irrefragable Argument viz. that the Will then is not disabled by the fall more than the will of the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven Wallis Truth tried against the Lord Brook p. 55. But let Predetermination Moral fall or stand our Question is not of that but of Physical Predetermination as appears in that we make it common to all creatures some whereof are not capable of a Moral Predetermination supposing that to be which yet is not intended to be agitated at present but only that which is exercised about free agents that is rational creatures Which that it may be done with more clearness and may in part obviate some of our learned Antagonist's objections we shall endeavour with as much accuracy as is needful to a discourse that will fall into other than learned mens hands to consider Predetermination as contradistinguished or opposed rather to two things which are acknowledged by him as Gods Acts respecting the actions of free agents not excluding natural viz. Conservation and immediate Concourse or Concurrence the concession of the former of which two will not be sound sufficient to entitle God to the honour of the first cause of his creatures actions and of the latter will unless we take our measures amiss inforce him to grant that Predetermination which now he denies First as to Conservation we must observe that as Creation stands opposed to nothing so Conservatition to Annihilation i. e. making that cease to be something which was so and it differs from Creation only in this that it notes a continuation of that being and its powers and faculties which were given by creation as being a continuation of that action by which it was produced and therefore is commonly stiled continua creatio and not unfitly termed by the School-men manutenentia Dei i. e. Gods hand-hold because by it God holds up all things as it were with an hand from falling into nothing by the withdrawing of which Divines generally think the world would be annihilated Secondly As to concourse or concurrence it may be thus defined It is an extrinsickaction of God by which he does with second causes or the creatures immediately produce all their natural actions and effects 1. It is an action of God to distinguish it from the power communicated and conserved to second causes by which they perform their several operations by creation and conservation 2. Extrinsick to distinguish it from his Decree of this action called concourse which decree is an intrinsick action 3. With second causes or the creatures because it is such an action as joins with the creature as when the Writing-Master and the Scholar shape the same letter by the Masters guiding the Scholars hand 4. I add all their actions and what is produced by action or the effects as when the Master and Scholar write not only is the action the same but the effect the letters are the same which are done by both together 5. Natural actions and effects to exclude what by accident adheres to the actions and effects which seeing they are defects cannot be produced by a proper efficiency and so nor God concur to the production of them by such efficiency 6. Immediately produce to note the intimacy of the conjunction of God with the creature in the production of natural actions which is such that one and the same action is the action of God and of the creature 3. As to Predetermination it is thus defined It is a transient action of God which excites every creature to act It is called a transient action of God in opposition to Immanent or the Will and Decree of God that the creature should act That is distinguished from Concourse or Concurrence thus 1. The very difference of the particles Prae and Con i. e. Before and with notes that the former is in order of nature though not of time before the creatures action the latter with it 2. That the former notes the reduction of the creatures powers into act the latter notes Gods acting with the creature 3. The former is to be conceived of per modum principii under the notion of a principle or cause of the creatures acting the latter only per modum actionis i. e. as importing Gods acting with the creature 4. The Terminus or object of that action of Gods which we call Predetermination is the second cause it self the reasonable creature but the Terminus or object of that action of Gods called concourse or concurrence is the action of the second cause and effect produced by that action So that the Question in plain words is Whether God does move men to all their natural actions and so to one rather than another The Protestants generally maintain the affirmative and how forcibly Mr. Howe opposes it remains now to be considered The terms explained we shall endeavour a defence of our Arguments which Mr. Howe hath thought meet to single out The first of the two Arguments of ours which seeming most importunate and enforcing he hath attempted to enervate is Arg. 1. That it necessarily belongs to the Original and Fountain-Being to be the first Causc of whatsoever Being and consequently that what there is of positive Being in any the most wicked action must principally owe it self to the determinative productive influence of this first and Soveraign Cause Otherwise it would seem that there were some Being that were neither primum nor a primo i. e. neither the first Being nor from the first Being Let. p. 35. Answ To which he Answers It may well be thought sufficiently to salve the rights and priviledges of the first Cause to assert that no action can be done but by a power derived from it which in reference to forbidden actions intelligent Creatures may use or not use as they please without over-asserting that they must be irresistibly determined also even to the worst of actions done by them Let. p. 36. Reply For the better understanding of our Argument and the proof thereto annexed together with Mr Howes Answer thereunto it will not be unneedful to reduce them to Syllogisms the Argument thus All positive Being are effects of the first Cause All sinful actions as actions for that is our limitation are positive Beings Ergo All sinful actions as actions are effects of the first Cause viz. God The Major or first proposition is proved by an Hypothetical Syllogism thus If all positive Beings are not effects of the first Cause then there is some positive Being which is neither primum ens nor a primo i. e. neither the first Being nor from the first Being or which is neither God nor a Creature But there is no positive Being which is neither the first Being nor from the first Being Ergo All positive Beings are effects of the first Cause To the Argument it self Mr. Howe replies nothing nor yet to the proof in form as by the Laws of Argumentation he was obliged But seems to distinguish in the Major between a double
that might at her pleasure do what she would Durandus seemeth to incline to this opinion supposing that second Causes do bring forth their actions and operations by and of themselves and that God no otherwise concurreth actually to the production of the same but in that he preserveth the second Causes in that being and power of working which first he gave them Thus far the most Learned Dr. Field of the Church B. 3. Ch. 23. pag. 121 122. And yet he adds his dislike of Durandus opinion in these words But they that are of sounder judgment resolve that as the light enlightneth the air and with the air all other inferiour things so God not only giveth being and power of working to the second Causes and preserveth them in the same but together with them hath an immediate influence into the things that are to be effected by them c. Ibid. p. 122. 3. What account can be given of his exploding our distinction between the material and formal part of sin approved of above by Dr. Field Most of his way viz. Mr. Gales mince the business and say the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful not as sinful so Mr. Howe 's Postsc p. 33. Answ Except it were affirmed that it implied a contradiction for God to make such a creature there is no imaginable pretence why it should not be admitted he hath done it Let. p. 37. and subjoins soon after I must confess a greater disposition to wonder that ever such a thing should be disputed than dispute so plain a case p. 38. Reply That it is affirmed Mr. Howe cannot surely be ignorant nay he frees himself from that blame I am not altogether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impossible p. 38. but in the interim he incurs another of contradicting himself This Argument ab absurdo from the implication of Gods making a creature independent upon himself is urged against those that deny immediate concurrence and so by just consequence conservation and Predetermination 1. As to mediate concurrence 't is urged for it by Durandus That there is no repugnuncy nor contradiction for God to make a creature that should be able to act without his help otherwise that is than by conserving its being and powers To this is Answered Involvere repugnantiam quod creaturae sit potens c. That it involves a repugnancy and contradiction that the creature should be able to act independently upon the Creator as well in respect of the created cause it self which hath necessarily a power of acting commensurate and proportionable to its own being as in respect of the action or effect flowing from it for seeing they are Beings by participation they essentially depend upon the first Being Wherefore as the Divine power cannot produce a Being independent upon him in its Being so nor produce an Agent independent upon him in acting Suarez Met. T. 1. D. 22. n. 16. One egg is not more like another than Durandus Argument to Mr. Howe 's nor can a more solid Answer be given thereto no though Mr. Howe should acknowledg immediate concurrence as in his Postsc he does of which in his whole Letter there is altum silentium and deny only Predetermination for this Answer is a shoo that will fit either foot as will appear in its place 2. As to conservation the no necessity of Gods continual influx to that end seems colourably affirmed upon this ground too That it is not repugnant to Omnipotency to produce such creatures as when once made may continue their Being though the operation of the Agent cease by which they were produced To this Argument Suarez also fits a rational reply Ad amplitudinem divinae potentiae spectat c. It belongs to the amplitude of the Divine Power that nothing is nor can be a moment after its production without its influence and also that it have full dominion over all his creatures and an intrinsick power of annihilating them by the suspension or withholding of his influence Suarez Met. T. 1. D. 21. n. 2 17. 3. Which is directly to our case upon Mr. Howe 's explication of his mind that he does really believe Gods immediate concourse to all actions of his creatures both immediatione virtutis suppositi yet not determinative to wicked actions Postsc p. 28. we shall adventure a demonstration that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature that can act without Predetermination i. e. applying it to action and to one rather than another action and 't is this that such a creature would be but ens secundarium a second being not causa secunda a second cause or which is all one God should be but ens primum not causa prima the first Being not the first Cause which I prove thus Arg. 1. If God does concur only by simultaneous concourse and not by Predetermination or previous motion then God cannot be the cause of the actions of the creatures as they proceed from them But the consequent is absurd and Mr. Howe I presume will not own it Therefore so is the Antecedent The Consequence is proved thus God is not by concourse the cause of the actions of the creatures as those actions proceed from them because then concourse must be before the action of the creature for every Physical cause is before the effect but the very name concourse imports a joyning together in the same action as the Master and Scholar whose hand is guided in shaping the same letter And all consent in concourse neither does God act before the creature nor the creature before God but both together and at once Arg. 2. To make good the English Proverb He is twice killed that is killed with his own weapon I shall retort Mr. Howe 's two concessions upon him 1. If there be an immediate concourse then there is a Predetermination or putting the creature upon action before it acts or else the creature is the first mover of it self to action The consequence is plausible enough as depending on this ground that by concourse alone we have no account given us how God and the creature join in one individual action rather than another As for instance in the state of innocency when man was incircled with a variety of trees of the Garden all good and fit for food whence was it that he will'd to eat of one rather than another The concourse of God with Adam's will in the election of one suppose that in the midst of the Garden before the prohibition passed upon it could not determine it to that rather than to any of the rest as is plain in external actions Two men lanching a wherry-boat concur to the same effect but the one does not determine the other by lending common assistance to that act There must be therefore a Predetermination in order of nature though not of time to that act of Adam's will supposed of eating that tree instanced in to which God
concurred This may be illustrated by the example of a Writing-Master and his Scholar wherein there is a concurrence to the action of writing and its effect the letter written and also a Predetermination a putting the Scholar upon the action of writing not morally for that influence is discerned in commanding a Scholar to write by himself but Physically by putting his hand on the Scholars to write and to write one letter rather than another An account how the particular action of any rational creatures will comes to be determined upon the exclusion of Predetermination I know none can be given Not by chance upon the occasional sudden presentation of an object because the action is Gods who is not liable to any such impressions as well as the creatures not by the creatures self-determining power for that as such is indeterminate as to the acts to which we conceive it must be some way or other determined And these two Propositions are so evident that concurrence immediate does not determine the will and that yet it must be determined that Baronius himself who is an Antipredeterminant does acknowledg both Met. 7 8. Disp 3. n. 66. and he does suggest a reason against any necessity laid upon a thing by Divine Prescience which we will accept of for a necessity of Divine Predetermination to the acts of the will Illud solum imponit necessitatem alicui rei quod est prima ratio cur illa res non potuit non evenire i. e. That alone imposes necessity upon any thing which is the first reason or cause why that thing could not but fall out Baron Met. 7 12. D. 2. n. 59. which necessity that it excludes not the liberty of mans will shall be cleared in due time 2. Again from the necessity conceded by Mr. Howe of immediate concourse and Predetermination to the production of good actions we shall infer the necessity of both to all actions This necessity must take its rise either from something common to all actions or peculiar to good actions The removing the latter will be the fixing the former in its due place In order hereunto we must consider that grace is an habit seated in the natural faculties and fitting them for good actions which as it was concreated with them in innocency so in the lapsed estate it is re-created or created again by infusion which infusion is not Predetermination for this latter still presupposes the former There must be grace in habit before it can be acted Now then the Query is whether the terminus of Predetermination be the habit or the faculties not the habit for that is a Quality that meliorates the faculties and so the actions in genere morali and cannot be put upon action or one rather than another but mediante potentia by the intervention of the power or faculty in which the gracious habit resides It must then be the faculties the will for instance for of that is the grand inquiry for otherwise supposing what has been owned that holy habits fit the will for holy volitions and nolitions in what degree the habits are confirmed in that the will may act without Predetermination and produce sincerely good actions as it please as long as these good actions are done by a power derived originally from it which is Mr. Howe 's Hypothesis and judged by him sufficient to salve the rights and priviledge of the first cause with reference to forbidden actions Let. p. 36. and I see not why not as well with reference to commanded actions The result of this ratiocination will be that if it be the indetermination of the powers to individual actions that makes an excitation of them to one rather than another necessary and the possibility of action contained in the powers that makes the reducing of that possibility to action no less necessary to good actions then the consequence seems immovable that Predetermination in its two Branches is alike necessary to all actions even when they flow from a will tainted with vicious habits and inclinations Quod erat demonstrandum And to me this Argument seems to carry along with it triumphant evidence to borrow one of Mr. Howe 's lofty Epithetes Let. p. 62. my fancy labours under so despicable poverty as to be unable to supply me with any evasion As for Mr. Howe 's phrase of impelling by which he intends compelling we shall refer the word and thing to the Head where it will most properly fall under examination In the interim let us attend to what he subjoins Answ I confess a disposition to wonder that a matter whereupon all moral Government depends both humane and divine should not have been determined at the first sight Let. p. 38. Reply These words imply that all moral Government c. is rendred ludicrous and a meer Pageantry by the Doctrine of Predetermination but upon what Mr. Howe magisterially enough takes for granted but does not once make an offer of proving that the will is hindered by Gods own irresistible counter-action p. 37. from yielding obedience to such Government But if I live till that be proved my age will certainly exceed Methuselahs Answ But Mr. Howe adds The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God methinks should stick so close to our minds and create such a sense in our souls as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers And that we should rather chuse to have our sight hearing and motive power and what not besides disputed or even torn from us than ever suffer our selves to be disputed into a belief that the Holy and Good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to and punish the same thing Let. p. 19. Reply The sum of the Argument though accompanied with a long train of fine words is that Predetermination to sinful actions crosses the natural notions of mankind concerning Gods Goodness and Holiness To which we return 1. That there is not the least colour for any such consequence from our Doctrine but upon supposition of two things which Mr. Howe would fasten upon us but we disown 1. That God predetermines to sinful actions in concreto i e. to the natural action and the sinfulness of it which we constantly deny for though we own it a hâ—rd province to answer all objections that may be started against this partition made between the one and the other as to Gods influence which we affirm as to the former the action and deny as to the latter the sinfulness of it yet ' we doubt not in its season to evince these two things that God is the Author and consequently the Predeterminer of all the actions of rational creatures for as to irrational though we include them yet the Question not being of them we shall not intermeddle with them and that God is not the Author of the sinfulness and so not the Predeterminer thereof And then as to the modus or manner of Gods influence so as to separate these that
are so neerly conjoined in sinful creatures we shall be less solicitous at least with respect to Mr. Howe 's satisfaction who has professed that he can more easily be satisfied to be ignorant of the modus i. e. manner or medium i. e. the mean of Gods knowledg whilest he is sure of the thing and he knows not why any sober minded man might not be so too while we must all be content to be ignorant of the manner yea of the nature too of a thousand things besides when that such things there are we have no doubt And when there are few things about which we can with less disadvantage suffer our being ignorant or with less disreputation profess to be so Let. p. 49 50. And if this Argumentation be true in reference to Divine acts in general as there is no reason why it should be limited to Gods knowledg only and himself extends it beyond that I conceive Mr. Howe has against his will given us the cause for that God is not the Author of sin our last proposition he every where affirms as well as we That God is the Author of all the actions of rational creatures he grants too or else his words are unintelligible and we have cause to quarrel with him as he did with Persius a crabbed Poet si non vult intelligi cur vult legi i. e. If he would not be understood why would he be read an end that every man is presumed to intend that writes these words I mean This active providence of God about all the actions of men consists not meerly in giving them the natural powers whereby they can work of themselves but in a real influence upon those powers Postsc p. 39. By which last clause if he intends reducing them to act as his phrase is ibid. we are perfectly agreed so far and the remaining disagreement will be but about the modus or manner how God affords a real influence upon the powers defiled with sin and yet none upon the sin it self And of â—his he and I being both I hope sober minded men may well be content to be ignorant as long as we are sure of the thing But I fear I reckon without my Host and so must reckon again I mean that Mr. Howe will not stand to my comprimize of the difference between us though I see not why he should not if he will be but a man of his word stand that is to his own Assertions 2. Our Doctrine cannot be accused of a confederacy to raze out the impressions of Gods Holiness upon humane nature but upon this supposition also That God does irresistibly determine the wills of men to that which he punishes men for viz. to sin which is a brat we are not bound to father For we neither own irresistible nor resistible determination of mans will to sin as such nor do we acknowledg any determination of the will at all to be irresistible if he takes that term for equivalent to compulsory which if he do not it will be neither a friend to him nor foe to us We might also observe upon his Rhetorical amplifications of his Argument that he seems to be no ill-willer to Transubstantiation For if the natural notions of Gods goodness should be infinitely dearer to us than our senses I see not why the notion of Gods sincerity that he means as he speaks should not challenge a share in our indearments and so why Hoc est corpus meum should not assure us that the bread is transubstantiated though our senses sight taste feeling join in a common testimony that it remains bread after consecration as well as before not that I charge him with that Popish ridicule but I would have him take notice how dangerous sometimes an affectation of embellishments of speech may prove by leaving him that is guilty of it at the mercy of his Antagonist in deducing such inferences from them as can neither be safely admitted nor creditably turned off Answ Mr. Howe complains of the feebleness and impotency of our defence against the forenamed charge that God makes a Law and necessitates the violation of it when it is no more than That man is under the Law and God above it Let. p. 40 41. and he affirms that a tender spirit c. will not be relieved or eased by the thin Sophistry of only a collusive ambiguity in the word Law c. ibid. Reply If Mr. Howe 's candour did but bear any tolerable proportion to his Eloquence he would never have thus represented our Answer For the truth is this Answer is not given by the Predeterminants to that objection to which he applies it as is plain enough because we always esteem our selves unconcerned in the charge of representing God as necessitating the violation of his own Law but to another viz. that God sins when he produces that action with man which to man is sin which Mr. Howe who in words at least owns immediate concurrence to all actions as well we is therefore equally concerned to answer For the proof of this I shall alledg Bellarmine who after he had told us it was only Zuinglius's Answer to the same Objection that Mr. H. fits it to adds with the peril of his reputation Sententiam tamen aliorum quorundam c. i. e. That it was the opinion of others also who though they agreed not with Zuinglius in teaching that God impels men to sin yet they use no other medium to evince how God does not sin when he produces that action with man which to man is sin than that God is bound by no Law and nothing is sin but a transgression of a Law Bell de Amiss Gr. l. 2. c. 18. Yet withal I deny not but 't is also applied to that Objection that God sins if he does determine to that action to which sin inseparably cleaves But yet the necessitation of the violation of the Law is no way concerned in the objection What now is become of Mr. Howe 's charge of thin Sophistry and collusive ambiguity when we deny God to be under a Law in the same signification of the word wherein we affirm it of man viz. as Mr. Howe expresses it For the declared pleasure of a Ruler to a Subject p. 41. This charge disproved we yet grant what Mr. Howe objects that the term Law as noting an habitual principle and rule of acting after one steady tenour in which sense the perfect rectitude of Gods nature is an eternal Law to him c. Let. p. 41 42 is yet an Argument against our opinion upon Mr. Howe 's Hypothesis that thereby the creature is necessitated to sin but that he hath neither attempted nor ever will be able to prove If proof could be made that the consequence were natural we should not know how to decline the force of Bellarmine's grave Argumentation upon Mr. Howe 's ground Licet deo non sit posita Lex ab aliquo superiore Legislatore tamen sua
of a sensitive appetite for to this last spontaneity is essential and intellectual too and so it is for it proceeds from and is guided by a precedent though mistaken judgment of the understanding which represents God to him as a Tyrant that abuses his authority by needless restraints upon mans natural inclinations Suppose to unchastity with any woman whose skin and features attract his liking Joseph's Brethrens hatred of him was determined by God to the selling rather than killing of him yet as they acted spontaneously so upon precedent consideration Two Reasons determined their choice of the milder course of the two they had in view He is our Brother and our Flesh and what profit is it if we slay him and conceal his blood Gen. 37.26 3. If there be any reason to infer Coaction from Predetermination it must be the inconsistency of necessity on Gods part and contingency on mans Which if it be universally affirmed 1. Then I know not how Mr. Howe will salve the objection against immediate concurrence which he seems to grant that thereby the liberty of the will seems to be lost both as to the exercise and specification of the act Unless as Burgesdicius does whose solution offers it service he being the first Metaphysick Author that ever I read That the concourse of God takes not away the contingency of voluntary actions because it does not precede the action of the second cause Burg. Met. l. 2. c. 11. n. 9. But then that reason if assented to will give a mortal wound to the Predestination which certainly precedes them of good actions which Mr. H. acknowledges or if he will loose the knot artificially he must say that the concourse of God is so accommodated to the nature and manner of the creatures acting that notwithstanding it natural causes act necessarily and voluntary causes contingently or freely and then the same answer will fit Predetermination of free agents to all their actions 2. The denial of the consistency between liberty and necessity in general will bear as hard upon what we grant and Mr. H. cannot deny actions in themselves good as Amor Dei the love of God as it can do upon what we deny and you assert actions in themselves evil as odium Dei the hatred of God And harder for the Will is but in part free to good actions when as 't is wholly free I mean disposed and inclined to evil actions We are now the better prepared by way thus made to answer Mr. H's proofs of his consequence Which are 1. Not to do an action whereto the agent is determined by an infinite power is impossible Let. p. 33. Ergo not to do wicked actions for that 's the sum of his consequent in his Hyp. Syll. whereof this Enthymeme is a proof to which the creature is determined is impossible Rep. 1. In general that supposing his Antecedent true as 't is in the sense before given yet the impossibility he speaks of is not a simple and most strictly natural impossibility which he before asserted but an impossibility respective to the determination of an infinite power as hath been proved R. 2. That if he intends a respective or conditional impossibility I grant his Enthymeme for it hurts our Hypothesis no more than his viz. of determination to good actions For all determination does infer a necessity that the thing determined should be as it is determined to be or an impossibility that the thing determined should not be as it is determined to be Rep. 3. If we must supply from the Hypoth major the term irresistibly to modifie the determination he opposes and we must understand by it compulsion or force we again concede the whole without any disadvantage to us And so we may rid our hands of it as an ignoble begging of the Question for that was incumbent on him to prove not to take for granted that our Predetermination imports a Coaction Mr. H's second Enthymeme is this To separate the malignity of an action intrinsecally evil is impossible p. 33. Ergo not to do such wicked actions to which the creature is determined is impossible Rep. 1. Granting his Antecedent for Arguments sake I cannot imagine how he will defend the immediate concurrence of God to all the actions of his creatures and so to sinful actions and so to those if there be any such as are in themselves evil against the charge of involving God in the production of sinful actions as such seeing by Divine immediate concurrence the intrinsecally evil action is as much Gods as mans action Baronius and Strangius who are as Heterodox as Mr. H. do both confess that it is very hard to shew how God may be freed from that charge when-as he co-operates with the creature to every sinful action Bar. Met. 98. D. 3. n. 72. Strang. de Vol. Dei p. 344 372. Though Mr. H. would lay the great difficulty and encumbrance infer'd upon our Religion only upon Predeterminative concourse to wicked actions Yet the Learned Amesius a Predeterminant tells us not without reason Deformitas moralis magis annexa videtur actui in exercito quam in applicatione ad agendum Cont. Grev. p. 189. i.e. Moral deformity seems more closely joined to action than to application unto action For an object may be innocently presented to the eye which may put a man upon action viz. unchast desires Rep. 2. We will grant the Antecedent ex animo because it does implicate that there should be any such action 'T is a received maxim Malum est in bono tanquam in subjecto i.e. Evil is in good as in its subject And Augustine's saying is well known and as well approved Ipsum quantulum-cunque esse bonum est quia summum esse bonum est De vera Rel. c. 34. i.e. Being it self how inconsiderable soever is good because the chiefest Being is good R. 3. We deny that there cannot be a separation of an action from the evil of it Of this separation there are many instances supposing Usury lawful which I will not now dispute I may lawfully take up money at use at Ten pounds per Cent. if my necessity require it when the Interest allowed by Law which to break in matters of publick benefit is sinful is but 6 l. A Christian Prince may urge the great Turk to swear to Articles of Peace though the former knows the latter will swear by his Mahomet These are instances of our concurrence to the actions of others in a remoter kind than God does concur to the actions of his creature as Mr. H. speaks in another case Post p. 33. And by the like reason may God Predeterminatively concur as Mr. H. delights to speak though not accurately to an action that is evil and yet not to the evil of it which the Learned Twisse illustrates by divers pretty similitudes An Horseman that puts on a lame horse to go is the cause of his motion not of his halting that proceeds from some hurt in
to it inseparably Ergo future contingents must needs be future from some cause 6. The Major of the same fourth Syllogism proved If there be any cause why any thing passeth from Eternity out of the condition of a possible thing into the condition of a future that cause must be either something without God or in God and if in God either that cause shall be the essence of God or the knowledg of God or the will and decree of God But the cause of any thing becoming of possible future is neither any thing without God nor the essence or the knowledg of God Ergo it is only the will or decree of God 7. The Minor of the last Syllogism proved by parts For first nothing out of God could be the cause because that passage which they call futurition was made from eternity and therefore the cause thereof must be from eternity But nothing is eternal besides God Nor can the knowledg of God be the cause for that severed from his will doth rather suppose than make things future Moreover if the Essence of God were the cause of this passage of things from possibility to futurity it must either be said to be the cause as acting necessarily or freely Not the former for then all future things would fall out necessarily and none would fall out contingently and freely But God in things to be created or created hath done nor doth any thing by necessity of nature but freely If the Essence of God be said to be the cause of the passage of things from possibility into futurity as acting freely this is to grant that the will of God and the determination thereof is the cause why any contingent from eternity passeth out of the condition of an indifferent thing to be or not to be into the condition of a thing future or to determine the futurition of it It remains therefore that the Decree of God or the Decreeing will of God be alone the cause of futurition if you will admit the phrase and of its effect Thus far Dr. Twisse I desire the Reader to take notice That though I have a great reverence for Dr. Twisse and do judg the process of the above-cited Argument invincible as to the main yet I am not clear in my apprehension that the third Syllogism is in sense different from the second as Strangius objects against it with some probability Nor yet do I wholly dislike Strangius his alteration of the terms of both the Majors of the second and third Syllogism thus That which from eternity was possible so as that it also had the condition of a thing future its futurition is from the Decree of God But every future contingent was from eternity possible so as that it also had the condition of a thing future Ergo the futurition of every future contingent is from the Decree of God And then the fourth Syllogism will be the proof of the Major of the second leaving out the third and the words must be the same and so the argument runs on without any further rub unless perhaps the reason given in the fifth Syllogism Why contingent things are not future in their own nature because then it would follow that they should be always future and never become present For I confess ingenuously that I cannot answer Strangius contrary consequent from that antecedent That if future contingents were necessarily future whether in their own nature or in respect of any other cause as the 〈◊〉 of God they must necessarily be present some time or other For to be future is nothing else than that a thing should sometime be present Strang. p. 630. And these alterations though I will not positively assert to be needful as not having had time to examine Strangius throughly since he came to my hands which was long after Mr. H's Letter and Postscript came out yet I am the more willing to admit that I may in part wipe off the aspersion Mr. H. casts upon many of us who hold Predetermination That whatsoever strength there may be in arguments and replys to and fro in this matter that which hath too apparently had greatest actual efficacy with many hath been the authority and name of this and that man of reputation Let. p. 42. As to all the rest of the Doctor 's Arguments if I be not a partial judg of my own abilities an infirmity of lapsed humane nature which I cannot challenge an exemption from I seem to my self able to answer Strangius's subtil evasions and should willingly have done it but that I doubt not but I shall meet with them in Mr. H's threatened Rejoinder in which I expect Mr. H. should answer distinctly by denial or distinction to some Proposition in these Syllogisms and then let him rhetoricate as he pleases in the amplification We have now dispatched the two Arguments in the Letter there remain three in the Postscript cited out of Mr. Gale's Animadversions upon the Letter which though modestly proposed by way of Question will constringe our Learned Adversary Arg. 3. Whether there be any action of man on earth so good which hath not some mixture of sin in it And if God concur to the substrate matter of it as good must he not necessarily concur to the substrate matter as sinful for is not the substrate matter of the act both as good and sinful the same Postscr p. 32. Mr. H's Answ 1. It seems then that God doth concur to the matter of an action as sinful which is honestly acknowledged since by his principles it cannot be denied though most of his way mince the business and say the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful not as sinful Ibid. pag. 33. So Mr. H. Reply Mr. H. misrepresents Mr. Gale's meaning for it is not that God concurs to the sinfulness of the action but to the action which though physically one individual action yet is morally diversified in respect of its conformity and difformity to the Law of God so that considering the natural action in concreto with the good or evil adhering to it it is no less true that God concurs to the action that hath evil adhering to it than that he concurs to the action that hath good adhering to it This premised to the fault he finds with the distinction I answer that I doubt he must recur to it himself when he is pressed to know how Gods concurrence immediate to actions sinful will free him from the imputation of being the Author of Sin yea worse than so I cannot imagine but that as to those actions which he calls in themselves sinful he must own what he would fasten upon Mr. Gale that God doth immediately concur to the matter of an action as sinful for 't is impossible to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsecally evil action as he tells us Let. p. 33. of which hereafter Mr. H's Answ 2. This I am to consider as an argument for Gods Predeterminative
that as to the evil of it their physical influence is alike i. e. they have none at all for sin not being a physical effect cannot have a physical cause If the latter besides that that influence is not in the Question the Sinner and the Tempter have influence and concurrence to wicked actions and God not at all for neither by Commands Counsels Threats nor Promises does he induce men to sin 2. Were it so yet the immediate concurrence which he acknowledges to all actions and so to sinful actions in conjunction with the notion he entertains with self-applause of the inseparableness of the evil of some actions from the actions themselves makes himself obnoxious to the same charge of making Gods concurrence with sinful actions to be as much or more than the Sinners or the Tempters Arg. 3. Lastly he charges the Predetermination of sinful actions with irreconcilableness with Gods wisdom and sincerity c. Postsc p. 25. by which c. I presume he intends in his Counsels Exhortations and what-ever means he uses to prevent them which are the expressions he uses in the Title-Page of his Letter in reference to Prescience Reply As to both of these perfections of God I am not aware of any thing well said by Mr. Howe for the reconcileableness of Gods Prescience with them which may not by a just proportion be applied to Gods Predetermination For the evincing whereof we will cast his Discourse into Paragraphs 1. To speak particularly of Gods wisdom 1. That there should be a direct and explicit contradiction between fore-knowing and dehorting we may at first sight perceive the terms cannot admit Let. p. 51. Reply The same may be said of Predetermining and dehorting though not simply as to the terms yet as to the things signified by them for the elicite acts of the will being the Object of Predetermination contested for we may at first sight perceive it cannot be compell'd and so as to the event infers but a necessity of infallibility as to the sinners doing what he is dehorted from which also Prescience does 2. Mr. Howe goes on Let it be supposed only that the blessed God hath belonging to his nature universal Prescience we will surely upon that supposition acknowledg it to belong to him as a perfection And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection he is disabled for Government or wer it a good consequence he foreknows all things he is therefore unfit to govern the world Let. p. 54. Reply And why may not we as well argue thus Let it be but supposed only that universal Predetermination belongs to Gods nature we will upon that supposition acknowledg it a perfection And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection that he not only conserves the powers of his creatures but reduces them to act he is disabled for government or were it a good consequence He is the first cause not only of all beings but of all actions as such therefore he is unfit to govern the world And I will add nay surely but the more fit in the present state of mankind not to intermeddle now with Angels because all the actions of men being either in whole or in part sinful he would have nothing to govern if he had not the government of all their actions and govern them he could not nor limit them nor turn them to good if he did not Predetermine them as hath been I trust clearly evinced 3. Would the supposition of such foreknowledg in God make that cease to be mans duty which had otherwise been so Let. p. 54. for what influence can foreknowledg have to alter or affect any way either the nature of the thing foreknown or the Temper of the person that shall do it any more than the present knowledg of the same thing now in doing p. 55. Reply And can Predetermination make that cease to be mans duty which otherwise had been so seeing that it alters not the nature of the thing the will of man nor the Temper of the person Predetermin'd but as it finds the will free so it leaves it and as it finds the person disposed by habitual inclinations so works upon him which is confirmed by that grave observation of his which we embrace as our cordial friend and confederate It were very unreasonable to imagine that God cannot in any case extraordinarily oversway the inclinations and determine the will of such a creture as over whom Gods general course of Government is by moral instruments viz. Man in a way agreeable enough to its nature Let. p. 141. Only we extend it further That supposing what hath been before proved that Predetermination includes a Perfection God can in all cases determine the will without forcing it to actions to which it hath a renitency for that were to alter the nature of the will and the temper of the person whose will it is And I add what influence can fore-determining have to alter the nature of the thing or person fore-determined more than immediate concurrence to the same action of the same person now in doing 4. But if what was otherwise mans duty be still his duty what can make it unfit that it be made known and declared to him to be so and how is that otherwise to be done than by these disputed means yea for this is the case what can make it less fit than that God should quit the right of his Government to his revolted creatures upon no other reason than only that he foresees they have a mind to invade it Let. p. 56. Reply All this Argumentation fits our Predetermination as well as Prescience wherein Mr. Howe and we agree what can make it unfit that God should acquaint man with his duty by proper means seeing Predetermination supposes such a foreknowledg as Mr. Howe supposes antecedent to Gods decree of the creatures having a mind to invade Gods right of Government if put under such and such circumstances or rather because we understand not any foreknowledg but of Possibilium things possible not Futurorum of things future antecedent to Gods decree seeing Gods determination of the Creatures will to invade his right without which he could not will so to do leaves the Creatures will as truly free from Co-action as if it exerted all its elicite acts only by a power derived from God and preserved apt and habile for action 4. But it may now be said All this reasoning says Mr. Howe tends but to establish this assertion that notwithstanding God did foreknow mans sin it is however necessary he forewarn him of it but it answers not the objected difficulty viz. How reasonably any such means are used for an unattainable end as it manifests the end mans obedience cannot be attained when it is foreknown he will not obey Let. p. 57. To this difficulty Mr. Howe answers That there is this noble and important end which Gods Edicts aim at viz. the Dignity and Decorum of his Government it self