of all true profit to us no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one than in my choosing the commanded one To hate God and love sin hath no more natural entity than to love God and hate sin To speak an Oath or Lye than to speak Truth and Holily To will a forbidden Act than to Nill it and to will a good one So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause of that which hath no natural entity that is of an Act not as an Act but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised And Dr. Twisse hence saith That moral specification of Acts is no true specification of them And it 's true that it is not a Physical specification 2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety Even to will or not will do or not do And in this case to do or will when forbidden is more than not to do or will I answer 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power and it is as natural to it to be in act as to a stone to lie still And the Cartesians will tell you that Action needeth no more cause than Rest But I rather say that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul but only this or that Action upon this or that Object at an undue time So that no man ever sinned by meer Action as such whether Vital Intellectual or Volitive The Action which God commandeth he willeth The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object Adam had this liberty of contradiction to will or not to will this particular Act of eating the forbidden fruit but not to will or not will simply Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit instead both of nilling it and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it had no more natural entity in it than if he had not willed it but willed somewhat else at the same time 3. An Action it self is not properly Res but modus Rei and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature that supposing God the cause of its Power continued shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power he saith that which no mortal man can prove The Glory of Gods Works is their likeness to Himself And as Intellection and Free-will are parts of this likeness we know not just how far God can go in such Communications I see no contradiction in it to say that a faculty maintained by God in its natural force with necessary though not determining concurse can determine it self without any more causation And if it be not a Contradiction God can do it 4. But this is all prevented by considering that mans Soul is never out of Act. It s active force is never idle though it act not always the same way nor with the same extension or intension so that to reduce it into act is not to reduce it from a meer potentia in actum but from a power acting one way or slowly to act another way or more intensly 5. Yea this is all answered by considering that as I said while God continueth the Soul in its nature it continueth a naturally active force or power inclined essentially to activity So that though I say that Action needeth more cause than non-non-action that is here done in God still causeth the active disposition But supposing that upheld I say that there is oft more need of other causality or strength to keep it from Action than to cause it to act Whatever the world talketh against Durandus they are never well able to answer à Dola though in sense they that factiously oppose him mean the same as he And if a Rock hanged in the Air by something that might be cut off or removed as a threed supposing God to continue the nature of it and all things else there is more strength and causality needful to hold it from falling than to make it fall when the threed is cut It was a work of Gods Power to keep the fire from burning the three Confessors Dan. 3. and the Lions from devouring Daniel Dan. 6. and the Sea from flowing on the Israelites and the Sun from moving in Joshuah's fight 6. And yet consider that it is not so much as an Action which is but modus rei that is in question but only the comparative circumstantiating of that action so that it is but modus modi rei 7. And lastly The denial of the matter of our power and liberty in this I have else-where proved overthroweth the certainties and fundamentals of all our Religion Now whether any man should deny all our Religion and certain necessary Truths for such a metaphysical uncertain notion as this that God is not able to make a Creature that can cause a modus modi in determining its active nature to this Object rather than to that without Divine predetermination let sobriety be judge C. But thus you make man the specifier of his good acts without Gods determination as well as of the evil B. Jansenius is in the right in this we have more need of Divine help to the willing and doing of good than of evil We cannot do evil without his natural support and concurse But we cannot do good especially spiritual saving good unless we have moreover his medicinal special Grace To the specifying of good actions there must ever concur Gods natural help Gods gracious help and mans free-will or self-determination It is not two or three determinations of the Will which are made by these several Causes but one determination So that under God man is the specifying determiner of his Will to good or else he were not a Believer nor rewardable or punishable And that he cannot determine his Will to good as well as to evil proceedeth not from the Original nature of the Will for with that such a determination was consistent but from its Pravity or Corruption But how Grace and Free-will concur is after to be handled C. Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 190. Vol. minoris hath a full digression 4 to prove that God willeth that sin shall come to pass he permitting it and saith Nostri Theologi affirmanâ— Arminiani â—ontificii negant * This Digression of Dr. Twisse is answered in the first Book His Friend Alvarez de Aux li. 11. disp 110. p. 442 c. discusseth the Qu. An detur ex parte nostra causa reprobationis and concludeth that Reprobatio qua Deus statuit non dare aliquibus vitam aeternam et permittere peccatum eorum non est conditionata sed absoluta nec praesupponit in Deo praescientiam demeritorum ipsius reprobi 2. In Angelis qui ceciderunt nuâ—la datur causa reprobationis ex parte ipsorum quantum ad integrum effectum c. 3. Et ita de reprobatione parvulorum
him But it followeth not necessarily that this will be done because it 's possible no nor because it is easie or not difficult to be done 150. * * * Ruiâ— de praedet Tr. 2. diâ—p 12. §. 1 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed viz. Increatam permissionem Deus non praedâ—finit Creata permissio simul complecâ—itur quâ—rundam rerum productionem aliarum rerum negationem quibus positis peccatum permittitur And if by permission they will mean quid positivum it must have a positive Will and Cause but what 's that to the Negative or meer non impedire Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguoâ—s words His reason §. 2. is Permission of sin is good 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum And he said that permissio increata is not decreed 2. Negatio motivorum c. 3. Prodâ—ctio Constitutio circumstantlarum 4. Generalis concursus Ans 1. Nothing is not Good meer Negations are Nothing 2. Moral Negations or Logical that is Denyal and restraints are something and have a Cause 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause but so is not a meâ—r non-impedition which is proper permission But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent and an indifferent agent and a contrarily disposed agent To permit a stone to ascend will not make it ascend To permit the Air to move will not make it move But to permit a stone in the Air to fall I think with Durandus is enough to make it fall supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin 151. But yet here we must distinguish 1. Between a necessary and a free agent 2. Between Adams sinning and ours 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly or that hath many disswasions or but few 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general that is of not living innocently yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth nor is it a valid consequence He is a bad man Ergo he will do this and that and the other Sin Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin than to the contrary So that bare permission will not inferr the Certainty of all sin atleast and therefore will not here serve turn 152. But saith Rada it is not common permission but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin Answ 1. God did not so by Adam at first 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn as well as effectual If so then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God as he was to dye by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin as to live without God But if not so then while Necessary Grace called sufficient is continued the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him till Adam cast it away It is therefore no good Illation Deus permittit aliquem peccare ergo peccat unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help which is more than proper permission 153. And it must be remembred that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin He alwayes hindereth it so far as to forbid it to threaten damnation to affright men from it to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it And his daily mercies and corrections should withhold men from it Only by doing no more nor effectually changing or restraining sinners but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means he permitteth sin 154. But it is also confessed that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited some of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given And so some are without that Teaching those mercies or those corrections which others have But yet they are still under a Law of Grace 155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity Truth and Goodness which is Natural doth continue Otherwise it is confessed that Permission would inferr sin materially but no sin formally if by permission be meant Gods withdrawing Reason Free-will or executive power 156. But I easily confess that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion * * * Or Bradwardines Effective Volition as necessary and productive of all that cometh to pass in sinful actions could be proved that would certainly inferr the event of sin And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will sin may be fore known in that decree And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind they had never omitted that easie solution of the Case How God fore-knoweth sin But this I have elsewhere confuted and shall add a little here 157. But first having disproved all these presumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future sin I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfie us which is That Gods Understanding is Infinite and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible But How his understanding reacheth them what Idea's he hath of them how they are Intelligible to him with such like are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men who know not their own ignorance And no manner of understanding is properly Divine which mortals can comprehend SECT IX Of Predestination and Free-will of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford 158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods Execution and be after his Volitions in order yet because I am now only to speak of it as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin and as quid decretum I shall touch it here It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of besides himself Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause 159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of humane Actions in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties and a Power to Act or not act at this time or to choose this or that and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency So that when ever any Act is done as an Act in genere God is the first Cause of it For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth and by his Vital Influx And there is
212. It is no true Power ad hoc which is put to overcome a Greater opposing Power We never had Power to overcome God or to act against his pre-moving pre-determination as Bradwardine truly saith 213. A man may be Able mediately to do that which he is not Able Immediately to do I mean he that can write with a Pen or move things with an Engine and so act but as a partial though Principal Cause may not be Able to write without a Pen nor to do the same alone as a Total Cause 214. And a man may have Power to do that Mediately and Hypothetically hereafter which he Cannot do Immediately that is at the present time He can learn to write and after can write who cannot write till he hath learnt Thus Infants have a remote Power of speaking and Infidels of believing 215. No man Doth all that he is truly and properly Able to do 216. No man doth all that he is Disposed and Habited to Sudden objects oft carry us againt strong Habits 217. A man ordinarily Willeth and Acteth according to the predominant Habits of his soul if he have objects and means 218. A man alwayes willeth that which he is soley disposed to will or most disposed to will at that moment and which he apprehendeth sub omnimoda ratione boni Much more if he were perfectly Habited to it in his Vitality Intellect and Will 219. No man acteth without the Essential fundamental Inclination to Good and to Natural felicity But a man may by sudden instigation and occasions will that which before he had no particular disposition to A Power may be without a Habit. 220. No Good mans Habits here are perfect in goodness 221. No Bad man here is at the worst nor destitute of all Moral Power to all things commanded him of God 222. A bare Moral Power which cometh not up to be an Inclination or Habit determineth not the Will of it self 223. Habits tend to the Wills determination per modum naturae ut appetitus But they are not sufficient to it or necessary determiners de eventu 224. Weak Habits are oft born down Strong ones rarely yet sometimes 225. An unholy soul is much more Impotent as to the great Internal Acts of Loving God delighting in him c. than to any meer external Act which the Natural Power extendeth to And so are the regenerate in that measure as they are unrenewed 226. But we are more able to Love or Will aright than to Work and Do aright because here both must concurr which requireth more Power than one alone E. g. to Rule the Thoughts aright requireth more Power than to be Willing to rule them 227. Yet in that measure that a man is Willing to do Good he is Morally able and more than able Because Morality being first seated in the will it is no farther Morally Good or Bad than it is Positively or Privatively Voluntary He that is sincerely Willing is sincerely Abole and he that is Perfectly Willing is perfectly able and more 228. Every mans Natural faculties may be called Moral Powers as to the Obligation as being obliged by God to Moral Good 229. And because Obligation presupposeth some true Power to obey mediately or immediately present or former when the Law was made therefore mans Natural faculties though undisposed are thus far called a moral power to the commanded act SECT XI Whether God bind Men to Impossibilities 230. THis leads us to the question Whether God bind men to Quaudo praeceptum supernaturale obligat non potest vitari peccatum contra illud absque auxilio gratiae Pet. à S. Joseph Thes Univers Theol. de auxiliis p. 83. Alliac Camerac 1. q. 14. R. saith 1. We cannot be bound to a simple impossibility 2. We may be bound to Will an Impossibility as that his sin past had not been though he doubt of this 4. He may be bound to that which is not in his power to do of himself So every one is bound habere gratiam quilibet viator fidem infusam tamen non est in creaturae potestate activâ things Impossible Where we must needs distinguish 1. Of disability Antecedent to the Law and Consequent 2. Mediate and Immediate 3. Between Impossibles as such and as Things Hated or Nilled 4. Between Primary and Secondary Moral acts And so I answer 231. 1. No Law of God or just men bindeth to things Naturally Impossible before the Law was made and broken by an Immediate obligation 232. A just Law may antecedently bind us mediately to that which is immediately impossible So he that cannot Read may be bound to Read mediately that is first to Learn and then to Read And Paul requireth men to work with their hands that they may have to give to him that needeth and then to give which yet before they have got it is impossible 233. The obligation of a Law ceaseth when the thing commanded becometh Impossible without the subjects fault 234. Every sin is Voluntarium-prohibitum And so far as Impossible things may be Voluntaria-prohibita which is all the doubt so far they may be sins 235. Gods Law is Antecedent to our practice and mediately ex parte sui bindeth us at once to all that we must do to the End of our Lives As if a Master in the Morning command his servant his work till night Therefore as if that servant purposely break his Spade or other Tools that he may not work he is not therefore so disobliged as to be guiltless even so when man by sin disableth himself to his commanded duty the Law is not changed but is still the same nor is he thereby excused 236. Here the Primary sin is that which contracted the Impotency The Secondary sin is the Impotency it self thus wilfully contracted and seated in the will The third rank is the not doing of all that was first commanded and the doing of all that was forbidden 237. But if it be not only a Moral Vicious Impotency that is contracted such as the habitual unwillingness in question but a Physical Impotency as if a man drunk himself stark mad or blind c. this is a sin and the consequent acts and omissions not simply in it self considered but secundum quid and participatively as it partaketh of the first sin which is described it self to be a Voluntary forbidden act disabling us to future duty and That a necessity contracted by our own fault as by drunkenness excuseth not from guilt see August l. de Natur. Grat. c. 67. Aquin. n. 4. d. 50. q. 2. a. 1. virtually containing a sinful life to the end 238. But if it be this Physical Impossibility that is contracted then though the Law change not yet the Subjects capacity being changed strictly and properly God is not said after to Oblige him by that Law because he is not Receptive and Capable of such new obligations And yet he is not disobliged as to his benefit For no man
subject de quo of which it is truly said They are without the Gospel 520. 2. Gods not converting effectually some that have the Gospel is no Act and hath no object But the subject of the Privation called the Object is Some part of those men who have forfeited the helps of special Grace by their abuse or neglect of the Gospel and the Commoner grace which was given them 521. 3. Gods not Pardoning Justifying Adopting and Sanctifying men is no Act and hath no object But the subject of the Privation and object of the Laws contrary sentence is Impenitent Unbelievers or the non-performers of the condition of Justification c. in the Covenant 522. 4. Gods not Glorifying men is no Act nor the damnation which consisteth in sin as aforesaid is none of Gods act But the sentence of condemnation is Gods Act and no doubt some other Positive Execution And the object of these is All finally Impenitent Unbelievers and unholy ones that is who performed not the Condition of that Edition of the Covenant of Grace which they were under 523. And it being past all denyal that these are the objects of the Executive Acts we must say that these also are the objects of the Decrees accordingly where a Decree is proved and when we speak of them only juxta ordinem executionis and not Intentionis which I laid by before 524. And lest you recurr to it once more I will recite more of Davenants words de ordine Intentionis De Praed Reprob cap. 1. p. 107. 1. Sciendum tenendum est si Dei naturam perfectionem in se consideremus illum non prius unum videre deinde aliud neque prius hoc decernere aut velle deinde illud sed unico simplicissimo actu c. 2. Ex parte tamen Rerum quae decrevit signa quaedam prioritatis posterioritatis distingui possunt Hic tamen observandum est inter ipsos Scholasticos non admodum certam constantem esse hanc doctrinam de hisce signis seu instantibus prioritatis Scotus qui primarius est ad haec signa fabricanda artifex videtur non-nullis non solum eadem posuisse priora posteriora secundum nostrum intelligendi modum sed etiam statuisse unum esse in ipso Deo prius naturâ alio But from this he vindicateth him Ex adversa parte Occamus noster haec signa quocunque modo considerata negavit in 1. d. 9. q. 3. Et Biel ejus sententiam amplexus haec signa oppugnavit in 3. d. 2. q. 1. dub 3. Prioritates in Divinis non sunt ponendae sicut nec pluralitates actuum ordinatorum Unus est enim Actus in Divinis re ratione indistinctus qui est ipsa essentia Divina ne secundum nostram quidem considerationem talem ordinem Prioritatis posterioritatis concipi posse in decretis Divinis ut talis consideratio non sit falsa speculatio If this hold our Controversie of the order is at an end 525. And he added the words even of a rigid Thomist Domin Bannes quamvis non omnino explodat haec signa cum Biele perpendens tamen discordiam Theologorum in his assignandis Animadvertendum est inquit quam pro libito in negotio praedestinationis reprobationis multiplicentur instantiae à Theologis quam parum illa conferant ad assignandam rationem differentiae inter praedestinatos reprobos Liceat itaque hic paucis monere non esse nimis confidendum aut certo dogmati adhaerendum ulli certo ordini decretorum divinorum sive à Protestantibus sive à Pontificiis assignato cum difficile sit duos reperire sive inter nostros sive inter adversarios qui ad amussim per omnia consentiant in hac serie decretorum divinorum describenda Caveat it aque unâ—squisque ne talem considerationem praedestinationis reprob inducat quae vel Divinae justitiae vel gratiae gratuitae adversetur tâ—m non multum refert quo ordine prioritatis c. SECT XVII Of Gods Causing and Decreeing Sin 526. BUt because it is the avoiding of Gods Causing and Willing sin Of too many such enquirers it may be said with Augustine de Utilit Credâ—ndi cap. 18. Dum nimis quaerunt unde sit malum nihil reperiâ—nt nisi malum Obj. Omnis determinatio diâ—ina est immutabilis Omnia siuâ—t Deo determinante Ergo omnia siunt immutâ—hiliter Respondet Mâ—lanâ—th Ad maj Est immutâ—bilâ—s necessitate conseqâ—entiae Ad minor Dissimilâ—s est determinatio in bonis malis actionibus Mala siunt 1. Deo praesciente non impediâ—nte non autem adjuvante vel impellente Item Deo sustentante naturam suum opus Item Deo eventus certos decernente Strigel in Melancth pag. 296. Carbo Compend Thom. 1. q. 19. a. 9. Malum ut malum nullo appâ—titu potest appeti nisi per aâ—â—idâ—ns Deus â—ullo modo vult malum Culpae Deus neque vult siâ—ri malum â—â—que non vult sed permitti Ruiz de praedesin Tr. 2. disp 13. §. 3 4. would prove a decree to permit mortal sin in the unjust and just ex destitutione circumstantiis And d. 16. §. 3. he tellâ—th us of many wayes by which God maketh sin the occasion of his Grace without causing or willing sin in form or nearest matter which is a great reason of these Controversies I shall say somewhat more particularly of that About which there are various Opinions 1. Some think as Hobbs that no acts of the will are so free as not to be necessitated as the motions in an Engine though unobserved by our selves who see not the Concatenation of Causes 527. 2. Some Dominicans and our Dr. Twisse and Rutherford held that no act natural or free can be done by any creature without the Predetermination of Gods Physical efficient immediate Premotion as the first total Cause of that act But yet that this standeth with Liberty because God causeth contingentia contingenter fieri And that he so causeth every Act of sin in all its circumstances and the totum materiale peccati and all that the sinner causeth But yet that he is not the Author of sin nor causeth the form Because 1. They say that sin hath no efficient cause but a deficient which God is not being not obliged to act And sin is nothing but a privation 2. Because God is under no Law and therefore though he do the same things that man doth it is sin in man but not in him And saith Holkot he is the cause of sin but not the Author because he commandeth it not by his Law 3. At other times they say that sin is formally a Relation of disconformity to the Law of God and God causeth the whole act as circumstanced but not the relation which resulteth from it 4. And God causeth not sin as sin but as a means to his Glory or as a punishment of former sin
528. 3. Others say as Camero that the Intellect necessitateth the will and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect and God causeth the Objects and Laws and permitteth the Tempter 529. 4. Others say that God only as the Cause of Nature 1. By Support and Concurse necessary to all agents causeth the Act as an Act in general 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects of which mens sins are also a cause 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil 6. But as to the sin it self he is no cause of it either as sin or punishment either of the form or of the Act as morally specified that is as it is about this Forbidden object or End rather than another And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth 530. Let it here be noted 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part in respect to the events which we see And unnecessaries are not to be asserted 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World and all therein 4. And yet to be no Author of sin Let us consider of the particulars 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent and therefore a self-actor under him and an Intellectual Agent and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone And a Free-willing Agent and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic nunc or to choose or refuse or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions which I acknowledged and enumerated before which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their servato ordine finis Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale it is of God as the first Cause of Nature * * * Vid. Gregor Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 8. 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. Mâ—tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse co-operatione determinatione nostra in operibus bonis at in operibus peccati etiam secundum substantiam seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determinationâ—m codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternitaâ—â— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante detâ—rminatiâ—nâ—m nostram ullo modo praevisam sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis Vid. Marsil in 1. q. 45. ar 2. post 4. conclus And so when a sinner acteth it is not without this Universal first Cause Whether God do it only as Durandus thought by the meer continuation of the nature of all things Active and Mobile or by any superadded concurse besides is nothing to our present business which only sheweth that God is the Cause 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil Every thing is turned into sin by sinners †††Titus 1. 15 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified Bad stomachs corrupt the wholsomest food All Gods mercies are abused to sin 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life or take it away lest they abuse it or deny men all those mercies or remove them which he foreseeth that they will turn to sin 535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth and so is as a concause of it with sin And this effect is so near to the Act of sin as that the sin it self is ost called by its name as if it were its nearest matter which it is not And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case that cannoâ— distinguish Of which more anon in the instances 536. V. And it is certain that God as the Governour of the World doth do much good by the occasion of mens sin But this is not to turn the sin it self into good 537. VI. And to these five operations of God I add as to his Volitions that all this which he doth he willeth or decreeth to do And he hath no contrary will at all 538. But that which we deny is that He is any proper cause of the sin it self efficient or deficient culpable or not culpable Physical or Moral For the opening of which we must enquire what sin is and what goeth to its being or constitution 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus Amabilissimus and that he is our absolute Owner And that as rational free agents we that are his own are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end and of obeying his Laws And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws with our denying God our selves as his Own and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End 540. As Logick hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot so that it 's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them so hath it done here Men may more easily know what sin is and what it is to disobey a Law and that either by doing what we should not or by not doing what we are commanded than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called Whether a privation or a relation an act or no act c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them and torment them for their sin 541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God For the soul is an Active nature and can no more cease all action than to be though it can forbear a particular act as to this object and at this time And God is the Cause of Acts as such 542. I have shewed before that as Action it self is no substance but the mode or motion of a substance so to choose this object rather than that hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other or than Ex to verb quod Dâ—us concâ—â— at nobiscum ad actum peccati prout facultas liberi
blessing and felicity To predetermine the will physically is to end that Liberty to that particular act which consisted partly in being undertermined But that Liberty which consisteth in deliverance from all true evil is increased by such a Gracious predetermination And therefore Jansenius pleadeth only for the necessity of predetermination to Good by medicinal Grace and not to Evil or meer Natural actions Yet we say that even to Good God can procure the will to determine it self by moral means which infinite Wisdom can sufficiently improve But it is only 1. A natural power to act without predetermination from God or Others 2. And a Liberty of Condition from all predetermination ab extra to evil from God or Creatures which I here assert and plead for in this cause 564. 8. Much less do we take the Will from under the Power and Government of God For 1. It could have no self-determining Power but of God one moment 2. He giveth it this power to make us capable subjects of Moral Sapiential Government 3. He giveth us Governing Laws accordingly 4. And he attaineth all his Ends and fulfilleth all his Will as perfectly in consistency with our power and freedom as if we had none such at all so that God hath his proper Will whether men Will or not 565. But the turning point of difficulty here is Whether God is ever Causa partialis and if we so make him is it not injurious to his perfect operations All our Controversies turn upon the decision of this one question See the End For if we may conceive of God as Scotus speaketh like one that draweth at the same Ship with another and the act of both must concurr to the effect then all is easie and we may say when men Love not God repent not believe not c. that God did his part but the sinner did not his and so the effect failed As if a Father did resolve that he will help I remember one derideth John Goodwin for this similitude or the like Mr. Roborough his little Child to lift up a weight and will put to nine hundred ninety nine parts of the strength that is necessary but no more because the Child shall do something one part to shew his willingness and obedience Here if the thing be done it is the Father that deserves nine hundred ninety nine parts of the praise If it be undone the Child only doth deserve the blame But we have more to say 566. Note therefore 1. That here the Child hath in himself a Power independent on his Father and therefore the whole effect is not to be ascribed to the Father But man hath no Power but of God and what he holdeth yea and useth in dependence on him And therefore the praise of all his Power and his Acts as Acts are due to God 2. And all the good Inclinations of his will and all the Laws promises perswasions threatnings mercies afflictions examples convictions which tend morally to turn his will are from God so that in every good Volition or action man doth no more than God did both enable him command him perswade him and help him to do and so procure the actual determination of his will So that de re we see how much God doth alwayes besides that Grace may sometimes for ought I know otherwise predetermine And we see what man doth And all that you can desire more is that no man that doth any good act should be able at that instant not to do it or to do otherwise and then it must follow that no man that omitteth a good act or that sinneth could do otherwise which are false * * * Molina maketh God Causam partialem 1. p. q. 14. a. 3. disp 6. Sotus li. 2. Phys disput de causis denyeth it And Zumel disputeth against it in Disp in 1 2. Thom. p. 43. Concl. 2. And so do many others And great diversity here is among them while some affirm and some deny but none of us understand the mysterie of divine concurse So that here is only the lis de nomine left An Deus sit Causa partialis I think it fittest to say that he is Causa totalis of his own Act and of the effect as it is an Act and of all that is laudable in it too for the reasons aforesaid But yet he is not the Causa sola nor in that sense totalis of the Moral specification as if when he giveth his Creature a Power of choosing or refusing freely it could not be done without his further physical predetermination 567. And under favour I take the name Causa partialis to be improper and that it should properly be called Pars Causae For when divers concurr in efficiency all make but one proper efficient Cause †††So say Ockam and Gabriel Biel though Zumel call it a most improper mode of speaking because so no one Cause could be called Total And why should it if it be not except that God is above our order and so not a Part. Bonavent in 1. dis 38. q. 2. inquit Futurum triplex est Quoddam est cujus Deus est tota Causa ut Creata Quoddam cujus Creatura aut Voluntas est Tota Causa ut sunt defectus peccata Quoddam cujus Deus Creatura simul sunt Causa ut sunt opera naturalia moralia quia Deus cooperatur creaturae Respeâ—â—u primi futuri Divina praescientia est tota causa secundi non causa tertii est Causa sed non tota Gab. Biâ—l in 2. d. 37. bringeth in Scotus saying Licet Deus Volendo causat omnia quae causat non tamen ideo est Causa totalis quia vult etiam secum concurrere alias causas utrumque vult effectus esse secum concurrere Causas secundas non diversis sed una Volitione nec unum plus alio sed aeque utrumque simul Et nulla Creatura est Causa totalis Quia semper concurrit Deus ut Causa partialis Et ad dub 2. ex Greg. Arim. Nobiscum â—anquam Causa partialis producit actum malum Gregor Arim. his words are in 2. d. 34. a. 3. Actus mali quem efficit Peccator Deus est immediata Causa Partialis tamen co-efficiens actum eundem Of Greg. Arim. see more in the conclusion of this Chapter Now I suggest to the Learned Reader that is against me How he will decide the forementioned hard question Whether there be more Entity in God and the Creature than in God alone It is dangerous saying Yea or Nay and we know not well what to say But for my part as I said I will not say that God is Pars Entitatis nor yet that the Creature is not Ens nor yet that it is God But the solution must be either from the Equivocation of Entity or from the Creatures Inexistence in God or from somewhat rather which I know not And
just so here the question is Whether Gods Causation and Mans be more than Gods alone And I will not say that Gods is a Part nor yet that Mans is none nor that it is the same with Gods But that Gods acting and concurse are quite above the reach of Mortals 568. But here again note what I said even now 1. That it is no more sign of finiteness in God nor dishonour to him to be a limited or Partial Cause than to be no Cause and limited totally by suspension of the whole act And yet so he is as to all Possibles which he doth not make or move 2. And that it is his own free will only that thus limiteth him As it doth from giving all men more grace c. So that really here is matter of satisfaction 569. Though he offend me by making God the Cause of sin I will here cite the words of our Countrey-man Holkot Quodl lib. 2. qu. 1. Est sententia omnium Theologorum quod Deus est Causa immediata omnis rei productae sic quod omni creaturae agenti sive sit Natura sive Voluntas Deus coagit sic imaginandum est quod in omni actione creaturae qua aliquid producit Deus Creatura sunt duae causae Partiales illius producti Non sic imaginando quod Deus producit unam partem effectus creatura aliam ob hoc dicatur Causa partialis sed ideo quia concurrunt in agendo vel causando Unde tam causa universalis quam particularis dicitur communiter causa partialis ideo etiam Sol Homâ— sunt duae causae partiales hominis generandi similiter Vir Mulier Quia ad hoc quod aliquid dicitur causa partialis sufficit quod sit tale quod propter ipsum quoddam aliud vel quaedam alia res ponatur in esse sit quod illis positis res est aliquo istorum ablato res non fiet 570. Further I desire that it may be specially noted that God is our Creator in order of Nature before he is our Ruler And that Nature is before Morality obedience or sin And that God as Creator first setled the order of Nature so as that the Alteration of that Law or setled Order should not be ordinarily expected by us though he can alter it And therefore that man is man and hath a Natural Power of Self-determination and that God upholdeth him and concurreth as an Universal Cause belongeth to this fore-setled natural order and is presupposed to moral determinations and specifications either as from God or man 571. And note that to Good Acts we have need of more Help from God than this meer Natural Causality and Concurse And therefore God affordeth us more accordingly but not to all alike 572. It is further objected against this way that our making Reprobation to Infidelity Permission of sin not-giving faith c. to be no Acts of God cometh all to one as to mens sin and damnation because man cannot believe nor avoid sin without those Acts of Grace which God withholdeth Answ I confess it were all one if the supposition were true as it is not For we have proved after that man hath power without those acts of Grace which God suspendeth by that Common Grace which he giveth to do more good and forbear more evil than they do Of which in due place 573. It is objected also that while we make Gods Providence to fill the World with occasions of sin which he fore-knoweth men will take to their damnation yea as long as God could prevent all sin and save all souls and yet will not it cometh all to one which way soever you go in these Controversies I answer 1. Undoubtedly Gods Judgements are unsearchable But when we come into his Light we shall be perfectly reconciled to them all 2. And undoubtedly God doth whatsoever he will and all that he thought meet to Decree or Will shall come to pass in despight of sin 3. And when we have said all flesh and blood will be unsatisfied till faith and the will of God do satisfie us 4. But yet be it known to you that there is a great difference between Gods permitting sin after great means against it and his causing it Between the making of a free agent and putting life or death in his choice and his causing men unavoidably to sin and then to damn them for it The Holiness of Gods Nature will stand with the Being of sin by mans causing but not with Gods causing it And the Truth of Gods Word must be considered 574. If this were all one to Damn men unavoidably and to give them their free choice of Heaven or Hell in the means it is strange that so many Learned men as among the Jesuits Arminians Lutherans and Greeks do hold no other Grace at all but what leaveth man to such a free Choice could ever be so satisfied when others hold that the Elect have more SECT XVIII A Confutation of Dr. Twisse 's Digr 5. l. 2. sect 1. Vind. Grat. 575. I Come now to consider of what is said by them that go further about Gods will or Causality as to sin And because Dr. Twisse hath a peculiar Digression Vindic. Grat. li. 2. p. 1. Digr 4. I will somewhat animadvert upon it He beginneth Sententia nostra haec est Deum hactenus dici posse Velle peccatum quatenus vult ut peccatum â—iat viz. ipso permittente And so he maketh the question An Dens Velit ut peccatum eveniat ipso permittente Arminius thought God willed only his own Permission of the sin Twisse saith that he willed that sin should come to pass God permitting it Arminius his concession cannot be proved as I have shewed But Twisses must be disproved And 1. I will give you our Reasons against it Bonavent in 1. d. 46. q. 3. resolveth this question very plainly and truly Mala â—ieri nullatenus bonum esse potest sed bene occasio boni And shewing the difference between Causa Casus Occasio he saith that Causa est procedens intendens Casus pâ—ivat Intentionem sed non operationem Occasio privat utrumque And he distinguisheth Occasion into that which hath ratioâ—â—m Actiâ—i excitat agentem and that which hath but rationem passivi as one by anothers evil exciteth himself to do good And also between the evil and the ordinability to good And saith the evil is but the occasio passiva of the good and the ratio boni quod substernitur is occasio aliquo modo activa Vide locum 576. Let the Reader remember that what the Author saith of Gods Willing he also in the point of Predetermination saith of his working viz. that he Causeth as much as he willeth But I pass that by now because I have largely confuted it elsewhere And to speak to One is to speak to both 577. 1. All sober Christians are agreed on what side
soever that God is not the Cause of sin except some odd presumers who are condemned by the generality One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia whom the Synod of Dort rejected Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod Beza himself in Rom. 8. 28. passim abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin Yea more very much more than wicked men or Devils are which is not true 578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second pre-moved predetermined Cause of the Act of Volition and Execution whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin His saying Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin when they are committed which they would not be without the Law 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat and is the first predetermining Cause even the total Cause of all that is in the act and all its circumstances without which predetermination it could not be So that man doth but will what God first willeth and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act as the pen in my hand 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result and hath no other cause 579. And note here what Estius before cited after Aquinas saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat is all that the Sinner himself doth when he willeth sin And therefore it 's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin and willing the event futurity and existence of it ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction For he willeth sin who willeth the existence of it or that it be or come to pass 580. And note that it is both matter and form Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat For it is sin And forma dat nomen It is not sin but by the form of sin But if they had said otherwise it had been all one For he that willeth the fundamentum relate and correlate Saith Twisse Vindic. Graâ— li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. Posito quod velit perâ—ectiones istas manifestare necesse est non impediat ingressum peccati sed permittat 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws and Illuminating men to know them without execution by the occasion of sin 2. Yet doth he make Christs death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would And is sin better or more necessary than Christs satisfaction 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical should not give so much to sin which were it a means as it is not but a Passive and opposite occasion is but a moral means And himself saith page 136. Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi â—inem à Deo praefixum At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum sive manifestandae Dei misericordiae sive justitiae Media enim ejus sunt naturae ut ad ea facienda movâ—atur quis ex intentione finis Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium as stone and Timber to an House And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae it is not so to Christs Rather if a beggar Want a house is that Want the Materia domus no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propriâ— dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordiâ— sive iâ—stitiâ— potiâ—s quam medium Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this 2. Permission it self is nothing being but non-impedire And is nothing or non-agere a proper means But especially I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed that it is the Permission of sin and not the sin that is the Divine medium only one saith Praedestinationis and the other providentia And yet they will differ while they agree And I that differ from both would agree with both willeth the Relation 581. There is nothing left to be said then but that God willeth that sin be done but not as sin or because it is sin But this is nothing For 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination or for seeming good 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God so doing is but one of their sins which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it and predetermined them to it so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God 582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice and so do not wicked men but for wicked ends or in enmity to God I answer That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat 583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente non faciente Answ The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law And why then do they put in the word permittente Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do but only permit when they mean no such thing For that is my second reason against them 584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin which is false For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause he cannot be said to Permit To do a thing and
Holiness The Holiness of Christs Humane Nature and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators as is his Works of Mercy and Justice And Gods glory shineth as much in them And it is the glory of his Goodness if not of Mercy which preventeth sin and misery yea and of Mercy too For though mercy relate to misery it is as well to possible misery prevented as to existeâ—â— misery removed And if he speak not of Subjects but Proprietors the Boâ—um Creaturae is also Creatoris SECT XIX The same doctrine in Rutherford de providentia confuted 625. I Have been too long in confuting this Digression of Dr. Twisse which is contrary to the commonest doctrine of Protestants and The summ of their opinion I think soundeth not well in Christians ears The summ of which is this Neither God nor Devil do will sin as it is evil but God is the first willer of its existence because it is in its own nature summe unice conducibile to the manifestation of his Justice and mercy And willing and Loving being all one in God he thus singularly Loveth the existence of sin above its contrary holiness for this end And by Predetermining premotion which he much more largely writeth for elsewhere he causeth as the first total Cause all that man Causeth But it is sin in man because forbidden him but not in God because not forbidden him And therefore God is not to be said to cause sin though he cause all that is caused but to permit it because he causeth it not in himself nor is he to be called a Deficient cause of our omissions because he is not bound to Actuate us but man is to be called the efficient and deficient cause because he is under an obliging Law Though God made that Law And though he can no more than a stone act without physical predetermination nor forbear acting when so acted yet he is to be called free because he is actually willing or his will doth act and because he is predetermined by none but God This is the true sence of their opinion as opened by themselves I shall now briefly consider what Rutherford saith to the same sence 626. Cap. 15. pag. 186. To Annatus charging Twisse as denying Gods permission of sin because he maketh him the * * * Nec omnino negari potest Voluntatem Dei esse Causam rerum omnium quas fieri velit Twiss recitante etiam Rutherf de Prov. c. 15. p. 186. See all their Reasons for Gods causing sin or willing its existence answered by Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 26. p. 262 263 264 265. As also against Gods predetermining to the immediate materiale peccati disp 27. p. 270 c. disp 28 29 30 c. usque ad p. 580. As to the common saying that God willeth not sin as sin all men will confess Dr. Twiss often that neither doth a wicked man do so Peccans ut sic non intendit peccatum quoad illud quod est formale in peccato seu carentiam conformitatis sed intendit actum ut est in genere moris inquit Aureolus in 2. d. 42. a. 3. pag. 319. I will not conceal a more difficult argument than most of theirs which may occurr to others God caused e. g. in Nathanaâ—l Peter c. this act of saith before Christs coming the Messiah is to come hereafter When Christ was come this was false and so evil God still caused the faith which he gave them Therefore he caused an untrue belief and evil and that supernaturally But I answ 1. God caused the habit of their faith and the act The nature of the habit was in general A belief of all divine revelations and in special A belief in the promised Messiah The termination of the act on the Messiah as future rather than as Incarnate required nothing positive in the Habit The same Habit served to both acts unless the latter being for the nobler act had some addition but the former needed none 2. And that this Habit might bring forth the act in that circumstance no more was necessary but 1. Gods word Christus venturus est 2. And Gods influx on the habited faculty to cause it to act according to that habit So that when God had reversed that word Christus venturus est he was no longer the cause determining the mind to believe that word but only the cause that the habit of faith was still towards Christ But not at all sub ratione venturi For the determining word was called in and it was an imperfection not to know so much where it was not a sin Cause of the Act the Liberty and the Prohibition and to Cause is not to Permit he hath no better answer than to say that God doth not permit the Act nor the Evil of the Act but he permitteth the evil act and 2. To say that the Dominicans and Jesuits hold the same as he Which is to jest with holy things and not to argue As if he said God made neither the soul nor the body and yet he made the man What! is it as it 's said that non animased unio est vita so Doth God permit the Union of Actum and Malâ—m No that he pretendeth not 627. To prove that God willeth the existence of sin he bringeth the instance of Joseph's case Gen. 45. To which I say that the text saith not at all that God willed the Will or Act or Sin of Joseph's brethren but only the Venditio passiva or effect and the consequents Nay only the consequents are mentioned in the Texts His replyes to the answers prove no more than the five things which I before asserted about sin Nothing so much deceiveth them as not distinguishing between the sinful act and the effect or passion when they are called by the same name as Selling Killing c. 628. His next instance is of Christs death of which I said enough before But 1. He understandeth his adversaries as ascribing only the Consequents of Crucifixion to Gods will which is his mistake It is Crucifixion it self passivè sumpta which they ascribe to it some of them at least And let men too wise against God deride it as much as they will God can will and Love that Christ be Crucified and yet hate and not will the will and act of the Crucifiers but only foresee it as aforesaid And let them jeer God as Idle or asleep if he neither will nor effectually nill the sin we will believe it to be his perfection and liberty which they so deride 2. And whereas he addeth that Active Verbs are used as Gen. 45. Misit me Deus Isa 53. Deus voluit eum conterere Zech. 13. Ego percutiam Pastorem and God delivered Christ to death I answer It is too too gross to perswade us hence that any of these Texts say that God willeth the sinners will or Act. God sent me speaketh Gods act that is his disposal
naturally happy is proper to God therefore Adam was to be led to it freely by a Covenant An. To be happy necessarily and independently and primarily is proper to God But you can never prove it any contradiction or impossible for God to make a Creature naturally happy nor that there are not such § 9. Here the M. S. citeth some words of his Gibieuf making our Being in God initially and finally to be our state of amplitude and liberty and our going out from God to be our particularity and state of necessity as if we were pre-existent in God and our individuation ceased upon oâ—â— return into him as our End An. But these are Platonick Phantasms And Gibieuf who was a devout Oratorian and talketh too oft of our Deification as Benedictâ—â— de Benedictis Barbanson Baker and other Fryers that talk phanatically must be read with caution and exception and as the Soul need not fear too near a Union with God as the loss of its individuation so neither must it desire or hope for such § 10. M. S. An unchangeable state of Happiness in the love of God is called Eternal Life An. No doubt but that is called Eternal Life in the fullest sense which actually endureth to eternity as to that particular Subject And so 1. The life of Glory perfectively 2. And a confirmed state of Sanctity here initially are usually called Eternal Life But 3. Whether the lossable state which the Angels fell from and Adam fell from or that measure of Grace which the ancient Fathers thought the justified may fall from be never so called also I cannot prove § 11. M. S. Adam's promised Happiness was 1. Essential in this perfect holiness or love of God 2. Complemental in the enjoying God iâ— all the sanctified Creatures in that Paradise but not to be translated to Heaven which Christ only procureth us An. I inclined to that Opinion 26 years ago when I wrote the Aphorisms which you oppose But I now incline more to the contrary and rather think man should have been translated to Heaven as Henoch and Elias were upon many reasons which I now pass by Though I take it yet to be scarce certain to us § 12. M. S. The Holiness of God is his loving himself as his End And the third Person proceeding by a reflex act of the infinite Will and self-love of God is therefore called the Holy Spirit An. 1. This notion of Gods Holiness that it is his Self-love is not to be contemned It seemeth to be so with this limitation that you confine not his Holiness to this but take this only as the most eminent among the inadequate conceptions of it For his whole Transcendency in Being Life and Knowledg as being adoreable by the Creature and its End and the Fountain of all created Goodness and specially of Morality is also Gods Holiness 2. But the saying that God is his own End seemeth improper though tolerable if spoken but analogically For God neither hath nor is to himself a Cause nor an Effect a Beginning nor an End 3. That the third Person proceedeth by a reflex Act of the infinite Will many School-men boldly say And so some say that he is Gods actual self-love which is â—he same that you call his Holiness And some say that he is the Divine Will or Love considered in it self as distinct from Vital Power and Intellect or Wisdom But of this I have spoken more largely else-where § 13. M. S. Adam's promised Reward was to be fixed in an unchangeable state of pleasing God by this Holy Spirit not by infusing any new quality which should unchangeably fasten him to the Rule for no created thing can unchangeably keep a man from falling An. 1. The promise to Adam is very obscure But Happiness it must needs be and everlasting 2. But it is past my reach to conceive how the Spirit of God can fix man in perfect holiness without any fixing quality as it 's called on his Soul A constant Act the Soul must have And 1. If that Act be caused by any Divine Impulse disposing the Soul so to act then that disposition is a quality 2. And if there be not both disposition and habit then the Soul will not in Glory be habitually or qualitatively holy but only actually 3. And a habit-acting being perfecter than an act without a habit or inclination the Soul will be more imperfect in Glory than in this state of Grace 4. Operari sequitur esse God fitteth all his Creatures to their works And as when he will give Immortality he will give a Nature fit for Immortality even indissoluble and incorruptible so when he giveth perpetuity of Love he giveth a nature or habits fit for perpetual Action Christ saith A good Tree bringeth forth good fruit and an evil Tree evil fruit Make the Tree good and his fruit good 5. The Operations of Love in Glory should be ex potentia aut violentia aut neutra if there were no intrinsick disposition or inclination to them In a word it is a contradiction for a Soul to be perfectly holy and not have the perfection of inclination to its Acts. 3. But if the meaning were that no holy quality alone sufficeth without Gods Influx that were no more than what must be faid of every Creature without Divine Influx no Creature can be or operate a moment No created thing of it self without God can continue How then should it keep a man from falling But if the Soul have any more goodness of nature or inclination in it than the Devils have it must be a created thing or God himself If only God that proveth not a Saint to be himself better than a Devil as to nature or disposition but only that God in him is better His reason why the Sun is naturally fixed to its Operations but not a glorified Soul is § 14. M. S. that one is a natural and the other a voluntary Agent One as Gibieuf saith Non agit sed agitur the other doth agere non tantum agitur An. 1. Gibieuf and you were deceived in thinking that such naturals non agunt Passive matter doth not Act ex principio essentiali unless Dr. Glissons and Campanellas Doctrine hold true But the three Active Natures Intellectual Sensitive and Vegetative and so Fire and the Sun do ex principio Activo essentali agere but nothing doth Act without an Antecedent Influx to action from the first Cause in which it is passive For no Creature is Independent 2. Voluntas est quaedam Natura quamvis libera To move naturally only and not freely is proper to Agents meerly natural distinct from free But to move freely and yet from a fixed principle which shall infallibly determine the Soul to act freely is not a contradiction nor that which Gibieuf should deny to the glorified § 15. M. S. Man though a Creature is the first Cause of his own action He moveth and sets himself on work else he were
remedy is as far off and cannot be made their own and applied If any would know the very moment in which a man that had contracted guilt by a hainous sin is actually absolved Cyprian seemeth to have determined it clearly in these words When I see thee sighing before the Lord I doubt not but the Holy Ghost is breathing on thee when I see thee weeping I perceive him pardoning The like you have Judic Theol. Bremens de persever ib. pag. 233. n. 9 10 11. vid. rejecta pag. 237. 267. The Brittish Divines in that Synod Judic de perseverant p. 188. begin with this explication that it is only the perseverance of the Adult Vid. Davenant and Ward de Grat. Baptismati that are actually Believers and not of Infants which is intended For some of them as Bishop Davenant and Dr. Ward have written that an Infant state of Grace and title to Salvation may be fallen from and lost 268. They add ibid. p. 108. Thes 3. This perswasion of perseverance hath not that degree of certainty which always excludeth all fear of the contrary but is sometime lively sometime languid sometime as in greatest Temptations none The first debility ariseth from the fundamental dependance of this personal affiance which seemeth to come below the certainty of dogmatical Faith For the Articles of Faith do affect our assent as immediate and first principles But the truth of special Faith is not thence deduced as a necessary consequent but is only subjoyned by way of assumption Ergo the firmness of that conclusion which maketh this perswasion cannot be greater than that which is in the weaker of the premises But that sumption resteth on experimental signs weighed by mans private Conscience which being sometime doubted of whether they are true signs and sometimes hid by temptations that they cannot shine out to our comfort what wonder if Believers perswasion of their eternal Salvation be not always vegete and valide Besides that the very Principles of the Catholick-Faith though by revealed light clear in themselves yet being not known to us by certainty of evidence but only of Adhesion * * * Here I leave them with the School-men Adhesion as Durand confesseth supposeth or is strongest where there is evidence and such we have though not sensible ipsius rei yet veritatis testimâ—â—ii they beget not in us so firm an assent as mathematical demonstrations and common notions But in beholding them from the relicts of carnal diffidence some vapors as it were sometime arise by which the light of divine immutable verity seemeth to us to be resringed and to waver How much greater and daily is the errour of every Believer in the beholding of their own personal affiance 269. It is too certain by sad experience that a true Believer may lose much of the Grace which he once had and may die in a worse and weaker state 270. It is certain by Gods Word that the justified have need of warnings that they fall not away and of threatenings if they fall and Luk. 12. 4 5. Hâ—b 4. 1. 1 Cor. 9. 27. Heb. 12. 28 29. that they are obliged to fear it by a cautelous preventing fear that they may escape it 271. It is certain therefore that if the thing be denominated possible in relation to our own power it is not only possible that we should fall away but too certain that we should 272. But if the event be denominated possible or impossible in relation to Gods meer Decree or Fore-knowledge which as such do nihil They that are too favourable to the Dominicant predeterminants should remember how far their Doctrine of supernaturality of Grace hath carried them against all possibility of knowing not only our perseverance and Salvation but our present state of Grace For they say that nothing but Divine Revelation can assure any man that his acts are from a supernatural principle yea that only by the beatifical Vision which is by uncreated Species can the true difference between the acts of acquired and infused habits be known So Alvarez li. 6. disp 51. p. 232. Habitus virtutum Theologicalium solum divina revelatione cognoscuntur certo infallibiliter Immo Bannes addit quod non possunt â—videnter cognosci secundam suam ultimam differentiam per speciem aliquam creatam propter similitudinem quam habent actus charitatis infusae acquisitae non potest quis secusa divina revelatione cognoscere infallibiliter actum charitatis quem habet in via esse supernaturalem nec discernere certo utrum procedat effective ab habitu infuso vel acquisito aut a nuda potentia â— Besides Bannes he cites as his Consenters D. Toom p. 1. q. 62. a. 1. c. 1. d. 17. q. 1. a. 4. Sotus de Grat. li. 1. c. 22. corol 3. Cajet 22. q. 6. a. 1. And by this it appeareth that their very Doctrine of Infusion and Supernaturality in excess is the very ground of their denying all certainty of Justification and Salvation efficere ad extra without respect to his operative power so the Apostacy of the Elect is impossible logically or their perseverance necessary necessitate consequentiae in ordine probandi it being impossible that both these should be true Paul will apostatize and God decreeth the Paul shall not or fore-knoweth that he will not apostatize But posita nulla operatione divina ad extra it would be nevertheless possible in re in causis that such a one should fall away For all possibles are not futures Therefore as God may both fore-know and decree the nonfurity of a thing if a Negative needed a Decree and yet decree that it shall be possible So God may decree the futurity of a mans perseverance and yet decree that it shall be possible as to all Causes that â—e persevere not For he is supposed to decree only the determination of an undetermined Power but not antecedently to take it away and make it no free power 273. But if the Relation of possibility be denominated from Gods operative Grace effecting perseverance then God hath various Operations He can give his Grace by such an Omnipotent insuperable force as shall predetermine the faculty so far as antecedently to take away the moral power though not the natural ad contrarium And he can work in such a compliance with the liberty of the Will as shall only determine the power natural or moral to act and not antecedently take it away unless as determining it is a taking it away as to the contrary act at the same instant as every man taketh away his own power by acting when God operateth the first way antecedently taking away the power aâ— contrarium then the apostasie of a man is properly called Impossible in relation to the impotency of all other Causes to overcome God the cause of perseverance But when God only worketh the latter way not taking away the moral power ad contrarium but determining
Creatures and their various species of being is after by PROVIDENCE to manage them as Active or Passive in their several Capacities And the ACTIVE Natures are threefold which he hath made to operate on the threefold Passives viz. INTELLECTUAL SENSITIVE and IGNEOUS or VEGETATIVE in its proper matter upon AIR WATER and EARTH § 12. GOD is so Active as not to be at all PASSIVE All the Active Creatures are first Passive as receiving the Influx of the first Cause and Inferiours from the Superiour second Causes But they are Naturally Active in that dependence and supposing that Influx § 13. The works of Providence about the Existent Creatures are MOTION causing Motion GUBERNATION causing ORDER and ATTRACTION or meet objective Termination satisfying their Appetites and giving them their Ends. * * * Cyprianus sie explicat Act. 17. In ipso sumus movemur vivimus In Patre sumus in Filio vivimus in Spiritu Sancto movemur Pater est sons omnis essentiae Filius est Vita Spiritus Sanctus est agitator seu motor unde apud Hebr. nomen habet Ruah quod significat endelechiam continuam perennem agitationem Vid. Strigel in Melanct. Loc. com pag. 294. § 14. MAN being endowed by his Creator with his Image in Vital-Active-Power Intellect and Free-will a Threefold Virtue in One as the formal Essence of his soul is peculiarly fitted for such acts of Providence as he must be under § 15. As the higher and Nobler Natures are under God the Immediate 1. Movers 2. Governours of the Inferiour so also are they 3. Their Immediate or nearest End having a Goodness in them fitted to attract terminate and satisfie the Appetites of the Inferiour God is not the only end of Appetites § 16. The Acts of Divine PROVIDENCE about MAN-existent are 1. Action or Motion 2. Special Government 3. Love From whence God is Related to Man the fundamental Relation of CREATOR supposed †††I hold with Bradwardine li. 1. c. 2. cor 3. Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet creaturam immediatius quacunque cansa creata Et c. 3. cor 3. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere nisi Deus faciat illud idem immediatius quolibet alio faciente Et c. 4. cor 3. â—adem de Deo Motore â—aking immediation for proximity and facere movere for the action as such and not for the meer moral specification and comparability 1. As ACTOR vel MOTOR 2. As RECTOR 3. As AMICUS vel FINIS Lover Benefactor and End 1. ACTION as such is from God in the first relation 2. Action as ORDERED is by him in the second 3. Action as TERMINATED FINALLY and in perfection is in him in the third § 17. Creation inferreth Propriety and making us Good and inter bâ—na and ad bonum inferreth that God is our Benefactor So that ab origine he standing in these three Relations to us from what is past he is to dispose of us by Providence accordingly § 18. Gods Omnipotence is most conspicuous in Creation propriety and Motion His Wisdom in Governing and Order and his Good will in our Benefits efficiently and our Perfection finally in mutual Love § 19. MOTION is caused by Moving â—â—â—ce impressed ORDER moral by LAW or signification of Gods Will de debito And PERFECTION by attingency and union with our END § 20. From the first resulteth NECESSITY properly so called From the second Moral RECTITUDE In the third is FELICITY as to single persons § 21. From the first viz. God as Actor upon Many or the Universe ariseth CO-OPERATION or Concurse All things work together as the Wheels in a Watch. From the second Divine ORDERING ariseth HARMONY and from the third UNIVERSAL PERFECTION and Melody of the whole Creation and to man perfect Love § 22. Motion is unresistible unless by a greater or unequal Contrary Motion or passive impedition and its effect as such not free but Necessary Government by Law is resistible and obedience free Final Goodness or Love do perfect and felicitate necessarily and freely not effecting for so they are not now considered but satisfying so far as they are enjoyed § 23. The Creation being past and Beings existent except what Generation and Composition make unfearchably and Gods fundamental RELATIONS setled we shall confound and be confounded if we distin-guish not Gods after-actions according to the Relations in which he worketh them and their foresaid differences in themselves SECT II. The Order of Divine Operations § 1. GOD is the Immediate Cause of all things and actions caused * * * Bradwardine ib. p. 172. seemeth to favour Averrois saying that God is Forma omnis formae forma maxime essentialis principalis cujuscunque formati and so acteth all things And indeed when we deny him to be the form of any creature we mean that he is More and not Less And that we have not a fitter Analogical conception of God than that he is eminently more than the soul of the world And c. 14. p. 210. he calleth Necessarium the most proper name of God But when he saith c. 17. that Gods Essence Omnipotence Intellect Naturally precede Gods Knowledge and cause it and so putteth Causes and Effects in God he is too bold by him as to the Proximity of God to the effect For he is every where present in Essence and as near to every Being and Action as it is to it self We must not conceive of Gods using means as we do of mans where the Pen the Saw the Knife c. is between the hand and the effect God is as near and as total a Cause of what he doth as if he used no second cause § 2. They that say God is thus Causa Immediata Immediatione Suppositi seu Essentiae Virtutis speak true but not aptly because it ill insinuateth as if Gods Virtus were not his Essence when as in God they are all one only as inadequate conceptions we may distinguish suppositum à virtute but not otherwise And it is not as quid creatum that we speak of Virtus § 3. Since the Creation in the Motions of Providence God who at first made the Universe to be One by conjunction and co-operation of parts as truly as a Clock or Man is one hath setled a course of second Causes that one thing may act upon and move another and though he work upon the Highest of these Causes immediately without any other subordinate Cause yet on all the rest he ordinarily worketh by superiour created Causes which are some of them Necessary and operate in one constant course and some of them Voluntary and Free and operate more mutably and contingently § 4. The course of Necessitating Causes is commonly called NATURE and the Influence of Angels and other Voluntary Causes distinguished from Natural But they all operate as second Causes under the Influx and Government of God upon us that are here on earth § 5.
make this motion to be somewhat received before we act and yet nothing but our act which is absurd IV. Other Thomists hold that It is somewhat really distinct from our operations and that is Quoddam complementum virtutis activae quo actualiter agat And he that knoweth what predicament this complementum belongeth to and what it is let him take this opinion for more than a meer complement And here they tell you that they speak not of Gods simultaneous concurse for that Alvarez confesseth is nothing besides Gods essence and mans act But of his previous motion which he saith is somewhat more So Amesius Antisynod de Grat. c. 2. pag. 255. Satis esset apud omnes pios dicere Dei Velle sine ulla Impressione intercedente certe posse efficere ut Voluntas consentiat ipsius Vocationi I now meddle not with the truth of this and Twisses argument is easily answered But I intreat the Reader to note into what all our controversies are by these excellent men reduced who yet most aggravate them What now is the Gratia efficax ad credendum Nothing besides Gods esse but ipsa fides Is faith effective of it self No. Is Gods essential will effective of it Who ever denyed it What place is there for Controversies of sufficiency and efficacy when it is but Gods essence and the known effect of which they speak and hold not as Alvarez doth any motion or Impress made by God upon mind or will at all Gods will then is effectual quia vult effectum and it is virtually sufficient for whatever he willeth not but could will But then no man can possibly do any more good or less evil than he doth because no more or less is willed of God which volition is the first necessary Cause of all things And is not all their Volumes de Auxiliis Gratiae and the several sorts previous simultaneous operating co-operating c. meerly vain when there is no such thing as any Grace besides Gods meer will and the Act of man And yet Dr. Twisse elsewhere saith that Gods Decrees do nihil ponere in objecto As if they differed in the nature of motion And he saith that this is true both of supernatural acts which are from Infused habits as faith hope Love and of Imperfect supernaturals as fear of hell and attrition by which man is remotely prepared for Justification ◠which proceed not from supernatural habits but from the spirits special impulse not yet inhabiting but moving And Alvarez thus concludeth I. That which God doth in second causes by which these act is Aliquid habens esse quoddam incompletum per modum quò colores sunt in aere virtus artis in instrumento artificis It is Aliquid incompletum transiens cum ipsa operatione Are you ever the wiser for all this II. Hoc ens incompletum praevium actioni causae secundae producitur in illa effective à solo Deo nullo modo dependet efficienter ex influx◠ipsius causae secundae And therefore herein the will is passive though not in its own Act as he falsly affirmeth Luther to assert for what can act and not be active III. When second causes natural or supernatural have by their inherent form sufficient Active virtue per modum actus primi proportioned with the effect then Gods premotion is not a Quality but proprio vocabulo dicitur Motio Virtuosa by which the universal cause maketh the second actually operate according to its proper mode Therefore it is not a Habit or disposition or natural power IV. Yea in Imperfect supernatural acts as fear of hell which go before habits and by preventing grace are elevated to the acts it is not a Quality but Motio Dei virtuosa by which they are done and is of the same sort with that which causeth acts from habits V. This previous Motion is Really distinct from the operation of the second cause and is not our act it self but is immediately from God Which he useth many arguments to prove And can all this give any man a formal conception what it is which he calleth aliquid incompletum and Motio Virtuosa We know not what the Vis projectis impressa is in corporeals And can we tell how spirits and how the God of spirits maketh his Impressions or what the word Impression or Motion here signifieth We know that we know it not if we know what we know and know-not And why is it called Motio Virtuosa Virtus he maketh a quality It is no quality and yet Virtuosa Omnis motio est Actio Is it Actio Increata Then it is God himself which he denyeth and speaketh of somewhat between God and mans Act. Is it Actio creata Then it is a Modus Agentis for so is every Action as such as distinct from its effect in patiente And if so it cannot be modus Dei for then it is Ipse Deus And if it be modus hominis it is either homini◠agentis vel patientis If the first then it is mans Action If the second it is formally no action For modus patientis is passio though many would confound action and passion with saying after their Masters that Actio est in patiente which is equivocation So that the plain truth is that mans understanding can reach no further than to conceive 1. That our souls are the termini of Gods Volition and Active power 2. That though God act not on us by corporeal contact yet we must call our selves Patients and think of the Attingency of his Active essence with its effects by some Analogie of Corporeal attingency contact and impressed moving force But truly to know how God toucheth moveth operateth on any Creature and by what Impressions or what there is indeed between Gods essence and mans Act we know not at all And if Christ had never said Joh. 3. so is every one that is born of the spirit our own experience might have told us that we know it not Boldly then tell our Church-distracting wranglers that contend about the nature sufficiency efficacy resistibility of this Act of Grace that they know not the very subject of their disputes And shall we still fire the Church by striving about words that profit not but subvert the hearers and tend to the increase of ungodliness Yea and shall bold blind zeal use the Reverend names of God and his precious Truth to colour and countenance these pernicious contentions I grant that the nature of Grace and the concord of it with Free-will may be soberly treated of But when men have followed the controversie beyond the ken of humane understanding and there will proceed to build great Fabricks upon unknown suppositions and perversly contend for them against Love and peace they do but serve Satan against God under the colour of his sacred truth and name And I think it not amiss here to tell you what Alvarez saith to this Question de Aux l. 12. disp 118. p.
causeth no antecedent necessity but concomitant existentiae 3. This supposeth Gods Scientia futuri conditionalis Against this Dr. Twisse hath said much in a peculiar Digression And surely God ever operateth as God which is ut Causa prima But how far he determineth is the doubt i a capable object of knowledge And therefore he knoweth what conditional propositions of future contingents are true 2. Whether this should be called scientia media or not is a vain question 3. Gods acts ex parte sui being but his Essence and all one can no otherwise be distinguished nor ordered as to the denominations of priority or posteriority than as the objects are distinct and by their order of priority and posteriority allow us by Connâ—tation so to denominate the acts 4. The Intelligibility and the Amability of things are in themselves simultaneous though from the order of humane operations we say that things are first Intelligible before they are Amiable And so we may say of God after the manner of men but not otherwise 5. God doth not will the form or the act of sin as circumstantiated and as the form necessarily resulteth from it neither for it self nor propter aliud the essence or existence 6. Therefore God doth not foreknow sin as willed and decreed by him nor therefore foreknow it because he willeth it 7. God fore-knoweth or knoweth the formale peccati as well as the materiale yet almost all confess that he willeth not the formale Therefore he knoweth that which he willeth not Therefore his Volition of it is not necessary to his knowledge of it 8. There is no effect in God for all that is in God is God who is not effected Therefore there is no Cause in God of any thing in God Therefore Gods will or decree of Good is not the cause that he foreknoweth it noâ— his foreknowledge the cause that he willeth it But he both knoweth and willeth all that is Good at once 9. Gods inward operations on the soul are real efficiencies and yet moral and to us unsearchable They cause the will to determine it self to Good when it doth so but how we know not But we know that he ordinarily worketh by means and according to their aptitude 10. God useth such means with the free wills of his elect as he foreknoweth will prevail with them and setteth them in such circumstances as he foreknoweth they will freely act aright in But his inward grace is the principal or chief cause And he doth not will or decree to give them such means and circumstances because he foreknoweth they will prevail That is Gods will and decree as in him hath no cause 11. But the word because is in Scripture applyed sometimes to Gods Love or hatred and sometimes to his outward acts as John 16. 27. The Father loveth you because ye have loved me and believed And in the first case that which is meant is that the qualification of the object is the material constitutive cause of the act of God not as it is Himself but as relatively denominated ab extra from the object in specie vel individuo And in the second case It meaneth that the effects of God ad extra called his transient acts as in passo have their proper uses and we our commanded ends in using them And so God is said to send Ministers e. g. because he would save the hearers that is the Ministry is a cause of mens â—â—lvation 12. From all this it appeareth that they err who think that their scientia media is equally useful in the points of Election and of Reprobation and that they run pari passa For all Good is both willed and known and so Election supposeth not the foresight of our faith or obedience as causal or antecedent if we speak of that Act of Election which is to faith and obedience But Evil is foreknown and not willed at all And therefore there is no such Reprobation which is a will or decree that men shall sin And the non-impedition of sin being no act needeth no positive act of will or decree * * * Yet none of the stress of their differences lyeth on this And the Jesuits with the rest assert a Positive Volition de peccato permittendo without proof which I leave to â—uens various opinions But Reprobation which is the decree of damning ever supposeth the object to be a foreseen-sinner finally rejecting grace The rest about this is spoken to sufficiently before §. IV. II. Of Durandus 's way II. AS to the way of Aureolus Durandus Ludov. à Dola c. I conceive it is commonly rejected because not understood or because the wording of it soundeth disgracefully But it is a great matter that all confess how easily it would end all these controversies were it true And by Lud. à Dola's Explication and what Capreolus saith of Aureolus I conceive that they are commonly mistaken Durandus thinketh that to the motion of the Creature it is necessary 1. That God by his continued No doubt but God is quoad praesentiam Immediate in all his efficiency and as Near to the effect as if he used no second cause But yet he is not so immediate as to exclude second causes as media And while he useth them he operateth on us according to their kind of operations even as if they were between him and the effect And this is the sense of Durandus and à Doâ—a and easily reconcileth all Amyraldus de lib. Arbit c. 4. concurreth with Durandus It is consâ—derable that all confess that if Durandus's way did hold it easâ—ly ended all the controversie As Lud. le Blank noteth Thes 3. de Concurs Juxta hos doctores nulla est difficultas in conciliando divino concursu cum libertate c. And this way is as consistent with Gods certain disposal of events as predetermination it self influx continue the being and the nature and properties of the agent 2. And that he continue all the circumstant creatures concauses and objects and the media of action 3. And that no powerful impediment hinder the action Now say the Jesuits and Dominicans and the rest God doth moreover concurr as the first cause to the Act it self by an Immediate efficient Influx besides that by which he upholdeth the Power and second Causes But I think that Durandus meaneth as much as they that is that God doth not only uphold the creature in its meer esse but in its Nature which is its Mobility and its principium motus And this Nature is not only a Power to Action but also an Inclined Power So that for God by constant Influx to continue a Natural Power and Inclination to Action or motion with all necessary concurrents without impediments is truly by his Influx to concurr to the motion as the first Cause while his Influx is not only as to Being but as to the Motive force and inclination And no more than this doth seem to me
to be simply necessary to motion Here the Reader must know that the Controversie is equally of Natural and Free agents and action And first let us enquire of natural action I. Fire is an Active nature as much Inclined to Action as Earth to non-action or rest Yea it s Active Virtue and Inclination is its very Essential Form and this as to a threefold action viz. Motion Light and Heat If God then make Fire and continue its Nature or Essential Inclination For I have before shewed how many wayes this is certainly done The whole experience of the world sheweth that God doth operate by second causes according to their natures and wayes of operation Therefore it more concerneth us here to know what second causes do on the soul in good and evil actions than in these disputes is usually observed Adrian Quodl 3. fol 18. Sententia Durandi plurium aliorum certum tenet c. Quam opinionem ultimo tradit Magister 37. d. 2. judicium relinquens prudentis lectoris examini to these acts and continue fuel approximate with all necessary concauses and media without impediments to say that this Fire yet cannot burn or act without another kind of Divine premotion besides all this even an Immediate physical impulse besides the described Influx is a plain contradiction For Fire is essentially an Inclined Power to act And that which hath a true Power to act can act It 's a contradiction to say It hath power but it cannot And a Power naturally inclined to act will act caeteris paribus The question then is Whether it be an impossibility for fire to burn if God do but as the first Cause of Nature continue its burning power and inclination with all concauses or rather Was it not a Miracle for the three Confessors Dan. 3. not to be burnt in that fiery Furnace If you say that the Miracle was in Gods withholding his additional premotion you then imply that God as principium vel causa prima Naturae doth ordinarily give that additional premotion For that is no Miracle which is not dissonant from the common course of nature But nothing can belong to God as the Cause of Nature but to continue Nature as he made it and he actually premoveth and concurreth while by his Influx as the first cause he continueth all its Moving Nature both Power and Inclination In the motus projectorum so far as the moving vis impressa continueth and prevaileth the motion continueth accordingly And who can prove that though the vis impressa continue e. g. in a Bullet shot out of a Gun and all concauses yet there can be no motion unless God otherwise thrust it on or move it by some other impulse Suppose a Stone or Rock hang in the Air quasi per filum or by somewhat that hindereth its descent If God continue the Natural Gravity of that Rock which is not only a power but an inclination to descend and if he continue all concauses and media and if the thred be cut or the impediment removed that held up the stone yet saith the Dominican this Stone cannot fall unless God moreover by another action thrust it down or by an efficient physical premotion predetermine it or as the Jesuits say unless God concurr with a further moving Impulse A plain contradiction That a Power of motion strongly inclined to act so as a greater power is necessary in the impediment that will hinder it and this in genere Agentis continued by Divine Influx yet cannot act unless otherwise moved God worketh so constantly by Natural Inclinations of second causes as fully proveth to us that ut prima Causa Naturae he hath decreed so to work And how is that then but by his Influx into Nature as Nature If my house cannot fall when the foundations and pillars are gone unless God otherwise thrust it down If I cannot fall though I leap down from the house top unless God otherwise thrust me down If the Town cannot be fired unless God predetermine it or concurr besides his continuation of Nature why should we fear it when we know not that God decreeth any more than the continuation of natural causes and that action which is by them and by him as the upholder of them II. And the case of Free-agents is here confessed to be the same The Influx into their Natures and Virtues is it that continueth them in esse substantiali and in esse movente moto An Act is but the modus substantiae And it surpasseth my understanding to conceive what it is for God physice influere in actum immediate non in potentiam seu virtutem agentem nor how he can be said to move the faculties to act that doth cause the act and not meddle with and therefore not move the faculty Nor know I how an Act immediately and not the agent can be the terminus of a physical motion Though it 's easie to conceive how God should cause an act by moral and extrinsick objective means Therefore as God moveth things Natural by his Influx into their moving Virtues or into the moving Virtues of second Causes which being Active operate on passive matter so as the Soul and its Will is quadam natura inclined to Action in genere and to will good in special God as the cause of nature moveth it by his Influx into the faculty as he doth other natural agents But having made it a Free self-determining Agent his Influx upholdeth and moveth it as such And the same Influx is upholding and moving and moving as upholding seeing God as Motor also doth influere in naturam vitalem liberam Besides which supporting and moving Influx no other predetermining premotion is necessary to an Act as an Act that I know of But the very natures or dispositions of lapsed man being depraved the reparation of them is necessary to holy actions And here also God operateth on the faculties by right disposing them and by that grace which Augustine and Jansenius well call Gratia medicinalis his special Influx causing maintaining and actuating it he causeth the holy actions of believers I do verily believe that Durandus and his followers under the name of supporting the natural and free faculties did mean inclusively that which Bellarmine pleadeth for A General Concurse to the Act as an Act And that they differ in words and not in sense And if his doctrine hold not true I cannot see how God can be said to Permit mens sinful Actions or any action at all For if neither the Inclination of natural agents as of Fire to burn a Stone to descend c. nor the Inclination of the most wicked nature would cause any act unless God otherwise cause it by premotion then there is no place for Impedition for we cannot be said to Hinder a Stone from speaking or a Mountain from walking nor anything from any act which it could not as And permittere is non impedire And
circumstantially but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency as the first Cause besides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and concauses and affordeth them his general Concurse or premotion to the act as an act in genere only And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermined by physical premotion not to act in all the circumstances that it is so moved to act in II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances or can forbear to act when so predetermined is by consequence to say that such a creature is God the first cause For it is as impossible as to be God or to make a World III. Yea the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to must be stronger than God and overcome him or do contradictions IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion he could not have known any future acts No though with Scotus we say that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience it would not serve unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them V. Yet we will say that the Will is free but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth and his Willing is not a Nilling VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis rationis â—d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum ad agendum unum vel alterum sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur That is it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will by making it will yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive but also Active because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth God predetermineth the will to determine it self VII We will call this the wills Power but it is but hypothetically a Power viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it else not at all As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them or rather as the hand can move if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it VIII The will is said to be free partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God and then by it self ad utrumlibet and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction IX The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God is not constrained because it willeth not unwillingly that is so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant X. Yet the will that was one way enclined habituated and acted in the precedent instant is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant which it could not resist As he that in this instant wilâ—eth Chastiâ—y may in tâ—e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipâ—tency to will fornication or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by God to hate him the next moment But we will not call this irresistible efficiency coaction because it is ad Volendum and so in ipso actâ— there is no reluctancy or resistance XI When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill or not will to will this or that and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such yet the moral specification of that Act to this proposed object rather than that as to hate God rather than to hate sin or to this Act rather than to that as to hate God rather than to Love him or to speak a lye rather than the truth hath so much Entity in it that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say that man can do it without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion XII God made the Law which forbiddeth sin and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law and God made and ordereth all the objects temptations and concauses and God by the said efficient physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances As when David was deliberating Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it or else he could not possibly have done it And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum fundamentum terminum nor can it possibly be but it must exist per nudam resultantiam hisce positis And yet though God make the man the Law the act the object and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a meer relation we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin XIII Yea though the Habits of sin are certain Entities and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature according to our principles who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity yet we are resolved to say that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin XIV Yet we will say that he is an enemy to Gods Providence that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness unless God thus predetermine both Will Tongue Hand and every active part to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale but not as to the formale And yet we must confess that the Relation is caused by causing the subject foundation and term all which God principally doth and can be caused no otherwise XVI But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation which is nothing Therefore man and not God is the cause of it For God cannot be a deficient cause nor have any privation And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience in curvity as in rectitude in disconformity as in conformity 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations such as death is though not a subject of them even such a cause as they can have 3. Nor that some of ours even Alvarez say that sins of commission and habits are positive in their formale 4. And sin is such a Nothing as is mans misery and he is damned for and by And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause man can no more be the cause of it than God 5. And that the Reason of non existences negations or privations is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the first necessary cause of the contrary as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency And if a man cannot
usu ut in auditâ— verbi cum attentione meditatione virâ—ute sua efficaci singulis excitis liberrime sine coactionis impulsu raptâ— nova luce accensa in mente nova vero virtute voluntati communicata c. Qui assentiuntur obsequâ—ntur spiritui sancto virtute ejusdem id faciunt non tamen sine actione motu annixu Id. p. 722. Still note that the Grace called sufficient is that which giveth the Power without the Act Therefore as many things concur to denominate us able so do they to sufficiency of Grace Malderus in 12. qu. 111. â— 3. d. 3. saith Recte quidam eruditus annotavit neque praedicationem aut excitationem externam neque internam illuminationem intellectus simpliciter esse gratiam sufficientem quamvis in sâ—o genere quaeque sufficiens dici potest c. sed voluntas per boni affectus aspirationem supernaturali motione excitanda est Our Bradward shortneth all the Controversie li. 13. cor p. 208 109. telling us that Gods Will is the cause of every future and so of the future form of sin and that if there were no God there would be no Impossibile Whereas I think there would be nothing but impossibles For it would be impossible that any thing should ever be But there would be no propositions de impossibili Nay he talks of a non-posse esse impossibile and calls this mirum corrollarium Adrian Quodl 3. fol. 16. Quis duplicitur potest crederese a peccatis abstinere non posse 1. Quod non posset sine speciali Dei gratia adjutorio sic non errat 2. Absolute credendo se non abstinere posse a peccata aut non posse ad vitandum peccata a Deo sufficiens auxilium impetraâ—â— etiamsi fecerit quod in se est Et hic error est species infidelitatis opposita fidei ad quam obligatur credendo Deum juste pie miscricorditer mundum gubernare Illi-enim manifestissime repugnat apud nunquemque sanae mentis Deum homini imputare ad culpam ad quod vitandum nec dedit nec dare paratus est sufficientem facultatem homini inquam facienti totum quod in se est medium helps concauses c. B. You say true But remember still that this is from no change in the natural faculty as you confess For it was never in any man a power e. g. to act without dependance on God nor to act without an Object in Specie nor to act on an incongruous uncapable Object nor without a due medium and necessary concauses Now if you mean that the change is not on mans faculties but on the Objects Medium Causes c. that men do not love God while unholy you are notoriously mistaken For it is Sin that hindereth And God is the same God and Christ the same Christ and the Word the same and oft the preaching the same to a Believer and an Unbeliever So that though outward helps and hinderances do much the inward cause is most considerable And if all were right within it were no sin in us to be disabled by outward changes It is no sin not to hear without a Preacher or not to see that which is invisible or not to understand that which is not Intelligible or not to love that which is not Amiable or that which is by distance or unfit mediums made no Object of our Acts no more than not to touch the Moon or not to see into the bowels of the Earth Therefore though it 's true that the Will is related as a power to capable Objects and not as a power to things that by incapacity are no Objects yet the change that is made on it self by Sin and Grace doth not make it no power and a power in this natural essential sense It is one thing that is called natural power or faculty and another thing that is called Aright disposition or habit Therefore as to the first the Soul of every man hath a true natural power to repent believe and love God and they omit it not for want of natural power but of something else A. Call it then a moral power if you will B. We must so call it But you must know what that is It is not a power of the same sort with the natural power The very word Power is equivocal or analogous to them Else Grace should increase the Essence of the Soul or make a man to be more a man than he was before And Dr. Twisse derideth the Arminians for saying that potentia fundatur in potentia viz. Moralis in naturali which were very just if it were powers of the same kind that were spoken of but now being otherwise it is unjust for no doubt but potentia moralis is in potentia naturali as health is in the Body Quest 4. But I further ask you Do you think that any men do now in an unregenerate state love God above all and live a holy heavenly life yea or effectually and savingly believe by the meer power of their natural faculties till they are changed A. No that 's a contradiction to be unholy and holy I am none of those Pelagians that make Grace unnecessary to mans cure B. Are you not convinced then that where the natural power is existent something is wanting without which the acts of Holiness will not be performed Tell me then what that is A. That which is wanting to a man that hath sufficient Grace is nothing but his own Concurrence or Will For without any special Grace differing from sufficient he can believe But that which is wanting to them that have it not is sufficient Grace it self for believing which they want for abusing the antecedent Grace sufficient for preparation B. We speak not now of Grace as efficient ex parte Dei agentis But of Grace as it is in us or an effect of the former what is it in man that is wanting to believing Is it a natural Power or a right Disposition or what A. Till a man have sufficient Grace to believe it is proper strength or power it self that he wanteth and sufficient Grace is such a power But when he hath it he wanteth nothing but the Act which he can excite and doth not B. I confess I find Arminius Arnoldus Corvinus and others granting that all men are unable to believe till Grace enable them and more than so saith Arnoldus There is more strength or power necessary now to believe in Christ than was necessary to Adam to keep all the Law partly because of the mysteriousness of Faith and partly because we must first be restored to a new ability which requireth more power than to keep what we had A sly equivocation turning the question from the potentia operata to the potentia operans If it did require more power in the efficient so to renew us it followeth not that he thereby putteth more power into us than Adam had But Gods Power hath no degrees
stir up their distast of others B. The question may have three several senses of passiveness as man is considered 1. In his Nature 2. In his Action And therein 1. In the reception of the Divine Influx 2. In the acting thereupon And so the questions are 1. VVhether mans Soul be an active nature or passive matter only 2. VVhether mans Soul be meerly passive in the reception of the Divine Influx ad agendum 3. VVhether mans Soul be meerly passive in its own first act of Faith or Repentance Tell me Are not these three distinct questions And are they not all that you can devise unless you will make another whether we are merly passive in the preparatory part And are you not now ashamed to confess that you need any answer to any one of these three questions I. All the world is agreed save the Hobbists and Somatists and Sadduces that mans Soul is not meer passive nature but is an active nature inclined to Action as passive Elements are to non-action And that when God moveth it he moveth not Earth Water or Air but a Spirit whose nature is self-moving as fire under the first mover II. All the world is agreed that the Soul and all Spirits are not so purely and meerly active as God is but are partly and first passive and that they do and needs must be receptive of the Divine Influx before they can act For all Creatures depend on the first Cause and both Being Nature and Action would cease if Gods emanation to it ceased And all the world agreeth that no man before Conversion or after doth any act of Faith Love c. no nor eating and drinking and going c. but he is in the first instant passive as influenced by God before he is active Who ever doubted whether physice recipere be pati Did you ever know such a man III. All the world is agreed that man is not meerly passive when he acteth An Act is an Act sure And to believe repent and love is an Act and an act of mans Soul And Scotus who thinketh that immanent Act are qualities as we think of habits yet thinketh that the Soul is truly active antecedently to that quality Where now is there any room for a Controversie C. You would make me believe that we are very ignorant Wranglers that make a noise in our dream and will not suffer others to rest Do not the Arminians say that man concurreth with God to the first act of his own Faith yea that he maketh Gods Grace effectual B. You shall not again tempt me to anticipate the question of effectual Grace though enough is said before to it as far as this Objection is concerned in it Gods Influx on the Soul is one thing mans natural faculty receiving that Influx passively is another And mans Act is another To thrust in here a general word man concurreth and so to run away from clear and necessary distinction is not the part of a man of knowledge Did ever man yet deny that man herein concurreth as aforesaid 1. Man concurreth not to make his Soul nor to continue it in being or power 2. Man concurreth not as any efficient of Gods Influx on his Soul ad agendum 3. But man receptively or passively concurreth as a Receiver of that Influx 4. And man actively thereupon concurreth to believe and repent Is not all this true But you would tempt the Arminians to say that it is you and not they that are herein to be accused For what mean you else by confining the Controversie to the first act of Faith or to our first Conversion Would you make men believe that a converted man is not as truly passive in believing loving God c. as the unconverted is Must not the holiest person be passive in receiving the Divine Influx on his Soul before he do any holy Act You seem to deny this and then you are the person that err by ascribing too much to man If not shew the difference C. There is a habit of Faith goeth before the first Act And it is in respect to that habit that the Arminians say we are active procurers of it which we deny But the godly operate from a habit B. You speak a private Opinion of your own brain against the sense of the Concordant Churches Where doth Scripture say that a habit of Faith goeth before the first Act Mr. Pemble * Vind. Gratâ— saith so indeed yet he sometime calleth that but a Seed which at other times he calleth a habit Dr. Ames in his Medulla contradicteth it Bishop Downame * In the end of his Treatise Of Perseverance Le Blank de diss Grat. 2. Thes 22. speaking of our being passive as to operating Grace saith truly Non videntur hac in parte Reformati a sanioribus inter Scholasticos dissentire licet aliis verbis mentem suam exprimant The School-men and Protestants little differ in the method of operations of Grace and all are drawn by Controversies too near curiosity beyond their reach hath written a large Confutation of Mr. Pemble The generality of Protestant Divines contradict it and thus with Rollock de Vocat distinguish Vocation from Sanctification that they suppose Vocation to cause the first act of Faith and Repentance and Sanctification to give us the fixed habit the act intervening Mr. Tho. Hooker is large upon it in his Souls Vocation Will you start one mans Opinion which Calvinists and Arminians are against and feign this to be a difference between Calvinists and Arminians And perhaps Mr. Pemble himself by his first semen or habit meaneth no more than the Divine Influx ad actum received I have before told you how unsearchable the nature of that Influx is and how hard it is to know the true nature of an Habit. C. But Mr. Pemble saith It is the Spirit that is given before we believe B. Away with Ambiguity By the Spirit is meant either the meer received Influx of the Spirit ad agendum and so it is granted Bad men receive the Spirits Influx to such acts as he moveth them to Or else you mean the foresaid fixed Habits and Dispositions to a ready and facile ordinary Operation Or else you mean the Spirit given relatively by Covenant undertaking to be the Sanctifier and Preserver of the Soul In both these latter senses the Spirit is not given before the first act of Faith to Infidels They have not the fixed habits of Holiness Love Hope Obedience c. Otherwise they were holy Infidels No Scripture speaketh it nay contrarily it promiseth the Spirit as to Believers and affirmeth it given after Faith Eph. 1. 13. Joh. 14. 17. 15. 26. Gal. 3. 14. 4. 6. Joh. 7. 39. And that the Holy Ghost is not given in Covenant to Infidels I need not prove to them that will not baptize Infidels The sixth Crimination C. They hold that none are damned only for Adam's sin imputed * Yes Vasqu and other
by it self anon Before we come to that these things I here conclude of 1. That the Diversity of Nature or Receptive Dispositions being presupposed God hath an established order of means and a congruous established universal Concurse which quantum in se as far as belongeth to it to do worketh equally on all 2. That this established measure of aid or concurse recipitur ad modum recipientis and operateth variously as to the effects according to the various disposition of the Recipients from whom the ratio diversatis is to be fetcht and not from it 3. That this established measure of Concurse or aid may by the greatness of the Passive and Active Indisposition and Illdisposition of the Recipient be both resisted and overcome or frustrate 4. That as Adam did resist and overcome such Grace so do all wicked Hi praecedanâ—i effectus virtute verbi spiritusque in hominum mentibus producti rebellis voluntatis vitio suffocari penitus extingui pâ—ssuâ—t in multis solent adeâ— ut nonnulli in quorum mentibus virtute verbi spiritusque impressâ— fuit aliqualis notitia veritatis divinae c. mutentur plane in contrarium c. And even Alvarez Disp 18. n. â—0 saith Si non operatur actione qui est in praeceptâ— imputabitur illi ad culpam eo quod suâ— culpa se impedivit ne dareter illi auxilium efficax quod necessarium erat ut actualiter operaretur sicut si Deus imponeret homini prâ—ceptum volandi quantum est ex parte sua offerret illi alas adjutorium necessarium uâ— volaret ipse autem responderet Dâ—mine nec vâ—lâ— alas accipere nec volâ—re meritâ— reputaretur reus etiamsâ— non possit absque alis volare qâ—ia sua culpaâ—se impedirit ne illi dâ—narentâ—r a Deâ— men in some cases now And so do all godly men in most of the sins if not all which they commit 5. As God rarely worketh Miracles and we hardly know when he violateth his established course of nature though we may know when he worketh beyond the power of any second cause known to us and when he leaveth his ordinary way but ordinarily keepeth to his established course and use of the second causes even in his wonders So it is very probable that in the Works of Grace Recovery and Salvation he ordinarily keepeth to his established order his Ordinances and fixed degree of Concurse 6. Yet as God is still above all his Works and a free Agent and is no further tied to one constant order and measure of Concurse than he tieth himself by his Wisdom and Free-will so God is free in the conveyance of his Grace and can when he please forsake that order and work Miracles by Grace as well as on natural things above nature He can strike down Saul and convert him by a voice from Heaven and in a word can do what he will 7. And as in most wonders its past our power to know whether and when God doth indeed forsake his established order and work contrary to it or without such second causes as are unknown to us though we can tell when he acteth unusually So is it in this case about his works of Grace A Comet or Blazing Star is an unusual thing whose necessary antecedent cause we know not And yet it is but a natural effect of second causes operating in their established course so are ecclipses better known and unusual Tempests and terrible Lightnings c. So great and sudden unusual and wonderful changes may be made by Grace on sinners and yet all in Gods established course of working and by those second causes which are to us unknown C. But God is not a natural but a voluntary Agent and Grace is hiâ— immediate work or off-spring B. 1. He is a voluntary Agent in Creation Preservation and in all the works and changes of nature and yet he operateth constantly in his appointed course 2. It s unknown to us what means he useth out of our reach in his operations upon souls as well as in nature 3. We find that Grace keepeth a harmony with nature yeâ— as morality is but the modality of things natural so we may conceive that God may possibly work it by the modifying of physical Agents and their actions and the recipients 4. Immutability and constancy is one of Gods perfections and the expression of it in the constant order of his Works is part of his glory in the world Though our mutable Free-wills are better than the fixed or necessitated appetite of Bruits that is not as they are mutable and the acts contingent but as they have a higher object But the fixed unchangeable wills of the Glorified Angels and Saints are far better than ours And why should we think unsetled mutability of efficiency to be the best discovery of Gods Immutability 5. But yet we grant that God is free to do what he please C. But it is by fixed second causes that God keepeth a fixed order of natural productions and alterations in the world But you can name no such universal second cause of Grace affording under God a resistible Influx as the Sun doth in Nature B. What will you say if I name you such a second universal cause though if I could not it followeth not that therefore there is none such I think I can name you one that all Christians should know and yet it seems is not well by Divines themselves considered JESUS CHRIST as MAN and MEDIATOR is Gods Administrator General of the humane world and is compared to the Rising Sun which illuminateth all the world with a light suitable to it and them So Christ is the light of the world the Sun of Righteousness that ariseth with healing Grace and enlightneth every man that cometh into the world or as Crotius and Hammond render it which coming into the world enlightneth every man supposing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the Nominative Case and Neuter Gender and not the Accusative Masculine In him was Life and the Life was the light of men not only to the sanctified who received but uneffectually though quoad se sufficiently the light shined in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not The world that was made by him knew him not He came to his own and his own received him not yet he came to them But as many as received him to them gave he power to become the sons of God John 1. 3 10 11. It is apparent in Scripture that all power in Heaven and Earth is given to Christ Matth. 28. 19 20. that all things are delivered into his hands John 13. 3. and God hath given him power over all flesh John 17. 2. and he is head over all things to the Church Ephes 1. 22 23. C. We all grant that Christ is an universal light and Saviour 1. Objectively 2. And as to his Doctrine Covenant and Example But what 's that to internal efficient Grace which is immediately from God
finem Now either there is such a middle Impulse or not If not then besides Gods essence there is no effect on us antecedent to our consent but the said cogitation and passion And 1. These are commonly said not to necessitate the will 2. And if they do it must be but Morally which is commonly held to be no way of necessitating though it may be of ascertaining the event And so consent or our Volition it self would be but of co-operating Grace And if there be such a middle Impulse as Gregory holdeth it is confessed by him and the Dominican praedeterminants to determine the will only to act freely and therefore not to necessitate it to consent but only to ascertain it and so the Volition will be as free as but by co-operating Grace though the Impulse would be necessary which tendeth to it of a special Grace for every preparatory Act. But of the rest I doubt B. And then 2. Sure you cannot deny it as to well prepared Souls 1. Because you granted that the same degree of help may be effectual to a disposed Soul 2. And so the Help though universal will to a prepared Soul be proportionable to the desired effect and is nevertheless Grace or powerful to such for being universal or uneffectual to others 3. And it seems that such a kind of degree of Grace was effectual on Adam before his fall and uneffectual in his fall 4. And it seemeth congruous to Gods other works that he give Grace suitable to his Law and Promise which shall not be always uneffectual So that it is most probable that to prepared Souls that ordinary established degree of the Spirits Influx from Christ which is universal but uneffectual to the unprepared is not only sometimes but ordinarily effectual I think none can prove the contrary And the same Grace you confess to be effectual to preparation But to unprepared Souls whom God will suddenly convert out of the ordinary way a special extraordinary operation seemeth necessary But wherein the extraordinariness of it consisteth antecedent to faith the second effect besides the extraordinary means I think it past mans reach to know C. Well now tell us Unde Gratia fit Efficax B. Any ordinary Logician will tell you that the effect is from all the causes and not from any one alone It is effectual in that it produceth the effect To which each cause doth its proper part and one is not all The effect in question now is Faith Faith is caused as is said 1. By Gods will as the Original 2. By Christ as sending the Spirit and meriting Grace first 3. By the Spirit as the Operator 4. By the Gospel as the Instrument 5. By the Preacher as a Sub-Instrument 6. But all this effecteth ordinarily in materia disposita and no other Having before wrought that preparation 7. But extraordinarily in materia indisposita working disposition and all at once Now here 1. Gods Will doth its part without any cause Velle ex parte Dei sicuâ— agere is his essence and the termination of it in rem Volitatam hath no efficient but only an Objective Cause 2. This prime Cause is the prime reason of all the efficacy of Inferior Causes Not qua voluntas simply moving them but qua voluntas cum potentia executiva moving them and qua volitio inferreth the necessitatem consequentiae of the effect So that plainly I think that no Good cometh to pass in the world but what God forewilled and nothing which he absolutely willeth cometh not to pass what he fore-knoweth is necessary necessitate Infallibilitatis and what he absolutely willeth necessitate Imutabilitatis and what he worketh from such a will is necessary necessitate invincibilitatis 3. Though all the other Causes are the reason of the effect and not only the first yet none of them operate on the first Cause and put any force into it for the act So that its force is from it self but theirs from it And having said this much preparatorily I thus resolve your great question Here are three things before us whose cause may be enquired of 1. The necessitas Logica consequentiae ex quo in ordine probandi necessario sequitur eventum futurum esse And this is the Decree or Will of God yea and his fore knowledge This is presupposed 2. The prime effect of Gods Will and Active power operating And this prime effect is not our Faith or Act but the Impression or Received Influx of God on the Soul For the Soul receiveth its like some Impression by the Divine Influx by which it believeth or acteth it self It doth not Receive its own Act as if that act had been first pre-existent in the Donor but it performeth that Act because it is premoved to it Now if the question be of this first effect Unde operatio Gratiosa sit efficax I answer 1. The whole efficient reason is in the operator and operation it self It is effectual ad impressionem ex natura rei because it is an Act If it did nothing it were no Act transient 2. And the specification and individuation is from the terminating object It is denominatively and Relatively one Act which is on a Stone and another on a Soul de specie And it is numerically one which is on Peter and another on John If the Sun did shine in vacuo there being no other creature to be objective or passive it would still agere but it would nihil efficere quia nihil afficere So God is one Infinite act and ex parte sui never begineth to act nor ever ceaseth nor is divided But transiently he doth nihil afficere vel efficere but first by making objects and then acting on them So that were there no mobile Gods act would not movere This first effect then of Impress hath an Effective and an Objective Cause The Effective Cause is Gods Essence that is his Active Power Intellect and Will and nothing else Supposing now that it be not Gods operation on the Instrument or medium that we speak of but immediately on the Soul it self But Man's Soul is the Objective Recipient Cause of this first effect which is the Impress or Influx received 3. The Secondary effect is Mans Act Faith and Repentance it self If the question Unde Gratia sit efficax mean this as with most it doth then it is all one as to ask Unde hic Effectus For that Gods Influx on the Soul immediately is the sole Cause is false Therefore the answer is that this effect is from all the Causes conjunct From Gods Will or Law and Power and Wisdom from Christs mission of the Spirit before merited from the Spirits Impress or Influx from the Gospel from the Ministry usually and from the Agent Believer all these as the efficient Causes And it is from or on the prepared Soul ordinarily as the Materia disposita vel Causa Receptiva Objectiva of the Divine operation And from or on God Christ the promise
but God himself 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man nor of the same formal Conception And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man and not as in God and so this to us is the prius significatum 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sence formaliter but only eminenter 6. And lastly That Mortals know not just how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man All this you must grant me or be singular and ignorant A. All this is past denial but proceed to the Case B. Do you differ from us de eventu whether there be a Hell or yet of the number of those that are damned A. No or if we do about the Case of Heathens that belongeth not to this Point B. Do you differ from us about the Cause of mens Damnation We say that God damneth no man but for Sin yea for Sin impenitently continued in to the last against all the mercy which tended to their Cure A. So far we are agreed But it 's not the cause of damnation which I speak of but the cause of the Decree B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth he willeth to do A. Yes God doth nothing without a will to do it at least consequently B. Do you think that God willeth any thing to day which he willed not yesterday and so from eternity A. No we do not with Vostius make God mutable B. Good still you grant then that God damneth men that he damneth them for sin that he doth it willingly that he willed it from eternity And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God A. No. B. Then can that which is not be a cause was there any thing but God himself to be the Cause of Gods Will from eternity A. Not in esse reali but there was in esse cognito B. So now the game begins Thus the World is cheaâ—ed and troubled by Logical Notions and meer words Is that esse cognitum any thing or nothing If nothing it is no Cause If any thing is it God or a Creature It can be no Creature because it is eternal If God you do but say That God caused his own Will A. It is Gods fore-knowledge of Sin which causeth his Decree or Will B. 1. Even fore-knowledge it self say the Schools is but the same with knowledge and spoken say they but to the respect and sense of man There being neither priâ—s vel postoriâ—s before or after in eternity But this I now insist not on 2. It is commonly taken for blasphâ—my to talk of a Cause of God or any thing in God If Gods Will be his Essence it hath no Cause He causeth not himself being no Effect 3. If this were so as you say yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge * Vasquer in 1. Thâ— d. 91. saith of the Cause of Gods Decree Divinâ— voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem motivam per modum objecti sed etiam nullum esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud sed solam suam bonitatem Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem causam alterius italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam quia â—na est causa altâ—rius Non ergâ—â—â—â—â— mus an aliud â—â—â—â— ratio â—â—tiva Deo per modum â—â—â—â— ut velit nos prâ—dâ—stinare praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest Id. ib. disp 91. c. 4. Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cujâ—s gratia ratio nolendi aliquid sed propter quod câ—tera esse vult Deus For Siâ— fâ—re-seen is no Sin and nothing is no Cause so that you your self resolve all into God And indeed what can be a cause of the first Cause or any thing in him Use not tergiversation and vain words now and tell me what you have to say A. A thing not existent but fore-seen may be â— moral Cause though not a physical and so fore-seen Sin may be to God B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God There is nothing in God but God To be a cause of his Will is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence And shall so base a thing aâ— Sin cause God 2. We are still at the cheating Game of playing with â—rbitrary Notions What mean you by a moral Cause If a true cause of moral Being that 's one thing If any thing that is not physically or properly but by moral imputation only a cause of any event that 's another thing The first you dare not own as if any thing which is nothing Sin not existent were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica It is really no Cause but that for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that â—â—â—â— equivocally a Cause 3. Therefore if you use not the word Cause equivocally your rule is false Nothing is no moral Cause You will instance in good destrâ—d in fine nondum existente c. But I answer you Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes which are never found but in an existent entity or subject A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum That which is not is not good or amiable Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause But if we will let go the toy and come to the matter It is no other good but the desire of good or the apprehension of the â—â—â—â—rity of good which causeth so that all the Cause is in the Agent 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge that when any mâ—n saith That sin which is no sin and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will he must needs mean no real cause Because to be a cause is tertium Adjectum and presupposeth to be That which is not is not a cause much less of God or of his Will A. I can shew you that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logick For if this hold true then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings c. was no moral true cause of Gods Will to pardon Sin and save Souls to â—hose under the Promise before the Incarnation B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter but advantageth you not at all Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this that nothing can do nothing nor cause nothing It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering not yet existent that caused Gods Will tâ— pardon Sinners Nor had Gods Will any proper cause But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another he willed that
Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fulness of time demonstrate his Justice and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispence with the Law of Innocency and to pardon Sin And therefore not Christ's Death it self but God's Decree of the Death of Christ Incarnate was the cause of the Promise and of the New Covenant made with Adam and of the Salvation of Believers then Which Will or Decree is called by some the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word A. But at least Sin fore-seen is causa sine qua non B. Call it by what name you please as long as you confess it to be no Cause for causa sine qua non is called Causa fatua and is none But it is not Sin which is Causa sine qua non for it is no sin from eternity A. It is the futurity of sin that is Causa sine qua non B. Yet more notions what is futurity any thing or nothing nothing certainly For quoad ens it is terminus diminuens and nothing is no cause But it is Gods knowledge that Sin will be which is to be called the Cause of Gods Decree as sine qua non if any be But I must deal most about futurition with the Calvinists when I come to save you from Dr. Twisse his Ferula A. I pray you then open me the matter as it is your self B. I will make your Cause better than you have made it But not by making other mens worse but by opening the reconciling truth 1. I shall tell you in what sense Gods Will and Decrees may and must be said Predestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2. to have an extrinsick cause without change in God 1. Know therefore that Gods Essence is his Will but not as Essence To say that God is God and that God willeth this or that are not terms of the same signification 2. Gods Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good as the Object and so there is ever quid respectivum in the notion of Will 3. As God willeth himself the Act being perfectly immanent his Will is called himself much more properly than his Will of things extrinsick which is ever either effectively or at least objectively transient Because it is God that willeth and that is willed or loved which made many Ancients say That this was the third Person in the Trinity 4. But as God willeth things ad extra though it is his Essence that so willeth them yet it is unfit to say simply that this Will is God e. g. that to will Peter's Salvation is God because the name Will here includeth the thing willed 5. And therefore when we speak of Gods Will in the universal notion as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts it is less inconvenient to say simply that this Will is God than when we speak of his Will in act ad extra By this time you may see that though Gods Will as his Essence hath no cause yet his Will as denominated extrinsecally from the Object may have some kind of Cause that is * Alvarez himself saith that by a Cause he meaneth also any objective condition or reason of the Act. Objective which is quasi materia actus and the terminus sine quo non that is Gods Will is not denominated a complacency in Christ existent or in Peter regenerate * This is all that Ruiz his Reasons prove De Vol. Dei disp 115. Sect. 4. p. 102 Who saith that there is more than extrinsick denomination Et relatio rationis â—um realis formalitas But he doth but shew by his quodammodo that he knoweth not what to say or his understanding a seeing that the World was good before any of these things did exist So that by extrinsick denomination without any change in God he may and should be said de novo to know things to be existent to be past to will things as existent with complacency or will them with displicency But not to will the futurity of mens damnation de novo but yet his Will of the futurity of mens damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause from whence it is denominated As in esse cognito the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man a subject and then a Sinner and a Despiser of Mercy and then a damnable Sinner And so these are indeed conditions in the Object or Causae sine quibus non or Objective material-constituent causes not in themselves but the fore-sight of them not of Gods Will as his Essence nor of his Will as a Will but of his Will as extrinsecally denominated a Decree to damn Judas e. g. because no otherwise is Judas an Object capable of giving such an extrinsick denomination to Gods Will. II. Both you and I hold and must hold that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. p. 709. Conclusio quod Deus aliquos reproâ—at est de fide constat â—nim ex scriptura multos a Deo reprobari Vid. Ruâ—z de prâ—de fin Tract 2. per totum But it is false that we hold that he doth it without any respect to fore-seen sin For 1. He fore-seeth this Sin as the only meritorious cause of their damnation what he doth in time that is it which he decreed to do from eternity But in time he damneth no man but for Sin therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin For sin I say as the cause of damnation which Dr. Twisse doth frequently profess 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cause of Gods Volition or Decree yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object as fore-seen in the Mind of God and so as aforesaid is an Objective Cause as fore-seen III. The execution of Justice and glorification of it and Gods Holiness thereby is good and fit to be the Object of Gods Volition or Decree But in the word Reprobation is in most mens sense included much which we hold not which is to be opened further anon IV. And as to the absoluteness of Gods Decree to damn those that are dammed I think you will not deny it your self supposing them to be fore-seen finally impenitent Sinners God doth not only will that all the finally impenitent shall be damned nor only that e. g. Judas shall be damned if he be finally impenitent But also that Judas as fore-seen finally impenitent shall certainly be damned So that when the condition is fore-seen in the Recipient or Object it is no longer a meer conditional Decree but absolute supposing that condition In all this we are agreed The second Crimination A. II. But that 's not all But you hold That God eternally decreed mens sin yea all the sin of Men and Devils some say That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act and