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A56530 Politick discourses written in Italian by Paolo Paruta ... ; whereunto is added a short soliloquy in which the author briefly examines the whole course of his life ; rendred into English by the Right Honorable Henry, Earl of Monmouth.; Discorsi politici. English Paruta, Paolo, 1540-1598.; Monmouth, Henry Carey, Earl of, 1596-1661. 1657 (1657) Wing P639; ESTC R19201 289,485 232

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the Magistracie of Consuls which occasioned many disorders which might easily have been corrected by a just fear as is cleerly seen by many examples but chiefly by this that the People being in insurrection and contumacious against the power of Consulship the creating of a Dictator a Magistracie of supreme authority and reverence proved a sure remedy to asswage the Tumult And what more manifest sign could there be given that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by respect unto the Magistrates then that which was given upon the occasion of Appius his Decemvirate For being so ill dealt with by him and by his Colleagues as they wanted not reason to apprehend Tyranny yet the authority of this Magistracie from which there was no Appeal to be made and the severity wherewith it was administred did so bridle the people as they patiently endured all injuries nor durst they go about to shake off that slavery till the Senate interposed it self and that Horatius and Valerius declared themselves Heads of the Insurrection against the Decemviri There ought therefore either greater respect to have been given to the Consulary Authority or else if the more severe and free power of an ordinary Magistrate seemed not to be convenient for the state of that Commonwealth the respect and reverence due to the person of the Magistrate ought to have been transferred to the authority of certain Laws of which the Magistrate should have been chief Guardian inflicting severe punishment upon the not observers thereof For by this means the People would have had no occasion to be off●nded with the Nobles when their insolencie should be punished by vertue of the Laws this arising amongst many other be●efits from the Laws that he who is punished for his faults cannot complain of any one being condemned by order of Law not by the Judge his will But what hath been noted of Publicola in this first beginning may also be known at all other times and in many other of the chief Roman Citizens who through ambition siding with the People were the cause of their pride and insolencie So the Consuls Valerius and Horatius not being able to obtain Triumph from the Senate sought to have it from the People and the whole Senate not to multiply examples by creating a Dictator to suppress the authority of the Consuls Titus Quintus Cincinnatus and Geneus Iulius Mento who opposed them therein had recourse unto the Tribunes who by threatening imprisonment forc'd them to give way to the resolution And those Noblemen did usually take another course then what is to be held with the People with whom grave and severe proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor But they were so blinded by Ambition as not knowing or not caring for such errors they strove who should most ingratiate themselvs with the the People by Presents Shews and submiss comportment And this instruction might be learn'd by the example of the People of Rome themselves For it was ofttimes seen that greater respect was given to those few who had known how to use severity to the People then to those who carried themselves submissly unto them And certainly amongst other things the Judgment which followed upon the cause between Menimiu● and Spurius Servilius was very remarkable who being both of them accused of the same fault by the Tribunes to wit that being Consuls they had opposed the Agrarian Law Menimius who by intreaties and submiss carriage endeavoured absolution was condemned but Spurius Servilius stoutly withstanding the Tribunes fury and speaking severely to the People was acquitted And Furius and Manilius who had both of them been Consuls being not long after accused the Nobles being willing totally to free them from such danger kill'd the Tribune in his own house who had impeached them which did so affright his Colleagues and the People as none of the Tribunes would afterwards reassume the same cause And all the Insurrections which were then in the City being suddenly appeased all of them did willingly subscribe the Militia Appius Claudius was always very severe against the People and amongst other of his actions the punishment which he took upon the Armies insolencie was very observable for he made them be decimated very tenth man be put to death which was submitted unto without any the least tumult by reason of the antient opinion of the Captains severity and for the fear infused into the Soldiers by the sentence of death against some Centurions who were accused for having been Authors of that Insurrection Which was sufficient so far to curb them all as though they were all of them then in Arms every of them stood peacefully spectators of the death of so many Kinsmen and Friends and of their own doubtful chance and which peradventure is a greater wonder and doth the better confirm this truth Appius being accused for this sentence by the Tribunes after he had laid down the Consulship using the same severity in defending himself he was not held less guilty for having been formerly Consul So as the People neither willing to absolve him nor daring to condemn him the cause was put off and he suffered to depart And in the latter times when the Peoples power was greatest Tiberius Gracchus endeavouring to propound the observance of the Licinian Law the Nobles changing their habits and shewing great humility labored to win favor from the People but since they saw they could do no good by this means they resolved for their last refuge to use force and kill'd the Author of those seditions Which action of theirs did so astonish the People as they suffered the Tribunes death whom they had so dearly loved and who had lost his life in defence of their cause to go unrevenged And soon after Caius Gracchus reassuming the cause which his Brother had in vain endeavoured the Nobles using the same cunning sought first by fair means to deprive him of Popular favor making use of another Tribune to this purpose by causing other popular Laws to be propounded by consent of the Senate But humility avail'd no more at this time then it had done formerly so as it behoving them to betake themselves again to Arms they slew Caius Gracchus in the Aventine and after the death of two Brothers annull'd all the Laws made by them nor did the People ever seem to resent it Which if it might have been done by an usual way of a Magistrate as hath been touched upon doubtless these ruder remedies as better suiting with the infirmities of that Commonwealth might have freed her from many mischiefs This is likewise confirmed by many other experiences For as long as the Senate kept up the authority thereof threatening to create a Dictator it kept the Terentilla Law from being made of creating a Magistracie of five men who were to correct the Consuls power But when it chose to appease the People by giving way to their importunities it did only invite them
being invited in by the Mamertini as Pyrrhus was first called ito Italy by the Tarentini And the weakness of Pyrrhus his Forces did not so much occasion the Victories won in the War asdid his inconstancy in prosecuting Enterprises once begun which though it was a natural defect in him yet may it be believed that his sudden departure from Italy might be occasioned by the injury done him by the Carthaginians who unprovoked had taken up Arms against him and were ready to come and find him out in other mens Countries But it may be another greater respect might have moved him to assault the Carthaginian State to wit That he might onely have to do onely with the Carthaginians as he had at first fought onely with the Romans beginning to suspect as having already discovered the Carthaginians good will that if he should tarry longer in Italy and that the Romans danger should encrease that Confederacy might be made between them and the Carthaginians which was first refused So that whatsoever he should afterwards undertake against either of them might afterwards prove more difficult This was then the reason why Pyrrhus whilst the business in Italy was not yet finished nor the danger of the Tarentines not well secured marched to go for Sicily which caused so much trouble and danger to the Carthaginian Affairs as if he had known how to make good use of his Victory the Carthaginians might peradventure have been brought then to those final Extremities which were deferred for another time more for the Romans Glory then for their Welfare and good Fortune Thus what hath been already said may suffice for what concerns the Carthaginians Let us now see what the Romans did and consider whether they did well or no in refusing the help which was voluntarily offered them nay brought home to them by the Carthaginians The War which was made by Pyrrhus against the Romans must be thought to be both great and difficult being made by a Warlike Prince who brought many many men with him well trained up in Arms so as by the very Name and Fame of his Forces he had almost brought many Cities of Italy to his devotion withdrawing them from the obedience of the Romans and though he were a stranger yet having firm footing in Italy whither he was called by the Tarentini he was not likely to undergo those dis-accommodations which Armies use to suffer in another Country but his Forces appeared the more formidable by reason of that terror which things of great Fame and not formerly known use to bring with them And the Elephants were a great cause of fear the Romans not being formerly acquainted with that manner of Militia In so much danger therefore when the whole Rest was at Stake to presume too much upon ones self and upon ones proper Forces and to dream onely of Glory when they were to have been more sollicitous of Safety hath the appearance rather of Rashness then of mature and wise Counsel And why should the Romans promise so much unto themselves against Pyrrhus as to despise the Carthaginians help being as then accustomed to fight with the Tarentini a weak Nation given over to delights of which they were reprehended by Pyrrhus himself and being now to fight with true Souldiers expert in all sort of sufferings and all military Discipline in the recent Wars made by Pyrrhus in Macedonia And when nothing else but even Fortune which in matter of War is so uncertain should have proved averse unto them in any thing to whom could they afterwards have had recourse for succour having despised so great helps readily sent by so great a Power of so great esteem and Authority as was then the Commonwealth of Carthage Yet on the other side it may seem no ways to agree with the Romans Greatness and Generosity to confess themselves so terrified by Pyrrhus his Forces as that they needed Foreign help to defend themselves The Romans might have had Peace from Pyrrhus who when he came into Italy sent his Ambassadors to Rome informing the Senate by them that he was come to compose the Difference between them and the Tarentini with whom if the Romans would have Peace he proffered them the like To which answer was made That the Common-wealth of Rome had not chosen him for their Arbitrator neither did they fear his enmity therefore let him first return to his own Kingdom and then as a Friend to the Commonwealth he might treat of Peace and should be willingly listened unto But the City of Rome did already begin to envy and emulate the Common-wealth of Carthage which she did peradventure more esteem then open enmity with the Kingdom of Epire wherewith she thought she should not so soon have to do neither in matter of Peace nor War though Pyrrhus his ambition had then brought him into Italy Therefore if the Romans would not accept of Peace from Pyrrhus they oughtless to acknowledg their Safety from the Carthaginians They likewise thought they might so much rely upon their own Forces having valiant and well disciplined Souldiers of their own as that there remained no doubt of Victory in that War then what does never part from the uncertainty of Chance in War They considered that the number of Armies or Fleets might be increased by Foreigners and yet the power to resist an Enemy not be made the greater whilst either the differing ends of Princes the little agreement between Commanders or the contrary Custom and Discipline of Souldiers do often occasion many discords in matter of War which are not found where one onely Chieftain commands and disposeth of all things and where better obedience shewn by Souldiers of one and the same Dominion Therefore was it that the Romans did sundry other times refuse foreign aid as particularly in the War against Antiochus when refusing assistance sent unto them by other Kings of Africa they with their own few but valiant Souldiers routed Antiochus his numerous Army made up of many several Nations Such respects as these might have been liable to consideration even when their Faith and Friendship who were to have lent assistance had been for certain to be credited but who could secure the Romans who having already extended their Dominions far into Italy could not grow much greater without injuring Nations further off from being jealous of the Carthaginians who were antient and powerful Lords in Affrica and in Spain and possessed of the greatest part of Sicily and as there were none who could more hinder the increase of their Greatness then the Carthaginians so was it necessary that they being apprehended for such by the Romans should likewise fear them for the preservation of their own quiet and security And what charity is this might those wise and ancient Senators of Rome say which hath moved these Affricans to be so careful of us as without any obligation of Confederacy and not sought unto they should send so prime a Captain as Mago with such a
as depended on him which was that which made his faction so potent And truly he who will consider it well will finde that as long as Rome retained any Form of a Commonwealth Cato's power was no less then was Caesars for he oftentimes bore it even against Caesar As when the business of those that were Complices with C●iline in his conspiracy was in hand in the Senate they being accused by Cato and defended by Caesar were condemned to be put to death And also another time when he opposed the publishing of the Law proposed and favoured by Caesar touching the division of Lands in Latium wherein Cato's authority appeared to be the greater by making Caesars am●●tious designs fail of success is so popular things as were the Agrarian Laws The same success had the things maintained by Caesar against Po●●pey though he was more powerful then any other Citizen for having stoutly opposed Metellus who moved at the time of Cataline's conspiracy that Pompey should together with his Army be recalled back to Rome he carried the business which was the cause why these two prime Citizens endeavored the friendship and good will of Cato for they doubted of compassing what they desired without his good will so great was his Authority Caesar when Cato appeared to be his bitterest enemy procured Cato's releasement when he was imprisoned by order from the Senate And Pompey that he might be fastened to him by the bond of Alliance endevored to have his Neece for Wife Whence it is conceived that Cato's austere behaviour had purchased him more Authority though unarmed in the management of the Commonwealth then the reputation of having commanded Armies and their so much obsequiousness to the people had done to Pompey and Caesar. A just occasion then offers it self here of consideration whether was the better and safer course taken to arrive at Glory and Civil Greatness or that which Caesar or that which Cato took Caesars comportments seem to have been more noble and better defitting a Civil life as also more easie to be imitated and what indeed is of more importance for the happiness of a City then quietness and concord amongst Citizens What more proper to produce and preserve this then Magnificence Grace and Affability all which vertues were proper to Caesar and which by a straight and speedy way guided him to the height of greatness and glory He who desires to obtain this favour from Citizens must abstain from doing any injury must seek out all occasions of doing good must attribute much to others must speak moderately of himself must do good things and make them appear to be so so as he may help not onely by his actions but by his example Rigor Severity the neglect of all other respects where there is onely an upright mind to do well things which are sufficiently commendable in Cato may of themselves peradventure border nearer upon true vertue but bear a less proportion with civil vertue if respect be had to that which is found not to that which is desired Who does not value the love of his Citizens or will not endeavor the acquisition thereof save by very upright ways which are not always possible meets with continual occasion of contention from whence great and open enmities do often arise which do at last put the City into confusion So as such men do first ruine themselves and then the Commonwealth When laws are observed with such extremity of rigor it seems to be done to oppress Citizens not to preserve Justice Wherefore such a Government is but little acceptable and therefore easier to receive alteration upon any accident that shall happen This was seen in Cato's actions for his way of proceeding got him many enemies who that they might make themselves able to bulk with his Authority made themselves strong by Alliances and Friendships and became not onely formidable to him but even to the Commonwealth If Cato had not despised the Parentage offered him by Pompey Caesar had not joyned alliance with him by giving him his Daughter Iulia for Wife which was the occasion of both their too excessive greatness by which they ruined the Commonwealth The people were not pleased with Cato's severe way of proceeding which made them the more easily adhere to Caesar and his Associats and so not perceiving it became enemles to the Commonwealth Therefore Caesar might still continue in the peoples good opinion and long preserve his Authority and Power But Cato though his counsels did sometimes prevail yet was not his Dignity and Power grounded upon so sound foundations as that he could alwaies keep himself in the ●●me condition Nay sometimes things were born against him in the choyce of Consuls when people much more unworthy then he were Corrivals with him The little pleasingness of his proceedings was also cause though under pretence of honor and publick imployment why he was sent from the City and in a manner banished being sent by Sea to Cyprus for some concernments of that Kingdom so as the Common-wealth suffered by his absence and particularly Cicero who was formerly upheld by Cato's authority and held for a Defender of the publick Liberty was banished By these things the question seems cleerly enough decided that Caesars way of proceeding is much more easie and certain to bring a man to dignity and greatness then the way which Cato took Yet he who on the other side shall examine Cato's manners and actions as he will find them more praise-worthy so will he think that they may lead by a righter and more direct way to true Honor and to that greatness which is to be desired by him that lives in a Commonwealth For he takes a safer and a more noble way to arrive at Dignity who walks by the way of true Vertue of Justice Modesty and Temperance then he who endeavors the like by Popular Favor For that Favor which is won by a good repute and by vertuous actions is easily preserved by herself and of herself nay the cry'd-up Honor which ariseth from publick Imployments and Places if it be not grounded upon true worth soon vanisheth and leaves that in obscurity which did before shine forth so bright But he who deals uprightly doth always advance as it were by a certain natural motion and confirms himself more and more in the habit of well-doing So that Favor which hath so good a leaning-stock is more firm and stable whereas that which is purchased by extrinsecal appearances as it is easilier gotten so is it upon any slight occasion more easily lost For those who are moved to favor for such reasons are incited so to do rather out of their own humor or for their own advantage then out of any true affection that they bear to such persons And therefore growing either glutted of the same things they did so like at first or thinking that they may receive them in a larger proportion from others they change their minds and turn their liking
That whatsoever hath had a beginning must have an end will not satisfie our inquisitive understandings Empires as all other earthly things have their beginning increase perfection declination and last ruine and destruction all of them ordained and disposed of by certain causes And though they may be seen to vary according to the variety of Accidents that is not notwithstanding Chance which appears to us to be so when we cannot penetrate into the true causes of things In the beginning the Roman Empire was governed in the form of a Common-wealth her first Founders having begun to enlarge her Dominion amongst her neighboring people She continued in this her infancie as I may call it many years till the times of those famous Scipio's who brought Spain and Africa under her dominion But afterwards in the ensuing Age wherein Caesar Pompey and so many other famous Commanders did flourish she mounted to the height of her greatness and glory Neither did Augustus Caesar degenerate from the worth of them though the Form of Government was changed but he likewise did much increase the Empires Confines in the Eastern parts amongst the Indians and other exterior Nations and establish'd excellent Orders both Civil and Military in the Empire But this Monarchy may be said to sta●d at a stay at this time being constituted in a Throne of Majesty reverenced and obeyed by all Nations and in this condition she preserved herself for well nigh three hundred years wherein though many and great Wars were made by the so many Emperors who governed in those days yet were they rather made for the preservation then for the enlarging of the Empires confines For there was not almost any of the barbarous and far distant Nations as well of the East as of the West which those Emperors were not forc'd to vanquish and overcome several times and reduce them to the obedience of the Empire from which they had rebelled And if any one did enlarge the Empire in furthest remote parts as did the Emperor Trajan in Armenia India and some others in other Regions and Provinces it was notwithstanding at the same time lessened in other parts by new Rebellions But in Galienus his time who was the thirty fourth Emperor the Empires supreme greatness began to decline For though she received her mortal wound afterwards in the time of Arcadius and Honorius which was above a hundred years after yet in this intervening time the Empire being in her decaying age grew weak yet sustein'd herself and like a Tree whose root hath been for a long time very deeply fix'd could not be easily eradicated so as though she were oftentimes shrewdly shaken by Armies of sundry Nations yet was she able to resume her strength and keep herself on foot Thus stood the Roman Empire then wherein many miraculous things offer themselves to our consideration and invite us to seek out the true occasion thereof For on one side it appears a strange thing that an Empire arrived at such a height of greatness when she once began to decline hasted so fast to her ruine there not being any other Potentate left in the World which was able to counterpoise her power yea which did not obey her as subjugated by her Armies having also so many Soldiers to defend her desirous for their own advantage to preserve the Empire But on the other side he who shall consider into the hands of how many base and wicked men this so great Empire fell he may very well wonder how so violent a thing could endure for so many Ages and how a Dominion governed by so many Tyrants could pass from hand to hand through the series of so many Emperors whereof there were above five hundred between Caesars time and that of Arcadius and Honorius in whose days the Roman Empire began visibly to fall by the taking of Rome by the ruine of Italy and of other Provinces belonging to the Empire And yet 't is known that the Persian Monarchy which was of so great esteem amongst the antient Kingdoms was quickly ruined by its falling into the hands of Princes given to idleness and pleasure and was by Alexander carried to another Nation whereof there are many examples seen almost in every Age. Let us then say that another violence helped very much to sustain this violence of such a force is the union of alike things Thus did the corrupt Customs of the People and Militia of Rome help to maintain the State and Power of these Tyrannous Princes For since People lived in Rome with much licentiousness and were ente●tained with many Pastimes and publick Shews made by the Emperors wherein those appeared to be most splendid who were most overgrown with vice as were Caligula and Nero who did not only make the wonted sports of Hunting and of Comedies be often represented with more then usual magnificence but introd●ced new Shews as Naval battels Chariots drawn by Camels and Elephants and permitted all licentiousness to the Soldiery no man desired to change condition and the Pretorian Soldiers enjoying all things of use and priviledg neer unto the City did not greatly care to be commanded by generous men And when such Princes grew tedious to them they put them to death proclaiming a new Emperor and receiving from the new Prince many gifts in reward of their wickedness And the disorder grew so great as sometimes the Empire of the World was by the Soldiers sold by Outcry to who would give most for it and at low rates as it fell out in the time of Didius-Iulianus Nor was the authority of the Senate able to correct this so great inconvenience as well for that being trodden under foot by force it was grown very weak as also for that the antient Roman generosity was wanting in them So as the Senate having resolved after the death of Caligula to free the City and Empire from the like Tyranny and to restore her to her liberty they could not be constant iu their resolution but being abased by fear submitted soon to the obedience of Claudius of Caesars linage and accepted of him for their Emperor as soon as he was cry'd up by the Pretorian Soldiers The like to which happened afterwards in many Emperors those being confirmed by the Senate which were chosen by the Army This licence was diversly used by the Soldiers themselves For the Pretorian Bands and that Army wherein the Emperor was at the time of his death pretended a particular priviledg in the choice of the new Emperor Yet Emperors were so often cry'd up by other Armies also which were in several Provinces of the Empire as all of them desirous in Galienus his time to usurp this authority there were thirty two who at one and the same time made use of the name and title of Roman Emperor So as it seems it may be truly said that the Roman Empire was preserved not in respect to unity or to the same form of Government but only in respect of
harmonie is composed of differing ●ones of V●yces The perfectest State Governments alwaies provided that they be essential and not meer Idea's are those which being composed of the Three best do comprehend the perfections of all the Three and it is easie to observe the like in many other things And Aristotle when he would shew the perfection which proceeds in every thing from this concourse and union of many doth instance in the example well known in those times of publick banquets and entertainments where those wherein many were imployed some in one thing some in another proved more noble and sumptuous then those which were made by any one onely though never so wealthy Citizen Let us then gather by this that such Forces likewise wherein several Potentates do concur for some noble and important action where every one lends his assistance and advice will be fitter to atchieve any great enterprise then those of one onely though never so great a Prince In War there are several Offices and several imployments whereunto we see that one N●tion is not so proper be it either by reason of the several influences of the Heavens or through custom which is a second nature as is another So in this mistery of War several people prove proper for several imployments In pitcht Battels the Dutch and Switzers have exceeded others and have purchast most fame The Italians have been alwaies esteemed for making assaults and storming of Cities and the Spainards are held better then others at defending a strong hold by reason of their undergoing labor and disquiet and for their dexteritie in military actions Others are better at Horse-service then on foot as the French others are good at Seafaring and at Mariti●e Discipline as the Gen●●ses P●●tugeses and Venetians and others have been p●●ticularly addicted to other exercises So as those who are able to imploy several people and several Forces as Leagues may do especially if they be made between puissant Princes may have great designs for they shall have wherewith to offend and defend both by Land and Sea and numbers enough of Soldiers ●it to undertake and accomplish whatsoever Enterprise But besides this many things are requisite for the maintaining a long War Arms Ammunition Victuals Money and other things the which no one State can sufficiently furnish at least not without much incommodity for any long time but where many joy● together and every one furnisheth somewhat which they most abo●nd in the enterprise is s●●e not to be impeded nor retarded for want of any thing nor for the difficulties which are occasioned thereby Moreover for great enterprises as they cannot be so soon effected so are they subject to the hazard of ill success when they depend upon one onely Commander who when he is lost there is never another of equal authority valor and experience left to succeed him for there are but few of those that are fit for much pains-taking and for management of great affairs Insomuch as that State is very happy which in more then one Age meets with a generous and warlike Prince and that Prince is very fortunate who when he will not follow the Wars in his own person hath a Subject of his so qualified as becomes him to be who is to command an Army when the War is difficult and of importance which is the cause why we often-times see great enterprises which are we●● begun precipitate into great disorders and ruines The death of Alexander the Great without any legitimate Heirs fit to undertake the Government of such an Empire and of so weighty affairs kept the Macedonians and Grecians of which two Nations his valiant and unconquered Army did consist from following his prosperous course and from conquering the Well as he had done the East and which whilst he was alive he had proposed to himself to do The Carthaginians chiefest ruine arose from the want of Commanders for having placed their hopes in one onely Hannibal they were forced to send for him back out of Italy to defend themselves in Africa against Scipio and his fortune forgoing him when he was beaten they knew not whom to betake themselves unto to uphold their tottering Commonwealth But in Leagues there is no such hazard run since the best Commanders that are in any of the Confederate Princes States may be imploied and the Princes themselves may serve upon an urgent occasion so as one Commander being lost another may be found to succeed him of as great excellency and worth For every State hath usually in all Ages had some one man more eminent then the rest unto whom is greatest extremities they have recourse So as a League if we suppose it to be like a well Fabrickt humane body may since it hath the strength of many Dominions united in it be resembled to Briar●●● for strength for as he had a hundred hands to make use of as he pleased in several actions so many do lend help to such a League and make it stronger and fitter for any undertaking Moreover when we have to do with a very powerful Prince as it falls out in great Enterprises if we will weaken his strength we may endeavor chiefly to keep his forces divided and imploied in several parts for so they are lessened and become less apt to make resistance but as this will be hard for a single Prince to do though a great one for he who will drive another man from his own home must be much stronger then be so is it more easily done when many are confedrates together and this not onely because several ●orces joyned together prove the greater as hath been said and several Armies abounding with all things necessary may be thereout framed but for the commo●iousness which several confederate States have of assaulting the Enemies Country at one and the same time in several parts Wherefore when any great and difficult enterprise was to be undertaken not to speak of antient times but of more modren ones against the Saracens and the Turks two Nations which have governed and domineered in these latter times with great fame and force recourse was had to Leagues to C●●sadas and to the unions of Christian Princes by means whereof notable things have been done against those cruel Barbarians How many Princes how many several Nations join'd together in the time of Pope Urban the Second for the recovery of the Holy Land About Fifty thousand fighting men were raised commanded in chief by Godfrey of Bullen who gained so many and so famous Victories and so worthy of eternal glory this holy League having regained more then a hundred Cities in Asia which were possest by the Saracens And in the t●me of Baldwin the Third King of Ierusalem when the Emperor Conradus and Lodowick King of France joining together with other lesser Princes went themselves in person against the said Saracens did not they do excellent explo●ts though couzened and be rayed by some Lords of Asia they could not continue
hopes There remains yet some things to be stated which have formerly been alleadged in the behalf of Leagues lest they may get more credit amongst men then they deserve To that then which was said That the multiplicity of the movers make the greater motion and things are better done by many especially things of the highest nature then by reason of the imper●ection and weakness of our humanity can be effected by a few it may be answered That it is true that the assistance of many is requisite to the affecting of great things but it is also as true that for the right carrying on of affairs it is requisite that the second causes to speak in terms of natural Philosophie should be subordinate to the first as is seen in the Order and Government of the world So doubtlesly no great enterprises can be effected without Armies Commanders and a thousand other necessaries but by how much the more all these are constituted under the power of one alone by which their order and union is the greater the work they take in hand will prove so much the more excellent and perfect A Prince though single in what he goes about is not forbidden the making use of Soldiers of several Nations in his Militia to the end that he may have an Army as hath been said fitter for any military action in businesses which are at once undertaken against several States so as all of them be to be understood as Enemies though they be not confederates but the truest and securest rule in this case would be to be so careful and diligent in training up and in disciplining a Prince his own Militia as that he may be able to provide for all actions of War out of men of his own Dominions as we see those have done who have done the most glorious actions The same may be said of other things belonging to War for which a wise Prince ought so to provide as that he may rely upon himself and not upon the friendship of others As for the assertion that Leagues do abound in Chiestains fit to command Armies this proves not alwaies true by reason of the scarcity of excellent men which hath been found in all Ages or say that such be to be found amongst confederate Princes they use to cause more of discord and contention by reason that every one pretends to have the supreme command and chiefest honor in the Militia and more of prejudice to the Leagues then of profit or advantage And if it be found that some Leagues have effected great matters it hath happened though but seldom where the particular respects which we have mentioned have concurr'd But in the fore-named unions made by Christians against Infidels no good reasons can be given which do sute well with the business now in hand if we speak of Leagues according to the ordinary acception of reason of State for such Princes or People as were signed with the Cr●ciata had all of them but one onely respect and affection which was more prevalent with them then any other to wit their zeal to religion therefore their Forces not being onely kept together by that so powerful bond but even their souls more heavenly then humane rewards being proposed to them they might work miraculous effects though they could not even in this case altogether sh●● those disorders which are caused by the association of so many and by the multiplicity of sovereign Lords and of Nations The same may be said of other Unions as of those that did associate the Romans and of the Hans Towns of Germany for amongst these certain particular respects did concur which were common to them all no respects of States concerning differing interests and other things which have been considered in Unions which do truly and usually bear this name of Leagues For when though against Infidels any enterprises have been attempted by Leagues out of other reasons and other humane respects concurring more principally therein what success they have had and how different though usual to Leagues may plainly be known by other examples already spoken of The Sixth DISCOURSE Why modern Princes have not done actions equal to those which were done by the Antients THere are some who praising only the actions of antient times do equally blame all modern deportments and hold them in little or no account as if the way were block'd up to those who are born in our days to keep them from arriving at any height of glory Others on the contrary labor to heap our present Age with all manner of praise and to compare it to the most celebrated and most cry'd up former times affirming that the antient worth is sprung up again in these our days and in our now modern men which come no● short of nor differ from the former times or men save in the veneration which is given to Antiquity They celebrate the ingenuity of modern men for the excellencie and perfection unto which they have brought many noble Arts and Sciences which were obscured and of no esteem in former times particularly that of the Militia In which respect by the so many new-found ways of Fortification and expugning strong Holds by their Engines and by other very miraculous Inventions it appears that the industry of Modern men hath not only equall'd but in many things much exceeded that of the Antients and that the glory of many excellent Professors of the most esteemed Arts shines cleerer in the present Age for that they have not only sufficiently improved that of the Militia but also Architecture Painting Sculpture and other noble Arts and Disciplines which are adornments to Civil life and have drawn them out ● obscurity wherein they were hidden for a while I do not differ so much from the opinion of these men nor do I think that other mens actions ought to be so much heightned as that through a foolish modesty or ignorance we should undervalue our own when they deserve praise But as for Military actions which as they are the most perspicuous to the eyes of all men so are they most commended or blamed by the universality of men when I call to mind the warlike actions done by the Antients and those done by our Modern men methinks that those do so far exceed these as they can hardly admit of any comparison though these latter Ages as they have produced more excellent Wits in other Disciplines so also may they glory in the valor and generosity of some Princes no less great in worth then in Forces But that which peradventure affords no less cause of wonder and which affords particular matter for this discourse is to consider whence it is that modern Princes though some of them have been generously minded and of much experience and worth in military affairs of great possessions and strong in power yet have they not been able to bring to pass such enterprises as for their weighty consideration for the shortness of time or for the
to endeavour more novelties so as Humility made them not more quiet but more insolent Wherefore having obtained Appeals they would have a Magistrate of their own endowed with supreme authority and having gotten the power of the Tribunes they could not stop there but would be admitted into the Consulship into the Dictatorship and to all other sort of Dignities and having obtained all sort of Honors they began to aspire to the Estates of the Nobles who being too late aware of their Error to keep themselves from being quite dis-robed of every thing and not being able to remedy themselves by the Laws or by Magistracy they were forced to have recourse to Arms to moderate the Peoples Insolencie Whence it may be concluded that the Romans not having used those means neither at the first making of their Laws nor almost at any other time in any of their Actions which were proper to overcome certain bad qualities which they had contracted even from the birth of the Commonwealth was the reason why remaining alwaies as it were a distempered body wherein ill humours did continually encrease she was alwaies sickly perplext by so many civil Discords and and came to a shorter period of life then she ought to have done for many other of her most noble conditions The example of this powerful and famous Republick if we will well obserserve her civil Orders and what proceeded from thence and if they shall be measured by truer and more general Rules may instruct us excellently well how to discern the perfections and imperfections of Modern States And say it will not serve to correct Errors already too much confirmed by corrupt Customs it will at least be of use to know what value ought to be put upon every Government and what length of daies may in reason be allotted thereunto holding notwithstanding that Disorder for a truer Rule then all Orders which is oft times introduced by various and unthought of Acciden●s upon which our civil Actions do depend not onely regulated by humane wisdom but subject for ought that appears to us in many things to a certain casualty though they be indeed directed by assured though hidden causes reserved in the bosom of Divine Providence whereunto our Reason cannot reach Therefore if following the usual manner of speech we shall in these our Discourses make often use of the names of Chance and Fortune let them be understood in this true and pious manner The Second DISCOURSE What Success the Roman Affairs would have had if Alexander the Great had turned with his Victorious Army into Italy THE Republick proved more fortunate then any other State in many things so as he had reason on his side who said That Fortune who was usually an Enemy to vertue had made Truce with her that she might exalt that City to the highest pitch of Greatness But this may chiefly be acknowledged from her being freed from the necessity into which the course of time had brought her of making trial of her Forces against those of Alexander the Great who after having conquered Darius and subjugated Persia together with other Nations did not bethink himself of turning into Europe and chiefly into Italy rather then into the utmost parts of the East Or that from having accomplished so many famous Interprizes in Arabia and in the Indies being as yet but in his youth he lived no longer to carry his Victories over the other parts of the world not as yet concerned in his Forces though invaded by his immense desire of Dominion It will certainly be worth the consideration whether if Alexander had at first had any such thought or that he had had time afterwards to put it in effect to think what influence he would have had upon the Affairs of Rome This doubt was put by Livy who in the Ninth Book of the first Decade of his Histories betook himself to discourse of what might have happened if the Roman Commanders had been to have made War against Alexander But without considering any thing which might make against his opinion he bends all his reasons to prove that the Roman Forces would have proved Victorious if they had chanced to have fought against those of Alexander the Great which he resolves for as great a certainty as if the effect had ensued Yet many Arguments to the contrary may be taken out of divers of those things which Livy relates of his Romans We can take no surer way to know what would have been the success of things not done then to consider what hath been done which may guide us by conjecture to penetrate into what might have happened in other things if occasion should have served Let us then cast an eye upon what Alexanders actions were in those times and what those of the Roman Commonwealth and we shall see what might have been expected from the worth of Force and either of them if trial had been made thereof Alexanders Enterprizes were sufficiently famous and known to all men since the recounting of them hath wearied so many Writers And Plutarch who writ the Lives of the valliantest and most magnanimous men of so many ages In his Preface to that of Alexander excuseth himself with he doth not in relating the lives of any others if he be not able sufficiently to write all his actions by reason of their number and worth But the Romans Enterprizes in that age were not in themselves very great nor very greatly cried up by others Though those which they afterwards performed did for glory out-do what ever was done by any other Potentate So as Reputation and Fame which bear so great a sway in all our operations but chiefly in what belongs to War was without all doubt greater in Alexander then in those Roman Captains who flourished in his time when the greatness of the Roman Commonwealth was but in its rise and first beginning But let us come to some further particular The Commonwealth had not as then inlarged her Confines further then into Latium into some parts of Umbria and into Picenum amongst people who were very near the Volsci and the Aequi. Their Armies were not yet marched out of Italy which they did not till they made War with the Carthaginians Whence it is to be gathered that the Commonwealth was as yet but weak and not accustomed to those more weighty and important Actions of War wherein in after Ages it must be confest she did great and wonderful things But at this time many vertues in the Citizens of Rome and the customs of the City not as yet corrupted were more to be exalted then their Military valour which though their souls might be full of yet they wanted illustrious occasions to exercise it And those so many famous Commanders which as Livy says may be paralelled with Alexander Fabius Maximus Valerius Corvinus Lucius Papyrius Titus Manlius Torquatus and others of that Age what great Fears of Arms did they The War was as yet made as it were
Tyranny could put her self into a free condition why I say she could not do the like when Brutus and Cassius had slain Iulius Casar when it appears they ought rather to have done so now the people being more numerous and powerful and the City in such greatness as the liberty nay rather power which the people had in ordering that Commonwealth ought to have been more esteemed and held dear To this may be added that in the time of Kings the very name of Liberty was not well known much less was the good thereof injoyed Wherefore a good which they had not known ought to have been of less power with them And in the Government of Kings the City had been so successful as it seemed she might run a hazard by chusing a new form of Government which she had not formerly experienced And in the time of the Decemviri the affairs of Rome were also in a very weak condition nor ought the Liberty or command of that City be reputed a thing of such moment as it became afterwards by the wonderful felicity by which she marched to the height of all Glory and Greatness Besides the Government of Ten retained a certain shew of a Commonwealth and many being therein interessed she seemed to have thereby also a better ground for her subsistance Whereas in Caesars time he having reduced the main of all affairs into himself and begun to accept of the Title and Honors of a King all Form of a Commonwealth and of Liberty was lost and he having maintained himself in that degree onely by his own Greatness and in a City so full of Nobility at that time and of so many generously minded men his Principality must of necessity be the weaker and easilier to be eradicated which when it should fall it seemed that the former Government of Common-wealth must of it self rise up again These and other such like reasons afford occasion of seeking into the cause why contrary effects were seen to ensue We will herein consider first what the customs of the City of Rome were in each of these times and what effects were prevalent in the peoples minds men not being accustomed to imbrace such things as are truly useful but often such as by the predominate affection are held to be so Whilst the City was in an humble condition and that her Citizens were not begun to be corrupted by an immoderate ambition of Governing there was no siding nor partaking studied amongst them which crept on by little and little and did so contaminate all orders as it reduced the Commonwealth to such weakness as wanting strength to rule her self she must fall and being once down could not rise up again This corruption began amongst the Soldiers in whom the Commanders did permit such unbridled licentiousness to the end that they might dispose of them as they listed to oppres their particular enemies and sometimes against the very Commonwealth As Sylla did to lessen Marius his power and Marins no less to counterprize Sylla by the same means things growing into such disorder as he made the servants of the Commonwealth to take up arms against his enemies the Syllania●s and this authority did so continue in great Citizens and in the Commanders of Armies as it seemed a wonder that Pompey the Great who had exceeded all others in Glory and Power after his return into Italy having prosperously ended his enterprise against Mithridates should be content to quit the Army when every one feared that he would enter Rome therewithal and do even then with Rome as Caesar did not long after assume unto himself the chief Government of all publick affairs So great was the disorder and so little was the Authority either of Laws or Senate esteemed But his Design who plotted tyranny in the succeeding time prospered the better for that this corruption which was first entred into the Soldiers was past into the Nobility and spread every day abroad amongst the people For those who had been Generals of the great Enterprises of War being grown exceeding rich did several waies purchase the popular votes turning and winding them as they liked best to the end that the places of Magistracy might be conferred on them or upon their Friends and Adherents Neither was the very Senate free from this contagion but being long before accustomed not to be at their own command but to depend upon the power of those who were of supreme Authority in the Armies they fell headlong into the same errors into which the people were faln manifestly adhering by way of Faction not by any civil favor to particular Citizens who headed parties and the authors of novelties which was at first done with some appearance of honesty to maintain the Commonwealth and to defend Liberty against those who had been too immoderately exalted by the peoples favour to the injury of other more deserving Citizens and to the prejudice of Liberty But in the process of time and affairs those who had taken up Arms in behalf of the Commonwealth proved no less burthensom much power thereby encreasing in one particular person then those themselves against whom Arms were taken up For an immoderate desire of encreasing in power and wealth began to possess the souls of many who were already accustomed to rule longer and with greater authority then was sitting to be done in a Civil Government So as all things were put into great confusion and now not those who were worthy and valiant but those who were most bold insolent found places of greatest honor in the Commonwealth Hence it was that it being observed that those who had adhered to Sylla's party when his Adversary being overcome he was become almost the sole Arbitrator of all things had often gotten great riches and preferments in reward of their wicked actions the wealth of those who were proscribed by Sylla being given to these and such being easily proscribed at his Favorites pleasure whom they would rob of their Palaces or of what they valued most Many allured by hope of getting better things and more easily then they could have done in a well-governed Commonwealth loved confusion and favoured the Government of one alone thinking that they might obtain Honors and many other favors which are usually bestowed freely upon such as are partial to them by those who will preserve themselves in height of Power Hence then it arose that Brutus and Cassi●s the murderers of Caesar were not so backed nor met not with that general approbation from the City to uphold their fact and the common Liberty as Iunius Brutus and Virginius did when they raised the people to free themselves from the Tyranny of the Tarqui●s and of the Decemviri The latter had recourse unto the Camp and kindled a servent desire in the Soldiers to vindicate the injuries and msolencies used by the Tarqui●s and by Appi●s But what favour could Bru●●i and Cassius expect from the Soldiers themselves being contaminated and more desirous
onely to the benefit of the Pisans to the preservation of their liberty as much as might be and to the right of what belonged to their Territories which they were possest of when they put themselves into the Commonwealths protection wherein the Venetians were alwaies very constant though the imminent War with the Turks might have made them forget the dangers and interests of other mens for their own concernments And at last as they would yeeld to nothing which might be prejudicial to the Pisans so to witness to the World that in reality they had no thought in maintaining this controversie to any peculiar design of their own in making themselves Masters of that City they put the determination of these differences into the arbitrement of Hercules Duke of Ferrara which though it had not any effect afterwards the Pisans not consenting thereunto yet it might be discerned that the Pisans averseness thereunto or the constancy wherein they persevered was not fomented by the Venetians but rose either out of the meer election or necessity of the Pisans themselves But let us come to another consideration more proper for this business that is to the reasons of State wherein th● many of the same things do concur yet they are clothed with other respects wherewith Princes building either onely or chiefly upon what may most redound to their own advantage do not advise with counsel of equity or do not attribute thereunto what is requisite It is most certain being already reduced to the greatest extremity if they should have been abandoned by the Venetians they must have put themselves either into the power of the Duke of Millan or of the Florentines but reason of State would not permit that in this conjuncture both of times and affairs this City should be joyned to the Dominion of either of these As for Sforza his vast and disordinate drifts were already known and how he would be the sole Arbitrator of Italy so as if he should become more haughty and p●ft up by this important acquisition no part of Italy could remain quiet or secure either from his force or craft And as for the Florentines you have heard how resolute they were not to part from the friendship of the King of France by how much greater the danger of whose Army was in recent memory so much the more were his friends and associats to be kept weak and under to the end that they might not increase to the prejudice and apprehension of the rest It was seen in what danger Italy was put by forein Forces how soon the Kings of Aragon were driven out of their Dominion how little resolute the other Princes of Italy were to withstand forein Forces which having once found an open and easie way into Italy it was to be imagined that they would be cause of greater dangers and molestations to her So as the Commonwealth being to be put into a condition of being able to resist the Forces of greater Princes and of not being exposed to their wills she was necessitated to think upon increasing her power and reputation that she might depend upon her own Basis and be well esteemed of by others She knew particularly that 〈…〉 was a State which might accommodate or dis-accommodate the French designs accordingly as it was well or ill affected towards them And the keeping of the City of Pisa dependant upon the Venetians might several waies be helpful ●nto them in their intentions in seeping the French from ●according the ●ingdom of Naples and in securing themselves afterwards from the Florentines as also in winning such strength and reputation to the Commonwealth with friends and 〈◊〉 as she might provide for her own preservation and for the like of 〈◊〉 other Italians who had the like intentions with her to maintain peace in Italy and to keep her safe from foreign Forces It was not their onely useful but necessary for the Venetian in this conjuncture of affairs to have footing in Italy and to have the City of Pisa if not subject to their dominion at least dependent upon the authority of the Commonwealth Now take it for granted that that suspition might be true which they have so much divulged who have endeavored to cast a blur upon the honor and dignity of the Commonwealth to wit that the Venetians intended to make th●mselves absolute masters of that City only out of a design of increasing their dominion Certainly the actions of a Philosopher and those of a Prince ought not to be measured by one and the same Rule nor must we fancy the condition of men and of affairs to be what peradventure they ought to be but what they are for the most part Magnanimity is the proper vertue of Princes which makes them always busie themselves about great matters and whereby they make themselves be dreaded and reverenced by others Therefore the desire of Glory and Empire is highly praised in such Princes as have been greatest and most celebrated as Alexander Cyrus Caesar Charls and all the rest of the most famous men in whom a spirit of Grandure and Generosity which did still egg them on to new and glorious enterprises is not only commended but even admired If the Romans whose actions are praised and celebrated by the general consent of all men had been content to contain themselves within the precincts of Latium their worth would have been hidden and obscured nor would their names have been so highly cry'd up to the memory of posterity And had not the Venetians had larger thoughts then to keep within their private merchandising affairs as it became them to do in their weak begining dispising or neglecting such occasions as they sundry times met with of enlarging the bounds of their Dominions the Commonwealth would not only not have gotten such esteem and reputation as it hath got but could not have kept herself so long in liberty amidst so many revolutions of affairs and such movings of Forein Armies It remains now only to see whether the opportunity of the Times and condition of Affairs did counsel them to purchase new glory and greater Empire to their Commonwealth Which though it may be known by what hath been formerly said yet it will more clearly appear by adding some other particular Considerations The Commonwealth was then in a more powerful condition then any Prince in Italy being much stronger then them all both in Land and Sea-Forces the Pisans cause was generally well wish'd unto the Florentines were but little acceptable to the rest of the Princes of Italy by reason of their friendship with the French and for this and other respects were particularly much hated by their neighbors the Genoeses Seneses and Lucheses and all the actions of the Commonwealth seemed to be favored by a certain Genius She had lately gotten the Kingdom of Cyprus she had enlarged her Confines in Friuli by the acquisition of many Towns in the Country of Go●itia and she prospered greatly in all that
not able of themselves to do any notable action so as one Nation or one Prince not being able to overcome another and all of them wanting the excellencie of good Orders he who hath at any time endeavored to advance himself by some design hath been forced to have recourse to the advantage of Leagues of which Italy since by reason of the declination of the Western Empire she hath been divided into so many members and Scignories hath in particular afforded many examples which may serve to teach whatsoever belongs to these Leagues whereof we do not read of any great good effect which hath ensued at last or at least which have continued long in their first prosperity for their Forces though powerful enough of themselves when met withal by contrary respects and wearied in their first attempts have soon gone but lamely off And he who shall well consider such particulars as are most necessary in great undertakings will easily see how badly they do correspond in Leagues Deliberations would be wise and mature but not slow and unseasonable execution would be speedy and bold counsels are oft-times to be taken upon unexpected accidents the end of all ought to be one and the same though the Offices Degrees and Authorities be different the respect and aim one and the same whereunto all resolutions do tend to wit the safety glory and the greatness of that Prince or State for whom the War is made the reward and honor one and the same and alike the loss and shame so as the possibility of haveing means to lay the fault on another do not retard the doing of what is ●itting These are things which have alwaies been hard and rare to be found yet they may the more easily be met withal in an enterprise which is undertaken by one onely wise Prince or by one well governed Commonwealth But in Leagues all things run counter byass to these important affairs It is not alwaies generositie but fear which makes a Prince take up Arms which likewise makes others joyn with him who otherwise do much differ from him in desires and interest but that brunt being over and every one being in their former particular and more natural condition he who dreads War bends to idleness and willingly takes all occasions to change War for Peace and he who was become a friend by reason of some contingencie not out of any good will discovering his real affection upon some other occasion or by reason of some change returns to be not onely as formerly an Enemy but more inveterate then before so as these Ties of Common interests being soon loosened either by particular interest or by some other affection hatred confusion and disorder doth thereupon ensue The Moralists ●ay That friendship cannot long continue between those where one and the same thing is not interchangeably given and received and that therefore true friendship is onely found where the end is not that which is advantag●ous or delightful because equal correspondencie is not usually there but what is honest which alwaies is and does still continue the same on all behalfs In the Friendship or Leagues of Princes every one hath his own conveniencie and particular benefit for his aimed at end and then the like of others onely so far as by accident it may square with his But it commonly falls out that what makes for one makes against another so as the ●ame things cannot please all wherefore a thousand accidents do easiry cause diversity of opinions contentions and breaches so as hardly any League hath been able to preserve it self any long time It is also usually seen that no man minds what is recommended to the care of many and therefore in Leagues which are fastned together but with weak Ties whilst one doth either trust upon anothers provisions or is ill satisfied with others omissions men neglect their own daties and study more to pick a hole in anothers coat then to mind his own business The ignomi●y which may in●ue upon such defaults and the loss of reputation which use to be great incitements to a noble mind are not so much valued in things which are undertaken and negotiated by many together because the way lies fair to excuse ones self by laying the fault upon another or at least the fault is lessened by others being sharers therein Thus that common benefit which is so magnified and cried up and which ought to be their onely object is found onely in a certain fancied Idea and in a potentia remota or in a vain and useless appearance whilst none endeavor to reduce it to its true essential and perfect being by laying aside their own proper and peculiar advantage and by directing his actions to the common good of his Colleagues So as he who shall duly consider what the first intention is of making a League and with what degrees it is proceeded in afterwards and to what ends it is directed will by many evident examples find it quickly so transformed as though it meet not with any external forces it easily dissolves and moulders away of it self Leagues made by Christians against the Turks have oft-times in particular met with these impediments and difficulties the League between Pope Alexander the Sixt and the three most powerful Kingdoms of Europe the Kingdoms of Spain Fance and Portugal and the Commonwealth of Venice was stipulated with great hopes and noble intentions the Venetian and French Fleet came into the Archipelag● where they had some prosperous success but the forces of the other Colleagues were in vain expected the first year and it ended the second year before it had fully effected any thing by reason of the discords which arose between the Crowns of France and Spain which were occasioned by the division of Naples so as these Princes turned their Arms each upon other which were intended against the Infidels The league made between Pope Paul the Third the Emperor Charls the Fift and the Commonwealth of Venice against Sultan Soliman likewise ended almost as soon as it was begun and it is too well known as being of rescent memory what occasions of victories were thereby lost and out of what respects But what greater thing could be expected from any League then from that which God blest with the famous victory at the Curz●la●● Islands Yet how slight a matter was able to re●●●d the glorious atchievements which were with reason to be expected from thence when a slight suspition of the Spainards that the States of Flanders might be molested by the French by reason of the going of the Duke of Alanson the Kings Brother towards those parts was sufficient to keep back the Fleet which was destied for so great affair in the Levant and to make the best season of the year pass over without any advantage whereupon all other things ●ell into great disorders and the League was quickly ●erminated Neither can this natural motion of Leagues be so stopt by any means or
of Thirty years when in the time of the Popedom of Leo the Tenth she seemed to have some hopes of quiet and of enjoying some better condition after her so many and so grievous vexations and ruines which had called to mind the unhappy memorie of the former calamities which she had undergone by the invasion of the Northern Armies But the wounds of the late evils remained yet uncured for two noble members of this Province were faln into the hands of forein Princes the State of Milan being at the devotion of Francis King of France and the Emperor Charls the Fifth being possest of the Kingdom of Naples which Princes being now weakned and weary with so many Wars so as the one could not exceed the other and having at that time their thoughts elsewhere bent being governed more by necessitie peradventure then by their own wills they seemed to rest satisfied with what they did already posses in Italy and that they would suffer her to enjoy at least some rest after her past molestations In this posture of Affairs Pope Leo who had often negotiated with several Princes about the business of Arms and had endeavored as he said the liberty of Italy and chiefly the preservation of the Dukedom of Milan in the Government of the Sforza's was much displeased to have the power of strangers any longer continued and particularly that the Church should be berest of two noble Cities Parma and Piacenza which were become members of the State of Milan Therefore with a haughty and generous mind he resolved not to prefer an unsecure quiet before some present troubles so to shun other molestations and dangers which he thought might grow the greater by such a peace in future if not to himself at least to the Church And knowing that he should not be able either of himself nor by joining with other Italians to drive forein Potentates out of Italy he resolved to join with some foreiners against some other foremers with design as he said that when some of them should be forced to forgo Italy it might be the easier to expel the rest Leo having thus put on this noble and generous resolution it may seem to merit praise by all men as to the intention but as for the means he took to compass it it is not so easily to be agreed upon for many and weighty respects do concur thereunto for some of which this action may seem to be as wise as glorious and if we will reflect upon other some there will appear much more of difficulty and danger therein then of security and hopes That all Transalpin●rs might be driven out of Italy was a thing desired and not without cause by all Italians and which ought to be his chi●fest care and endeavor who had such Territories degree and authority in that Province as Leo had The antient dignity of the Italian honor seemed to appear in the Pop●s majesty and in the splendor of the Court of Rome ●ut as for the effecting of this business it did planly appear that all the power of the Italian Pot●ntates was too weak since two great Princes and warlike Nations had fo● many past years though with various fortune got footing there and still kept their possession so as their power could suffer no disturbance but must be confirmed and consolidated and must become more formidable to the Church and to all the Italian Princes unless it were by some of the same forein Nations If the sole Forces of the Italian Princes when Italy by reason of a long Peace did flourish most were not sufficient to stop the French Forces which were then but new in those parts and but meanly assisted what reason was there to believe that this Province should ever be raised up again of herself and should by means of her own Forces return to her pristine fortune and digni●y after having been so long vexed by cruel Wars and having lost two of her noblest Members Wherefore though to administer fresh fuel as it were to this fire of War as would be done by the authority and Forces of the Apostolick Sea if they should jo●n with Caesar or with the King of France might be troublesom and dangerous yet might it be beneficial or at least hopeful since it might so fall out that the fortune of War being various and subject to unexpected chances some good effect might ensu● thereupon for the liberty of Italy the Forces of those Princes who did oppose her growing much the weaker or else by their growing weary of the work and by their tu●ning themselves to some other undertaking Whereas on the contrary to suffer them to settle there and to get in time greater authority over the people and more love to the States which they had gotten was a certain and irreparable ruine and an utter abolishing of all hopes of ever restoring the States which were postest by strangers into the hands of the Italian Princes But the fear lest both these Princes who were grown so powerful in Italy might join together against the Territories of the Church or those of other Italian Princes to divide them amongst themselves as had happened not many years before when the Emperor Maximilian and Lewis the Twelfth King of France who had been formerly at such great enmity one with another grew good friends by dividing the Lands between them which belonged to the Venetians might chiefly perswade the Pope to quit neutrality and to side with the one or the other of these Princes Leo knew that upon many past occasions he had done things not only of but little satisfaction but of much disgust to both these Princes and Nations more particularly to the French who were alwaies jealous of his cunning so as great emulation growing in them both and a desire of commanding over all Italy and finding that affairs were so equally poised between them in this Province as the one could not much exceed the other nor make any new acquisition it was with reason to be feared that being void of all hopes of having the Pope to side with either of them from whose friendship they might for many reasons expect very considerable assistance they might at last convene together to the total oppression of the Liberty of Italy Nor was Leo's Neutrality in this conjuncture of time and affairs able to secure him from such a danger since he had formerly openly declared himself and taken up Arms in company with others and chiefly since the French knew that he was no waies pleased with their Dominion in Italy as well for the common affairs as for his own particular dislike that they had possessed themselves of the Cities of Parma and Piacensa which were returned to the obedience of the Apostolick Sea by his Predecessor Iulius So as the Churches State and that of the Florentines which was under the same Popes protection and government grew to be those alone which were exposed to the injuries of all men for the Venetians
having the luck to light upon excellent Masters I made some advancement I will not say that now I am sor●ie for it for the fear least the time that I imploied therein might have been spent worse but surely I cannot deny but that I did thereby foment that affection which doth sometimes preva●c●●e better to wit to the desire of praise and of self-estimation Knowledge doth oft-times puff up him that is master of it so as he forg●●s to glory in the Lord I dare not say I possessed it for hardly could I taste the waters of the over-flowing fountains of learning through the shallowness of wit and other affairs that I was busied in yet man doth easily flatter himself and attributes unto himself more then falls to his share Which is the cause why ambition is seen to get into all places yea even into their most secret retirements who forsake the world being a vice which is the harder to be cured for that it keeps close and hidden But what shall I say more What could I answer if I should be asked what fruit I reaped by these my studies I might peradventure say that the little of Philosophie which I learnt hath more awakened my understanding in knowing the truth of things But say I pray what need hath he to have recourse to the candle light of humane knowledge who hath the bright Sun-shine of Grace in him and to whom infallible truth is revealed I did for a while give my self to study Moral●ie wherein I took such delight as I wrote a book thereof which I was afterwards perswaded to print and so to impart it unto others I learned how to become morally good it is true I did but is not the first precept in this knowledge that the doctrine of manners is it of self very vain For it consists in doing in action not in knowing it had been much better that setting his commandements before mine eies who is the true and real Master of that Christian life which I live and have yet to live I should have imploied my time in observing the precepts of the divine Law rather then in collecting the Documents of Philosophers who wanting the taste of that truest chiefest and most excellent vertue which divine love doth so much the more afford as it is the more ardently inflamed applied themselves to a certain mediocritie which is better discerned or known in their Idea or in their writings then in the affections or actions which they go about to moderate Afterwards when I was come to mans Estate being commanded so to do by him whom I ought to obey and it being a thing also which I my self did much desire I betook my self to write the History of my Country a good and gallant work But what proportion can the good reward which I hoped for thereby bear with the pains I took which was truly very great Had I spent part of the time and study which I imployed therein in the reading of divine Books I cannot doubt but that I should have been inflamed with the love of spiritual things which for so long a time I did so little relish And to pass by other things I cannot deny as best knowing mine own intrincecal affections but that whilst I labored so much to celebrate the fame and glory of others by these my Writings I often felt within my self a certain tickling and delight out of the hope which I flattered my self withal and wherewith I nourished my thoughts that by these my labors I my self might likewise reap some honor and as the Poets say live in my fame after my death Oh gross vanity and when this affection with which I must confess I was sometimes drunk gives place to reason I acknowledge that amongst all vanities none is greater then wordly glory which is vain because man glories of that which is none of his for he hath received every good thing especially the endowments of the soul from God Vain because it is nothing of it self it hath no true existenc●e it is made up of various opinions of men and of theirs most who know least Vain because it reflects upon that which is not in us upon that which is a trivial and common accident to wit our Fame the memory whereof we do with so much vanity desire to propagate Tell me thou humane soul which are so much ●●amored of this bare shadow of good which doth not at all belong unto thee if after thou art departed out of this world thou couldst have any thing to do with humane affections what good would this folse glory do thee which thou dost so much do●e upon as thou dost sometimes lose the way which leads to true heavenly glory If thou shalt be damned and in the eternal torments of Hell thinkest thou that the satisfaction of this thy glory shall be able any waies to ease those immense and unconceivable Torments and in thou shall be fixt in heavenly bliss what need in that abode hath he of worldly glory who is glorified with eternal glory who is satisfied who is content who is for ever blessed But since I examine mine own waies I return to consider my life Some few years since I gave myself to the government of my Country wherein I found the way so plain and easie and the savor and grace of my Country so far above my merits as I soon got into great Honors and into the chiefest Imployments which I still containe in and do imploy my time But my Talent is so small as though I spend it all I know it is but little And if I spend all how can I according to humane respect be blamed Or what reason have others to complain more of me then I have of my self Since so little a part of my life remains or almost none at all wherein I may recollect my thoughts what time have I to think of my end to repent me of my sins to endeavor amendment and yet I see I am not diligent in doing any thing The most troublesom yea and the most contented thoughts wherewith my mind is now incumbred will vanish as a shadow or as smoak before the winde and shall be withered as flowers by the Suns beams and yet whilst this mind of mine is continually involved in these afficuous cares it is so filled with the fantasms of those things wherein I imploy my self all the day long as I most meditate onely upon them and though unwillingly have them alwaies before mine ties at all times in every place and upon all occasions So as all contemplation of nobler and better things which I sometimes turn my self unto is alwaies mixt with these base affections and troubled with these clouds of worldly thoughts Alas how hard is it to serve two Masters God and the World The world measures its actions by its worldly respects he who makes that his stay who lives acco●d●ng to that can make no new laws to himself but must govern himself by