prove it Impossible for Self-Consciousness to be that wherein the Personality of Created Beings doth consist And so long as the Being or Entity of the Agent must in Order of Nature precede its Action I affirm the Argument to be unanswerable and am not ashamed again and again to own it for a Demonstration Nevertheless since this Author to evade the force of the forementioned Argument shamefully changes the Terms of it by putting the Principle instead of the Act it self pag. 39. it is not impossible but that in his next Defence he may do the same here and tell us That by Sensation he means not the Act but the Principle of Sensation that is to say that he means that by it which the word never did or can properly signify In short therefore I demand of this Man whether this Term Sensation so often used by him signifies the Act or the Principle of Action If he owns it to signify the Act as all Men of Sence and Philosophy know it does then I affirm that it cannot signify the Principle of Action but by a Metonymy of the effect for the Cause And I do affirm further that since in declaring the strict and Philosophical Truth of Things Tropes and Metonymies are by no means to be allowed of no Man's after-meaning ought in dispute to be admitted in bar of the Confutation of his express words For if this should take place there could be no discoursing ad idem and consequently no Argumentation in any Case And yet this is this Author 's constant way and that even to the Degree of Impudence that being baffled in his words he still takes Sanctuary in his meaning which practice we shall have frequent occasion to expose him for But however to cut off all subterfuge from this Shifter if we here admit Sensation to be taken for the Principle of Sensation it is certain that this Principle must be the Essence of the Spirit which this Sensation is said to belong to the Essence of every Thing being the proper Productive Principle of all the Operations of that Thing But then we must observe also That the Essence of every Thing sustains the office of a double Principle First of an Internal Principle giving Being to the Thing of which it is the Essence and Secondly of an efficient Principle of all the Actions or Operations belonging to that Thing and it discharges the office of the former antecedently in Nature to that of the Latter So that the same Essence is a Principle of Being before it is a Principle of Action even with reference to the same Agent and consequently as it is a Principle of Action it is not properly and formally a Principle of Being And this Argument with any one acquainted with the True Principles of Philosophy of which this Author understands not one Tittle quite overthrows that assertion of his viz. That the very Nature of a Spirit consists in Sensation and that whether we take it for the Act or Principle of Sensation and plucks it up by the very roots But I shall refer the Reader for his further satisfaction to my Vindication of the forementioned Argument where I shall more fully canvas and confute this pittiful shift not being willing to anticipate that here which will come in more directly and naturally in another place Thirdly As I have shewn That the Nature of a Spirit cannot consist in Sensation so I affirm That neither can the Vnity of a Spirit consist in the fame For Unity being the first Transcendental mode or Affection of Being and so in reality the same with it and consequently in order of Nature preceding all Acts flowing from it can never consist in any such Act or Number of Acts whatsoever These Arguments I know are wholly Metaphysical but the Dispute being about Spirits as to the Nature Unity and Actings of them things essentially abstracted from matter the very condition of the subject neither affords not admits of any other Well but notwithstanding what has been argued against bare Sensation may not the Unity of a Spirit consist in continuity of Sensation For this is it which this Author here expresly asserts p. 7. In answer to which I must demand of him whether he has a clear and distinct Knowledge what this continuity of Sensation is and wherein it does consist If he has such a Knowledge of it why then does he usher it in with those Terms of doubting and uncertainty as I may so speak for so speaks and so says must not be admitted in giving a Philosophical state and account of Things But if on the other side this Author has not a distinct Knowledge of Continuity of Sensation as it is manifest from his inability clearly to express it that he has not then let us consider what an Explication of an Unity in Trinity he is like to give us from a Thing which he neither distinctly knows nor can clearly express For if he could do the former what Reason can there be why he should not be able to do the latter Now his method in explaining the Trinity which he promises us such great Things from is this He first tells us That he is certainly in the right in seeking for an Image of the mysterious Vnity of the Divine Persons in the Vnity of a Spirit p. 6. l. 21. and in the next place he tells us That we can know nothing of the Vnity of a Spirit but what we feel in our selves And here in the last place he tells us That all that we feel in our selves is this Continuity of Sensation but what this is he does not express and gives us but too much Reason from his own words to conclude that he cannot So that here we have an Explication of Unity in Trinity by Continuity of Sensation but who shall explain to us this Explication it self For admit that the Unity of a Created Spirit â—arries in it the nearest Resemblance to the Unity of the Godhead in the Three Persons yet how can this Unity of a Created Spirit be explain'd by Continuity of Sensation when the very Terms of this Explication import a direct contradiction to the Nature of the Thing pretended to be explained by them For I defy all Mankind to form in their Minds such a Conception of Continuity as does not essentially imply in it connexion of Parts and where there are Parts there must be extension and consequently Divisibility So that the sum of all is this That the mysterious Unity of the Trinity is explained to us by the Vnity of a Spirit and the Vnity of a Spirit which can have neither Parts Extension nor Divisibility is explained to us by something which necessarily implies them all For in giving an Account of the Nature of a Thing by Continuity nothing but a Real Continuity a Continuity properly so called can take place And it will be in vain here for this Author to plead that we Know not the Nature of a Spirit For
Nature but to the Vnity in Trinity p. 69. l. 29. And will this Man say That any Thing can be essential to the Vnity of the one which is not as essential to the Vnity of the other For though we frequently use the word Vnion of Persons yet strictly speaking it is improper since it is not an Vnion which is but another word for Vnition but an Vnity of Persons in Nature or an Vnity of Nature in the Persons which is the proper expression and therefore we neither say an Vnion in Trinity nor a Trinity in Vnion but always apply the word Vnity to both But our Author closes this Paragraph with these words p. 69. at the end That if mutual Consciousness be essential to this Vnity of Nature so that the Three Persons are thus united and cannot be one without it he will contend no further And so far I think he does discreetly but too late For whether he will contend further or no his Adversary both does and will for as much as this Author has asserted a great deal more than what this Concession amounts to and if he does not prove all that he has asserted he is a baffled Person For he has positively asserted as we have shewn from his own words that mutual Consciousness makes the Three Divine Persons to be Naturally one p. 66. Def. 26. and to be essentially one God Vind. p. 68. l. 6. And this by his favour is quite another thing from only asserting that mutual Consciousness is essential to that Vnity of Nature which is in the Three Persons For that it may be as it is an essential consequent of the said Unity of Nature and no more As also from asserting as he here does p. 69. l. the last That the three Divine Persons cannot be one without it For surely that which is only a Conditio sine quâ non and without which the said Divine Persons cannot be one in Nature and that which formally makes them so or wherein their Vnity does consist are wholly different Things And therefore since it is manifest that this Man has no Logick I heartily wish that he had some shame In the mean time he is for shewing as well as he can how the Animadverter mistakes the whole matter in these words quoted from him Anim. p. 108. l. 14. The Divine Nature or Essence being one and the same in all the Three Persons there is upon this account one and the same knowledge in them also And they are not one in Nature by vertue of their mutual Consciousness but they are therefore mutually conscious because the Perfect Unity and Identity of their Nature makes them so Thus the Animadverter and where is now the mistake why our Author tells us That Three Persons who have the same Nature may know the same Things without feeling one another's thoughts and knowledge in themselves p. 70. l. 22. To which I answer first That the foundation of this reply is That there is such a thing as Feeling in God distinct from knowledge which is the height of nonsence and Absurdity as shall be declared before we pass from this head of mutual Consciousness Secondly I utterly deny That Persons who have the same Divine Nature can know the same Things I mean all the same Things for that only here can be insisted upon without knowing each other's thoughts and knowledge in themselves For as much as whatsoever each of these Divine Persons knows he does and must know by an Infinite Act of Knowledge comprehending both himself and the other Two Persons and all that is Knowable in the World besides and how each of the Divine Persons can know all this without mutually knowing one another I desire this Man to shew But he argues further That if by one and the same knowledge the Animadverter means that the knowledge of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons is but one Individual Act as the knowledge of one single Person is this destroys the Distinction of Persons which cannot be distinct without distinct personal Acts as mutual knowledge is and destroys mutual Consciousness for there is no place for mutual Consciousness or mutual Knowledge where there is but one single Act of Knowledge p. 70. l. 24. In answer to which I observe these Two Notable Instances of his Great Ignorance First His supposing and taking for granted the very Thing in dispute between him and his Adversary viz. That the Distinction of the Divine Persons depends upon certain Distinct Acts of Knowledge as the cause or antecedent Reason of that Distinction whereas his Adversary on the contrary affirms all Distinction of Divine Knowledge as well as all Diversification of the Divine Nature it self to be from the Distinction or distinct Subsistence of the Divine Persons as the Prime and original Reason of it And whereas this Author says again That the Divine Persons cannot be distinct without Distinct Personal Acts as mutual knowledge is it is true That they cannot be without them as Inseparably consequent upon their Personal Distinction but not as constituent of it Secondly The other Instance of his Ignorance here is his affirming that there can be no place for mutual Consciousness or Knowledge where there is but one single or Individual Act of Knowledge Which I utterly deny as false and in order to the proving it so I do here observe That there is but one single Act of Knowledge in all the Three Divine Persons that is to say single as to the Substance of the Act though diversified by the several modifications which it receives from the Persons whom it proceeds from and from the several respects it bears to the several objects it terminates upon Which different modifications and respects do by no means infer diverse or distinct Acts of Knowledge but only variously modify determine and distinguish one and the same Act. Accordingly in the present Case I do here affirm to this Author That mutual Consciousness is nothing else but one and the same Act of Divine Knowledge differently modified as it proceeds severally and after a different manner from Father Son and Holy Ghost as the Persons knowing and jointly terminated in them all as the objects known as on the other side Self-Consciousness is no more than this one and the same Act of Knowledge as it issues only from one of the Persons and terminates upon the same too Though I confess if the Three Divine Persons were Three distinct Minds or Spirits mutual Consciousness could not be one Act only but must be Three This I hold concerning the Divine Knowledge and the respective distinctions of it and I leave this Author to try his best skill in Divinity and Philosophy to confute it In the mean time he gives us one Absurdity more out of his inexhaustible stock viz. That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ascribed by the Fathers to the Three Divine Persons is that very mutual Consciousness which the Dean means For these are his words p. 7.
do or can inferr in it a Plurality of Minds forasmuch as the said Acts belong to the Three Divine Persons as has been just now observed by vertue of that One Infinite Mind from which they flow and which is numerically one and the same in all Three But this Author is now upon an higher strain and resolving under the Protection of a Licence to open himself farther than before tells us in plain Terms That if every Person in the Trinity considered as a distinct Person be not a distinct Infinite and Eternal Mind there is he confesses an end of his Notion p. 8. And I think it had been well for the Church and himself too if it had never had a Beginning But then he adds with unsufferable Presumption and equal Falshood That with that there will be an End of a Trinity of Persons also and that we shall have nothing left but a Trinity of Modes Postures and Names not in the Vnity of the Godhead but in the Vnity of One Person who is the whole Deity These are his detestably Heretical and senseless Words In answer to which I demand of this Confident Man How he dares in defiance of the Doctrine of the Catholick Church place a Trinity of Modes Postures and Names upon the same Level as if they all indifferently amounted but to the same Thing Whereas Names are certainly of Arbitrary Imposition whether God or Man imposes them and Postures none ascribe to God but that silly Sort of Men the Anthropomorphites But as for Modes they result eternally and necessarily from the Divine Nature and eternally and inseparably remain in it and withal import such distinct Relations as can never coincide in one and the same Person and how then can this Ignorant Man talk of the Vnity of one Person who is the whole Deity or Godhead when these Three Relations can never concur in such an Vnity of Person but all of them may and do concur in the Vnity of the Godhead In a word I do here ask this bold Man whether he will venture to affirm That the Divine Nature determined or modified by such a certain subsistence or subsisting Relation is a meer Mode or no and I do here leave it to his second Thoughts whether he will venture to say so And if not why does he here against his Conscience reproach the Doctrine of the Catholick Church for so it is as if it established a Trinity of meer Modes Which it is so far from that I do here affirm against this Author and others who speak like him upon this Subject That according to the sence of the Catholick Church The Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Relative Modes of Subsistence or Three subsisting Relations of one and the same Infinite Divine Nature included in all and each of them or again They are the Divine Nature it self subsisting with Three distinct Relations This I say I affirm and doubt not but that to all Men of sence it confutes the Three Divine Persons being Three meer Modes and shews withal what an irrational Blasphemous Cavil it is to call them so For certainly a Mode in concretion with the Essence cannot with the least pretence of Reason be called a meer Mode And This I do again avouch for the Doctrine of the Catholick Church concerning the Trinity and do over and over challenge this Pert Novellist to disprove it if he can But in the next place he is for confirming his Trâ—â—â—theistical Assertion with this Invincible Argument as he thinks Poor Man p. 8 9. If says he every distinct Person in the Godhead considered as Distinct be not an Infinite and Eternal Mind as it must be if every distinct Person be God unless any Thing else than an Infinite Mind can be God then though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them Three Eternal Minds yet there is no Heresy in it nor any intended by it In answer to which I must tell him That I shall not much concern my self about what he intends it being his old way when he is pressed with his Words to fly to his Intentions but shall only consider what his words express or infer And whether they carry any Heresy in them or no shall appear presently And in order to this I must remind him of these Two Things First That God and Infinite Eternal Mind are Terms perfectly equipollent And Secondly That in Terms equipollent putting one in the room of the other you may argue with the same consequence from one that you can from the other According to which rule we will try the force of his Argument by proposing it with the bare change of one of the forementioned Terms for the other Thus. If every distinct Person in the Godhead considered as distinct be God as it must be if every distinct Person be an Infinite and Eternal Mind unless any thing else than God can be an Infinite Mind then though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them Three Gods yet there is no Heresy in it nor in spight of his words any intended by it Now let this Author consider how he will allow of this Conclusion for if his own Conclusion holds good this is certainly good also since the Validity of the Consequence is the same in Both the Matter of the Argument being the same and the Form of it the same too There must be therefore a gross Fallacy in the Argument it self and it lies in the Homonomy of the Term as distinct For the English Particle as and the Latine quà or quatenus thus applied has Two Significations 1. The first importing any Qualification specifying affecting or any way denominating the Subject and so a Person as distinct signifies no more than a Person who is distinct or a Person under this Qualification or Denomination 2. But secondly the other Signification of the Particle as is causal and imports a causal Connexion of the Term to which it is joined with some Predicate or Attribute belonging to the Subject and so a Person as distinct signifies as much as a Person because distinct or by reason of his distinction And this makes an Attribute to be necessarily and universally predicated of its Subject so that if the Subject be multiplied the Thing predicated of it must be multiplied too but in the former Signification of the Particle as it is not so for as much as the Predication imported thereby is only Accidental and has no causal necessary nor Universal Connexion with it's Subject Accordingly in the causal sence of the Term as distinct I must tell him that no Person in the Godhead as distinct is an Infinite Eternal Mind that is to say This Attribute belongs not formally to his Distinction and that his Distinction is not the cause or reason that it is affirmed of him For it is an Attribute Springing from the Divine Nature which is in the Person and not from his Personality or Personal Distinction for as much as that does
Principle Concerning which we are to observe also That though a Cause or Principle by Emanation in a large sence is reckoned an Efficient Cause and reduced to it yet in the strictest and properest sense of an Efficient Cause it is not so as not producing its Effect by an Action or Efficiency properly so called but only by Resultance or Efflux which are the best words which Philosophers have to express the peculiar Causality of it by And now to explain what I have said by Instances All Properties are said to be Emanations or Effects resulting from their Forms And all Accidents immediately affecting and issuing from their Subjects are Emanations And all sensible and intelligible Species flowing from the Things which they represent are Emanations And the Light issuing from the Sun is an Emanation To all which we may add the Substantial derivative Modes belonging to the Divine Nature Which being premised let us see what Propositions this Man advances upon this Subject As First That an Image is not an Emanation but a Reflexion which is manifestly Oppositum in Apposito For an Image by Reflexion in Things Material is Both viz. an Emanation from the Prototype or Exemplar from which the Species Sensibiles issue or proceed and a Reflexion from that whether Medium or Object upon which they terminate and from which by Repercussion they are return'd back again Secondly He tells us That the Son and the Holy Ghost are not Emanations from the Father But on the contrary I affirm That the Son is an Emanation from the Father and the Holy Ghost from Both. For though Generation expresses the particular way of the Son 's issuing from the Father and Procession the particular way of the Holy Ghost's issuing both from Father and Son yet Emanation is here a general word properly applicable to and expressive of both of them And accordingly Aquinas affirms That the Son proceeds from the Father not as an Effect from a Cause viz. an Efficient Cause properly so called but by way of Intellectual Emanation Affirming withal That this is the Catholick Faith And one of higher Note in the Church than Aquinas even the Great Athanasius himself owns and commends the Doctrine of Dionysius concerning the Eternal Generation of the Son for that in his explaining of it and speaking of the Father as a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Mind and of the Son as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Word of that Mind he expresly calls the latter an Emanation from the former in those words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies properly Emanatio aut Effluviam which all know are Terms Synonymous Athanas. Tom. 1. p. 565. Edit Colon. It is true indeed That in the Son 's issuing from the Father and the Holy Ghost's issuing from Both there is besides the Terminus producens and the Terminus productus assigned also an Act or Action viz. Generation with reference to the Son and Spiration to the Holy Ghost yet because these are not Actions or Efficiencies properly so called viz. distinct Entities from the Terminus producens and productus but really identified with both therefore the Production both of Son and Holy Ghost are truly and properly to be reckoned Emanations Thirdly The Defender affirms Than an Emanation is of the same Substance viz. specifically the same with that from which it proceeds of which I desire him to shew me so much as one Instance in the whole World if he can Fourthly That an Emanation multiplies Natures and Substances as being individually distinct from that from which it issues which yet in the Son 's issuing from the Father and the Holy Ghost's issuing from both is certainly false for though these Emanations multiply Persons yet they do not multiply Substances Nor are these two Propositions viz. the Third and Fourth less false with reference to those other forementioned Emanations or Emanative Effects set down by us for since none of them all are Substances they can neither be said to be Substances specifically the same with nor Substances individually distinct from those several Substances from which they flow Fifthly and lastly he tells us That when the Fathers call the Holy Spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is not in the Sence of Emanation but of Mysterious Procession To which I answer as before That he here opposes Things fairly subordinate viz. a General Term to a Particular For Procession is really and truly an Emanation though every Emanation it being a more general word is not a Procession and therefore for this Man to say as he here does That the Holy Ghost is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not by Emanation but by Procession is just as if one should say of Peter That he is not a living Creature but a Man From all which it follows That this Author is grosly ignorant of the True Philosophical Sence of the Term Emanation sometimes applying it to one Thing and sometimes denying it of another but Both at a venture and just as People use to play at Blind-Man's Buff. In fine I conclude from what has been discoursed upon this whole Matter That this Autor's Fiction of a Man and his living Image ought not to be admitted or endured as at all Explicatory of the Trinity but to be rejected as a most senseless self-repugnant absurd Notion as he has started it and fit only to abuse the Minds of Men with wrong and perverse Apprehensions of this great Mystery The Scriptures indeed call the Eternal Son the Image of the Father Coloss. 1.15 and speak also of Adam's begetting a Son after his own Likeness Genes 5.3 But both these places import a quite different sort of Image from the living Image insisted upon by this Author For the Ratio Imaginis in both these consist not barely in Representation and Production but in such a peculiar sort of Production as is by Generation For the Holy Spirit has all the Natural Eâ—â—ential Perfections of the Father and the Son and consequently a substantial Likeness to both and is withal produced by them and proceeds from them But because this is not by a Generative Production which is the Proper Natural way of conveying Substantial Likeness therefore the Latine Fathers never give the Title of Image to the Holy Ghost though some of the Greek Fathers indeed upon the forementioned Account sometimes in a less proper and strict sence do From which it follows That since the Son 's being the Image of the Father consist not barely in his Representing him or being produced by him but in his being produced by way of Generation nothing can truly and strictly represent How he is the Image of his Father but a begotten Image an Image intellectually begotten and begotten not only in the Likeness of a Specifick Nature but of the same Numerical Nature with him who begot it And since none of all these Conditions do or can possibly agree to this Author 's living Image with reference to
compound viz. the whole Man or Person as the Subjectum ultimum and Principium Quod and as that which receives the whole Denomination from what belongs immediately to any Part of it For it is the whole Man or Person who is properly said to be a living Reasonable Sensible Creature though it be by Virtue of his Soul as the Principium Quo that he is so After this comes another Absurdity where he tells us p. 48. l. 2. That an Hypostatical Vnion is the swallowing up of a Natural Personality in its Vnion with a superior Person Which if it be so Then say I where is the Hypostatical Union of Christ's Person with the humane Nature for the humane Nature which was united to his Divine Person had no Personality of its own to be swallowed up for Christ assumed it without any Subsistence or Personality belonging to it which it neither has nor ever had and consequently could never be said to be lost or swallowed up by this Union So that we have a new sort of Heresie started viz. That as Eutyches heretofore affirmed Christ's Humane Nature to have been swallowed up by His Divine so this Author holds an Humane Personality to have belong'd to this Humane Nature which in like manner is swallowed up by the Superior Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But where these vile Heterodoxies will stop God only knows For I cannot see but this Innovator may freely and uncontrollably vent as many of them as he pleases and no doubt he has a great many more such in Reserve and will in due time produce them But the Animadverter had argued against the Personality of the Soul in Conjunction with the Body thus If the Soul in the Composition of a Man's Person were an entire Person it self and as such concurred with the Body towards the Constitution of the Man then the Man would be an Imperfect Accidental and not a Perfect Natural Compound He would be that which Philosophy calls Unum per Accidens that is a Thing made up of such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One Animadvers p. 75. And what says he to this Why he tells us That the Soul and the Body are vitally united and that the Animadverter's own beloved Philosophy never calls Things vitally united Unum per Accidens To which I answer That no Created Person ever was or could be vitally united to any Being distinct from it self And therefore since it is certain That the Soul is vitally united to the Body it is impossible that the Soul should be a Person For this beloved Philosophy teaches me That in Created Beings there can be no Vital Vnion but between Parts and consequently that since there is a Vital Vnion between Soul and Body this Soul and Body must be united as concurrent Parts of the same Compound And this by this Author's Favour must utterly destroy his senceless Notion of the Personality of the Soul since that which is a Part cannot be a Suppositum or completely subsisting Nature and whatsoever is not so can never be a Person So that the Animadverter's Argument stands good viz. That in created Beings an Entire Person united to a Body would make an Unum per Accidens and consequently that a Vital Vnion between them would be impossible Yet nevertheless since it is certain that there is actually such a Vital Vnion between Soul and Body it is upon the same account also as certain That the Soul which must be one of the Terms of that Vnion and by consequence a Part cannot be a Person So that all this is but a meer Petitio Principii first to suppose the Soul a Person which is the principal Thing in Dispute and then to say that its being vitally united to the Body keeps it from making a Man That which we call Vnum per Accideâ—s Whereas it is affirmed and argued against him That this very Vital Vnion of the Soul with the Body overthrows the Soul's Personality as a Thing which this Vnion is utterly inconsistent with In short the Soul 's being a Person if it were so can never prove it vitally united to the Body but its being vitally so united irrefragably proves it to be no Person But he is now for confounding the Animadverter with Two Questions but still in pursuit of the same Point First Whether the Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before the Incarnation were a Compleat Being which is readily answered in the Affirmative That he was Secondly Whether the Humane Nature assumed by him were a Compleat or Incompleat Being I answer That though it were a Perfect Nature yet since it was without a proper Natural Subsistence of its own it was upon that account an Incompleat Being But then I add that this was a Peculiar and a Supernatural Case there being no other particular Humane Nature in the World without its particular proper Subsistence but this alone which subsists wholly by a borrowed Subsistence as being assumed into that of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But now what is all this to the Vnion between the Soul and Body which are vitally united as essential Parts of the whole Humane Person But the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not vitally united to the Humane Nature as to a Part of it And though as I noted before it be impossible for a Finite Person to be vitally united to any other Being distinct from it self yet an Infinite Person as we see in the Person of our Saviour may be united to another distinct Being or Nature For this is neither a Composition nor yet a Natural Vnion But to this our Author very Learnedly excepts and affirms the Vnion between the Person of Christ and his Humane Nature to be a Natural Vnion and gives this as a Reason for it Because it is a Vnion of Natures and that an Vnion of Natures is a Natural Vnion by whatsoever Power it is done p. 49. In answer to which though I might say That This is not properly at least not immediately an Vnion of Natures but of the Divine Person of Christ to the Humane Nature which by and through the Person comes to be united to the Divine Nature yet to let that pass I absolutely deny both his Propositions viz. That the Vnion between the Person of Christ and his Humane Nature is a Natural Vnion And that all Vnion of Natures must be a Natural Vnion by what Power soever it is wrought Both which are absolutely false Forasmuch as a Natural Vnion is only that which is wrought by a Natural Cause or Principle acting according to the Ordinary Course and Measures of Nature which an Vnion between Two Natures so vastly disproportioned as a Finite and an Infinite can never be effected by For will this Man affirm That GOD by the ordinary Exercise of that Power by which He carries on the daily Production of Things in the World and which is properly called Nature united the Divine Person of the 〈◊〉
closes his wretched trifling dodging answer to the Animadverter's Argument with Thus says he All his Arguments vanish like smoak rise in a dark Cloud but immediately disperse and are seen no more till they return as such vapours use to do in Thunder and lightning or some Threatning storm p. 87. at the end But was there ever such a Rhodomontade in words so Big with Nothing and without one grain of sense at the Bottom of them For is this the way to expose an Adversarie's Argument to contempt first to represent it as vanishing into smoak and vapour and afterwards returning in storm and thunder But it shews that his Rhetorick keeps pace with his Logick and that whether he would describe or prove a Thing it is much at the same rate In the mean time the Reader may take this for an Observation that will never fail him viz. That this Author is never so high upon the Huff and Rant as when he is lowest nay and knows himself lowest in Point of Reason And so I pass to the Vindication of the Second Argument Which is this If Vnity of Nature in the Divine Persons be the Cause Reason or Principle of mutual Consciousness in the said Persons then their mutual Consciousness is not the cause or principle of the Vnity of their Nature but the former is true and therefore the latter is so too This is the Argument and a plainer and clearer there cannot well be To which our Author answers thus That the Divine Persons may be thus essentially one by mutual Consciousness or mutual Consciousness may be essential to this Vnity though they could not be thus actually conscious to each other unless they were thus united as to have and to feel each other in themselves Def. p. 68. l. 22. Which Enigmatical obscure and confused stuff if the Reader understands it is well for I profess that I do not But so far as the Term Essential made use of here may seem to make any Thing for his Purpose I answer That mutual Consciousness is Essential to the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons not as that wherein this Unity does consist but as that which is essentially consequent upon it and inseparable from it So that there is an Homonymy in the Term Essential as either importing that Essential Principle wherein the Nature or Essence of a Thing is placed or some thing necessarily resulting from it in which latter sense alone mutual Consciousness is essential to the Unity of the Divine Nature And whereas he says That if by Vnity of Nature in the Divine Persons the Animadverter means the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That he says is indeed a Necessary foundation of this mutual Consciousness but not the immediate Cause of it For that the Fathers he pretends were sensible that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not of it self make this Essential Vnity and therefore added the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he affirms to be that very mutual Consciousness here maintained by him to perfect it p. 68. l. 27. In which words there are several very vile Heterodoxyes For first I affirm That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 adequately perfectly and sufficiently makes the Vnity and Identity of the Divine Nature in the Divine Persons and that as I have already shewn not meerly from the force of the word it self but from the peculiar condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which it was applyed to which being Infinite could not possibly be otherwise than numerically one and the same and consequently that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or agreement of the Divine Persons in such an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could be no other than a Numerical Vnity and Identity of Nature belonging to them upon that account And therefore I deny That the Fathers ever reckoned the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insufficient of it self to make this Unity and challenge him to prove they did And I deny further that they ever alleged the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an addition to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to perfect this Unity but as an Explication and Illustration of it and I add moreover That the Fathers never accounted this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 either to be mutual Consciousness or to consist in it but to be the mutual Inexistence or Indwelling of the Divine Persons in each other founded upon and resulting from their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mutual Inexistence being no more mutual Consciousness than bare Existence can be said to be Knowledge and lastly I affirm that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ascribed to the Three Divine Persons to which this Author may add his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 too if he pleases is not the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it self but a consequent or effect of it for as much as they are not therefore in one another because they mutually know one another but they thus know one another because by the essential Identity of their Nature they mutually are and exist in one Another All which having been so fully proved in the seventh Chapter of Animadv p. 201 202 203 204 205 206. and the ninth Chapter p. 295. 6 7 8 9. and 300 301. to allege it again is in effect but dictum dicere which though it is the constant practice or rather Trade of this Author is the scorn of the Animadverter But to go on the Animadverter having said as is here alleged That Vnity of Nature is the Cause and Principle of mutual Consciousness which being an Essential Property equally belonging to all Three Persons must issue and result from the Divine Nature and so can have no Antecedent Causal Influx upon the same Nature Our Author in answer to this tells us That mutual Consciousness belongs not immediately to Nature but to Persons p. 69. l. 20. And I dare say he tells us the best he knows But in reply to it I must tell him again That it belongs immediately to both but upon a different account viz. to Nature as the immediately producing Principle of the Act and to the Person as to the immediate proper subject of Denomination from the Act. But he adds That he for his part will not Philosophies upon Antecedent causal Influxes in the Divine Nature p. 69. l. 24. Nor does any one else in the strict proper and Philosophical sense of these Terms pretend to do so but only by accommodating them to help us with the better Method and Distinction to conceive and discourse of so high a Subject as the Divine Nature is And therefore it was not for nothing That he passed over the Nine preliminary Considerations at the beginning of the fourth Chapter of the Animadversions without so much as touching upon them For they would have corrected his Ignorance and taught him how these words are to be understood and used about the Divine Nature and Persons But his Modesty adds That it contents him to know what is Essential not Absolutely to the Vnity of the Divine
and the seven first lines so that according to him an Act of Volition and an Act of Consciousness or Knowledge are formally and properly one and the same Act. In the last place as to his affirming That Three distinct Subsistences of the same Individual nature are by mutual Consciousness essentially one p. 71. l. 9. I answer That if he means hereby That they are by mutual Consciousness made essentially one as by the Cause or Antecedent Reason of that Unity I deny it But if he means That they are thereby proved essentially one as by an essential consequent of the said Unity I grant it But this will do him but little service For his Hypothesis requires more And so leaving this second Argument in its full force against him I proced to the Third Argument which is this To affirm mutual Consciousness to be the cause of the Union of the Three Divine Persons in the same Nature is to confound the Union and Communion of the said Persons together which confusion ought by no means to be allowed To which he answers That to affirm that the Three Divine Persons are essentially one by mutual Consciousness is not to affirm that mutual Consciousness is the cause of their Vnion p. 71. l. 18. But on the contrary I affirm That if for one Thing to be so or so by another does and must signify causally then to say That Things or Persons are one by mutual Consciousness and yet that mutual Consciousness is not the cause or antecedent Reason of their being one is a direct contradiction in the Terms And it is hard to imagine how a Man in his Sences can think otherwise In the next place he passes impertinently from the Union of the Divine Persons to their mutual Indwelling in each other which are very different Things affirming withal That his mutual Indwelling is their mutual Consciousness though this has been and still is peremptorily denied him and the Reader for the Confutation of it referred to the Two forecited Chapters of the Animadversions which this Author neither does nor can say one word in answer to Well but how does he prove The mutual Inexistence or Indwelling of the Divine Persons to be mutual Consciousness Why because forsooth they are in one another as Minds not as Bodies p. 71. l. 30. But here besides that we deny his very supposition viz. That the Three Divine Persons are Three Minds we deny also That Three distinct Minds can be made Identically one in Nature by any Consciousness or mutual Consciousness whatsoever and in the Divine Persons who are neither Minds nor Bodies it is the Vnity and Identity of their Essence by which alone they are mutually in one another as the sole proper Reason of their being so For there neither is nor can be such a Thing as a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of distinct Minds Essences or Natures in one another But he tells us That in the Divine Persons Vnion and Communion are one and the same Thing p. 72. l. 15. But if he means that they are formally and in all respects the same I deny it affirming withal that they are as much distinguished as the very Divine Essence and Personalities themselves are and consequently that the Union of the Persons consists in their Identification in one and the same Essence or Nature and their Communion consists in those mutual Acts towards each other respectively issuing from and belonging to them by vertue of their Personal Properties But the Animadverter he tells us falsly represents both the Communion of the Divine Persons with each other and their mutual Consciousness too in these words cited from him p. 72. l. 27. viz. That all Acts of several Persons upon each other as all that are mutual must be are properly Acts of Communion by which the said Persons have an Intercourse among themselves as acting interchangeably upon one another To which words of the Animadverter this Author replies first That this may be true in Persons separate but that Persons only distinct and not separate do not Act upon one Another for that such acting must as he says signify an External Impression made by one Person upon another p. 72. at the end and p. 73. at the beginning But will this Man here abide by this false and prophane assertion For do not the Divine Persons mutually know and mutually love one another and do not these Acts of Knowledge and Love both mutually proceed from them and mutually terminate in them too Or will he say that those Acts pass mutually between them by an External Impression upon each other Or lastly That the Divine Persons are any more than only distinct Certainly such Propositions as this Audacious man vents the Church of England was never accustomed to hear or endure before But in the next place after he had said that the Animadverter's Assertion might hold true in Persons separate but not in Persons only distinct which we have confuted He says also p. 72. at the end That it holds true of all other mutual Acts excepting mutual Consciousness which is a fulsome and ridiculous begging of the Question by presuming an Exception where he should first prove it and is as arrant a Petitio Principii as ever appeared in Argumentation And I challenge him to prove how the Exception holds in mutual Consciousness more than in mutual Complacency though indeed in neither But he is now for calling the Animadverter to an account for that unwary and improper expression as he represents it That all Acts of several Persons upon one another are Acts of Communion which says he in the Gravel-lane Dialect makes Boys in a state of Communion with each other at boxing and a match at scolding for it seems he cannot yet rid his head of Billingsgate another state of Communion To which my answer in the first place is That I am sorry to find his ill breeding got so far into his Religion as to dare to mingle such sacred matters with such dirty and prophane Comparisons In the next place I would have him know that the Animadverter abides by what he has said and accordingly would have this Man learn that words in discourse though never so general and indefinite are yet to be limited and determined in their sence by the subject professedly treated of And this in the present Case was such an Act only as supposed Persons in a state of Agreement and proceeded from them and passed between them considered only as such And I must tell him further That though the common use of the World has restrained the sence of the word Communion and Communication ad benigniorem partem yet the literal sence of it imports no more than a bare Interchange of Acts or Offices whether Friendly or hostile and there may be as real and as proper a Communication of ill Turns as of good and sometimes of ill for good as this Author very well knows But as for those words which he concludes this
Power it self inseparable both from the Essence which they belong to as also from one Another which distinct Minds can never be But the Defender adds That the True and short answer to the Animadverter's Argument is That the same Substance repeated in Three distinct Subsistences is not Three Substances but one p. 90. ibid. In answer to which he has been sufficiently told already That the Term Repeating the Divine Substance or Nature is New Odd and Unjustifiable and such as the Catholick Church never made use of and for that cause ought utterly to be condemn'd and thrown aside But for a further answer to it I do first affirm in general That for the same numerical Nature or Substance to be repeated is impossible and a contradiction Repetition as we have shewn being nothing else but Another Production In the second place I deny in particular that there is any such Thing as a Repetition of the Divine Substance or Nature in Three Subsistences The said Nature indeed is and exists in Three Subsistences but I absolutely deny that it is repeated in them and it will concern this Bold Novellist to prove as well as assert that it is so In the mean time it is no small shame and calamity to the Church that he is not called to account for such horrible Innovations But the Animadverter had argued further against Three distinct Substances in the Godhead thus That if the Three Persons are Three distinct Substances then Two distinct Substances will concur in and belong to each Person to wit That Substance which is the Divine Essence and so is communicable or common to all the Persons and that substance which constitutes each Person and thereby is so peculiar to him as to distinguish him from the other and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him to whom it belongs since for one and the same substance to be common to all Three Persons and withal to belong incommunicably to each of the Three and thereby to distinguish them from one Another is contradictious and impossible And what can this Man oppose to this Argument with the least shew or shaddow of Reason What part of it does he deny Or what Term of it does he distinguish For the Argument proceeds upon his own supposal at present that the Three Persons are Three distinct Substances as the Animadverter had fully proved them to be before Why all that he says is That he is heartily ashamed and sorry good Man to see such stuff as must necessarily expose our Faith to the scorn of Atheists and Infidels and therefore that he may not contribute to it he graciously declares that all this Non-sense shall escape the lash of his Pen p. 91. l. 22. That is according to his constant never failing way he is then highest in Noise and Vapour when he is brought most to a Nonplus But I have some Answers of another sort to make to this passage alleged out of him As first That whatsoever his Sorrow in this Case may be he will hardly convince the World that he has any shame Secondly That to expose our Holy Faith to the scorn of Atheists and Infidels by one's Folly and Nonsense is very bad But that to make Atheists and Infidels by one's Scandalous Writings and more scandalous Practices is much worse Thirdly That nothing does or can more expose our Holy Faith to the scorn of Atheists and Infidels than for any one who wears but the Name of a Christian to assert Three Gods which Three distinct Infinite Minds Spirits or Substances upon all the Principles of common Reason and Philosophy certainly and undeniably are and withal that there can be no Non-sense comparable to the asserting Three distinct Absolute Infinites And fourthly and lastly Whereas he says That all the Non-sense of the foregoing Argument as he calls every thing which he cannot Answer shall escape the lash of his Pen I would have this poor Whipster know that the Animadverter is far from dreading the lash of that Pen which never yet drew blood of any one but of Priscian And so having answered his compassionate Preamble in behalf of our suffering Faith forsooth we will now see what he has to say upon occasion of the Animadverter's Argument for it can be no more called an Answer to it than to that Learned Reply made to his Hobbian Vindication of his Case c. And in order to this I demand of him first Whether that one Infinite common Essence or Substance which formally unites the Divine Persons together does or can formally distinguish them also from one another Secondly Whether since he utterly denies all Modes as well as Accidents in God that which distinguishes each Person from the other can be any thing else but a Substance there being nothing in Nature conceievable by the Mind of Man but what is either a Substance an Accident or a Mode of Being and I defy this Man or any one besides to give Instance of a fourth which is none of these And Thirdly and lastly Whether each Person hereupon must not either have Two Substances belonging to him viz. One uniting him to and the other distinguishing him from the rest or be both united and distinguished by one and the same substance common to them all Both of which are Impossible This is the Argument though after another and more particular manner proposed and I Challenge this Piece of a Disputant to overthrow any one Part or Proposition of it by solid and clear Reason for fooling and flounceing and throwing out the word Non-sense from a plentiful stock within will not do it But to shew how wofully he is hampered see what desperate assertions he advances p. 91 92. for the disentangling himself And first in p. 91. l. 28. he roundly tells us That the Dean knows not any distinction between the Divine Essence and a Divine Person but that the Essence makes the Person In which words there are Two as false and Heterodox Propositions as can well be delivered by any one professing Divinity viz. First That there is no distinction between the Divine Essence or Substance and the Divine Persons And secondly That the Divine Essence makes the Person Both of which I will distinctly examine and first as to the first of them I affirm That the Divine Essence is and cannot but be vertually and fundamentally distinguished from the Persons That is to say it affords a Reason and Foundation in the Thing it self sufficient for the Mind to form thereupon a different Conception of the Divine Essence from the Conception of the Divine Persons by proper and Metaphysical abstraction and that so distinct that the Conceptus objectivus of one neither is nor can be the Conceptus objectivus of the other And if this distinction or rather distinguishableness should not be admitted in the Divine Nature and Persons as founded upon some Reason in the Things so distinguished I desire this Man to tell me upon what account it is