loving p. 21 22 25 c. usque ad 42 73 74 75 76 77 115 116 117 118 120 121 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 211 212 113 214. But first suppose though not grant that there were such a term of the immanent action of loving yet this cannot be the actual Divine love which Dr. H. speaks of For 1. The actual love which he speaks of is the matter of that Commandement Deut. 6.5 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart c. Now that the supposed term of the immanent action of love is not in any probability For 1. That is most likely to be the matter of this precept whose being is most undeniable and uncontroverted but the existence of immanent actions is less questioned then that of their terms The existence of these hath been much questioned by many subtil Philosophers and setting aside Philosophers the most of men never so much as dâ—camt of them Take ten rational and knowing men that never heard of this Question An omnis actio habeat terminum and demand of them whether they think that by the immanent actions of their senses their understandings and wills they preduce within themselves certain qualities of the same name with the actions themselves and I am confident that most if not all of them will return a negative answer 2. The matter of this precept is of a very important general an necessary obligation and therefore it must be obvious and evident unt all that have the use of their reason so that the knowledge of it ma be gained without any great difficulty but now the pretended terme of the action of loving is a very dark and abstruse thing and it will be a very difficult matter to make unlearned men understand it Nay I believe many great Scholars are yet strangers to what the Schoolmen say about the nature of it 3. We may and ought to examine the sincerity of that love of God in us which is commanded Deut. 6.5 But it would be new Divinity to say that we are to examine the terms of the immanent actions of divine love whether they be in us or no men may with some certainty review and reflect upon the habit of love and the immanent actions thereof but their reslex knowledg of the terms thereof can be but conjectural 2. The Love of which Dr. Hammond speaks is by the Defendant such wherein there is exercised that freedome of the will which is usually called a freedome of indifferency But there is no freedome of the will exercised in the supposed terms of the immanent action for they presupposing the actions are supposed to be necessary and unavoidable and therefore the will hath no indifferency unto them the will indeed is a free cause of the action of loving but this action if it be the cause of a terme it is the natural and necessary cause thereof 3. The Terme of the immanent action of loving is called love saith the Defendant for want of sufficient words but to affirm this of that actual love which Dr. Hammond speaks of is very very ridiculous For of that love saith he love is predicated as a genus and so in primo modâ— dicendi per se the love therefore that Dr. Hammond meant cannot be the terme of the immanent action of loving But secondly It is denyed also by many great both Philosophers and Divines that there is any such terme as the immanent action of loving and they say the same of all other immanent actions Indeed our Defendant takes notice of no Diffenters but my self and my poor Master Scheibler But this bewrayes his gross ignorance in the School-men many of whom lead the way unto Scheibler into this his opinion and go herein a great deale farther then he Durand is very express for it Lib. 1. dist 27. q. 2. Capreolus l. 1. dist 27. q. 2. quotes also Aureolus Petrus de Pallude Gerar. de Carmâ—lo as of the same judgment unto these I may add Scotus upon the same Dist quaest 3. and two Eminent Scotists Philip. Faber Favâ—ntinus lib. 1. disp 21. and Reda l. 1. Controvers 7. represent this to be the Common opinion of the followers of Scotus Unto all these let me farther subjoyn Raphel Aversa Philos tom 2. q. 58. Sect. 3. And Franciscus bonae spei in lib. de animâ Disp 2. dub 3. who mentions others of the same perswasion Oviedo though he blame Cajetan and other Thomists for denying actual intellection to have a terme because every action he thinks is productive of some terme or other yet he thinks this opinion may be so interpreted as to be drawn into a good sense and that is done he supposeth by making the terme not to be really distinct but the same with actual intellection Haec opinio jure ab omnibus rejecta si loquendi modum attemperaret mea quidem sententia optime posset defendi Existimo enim tantum in modo loquendi discedere à sententiâ quam poste à omnibus praeferam asserente intellectionem consistere in qualitate immediatè per se-ipsam nullâ interjectâ actione à principio dimanaute vel in actione identificatâ cum termino quod sic ostendo utraque opinio constituit intellectionem in entitate quadam immediatè ab intellectu dimananâ—e per suammet entitatem ex vi cujus intellectûs in actu secundo constituitur formaliter intelligens Ergo tantum differunt hae duae opiniones ex â—o quod una entitatem hanc essentialiter per suam entitatem ab intellectu dependentem nullum distinctum terminum respicientem vocat actionem sine termino altera â—andemmet entitatem vocat actionem â—um termino identificatam Neutra â—nim barum opinionum novam formalitatem concedit vel negat quam altera opinio diverso modo deâ—endat De anima Controv 6. punct 1. S. 1. It were an easie matter to produce many other testimonies But the matter must not be carried by the number of voices but by the weight of Arguments And therefore I shall next propound the Arguments on both sides The Arguments for the Negative may be ranged into two sorts the first prove that some immanent actions have no terms the second that no immanent actions have any terme The 1. That some immanent actions have no terms Cajetan as it is said determineth that intuitive intellections have no term and such are the Beatifical Vision of the Saints in Heaven the Angels intuitions of themselves And the reason which he giveth is Because the Objects of such intellections are per se present unto them and intimately conjoyned with them But omitting Cajetan I shall insist onely upon the Arguments of Scheibter which I referred unto in my refutation of Dr. Hammond's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Defendant is pleased in derision to call him my Master But where the wit of the Sarcasme lieth is best if not onely known unto himself If his meaning be that I have no Metaphysicks
operationes immanentes and his Resolution is that they are onely Qualities This he proveth by removal from them of all other kinds of being and because there is most doubt whether they be not actions de praedicanento actionis he cheifly insists upon that and the cheif reason which he brings is because they are not productive of any terme he thought Immanent Operations not to be Predicamental Actions and herein I consess he differs from mine opinion and so he doth also from yours But pray 〈◊〉 mark what 's the reason for which he excludes them from the Predicament of Action It is because they have no term With what face then do you affirm that Scotus sayes That Immanent Operations cannot be without a quality that terminates them But because you are likely to outface the matter I shall in e rt Scotus his words at large First he hath N. 31. this passage Praeterea actiâ—nis est aliqualis terminus realis hic autem praeter intellectionem non est aliqualis terminus c. And again afterwards N. 32. Quod intellectio non sit actio vel passiâ— pâ—obâ— sic actio passiâ— sunt alicuâ—us termini accipientis esse per ipsas sed operationes immanentes sunt ultimi termini quibus nihil accipit esse c. Marke you me that Sir Quod si dicos qued cum per actus habitus generantur habitus est termâ—nus dictaâ—um operationum sic sunt actio vel passio Ad argumentum dicendum quod actio illa quae proprie est ad terminum non potest intelligi sine terminâ— sed operationes hujusmodi possunt intelligi sine habitu esse ut patet in habentibus habitum intentissimum ut in Beatis Ergo proprie non dicitur terminus quasi intrinsecus sed quasi consequens accidentalis cum ergo hujusmodi operationes aliquid sint probatum est quod non sunt substantia nec relatie nec actio aut passio neque quantitas vel aliquid extrinsecus adventitium relin â—uitur quod sint in genere qualitatis c. The Reader is by this time I suppose convinced of your unworthy falsification of Scotus for he saith no such thing as you say â—ay he saith the quite contrary Operationes Immanentes sunt ultimi termini quibus nihil accipit esse This one instance is sufficient to give a taste of your fidelity and honesty in quoting Authors Of it I shall make this Vse that for the future I shall little trouble either my self or the Reader with Examination of your Authorities for you have in so shameless gross and palpable amanner salsified Scetus as that you deserve but little Credit in any Testimonies that you shall alledge In the very same question afterwards N. 35. he expresly denyeth that Immanent Operations have any Terme which receives any being by them And in this particular he sayes they are unlike proper and praedicamental actions Tertia prepricâ—as actionis proprie sumptae est quod est circa aliquem termnum ad quem terminatur qui esse accipit per eum idem intelligâ—t de passione Operationes ergo immanentes assimilantur actioni passioni in prima conditione et secunda non autem in tertia que est completiva A second place is lib. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. ult p. 130. n. 11. Isâ—â— est alia conditio ulterior videlicet quod istae formae de ratione sui transeant in aliquid ut in terminum hoc sive illud aliud sit intra operans five extra non curo non est enim intelligibile quod sic intellectio volitio et quod non sit alicuâ—us term ni hoc aâ—tem conveniâ— actioni propriè dicts ut transeat in aliquid ut ia terminum propter istas igitur duas conditiones concurreâ—tes in istis firmis dicuntur istae formae esse actus secundi cum vere sint fâ—â—mae manentes The words are not quoted but I suppose these are those the Defendant meaneth But 't is plain that Sectus speaks of an Objective not Effective Terme 1. From a comparison of this place with other passages that plainly and expresly deny Immanent Actions to have Termes 2 From a following passage in the same page Nunc autâ—m aliquis actus intellectionis vel volitionis potest esse ejusdem rationis licet non sit alicujus termini producti Here he supposeth it possible for Intellection and Volition not to have any Terme produced by them And therefore when he sayeth in the place objected Non est enim intelligibile quâ—d sit intellectio et volitio et quod non sit alicujus tâ—rmini Here by the Terme he means onely the Object and not the Product of Intellection and Volition 3 From the Coherence of the words with the foregoing Scotus his design is to prove that Immanent Operations though they be not proper actions de genere actionis may yet be called Second Acts because in two respects they resemble Actions 1 Because of their perpetual dependance upon their causes 2 Because they have a tendency unto a Terme Now this must needs be understood of an Objective Terme onely for if it were understood of an Effective Terme it Would make them to be by Sâ—oâ—us his Opinion proper and Praedicamental Actions which is a thing that he constantly denyeth 4 That the word Teâ—mâ— which Intellection saith Scotus regards signifieth onely an Objective Terme the Defendant if he had not been in haste might have gathered from the Margent where we have these words Intellectio volitio dicunter Actiones quia dependent continuè a suis causis et quia tendunt in aliquid ut in terminum attingentiae Here terminus attingentiae is distinguished plainly a termino efficientiae This distinction of the Terme of Intellection is plainly insinuated by Rada a great follower of Scotus controv Theol. p. 1. controv 7. p. 124. 125. Intellectio inquit habet terminum quem actualliter respicit scilicet objectum c. Sed non est productiva sui termini nec per ipsam tanquam per actionem aliquid producitur c. But go we on to a third place in Scotus lib. 1. sent d. 27. q. 3. p. 347. ad 3. This place the Defendant quotes again p. 32. and there he inserts the very words of Scotus Howsoever saith he Though the Refuter thinks fit to refer the Doctor because he is a Critick to learn some Metaphisicks from Sheibler yet I will be so civil to him because he is a School-man to refer him for his learning in this point to one of the subtlest of thâ—se Doctors And let Scotus be the man it is l. 1. sent d. 27. q. 3. f. 19. â—d tertium The place is short but full and not taken notice of by Suarez and the words are these Ad tertium concedo quod Nâ—titia est proles vere genita sed preductio illa non est actualis intellectio quia ut
extra vi am non minus quam alii beati videtur sane quod non plus mereri potuerit quam alius beatus in Patria Respondeo cum Scoto quod sicut meritum non respicit nec consistit tantum in ipso actu eliâ—ito sed aliquo modo in conditionibus persona suae suppositi eâ—â—cienâ—is sic acceptatio Divinâ— non solum respicit actum sed conditiones etiam accidâ—â—tates suppositi clicientis Atque itâ— actus Christi ctiam beatisicus cum ipse esset viator nec totaliter in termino potuit ob hane conditionem acceptari non tamen actus beatificus alterius beati licet in hoc nulla esset contradictio Rada Super tert lib. sent controv 12. a. 1. p. 338 339. Faber Faventinus and Rada The first is taken from a comparison of Christs beatisick love with that of the blessed Angels and Saints in heaven If his beatisick love of God be meritorious then also that of the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven is so too But this is absurd for then they should merit unto all eternity They both answer out of Scotus by denial of the sequel of the Major and for this denial they give this reason God's acceptation is requisite unto merit Now God accepteth all the created acts of Crist as meritoriouâ— whereas he made no Covenant with or promise unto the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven touching any such acceptation And for this different dispensation towards them and Christ they lay down out of Scotus this following congruence Whilst Christ was here in this life he was Viator as well as Comprehensor and consequently all his created actions were capable of meriting for merit regards not only the action meriting but also the state and condition of the person performing the action but now the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven were absolutely and altogether comprehensores and so in termino extra statum merendi uncapable of meriting You see then they resolve the meritoriousnesse of Christs beatisick love of God into the condition of Christs person Christ merited by it not so much because 't was beatisick but because 't was the love of a person who was in some respect Viator in viâ which was a state of meriting A second Objection is drawn from the necessity of Christs beatisick love of God Every merito ious act is free for freedome is essentially requlfite unto merit But now Christs beatisick love of God was not free because 't was necessary And freedome and necessity are incompetible in the same act It followeth therefore that Christs beatisick love of God was not meritorious This argument the Defendant inculcates frequently The Scotists answer by denying the Minor Christs beatisick love of God was say they free though not with a freedome of indifferency yet with a freedome of complacency and that not only concomitant but causal I call that concomitant which is in acts whereof the will is not a cause qua voluntas sibi complacet in aliquo etsi respectu ejus nullius causaeâ—â—rationâ—m habet and such a freedome there was say they in the Fathers bâ—getâ—ing of the Sonne the Father had a complacency therein and was well-pleased therewith But he did not beget the Sonne by any act of his will I call that cansal which is in acts whereof the will is a cause This is that liberty which the Scotists call the essential liberty of the will and is by Rada thus defined Haec libertas est complacenter cognitione finis sub propria finis ratione supposita quasi se determinare ad agendum sive con ingenter se determinet sive necessario In 1. lib. sent Controv. 13. p. 207. This freedome the Scotists make to agree unto every elicite act of the will and consequently unto the bâ—atifick love of God And the reason that they give is because freedome is essential to the will and is predâ—cated of it quitâ—nus ipswn and a quatenus ad de omni valet argumentum What is predicated of the will as the will is pâ—edicated of every act of the will This reason is urged very acutely by Faber Faventinus against Cajetan who saith that the will is a free agent only in respect of some acts and not in regard of others Contra vel competit volâ—ntati sâ—cundum essentiam absoâ—ute esse pâ—â—ncipâ—um liberum vel non si non ergo volunâ— as accidentaliter est principium liberum tunâ— quaere quaenam fit illa potentia cui inest principium agendi libere per essentiam vel est voluntas vel non dabitur principiuâ— liberum essentialiter quod est absurdum quia omne per accidens redueitur ad aliquod per se datur principium liberum per accidens ergo debet dari principium liberum per essentiam Si dicas voluntaes respectu aliquorum actum est libera per essentiam respâ—ctu aâ— orum est natueale principium Coâ—â—ra quod inest alieui per essâ—ntiam secundum quod ipsum inest â—i universaliter Ex Arist 1. Post c. 4. exemplum Homo per eslentiam secundum quod ipsum est rationalis ideo omnis actus qui provenit ab homine per essentiam est rationalis i. per rationem factus unde actus naturales sentiendi vegetandi c. quia non sunt rationales non competunt homini ut homo est sed ut animal vivens Est ergo verissimum quod inest alicui secundum quod ipsum inesse ei universaliter tunc sic at voluntas est principium liberum per essentiam ergo universaliter est libera respectu omnis actus vel est dicendum quod non est libera per essentiam sed per accidens quod jam rejectum est ut absurdum si dicas quod inest voluntati secundum essentiam tenc sic Duo praedicata contraria muâ—◠ò se destruentia non possâ—nt inâ—sse â—â—dem subjecto securdum id m quia implicat repugnantiam sed voluntati secundum essentiam inest esse principium liberum ergo nonporest secundum essentiam inesse principium naturale ut contra distinguitur à libero ut in proposito intendimus ex hace go ratione colligitur qued voluntas essentialiter est libera non naturalis sic patet quod ratio Scoti concludit nâ—m rum quod agere naturaliter agere liberè sunt differentiae primae entis quae non possunt inesse eidem potentiae principio essentialiter sed necessario constituunt duo opposita principia activa quotum unum non redecitur ad alterum nec ambo ad tertium per hoc impugnatur quoâ— volt â—as râ—spectu sin 's cla èâ—vâ—si beatitudinis in communi habeat actum naturalem si enâ—m est potentia essentiaâ—ter libera omnis actus clicâ—â—us ab ea est ei liber non naturalis Consi matur quia aliequin voluntas in primo instanti quo habet actum naturalem nonesset voluntas sed
his love of his neighbour This is so plain in Suarez out of whom the Dâ—fendant borroweth the distinction as that one would think it impossible for the Gentlâ—man to oversee it But this oversight renders it very probable that he never read Suarez himself but had the distinction sent him from some friend who knew not the consistency of it with his other distinctions Unto this we may adde that those that stickle for this twofold actual love of God in Christ as terminated unto God himself have not so much as one word or syllable for the indifferency of his love as Viator touching the degrees whereof all the indifferency that they assert therein is Contradistionis quoad exercitium actus So much is affirmed by Gregory De Valentia tom 4. disp 1. q. 19. punct 2. Hunc actum charitatis aiunt in Christo fuisse aliquo modo liberum ita scilicet ut posset ab eo certe aliquando desistere c. quam libertatem modo diceudi in Scholis usitato vocamus libertatem quoad actus excreitium tantum c. But our Defendant himself will not deny that all the inward acts of the love of God in Christ that were terminated immediately on God himself were alwayes at the highest equally intense And therefore this distinction being meant of the acts of Christs love of God as terminated unto God himself can do Dr. Hammond no service at all in this Controversie Having beaten the Râ—fater from all his Evasions I shall next examine what he saith unto my three Arguments The first is drawn from the all fulnâ—ss and perfection of Christs habitual grace The habits of all graces and vertues in Christ were alwayes fulâ— and perfect most intense and not capable of further or higher degrees and therefore so are the inward acts or actions of those graces and vertues too Now what is said in general of the habits of all graces may in particular be averred of the habitual grace of divine charity That in Christ was alwayes full and perfect most intense and not capable of further or higher degrees and therefore so were the inward acts that is actions thereof too Here are two Enthymems implyed the latter subordinate unto the former For habitual grace is the genus of divine charity and not the equivalent thereof as the Defendant fondly thinks That I make it p. 330. B. the Consequence of the latter Enthymem I proved p. 3 4 12. from which the confirmation of the former may easily be collected The said proof of the Consequence I shall briefly repeat and somewhat re-inforce And 't is that there can no other ground be assigned for the intension of the action of loving of God in Christ but the intension of the habit of love which Dr. Hammond and his Defendant both affirm in Christ to be alwayes so full and intense as that it was not capable of further or higher degrees For an action is not capable of degrees of intension and remission but sâ—condarily mediante qualitate which it produceth or from which it proceedeth vatione termini or vatione principij it cannot be ratione termini any quality that was the effective term the product of the inward action of love for that there is no such term or product of the action of love hath now been largely confirmed And if it be said that it was ratione principij then it must be in regard of the habitual grace of divine love for there are but two qualities that are the principles of the action of loving God in Christ the power or faculty of the will and the habitual grace of love Now the power or faculty of willing cannot be intended in any man and the habitual grace of love in Christ was alwayes so intense as that in him 't was uncapable of further intension and consequently all the inward actions flowing therefrom were of an equal intension Here your Answer unto which you referre is that I ignorantly or wilfully confound the immanent acts of love with the action of loying c. And that the Doctor speaks of the immanent acts of love and not at all of the actions p. 21 22. But first I have proved that there are no such things in rerum naturá as the acts of love distinguished from their actions as their termes Secondly Suppose that there were such termes yet that the Doctor cannot reasonably be understood of them hath been sufficiently demonstrated Unto this I adde ex abundanti the testimonies of some few Schoolmen from which may be gathered that the habit and the act are alwayes equal in gradual perfection and from this it will follow that if the habit be alwayes equally â—ntense the act mâ—st be so too But now for preventing all future mistakes and to cut off the Defendants Objections I shall lay down of this a limitation which might easily have been foreseen and is usually in things of this and the lâ—ke nature It is to be understood caeteris paribus provided that all other caâ—sâ—s concurre equally and uniformly unto the act so that the habit be not hindred by them but left to its natural way of working Now in Christ caetera erant paria there was no disâ—arity but a most absolute and perfect equality and uniformity in the influence of other causes viz. The will of Christ and Gods assisting grace in the production of his actual love of God hâ—s will never willed any abatement of the act and God never withdrew his assisting grace in the least degree or measure and therefore his habitual love of God wrought in him alwayes equally and uniformly as to the inward acts thereof Having premised this limitation which I shall intreat the Reader to carry along with him in his mind in that which followeth Let us come unto what you say unto the testimonies themselves First you quarrel me for that I cite not Aquiâ—as from his own writings But quote him twice from Caprcolus but I had very good reason for this for the passages that I quote are not in Aquinas his Sâ—mâ—nes or in his book Contra gentes which is all that I have of Aquinas The first passage he quotes out of Aquinas De Vertutibus q. 1. a. 11. and the second is out of the same work questio de charitate art 10. I believe that if you had read Caprcolus you would have been as much to seek to sind these places in Aquinas as I was If you can direct me to them I shall thank you but I suppose 't is a book not commonly to be had The first testimony you do not answer but outface From iâ— I truly as you grant concluded that a greater vehemency in the operation of love argued a greater participation in the subject of the habit of love Now from this it undeniably followeth that if the operation of love be more vehement at one time than another then the subject doth more participate of the habit of love at one time than another and
were connatural sequels 1. A fulnesse of unspeakeable and unconceivable joy solace delight pleasure and comfort in his soul 2. A redundancy of glory from his soul unto his body But by he special dispensation of God the resultancy of the former was suspended and withheld in the time of his passion and the latter the derivation of glory from his soul unto his body was totally deserted until his exaltation Here I do not say that there was a cessation interruption or abatement of the beâ—tifical vision but only a restraint of its influence not upon his love of God but upon the fulnesse of joy in his soul in the time of his passion and the redundancy of glory from his soule unto his body in the whole time of his humiliationâ— excepting his transfiguration Now from this the Defendant inferieâ— two Propositions one in the neck of another one immediately and the other mediately 1. In his state of humiliation he could not see God so perfectly and so perfectly enjoy him as after his Glorification when there was no restraint And 2. Consequently his love of God could not be so ardent so highly intense and perfect as afterwards when now he sits at the right hand of God But now if any should presume to ask for a reason of the consequence of these two Propositions I must needs tell him that they are dravvn from a Topick place vvherein the Defendant is vvonderfully skâ—â—led fallacia cosequentis And in Keckerman's Logick p. 543 544. there are amongst others especially two rare sequels instanced in that are of the same stamp vvith these of our Defendants Beculus stat in argulâ— eâ—gò â—raâ— pluet Divus Gregorius edit casâ—um Ergò Divâ— Veronica saltâ—t I finde aftervvards p. â—22 that from this very same Proposition of mine he hath tvvo other like absurd and inconsequent inferences His vvords are as follovveth If the invvard acts of Christs love vvere alvvays at the utmost height because this most intense love is a natural and necessity sequel of the beatifical vision then it necessarily follovves if his love vvere alvvays thus intense that then he alvvays enjoyed the beatifical vision the sole and necessary cause of such a love For it is an undoubted maxime That positis â—ut sublatis effectu causa necessariis ponuntur â—olluntur causa effectus And if so vvhat then shall vve say to the Author of a mixture of Scholastical Divinity vvith Practical Henry Jeanes of Chedzey for sayes he not expressely That it is not to be denied but that by special dispensation there vvas some restraint of the influence of this happinesse or beatifical vision in the vvhole course of his humillation and particularly in the time of his doleful passion And novv if his fervour of love vvere a natural issue of the beatifical vision it vvill necessarily follovv that as that his happinesse and clear intuitive sight of the divine essence vvas restrained so the fervour of his love vvas proportionably abated also Here he dravves tvvo Propositions from my vvords 1. That Christ did not always enjoy the beatifical vision 2. That sometimes the fervour of his love of God was abated Now both these inferences are very inconsequent For First this stands the first there was some restraint of the influence of the beatifical vision in Christ Therefore he did not alwayes enjoy the beatifical vision with as good Logick a man may conclude that there was no heat in the fire Dâ—n 3. because God restrained its influence upon the bodies of those three Worthies It is very strange that this our great Schoolman should bâ— so ignorant as to confound the interruption or cessation of the beatifical vision vvith the restraint of its influence or to think the former a necessary sequel of the latâ—er Here by the vvay observe that vvhereas the Defendant p. 523. quotes a saying of Leo vvhich he saith is approved of by all Antiquity that at the time of our Saviours passion Non dissolvit unionem sed substraxit visiâ—nem It is to be understood vvarily that the beatifical vision vvas vvithdravvn only in regard of influence and never in respect of existence for that in had a perpetual being or existence in the soul of Christ iâ— upon very good reasons affirmed by the generalitie of both Papists and Protestants The second Inference is every way as inconsequent for thus it stands There was by special dispensation some restraint of the influence of his beatifical vision Therefore there vvas a restraint of the influence of it upon his love of God so that the fervour of his love vvas proportionablie abated as the influence of his beatifical vision vvas restrained Here is palpable fallacie à dicio secundâ—â— quid ad dictum simpliciter the restraint of the influence of the beatifical vision in Christ is particular not universal There vvas I said some restraint of the influence of this happinesse or beatifical vision c. And I instanced in the particulars upon vvhich the restraint of this influence vvas of vvhich his love of God vvas none Thirteenthly p. 378 379 380 381. the Defendant chargeth me to make use of an objection that not only opposes Dr. Hammond in this particular but equally overthrovvs the vvhole Christian Religion that destroys the doctrine of the eveâ—â—blessed Trinitie the Godhead and satisfaction of our Saviour and the immortalitie of the soul and hell-fire and eternal torments that blovvs up as vvell the office as the maintenance of Ministers and opens a broad gap for the Socinian and Anabaptist the Ranter and Atheist to come and invade all that is sacred among us This is a terrible and most horrid accusation and if the Defendant cannot make it good he may to use his ovvn vvords p. 11. justlie be decried for the most monstrous Railer and Sycophant or any vvoâ—se thing that Christianitie abominates But he pretends that he hath made it good And novv that the Reader may see that I do you no vvrong I shall for the present suppose that the Doctor had borrovved this Exposition from Bellarmine and consider the force of your Argument against him upon this supposition I reduce it thus into forme that the strength of it may appear Whosoever makes use of any Argument or Tenent or Exposition of Scripture that is to be found in Bellarmine or other Popish Writers is guiltie of a compliance vvith Papists But Dr. Hammond makes use of this very Exposition vvhich is to be found in Bellarmine Ergo Dr. Hammond is guiltie of compliance vvith Papists That you do me intolerable wrong the Reader may see if he will but peruse my words Your Reader hath just reason to expect a confirmation of what you say Because this very Answer is the shift of Papists in several controversies between them and us Bellarm Tom. 2. De Monarchis lib. 2. cap. 1. Tom. 4. de amissione gratie statu peccati lib. 1. cap. 12. c. And was it not fit that you should acquaint