary causes which is directly contrary to T. H. his opinion d Thirdly for the actions of bruit beasts though they be not free though they have not the use of reason to restrain their appetites from that which is sensitively good by the consideration of what is rationally good or what is hoâ—est and though their fancies be determined by nature to some kinds of work yet to think that every individual action of theirs and each animal motion of theirs even to the least murmure or gesture is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity to the extrinsecal causes or objects I see no ground for it Christ saith one of these Sparrows doth not fall to the gound without your Heavenly Father that is without an influence of power from him or exempted from his disposition he doth not say which your Heavenly Father casteth not down Lastly for the natural actions of inanimate Creatures wherein there is not the least concurrence of any free or voluntary Agents the question is yet more doubtful for many things are called contingent in respect of us because we know not the cause of them which really and in themselves are not contingent but necessary Also many things are contingent in respect of one single cause either actually hindred or in possibility to be hindred which are necessary in respect of the joynt concurrence of all collateral causes e But whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning so as they must all have concurred as they have done and in the same degree of power and have been deficient as they have been in all events whatsoever would require a further examination if it were pertinent to this question of liberty but it is not It is sufficient to my purpose to have shewed that all elective actions are free from absolute neâ—essity And more-over that the concurrence of voluntary aâ—d free Agents with natural causes both upon purpose and accidentally hath helped them to produce many effects which otherwise they had not produced and hindred them from producing many effects which otherwise they had produced And that if this intervention of voluntary and free Agents had been more frequent than it hath been as without doubt it might have been many natural events had been otherwise than they are And therefore he might have spared his instances of casting Ambs-ace and raining to morrow And first for his casting Ambs-ace If it be thrown by a fair Gamester with indifferent Dice it is a mixt action the casting of the Dice is free but the casting of Ambs-ace is contingent a man may deliberate whether he will cast the Dice or not but it were folly to deliberate whether he will cast Ambs-ace or not because it is not in his power unless he be a cheater that can cogge the Dice or the Dice be false Dice and then the contingency or the degree of contingency ceaseth accordingly as the Caster hath more or less cunning or as the figure or making of the Dice doth incline them to Ambs-ace more than to another cast or necessitate them to this cast and no other Howsoever so far as the cast is free or contingent so far it is not necessary And where necessity begins there liberty and contingency do cease to be Likewise his other instance of raining or not raining to morrow is not of a free elective act nor alwayes of a contingent act In some Countries as they have their stati venti their certain winds at set seasons so they have their certain and set rains The Aethiopian rains are supposed to be the cause of the certain inundation of Nilus In some eastern Countries they have rain onely twice a year and those constant which the Scriptures call the former and the later rain In such places not onely the causes do act determinately and necessarily but also the determination or necessity of the event is fore-known to the inhabitants In our Climate the natural causes coelestial and sublunary do not produce rain so necessarily at set times neither can we say so certainly and infallibly it will rain to morrow or it will not rain to morrow Neverthelesse it may so happen that the causes are so disposed and determined even in our climate that this proposition it will rain to morrow or it will not rain to morrow may be necessary in it self and the Prognosticks or tokens may be such in the sky in our own bodies in the creatures animate and inanimate as weather-glasses c. that it may become probably true to us that it will rain to morrow or it will not rain to morrow But ordinarily it is a contingent proposition to us whether it be contingent also in it self that is whether the concurrence of the causes were absolutely necessary whether the vapours or matter of the rain may not yet be dispersed or otherwise consumed or driven beyond our coast is a speculation which no way concerns this question So we see one reason why his two instances are altogether impertinent because they are of actions which are not
no good by fight he seeks to circumvent us under colour of curtesy Fistula dulce canit volucrem dum decipit auceps As they who behold themselves in a glass take the right hand for the left and the left for the right T. H. knows the comparison so we take our own errours to be truths and other mens truths to be errours b If we be in an errour in this it is such an errour as we sucked from nature it self such an errour as is confirmed in us by reason and experience such an errour as God himself in his sacred Word hath revealed such an errour as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church in all ages have delivered Such an errour wherein we have the concurrence of all the best Philosophers both Natural and Moral such an errour as bringeth to God the glory of Justice and Wisedom and Goodness and Truth such an errour as renders men more devour more pious more industrious more humble more penitent for their sins Would he have us resign up all these advantages to dance blindfold after his pipe No he perswades us too much to our loss But let us see what is the imaginary cause of our imaginary errour Forsooth because we attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the World as seeing hearing willing knowing Justice Wisedom but deny him such poor things as eyes ears brains and so far he saith we do well He hath reason for since we are not able to conceive of God as he is the readiest way we have is by remooving all that imperfection from God which is in the creatures So we call him Infinite Immortal Independent Or by attributing to him all those perfections which are in the creatures after a most eminent manner so we call him Best Greatest most Wise most Just most Holy c But saith he When they dispute of Gods actions Philosophically then they consider them again as if he had such faculties and in the manner as we have them And is this the cause of our errour That were strange indeed for they who dispute Philosophically of God do neither ascribe faculties to him in that manner that we have them Nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to God Gods Understanding and his Will is his very Essence which for the eminency of its infinite perfection doth perform all those things alone in a most transcendent manner which reasonable creatures do perform imperfectly by distinct faculties Thus to dispute of God with modesty and reverence and to clear the Deity from the imputation of tyranny injustice and dissimulation which none do throw upon God with more presumption than those who are the Patrons of absolute necessity is both comely and Christian. It is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed errour which drawes them ordinarily into these exclamations against those who dispute of the Deity For some of themselves dare anatomise God and publish his Eternal Decrees with as much confidence as if they had been all their lives of his cabinet councel But it is for fear lest those pernicious consequences which flow from that doctrine essentially and reflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness should be laid open to the view of the world Just as the Turks do first establish a false Religion of their own devising and then forbid all men upon pain of death to dispute upon Religion Or as the Priests of â—olech the Abhomination of the Ammonites did make a noise with their timbrells all the while the poor Infants were passing through the fire in Tophet to keep their pitiful cries from the ears of their Parents So d they make a noise with their declamations against those who dare dispute of the Nature of God that is who dare set forth â—â—s Justice and his goodness and his truth and his Philanthropy onely to deaf the ears and dim the eyes of the Christian world lest they should hear the lamentable ejulations and howlings or see that rueful spectacle of millions of souls tormented for evermore e in the flames of the true Tophet that is Hell onely for that which according to T. H. his doctrine was never in their power to shun but which they were ordered and inevitably necessitated to do onely to express the omnipotence and dominion and to satisfie the pleasure of him who is in truth the Father of all mercies and the God oâ— all consolation f This is life eternal saith our Saviour to know the onely true God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent Joh. 17. 3. Pure Religion and und filed before God and the Father is this to visite the fatherless and widowes in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world saith Sâ— James Jam. 1. 27. Fear God and keâ—p his Commandments for this 〈◊〉 the whole duty of man saith Solomon â—câ—les 12. 13. But T. H. hath found out a more compendious way to heaven True Religion saith he consisteth in obedience to Christs Lieutenants and giving God such honouâ— both in attributes and â—â—â—ions 〈◊〉 they in their several Lieutenancâ—â—â— shaâ— ordain That is to say â—e of the Religion of every Christian Country where you come To make the Civill Magistrate to be Christs Lieutenant upon earth for matters of Religion And to make him to be Supreme Judge in all controversies whom all must obey is a Doctrine so strange and such an uncouth phrase to Christian ears that I should have missed his meaning but that I consulted with his Book De Civ c. 15. Sect. 16. and c. 17. Sect. 28. What if the Magistrate shall be no Christiam himself What if he shall command contrary to the Law of God or Nature Must we obey him rather than God Act. 14. 19. Is the Civill Magistrate become now the onely ground and pillar of Truth I demand then why T. H. is of a different mind from his Soveraign and from the Laws of the Land concerning the Attributes of God and his Decrees This is a new Paradox and concerns not this question of liberty and necessity Wherefore I forbear to prosecute it further and so conclude my reply with the words of the Christian Poet. Caesaris jussum est ore Galieni Princeps quod colit ut colimus omnes Aeternum colemus Principem dierum Factorem Dominumque Galieni Animadversions upon the Answer to the Postscript Numb XXXVIII HE taketh it ill that I say that Arguments do seldome work on men of wit and learning when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion Neverthelesse it is not onely certain by experience but also there is reason for it and that grounded upon the natural disposition of mankind For it is natural to all men to defend those opinions which they have once publickly engaged themselves to maintain because to have that detected for errour which they have publickly maintained for truth is never without some dishonour more or lesse and to find in themselves that they have spent a great
are intelligible enough for he hath said in his Reply to Numb 24. that his opinion is demonstrable in reason though he be not able to comprehend how iâ— consisteth together with Gods eternal Prescience and though it exceed his weak capacitie yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest so that to him that truth is manifest â—nd demonstrable by reason which is beyond his capacity so that words beyond capacity are with him intelligible enough But the Reader is to be Judge of that I could add many other passages that discover both his little Logick as taking tâ—â— insignificant word above recited for Terms of Art aâ—d hiâ— no Philosophy in distinguishing between moral and â—â—turâ—lâ— mâ—tion and by calling some motions Metaphorical and his thâ—r offers at the causes of sight and of the descent of heavy lies and his talk of the inclination of the Lâ—ud-stone and diverse other places of his Book But to make an end I shall briefly draw up the sum of what we have both said That which I have maintained is that no man hath his future will in his own present power That it may be changed by others and by the change of things without him and when it is changed it is not changed nor determined to any thing by it self and that when it is undetermined it is no Will because every one that willeth willeth something in particular That deliberation is common to men with beasts as being alternate appetite and not ratiocination and the last act or appetite therein and which is immediately followed by the action the onely will that can be taken notice of by others and which onely maketh an action in publick judgment voluntary That to be free is no more then to do if a man will and if he will to forbear and consequently that this freedome is the freedome of the man and not of the Will That the Will is not free but subject to change by the operation of external causes That all external causes depend necessarily on the first eternal cause God Almighty who worketh in us both to Will and to do by the mediation of second causes That seeing neither man nor any thing else can work upon it self it is impossible that any man in the framing of his own Will should concur with God either as an Actor or as an Instrument That there is nothing brought to passe by fortune as by a cause nor any thing without a cause or concurrence of causes sufficient to bring it so to passe and that every such cause and their concurrence do proceed from the providence good pleasure and working of God and consequently though I do with others call many events Contingent and say they happen yet because they had every of them their several sufficient causes and those causes again their former causes I say they happen necessarily And though we perceive not what they are yet there are of the most Contingent events as necessary causes as of those events whose causes we perceive or else they could not possibly be foreknown as they are by him that foreknoweth all things On the contrary the Bishop maintaineth That the Will is free from necessitation and in order thereto that the Judgment of the understanding is not alwayes practice practicum nor of such a nature in it self as to oblige and determine the Will to one though it be true that Spontaneity and determination to one may consist together That the Will determineth it self and that external things when they change the Will do work upon it not naturally but morally not by natural motion but by moral and Metaphorical motion That when the Will is determined naturally it is not by Gods general influence whereon depend all second causes but by special influence God concurring and powring something into the Will That the Will when it suspends not its Act makes the Act necessary but because it may suspend and not assent it is not absolutely necessary That sinful acts proceed not from Gods Will but are willed by him by a permissive Will not an operative Will and hardeneth the heart of man by a negative obduration That mans Will is in his own power but his motus primo primi not in his own power nor necessary save onely by a Hypothetical necessity That the Will to change is not always a change of Wil That not all things which are produced are produced from sufficient but some things from deficient causes That if the Power of the Will be present in actu primo then therâ— is nothing wanting to the production of the effect That a cause may be sufficient for the production of an effect though it want something necessary to the production thereof because the Will may be wanting That a necessary cause doth not alwayes necessarily produce its effect but onely then when the effect is necessarily produced He proveth also that the Will is free by that universal notion which the World hath of election For when of the six electors the votes are divided equally the King of Bohemia hath a casting voyce That the Prescience of God supposeth no necessity of the future existence of the things foreknown because God is not eternal but eternity and eternity is as standing Now without succession of time and therefore God foresees all things intuitively by the presentiallity they have in Nunc stans which comprehendeth in it all time past present and to come not formally but eminently and vertually That the Will is free even then when it acteth but that is in a compounded not in a divided sense That to be made and to be eternal do consist together because Gods Decrees are made and are nevertheless eternal That the order beauty and perfection of the World doth require that in the universe there should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some free some contingent That though it be true that to morrow it shall rain or not rain yet neither of them is true determinatè That the Doctrine of necessity is a blasphemous desperate and destructive doctrinâ— That it were better to be an Atheist that then to hold it he that maintaineth it is fitter to be refuted with Rodds then with Arguments And now whether this his Doctrine or mine be the more intelligible more rational or more coâ—â—ormable to Gords Word I leave it to the Judgment of the Reader But whatsoever be the truth of the disputed Question the Reader may peradventure think I have not used the Bishop with that respect I ought or without disadvantage of my cause I might have done for which I am to make a short Apologie A little before the last Parliament of the â—â—te King when every man 〈…〉 freely against the then present Government I thought it worth my study to consider the grounds and consequences of such behaviour and whether it were conformable or contrary to reason and to the Word of God and after some time I did put in order and publish my thoughts thereof first in Latine and then again the same in English where I endeavoured to prove both by reason and Scripture That they who have once submitted themselves to any Soveraign Governour either by express acknowledgment of his power or by receiving protection from his Laws are obliged to be true and faithful to him and to acknowledge no other supreme power but him in any matter or question whatsoever either civill or Ecclesiastical In which Books of mine I pursued my subject without taking notice of any particular man that held any opinion contrary to that which I then writ onely in general I maintained that the office of the Clergy in respect of the supreme civil power was not Magisterial but Ministerial and that their teaching of the People was founded up nâ—o other Authority then that of the civil Soveraign and all this without any word tending to the disgrace either of Episcopacy or of Presbytery Nevertheless I find since that divers of them whereof thâ— Bishop of Derry is one have taken offence especially at two things one that I make the supremacy in matters of Religion to residâ— in the civil Soveraign the other that being no Clergy-man I deliver Doctrines and ground them uâ—on Words of the Scripture which Doctrines they being by profession Divines have never taught And in this their displeasure divers of them in their Books and Sermons without answering any of my Arguments have not onely exclâ—iâ—ed against my Doctrine but reviled me and endeavoured to make me hateful 〈…〉 things for which if they knâ—w their own and the Publick good they ought to have given me thanks There is also one of them that taking offence at me for blaming in part the Discipline instituted heretofore and regulated by the Authority of the Pope in the Universities not onely ranks me amongst thosâ— men that would have the Revenue of the Universities diminished and sayes plainly I have no Religion but also thinks me so simple and ignorant of the World as to believe that our Universities maintain Popery And this is the Author of the Book called Vindiciae Academiarum If either of the Universities had thought it self injured I believe it could have Authorised or appointed some member of theirs whereof there be many abler men then he to have made their vinâ—ication But this Vindex as little Doggs to plâ—ase their Masters use to bark in token of their sedulity indifferently at strangers till they be rated off unprovoked by me hath fallen upon me without bidding I have been publiquely injured by many of whom I took no notice supposing that that humour would spend it self but seeing it last and grow higher in this writing I now answer I thought it necessary at last to make of some of them and first of this Bishop an Example FINIS
THE QUESTIONS Concerning LIBERTY NECESSITY And CHANCE Clearly Stated and Debated Between Dr. Bramhall Bishop of Derry And Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury London Printed for Andrew Crook and are to be sold at the Sign of the Green Dragon in St. Pauls Church-yard 1656. To the Reader YOu shall find in this little Volum the Questions concerning Necessity Freedom and Chance which in all Ages have perplexed the minds of curious Men largely and clearly discussed and the Arguments on all sides drawn from the Authority of Scripture from the Doctrine of the Schools from Natural Reason and from the Consequences pertaining to common Life truly alleadged and severely weighed between two persons who both maintain that Men are Free to Do as they Will and to Forbear as they Will. The things they dissent in are that the one holdeth That it is not in a Mans Power now to choose the Will he shall have anon That Chance produceth nothing That all Events and Actions have their Necessary Causes That the Will of God makes the Necessity of all things The other on the contrary maintaineth That not onely the Man is Free to choose what he will Do but the Will also to choose what it shall Will That when a Man willeth a good Action Gods Will concurreth with his else not That the Will may choose whether it will Will or not That many things come to pass without Necessity by Chance That though God foreknow a thing shall be yet it is not Necessary that that thing shall be in as much as God seeth not the future as in its Causes but as present In sum they adheare both of them to the Scripture but one of them is a learned School-Divine the other a man that doth not much admire that kind of learning This is enough to acquaint you withall in the beginning which also shall be more particularly explained by and by in the stating of the Question and dividing of the Arguments into their several heads The rest you shall understand from the persons themselves when they enter Fare ye well T. H. THE OCCASION OF THE CONTROVERSIE WHether whatsoever comes to passe proceed from Necessitie or some things from Chance has been a Question disputed amongst the old Philosophers long time before the Incarnation of our Saviour without drawing into argument on either side the almightie power of the Deity But the third way of bringing things to passe distinct from Necessitie and Chance namely Freewill is a thing that never was mentioned amongst them nor by the Christians in the beginning of Christianity For St. Paul that disputes that question largely and purposely never useth the term of Freewill nor did he hold any Doctrine aequivalent to that which is now called the Doctrine of Freewill but deriveth all actions from the irresistible Will of God and nothing from the will of him that runneth or willeth But for some ages past the Doctors of the Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of Gods Will the Will of Man and brought in a Doctrine that not onely Man but also his Will is Free and determined to this or that action not by the Will of God nor necessary causes but by the power of the Will it Self And though by the reformed Churches instructed by Luther Calvin and others this opinion was cast out yet not many years since it began again to be reduced by Arminius and his followers and became the readiest way to Ecclesiastical promotion and by discontenting those that held the contrary was in some part the cause of the following troubles which troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at Paris where we discoursed together of the Argument now in hand from which Discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion and for ough I remember without any offensive words as blasphemous atheistical or the like passing between us either for that the Bishop was not then in passion or suppressed his passion being then in the presence of my Lord of Newcastle But afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship his opinion concerning the question in writing and desired him to perswade me to send an answer thereunto likewise in writing There were some reasons for which I thought it might be inconvenient to let my answer go abroad yet the many obligations wherein I was obliged to him prevailed with me to write this answer which was afterwards not onely without my knowledge but also against my will published by one that found means to get a Copy of it surreptitiously And thus you have the Occasion of this Controversie The State of the Question THe Question in general is stated by the Bishop himself towards the end of Numb 3. in these words Whether all Events Natural Civil Moral for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner that concernes not this question be praedetermined extrinsecally and inevitably without their own concurrence so as all the actions and events which either are or shall be cannot but be nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other place time number measure order nor to any other end than they are And all this in respect of the supream cause or a concourse of extrinsecall causes determining them to one Which though drawn up to his advantage with as much caution as he would do a Lease yet excepting that which is not intelligible I am content to admit Not intelligible is First that the conversion of a sinner concerns not the Question If he mean that the conversion of a sinner is from necessity and praedetermined then he is for so much as the Question concerns Religion of the same mind that I am and what he can mean else by that exception I cannot guesse Secondly these words without their own concurrence are insignificant unless he mean that the events themselves should concurre to their production as that fire doth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning as the words properly import or at least without concurrence of the fuell Those two clauses left out I agree with him in the state of the Question as it is put universally But when the Question is put of the necessity of any particular event as of the Will to write or the like then it is the stating of that particular Question but it is decided in the decision of the Question universall He states the same Question againe â—n another place thus This is the very Question where the water sticks between us Whether there be such a Liberty free from necessitation and extrinsecall determination to one or not And I allow it also for well stated so Again he sayes In a word so great difference there is between Natural and Moral efficacy as there is between his opinion and mine in this Question So that the state of the Question is reduced to this Whether there be a Moral efficacy which is not Natural I say there is not he sayes there is Again he writes thus And
But if these causes did operate freely or contingently if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence or have concurred after another manner then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary but either free or contingent This will be yet clearer by considering his own instance of casting Ambs-Ace though it partake more of contingency than of freedome Supposing the positure of the parties hand who did throw the Dice supposing the figure of the Table and of the Dice themselves supposing the measure of force applied and supposing all other things which did concur to the production of that cast to be the very same they were there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary But still this is but a necessity of supposition for if all these concurrent causes or some of them were contingent or free then the cast was not absolutely necessary To begin with the Caster He might have denied his concurrence and not have cast at all He might have suspended his concurrence and not have cast so soon He might have doubled or diminished his force in casting if it had pleased him He might have thrown the Dice into the other Table In all these cases what becomes of his ambs-ace The like uncertainties offer themselves for the maker of the Tables and for the maker of the Dice and for the keeper of the Tables and for the kind of Wood and I know not how many other circumstances In such a mass of contingencies it is impossible that the effect should be antecedently necessary T. H. appeales to every mans experience I am contented Let every one reflect upon himself and he shall find no convincing much less constreining reason to necessitate him to any one of these particular acts more than another but onely his own will or arbitrary determination So T. H. his necessity is no absolute no antecedent extrinsecal necessity but meerly a necessity upon supposition d Thirdly that which T. H. makes the Question is not the Question The Question is not saith he Whether a man may write if he will and forbear if he will but whether the will to write or the will to forbear come upon him according to his will or according to any thing else in his own power Here is a distinction without a difference If his will do not come upon him according to his will than he is not a free nor yet so much as a voluntary Agent which is T. H. his Liberty Certainly all the freedome of the Agent is from the freedom of the will If the will have no power over it self the Agent is no more free than a Staff in a mans hand Secondly he makes but an empty shew of a power in the will either to wtite or not to write â— If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever what a man shall will and what he shall not will what he shall write and what he shall not write to what purpose is this power God and Nature never made any thing in vain but vain and frustraneous is that power which never was and never shall be deduced into Act. Either the Agent is determined before he acteth what he shall will and what he shall not will what he shall act and what he shall not act and then he is no more free to act than he is to will Or else he is not derermined and then there is no necessity No effect can exceed the vertue of its cause if the action be free to write or to forbear the power or faculty to will or nill must of necessity be more free Quod efficit tale illud magis est tale If the will be determined the writing or not writing is likewise determined and then he should not say He may write or he may forbear but he must write or he must forbear Thirdly This answer contradicts the sense of all the world that the wil of man is determined without his will or without any thing in his power Why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not Why do we represent reasons to them Why do we pray them Why do we intreat them Why do we blame them if their will come not upon them according to their will Wilt thou be made clean said our Saviour to the Paraiyticke person John 5. 6. to what purpose if his will was extinsecally determined Christ complains We have piped unto you and yâ— have not danced Matth. 11. 17. How could they help it if their wills were determined without their wils to forbear And Matth. 23. 37. I would have gathered your Children together as the Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings but ye would not How easily might they answer according to T. H. his doctrine Alas blame not us Our wills are not in our own power or disposition if they were we would thankfully embrace so great a favour Most truly said St. Austin Our will should not be a will at all if it were not in our power f This is the belief of all mankind which we have not learned from our Tutors but is imprinted in our hearts by nature We need not turn over any obscure books to find out this truth The Poets chant it in the Theaters the Shepheards in the mountains the Pastors teach it in their Churches the Doctors in the Universities the common people in the markets and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto it except an handful of men who have poisoned their intellectuals with paradoxical principles Fourthly this necessity which T. H. nath devised which is grounded upon the necessitation of a mans will without his will is the worst of all others and is so far from lessening those difficulties and absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoicks that it increaseth them and rendreth them unanswerable g No man blameth fire for burning whole Cities No man taxeth poison for destroying men but those persons who apply them to such wicked ends If the will of man be not in his own disposition he is no more a free Agent than the fire or the poyson Three things are required to make an act or omission culpable First that it be in our power to perform it or forbear it Secondly that we be obliged to perform it or forbear it respectively Thirdly that we omit that which we ought to have done or do that which we ought to have omitted h No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun or forbearing those things which never were in his power T. H. may say that besides the power men have also an appetite to evil objects which renders them culpable It is true but if this appetite be determined by another not by themselves Or if they have not the use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites they sin no more than a stone descending downward according to its natural appetite or the brute Beasts who commit voluntary errours in following their
sensitive appetites yet sin not i The Question then is not whether a man be necessitated to will or nill yet free to act or forbear But saving the ambiguous acception of the word Free the Question is plainly this whether all Agents and all events natural civil moral for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner that concerns not this Question be predetermined extrinsecally and inevitably without their own concurrence in the determination so as all actions and events which either are or shall be cannot but be nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other place time number measure order nor to any other end than they are And all this in respect of the supream cause or a concourse of extrinsecal causes determining them to one k So my preface remains yet unanswered Either I was extrinsecally and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse without any concurrence of mine in the determination and without any power in me to change or oppose it or I was not so predetermined If I was then I ought not to be blamed for no man is justly blamed for doing that which never was in his power to shun If I was not so predetermined then mine actions and my will to act are neither compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsecal causes but I elect and choose either to write or to forbear according to mine own will and by mine own power And when I have resolved and elected it is but a necessity of supposition which may and doth consist with true liberty not a reall antecedent necessity The two hornes of this Dilemma are so strait that no mean can be given nor room to passe between them And the two consequences are so evident that instead of answering he is forced to decline them Animadversions upon his Reply Numb III. a THus much I will maintaine that that is no true necessity which he calleth Necessity nor that Liberty which he calleth Liberty nor that the Question which he makes the Question c. For the clearing whereof it behooveth us to know the difference between these three Necessity Spontaneity and Liberty I did expect that for the knowing of the difference between Necessity Spontaneity and Liberty he would have set down their Definitions For without these their difference cannot possibly appear for how can a man know how things differ unless he first know what they are which he offers not to shew He tels us that Necessity and Spontaneity may meet together and Spontaneity and Liberty but Necessity and Liberty never and many other things impertinent to the purpose For which because of the length I refer the Reader to the Place I note onely this that Spontaneity is a word not used in common English and they that understand Latine know it means no more than Appetite or Will and is not found but in living Creatures And seeing he saith that Necessity and Spontaneity may stand together I may say also that Necessity and Will may stand together and then is not the Will Free as he would have it from Necessitation There are many other things in that which followeth which I had rather the Reader would consider in his own words to which I referre him than that I should give him greater trouble in reciting them again For I do not fear it will be thought too hot for my fingers to shew the vanity of such words as these Intellectual appetire Conformity of the appetite to the object Rational will Elective power of the Rational will nor understand I how Reason can be the root of true Liberty if the Bishop as he saith in the beginning had the liberty to write this discourse I understand how objects and the Conveniences and the Inconveniences of them may be represented to a man by the help of his sences but how Reason representeth any thing to the Will I understand no more than the Bishop understands there may be Liberty in Children in Beasts and inanimate Creaturs For he seemeth to wonder how Children may be left at Liberty how Beasts imprisoned may be set at Liberty and how a River may have a free course and saith what will he ascribe Liberty to inanimate Creatures also And thus he thinks he hath made it clear how Necessity Spontaneity and Liberty differ from â—â—e another If the Reader find it so I am contented b His Necessity is just such another a Necessity upon supposition arising from the concourse of all the causes including the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable Creatures c. The Bishop might easily have seen that the Necessity I hold is the same Necessity that he denies namely a Necessity of things future that is an antecedent Necessity derived from the very beginning of time and that I put Necessity for an Impossibility of not being and that Impossibility as well as Possibility are never truly said but of the future I know as well as he that the cause when it is adaequate as he calleth it or entire as I call it is together in time with the effect But for all that the Necessity may be and is before the effect as much as any Necessity can be And though he call it a Necessity of supposition it is no more so than all other Necessity is The fire burneth neoessarily but not without supposition that there is fewel put to it And it burneth the fewel when it is put to it necessarily but it is by supposition that the ordinary course of nature is not hindred For the fire burnt not the three Children in the Furnace c But if these causes did operate Freely or Contingently if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence or have concurred after another manner then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary but either free or Contingent It seems by this he understandeth not what these words Free and Contingent mean A little before he wondred I should attribute Liberty to inanimate Creatures and now he puts causes amongst those things that operate Freely By these causes it seems be understandeth onely men whereas I shewed before that Liberty is usually ascribed to whatsoever Agent is not hindred And when a man doth any thing Freely there be many other Agents immediate that concur to the effect he intendeth which work not Freely but necessarily as when the man moveth the Sword Freely the Sword woundeth necessarily nor can suspend or deny its concurrence And consequently if the man move not himself the man cannot deny â—is concurrence To which he cannot reply unless he say a man originally can move himself for which he will be able to find no Authority of any that have but tasted of the knowledge of motion Then for Contingent he understandeth not what it meaneth for it is all one to say it is Contingent and simply to say it is saving that when they say simply it is they consider not how or by what means but in saying it is contingent they tell us
it s left to her Husbands choice either to establish it or to make it void And Josh. 24. 15. Choose you this day whom you will serve c. But I and my house will serve the Lord. He makes his own choice and leaves them to the liberty of their election And 2 Sam. 24 12. I offer thee three things choose thee which of them I shall do If one of these three things was necessarily determined and the other two impossible how was it left to him to choose what should be done Therefore we have true liberty T. H. ANd the first place of Scripture taken from Numb 30. 14 is one of them that look another way The words are If a Wife make a vow it is left to her Husbands choice either to establish it or make it void for it prooves no more but that the Husband is a free or voluntary Agent but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose by praecedent necessary causes J. D. MY first Argument from Scripture is thus formed Arg. 1. Whosoever have a liberty or power of election are not determined to one by praecedent necessary causes But men have liberty of election The assumption or minor proposition is prooved by three places of Scripture Numb 30. 14. Josh. 24. 15. 2 Sam. 24. 12. I need not insist upon these because T. H. acknowledgeth that it is clearly prooved that there is election in Man But he denieth the major Proposition because saith he Man is necessitated or determined to what he shall choose by praecedent necessary causes I take away this answer three wayes First by Reason Election is evermore either of things 1. possible or at least of things conceived to be possible that is efficacious election when a man hopeth or thinketh of obteining the object Whatsoever the will chooseth it chooseth under the notion of good either honest or delightful or profitable but there can be no reall goodness apprehended in that which is known to be impossible It is true there may be some wandring pendulous wishes of known impossibilities as a man also that hath comitted an offence may wish he had not committed it but to choose efficaciously an impossibility is as impossible as an impossibility it self No man can think to obtein that which he knows impossible to be obteined but he who knows that all things are antecedently determined by necessary causes knows that it is impossible for any thing to be otherwise than it is Therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election to choose this or that indifferently is to make the same thing to be determined to one and to be not determined to one which are contradictories Again whosoever hath an elective power or a liberty to choose hath also a liberty or power to refuse Isa. 7. 10. Before the Child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good He who chooseth this rather than that refuseth that rather than this As Moses choosing to suffer affliction with the people of God did thereby refuse the pleasures of sin Heb. 11. 24. But no man hath any power to refuse that which is necessarily praedetermined to be unlesse it be as the Fox refused the Grapes which were beyond his reach When one thing of two or three is absolutely determined the other are made thereby simply impossible a Secondly I proove it by instances and by that universal 2. notion which the world hath of election what is the difference between an elective and hereditary Kingdom but that in an elective Kingdom they have power or liberty to choose this or that Man indifferently But in an hereditary Kingdome they have no such power nor liberty Where the Law makes a certain Heir there is a necessitation to one where the Law doth not name a certain Heir there is no necessitation to one and there they have power or liberty to choose An haereditary prince may be as grateful and acceptable to his subjects and as willingly received by them according to that liberty which is opposed to compulsion or violence as he who is chosen yet he is not therefore an elective Prince In Germany all the Nobility and Commons may assent to the choice of the Emperour or be well pleased with it when it is concluded yet none of them elect or choose the Emperour but onely those six Princes who have a consultative deliberative and determinative power in his Election And if their votes or suffrages be equally divided three to three then the King of Bohemia hath the casting voice So likewise in Corporations or Common-wealths sometimes the People sometimes the Common Councell have power to name so many persons for such an office and the Supreme Magistrate or Senate or lesser Councel respectively to choose one of those And all this is done with that caution and secrecy by billets or other means that no man knowes which way any man gave his vote or with whom to be offended If it were necessarily and inevitably predetermined that this individual person and no other shall and must be chosen what needed all this circuit and caution to do that which is not possible to be done otherwise which one may do as well as a thousand and for doing of which no rational man can be offended if the electors were necessarily predetermined to elect this man and no other And though T. H. was pleased to passe by my University instance yet I may not untill I see what he is able to say unto it The Junior of the Mess in Cambridge divides the meat in four parts the Senior chooseth first then the second and third in their order The Junior is determined to one and hath no choice left unless it be to choose whether he will take that part which the rest have refused or none at all It may be this part is more agreable to his mind that any of the others would have been but for all that he cannot be said to choose it because he is determined to this one Even such a liberty of election is that which is established by T. H. Or rather much worse in two respects The Junior hath yet a liberty of contradiction left to choose whether he will take that part or not take any part but he who is precisely predetermined to the choice of this object hath no liberty to refuse it Secondly the Junior by dividing carefully may preserve to himself an equal share but he who is wholly determined by extrinsecal causes is left altogether to the mercy and disposition of another Thirdly I proove it by the texts alleadged Numb 30. 3. 13. If a Wife make a vow it is left to her Husbands choice either to establish it or make it void But if it be predetermined that he shall establish it it is not in his power to make it void If it be predetermined that he shall make it void it is not in his power to establish it
not indeed He who casts his goods into the Sea may do it of his own accord in order to the end Secondly he erres in this also that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but onely fear Invincible and Antecedent ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness by removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the action As a man thinking to shoot a wild Beast in a Bush shoots his friend which if he had known he would not have shot This man did not kill his friend of his own accord For the clearer understanding of these things and to know 4. what spontaneity is let us consult a while with the Schools about the distinct order of voluntary or involuntary actions Some acts proceed wholly from an extrinsecal cause as the throwing of a stone upwards a rape or the drawing of a Christian by plain force to the Idols Temple these are called violent acts Secondly some proceed from an intrinsecal cause but without any manner of knowledge of the end as the falling of a stone downwards these are called natural acts Thirdly some proceed from an internal principle with an imperfect knowledge of the end where there is an appetite to the object but no deliberation nor election as the acts of Fools Children Beasts and the inconsiderate act of men of judgement These are called voluntary or spontaneous acts Fourthly some proceed from an intrinsecal cause with a more perfect knowledge of the end which are elected upon deliberation These are called free acts So then the formal reason of liberty is election The necessary requisite to election is deliberation Deliberation implyeth the actual use of reason But deliberation and election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsecal praedetermination to one How should a man deliberate or choose which way to go who knows that all wayes are shut against him and made impossible to him but onely one This is the genuine sense of these words Voluntary and Spontaneous in this Question Though they were taken twenty other waies vnlgarly or metaphorically as we say spontaneous ulcers where there is no appetite at all yet it were nothing to this controversie which is not about Words but about Things not what the words Voluntary or Free do or may signifie but whether all things be extrinsecally praedetermined to one These grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the words the next thing to be examined is that contradiction which he hath espied in my discourse or how this Argument fights against his fellows If I saith T. H. make it appear that the spontaneous actions of Fools Children mad Men and Beasts do proceed from election and deliberation and that inconsiderate and indeliberate actions are found in the wisest men then this argument concludes that necessity and election may stand together which is contrary to his assertion If this could be made appear as easily as it is spoken it would concern himself much who when he should prove that rational men are not free from necessity goes about to prove that brute Beasts do deliberate and elect that is as much as to say are free from necessity But it concerns not me at all it is neither my assertion nor my opinion that necessity and election may not meet together in the same subject violent natural spontaneous and deliberate or elective acts may all meet together in the same subject But this I say that necessity and election cannot consist together in the same act He who is determined to one is not free to choose out of more then one To begin with his later supposition that wise men may do inconsiderate and indeliberate actions I do readily admit it But where did he learn to infer a general conclusion from particular premises as thus because wise men do some indeliberate acts therefore no act they do is free or elective Secondly for his former supposition That Fools Children mad Men and Beasts do deliberate and elect if he could make it good it is not I who contradict my self nor fight against mine own assertion but it is he who endeavours to prove that which I altogether deny He may well find a contradiction between him and me otherwise to what end is this dispute But he shall not be able to find a difference between me and my self But the truth is he is not able to proove any such thing and that brings me to my sixth Consideration That neither Horses nor Bees nor Spiders nor Children nor Fools nor Mad-men do deliberate or elect His 6. first instance is in the Horse or Dog but more especially the Horse He told me that I divided my argument into squadrons to apply my self to your Lordship being a Military man And I apprehend that for the same reason he gives his first instance of the Horse with a submission to your own experience So far well but otherwise very disadvantageously to his cause Men use to say of a dull fellow that he hath no more brains than a Horse And the Prophet David saith Be not like the Horse and Mule which have no understanding Psal. 32. 9. How do they deliberate without understanding And Psal. 49. 20. he saith the same of all brute Beasts Man being in honour had no understanding but became like unto the Beasts that perish The Horse dâ—â—urres upon his way Why not Outward objects or inward fancies may produce a stay in his course though he have no judgement either to deliberate or elect He retires from some strange figure which he sees and comes on again to avoid the spur So he may and yet be far enough from deliberation All this proceeds from the sensitive passion of fear which is a perturbation arising from the expectation of some imminent evil But he urgeth what else doth man that deliberateth Yes very much The Horse feareth some outward object but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same end Fear is commonly of one deliberation of more than one fear is of those things which are not in our power deliberation of those things which are in our power fear ariseth many times out of natural antipathies but in these disconveniences of nature deliberation hath no place at all In a word fear is an enemy to deliberation and betrayeth the succours of the Soul If the Horse did deliberate he should consult with reason whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or not He would represent to himself all the dangers both of going and staying and compare the one with the other and elect that which is less evil He should consider whether it were not better to endure a little hazard than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty towards his Master who did breed him and doth feed him This the Horse doth not Neither is it possible for him to do it Secondly for Children T. H. confesseth that they may be so young that they do not deliberate at all Afterwards as they
Free acts and Voluntary acts but he saith I confound them and make them the same In his Reply Number 2. he saith that for the clearing of the Question we are to know the difference between these three Necessity Spontaneity and Liberty and because I thought he knew that it could not be cleared without under standing what is Will I had reason to think that Spontaneity was his new word for Will And presently after some things are Necessary and not Voluntary or Spontaneous some things are both Necessary and Voluntary These words Voluntary and Spontaneous so put together would make any man beleeve Spontaneous weâ—e put as explicative of Voluntary for it is no wonder in the eloquence of the School men Therefore presently after these words Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the Appetite either intellectual or sensitive signifie that Spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appetite to the object which to me soundeth as if he had said that the Appetite is like the Object which is as proper as if he had said the Hunger is like the Meat If this be the Bishops meaning as it is the meaning of the Words he is a very fine Philosopher But hereafter I will venture no more to say his meaning is this or that especially were he useth terms of Art c Thirdly he saith I ascribe spontaneity onely to Fools Children mad Men and Beasts But I acknowledge Spontaneity hath place in rataonal men c. I resolve to have no more to do with Spontaneity But I desire the Reader to take notice that the common people on whose arbitration dependeth the signification of words in comâ—â—n use among the Latines and Greeks did call all actions and motions whereof they did perceive no cause Spantaneous and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I say not those actions which had no causes for all actions have their causes but those actions whose causes they did not perceive So that Spontaneous as a general name comprehended many actions and motions of inanimate creatures as the falling of heavy things downwards which they thought spantaneous and that if they were not hindred they would discend of their own accord It comprehended also all animal motion as beginning from the Will or Appetite because the causes of the Will and Appetite being not perceived they supposed as the Bishop doth that they were the causes of themselves So that that which in general is called Spontâ—neous being applyed to Men and Beasts in special is called Voluntary Yet the Will and Appetite though the very same thing use to be distinguished in certain occasions For in the publique conversation of Men where they are to judge of one anothers Will and of the regularity and irregularity of one anothers actions not every Appetite but the last is esteemed in the publique judgement for the Will Nor every action proceeding from Appetite but that onely to which there had preceded or ought to have preceded some deliberation And this I say is so when one man is to judge of anothers Will. For every man in himself knoweth that what he desireth or hath an appetite to the same he hath a will to though his will may be changed before he hath obteined his desire The Bishop understanding nothing of this might if it had pleased him have called it Jargon But he had rather pick out of it some contradictions of my self And therefore saith d Yet I have no reason to be offended at it meaning such contradictions for he dealeth no otherwise with me than he doth with himself It is a contradiction he saith that having said that voluntary presupposeth deliberation I say in another place that whatsoever followeth the last appetite is voluntary and where there is but one appetite that is the last Not observing that voluntary presuppâ—seth deliberation when the judgement whether the action be voluntary or not is not in the Actor but in the Judge who regardeth not the will of the Actor where there is nothing to be accused in the action of deliberate malice yet knoweth that though there be but one appetite the same is truly will for the time and the action if it follow a voluntary action This also he saith is a contradction that having said no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation though never so suddain I say afterward that by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding Again he observes not that the action of a man that is not a child in publique judgement how rash inconsiderate and suddain soever it be is to be taken for deliberation because it is supposed he ought to have considered and compared his intended action with the Law when nevertheless that suddain and indeliberate action was truly voluntary Another contradiction which he finds is this that having undertaken to proove that Children before they have the use of reason do deliberate and elect I say by and by after a Child may be so young as to do what he doth without all deliberation I yet see no contradiction here for a Child may be so young as that the appetite thereof is its first appetite but afterward and often before it come to have the use of reason may elect one thing and refuse another and consider the consequences of what it is about to do And why not as well as Beasts which never have the use of reason for they deliberate as men do For though men and beasts do differ in many things very much yet they differ not in the nature of their deliberation A man can reckon by words of general signification make propositions and syllogismes and compute in numbers magnitudes proportions and other things computable which being done by the advantage of language and words of general significations a beast that hath not language cannot do nor a man that hath language if he misplace the words that are his counters From hence to the end of this Number he discourseth again of Spontaneity and how it is in Children mad Men and Beasts which as I before resolved I will not meddle with let the Reader think and judge of it us he pleaseth J. D. SEcondly a they who might have done and may do many things which they leave undone And they who leave undone many things which they might do are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what they do but have true liberty But we might do many things which we do not and we do many things which we might leave undone as is plain 1 King 3. 11. Because thou hast asked this thing and hast not asked for thy self long life neither hast asked riches for thy self nor hast asked the life of thine enemies c. God gave Solomon his choice He might have asked riches but then he not had asked wisdom which he did ask He did ask wisdom but he might have asked riches which yet he did not ask And Acts 5. 4. After it was sold was it not in thine own power It was in his own power
earnest maintainers of the liberty of Adam Therefore none of these supposed impediments take away true liberty T. H. THe fourth Argument is to this effect If the decree of God or his foreknowledge or the influence of the Stars or the concatenation of causes or the physical or morall efficacy of causes or the last dictate of the understanding or whatsoever it be do take away true liberty then Adam before his fall had no true liberty Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulous odi That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action that he may no longer doubt of my meaning is the sum of all those things which being now existent conduce and concurre to the production of that action hereafter whereof if any one thing now â—ere wanting the effect could not be produced This concourse of causes whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes may well be called in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things God Almighty the decree of God But that the fore-knowledge of God should be a cause of any thing cannot be truly said seeing fore-knowledge is knowledge and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the things known and not they on it The influence of the Stars is but a small part of the whole cause consisting of the concourse of all Agents Nor. doth the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or concatenation but an innumerable number of chains joyned together not in all parts but in the first link God Almighty and consequently the whole cause of an event does not alwayes depend upon one single chain but on many together Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary Agents and necessitates the Will and consequently the Action but for moral efficacy I understand not what he means by it The last dictate of the judgement concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action is not properly the whole cause but the last part of it And yet may be said to produce the effect necessarily in such manner as the last feather may be said to break an Horses back when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that to do it Now for his Argument That if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect that then it follows Adam had no true liberty I deny the consequence for I make not only the effect but also the election of that particular effect to be necessary in as much as the Will it self and each propension of a man during his deliberation is as much necessitated and depends on a sufficient cause as any thing else whatsoever As for example it is no more necessary that fire should burn then that a man or other creature whose limbs be moved by fancy should have election that is liberty to do what he has a fancy to though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy or choose his election or will This Doctrine because he saies he hates I doubt had better been suppressed as it should have been if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer J. D. a THis Argument was sent forth onely as an espie to make a more full discovery what were the true grounds of T. H. his supposed Necessity which errand being done and the foundation whereupon he bnilds being found out which is as I called it a concatenation of causes and as he calls it a concourse of necessary causes It would now be a superfluous and impertineut work in me to undertake the refutation of all those other opinions which he doth not undertake to defend And therefore I shall wave them at the present with these short animadversions b Concerning the eternal decree of God he confounds the decree it self with the execution of his decree And concerning the fore-knowledge of God he confounds that speculative knowledge which is called the knowbedge of vision which doth not produce the intellective objects no more then the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects with that other knowledge of God which is called the knowledge of approbation or a practical knowledge that is knowledge joyned with an act of the Will of which Divines do truly say that it is the cause of things as the knowledge of the Artist is the cause of his work God made all things by his word John 1. that is by his wisdom Concerning the influence of the Stars I wish he had expressed himself more clearly For as I do willingly grant that those Heavenly Bodies do act upon these sublunary things not onely by their motion and light but also by an occuit vertue which we call influence as we see by manifold experience in the Loadstone and Shell-fish c. So if he intend that by these influences they do naturally or physically determine the Will or have any direct dominion over humane Counsels either in whole or in part either more or less he is in an errour Concerning the concatenation of causes where as he makes not one chain but an innumerable number of chains I hope he speaks hyperbolically and doth not intend that they are actually infinite the difference is not material whether one or many so long as they are all joyned together both in the first link and likewise in the effect It serves to no end but to shew what a shaddow of liberty T. H. doth fancy or rather what a dream of a shaddow As if one chain were not sufficient to load poor man but he must be clogged with iunumerable chains This is just such another freedom as the Turkish Galli-slaves do enjoy But I admire that T. H. who is so versed in this Question should here confess that he understands not the difference between physical or natural and moral efficacy And much more that he should affirm that outward objects do determine voluntary agents by a natural efficacy No object no second Agent Angel or Devill can determine the Will of man naturally but God alone in respect of his supreme dominion over all things Then the Will is determined naturally when God Almighty besides his general influence where upon all second causes do depend as well for their being as for their acting doth moreover at some times when it pleases him in cases extraordinary concurre by a special influence and infuse something into the Will in the nature of an act or an habit whereby the Will is moved and excited and applyed to will or choose this or that Then the Will is determined morally when some object is proposed to it with perswasive reasons and arguments to induce it to will Where the determination is natural the liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the will but not so where the determination is moral In the former case the Will is determined extrinsecally in the later case intrinsecally The former produceth an absolute necessity the later onely a necessity of supposition
the sin of David in killing Uriah Nor when one is cause both of the action and of the Law how another can be cause of the disagreement between them no more than how one man making a longer and shorter garment another can make the inequality that is between them This I know God cannot sin because his doing a thing makes it just and consequently no sin And because whatsoever can sin is subject to anothers Law which God is not And therefore t is blasphemy to say God can sin But to say that God can so order the world as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man I do not see how it is any dishonour to him Howsoever if such or other distinctions can make it clear that St. Paul did not think Esaus or Pharaohs actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God or that proceeding from his will could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished I will as soon as I understand them turn unto J. D's opinion For I now hold nothing in all this Question between us but what seemeth to me not obscurely but most expresly said in this place by Saint Paul And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture J. D. T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone and satisfie two Arguments with one answer whereas in truth he satisfieth neither First for my third reason a Though all he say here were as true as an Oracle Though punishment were an act of dominion not of Justice in God yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act or why he should chide or expostulate with men why they did that which he himself did necessitate them to do and whereof he was the actor more than they they being but as the stone but he the hand that threw it Notwithstanding any thing which is pleaded here this Stoical opinion doth stick hypocrisie and dissimulation close to God who is Truth it self And to my fift Argument which he changeth and relateth amiss as by comparing mine with his may appear His chiefest answer is to oppose a difficult place of St. Paul Rom. 9. 11. Hath he never heard that to propose adoubt is not to answer an Argument Nec bene respondet qni litem lite resolvit But I will not pay him in his own coin Wherefore to this place alledged by him I answer The case is not the same The Question moved there is how God did keep his promise made to Abraham to be the God of him and of his seed if the Jews who were the legimate progeny of Abraham were deserted To which the Apostle answers ver 6 7 8. That that promise was not made to the carnal seed of Abraham that is the Jewes but to his spiritual Sons which were the Heirs of his Faith that is to the beleeving Christians which answer he explicateth first by the Allegory of Isaack and Ishmael and after in the place cited of Esau and of Jacob. Yet neither doth he speak there so much of their persons as of their posterities And though some words may be accommodated to Gods predestination which are there uttered yet it is not the scope of that text to treat of the reprobation of any man to Hell fire All the posterity of Esau were not eternally reprobated as holy Job and many others But this Question which is now agitated between us is quite of another nature how a man can be a criminal who doth nothing but that which he is extrinsecally necessitated to do or how God in Justice can punish a man with eternal torments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone That he who did imprint the motion in the heart of man should punish man who did only receive the impression from him So his answer looks another way But because he grounds so much upon this text that if it can be cleared he is ready to change his opinion I will examine all those passages which may seem to favour his cause First these words ver 11. being not yet borne neither having done any good or evil upon which the whole weight of his argument doth depend have no reference at all to those words ver 13. Jacob have I loved and Esau have I hated for those words were first uttered by the Prophet Malachy many ages after Jacob and Esau were dead Mal. 1. 2. and intended of the posterity of Esau who were not redeemed from captivity as the Israelites were But they are referred to those other words ver 12. The elder shall serve the younger which indeed were spoken before Jacob or Esau were Born Gen. 5. 23. And though those words of Malachy had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were Born yet it had advantaged his cause nothing for hatred in that text doth not signifie any reprobation to the flames of Hell much less the execution of that decree or the actual imposition of punishment nor any act contrary to love God saw all that he had made and it was very good Goodness it self cannot hate that which is good But hatred there signifies Comparative hatred or a less degree of love or at the most a negation of love As Gen. 29. 31. When the Lord saw that Leah was hated we may not conclude thence that Jocob hated his Wife The precedent verse doth fully expound the sense ver 30. Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah So Mat. 6. 24. No man can serve two Masters for either he will hate the one and lóve the other So Luke 14. 26. If any man hate not his Father and Mother c. he cannot be my Disciple St. Matthew tells us the sense of it Mat. 10. 37. He that loveth Father or Mother more than me is not worthy of me Secondly those words ver 15. I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy do prove no more but this that the preferring of Jacob before Esau and of the Christians before the Jewes was not a debt from God either to the one or to the other but a work of mercy And what of this All men confess that Gods mercies do exceed mans deserts but Gods punishments do never exceed mans misdeeds As we see in the Parable of the Labourers Matth. 20. Friend I do the no wrong did not I agree with thee for a penny Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as I will Is thy eye evil because I am good Acts of mercy are free but acts of Justice are due That which followes ver 17. comes something nearer the cause The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh for this same purpose I have raised the up that is I have made thee a King or I have preserved thee that I might shew my power in thee But this particle that doth not alwaies signifie the main end of an action but sometimes only a consequent of it As Matt. 2. 15. He departed into Egypt that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the
opinion of T. H almost as there are words Here we learn that God is rich in goodness and will not punish his creatures for that which is his own act Secondly that he suffers and forbeares sinners long and doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve Thirdly that the reason of Gods forbearance is to bring men to repentance Fourthly that hardness of heart and impenitency is not causally from God but from our selves Fiftly that it is not the insufficient proposal of the means of their conversion on Gods ' part which is the cause of mens perdition but their own contempt and despising of these means Sixtly that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion but an act of righteous judgement whereby God renders to every man according to his own deeds wrath to them and only to them who treasure up wrath unto themselves eternal life to those who continue patiently in well-doing If they deserve such punishment who only neglect the goodness and long suffering of God what do they who utterly deny it and make Gods doing and his suffering to be all one I do beseech T. H. to consider what a degree of wilfulness it is out of one obscure text wholly misunderstood to contradict the clear current of the whole Scripture Of the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter 1 Pet. 3. 22. The long suffering of God waited once in the daies of Noah And 2 Pet. 3. 15. Account that the long suffering of the Lord is salvation This is the name God gives himself Exod. 34. 6. The Lord the Lord God mercyful and gracious long suffering c. b Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be commonly true That he who doth permit any thing to be done which it is in his power to hinder knowing that if he do not hinder it it will be done doth in some sort will it I say in some sort that is either by an antecedent will or by a consequent will either by an operative will or by a permissive will or he is willing to let it be done but not willing to do it Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer that to be done which otherwise he would not suffer So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the Lions den to make good his rash decree So Herod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded to make good his rash oath How much more may the immutable rule of justice in God and his fidelity in keeping his word draw from him the punishment of obstinate sinners though antecedently he willeth their conversion He loveth all his creatures well but his own Justice better Again sometimes a man suffereth that to be done which he doth not will directly in it self but indirectly for some other end or for the producing of some greater good As a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body to save the life of the whole Or as a Judge being desirous to save a malefactors life and having power to reprieve him doth yet condemn him for example sake that by the death of one he may save the lives of many Marvel not then if God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruine so long as their sufferings do make for the greater manifestation of his glory and for the greater benefit of his faithful servants This is a most certain truth that God would not suffer evil to be in the world unless he knew how to draw good out of evil Yet this ought not to be understood as if we made any priority or posteriority of time in the acts of God but onely of Nature Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted the other respects him as he is lapsed The objects are the same but considered after a diverse manner Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in God for they are the same with the divine essence which is one But the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed Nor lastly do we make this permission to be a naked or a meer permission God causeth all good pemitteth all evil disposeth all things both good and evill c T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action I answer because he concurres to the doing of evill by a general but not by a speciall influence As the Earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants as well to Hemlock as to Wheat but the reason why the one yeilds food to our sustenance the other poison to our destruction is not from the general nourishment of the Earth but from the special quality of the root Even so the general power to act is from God In him we live and move and have our being This is good But the specification and determination of this general power to the doing of any evill is from our selves and proceeds from the free will of man This is bad And to speak properly the free will of man is not the efficient cause of sin as the root of the Hemlock is of poison sin having no true entity or being in it as poison hath But rather the deficient cause Now no defect can flow from him who is the highest perfection d Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God The general power to act is from God but the specification of this general and good power to murther or to any particular evil is not from God but from the free will of man So T. H. may see clearly if he will how one may be the cause of the Law and likewise of the action in some sort that is by general influence and yet another cause concurring by special influence and determining this general and good power may make it self the true cause of the anomy or the irregularity And therefore he may keep his longer and shorter garments for some other occasion Certainly they will not fit this subject unless he could make general and special influence to be all one But T. H. presseth yet further that the case is the same and the objection used by the Jews ver 19. Why doth he yet find fault who hath resisted his will is the very same with my argument And St. Pauls answer ver 20. O man who art thou that repliest against God shall the thing formed say to him that formed it why hast thou made me thus Hath not the Potter power over his Clay c is the very same with his answer in this place drawn from the irresistible power and absolute dominion of God which justifieth all his actions And that the Apostle in his answer doth not deny that it was Gods will nor that Gods decree was before Esaus sin To which I reply First that the case is
of his in his Book de Cive cap. 6. pag. 70. ascribes to power respectively irresistible or to Soveraign Magistrates whose power he makes to be as absolute as a mans power is over himself not to be limitted by any thing but onely by their strength The greatest propugners of Soveraign power think it enough for Princes to challenge an immunity from coercive power but acknowledge that the Law hath a directtive power over them But T. H. will have no limits but their strength Whatsoever they do by power they do justly But saith he God objected no sin to Job but justified his afflicting him by his power First this is an Argument from authority negatively that is to say worth nothing Secondly the afflictions of Job were no vindicatory punishments to take vengeance of his sins whereof we dispute but probarory chasstisements to make triall of his graces Thirdly Iob was not so pure but that God might justly have laid greater punishments upon him than those afflictions which he suffered Witness his impatience even to the cursing of the day of his nativity Job 3. 3. Indeed God said to Job where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth Job 38. 4. that is how canst thou judge of the things that were done before thou wast born or comprehend the secret causes of my judgements And Job 42. 9. Hast thou an arm like God As if he should say why art thou impatient doest thou think thy self able to strive with God But that God should punish Job without desert here is not a word Concerning the blind man mentioned John 9. his blindness was rarher a blessing to him than a punishment being the means to raise his Soul illuminated and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body is common to us with Ants and Flies but the sight of the soul with the blessed Angels We read of some who have put out their bodily eyes because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the Soul Again neither he nor his parents were innocent being conceived and born in sin and iniquity Psal. 51. 5. And in many things we offend all Jam. 3. 2. But our Saviours meaning is evident by the Disciples question ver 2. They had not so sinned that he should be born blind Or they were not more grievous sinners than other men to deserve an examplary judgment more than they but this corporal blindness befel him principally by the extraordinary providence of God for the manifestation of his own glory in restoring him to his sight So his instance halts on both sides neither was this a punishment nor the blind man free from sin His third instance of the death and torments of Beasts is of no more weight than the two former The death of brute Beasts is not a punishment of sin but a debt of nature And though they be often slaughtered for the use of man yet there is a vast difference between those light and momentary pangs and the unsufferable and endless pains of hell between the meer depriving of a creature of remporal life and the subjecting of it to eternal death I know the Philosophical speculations of some who affirme that entity is better than non-entity that it is better to be miserable and suffer the tormenss of the damned than to be annihilated and cease to be altogether This entity which they speak of is a Metaphysical entity abstracted from the matter which is better than non-entity in respect of some goodness not moral nor natural but trancendental which accompanies every being But in the concrete it is far otherwise where that of our Saviour often takes place Mat. 26. 24. Woe unto that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed It had been good for that man that he had not been born I add that there is an Analogical Juctice and Mercy due even to the brute Beasts Thou shalâ— not musâ—â—e the mouth of the Oxe that treadeth out the corn And a just man is merciful to his Beast f But his greatest errour is that which I touched before to make Justice to be the proper result of Power Power doth not measure and regulate Justice but Justice measures and regulates Power The Will of God and the Eternal Law which is in God himself is properly the rule and measure of Justice As all goodness whether Natural or Moral is a participation of divine goodness and all created Rectitude is but a participation of divine Rectitude so all Lawes are but participations of the eternall Law from whence they derive their power The rule of Justice then is the same both in God and us but it is in God as in him that doth regulate and measure in us as in those who are regulated and measured As the Will of God is immutable alwayes willing what is just and right and good So his justice likewise is immutable And that individual action which is justly punished as sinful in us cannot possibly proceed from the special influence and determinative power of a just cause See then how grossely T. H. doth understand that old and true principle that the Will of God is the rule of Justice as if by willing things in themselves unjust he did render them just by reason of his absolute dominion and irresistible power as fire doth assimilate other things to it self and convert them into the nature of fire This were to make the eternal Law a Lesbian rule Sin is defined to be that which is done or said or thought contrary to the eternall Law But by this doctrine nothing is done nor said nor thought contrary to the Will of God St. Anselm said most truly then the will of man is good and just and right when he wills that which God would have him to will but according to this doctrine every man alwayes wills that which God would have him to will If this be true we need not pray Thy Will be done in earth as it is in heaven T. H. hath devised a new kind of heaven upon earth The worst is it is an heaven without Justice Justice is a constant and perpetual act of the Will to give every one his own But to inflict punishment for those things which the Judge himself did determine and necessitate to be done is not to give every one his own right punitive Justice is a relation of equallity and proportion between the demerit and the punishment But supposing this opinion of absolute and universal necessity there is no demerit in the World we use to say that right springs from Law and Fact as in this Syllogism Every thief ought to be punished there 's the Law But such an one is a thief there 's the Fact therefore he ought to be punished there 's the right But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to be punished neither upon Law nor upon Fact but upon the irresistible power of God Yea it overturneth as much as in
but that Wheat should nonrish him be willeth operatively Which is very absurd or else he must confess that the venimous effects of wicked men are willed operatively d Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God The general power to act is from God but the specification of this general and good power to murther or to any particular evil is not from God but from the free will of man But why am I so mightily mistaken did not God foreknow that Uriah in particular should be murthered by David in particular and what God foreknoweth shall come to pass can that possibly not come to pass and that which cannot possibly not come to pass doth not that necessarily come to pass and is not all necessity from God I cannot see this great mistake The general power saith he to act is from God but the specification to do this act upon Uriah is not from God but from Eree-will Very learnedly As if there were a power that were not the power to do some particular act or a power to kill and yet to kill no body in particular If the power be to kill it is to kill that which shall be by that power killed whether it be Uriah or any other and the giving of that power is the application of it to the act nor doth power signifie any thing actually but those motions and present acts from which the act that is not now but shall be hereafter necessarily proceedeth And therefore this Argument is much like that which used heretofore to be brought for the defence of the divine Right of the Bishops to the Ordination of Ministers They derive not say they the Right of Ordination from tho civill Soveraign but from Christ immediately And yet they acknowledge that it is unlawful for them to Ordain if the civil power do forbid them But how have they right to Ordain when they cannot do it lawfully their answer is they have the Right though they may not exercise it as if the Right to Ordain and the Right to Exercise Ordination were not the same thing And as they answer concerning Right which is Legal Power so the Bishop answereth concerning Natural Power that David had a general power to kill Uriah from God but not a power of applying this power in special to the killing of Uriah from God but from his own Free-will that is be had a power to kill Uriah but not to exercise it upon Uriah that is to say he had a power to kill him but not to kill him which is absurd e But if the case be put why God doth punish one more than another or why he throwes one into Hell fire and not another which is the present case between us to say with T. H. that it is because God is Omnipotent or because his power is irresistible or meerly because it is his pleasure is not onely not warranted but is plainly condemned by St. Paul in this place I note first that he hath no reason to say the case agitated between us is whether the cause why God punisheth one man more than another be his irresistible power or mans sin The case agitated between us is whether a man can now choose what shall be his Will anon or at any time hereafter Again 't is not true that he sayes 't is my opinion that the irresistible power of God is the cause why he punisheth one more than another I say onely that when he doth so the irresistible power is enough to make it not unjust But that the cause why God punisheth one more than another is many times the will he hath to show his power is affirmed in this place by St Paul Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it c. And by our Saviour in the case of him that was born blind where he saith Neither hath this man sinned nor his parents but that the works of God may be made manifest And by the expostulation of God with Job This endeavour of his to bring the text of St. Paul to his purpose is not onely frustrate but the cause of many insignificant phrases in his discourse as this It was in their own power by their concurrence with Gods grace to prevent these judgements and to recover their former estates which is as good sense as if he should say that it is in his own power with the concurrence of the Soveraign Power of England to be what he will And this that God may oblige himself freely to his Creature For he that can oblige can also when he will release and he that can release himself when he will is not obliged Besides this he is driven to words ill becoming him that is to speak of God Almighty for he makes him unable to do that which hath been within the ordinary Power of men to do God he saith cannot destroy the Righteous with the Wicked which nevertheless is a thing ordinarily done by Armies and He could not destroy Sodome while Lot was in it which he interpreteth as if he could not do it lawfully one text iâ— Gen. 18. 23 24 25. There is not a word that God could not destroy the Righteous with the Wicked Onely Abraham saith as a man shall not the Judge of all the earth do Right Another is Gen. 19 22. Haste thee escape thither for I cannot do any thing till thou be come thither Which is an ordinary phrase in such a case where God had determined to burn the City and save a particular man and signifieth not any obligation to save Lot more than the rest Likewise concerning Job who expostulating with God was answered only with the explication of the infinite power of God the Bishop answereth that there is never a word of Jobs being punished without desert which answer is impertinent for I say not that he was punished without desert but that it was not for his desert that he was afflicted for punished he was not at all And concerning the blind Man John 9. who was born blind that the power of God might be shown in him he answers that it was not a punishment but a blessing I did not say it was a punishment certainly it was an affliction How then doth he call it a blessing reasonably enough because saith he it was the means to raise his soul illuminated and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the Body is common to us with Ants and Flies but the sight of the soul with the blessed Angels This is very well said for no man doubts but some afflictions may be blessings but I doubt whether the Bishop that sayes he reads of some who have put out their bodily eyes because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the soul think that they did well To that where I say that brute Beasts are afflicted which cannot sin he answereth that there is
a vast difference between those light and momentary pangs and the unsufferable and endless pains of Hell As if the length or the greatness of the pain made any difference in the justice or injustice of the inflicting it f But his greatest error is that which I touched before to make Justice to be the proper result of Power He would make men beleeve I hold all things to be just that are done by them who have power enough to avoid the punishment This is one of his pretty little policies by which I find him in many occasions to take the measure of his own wisdom I said no more but that the Power which is absolutely irrefistible makes him that hath it above all Law so that nothing he doth can be unjust But this Power can be no other than the Power divine Therefore let him preach what he will upon his mistaken text I shall leave it to the Reader to consider of it without any further answer g Lastly howsoever T. H. cries out that God cannot sin yet in truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin for he makes him to be the cause not onely of the Law and of the Action but even of the irregularity it self c. wherein the very essence of sin doth consist I think there is no man but understands no not the Bishop himself but that where two things are compared the similitude or dissimilitude regularity or irregularity that is between them is made in and by the making of the things themselves that are compared The Bishop therefore that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity denies him to be the cause both of the Law and of the Action So that by his doctrine there shall be a good Law whereof God shall be no cause and an Action that is a local motion that shall depend upon another first Mover that is not God The rest of this Number is but railing J. D. Proofs of Liberty drawn from Reason THe first Argument is Herculeum or Baculinum drawn Numb 13. Arg. 1. from that pleasant passage between Zeno and his man The servaâ—t had committed some pettilarceny and the Master was cudgeling him well for it The servant thinks to creep under his Masters blind side and pleads for himself That the necessity of destiny did compell him to steal The Master answers the same necessity of destiny compels me to beat thee He that denies Liberty is fitter to be refuted with rodds than with arguments until he confess that it is free for him that beats him either to continue striking or to give over that is to have true Liberty T. H. OF the Arguments from Reason the first is that which he saith is drawn from Zenos beating of his wan which is therefore called Argumentum baculinum that is to say a wooden Argument The story is this Zeno held that all actions were necessary His man therefore hâ—ing for some fault beaten excused himself upon the necessity of it To avoid this excuse his Master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him So that not he that maintaiued but he that derided the necessity of things was beaten contrary to that he would infer And the Argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story J. D. VVHether the Argument be withdrawn from the story or the answer withdrawn from the argument let the Reader judge T. H. mistakes the scope of the reason the strength whereof doth not lie neither in the authority of Zeno a rigid Stoick which is not worth a button in this cause Nor in the servants being an adversary to Stoical necessity for it appears not out of the story that the servant did deride necessity but rather that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own justification Now in the success of the fray we were told even now that no power doth justifie an action but onely that which is irresistible Such was not Zenos And therefore it advantageth neither of their causes neither that of Zeno nor this of T. H. What if the servant had taken the staff out of his Masters hand and beaten him soundly would not the same argument have served the man as well as it did the Master that the necessity of destiny did compell him to strike again Had not Zeno smarted justly for his Paradox And might not the spectators well have taken up the Judges Apothegm concerning the dispute between Corax and his Scholar An ill egg of an ill bird But the strength of this argument lies partly in the ignorance of Zeno that great Champion of necessity and the beggarliness of his cause which admitted no defence but with a cudgel No man saith the servant ought to be beaten for doing that which he is compelled inevitably to do but I am compelled inevitably to steal The major is so evident that it cannot be denied If a strong man shall take a weak mans hand perforce and do violence with it to a third person he whose hand is forced is innocent and he onely culpable who compelled him The minor was Zenos own doctrine what answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant very learnedly he denied the conclusion and cudgelled his servant telling him in effect that though there was no reason why he should be beaten yet there was a necessity why he must be beaten And parttly in the evident absurdity of such an opinion which deserves not to be confuted with reasons but with rods There are four things said the Philosopher which ought not to be called into question First such things where of it is wickedness to doubt as whether the soul be immortal whether there be a God such an one should not be confuted with reasons but cast into the Sea with a milstone about his neck as unworthy to breath the air or to behold the light Secondly such things as are above the capacity of reason as among Christians the mystery of the holy Trinity Thirdly such principles as are evidently true as that two and two are four in Arithmetick that the whole is greater than the part in Logick Fourthly such things as are obvious to the senses as whether the snow be white He who denied the heat of the fire was justly sentenced to be scorched with fire and he that denied motion to be beaten until he recanted So he who denies all Liberty from necessitation should be scourged untill he become an humble suppliant to him that whips him and confesse that he hath power either to strike or to hold his hand T. H. IN this Number 13. which is about Zeno and his man there is contained nothing necessary to the instruction of the Reader Therefore I pass it over J. D. SEcondly this very perswasion that there is no true Liberty Numb 14. Arg. 2. is able to overthrow all Societies and Common wealths in the World The Laws are unjust which prohibite that which a man cannot possibly shun All consultations are vain
Lieutenant of God from whom he derives his power of life and death T. H. hath one plea more As a drowning man catcheth at every Buâ—rush so he layes hold on every pretence to save a desperate cause But first it is worth our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular â— First he told us that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his actions though he command one thing openly and plot another thing secretly though he be the cause not onely of the action but also of the irregularity though he both give man power to act and determine this power to evil as well as good though he punish the Creatures for doing that which he himself did necessitate them to do But being pressed with reason that this is tyrannical first to necessitate a man to do his will and then to punish him for doing of it he leaves this pretence in the plain field and flies to a second That therefore a man is justly punished for that which he was necessitated to do because the act was voluntary on his part This hath more shew of reason than the former if he did make the will of man to be in his own disposition but maintaining that the will is irresistibly determined to will whatsoever it doth will the injustice and absurdity is the same First to necessitate a man to will and then to punish him for willing The Dog onely bites the stone which is thrown at him with a strange haud but they make the first cause to punish the instrument for that which is his own proper act Wherefore not being satisfied with this he casts it off and flies to his third shift Men are not punished saith he â—…fore because their theft proceeded from election that is because it was willingly done for to Elect and Will saith he are both one Is not this to blow hot and cold with the same breath but because it was noxious and contrary to mens preservation Thus far he saith true that every creature by the instinct of nature seeks to preserve it self cast water into a dusty place and it contracts it self into little globes that is to preserve it self And those who are noxious the eye of the Law are justly punished by them to whom the execution of the Law is committed but the Law accounts no persons noxious but those who are noxious by their own fault It punisheth not a thorn for pricking because it is the nature of the thorn and it can do no otherwise nor a child before it have the use of reason If one should take mine hand perforce and give another a box on the ear with it my hand is noxious but the Law punisheth the other who is faulty And therefore he hath reason to propose the question how it is just to kill on man to amend another if he who killed did nothing but what he was necessitated to do He might as well demand how it is lawful to murther a company of innocent Infants to make a bath of their lukewarm blood for curing the Leprosie It had been a more rational way first to have demonstrated that it is so and then to have questioned why it is so His assertion it self is but a dream and the reason which he gives of it why it is so is a dream of a dream The sum of it is this That where there is no Law there no killing or any thing else can be unjust that before the constitution of Commonwealths every man had power to kill another if he conceived him to be hurtfull to him that at the constitution of Commonwealhts particular men lay down this right in part and in part reserve it to themselves as in case of theft or murther That the right which the Commonwealth hath to put a malefactor to death is not created by the Law but remaineth from the first right of Nature which every man hath to preserve himself that the killing of men in this case is as the killing of beasts in order to our own preservation This may well be called stringing of Paradoxes But first h there never was any such time when Mankind was without Governors and Lawes and Societies Paternal Government was in the world from the beginning and the Law of Nature There might be sometimes a root of such Barbatous Theevish Brigants in some rocks or desarts or odd corners of the World but it was an abuse and a degeneration from the nature of man who is a political creature This savage opinion reflects too much upon the honour of mankind Secondly there never was a time when it was lawfull ordinarily for private men to kill one another for their own preservation If God would have had men live like wild beasts as Lions Bears or Tygers he would have armed them with hornes or tusks or talons or pricks but of all creatures man is born most naked without any weapon to defend himself because God had provided a better means of security for him that is the Magistrate Thirdly that right which private men have to preserve themselves though it be with the killing of another when they are set upon to be murthered or robbed is not a remainder or a reserve of some greater power which they have resigned but a priviledge which God hath given them in case of extream danger and invincible necessity that when they cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy that is the Magistrate every man becomes a Magistrate to himself Fourthly nothing can give that which it never had The people whilest they were a dispersed rable which in some odd cases might happen to be never had justly the power of life and death and therefore they could not give it by their election All that they do is to prepare the matter but it is God Almighty that infuseth the soul of power Fiftly and lastly I am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to compare the murthering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts The elements are for the Plants the Plants for the brute Beasts the brute Beasts for Man When God enlarged his former grant to man and gave him liberty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sustenance Gen. 9. 3. Yet man is expresly excepted ver â— Who so sheddeth mans blood by man shall his blood be shed And the reason is assigned for in the image of God made he man Before sin entred into the World or before any creatures were hurtful or noxious to man he had â—â—minion over them as their Lord and Master And though the possession of this soveraignty be lost in part for the sin of man which made not onely the creatures to rebel but also the inferiour 〈…〉 to rebel against the superiour from whence it comes that one man is hurtful to another yet the dominion still remains wherein we may observe how sweetly the providence of God doth temper this cross that though the strongest creatures
debt That cannot â—e for they have no sense of debt or duty And I think he will not say that they have received a command to obey him from authority It resteth therefore that the dominion of man consists in this that men are too hard for Lions and Bears because though a Lion or a Bear be stronger than a man yet the strength and art and specially the Leaguâ—ing and Societies of men are a greater power than the ungoverned strength of unruly Beasts In this it is that consisteth this dominion of man and for the same reason when a hungry Lion meeteth an unarmed man in a desert the Lion hath the dominion over the man if that of man over Lions or over Sheeep and Oxen may be called dominion which properly it cannot nor can it be said that Sheep and Oxen do otherwise obey us than they would do a Lion And if we have dominion over Sheep and Oxen we exercise it not as dominion but as hostility for we keep them onely to labour and to be kill'd and devoured by us so that Lions and Bears would be as good Maters to them as we are By this short passage of his concerning Dominion and Obedience I have no reason to expect a very shrewd answer from him to my Leviathan i The next branch of his Answer concerns Consultations which saith he are not superfluous though all things come to pass necessarily because they are the cause which doth necessitate the effect and the means to bring it to pass His Reply to this is that he hath shewed sufficiently that reason doth not determine the will Physically c. If not Physically how then As he hath told us in another place Morally But what it is to determine a thing Morally no man living understands I doubt not but be had therefore the Will to write this Reply because I had answered his Treatise concerning true Liberty My answer therefore was at least in part the cause of his writing yet that is the cause of the nimble local motion of his fingers Is not the cause of local motion Physical His Will therefore was Physically and Extrinsecally and Antecedently and not Morally caused by my writing k He adds further that as the end is necessary so are the means And when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen All which is truth but not the whole truth c. Is it not enough that it is truth must I put all the truth I know into two or three lines No. I should have added that God doth adapt and fit the means to their respective ends free means to free ends contingent means to contingent ends necessary means to necessary ends It may be I would have done so but for shame Free Contingent and Necessary are not words that can be joined to Means or Ends but to Agents and Actions that is to say to things that moove or are moved A Free Agent being that whose motion or action is not hindered nor stopt And a Free Action that which is produced by a Free Agent A Contingent Agent is the same with an Agent simply But because men for the most part think those things are produced without cause whereof they do not see the cause they use to call both the Agent and the Action Contingent as attributing it to fortune And therefore when the causes are Necessary if they perceive not the necessity they call those necessary Agents and Actions in things that have Appetite Free and in things inanimate Contingent The rest of his Reply to this point is very little of it applied to my answer I note onely that where he sayes but if God have so ordered the World that a man cannot if he would neglect any means of good c. He would fraudulently insinuate that it is my opinion that a man is not Free to Do if he will and to Abstain if he will Whereas from the beginning I have often declared that it is none of my opinion and that my opinion is only this that he is not Free to Will or which is all one he is not Master of his future Will After much unorderly discourse he comes in with This is the doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute Necessity which is impertinent seeing nothing flows from it more than may be drawn from the confession of an eternal Prescience l But he tells me in great sadness that my Argument is no better than this If I shall live till to morrow I shall live till to morrow though I run my self thorow with a sword to day which saith he is a false consequence and a false proposition Truly if by running through he understand killing it is a false or rather a foolish proposition He saith right Let us therefore see how it is not like to his He sayes If it be absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to morrow then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult whether he should dye to day or not And this he sayes is a true consequence I cannot perceive how it is a better consequence than the former for if it be absolutely necessary that a man should live till to morrow and in health which may also be supposed why should he not if he have the curiosity have his head cut off to try what pain it is But the consequence is false for if there be a necessity of his living it is necessary also that he shall not have so foolish a curiosity But he cannot yet distinguish between a seen and unseen necessity and that is the cause he beleeveth his consequence to be good m The next branch of my Argument concerns Admonitions c. Which he saies is this If all things be necessary then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools children or madmen but That they do admonish the one and not the other is confessedly true and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this that the former have the use of reason and true liberty with a dominion over their own actions which children fools and madmen have not The true reason why we admonish men and not children c. is because admonition is nothing else but telling a man the good and evil consequences of his actions They who have experience of good and evill can better perceive the reasonableness of such admonition than they that have not and such as have like passions to those of the Admonitor do more easily conceive that to be good or bad which the Admonitor sayeth is so than they who have great passions and such as are contrary to his The first which is want of experience maketh children and fools unapt and the second which is strength of passion maketh madmen unwilling to receive admonition for children are ignorant and mad men in an errour concerning what is good or evill for themselves This
acts and words to acknowledge it than he that thinketh otherwise Yet is this external acknowledgement the same thing which we call Worship So this opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds externally and internally and therefore is far from destroying it And for Repentance which is nothing but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way though the cause that made him go astray were necessary yet there is no â—…ason why he should not grieve and again though the cause â—…hy he returned into the way were necessary there remaines still the causes of joy So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of repentance grief for the errour nor joy for the returning And for Prayer whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroyes prayer I deny it For though prayer be none of the causes that moove Gods Will his Will being unchangeable yet since we find in Gods Word he will not give his blessings but to those that ask them the motive to prayer is the same Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessings And the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed T is manifest that thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past And that which is past is sure and necessary Yet even amongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgement of the benefit past though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for his blessings in general and though it precede the particular thing we ask yet it is not a cause or means of it but a signification that we expect nothing but from God in such manner as he not as we will And our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray Thy will not our will be done and by example teaches us the same for he prayed thus Father if it be thy will let this cup pass c. The end of prayer as of thanksgiving is not to move but to honour God Almighty in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him onely J. D. I Hope T. H. will be perswaded in time that it is not the Covetousness or Ambition or Sensuallity or Sloth or Prejudice of his Readers which renders this doctrine of absolute necessity dangerous but that it is in its own nature destructive to true godliness a And though his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions yet I will not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed b First he erres in making inward piety to consist meerly in the estimation of the judgement If this were so what hinders but that the Devils should have as much inward piety as the best Christians for they esteem Gods power to be infinite and tremble Though inward piety do suppose the act of the understanding yet it consisteth properly in the act of the will being that branch of Justice which gives to God the honour which is due unto him Is there no Love due to God no Faith no Hope Secondly he erres in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to God but onely the glory of his Power or Omnipotence What shall become of all other the divine Attributes and particularly of his Goodness of his Truth of his Justice of his Mercy which beget a more true and sincere honour in the heart than greatness it self Magnos facile laudamus bonos lubenter Thirdly this opinion of absolute necessity destroyes the truth of God making him to command one thing openly and to necessitate another privately to chide a man for doing that which he hath determined him to do to profess one thing and to intend another It destroyes the goodness of God making him to be an hater of mankind and to delight in the torments of his creatures whereas the very doggs licked the sores of Lazarus in pitty and commiseration of him It destroyes the Justice of God making him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act which they had no more powerto shun than the fire hath power not to burn It destroyes the very power of God making him to be the true Author of all the defects and evils which are in the world These are the fruits of Impotence not of Omnipotence He who is the effective cause of sin either in himself or in the Creature is not Almighty There needs no other Devil in the world to raise jealousies and suspitions between God and his creatures or to poyson mankind with an apprehension that God doth not love them but onely this opinion which was the office of the Serpent Gen. 3. 5. Fourthly for the outward worship of God e How shall a man praise God for his goodness who believes him to be a greater Tyrant than ever was in the world who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault to express his power How shall a man hear the word of God with that reverence and devotion and faith which is requisite who believeth that God causeth his Gospel to be preached to the much greater part of Christians not with any intention that they should be converted and saved but meerly to harden their hearts and to make them inexcusable How shall a man receive the blessed Sacrament with comfort and confidence as a Seal of Gods love in Christ who believeth that so many millions are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the passions of Christ before they had done either good or evil How shall he prepare himself with care and conscience who apprehendeth that Eating and Drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation but because God would damn a man therefore he necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily How shall a man make a free vow to God without grosse ridiculous hypocrisie who thinks he is able to pâ—rform nothing but as he is extrinsecally necessitated Fiftly for Repentance how shall a man condemn and accuse himself for his sins who thinks himself to be like a Watch which is wound up by God and that he can go neither longer nor shorter faster nor slower truer nor falser than he is ordered by God If God sets him right he goes right If God set him wrong he goes wrong How can a man be said to return into the right way who never was in any other way but that which God himself had chalked out for him What is his purpose to amend who is destitute of all power but as if a man should purpose to fly without wings or a beggar who hath not a groat in his purse purpose to build Hospitals We use to say admit one absurdity and a thousand will follow To maintain this unreasonable opinion of absolute necessity he is necessitated but it is hypothetically he might change his opinion if he would to deal with all ancient Writers as the Goths did with the Romans who destroyed all their magnificent works that there might remain no monument of their greatness upon
the face of the earth Therefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions nor one of their definitions nay not one of their â—earms of Art standing f Observe what a description he hath given us here of Repentance It is a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way It amazed me to find gladness to be the first word in the description of Repentance His repentance is not that repentance nor his piety that piety nor his prayer that kind of prayer which the Church of God in all Ages hath acknowledged Fasting and Sackcloth and Ashes and Tears and Humi-cubations used to be companions of Repentance Joy may be a consequent of it not a part of it g It is a returning but whose act is this returning Is it Gods alone or doth the penitent person concur also freely with the grace of God If it be Gods alone then it is his repentance not mans repentance what need the penitent person trouble himself about it God will take care of his own work The Scriptures teach us otherwise that God expects our concurrence Revel 3. 19. Be zealous and repent behold I stand at the dore and knock If any man hear my voice and open the dore I will come into him It is a glad returning into the right way Why dare any man call that a wrong way which God himself hath determined He that willeth and doth that which God would have him to will and to do is never out of his right way It followes in his description after the grief c. It is true a man may grieve for that which is necessarily imposed upon him but he cannot grieve for it as a fault of his own if it never was in his power to shun it Suppose a Writing-master shall hold his Scholars hand in his and write with it the Scholars part is only to hold still his hand whether the Master write well or ill the Scholar hath no ground either of joy or sorrow as for himself no man will interpret it to be his act but his Masters It is no fault to be out of the right way if a man had not liberty to have kept himself in the way And so from Repentance he skips quite over New obedience to come to Prayer which is the last Religious duty insisted upon by me here But according to his use without either answering or mentioning what I say Which would have shewed him plainly what kind of prayer I intend not contemplative prayer in general as it includes thanksgiving but that most proper kind of prayer which we call Petition which used to be thus defined to be an act of Religion by which we desire of God something which we have not and hope that we shall obtain it by him Quite contrary to this T. H. tells us h that prayer is not a cause nor a meanes of Gods blessing but onely a signification that we expest it from him If he had told us onely that prayer is not a meritorious cause of Gods blessings as the poor man by begging an almes doth not deserve it I should have gone along with him But to tell us that it is not so much as a means to procure Gods blessing and yet with the same breath that God will not give his blessings but to those who pray who shall reconcile him to himself The Scriptures teach us otherwise Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my Name he will give it you John 16. 23. Ask and it shall be given you seek and ye shall find knock and it shall be opened unto you Matth. 7. 7. St. Paul tells the Corinthians 2 Cor. 1. 11. that he was helped by their prayers that 's not all that the gift was bestowed upon him by their means So prayer is a means And St. James saith chap. 5. 16. The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much If it be effectual then it is a cause To shew this efficacy of prayer our Saviour useth the comparison of a Father towards his Child of a Neighbour towards his Neighbour yea of an unjust Judge to shame those who think that God hath not more compassion than a wicked man This was signified by Jacobs wrestling and prevailing with God Prayer is like the Tradesmans tools wherewithal he gets his living for himself and his family But saith he Gods Will is unchangeable What then He might as well use this against study Physick and all second causes as against Prayer He shewes even in this how little they attribute to the endeavours of men There is a great difference between these two mutare voluntatem to change the will which God never doth in whom there is not the least shadow of turning by change His will to love and hate was the same from eternity which it now is and ever shall be His love and hatred are immovable but we are removed Non tellus cymbam tellurem cymbareliquit And velle mutationem to will a change which God often doth To change the will argues a change in the Agent but to will a change only argues a change in the object It is no inconstancy in a man to love or to hate as the object is changed Praesta mihi omnia â—adâ—m idem sum Prayer works not upon God but us It renders not him more propitious in himself but us more capable of mercy He saith this That God doth not bless us execpt we pray is a motive to prayer Why talks he of motives who acknowledgeth no liberty nor admits any cause but absolutely necessary He saith Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessing which we pray for and conteined in the same decrree with the blessing It is true the spirit of prayer is the gift of God will he conclude from thence that the good imployment of one talent or of one gift of God may not procure another Our Saviour teacheth us otherwise Come thou good and faithfull servant thou hast been faithful in little I will make the ruler over much Too much light is an enemy to the sight and too much Law is an enemy to Justice I could wish we wrangled less about Gods Decrees until we understood them better But saith he Thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past and prayer is but a thanksgiving He might even as well tell me that when a beggar craves an almes and when he gives thanks for it it is all one Every thanksgiving is a kind of prayer but every prayer and namely Petition is not a thanks-giving In the last place he urgeth that in our prayers we are bouâ—d to submit our Wills to Gods Will who ever made any doubt of this we must submit to the Preceptive Will of God or his Commandements we must submit to the effective Will of God when he declares his good pleasure by the event or otherwise But we deny and deny again either that God wills things ad extra
difference between my words and his in the sense and meaning for in the one there is honour ascrihed to God and humility in him that prayeth but in the other presumption in him that prayeth and a detraction from the honour of God When I say Prayer is not a cause nor a meanes I take cause and meanes in one and the same sense affirming that God is not moved by any thing that we do but has alwaies one and the same eternal purpose to do the same things that from eternity he hath foreknown shall be done and me thinks there can be no doubt made thereof But the Bishop alledgeth 2 Cor. 1. 11. That St Paul was helped by their prayers and that the gift was bestowed upon them by their means and James 5. 16. The effectual and fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much In which places the words meanes effectual availeth do not signifie any causation for no man nor creature living can work any effect upon God in whom there is nothing that hath not been in him eternally heretofore nor that shall not be in him eternally hereafter but do signifie the order in which God hath placed mens prayers and his own blessings And not much after the Bishop himself saith Prayer works not upon God but us Therefore it is no cause of Gods Will in giving us his blessings but is properly a signe not a procuration of his favour The next thing he replieth to is that I make prayer to be a kind of thanksgiving to which he replies He might even as wel tell me that when a Beggar craves an Alms and when he gives thanks for it it is all one Why so Does not a Beggar move a man by his prayer and sometime worketh in him a compassion not without pain and as the Scripture calls it a yerning of the Bowels which is not so in God when we pray to him Our prayer to God is a duty it is not so to man Therefore though our prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks it is not necessary it should be so in our prayers and thanks to God Almighty To the rest of his Reply in this Number 15. there needs no further Answer J. D. FOourthly the order beauty and perfection of the world doth require that in the Universe should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some free some contingent He that shall make either all things necessary guided by destiny or all things free governed by election or all things contingent happening by chance doth overthrow the beauty and the perfection of the world T. H. THE fourth Argument from Reason is this The Order Numb 16. Arg. 4. Beauty and Perfection of the World requireth that in the Universe should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some free some contingent He that shall make all things nenessary or all things free or all things contingent doth overthrow the beauty and pefection of the World In which Argument I observe first a contradiction For seeing he that maketh any thing in that he maketh it he maketh it to be necessary it followeth that he that maketh all things maketh all things necessary to be As if a workman make a garment the garment must necessarily be So if God make every thing every thing must necessarily be Perhaps the beauty of the World requireth though we know it not that some Agents should work without deliberation which he calls necessary Agents And some Agents with deliberation and those both he and I call free Agents And that some Agents should work and we not know how And those effects we both call contingent But this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his election necessarily determined to one by former causes And that which is contingent and imputed to Fortune be nevertheless necessary and depend on precedent necessary causes For by contingent men do not mean that which hath no cause but which hath not for cause any thing which we perceive As for Example when a Travailer meets with a shower the journey had a cause and the rain had a cause sufficient enough to produce it but because the journey caused not the rain nor the rain the journey we say they were contingent one to another And thus you see though there be three sorts of events Necessary Contingent and Free yet they may be all necessary without the destruction of the beauty or perfection of the Univers J. D. THE first thing he observes in mine Argument is contradiction as he calls it but in truth it is but a deception of the sight As one candle sometimes seems to be two or a rod in the water shewes to be two rods Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad mâ—dum recipientis But what is this contradiction Because I say he who maketh all things doth not make them necessary What! a contradiction and but one proposition That were strange I say God hath not made all Agents necessary he saith God hath made all Agents necessary Here is a contradiction indeed but it is between him and me not between me and my self But yet though it be not a formal contradiction yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction in adjecto Wherefore to clear the matter and dispell the mist which he hath raised It is true that every thing when it is made it is necessary that it be made so as it is that is by a necessity of infallibility or supposition supposing that it be so made but this is not that absolute antecedent necessity whereof the question is between him and me As to use his own instance Before the Garment be made the Tailor is free to make it either of the Italian Spanish or French fashion indifferently But after it is made it is necessary that it be of that fashion whereof he hath made it that is by a necessity of supposition But this doth neither hinder the cause from being a free cause nor the effect from being a free effect but the one did produce freely and the other was freely produced So the contradiction is vanished In the second part of his answer a he grants that there are some free Agents and some contingent Agents and that Perhaps the beauty of the World doth require it but like a shrewd Cow which after she hath given her milk casts it down with her foot in the conclusion he tells us that nevertheless they are all necessary This part of his answer is a meer Logomachy as a great part of the controversies in the world are or a contention about words What is the meaning of necessary and free and contingent actions I have shewed before what free and necessary do properly signifie but he misrecites it He saith I make all Agents which want deliberation to be necessary but I acknowledge that many of them are contingent b Neither do I approve his definition of contingents though he say I concurre with him that they are such Agents as work we know not how For
innocent person that good may come of it And if his opinion of absolute necessity of all things were true the destinies of men could not be altered either by examples or fear of punishment Animadversions upon the Reply Numb XVII WHereas he had in his first discourse made this consequence If you take away Liberty you take away the very nature of evil and the formal reason of sin I denied that consequence It is true he who taketh away the Liberty of doing according to the will taketh away the nature of sin but he that denieth the Liberty to Will does not so But he supposing I understood him not will needs reduce his argument into form in this manner a That opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin and by consequence Sin â—t self is not to be approved This is granted But the opinion of necessity doth this This I deny He proves it thus This opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of Physicall determination from the first cause But whatsoever proceedes essentially by way of Physical determination from the first cause is Good and Just and Lawfull Therefore this opinion of necessity maketh sin to be very Good Just and Lawfull He might as well have concluded whatsoever man hath been made by God is a good and just man He observeth not that sin is not a thing really made Those things which at first were actions were not thâ—n sins though actions of the same nature with those which were afterwards sins nor was then the will to any thing a sin though it were a will to the same thing which in willing now we should sin Actions became sins then first when the commandement came for as St. Paul saith Without the Law sin is dead and sin being but a transgression of the Law there can be no action made sin but by the Law Therefore this opinion though it derive actions essentially from God it derives not sins essentially from him but relatively and by the Commandement And consequently the opinion of necessity taketh not away the nature of sin but necessitateth that action which the Law hath made sin And whereas I said the nature of sin consisteth in this that it is an action proceeding from our will and against the Law he alloweth it for true and therefore he must allow also that the formal reason of sin lieth not in the Liberty or necessity of willing but in the will it self necessary or unnecessary in relation to the Law And whereas he limits this truth which he allowed to this that the Law be just and the will a Free rational Will it serves to no purpose for I have shown before that no Law can be unjust And it seemeth to me that a rationall Will if it be not meant of a Will after deliberation whether he that deliberateth reasoneth aright or not signifieth nothing A rational man is rightly said but a rational Will in other sense then I have mentioned is insignificant b But supposing as he doth that the Law injoynes things impossible in themselves to be done then it is an unjust and Tyrannical Law and the transgression of it no sin c. And supposing likewise as he doth that the Will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause then it is not mans Will but Gods Will. He mistakes me in this For I say not the Law injoyns things impossible in themselves for so I should say it injoyned contradictories But I say the Law sometimes the Law-makers not knowing the secret necessities of things to come injoynes things made impossible by secret and extrinsicall causes from all eternity From this hâ—s error he infers that the Laws must be unjust and Tyrannical and the transgression of them no sin But he who holds that Laws can be unjust and Tyrannical will easily find pretence enough under any Government in the World to deny obedience to the Laws unlesse they be such as he himself maketh or adviseth to be made He says also that I suppose the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause It is true saving that senselesse word Influence which I never used But his consequence then it is not mans Will but Gods will is not true for it may be the Will both of the one and of the other and yet not by concurrence as in a league but by subjection of the will of man to the Will of God c That which he adds of a Judge is altogether impertinent as to his defence Neither is a Civil Judge the proper Judge nor the Law of the Land a proper Rule of sin A Judge is to judge of voluntary crimes He has no commission to look into the secret causes that make it voluntary An because the Bishop had said the Law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity it was no impertinent answer to say the Judge lookes at no higher cause then the Will of the Doer And even this as hâ— sayeth is enough to proove that the Will of the Doer did determine it self freely and that the Malefactor had liberty to have kept the Law if he would To which I answer that it proves indeed that the Malefactor had Liberty to have kept the Law if hâ— would but it proveth not that he had the Liberty to have a Will to keep the Law Nor doth it prove that the Will of the Doer dâ—d determine it self freely for nothing can prove non-sence But here you see what the Bishop pâ—â—sueth in this whole Reply namely to prove that a man hath Liberty to do if he will which I deny not and thinks when he hath done that he hath proved a man hath Liberty to Will which he calles the Wills determining of it self freely And whereas he adds a Judge ought to look at all essential causes It is answer enough to say he is bound to look at no more then hee thinks he can see d Nature never intends the generation of a Monster If all the causes concur sufficiently a perfect creature is produced but by reason of the insufficiency or debility or contingent aberration of some of the causes sometimes a Monster is produced He had no sooner said this but finding his error he retracteth it and confesseth that the causes of a Monster were sufficient for the production of that which was produced that is of a Monster otherwise a Monster had not been produced Which is all that I intended by sufficiency of the cause But whether every suffâ—â—â—â—nt cause be a necessary cause or not he meaneth to examine in Numb 31. In the meane time he saith onely that Liberty flows from the sufficiency and contingency from the debility of the cause and leaves out necessity as if it came from neither I must note also that where he says Nature never intends the generation of a Monster I understand not whether by nature he meane the Author of Nature in which meaning it derogates from God or nature it self as
Lipsius that a Fate is a series or order of causes depending upon the Divine counsel though the Divines thought he came to near them as he thinks I do now And the reason why he was cautelous was because being a member of the Romish Church he had little confidence in the judgment and lenity of the Romish Clergie and not because he thought he had over-shot himself b Concerning the other distinction of liberty in respect of the first cause and liberty in respect of the second causes though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer c. as namely that the faculty of willing c. I answer that distinction he alledgeth not to bee mine but the Stoicks and therefore I had no reason to take notice of it for he disputeth not against me but others And whereas he says it concerned me to make that answer which he hath set down in the words following I cannot conceive how it concerneth me whatsoever it may do somebody else to soâ—aâ— absurdly I said that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it which can not be doubted and though he deny it he does not disprove it For when he says those things which God wills without himself he wills freely and not necessarily He says rashly and untruly Rashly because there is nothing without God who is Infinite in whom are all things and in whom we live move and have our being and untruly because whatsoever God foreknew from eternity he willed from eternity and therefore necessarily But against this he argueth thus Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily doth work or act all that it can do or all that is in its power but it is evident that God doth not all things which he can do c. In things inanimate the action is alwaies according to the extent of its power not taking in the Power of Willing because they have it not But in those things that have Wilâ— the action is according to the wâ—ole Power wiâ—â— and all It is true that God doth not all things that he can do if he will but that he can Will that which he hath not Willed from all eternity I deny unlesse that he can not only Wil a change but also change his wil which all Divines say is immutable and then they must needs be necessary effects that proceed from God And his Texts God could have raised up Children unto Abraham c. And sent twelve Legions of Angels c. make nothing against the necessity of those actions which from the first cause proceed immediately J. D. THirdly they distinguish between liberty from compulsion Numb 19. and liberty from necessitation The Will say they is free from compulsion but not free from necessitation And this they fortifie with two reasons First because it is granted by all Divines that hypothetical necessity or necessity upon a supposition may consist with liberty Secondly because God and the good Angels do good necessarily and yet are more free than we To the first reason I confess that necessity upon a supposition may sometimes consist with true liberty as when it signifies onely an infallible certitude of the understanding in that which it knows to be or that it shall be But if the supposition be not in the Agents power nor depend upon any thing that is in his power If there be an exteriour antecedent cause which doth necessitate the effect to call this free is to be mad with reason To the second reason I confess that God and the good Angels are more free than we are that is intensively in the degree of freedom but not extensively in the latitude of the object according to a liberty of exercise but not of specification A liberty of exercise that is to do or not to do may consist well with a necessity of specification or a determination to the doing of good But a liberty of exercise and a necessity of exercise A liberty of specification and a necessity of specification are not compatible nor can consist together He that is antecedently necessitated to do evil is not free to do good So this instance is nothing at all to the purpose T. H. BUT the distinction of free into free from compulsion and free from necessitation I acknowledg for to be free from compulsion is to do a thing so as terrour be not the cause of his will to do it for a man is then onely said to be compelled when fear makes him willing to it as when a man willingly throws his goods into the Sea to save himself or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed Thus all men that do any thing from love or revenge or lust are free from compulsion and yet their actions may be as necessary as those which are done upon compulsion for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear But free from necessitation I say nothing can be And 't is that which he undertook to disproove This distinction he sayes useth to be fortified by two reasons But they are not mine The first he sayes is That it is granted by all Divines that an hypothetical necessity or necessity upon supposition may stand with liberty That you may understand this I will give you an example of hypotheticall necessity If I shall live I shall eat this is an hypotheticall necessity Indeed it is a necessary proposition that is to say it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered but t is not the necessity of the thing nor is it therefore necessary that the man shall live or that the man shall eat I do not use to fortifie my distinctions with such reasons Let him confute them as he will it contents me But I would have your Lordship take notice hereby how an easy and plain thing but withal false may be with the grave usage of such words as hypotheticall necessity and necessity upon supposition and such like tearms of Schoolmen obscur'd and made to seem profound learning The second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from compulsion and free from necessitation he sayes is that God and good Angels do good necessarily and yet are more free than we This reason though I had no need of it yet I think it so far forth good as it is true that God and good Angels do good necessarily and yet are free but because I find not in the Articles of our Faith nor in the Decrees of our Church set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good Angels to work by necessity or in what sense they work freely I suspend my sentence in that point and am content that there may be a freedom from compulsion and yet no freedom from necessitation as hath been prooved in that that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats and without fear of danger But how he can avoid the consisting together of freedom and
the Will chooseth of necessity And why but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does and say as he does here that Election is the Act of the Wil. No Election is the Act of a man as power to Elect is the power of a man Election and Wil are all one Act of a man and the power to Elect and the power to Wil one and the same power of a man But the Bishop is confounded by the use of calling by the name of Wil the power of willing in the future as they also were confounded that first brought in this senselesse term of Actus primus My meaning is that the Election I shall have of any thing hereafter is now as necessary as that the fire that now is and continueth shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it hereafter Or to use his own terms the Wil hath no more power to suspend its Willing then the burning of the fire to suspend its burning Or rather more properly the man hath no more power to suspend his Will then the fire to suspend his burning Which is contrary to that which he would have namely that a man should have power to refuse what he Wils and to suspend his own appetite for to refuse what one willeth implyeth a contradiction the which also is made much more absurd by his expression for he saith the Will hath power to refuse what it Wils and to suspend its own Appetite whereas the Will and the Willing â—â—d the Appetite is the same thing He adds that even the burning of the fire if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances is not so necessary an Action as T. H. imagineth He doth not sufficiently understand what I imagine For I imagine that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence I may truly say now it shall burn necessarily and of that which shall not burn then for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter thrown into it as in the case of the three Children that it is necessary it shall not burn m Two things are required to make an Effect necessary First that it be produced by a necessary cause c. Secondly that it be necessarily produced c. To this I say nothing but that I understand not how a cause can be necessary and the Effect not be necessarily produced n My second reason against this distinction of Liberty from compulsion but not from necessitation is new and demonstrates cleerly that to necessitate the Wil by a Physical necessity is to compel the Wil so far as the Wil is capable of compulsion and that he who doth necessitate the Wil to evil after that manner is the true cause of evil c. By this second reason which he says is new and demonstrates c. I cannot find what reason he means for there are but two whereof the later is in these Words Secondly to rip up the bottom of this business this I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools There is a double Act of the Wil the one more remote called Imperatus c. The other Act is nearer called Actus Elicitus c. But I doubt whether this be it he means or no. For this being the resolution of the Schools is not new and being a distinction onely is no demonstration though â—erhaps he may use the word demonstration as every unlearned man now a days does to signifie any Argument of his own As for the distinction it self because the terms are Latine and never used by any Author of the Latine tongue to shew their impertinence I expounded them in English and left them to the Readers judgement to find the absurdity of them himself And the Bishop in this part of his Reply indeavours to defend them And first he calls it a Trivial and Grammatical objection to say they are improper and obscure Is there any thing lesse be seeming a Divine or a Philosopher then to speak improperly and obscurely where the truth is in question Perhaps it may be tollerable in one that Divineth but not in him that pretendeth to demonstrate It is not the universal current of Divines and Philosophers that giveth Words their Authority but the generality of them who acknowledge that they understand them Tyrant and Praemunire though their signification be changed yet they are understood and so are the names of the Days Sunday Munday Tuesday And when English Reaâ—ers not engaged in School Divinity shall find Imperate Elicite Acts as intelligible as those I will confesse I had no reason to find fault But my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction between the Elicite and Imperate Acts of the Wil he says was onely to hide from the eyes of the Reader a tergiversation in not answering this Argument of his he who doth necessitate the Wil to evil is the true cause of evil But God is not the cause of evil Therefore he does not necessitate the Wil to evil This Argument is not to be found in this Numb 20. to which I here answered nor had I ever said that the Wil was compelled But he taking all necessitation for Compulsion doth now in this place from necessitation simply bring in this Inference concerning the cause of evill and thinks he shall force me to say that God is the cause of sin I shall say onely what is said in the Scripture Non est malum quod ego non feci I shall say what Micaiah saith to Ahab 1 Kings 22. 23. Behold the Lord hath put a lying Spirit into the mouth of all these thy Prophets I shall say that that is true which the Prophet David saith 2 Sam. 16. 10. Let him curse because the Lord hath said unto him curse David But that which God himself saith of himself 1 Kings 12. 15. The King hearkned not to the people for the cause was from the Lord I will not say least the Bishop exclaim against me but leave it to be interpreted by those that have authority to interpret the Scriptures I say further that to cause sin is not always sin nor can be sin in him that is not subject to some higher Power but to use so unseemly a Phrase as to say that God is the cause of sin because it soundeth so like to saying that God sinneth I can never be forced by so weak an argument as this of his Luther says we act necessarily necessarily by necessity of immutability not by necessity of constraint that is in plain English necessarily but not against our wills Zanchius says Tract Theol. cap. 6. Thes. 1. The freedom of our will doth not consist in this that there is no necessity of our sinning but in this that there is no constraint Bucer Lib. de Concordia Whereas the Catholicks say man has Free Will we must understand it of freedom from constraint and not freedom from necessity Calvin Inst. Cap. 2. § 6. And thus shall man be said to have Free
of things but every individuall creature and not onely in natural but voluntary actions I desire to know how Prester John or the great Mogol or the King of China or any one of so many millions of their subjects do concur to my writing of this reply If they do not among his other speculations concerning this matter I hope he will give us some restrictions It were hard to make all the Negroes accessary to all the murthers that are committed in Europe Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb XXI THere is not much in this part of his Reply that needeth Animadversion But I must observe where he saith a The sum of my answer was that the Stars and complections do incline but not at all necessitate the Will He answereth nothing at all to me who attribute not the necessitation of the Will to the Stars and Complections but to the aggregate of all things together that are in motion I do not say that the Stars or Complections of themselves do incline men to Wil but when men are inclined I must say that that inclination was necessitated by some causes or other b But whereas he mentions a great Paradox of his own that there is hardly any one Action to the causing of which concurres not whatsoever is in rerum natura I can but smile to see with what ambition our great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions c. The Bishop speaks often of Paradoxes which such scorn or detestation that a simple Reader would take a Paradox either for Felony or some other hainous crime or else for some rediculous turpitude whereas perhaps a Judicious Reader knows what the word signifies And that a Paradox is an opinion not yet generally received Christian Religion was once a Paradox and a great many other opinions which the Bishop now holdeth were formerly Paradoxes Insomuch as when a man calleth an opinion Paradox he doth not say it is untrue but signifieth his own ignorance for if he understood it he would call it either a truth or an errour He observes not that but for Paradoxes we should be now in that savage ignorance which those men are in that have not or have not long had Laws and Common-wealth from whence porceedeth Science and Civility There was not long since a Scholler that maintained that if the least thing that had waight should be laid down upon the hardest body that could be supposing it an Anvill of Diamant it would at the first accesse make it yeeld This I thought and much more the Bishop would have thought a Paradox But when he told me that either that would do it or all the waight of the World would not doe it because if the whole waight did it every the least part thereof would do its part I saw no reason to dissent In like manner when I say there is hardly any one Action to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever is in rerum natura It seems to the Bishop a great Paradox and if I should say that all Action is the effect of Motion and that there cannot be a Motion in one part of the World but the same must also be communicated to all the rest of the World he would say that this were no lesse a Paradox But yet if I should say that if a lesser body as a concave Sphere or Tun were filled with air or other liquid matter and that any one little particle thereof were moved all the rest would be moved also he would conceive it to be true or if not he a judicious reader would It is not the greatness of the Tun that altereth the case and therefore the same would be true also if the whole World were the Tun for t is the greatness of this Tun that the Bishop comprohendeth not But the truth is comprehensible enough and may be said without ambition of being the founder of strange opinions And though a Grave man may smile at it he that is both Grave and wise will not J. D. THirdly the moral Philosopher tells us how we are haled hither Num. 22. and thither with outward objects To this I answer First that the power which outward objects have over us is for the most part by our own default because of those vitious habits which we have contracted Therefore though the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them yet they were free and voluntary in their first originals As a paralitick man to use Aristotles comparison shedding the liquor deserves to be punished for though his act be unwilling yet his imtemperance was willing whereby he contracted this infirmity Secondly I answer that concupiscence and custome and bad company and outward objects do indeed make a proclivity but not a necessity By Prayers Tears Meditations Vowes Watchings Fastings Humi-cubations a man may get a contrary habit and gain the victory not onely over outward objects but also over his own corruptions and become the King of the little world of himself Si metuis si prava cupis si duceris irà Servitii patiere jugum tolâ—rabis iniquas Interius leges Tunc omnia jure tenebis Cum poteris rex esse tâ—â— Thirdly a resolved mind which weighs all things judiciously and provides for all occurrences is not so easily surprised withoutward objects Onely Ulysses wept not at the meeting with â—is wife and son I would beat thee said the Philosopher but that I am angry One spake lowest when he was most mooved Another poured out the water when he was thirsty Another made a Covenant with his eyes Neither opportunity nor entisement could prevail with Joseph Nor the Musick nor the fire with the three Children It is not the strength of the wind but the lightness of the chaff which causeth it to be blown away Outward objects do not impose a moral much less a Physical necessity they may be dangerous but cannot be destructi e to true liberty T. H. THirdly he disputeth against the opinion of them that say external objects presentâ—d to men of such and such tâ—mperatures do make their actions necessary And sayes the poâ—â—er that such objects have over us proceed from our own fault But that is nothing to the purpose if such â—ault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power And therefore that opinion may â—old true foâ—â— all this answer Further he saith Prayer Fasting c. may alter our habits 'T is true but when they do so they are causes of the contrary habit and make it necessary as the former habit had been necessary iâ— Prayer Fasting c. had not been Besides we are not mooved nor disposed to prayer or any ot er action but by outward objects as pious company godly preachers or something equivalent Thirdly he saith a resolved mind is not easily surprised As the mind of Ulysses who when others wept he alone wept not And of the Philosopher that abstained from striking because he found
himself angry And of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty And the like Such things I confess have or may have been done and do prove onely that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to weâ—p nor for the Philosopher to strike nor for â—hat other maâ— to drink but it does not prove that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abâ—â—ain as he did from weeping nor the Philosopher to abstain as he did from striking Nor the other man to forbear drinking And yet that was the thing he ought to have provâ—d Lastly he confesseth that the disposition of objects may be dangerous to liberty but cannot be destructive To which I answer tâ—â— impossible For liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost And if 〈◊〉 cannot be lost which he confesseth I may inâ—er it can be in no danger at all J. D. a THe third pretense was out of moral Philosophy misunderstood that outward objects do necessitate the will I shall not need to repeat what he hath omitted but onely to satisfie his exceptions b The first is that it is not material though the power of outward objects do proceed from our own faults if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power Well but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power as in truth they do then his answer is a meer subterfuge If our faults proceed from causes that are not and were not in our own power then they are not our faults at all It is not a fault in us not to do those things which never were in our power to do But they are the faults of these causes frâ—m whence they do proceed c Next he confesseth that it â—â—â—n our power by good endeavours to alter those vitious habits which we had contracted and to get the contrary habit True saith he but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way as well as the former habit did the other way By which very consideration it appears that that which he calls a necessity is no more but a proclivity If it were a true necessity it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours The truth is Acquired habits do help and assist the faculty but they do not necessitate the faculty He who hath gotten to himself an habit of temperance may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate act And so on the contrary Acts are not opposed to habits but other habits d He adds that we are not mooved to prayer or any other action but by outward objects as pions company godly Preachers or something equivalent Wherein are two other mistakes first to make godly Preachers and pious company to be outward objects which are outward Agents Secondly to affirm that the will is not moved but by outward objects The will is mooved by it self by the understanding by the sensitive passions by Angels good aâ—d bad by men and most effectually by acts or habits infused by God whereby the will is excited extraordinarily indeed but efficaciously and determinately This is more than equivalent with outward objects Another branch of mine answer was that a resolved and prepared mind is able to resist both the appâ—tibility of objects and the unruliness of passions As I shewed by examples e He answers that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to weep nor the Philosopher to strike but I do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear He saith true I am not now proving but answering Yet my answer doth sufficiently prove that which I intend That the rational will hath power both to sleight the most appetible objects and to control the most unruly passions When he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which I have produced then it will be time for him to cry for more work Lastly whereas I say that outward objects may be dangerous but cannot be destructive to true liberty He catcheth at it and f objects that liberty is in no danger but to be lost but I say it cannot be lost therefore he infers that it is in no danger at all I answer First that liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lost Many more men do abuse their wits than lose them Secondly liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished as when it is clogged by vicious habits contracted by our selves and yet it is not totally lost Thirdly though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the world yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man as to the exercise of it Reason is the root of liberty and though nothing be more natural to a man than reason yet many by excess of study or by continual gurmandizing or by some extravagant passion which they have cherished in themselves or by doting too much upon some affected object do become very sorts and deprive themselves of the use of reason and consequently of Liberty And when the benefit of liberty is not thus universally lost yet it may be lost respectively to this or that particular occasion As he who makes choise of a bad wife hath lost his former liberty to chose a good one Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb XXII a THe third pretence was out of Moral Philosophy misunderstood that outward objects do necessitate the Will I cannot imagine how the question whether outward objects do necessitate or not necessitate the Wilâ— can any â—ay be referred to Moral Philosophy The principles â—f moral Philosophy are the Laws wherewith outward objects have little to do as being for the most part inanimate which follow alwayes the force of nature without respect to moral Laws Nor can I conceive what purpose he had to bring this into his Reply to my answer wherein I attribute nothing in the Action of outward objects to Morallity b His first exception is that it is not material that the power of outward objects do proceed from our own faults if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power Well but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power as in truth they do then his answer is a meer subterfuge But how prâ—vâ—s he that in truth they do Because else saith he they are not our faults at all Very well reasoned A Horse is lame from a cause that was not in his power therefore the lameness is no fault in the Horse But his meaning is tâ—s no injustice unlesse the causes were in his own power as if it were not injustice whatsoever is willingly done against the Law whatsoever it be that is the cause oâ— the Wil to do it c Next he confesseth that it is in our power by good endeavours to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted and to get the contrary habits There is no such confession in my answer I said Prayer Fasting c. May alter our habits But I never said that the Will to Pray Fast c.
is in our own power True saith he but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the onâ— way as well as the former habit did the other way By which very consideration it appears that that which he calls a necessity is no more but a Proclivity If it were a true necessity it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours Again he mistakes for I said that Prayer Fasting c. when they alter our habits do necessarily cause the contrary habits which is not to say that the habit necessitates but is necessitated But this is Common with him to make me say that which out of readinâ— nâ—t out of Meditation he useth to say hiâ—â—â—â— Bâ—t how doth it apâ—â—ar that Prayer and Fasting c. make but a Proclivity in men to do what they do for if it â—ere but a Proclivity then what they do they do not Therefore they either necessitate the Will or the Will followeth nâ—t I contend for the truth of this onely that when the Wâ—ll followeth them they necessitate the will and when a â—râ—climity followeth they necessitate the proclimity But the Bishop thinâ—s I maintain that that also is produced necessiarily which is not produced at aâ— d He adds that we are not moved to Prayer or any other Action but by outward objects as pioâ—s company and Godly Preachers or something equivalent Wherein are two other mistakeâ— first to make Godly Preachers and pious company to be outward objects which are outward Agents Secondly to affirm that the Will is not moved but by outward objects The Wâ—l is moved by it self c. The first mistake he urgeth that I call Preachers and company objects Is not the Preacher to the hearer the object of his hearing No perhaps he will say it is the voyce which is the object and that we hear not the Preacher but his voyce as before he said the object of sight was not the cause of sight I must therefore once more make him smile with a great Paradox which is this that in all thâ— senses he Object is the Agent And that it is when we hear a Preacher the Preacher that we hear and that his voyce is the same thing with the hearing and a fancy in the hearer though the motion oâ— the Lips and other organs of speâ—ch be his that speaketh But of this I have written more largely in a moâ—e proper place My second mistake in affirming that the Will is not moved but by outward objects is a mistake of his own For I said not the Will is not moved but we ate not moved for I alwayes avoid attributing motion to any thing but Body The Will is produced generated formed and created in suâ—h â—ort as accidents are effected in a corpâ—real subject but moved it cannot be because it goeth not â—rom place to place And whereas hâ— saith the Will is moved by it self if he had spoken properly as he ought to do and said the Will is made or created by it self he would presently have acknowledged that it was impossible So that it is not without cause men use improper Language when they mean to keep their errours from being detected And because nothing can move that is not it self moved it is untruly said that either the Will or any thing else is moved by it self by the understanding by the sensitive passions or by Acts or habits or that Acts or habits are infused by God for infusion is motion and nothing is moved but bodys e He answers that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to weep nor the Philosopher to strik but I do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear He saith true I am not now proving but answering By his favour though he be answering now he was proving then And what he answers now maketh nothing more toward a proof then was before For these words the rational Wil hath Power to sleight the most appetible objects and to controle the most unruly passions are no more being reduced into proper terms then this the appetite hath power to be without appetite towards most appetible objects and to Will contrary to the most unruly Will which is Jargon f He objects that Liberty is in no danger but to be lost but I say it cannot be lost therefore he inferrs that it is in no danger at all I answer First that Liberty is in more danger to be abused then lost c. Secondly Liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened by vicâ—ous habits Thirdly it may be totally lost It is true that a man hath more liberty one time then another and in one place then another which is a difference of liberty 〈◊〉 to the Body But as to the liberty of doing what we will in those things we are able to do it cannot be greater one time then another Consequently outward objects can 〈◊〉 wayes endanger liberty further then it destroyeth it And his answer that liberty is in more danger to be abused then lost is not to the question but a meer shift to be thought not silenced And whereas he says liberty is diminished by vitious habits it cannot be understood otherwise then that vicious habits make a man the lesse free to do vicious actions which I believe is not his meaning And lastly whereas he says that Liberty is lost when reason is lost and that they who by expresse of Study or by continuall gurmandising or by extravagant passion c. do become sots have consequently lost their liberty it requireth proof for for any thing that I can observe mad men and fools have the same liberty that other men have in those things that are in their power to do J. D. FOurthly the natural Philosopher doth teach that the will Num. 23. doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding It is true indeed the will should follow the direction of the understanding but I am not satisfied that it doth evermore follow it Sometimes this saying hath place Video mâ—liora proboque Deteriora sequor As that great Roman said of two Sailers that the one produced the better reasons but the other must have the office So reason often lies dejected at the feet of affection Things neerer to the senses moove more powerfully Do what a man can he shall sorrow more for the death of his child than for the sin of his soul Yet appreciatively in the estimation of judgment he accounts the offence of God a greater evill than any temporal loss Next I do not believe that a man is bound to weigh the expedience or inexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to the least grain in the ballance of his understanding or to run up into his Watch-Tower with his perspective to take notice of every Jack-daw that flies by for fear of some hidden danger This seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to petit observations as concerning every rag that a man wears each drop of drink each morsel of bread that he eates
Liberty of Wil consists with Gods eternal Prescience and Decrees yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest But why should he adhere to it unlesse it be manifest to himself And if it be manifest to himself why does he deny that he is able to comprehend it And if he be not able to comprehend it how knows he that it is domonstrable Or why says he that so confidently which he does not know Me thinks that which I have said namely that that which God foreknows shall be hereafter cannot but be hereafter and at the same time that he foreknew it should be But that which cannot but be is necessary Therefore what God foreknows shall be necessarily and at the time foreknown This I say looketh somewhat liker to a demonstration than any thing that he hath hitherto brought to prove Free Wil. Another reason why I should be of his opinion is that he is in possession of an old truth derived to him by inheritance or succession from his Ancestors To which I answer first that I am in possession of a truth derived to me from the light of reason Secondly that whereas he knoweth not whether it be the truth that he possesseth or not because he confesseth he knows not how it can consist with Gods Prescience and Decrees I have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of necessity not onely agrees with but necessirily followeth from the eternal Prescience and Decrees of God Besides it is an unhansome thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by succession from his Ancestors For our Ancestors the first Christians derived not therefore their truth from the Gentils because they were their Ancestors c To passe by all the other great imperfections which are to be found in this Sorite it is just like that old Sophistical piece he that drinks well sleeps well he that sleeps well thinks no hurt he that thinks no hurt lives well therefore he that drinks well lives well My argument was thus Election is alwayes from the Memory of good and evil sequels Memory is alway from the Sense and Sense alwayes from the Action of external bodys and all Action from God therefore all Actions even of Free and Voluntary Agents are from God and consequently necessary Let the Bishop compare now his scurrilous Argumentation with this of mine and tell me whether he that sleeps well doth all his life time think no hurt d In the very last passage of my discourse I proposed my own private opinion how it might be made appear that the eternal Prescience and Decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency c. If he had meant by Liberty as other men do the Liberty of Action that is of things which are in his power to doe which he will it had been an easie matter to reconcile it with the Prescience and Decrees of God But meaning the Liberty of Wil it was impossible So likewise if by contingency he had meant simply comming to passe it had been reconcilable with the Decrees of God but meaning comming to passe without necessity it was impossible And therefore though it be true he says that he set it down in as plain terms as he could yet it was impossible to set it down in plain terms Nor â—ought he to charge me with misunderstanding him and wresting his words to a wrong sense For the truth is I did not understand them at all nor thought he understood them himself but was willing to give them the best imterpretation they would bear which he calls wresting them to a wrong sense And first I understood not what he meant by the Aspect of God For if he had meant his foreknowledge which word he had often used before what needed he in this one place onely to call it Aspect Or what need he here call it his View Or say that all things are open to the eyes of God not discursively but intuitively which is to expound Eyes in that Text Hebr. 4. 11. not figuratively but litteraâ—ly neverthâ—lâ—sse excluding external Species which the School-men say are the cause of seeing But it wat well done to exclude such insignificant speeches upon every occasion whatsoever And though I do not hold the foreknowledge of God to consist in Discourse yet I shall be never driven to say it is by Intuition as long as I know that even a man hath foreknowledge of all those things which he intendeth himself to do not by discourse but by knowing his own purpose saving that man hath a superiour power over him that can change his purpose which God hath not And whereas he says I confound this Aspect with the Wil and Decrees of Godâ— â—he 〈◊〉 wrongifully For how could I so confound it when I understood not what it meant e Secondly he chargeth me that hitherto I have maintained that Liberty and the Decrees of God are â—rreconcileable and the reason why I do so is because he maintained that Liberty and the absolute necessity of all things are â—rreconcileable If Liberty cannot stand with necessity it cannot stand with the Decrees of God of which Decrees necessity is a Consequent I needed not to say nor did say that Necessity and Gods Decrees are all one though if I had said it it had not been without Authority of learned men in whose writings are often found this sentence Voluntas Dei Necessitas rerum f But to cut his Argument short God hath Decreed all effects which come to passe in time yet not all after the same manner but according to the distinct natures capacities and conditions of his creatures which he doth not destroy by his Decree Some he acteth Hitherto true then he addeth with some he cooperateth by special influence and some he onely permitteth Yet this is no idle or bare permission This is false For nothing operateth by its own original power but God himself Man operateth not but by special power I say special power not special influence derived from God Nor is it by Gods permission onely as I have often already shown and as the Bishop here contradicting his former words confesseth for to permit onely and barely to permit signifie the same thing And that which he says that God concurs by way of general influence is Jargon For every concurrence is one singular and individual concurrence and nothing in the World is general but the signification of words and other signs g Thirdly he chargeth me that I allow all men to be of his opinion save onely those that conceive in their minds a Nunc stans or how eternity is an indivisible point rather then an everlasting succession But I have given no such allowance Surely if the reason wherefore my opinion is false proceed from this that I conceive not eternity to be Nunc stans but an everlasting succession I am allowed to hold my opinion till I can conceive eternity otherwise at least he allows men not till then to be of his
themselves free but rather necessary actions as when a man runs away from a Cat or a custard Thus far he says is true But when he calls sudden passions motus primo primi I cannot tell whether he says true or not because I do not understand him nor find how he makes his meaning ever the clearer by his example of a Cat and a Custard because I know not what he means by a secret Antipathie For what that Antipathy is he explaineth not by calling it secret but rather confesseth he knows not how to explain it And because he saith it is thus far true I expect he should tell me also how far it is false f Secondly as for those actions wherein actual deliberation seems not necessary because never any thing appeared that could make a man doubt of the consequence I do confesse that Actions done by vertue of a precedent deliberation without any actual deliberation for the present may notwithstanding be truely voluntary and free Acts. In this he agrees with me But where he adds yea in some cases and in some sense more free then if they were actually deliberated of in present I do not agree with him And for the instance he bringeth to prove it in the man that playeth on an iâ—strument with his hand it maketh nothing for him for it proveth onely that the Habit maketh the motion of his hand more ready and quick but it proveth not that it maketh it more voluntary but rather lesse because the rest of the motions follow the first by an easinesse acquired from long custome in which motion the Wil doth not accompany all the strokes of the hand but gives a beginning to them onely in the first Here is nothing as I expected of how far that which I had said namely that the action doth necessarily follow the thought is false unlesse it be improprieties of speech as calling that voluntary which is free and limitting the will to the last appetite and other mistakes as that no act can be said to be without deliberation For improprieties of speech I will not contend wâ—th one that can use motus primo primi practice practicum actus elicitus and many other phrases of the same kind But so say that Free actions are voluntary and that the Wil which oauseth a voluntary action is the last appetite and that that appetite was immediately followed by the action and that no action of a man can be said in the judgement of the Law to be without deliberation are no mistakes for any thing that he hath proved to the contrary g Thirdly whereas he saith that some sudden acts proâ—â—eceeding from violent passions which surprise a man are justly punished I grant they are so sometimes but not for his reason c. My reason was because he had time to deliberate from the instant that he knew the Law to the instant of his action and ought to have deliberated that therefore he may be justly punished The Bishop grants they are justly punished and his reason is because they were vertually deliberated of or because it is our fault they were not actually deliberated of How a man does deliberate and yet not actually deliberate I understand not If vertual deliberation be not actual deliberation it is no deliberation But he calleth vertual deliberation that which ought to have been and was not and says the same that he condemnes in me And his other reason namely because it is our fault that we deliberated not is the same that I said that we ought to have deliberated and did not So that his reprehension here is a reprehension of himself proceeding from that the custome of School Language hath made him forget the Language of his Country And to that which he adds that a necessary act is never a fault nor justly punishable when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsecal causes I have sufficiently answered before in divers places shewing that a fault may be necessary from extrinsecal causes and yet voluntary and that voluntary faults are justly punishable h But if the necessity be contracted by our selves it is justly punishable As he who by his wanton though in the day time doth procure his own nocturnal pollution This instance because it maketh not against any thing I have held and partly also because it is a stinking passage for surely if as he that ascribing eyes to the understanding allowes me to say it hath a nose it stinketh to the nose of the understanding This sentence I passe over observing only the canting terms not actually free in it self but vertually free in its causes In the rest of his answer to this Number 25. I find nothing alledged in confutation of any thing I have said saving that his last words are that T. H. is mistaken in that also that the right to kill men doth proceed meerly from their being noxious Numb 14. But to that I have in the same Numb 14. already answered I must not passe over that a little before he hath these words If a Child before he have the use of reason shall kill a man in his passion yet because he wanted malice to incite him to it and reason to restrain him from it he shall not dye for it in the strict rules of particular Justice unlesse there be some mixture of publique Justice in the case The Bishop would make but an ill Judge of innocent Children for such are they that for want of age have not use enough of reason to abstain from killing for the want of reason proceeding from want of age does therefore take away tho punishment because it taketh away the crime and makes them innocent But he introduceth another Justice which he calleth publick whereas he called the other particular and by this publick Justice he saith the Child though innocent may be put to death I hope we shall never have the administration of publick Justice in such hands as his or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him But the distinction he makes is not by himself understood There are publick causes and private causes private are those where the parties to the cause are both private men Publick are those where one of the parties is the Common-wealth or the person that representeth it and the cause criminal But there is no distinction of Justice into Publick and Private We may reade of men that having Soverain Power did sometimes put an Innocent to death either upon a vow as â—â—pthah did in sacrificing his Daughter or when it hath been thought fit that an innocent person should be put to death to save a great number of people But to put to death a Child not for reason of State which he improperly calls Publick Justice but for killing a man and at the same time to acknowledge such killing to be no crime I think was never heard of T. H. SEcondly I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall Num. 26.
by general influence which is evermore requisite Angels or men by perswading evill spirits by tempting the object or end by its appetibility the understanding by directing So passions and acquired habits But I deny that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it Physically to one except God alone who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases And where there is no antecedent determination to one there is no absolute necessity but true Liberry b His second argument is ex concessis It is out of controversie saith he that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause The argument may be thus reduced Necessary causes produce necessary effects but the Will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions I might deny his major Necessary causes do not alwayes produce necessary effects except they be also necessarily produâ—ed as I have shewed before in the burning of Protagoras his book But I answer cleerly to the minor that the will is not a necessary cause of what it wills in particular actions It is without controversie indeed for it is without all probability That it wills when it wills is necessary but that it wills this or that now or then is free More expresly the act of the will may be considered three wayes Either in respect of its nature or in respect of its exercise or in respect of its object First for the nature of the act That which the will wills is necessarily voluntary because the will cannot be compelled And in this sense it is out of controversie that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions Secondly for the exercise of its acts that is not necessary The will may either will or suspend its act Thirdly for the object that is not necessary but free the will is not extrinsecally determined to its objects As for example The Cardinalls meet in the conclave to chose a Pope whom they chose he is necessarily Pope But it is not necessary that they shall chose this or that day Before they were assembled they might defer their assembling when they are assembled they may suspend their election for a day or a week Lastly for the person whom they will choose it is freely in their own power otherwise if the election were not free it were void and no election at all So that which takes its beginning from the will is necessarily voluntary but it is not necessary that the will shall will this or that in particular as it was necessary that the person freely elected should be Pope but it was not necessary either that the election should be at this time or that this man should be elected And therefore voluntary acts in particular have not necessary causes that is they are not necessitated Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXX I Had said that nothing taketh beginning from it self and that the cause of the Will is not the Will it self but something else which it dispâ—seth not of Answering to thiâ— he endeavours to sheâ— us the cause of the Will. a I grant saith he that the Will doth not take beginning from it self for that the faculty of the Wilâ— takes beginning from God who created the soul and powred it into man and endowed it with this power and for that the act of willing takes not beginning from it self but from the faculty or from the power of willing which is in the soul. This is certain finite and participated things cannot be from themselves nor be produced by themselves What would he conclude from hence That therefore the Act of willing takes not its beginning from the faculty of the Wil It is well that he grants finite things as for his participated it signifies nothing here cannot be produced by themselves For out of this I can conclude that the Act of willing is not produced by the faculty of willing He that hath the faculty of willing hath the faculty of willing something in particular And at the same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same If therefore the faculty of willing be the cause he willeth any thing whatsoever for the same reason the faculty of nilling will be the cause at the same time of nilling it and so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same time which is absurd It seems the Bishop had forgot that Matter and Power are indifferent to contrary Forms and contrary Acts. It is somewhat besides the Matter that dâ—termineth it to a certain form and somewhat besides the Power that produceth a certain Act and thence it is that is inferred this that he granteth that nothing can be produced by it self which neverthelesse he presently contradicteth in saying that all men know when a stone descends the beginning is intrinsecal and that the stone mooves in respect of the Form and is moved in respect of the Matter Which is as much to say that the Form moveth the Matter or that the stone moveth it self which before he denied When a stone ascends the beginning of the stones motion was in it self that is to say intrinsecal because it is not the stones motion till the store begins to be moved but the motion that caused it to begin to ascend was a precedent and extrinsecal motion of the hand or other engine that threw it upward And so when it descends the beginning of the stones motion is in the stone but neverthelesse there is a former motion in the ambient Body aire or water that causeth it to descend But because no man can see it most men think there is none though Reason wherewith the Bishop as relying onely upon the Authority of Books troubleth not himself coâ—vince that there is b His second Argument is ex concessis It is out of controversy that of voluntary Actions the Wil is a necessary cause The Argument may be thus reduced Necessary causes produce necessary effects but the Wil is a necessary cause of voluntary Actions I might deny his Major necessary causes do not alwayes produce necessary effects except they be also necessarily produced He has reduced the Argument to non-sense by saying necessary causes produce not necessary effects For necessary effects unlesse he mean such effects as shall necessarily be produced is insignificant Let him consider therefore with what grace he can say necessary causes do not alwayes produce their effects except those effects be also necessarily produced But his answer is chiefly to the Minor and denies that the Wil is not a necessary cause of what it wills in particular Actions That it wills when it wills saith he is necessary but that it wills this or that is free Is it possible for any man to conceive that he that willeth can will any thing but this or that particular thing It is therefore manifest that either the Wil is a necessary cause of this or that or any other particular Action or not the necessary cause of any voluntary Action at all For universal Actions
there be none In that which followeth he undertaketh to make his doctrine more expressly understood by considering the Act of the will three ways In respect of its nature in respect of its Exercise and in respect of its object For the nature of the Act be saith that That which the will wills is necessarily volunrary and that in this sense he grants it is out of controversy that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary Actions Instead of that which the will wills to make it sense read that which the man wills and then if the mans will be as he confesseth a necessary cause of voluntary Actions it is no lesse a necessary cause that they are Actions then that they are voluntary For the Exercise of the Act he saith that the will may either will or suspend its Act This is the old canting which hath already been sufficiently detected But to make it somewhat let us reade it thus the man that willeth may either will or suspend his will and thus it is intelligible but false for how can he that willeth at the same time suspend his will And for the object he says that it is not necessary but Free c. His reason is because he says it was not necessary for example in choosing a Pope to choose him this or that day or to chuse this or that man I would be glad to know by what Argument â—e can prove the Election not to have been necessitated For it is not enough for him to say I perceive no necessity in it nor to say they might have chosen another because he knows not whether they might or not nor to say if he had not been freely elected the Election had been void or none For though that be true it does not follow that the Election was not necessary for there is no repugnance to necessity either in Election or in Freedome And whereas he concludeth therefore voluntary Acts in particular are not necessitated I would have been glad he had set down what voluntary Acts there are not particular which by his restriction of voluntary Acts he grants to be necessitated T. H. SEventhly I hold that to be a sufficient cause to which nothing Num. 31. is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect The same is also a necessary cause for if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect then there wanted somewhat which was needful to the producing of it and so the cause was not sufficient But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it Hence it is manifest that whatsoever is produced is produced necessarily for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it or else it had not been And therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated J. D. THis section contains a third Argument to proove that all effects are necessary for clearing whereof it is needfull to consider how a cause may be said to be sufficient or insufficient First several causes singly considered may be insufficient and the same taken conjointly be sufficient to produce an effect As a two Horses jointly are sufficient to draw a Coach which either of them singly is insufficient to do Now to make the effect that is the drawing of the Coach necessary it is not onely required that the two Horses be sufficient to draw it but also that their conjunction be necessary and their habitude such as they may draw it If the owner of one of these Horses will not suffer him to draw If the Smith have shod the other in the quick and lamed him If the Horse have cast a shoe or be a resty jade and will not draw but when he list then the effect is not necessarily produced but contingently more or less as the concurrence of the causes is more or less contingent b Secondly a cause may be said to be sufficient either because 2. it produceth that effect which is intended as in the generation of a man or else because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced as in the generation of a Monster The former is properly called a sufficient cause the later a weak and insufficient cause Now if the debility of the cause be not necessary but contingent then the effect is not necessary but contingent It is a rule in Logick that the conclusion alwayes follows the weaker part If the premises be but probable the conclusion cannot be demonstrative It holds as well in causes as in propositions No effect can exceed the vertue of its cause If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent the effect cannot be necessary Thirdly that which concerns this question of Liberty from necessity most neerly is That c a cause is said to be sufficient 3. in respect of the ability of it to act not in respect of its will to act The concurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect But the cause may be sufficient though the will do not concur As God is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds but it doth not follow from thence either that he hath produced them or that he will produce them The blood of Christ is a sufficient ransome for all mankind but it doth not follow therefore that all mankind shall be actually saved by vertue of his Blood A man may be a sufficient Tutour though he will not teach every Scholler and a sufficient Physician though he will not administer to every patient For as much therefore as the concurrence of the will is needful to the production of every free effect and yet the cause may be sufficient in sensu-divi'so although the will do not concur it followes evidently that the cause may be sufficient and yet something which is needful to the production of the effect may be wanting and that every sufficient cause is not a necessary cause Lastly if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear light and say that though the free Agent be sufficient in sensu diviso yet he is not sufficient in sensu composito to produce the effect without the concurrence of the will he saith true but first he bewrayes the weakness and the fallacy of the former argument which is a meer trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense and sufficiency in a compounded sense And seeing the concurrence of the will is not predetermined there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur and when it hath concurred the necessity is but hypothetical which may consist with liberty Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXXI IN this place he disputeth against my definition of a sufficient cause namely that cause to which nothing is wanting needfull to the producing of the effect I thought this definition could have been mistiked by no man that had English enough to
know that a sufficient cause and cause enough signifieth the same thing And no man wil say that that is cause enough to produce an effect to which any thing is wanting needful to the producing of it But the Bishop thinks if he set down what he understands by sufficient it would serve to confute my definition And therefore says a Two Horses joyntly are sufficient to draw a Coach which either of them singly is insufficient to do Now to make the effect that is the drawing of the Coach necessary it is not onely required that the two Horses be sufficient to draw it but also that it be necessary they shall be joyned and that the owner of the Horses will let them draw and that the Smith hath not lamed them and they be not resty and list not to draw but when they list otherwise the effect is contingent It seems the Bishop thinks two Horses may be sufficient to draw a Coach though they will not draw or though they be lame or though they be never put to draw and I think they can never produce the effect of drawing without those needful circumstances of being strong obedient and having the Coach some way or other fastened to them He calls it a sufficient cause of drawing that they be Coach hoâ—ses though they be lame or wiâ—â— not draw But I say they are not sufficient absolutely but conditionally if they be not lame nor resty Lâ—t the read r judge whether my sufficient cause or his may properly be called cause enough b Secondly a cause may be said to be sufficient either because it produceth that effect which is intended as in the generation of a man or else because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced as in the generation of a Monster the former is properly called a sufficient cause the latter a weak and insufficient cause In these few lines he hath said the cause of the generation of a Monster is sufficient to produce a Monster and that it is insufficient to produce a Monster How sooâ— may a man forget his words that doth nâ—t understand theâ—â— This term of insufficient cause which also the School calls Deficient that they may rime to efficient is not inteâ—â—eâ—ible but a word devised like Hocus Pocus to juggle a difficulty out of sight That which is sufficient to produce a Monster is not therefore to be called an insufficient cause to produce a mâ—n no more then that which is sufficient to produce a man is to be called an insufficient cause to produce a Monster c Thirdly a cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability of it to act not in respect of its will to act c. As God is sufficient to produce a thousand Worlds He understands little whâ—n â—en say God is sufficient to produce many worlds if he understand not the meaning to be that he is sufficient to prodâ—ce them if he will Without this sâ—pposition It he will a man is not sufficient to produce any voluntary action not so much as to walk though he be inhâ—alth and at Liberty The will is as much a sufficient cause without the strength to do as the strength without the Wil To that which he adds that my Definition is a meer trifling between a sufficiency in a divided sense and a sufficiency in a compounded sense I can make no answer because I understand no more what he means by sufficiency in a divided sense and sufficiency in a compounded sense then if he had said sufficiency in a divided non-sense and sufficiency in a compounded non-sense T. H. LAstly I hold that the ordinary definition of a free Agent namely Num. 32. that a free Agent is that which when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect can nevertheless not produce it implies a contradiction and is non-sense being as much as to say the cause may be sufficient that is necessary and yet the effect not follow J. D. THis last point is but a Corollary or an Inference from the former doctrine that every sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily which pillar being taken away the superstructure must needs fall to the ground having nothing left to support it Lastly I hold saith he what he is able to proove is something So much reason so much trust but what he holds concerns himself not others But what holds he I hold saith he that the ordinary definition of a free Agent implies a contradiction and is non-sense That which he calls the ordinary definition of liberty is the very definition which is given by the much greater part of Philosophers and School-men And doth he think that all these spake non-sense or had no more judgment than to contradict themselves in a definition He might much better suspect himself than censure so many Let us see the definition iâ— self A free Agent is that which when all things are present that are needful to produce the effect can nevertheless not produce it I acknowledge the old definition of Liberty with little variation But I cannot see this non-sense nor discover this contradiction For a in these words all things needfull or all things requisite the actual determination of the will is not included But by all things needful or requisite all necessary power either operative or elective all necessary instruments and adjuments extrinsecall and intrinsecall and all conditions are intended As he that hath pen and ink and paper a table a desk and leisure the art of writing and the free use of his hand hath all things requisite to write if he will and yet he may forbear if he will Or as he that hath men and mony and arms and munition and ships and a just cause hath all things requisite for war yet he may make peace if he will Or as the King proclaimed in the Gospel Matth. 2â— 4. â— hâ—ve prepared my dinner my oxen and my fatlings are killed all things are ready come unto the marriage According to T. H his doctrine the guests might have told him that he said not truly for their own wills were not readâ— b And indeed if the will were as he conceives it is necessitated extrinsecally to every act of willing if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will nor to will what it doth not will then if the will were wanting something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting But now when Science and conscience reason and Religion our own and other mens experience doth teach us that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsecal necessitation if the power to will be present in actâ— primo determinable by our selves then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect Secondly these words â—o act or not to act to wâ—rk or not to work to produce or nâ—t to produce have reference to the effect not as a thing which
is already done or doing but as a thing â—o be done They imply not the actual production but the producibility of the effect But when once the will hath actually concurred with all other causes and conditions and circumstances then the effect is no more possible or producible but it is in being and actually produced Thus he takes away the subject of the question The question is whether effects producible be free from necessity He shuffles out effects producible and thrusts in their places effects produced or which are in the act of production Wherefore I conclude that it is neither non sense nor contradiction to say that a free Agent when all things requisite to produce the effect are present may nevertheless not produce it Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXXII THe question is here whether these words a free Agent is that which when all things needfull to the production of the effect are present can nevertheless not produce it â—â—mply a contradiction as I say it does To make it appear no contradiction he saith a In these words all things needful or all things requisite the actual determination of the Will is not included as if the Will were not needful nor requisite to the producing of a voluntary Action For to the production of any Act whatsoever there is needful not onely those things which proceed from the Agent but also those that consist in the disposition of the patient And to use his own instance it is necessary to writing not onely that there be pâ—n ink paper c. but also a will to write He that hath the former hath all things requisite to write if he will but not all things necessary to writing And so in his other instances he that hath men and money c. without that which he putteth in for a requisite hath all things requisite to make War if he Will but not simply to make War And he in the Gospel that had prepared his Dinner had all things requisite for his guests if they came but not all things requisite to make them come And therefore all things requisite is a term ill defined by him b And indeed if the will were as he conceives it is necessitated extrinsecally to every act of willing if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will nor to will what it does not will then if the will were wanting something requisite to the produceing of the effect were wanting But now when Science and Conscience Reason and Religion our own and other mens experience doth teach us that the Will hath a Dominion over its own Acts to Will or Nill without extrinsecal necessitation if the power to will be present in actu primo determinable by our selves then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect These words the will hath power to forbear willing what it doth will and these the Wil hath a Dominion over its own Acts and these the power to Will is present in actu primo determinable by our selves are as wild as ever were any spoken with in the Walls of Bedlam and if Science Conscience Reason and Religion teach us to speak thus they make us mad And that which followeth is false to Act or not to Act to work or not to work to produce or not to produce have reference to the effect not as a thing which is already done or doing but as a thing to be done For to act to work to produce are the same thing with to be doing It is not the act but the power that hath reference to the future for act and power differ in nothing but in this that the former signifieth the time present the latter the time to come And whereas he adds that I shuffle out effects producible and thrust into their places effects produced I must take it for an untruth till he cite the place wherein I have done so T. H. FOr my first five points where it is explicated First what Num. 33. Spontaneity is Secondly what Deliberation is Thirdly what Will Propension and Appetite is Fourthly what a free Agent is Fiftly what Liberty is There can be no other proof offered but every mans own experience by reflecting on himself and remembring what he useth to have in his mind that is what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is spontaneous A man deliberates such is his will That Agent or that action is free Now he that so reflecteth on himself cannot but be satisfied that deliberation is the considering of the good and evil sequells of the action to come That by Spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding for else nothing is meant by it That will is the last act of our Deliberation That a free Agent is he that can do if he will and forbear if he will And that Liberty is the absence of externall impediments But to those that out of custome speak not what they conceive but what they hear and are not able or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words no argument can be sufficient because experience and matter of fact is not verified by other mens Arguments but by every mâ—ns own sense and memory For example how can it be prooved that to love a thing and to think it good are all one to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words Or how can it be prooved that Eternity is not nunc Stans to a man that sayes these words by câ—stoâ—â—e and never considers how he can conceive the thing it self in his mind Also the sixt point that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause can no other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it But if he try he shall find as much reason if there be no cause of the thing to conceive it should begin at one time as another that is he hath equall reason to think it should begin at all times which is impossible And therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then rather than sooner or later or else that it began never but was Eternal J. D. NOw at length he comes to his main proofs He that hath so confidently censured the whole current of Schoolmen and Philosophers of non-sense had need to produce strong evidence for himself So he calls his reasons Numb 36. demonstrative proofs All demonstrations are either from the cause or the effect not fâ—om private notions and conceptions which we have in our minds That which he calls a demonstration deserves not the name of an intimation He argues thus That which a man conceives in his mind by these words Spontaneity Deliberation c. that they are This is his proposition which I deny a The true natures of things are not to be judged by the private ideas or conceptions of men but by their causes and formal reasons Ask an ordinary person what upwards
which no man that hath his eyes in his head can dâ—â—bt oâ— g If all this will not satisfie him I will give one of his own kind of proofs that is an instance That which necessitates all things according to T. H. is the decree of God or that order which is set to all things by the eternal cause Numb 11. Now God himself who made this necessitating decree was not subjected to it in the making thereof neither was there any former order to oblige the first cause necessarily to make such a decree therefore this decree being an act ad extra was freely made by God without any necessitation Yet nevertheless this disjunctive proposition is necessarily true Either God did make such a decree or he did not make such a decree Again though T. H. his opinion were true that all events are necessary and that the whole Christian world are deccived who believe that some events are free from necessity yet he will not deny but if it had been the good pleasure of God he might have made some causes free from necessity seeing that it neither argues any imperfection nor implies any contradiction Supposing therefore that God had made some second causes free from any such antecedent determination to one yet the former disjunction would be necessarily true Either this free undetermined cause will act after this manner or it will not act after this manner Wherefore the necessary truth of such a disjunctive proposition doth not prove that either of the members of the disjunction singly considered is determinately true in present but onely that the one of them will be determinately true to morrow Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXXIV a HIs former proof that all sufficient causes are necessary causes is answered before Numb 31. When he shall have read my Animadversions upon that Answer of his he will think otherwise whatsoever he will confesse b And his two instances of casting Ambs-ace and of raining to morrow are altogether impertinent to the question for two reasons His first reason is because he saith our present controversy is concerning free actions which proceed from the Liberty of mans Will and both his instances are of contingent actions which proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes He knows that this part of my discourse which beginneth at Numb 25. is no dispute with him at all but a bare seâ—ting down of my opinion concerning the natural necessity of all things which is opposite not onely to the Liberty of Will but also to all contingence that is not necessary And therefore these instances were not impertinent to my purpose and if they be impertinent to his opinion of the Liberty of mans Will he does impertinently to meddle with them And yet for all he pretends here that the question is onely ab ut Liberty of the Will Yet in his first discourse Number the 16. he maintains that the order beauty and perfection of the world doth require that in the Universe should be Agents of all sorts some necessary some Free some contingent And my purpose here is to shew by those instances that those things which we esteem most contingent are neverthelesse necessary Besides the controversy is not whether free actions which proceed from the Liberty of mans Will be necessary or not for I know no action which proceedeth from the Liberty of mans Will But the question is whether those actions which proceed from the mans Will be necessary The mans Will is something but the Liberty of his Will is nothing Again the question is not whether contingent actions which proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes for there is nothing that can proceed from indetermination but whether contingent actions be necessary before they be done or whether the concurrence of natural causes when they happen to concur were not necessitated so to happen or whether whatsoever chanceth be not necessitated so to chance And that they are so necessitated I have proved already with such arguments as the Bishop for ought I see cannot answer For to say as he doth that there are free actions which proceed meerly from Election without any outward necessitation is a truth so evident as that there is a Sun in the Heavens is no proof 'T is indeed as cleer as the Sun that there are free actions proceeding from Election but that there is Election without any outward necessitation is dark enough c Secondly for mixt actions which proceed from the concurrence of free and natural Agents though they be not free yet they are not necessary c. For proof of this he instanceth in a Tile that falling from an house breaks a mans head neither necessarily nor freely and therefore contingently Not necessarily for saith he he did freely choose to go that way without any necessitation Which is as much as taking the question it self for a proof For what is else the question but whether a man be necessitated to choose what he chooseth Again saith he it was not Free because he did not deliberate whether his head should be broken or not and conâ—ludes therefore it was contingent and by undoubted consequence there are contingent actions in the world which are not free This is true and denied by none but he should have proved that such contingent actions are not antecedently necessary by a concurrence of natural causes though a little before he granteth they are For whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes was antecedently determined in the cause of such concurrence though as he calls it contingent concurrence not perceiving that concurrence and contingent concurrence are all one and suppose a continued connection and succession of causes which make the effect necessarily future So that hitherto he hath proved no other contingence then that which is necessary d Thirdly for the actions of brute beasts c. To think each animal motion of theirs is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity I see no ground for it It maketh nothing against the truth that he sees no ground for it I have pointed out the ground in my former discourse and am not bound to find him eyes He himself immediately citeth a place of Scripture that proveth it where Christ saith one of these sparrows doth not fall to the ground without your heavenly father which place if there were nâ— more were a sufficient ground for the assertion of tâ—e necessity of all those changes of animal motion in birds and other living creatures which seem to us so uncertain But when a man is dizzy with influence of power elicite acts permissive will Hypothetical necessity and the like unintelligible terms the ground goes from him By and by after he confesseth that many things are called contingent in respect of us because we know not the cause oâ— tâ—em which really and in themselves are not contingent bu necessary and errâ— therein the other way for he says in effect that
immediately produced the same may be said of the cause of this cause and so backward eternally from whence it will follow that all the connection of the causes of any effect from the beginning of the World were altogether existent in one and the same instant and consequently all the time from the beginning of the World or from Eternity to this day is but one instant or a Nunc stans which he knows by this time is not so T. H. AND thus you see how the inconveniences which he objecteth Num. 36. must follow upon the holding of necessity are avoided and the necessity it self demonstratively proved To which I could add if I thought it good Logick the inconvenience of denying necessity as that it destroyes both the Decrees and Prescience of God Almighty for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man as an instrument or foreseeth shall come to passe A man if he have Liberty such as he affirmeth from necessitation might frustrate and make not to come to pass And God should either not foreknow it and not Decree it or he should foreknow such things shall be as shall never be and decree that which shall never come to pass J. D. THus he hath laboured in vain to satisfie my reasons and to prove his own assertion But for demonstration there is nothing like it among his Arguments Now he saith a he could add other Arguments if he thought it good Logick There is no impediment in Logick why a man may not press his Adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opion Argumentum ducens ad impossible or ad absurdum is a good form of reasoning But there is another reason of his forbearance though he be loth to express it Haeret lateri laethalâ—â— arundâ— The Arguments drawn from the attributes of God do stick so close in the sides of his cause that he hath no mind to treat of that subject By the way take notice of his own confession that he could add othâ—r reasons if he thought it good Logick If it were predetermined in the outward causes that â—e must make this very defence and no other how could it be in his power to add or substract any thing Just as if a blind-man should say in earnest I could see if I had mine eyes Truth often breaks out whilst men sâ—eâ— to smother it b But let us view his Argument If a man have liberty from necessitation he may frustrate the Decrees of God and make his prescience false First for the Decrees of God This is his Decree that man should be a free Agent If he did consider God as a most simple Act without priority or posteriority of time or any composition He would not conceive of his Decrees as of the Laws of the Modes and Persians long since enacted and passed before we were born but as coexistent with our selves and with the acts which we do by vertue of those Decrees Decrees and Attributes are but notions to help the weakness of our understanding to conceive of God The Decrees of God are God himself and therefore justly said to be before the foundation of the world was laid And yet coexistent with our selves because of the Infinite and Eternal being of God The summe is this The Decree of God or God himself Eternally constitutes or ordaines all effects which come to pass in time according to the distinct natures or capacities of his creatures An Eternal Ordination is neither past nor to come but alwayes present So free actions do proceed as well from the Eternal Decree of God as necessary and from that order which he hath set in the world As the Decree of God is Eternal so is his Knowledge And therefore to speak truely and properly there is neither foreknowledge nor after-knowledge in him The Knowledge of God comprehends all times in a point by reason of the eminence and vertue of its infinite perfection And yet I confess that this is called fore knowledge in respect of us But this fore-knowledge doth produce no absolute necessity Things are not therefore because they are fore known but therefore they are fore-known because they shall come to pass If any thing should come to pass otherwise than it doth yet Gods knowledge could not be irritated by it for then he did not know that it should come to pass as now it doth Because every knowledge of vision necessarily presupposeth its object God did know that Judas should betray Christ but Judas was not necessitated to be a traitor by Gods knowledge If Judas had not betrayed Christ then God had not fore-known that Judas should betray him The case is this A watch-man standing on the steeples-top â—as it is the use in Germany gives notice to them below who see no such things that company are coming and how many His prediction is most certain for he sees them What a vain collection were it for one below to say what if they do not come then a certain prediction may fail It may be urged that there is a difference between these two cases In this case the coming is present to the Watchman but that which God fore-knows is future God knows what shall be The Watch-man onely knows what is I answer that this makes no difference at all in the case by reason of that disparity which is between Gods knowledge and ours As that coming is present to the Watch-man which is future to them who are below So all those things which are future to us are present to God because his Infinite and Eternal knowledge doth reach to the future being of all Agents and events Thus much is plainly acknowledged by T. H. Numb 11. That fore-knowledge is knowledge and knowledge depends on the existence oâ— the things known and not they on it To conclude the prescience of God doth not make things more necessary than the production of the things themselves But if the Agents were free Agents the production of the things doth not make the events to be absolutely necessary but onely upon supposition that the causes were so determined Gods prescience proveth a necessity of infallibility but not of antecedent extrinsecall determination to one If any event should not come to pass God did never foreknow that it would come to pass For every knowledge necessarily presupposeth its object Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb XXXVI a HE could add he saith other Arguments if he thought it good Logick c. There is no impediment in Logick why a man may not presse his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opinion Here he miss recites my words which are I could add if I thought it good Logick the inconvenience of denying necessity as that it destroys both the Decrees and Prescience of God Almighty But he makes me say I could add other Arguments then inferrs that there is no impediment in Logick why a man may not presse his adversary with the absurdities that flow from his opinion
opinions when they are taught as they are often in Divinity Books and from the Pulpit I could hardly guesse but that I remember that there have been Books written to intitle the Bishops to a Divine right underived from the civil Soveraign But because he maketh it so â—aynous a matter that the supreme civil Magistrate should be Christs Lieutenant upon earth let us suppose that a Bishop or a Synode of Bishops should be set up which I hope never shall for our civil Soveraign then that which he objecteth here I could object in the same words against himself For I could say in his oâ—n words This is life eternal to know the onely true God and Jesus Christ Joh. 17. 3. Pure Religion and undefiled before God is this to visit the Fatherless c. James 1. 27. Fear God and keep his Commandments Eccles. 12. 13. But the Bishop hath found a more compendious way to Heaven namely that true Religion consisteth in obedience to Christs Lieutenants that is now by supposition to the Bishops That is to say that every Christian of what nation soever coming into the Country which the Bishopâ— governe should be of their Religion He would make the civil Magistrate to be Christs Lieutenant upon earth for matters of Religion and supreme Judge in all controversies and say they ought to be obeyed by al how strange soever and uncouth it seem to him now the Soveraignity being in others And I may say to him what if the Magistrate himself I mean by supposition the Bishops should be wicked 〈…〉 What if they should command as much contrary to the â—…w of 〈◊〉 oâ— nature as every any Christian King did which is very possible must we obey them rather then God Is the civill Magistrate become now the onely ground and pâ—â—lar of truth No. Synedri jussum est voce Episcoporum Ipsum quod colit ut colamus omnes Aeternum colemus Principem dierum Factorem Dominumque Epilcoporum And thus the Bishop may see there is 〈…〉 difference between his Ode and my â—arode to it and that both of them are of equal force 〈◊〉 conclud nothinâ— The Bishop knows that the Kings of England since the time of Henry the 8. have been 〈…〉 by 〈…〉 Parliament supream Governors oâ— the Church of England in 〈…〉 both civil and Ecclesiastical that is to say 〈…〉 matters both Ecclesiastical and civil anâ— consequently oâ— this Church Supreme head on Earth though perhaps he will not allow that 〈…〉 me of Hâ—â—d I should wonder therefore whom the Bishop would have to be Christs Lieutenant here in England for matters of Religion if not the supreme Governor â—nd Head of the Church of England 〈…〉 Man or Women whosoever he be that hath the Soveraign Power but that I know he challenges it to the Bishops and thinks thaâ— King Henry the 8. took the Ecclesiastical Power away from the Pope to settle it not in himself but them But he ought to have known that what 〈…〉 or Power oâ— Ordaiâ—ing 〈…〉 the Popâ—s had here in the time of the Kings Predecessours til Henry the 8. they derived it all from the Kings Power though they did not acknowledge it and the Kings connived at it either not knowing their own right or not daring to challenge it til such tiâ—e as the behaviour of the Romane Clergie had undeceived the people which otherwise would have sided with them Nor was it unlawful for the King to take from them the Authority he had given them as being Pope enough in his own Kingdome without depending on a forraign one nor is it to be called Schisme unlesse it be Schisme also in the head of a Family to discharge as often 〈◊〉 he shall see cause the School-Masters he enter â—ineth to teach his Children If the Bishop and Dr. Hammond when they did write in defence of the Church of England against imputation of Schisme quitting their own pretences of jurisdiction and Jus divinum had gone upon these principles of mine they had not been so shrewdly handled as they have been by an English Papist that wrote against them And now I have done answering to his Arguments I shall here â—n the end of all taee that Liberty of censuring his while Book which he hath taken in the beginning of censuring mine I have saith he Numb 1. perused T. H. his answers considered his reasons and conclude he hath missed and miâ—â—aid the question that his answers are evasions that his Arguments are â—aralogismes and that the opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a 〈…〉 some groundless and ill chosen Principles And now it is my turn to censure And first â—oâ— the strength of his discourse and knowledge of the point in question I think it much inferiour to that which might have been written by any man living that had no other learning besides the ability to wriâ—e his mind but as well perhaps as the same man would have done it if to the ability of writing his mind he had added the study of School-Divinity Secondly for the manners of it for to a publick writing there belongeth good manners it consisteth in railing and exclaiming and scurrilous jesting with now and then an unclean and mean instance And lastly for his elocution the vertue whereof lieth not in the flux of words but in perspicuity it is the same Language with that of the Kingdome of Darkness One shall find in it especially where â—e should speak most closely to the question such words as these Divided sense Compounded sense Hypothetical necessity Liberty of Exercise Liberty of specification Liberty of contradiction Liberty of contrariety Knowledge of approbation Practical knowledge General influence Special influence Instinct Qualities infused Efficatious election Moral efficacy Moral motion Metaphorical motion Practice practicum Motus primo primi Actus eliciti Actus imperati Permissive will Consequent will Negative obduration Deficient cause Simple act Nunc stans other like words of non-sense divided besides many propositions such as thâ—se The Will is the Mistris of humane Actions The understanding iâ— her counseller The Will chuseth The Will willeth The Will suspends its own Act The Understanding understandeth I wonder how he mist saying The Understanding suspendeth its own Act The Will applies the understanding to deliberate The Will requires of the Understanding a riview The Wil determines it self A change may be Willed without changing of the Will Man concurrs with God in causing his own Will The Will causeth willing Motives determine the Will not naturally but morally The same Action may be both future and not future God is not Just but Justice not eternal but eternity Eternity is Nunc stans Eternity is an infinite point which comprehendeth al time not formally but eminently Al eternity is coexistent with to day and the same coexistent with to morrow and many other like speeches of non-sense compounded Which the truth can never stand in need of Perhaps the Bishop will say these Terms and Phrases