is because his Wisdom which in this respect is an Abyss to our apprehensions Wills it so Lastly 't is because this Conduct is more worthy of God than could be any other more favourable for the Reprobate For even they are condemn'd hy an Order as worthy our Adorations as that whereby the Elect are sanctified and sav'd And nothing but our Ignorance of Order and our Self-love make us blame a Conduct which the Angels and Saints eternally admire But let us return to the proofs of the efficacy of second Causes ARGUMENT V. If Bodies had not a certain Nature or Force to act with and if God did all things there would be nothing but what was Supernatural in the most ordinary effects The distinction of Natural and Supernatural which has been so well receiv'd in the World and establisht by the universal approbation of the Learn'd would be Chimerical and Extravagant ANSWER I answer that distinction is absurd in the Mouth of Aristotle since the Nature he has establisht is a meer Chimera I say that distinction is not clear in the mouth of the Vulgar part of Men who judge of things by the Impression they make upon their Senses For they know not precisely what they mean when they say the Fire burns by it's Nature I say that this distinction may pass in the mouth of a Divine if he means by natural Effects the consequences of the General Laws which God has settled for the production and preservation of all things And by supernatural Effects those which are independent on these Laws In this sense the Distinction is true But the Philosophy of Aristotle together with the Impression of the senses makes it as I think dangerous because it may divert from God the too respectful admirers of the Opinions of that wretched Philosopher or such as consult their senses instead of retiring into themselves to consult the Truth And therefore that distinction is not to be made use of without an Explication St. Austin having us'd the word fortune retracted it though there are few that could be deceiv'd by it St. Paul speaking of meats offer'd to Idols advertises that an Idol is nothing If the Nature of the Heathen Philosophy be a fiction if that nature be nothing it should be precaution'd for that there are many who are abus'd by it And more than we suppose who inconsiderately attribute to it the Works of God who are taken up with this Idol or fiction of the Humane mind and pay it those Honours which are only due to the Divinity They are willing to let God be Author of Miracles and some Extraordinary effects which in one sense are little worthy of his Greatness and Wisdom and they refer to the Power of their Imaginary nature those constant and regular Effects which none but the Wise know how to admire They suppose too that this so wonderful disposition which all living Bodies have to preserve themselves and beget their like is a production of their Nature For according to these Philosophers the Sun and Man beget a Man We may still distinguish between supernatural and natural Order several ways For we may say that the supernatural relates to future Goods that it is establish't upon consideration of the merits of CHRIST that it is the first and principal in the designs of God and other things enough to preserve a distinction which they are vainly apprehensive should fall to the ground ARGUMENT VI. The main proof which is brought by the Philosophers for the Efficacy of second Causes is drawn from the will and liberty of Man Man wills and determines of himself But to Will and Determine is to Act. 'T is certainly Man who commits Sin God not being the Author of it any more than of Concupiscence and Error Therefore Man acts ANSWER I have sufficiently explain'd in several Places of the Treatise about the Search of Truth what is the Will and Liberty of Man and especially in the first Chapter of the first Book and in the first Illustration upon it so that it is needless to repeat it again I acknowledge Man Wills and Determines himself in as much as God causes him to Will incessantly carries him towards good and gives him all the Idea's and Sensations by which he determines his Impression I know likewise that Man alone commits Sin But I deny that therein he does any thing For Sin Errour and even Concupiscence are nothing I have explain'd my self upon this Point in the first Illustration Man wills but his Volitions are impotent in themselves they produce nothing and God works all notwithstanding them For 't is even God that makes our Will by the Impression he gives us towards Good All that Man has from himself are Errour and Sin which are nothing There is a great difference between our Minds and Bodies that are about us I grant Our Mind in one sense Wills Acts and Determines it self Our own inward Consciousness is an evident Conviction If we were destitute of Liberty there could be no future Recompence and Punishment for 't is our Liberty that makes our Actions good or bad and without it Religion would be but a Phantasm and a Dream But that which we cannot see clearly is That Bodies have a force of Acting This it is we cannot comprehend and this we deny when we deny the Efficacy of Second Causes Even the Mind acts not in that measure which is imagin'd I know that I will and that I Will freely I have no Reason to doubt of it which is stronger than that inward feeling I have of my self Nor do I deny it but I deny that my Will is the true Cause of the Motion of my Arm of the Idea's of my Mind and of other things which accompany my Volitions For I see no Relation between so different things Nay I most clearly see there can be no Analogy between my Will to move my Arm and the Agitation of some little Bodies whose Motion and Figure I do not know which make choice of certain Nervous Canals amongst a Million of others unknown to me in Order to cause in me the Motion I desire by a World of Motions which I desire not I deny that my Will produces in me my Idea's I cannot see how 't is possible it should for since it cannot Act or Will without Knowledge it supposes my Idea's but does not make them Nay I do not so much as know precisely what an Idea is I cannot tell whether we produce them out of nothing and send them back to the same nothing when we cease to perceive them I speak after the Notion of some Persons I produce you 'll say my Idea's by the Faculty which God gives me of Thinking I move my Arm because of the Union which God has establish'd between my Mind and Body Faculty Vnion are Logical Terms of loose and indeterminate Signification There is no particular Being nor Mode of Being which is either Faculty or Vnion Therefore
them which by the Efficacy of the same Law giving the Elasticity to visible Bodies oblige them to rebound and hinder them from observing it But this I ought not to explain more at length XVII Now these two Laws are so Simple so Natural and at the same time so Fruitful that though we had no other Reason to conclude they are observ'd in Nature we should be induc'd to believe them establish'd by Him who works always by the simplest Ways in whose Action there is nothing but what 's so justly uniform and wisely proportion'd to his Work that He does infinite Wonders by a very small Number of Wills XVIII It fares not so with the General Cause as with the Particular with infinite Wisdom as with limited Understandings GOD foreseeing before the Establishment of Natural Laws all that could follow from them ought not to have constituted them if He was to disannul them The Laws of Nature are constant and immutable and general for all Times and Places Two Bodies of such degrees of Magnitude and Swiftness meeting rebound so now as they did heretofore If the Rain falls upon some Grounds and the Sun scorches others if a seasonable Time for Harvest is follow'd by a destructive Hail if an Infant comes into the World with a monstrous and useless Head growing from his Breast that makes him wretched this proceeds not from the particular Wills of GOD but from the Settlement of the Laws of Communication of Motions whereof these Effects are necessary Consequences Laws at once so simple and so fruitful that they serve to produce all we see Noble in the World and even to repair in a little time the most general Barrenness and Mortality XIX He that having built an House throws one Wing of it down that he may rebuild it betrays his Ignorance and he who having planted a Vine plucks it up as soon as it has taken root manifests his Levity because he that wills and unwills wants either Knowledge or Resolution of Mind But it cannot be said that GOD acts either by this Freakishness or Ignorance when a Child comes into the World with superfluous Members that make him leave it again or that an Hail-stone breaks off a Fruit half ripe If he causes this 't is not because he wills and unwills for GOD acts not like particular Causes by particular Wills nor has he establish'd the Laws of the Communications of Motions with design to produce Monsters or to make Fruit fall before Maturity it not being their Sterility but Fecundity for which He will'd these Laws Therefore what He once will'd He still wills and the World in general for which these Laws were constituted will eternally subsist XX. 'T is here to be observ'd That the Essential Rule of the Will of GOD is Order and that if Man for example had not sinn'd a Supposition which had quite chang'd the Designs then Order not suffering him to be punish'd the Natural Laws of the Communications of Motions would never have been capable to incommodate his Felicity For the Law of Order which requires that a righteous Person should suffer nothing against his Will being Essential to GOD the Arbitrary Law of the Communication of Motions must have been necessarily subservient to it XXI There are still some uncommon Instances where these General Laws of Motions ought to cease to produce their Effect not that GOD changes or corrects His Laws but that some Miracles must happen on particular Occasions by the Order of Grace which ought to supersede the Order of Nature Besides 't is fit Men should know that GOD is so Master of Nature that if He submits it to His Laws establish'd 't is rather because He wills it so than by an absolute Necessity XXII If then it be true that the General Cause ought not to produce His Work by particular Wills and that GOD ought to settle certain constant and invariable Laws of the Communication of Motions by the Efficacy whereof He foresaw the World might subsist in the State we find it in one Sense it may be most truly said that GOD desires all his Creatures should be perfect that He wills not the Abortion of Children nor loves monstrous Productions nor has made the Laws of Nature with design of causing them and that if it were possible by ways so simple to make and preserve a perfecter World He would never have establish'd those Laws whereof so great a Number of Monsters are the necessary Results But that it would have been unworthy His Wisdom to multiply His Wills to prevent some particular Disorders which by their Diversity make a kind of Beauty in the Universe XXIII GOD has given to every Seed a Cicatricle which contains in Miniature the Plant and Fruit another Cicatricle adjoining to the former which contains the Root of the Plant which Root contains another Root still whose imperceptible Branches expand themselves into the two Lobes or Meal of the Seed Does not this manifest that in one most real Sense He designs all Seeds should produce their like For why should He have given to those Grains of Corn He design'd should be barren all the Parts requisite to render them Fecund Nevertheless Rain being necessary to make them thrive and this falling on the Earth by General Laws which distribute it not precisely on well manur'd Grounds and in the fittest Seasons all these Grains come not to good or if they do the Hail or some other mischievous Accident which is a Necessary Consequence of these same Natural Laws prevents their earing Now GOD having constituted these Laws might be said to will the Fecundity of some Seeds rather than others if we did not otherwise know that it not becoming a General Cause to work by Particular Wills nor an infinitely wise Being by Complicated Ways GOD ought not to take other Measures than He has done for the Regulating the Rains according to Time and Place or by the Desire of the Husbandman Thus much is suffiâ—ient for the Order of Nature Let us explain that of Grace a little more at large and especially remember that 't is the same Wisdom and the same Will in a word the same GOD who has establish'd them both PART II. Of the Necessity of the General Laws of GRACE XXIV GOD loving Himself by the Necessity of His Being and willing to procure an Infinite Glory and Honour on all Hands worthy of himself consults His Wisdom for the accomplishing His Desires This Divine Wisdom fill'd with Love for Him from whom He receives His Being by an Eternal and Ineffable Generation seeing nothing in all possible Creatures worthy of the Majesty of His Father offers Himself to establish to His Honour an Eternal Worship and to present Him as High Priest a Sacrifice which through the Dignity of His Person should be capable of contenting Him He represents to Him infinite Models for the Temple to be rais'd to His Glory and at the same time all possible Ways to execute His Designs
were true that God acted by particular Wills since Miracles are such only from their not happening by General Laws Therefore Miracles suppose these Laws and prove the Opinion I have establish'd But as to ordinary Effects they clearly and directly demonstrate General Laws or Wills If for Instance a Stone be dropp'd upon the Head of Passengers it will continually fall with equal speed not distinguishing the Piety or Quality or Good or Ill Disposition of those that pass If we examine any other Effect we shall see the same Constancy in the Action of the Cause of it But no Effect proves that God acts by particular Wills though Men commonly fancy God is constantly working Miracles in their Favour That way they would have God to act in being consonant to their own and indulgent to Self-love which centers all things on themselves and very proportionate to their Ignorance of the Complication of Occasional Causes which produce extraordinary Effects naturally falls into Mens Thoughts when but greenly studied in Nature and consult not with sufficient Attention the abstract Idea of an Infinite Wisdom of an Universal Cause of a Being Infinitely Perfect CONCERNING Nature and Grace DISCOURSE II. Of the Laws of GRACE in particular and of the Occasional Causes which regulate and determine their Efficacy PART I. Of the Grace of JESVS CHRIST I. SINCE none but GOD can act immediately and by himself on Minds and produce in them all the various Motions they are capable of 'T is he alone who sheds his Light within us and inspires us with certain Sensations which determine our diverse Volitions And therefore none but he can as a True Cause produce Grace in our Souls For Grace or that which is the Principle or Motive of all the Regular Motions of our Love is necessarily either a Light which instructs us or a confus'd Sensation that convinces us that God is our Good since we never begin to love an Object unless we see clearly by the Light of Reason or feel confusedly by the tast of Pleasure that this Object is good I mean capable of making us happier than we are II. But since all Men are involv'd in Original Sin and even by their Nature infinitely beneath the Majesty of God 'T is Jesus Christ alone that can by the Dignity of his Person and the Holiness of his Sacrifice have access to his Father reconcile him to us and merit his Favours for us and consequently be the meritorious Cause of Grace These Truths are certain But we are not seeking the Cause which produces Grace by its own Efficacy nor that which merits it by its Sacrifice and Good Works We enquire for that which regulates and determines the Efficacy of the General Cause and which we may term the Second Particular and Occasional III. For to the end the General Cause may act by General Laws or Wills and that his Action may be regular constant and uniform 't is absolutely necessary there should be some Occasional Cause to determine the Efficacy of these Laws and to help to fix them If the Collision of Bodies or something of like Nature did not determine the Efficacy of the General Laws of the Communication of Motions it would be necessary for God to move Bodies by particular Wills The Laws of Union of the Soul and Body become efficacious only from the Changes befalling one or other of these two Substances For if God made the Soul feel the Pain of pricking tho' the Body were not prick'd or though the same thing did not happen in the Brain as if it were he would not act by the General Laws of Union of the Soul and Body but by a particular Will If Rain fell on the Earth otherwise than by a necessary Consequence of the General Laws of Communication of Motions the Rain and the Fall of every Drop that composes it would be the Effect of a particular Will So that unless Order requir'd it should rain that Will would be absolutely unworthy of God 'T is necessary therefore that in the Order of Grace there should be some Occasional Cause which serves to fix these Laws and to determine their Efficacy And this is the Cause we must endeavour to discover IV. Provided we consult the Idea of intelligible Order or consider the sensible Order which appears in the Works of God we shall easily discover that Occasional Causes which determine the Efficacy of General Laws and are of use in fixing them must necessarily be related to the Design for which God has establish'd them For Example Experience evidences that God has not made and Reason certifies that he ought not to make the Courses of the Planets the Occasional Causes of the Union of our Soul and Body He ought not to will that our Arm should be mov'd in such or such a manner or that our Soul should feel the Tooth-ake when the Moon shall be in conjunction with the Sun if so be this Conjunction acts not on the Body God's Design being to unite our Soul to our Body he cannot in prosecuting that Design give the Soul Sensations of Pain save when there happen some Changes in the Body repugnant to it Wherefore we are not to seek out of our Soul or Body the Occasional Causes of their Union V. Hence it follows that God designing to form his Church by Jesus Christ could not according to that Design seek the Occasional Causes which serve to settle the General Laws of Grace by which the Spirit of Jesus diffus'd through his Members communicates Life and Holiness to them except in Jesus Christ and in the Creatures united to him by Reason Thus the Rain of Grace is not deriv'd to our Hearts by the diverse situations of the Stars nor by the Collision of certain Bodies nor even according to the different Courses of the animal Spirits which give us Motion and Life All that Bodies can do is to excite in us Motions and Sensations purely Natural For whatever arrives to the Soul through the Body is only for the Body VI. Yet as Grace is not given to all that desire it nor as soon as they desire it and is granted to those who do not ask it it thence follows that even our Desires are not the Occasional Causes of Grace For this sort of Causes have constantly and most readily their Effect and without them the Effect is not produc'd For Instance the Collision of Bodies being the Occasional Cause of the Change which happens in their Motion if two Bodies did not meet their Motions would not alter and if they alter'd we may be assur'd they met The general Laws which shed Grace upon our Hearts find nothing therefore in our Wills to determine their Efficacy as the general Laws which regulate the Rains are not founded on the Dispositions of the Places rain'd upon For it indifferently rains upon all Places on hollow and manur'd Grounds even on the Sands and the Sea it self VII We are therefore reduc'd to confess that
Principle In a word Jesus Christ needing Minds of particular Dispositions for the causing particular Effects may in general apply to them and by that Application infuse into them sanctifying Grace As the Mind of a Projector thinks in general of square Stones when these Stones are actually necessary to his Building XVIII But the Soul of Jesus being not a general Cause we have reason to think it has often particular Desires in regard to particular Persons When we intend to speak of God we must not consult our selves and make him act like us but consider the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect and make God act according to that Idea But in speaking of the Action of the Soul of Jesus we may look into our selves and make him act like particular Causes For Example We have reason to believe that the Conversion of St. Paul was owing to the Efficacy of a particular Desire of Jesus Christ. And we are to look upon the Desires of the Soul of Jesus which have a general respect to Minds of a certain Character as particular Desires though they comprehend many Persons because these Desires change daily like those of particular Causes But the general Laws by which God acts are always the same because the Wills of God ought to be firm and constant by reason that his Wisdom is infinite XIX The diverse Desires of the Soul of Jesus distributing Grace we clearly conceive why it is not equally dispers'd to all Men and why bestow'd on some more abundantly at one time than another For his Soul not thinking on all Men at once cannot at the same time have all the Desires whereof it is capable So that he acts not on his Members in a particular manner except by successive Influences as the Soul moves not at once all the Muscles of our Body For the Animal Spirits are unequally and successively distributed into our Members according to the various Impressions of Objects the diverse Motions of our Passions and the several Desires we freely excite within us XX. True it is that all the Righteous constantly receive the Influence of their Head which gives them Life and that when they act by the Spirit of Jesus Christ they merit and receive new Graces though it be not necessary that the Soul of Jesus should have any particular Desires as the occasional Causes of them For Order which requires that every Desert should be rewarded is not an arbitrary but a necessary Law and independent from any occasional Cause But though he who performs a meritorious Action may be rewarded for it whilst the Soul of Jesus has no actual Desires relating to him yet 't is certain that he merited not this Grace but by the Dignity and Sanctity of the Spirit which Christ has communicated to him For Men are not well-pleasing to God nor able to do good but in as much as they are united to his Son by Charity XXI It must be farther acknowledg'd that those who observe the Counsels of Jesus Christ out of an Esteem they have for them and through the Fear of future Punishment sollicite as I may say by their Obedience the Charity of Christ to think on them though they act from a Principle of Self-love But their Actions are not the Occasional Causes either of Grace since it does not infallibly follow them or even of the Motions of the Soul of Jesus in their Favour since these Motions never fail to communicate it Thus only the Desires of Jesus Christ as Occasional Causes have infallibly their Effect because God having constituted him Head of the Church ought by him only to communicate his sanctifying Grace to his Elect. XXII Now we may consider in the Soul of Jesus Christ Desires of two sorts viz. Actual Transitory and Particular that have but a short-liv'd Efficacy and Stable and Permanent which consist in a setled and constant Disposition of the Soul of Jesus Christ with relation to certain Effects which tend to the Execution of his Design in general If our Soul by its various Motions communicated to our Body all that was necessary to its Formation and Growth we might distinguish in her two kinds of Desire For it would be by the actual and transitory Desires that she would drive into the Muscles of the Body the Spirits which gave it a certain Disposition with reference to present Objects or to the actual Thoughts of the Mind But it would be by stable and permanent Desires that she would give to the Heart and Lungs the natural Motions by which Respiration and the Circulation of the Blood were perform'd By these Desires she would digest the Aliments and distribute them to all the Parts that needed them in as much as that sort of Action is at all times necessary to the Preservation of the Body XXIII By the actual transitory and particular Desires of the Soul of Jesus Grace is deriv'd to unprepar'd Persons in a manner somewhat singular and extraordinary But 't is by his permanent Desires that it is given regularly to those who receive the Sacraments with the necessary Dispositions For the Grace we receive by the Sacraments is not given us precisely because of the Merit of our Action though we receive them in Grace but because of the Merits of Jesus Christ which are freely applied to us in consequence of his permanent Desires We receive in the Sacraments much more Grace than our Preparation deserves and it suffices to our receiving some Influence from them that we do not oppose and resist it But 't is abusing what is most Sacred in Religion to receive them unworthily XXIV Amongst the actual and transitory Desires of the Soul of Jesus there are certainly some more durable and frequent than others and the Knowledge of these Desires is of greatest Consequence in Point of Morality Doubtless he thinks oftner on those who observe his Counsels than on other Men. His Motions of Charity for Believers are more frequent and lasting than those for Libertines and Atheists And as all Believers are not equally prepar'd to enter into the Church of the Predestinate the Desires of the Soul of Jesus are not equally lively frequent and durable on the account of them all Man more earnestly desires the Fruits that are fittest for the Nourishment of his Body he 〈◊〉 oftner on Bread and Wine than on Meats of difficult Digestion So Jesus Christ designing the Formation of his Church ought to be more taken up with those who can most easily enter than on others which are extremely remote The Scripture likewise teaches us that the Humble the Poor the Penitent receive greater Graces than other Men because the Despisers of Honours Riches and Pleasures are the fittest for the Kingdom of Heaven Those for Example who have learn'd of Jesus Christ to be meek and humble in Heart shall find Rest to their Souls The Yoke of Christ which is insupportable to the Proud will become easie and light by the Assistances of Grace For God
same blow produces very different motions and consequently excites very different Sensations in a Man of a Robust Constitution and in a Child or a Woman of a tender make Thus since we cannot be ascertain'd that there are two Persons in the World who have the Organs of their Senses exactly match'd we cannot be assur'd there are two Persons in the World who have altogether the same Sensations of the same Objects This is the Original cause of the strange Variety which is found in the Inclinations of Men. Some there are who are extremely pleas'd with Musick others find nothing agreeable in it And even between these who delight in it some one sort of Musick some another according to that almost Infinite Diversity which is found in the Fibres of the Auditory Nerve in the Blood and the Animal Spirits How great for instance is the difference between the Musick of Italy of France of the Chinese and other People and consequently between the Relish these different People have of these different sorts of Musick It is usual likewise for the same Men at several times to receive different Impressions from the same Consorts For if the Imagination be well warm'd by a great plenty of brisk and active Spirits a Man is much more pleas'd with a bolder Hand or a Voluntarie wherein there are many Discords than with a softer Musick that is compos'd with exacter Rules and a Mathematical Niceness Experience proves this and 't is easie to give a Reason for it 'T is just the same with Smells He that loves an Orange-flower possibly cannot endure a Rose and so on the contrary As for Tasts there is no less a Diversity in them than in the other Sensations Sawces must be made wholly different equally to please different Men or equally to please the same Person at different times One loves Sweet another Sowre One loves the Taste of Wine another abhors it the same Person who thinks it pleasant when he 's in Health finds it bitter in a Fever and so 't is with the other Senses And yet all Men are fond of Pleasure they all delight in agreeable Sensations And in this have all the same Inclinations They receive not therefore the same Sensations from the same Objects since they do not love them equally alike Thus that which makes one Man say he likes sweet things is the agreeable Sensation he has of them and that which makes another say he does not love sweet things is indeed because he has a different Sensation from him that loves them And so in saying he loves not sweet things it is not imply'd that he would not have the same Sensation as the other but only that he has it not Wherefore 't is an Impropriety of Speech for a Man to say he loves not what is Sweet he should say he loves not Sugar or Honey or the like which to others seem sweet and agreeable and that he has not the same Taste as others because the Fibres of his Tongue are differently dispos'd But to give a sensible Instance Let us suppose that among twenty Men there were some one of them whose Hands were Cold and that he was unacquainted with the words they make use of in England to explain the Sensation of Heat and Cold by and on the contrary that the Hands of all the rest were extreamly Hot. If in Winter some Water somewhat frigid should be brought them all to wash in those whose Hands were very Hot washing after each other might very well say This Water is very Cold I can't endure it But when the other whose Hands were extreamly Cold came to wash at last he might say on the contrary I can't imagine Gentlemen why ye like not the Cold Water for my part I take pleasure in feeling it Cold and washing in it It is manifest in this particular instance That the last in saying he lov'd the Cold could mean nothing else but that he lov'd the Heat and that he felt the Water Hot whilst others felt the contrary Thus when a Man says I love what is bitter and can't endure sweets no more is meant thereby than that he has not the same Sensations as those who say they love sweets and have an aversion to what is bitter It is certain therefore that a Sensation which is agreeable to one Man is so to all others who have the same but the same Objects does not cause the same Sensation in all Men because of the different disposition of the Organs of the Senses which is a thing of greatest consequence to be observ'd both as to Natural and Moral Philosophy To this only one Objection can be made and that very easie to be answer'd which is this It sometimes happens that those very Persons who love extreamly some sorts of Meat at length shall hate them in as great a degree either because in eating they met with some uncleanliness in the Dish which surpriz'd and disgusted them or because they surfeited on them by eating to excess or for several other reasons These Men 't is objected love not the same Sensations as they lov'd before For still though they eat the same Meats yet they find them no longer pleasant and palatable In answering this Objection it must be observ'd that these Men upon eating those Meats to which they have so great an abhorrence and loathing have two very different Sensations at the same time They have that of the Meat which they eat as 't is suppos'd in the Objection And they have yet another Sensation of Distaste or Loathing which proceeds for instance from a strong imagination of some uncleanliness they have formerly seen mingled with what they eat The reason of this is that when two Motions are occasion'd in the Brain at the same time one of them is never excited without the other unless it be some considerable time after Thus because the Agreeable is always accompany'd with the Loathsome Sensation and we usually confound things which happen at the same time we imagine with our selves that this Sensation which was formerly pleasant and agreeable is no longer so And yet if it were always the same it must necessarily be always agreeable Wherefore supposing it to be disagreeable and unpleasant 't is because it is joyn'd and confounded with another Sensation which is more distastful than it is it self agreeable There is much more difficulty to prove that Colours and such other Sensations which I term'd the Faint and Languid are not the same in all Mankind Because all these Sensations affect the Soul so weakly that a Man cannot distinguish as he may in Tasts or other more powerful and lively Sensations whether one is more agreeable than another nor discover the diversity of Mens Sensations by the variety of Pleasure or Distast which might be found in different Persons Yet Reason which shews that the other Sensations are not all alike in different Persons does likewise shew there must necessarily be variety in
amiss to declare that no fault is to be found with these Terms of Form and Essential Difference Honey is doubtless Honey by its Form and thus it is that it differs essentially from Salt but this Form or this Essential Difference consists only in the different Configuration of its Parts 'T is this different Configuration which makes Honey to be Honey and Salt to be Salt And though it be accidental to Matter in general to have the Configuration of the parts of Honey or Salt and so to have the Form of Honey or Salt yet it may be said to be essential to Honey or Salt that they may be what they are to have such or such a Configuration in their parts just as the Sensations of Cold of Heat of Pleasure and Pain are not essential to the Soul but only to the Soul which feels them in as much as by these Sensations she is said to feel Heat Cold Pleasure and Pain CHAP. XVII I. Another Instance taken from Morality which shews that our Senses offer us nothing but false Goods II. That GOD alone is our true and proper Good III. The Origine of the Error of the Epicureans and Stoicks I HAVE I think brought sufficient Arguments to prove that this Prejudice That our Sensations are in the Objects is a most fruitful Principle of Errors in Natural Philosophy It is my Business at present to bring others drawn from Morality wherein the same Prejudice joyn'd with this other That the Objects of our Senses are the true and sole Causes of our Sensations is most highly dangerous There is nothing so common in the World as to see Men devoted to sensible Goods some love Musick some Banquetting and others have a Passion for other things Now this is the way of Reasoning these Men must have taken to perswade themselves that these Objects are their Goods All the pleasant Tasts we are delighted with in Feasting the Sounds which gratifie the Ear and those other Pleasures we are sensible of upon other occasions are doubtless contain'd in sensible Objects or at least these Objects give us the Sensation of them or lastly are the only means of Conveying them to our Senses Now it is impossible to doubt that Pleasure is good and Pain evil We receive a Conviction from within and consequently the Objects of our Passions are most real goods to which we must cleave if we will be happy This is the Reasoning we generally fall into almost without being aware of it Thus because we believe that our Sensations are in Objects or that the Objects are of themselves capable of giving us the Sensation of them we consider these things as our own Goods though we are infinitely exalted above them since they are able to act only upon our Bodies and to produce some Motion in their Fibres but are incapable of acting upon our Souls or making us sensible either of Pleasure or Pain Certainly if our Soul acts not upon her self on occasion of what happens in the Body it is GOD alone who hath that Power And if she be not the Cause of her own Pleasure and Pain according to the Diversity of the Vibrations of the Fibres of her Body as it is most highly probable she is not since she feels Pleasure and Pain without consenting thereunto I know no other Hand potent enough to make her sensible thereof except that of the Author of Nature Certainly it is GOD alone who is our true Good He only is able to fill us with all the Pleasures we are capable of enjoying and it is only by the Knowledge of Him and Love of Him He has resolv'd to make us sensible of them Such as He has affixt to the Motions which happen in our Body to make us the more sollicitous for its Preservation are very little in themselves very weak as to their Capacity and very short in their Duration Notwithstanding in the estate Sin has reduc'd us to we are as it were become their Vassals But those which He shall make His Elect sensible of in Heaven will be infinitely greater since He hath Created us that we might know and love Him For whereas ORDER requires the Perception of the greatest Pleasures in the Possession of the greatest Goods GOD being infinitely above all other things the Pleasure of those who shall enjoy Him will certainly exceed all other Pleasures What we have said of the Cause of our Errors in respect of Good gives us a sufficient Knowledge of the falsity of the Opinions the Epicureans and Stoicks embrac'd touching the Sovereign Good The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure and because a Man is sensible of this no less in Vice than in Vertue and more generally in the former than in the other it has been commonly thought they let loose the Reins to all sorts of Sensible Pleasures Now the first cause of their Error is this That judging falsly there is something pleasant and agreeable in the Objects of their Senses or that they were the real Causes of the Pleasures they felt and being moreover convinc'd by an Internal Sensation which they naturally had that Pleasure was good for them at least for the time wherein they enjoy'd it they let themselves loose to all sorts of Passions from which they had no Apprehensions of receiving any dammage in the Consequence Whereas they ought to have consider'd that the Pleasure they reap'd from sensible things could not exist in those things as their true Causes nor any other way and consequently that sensible Goods could not be Goods in respect of the Soul and they should have thought of the things we have already explain'd The Stoicks on the other hand being perswaded that sensible Pleasures were only seated in and fitted for the Body and that the Soul ought to have a peculiar Good of her own plac'd Felicity in Vertue see then the Origine of their Errors Viz. They believ'd that Sensible Pleasure and Pain were not in the Soul but in the Body only and made use of this their false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions as that Pain was not an Evil nor Pleasure a Good That the Pleasures of the Senses were not Good in their own Nature that they were common to Men and Beasts c. Notwithstanding it is easie to see that though the Epicureans and Stoicks were in the wrong in many things they were in the right in some for the Happiness of the Blessed consists only in a perfect and accomplish'd Vertue that is to say in their Knowledge and Love of GOD and in a most exquisite Pleasure that never fails to accompany them Let it then be well remembred That External Objects contain nothing either Pleasant or Troublesome in themselves that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures that we have no reason either to fear or love them but it is GOD alone whom 't is our duty to fear and our duty to love since 't is only He that has Power
to be able to pronounce it incapable of any thing more than Knowledge and Love This indeed might be maintain'd by those who attribute their Sensations to external Objects or to their Body and who would have their Passions to be in their Hearts For indeed if we rob the Soul of all her Passions and Sensations all that we leave discoverable in her is no more than a consequence of Knowledge or of Love But I cannot conceive how those who are retriev'd from those Delusions of the Senses can perswade themselves that all our Sensations and our Passions are nothing but knowledge and Love I would say Species of confus'd Judgments the Soul passes upon Objects with reference to the Body which she Animates I cannot conceive how a Man can affirm Light Colours Odors and the like to be Judgments of the Soul for it seems to me on the contrary that I distinctly perceive Light Colours Smells and the other Sensations to be Modifications quite different from Judgments But let us make choice of more lively Sensations and such as the Mind is most taken up with and see what these Persons say of Pain and Pleasure They will have these Sensations with several most considerable Authors to be only the consequences or dependences of the Faculties we we have of Knowing and Willing and that Pain for instance is only the Regret the Opposition and Aversion the Will has to what she knows hurtful to the Body which she loves Now to me this seems evidently to confound Pain with Sorrow but so far is Pain from being a Consequence of the Knowledge of the Mind and the Action of the Will that on the contrary it precedes them both If you put for example a burning Coal in the Hand of a Man asleep or that was warming his Hands behind him I know not how it can be with any probability affirm'd that this Man first knew there happen'd in his Hand some Motions contrary to the good Constitution of his Body that hereupon his Will oppos'd them and that his Pain was the Consequence of that Knowledge of his Mind and Opposition of his Will On the contrary it is in my Opinion undoubtedly certain that the first thing this Man perceiv'd as soon as the Coal touch'd his Hand was Pain and that the Knowledge of the Mind and Opposition of the Will were only the Consequences of it though they were truly the Cause of the Sorrow which succeeded the Pain But there 's a vast difference between this Pain and the Sorrow it produces Pain is the first thing the Soul is sensible of it is not preceded by any Knowledge nor can ever be agreeable and welcome of it self Whereas Sorrow is the last thing the Soul feels it is ever preceded with Knowledge and is always pleasant of it self This is evidently manifest from the Pleasure that attends the Sorrow a Man 's affected with at the direful Representations of the Theatre for this Pleasure increases with the Sorrow but Pleasure never increases with Pain The Comedians who study the Art of Pleasing know well that they must never lay the Stage in Blood because the sight though of a fictitious Murder would be too Terrible to be Pleasant But they are not afraid of touching the Spectators with a deep Sorrow because Sorrow is ever agreeable when there 's occasion to be mov'd with it There is then an Essential difference between Sorrow and Pain and it can no wise be said that Pain is nothing but the Knowledge of the Mind together with an Opposition of the Will As to all the other Sensations such as are Smells Tasts Sounds Colours the generality of Men do not think they are the Modifications of their Soul But on the contrary judge they are diffus'd upon the Objects or at least that they are only in the Soul as an Idea of a Square or a Circle that is are united to the Soul but are not the Modifications of it and the Reason of their judging thus is that this kind of Sensations do not much affect them as I have shewn in the Explication of the Errors of the Senses It ought then I think to be concluded That we know not all the Modifications incident to our Soul and that besides those which she has by the Organs of Senses it is impossible for her to have infinite others which she has never experimented nor ever shall till deliver'd from the captivity of her Body And yet it must be confess'd that as Matter is not capable of infinite different Configurations but because of its Extension so the Soul is not capable of different Modifications but on the account of Thought it being manifest that the Soul would be incapable of the Modifications of Pleasure Pain and even of those that are indifferent to her were it not for her being capable of Perception or Thought It is sufficient then to know that Thought is the Principle of all these Modifications If any one will have something in the Soul previous to Thought I shall not dispute it with him But as I am assur'd that no One has any Knowledge of his Soul but by Thought or by being inwardly conscious of what passes in his Mind so I am certain that if any One would reason about the Nature of the Soul he ought only to consult that Internal Sensation which constantly represents her to himself such as she is and not to imagine against the conviction of his own Conscience that she is an invisible Fire a subtile Air Harmony or the like CHAP. II. I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing of an infinite Nature II. Its Limitation is the Origine of a great many Errors III. And especially of Heresies IV. The Mind must be submitted unto Faith SO then that which we immediately discover in the Thought of Man is its being limited to a very narrow compass from which consideration may be drawn two very important Conclusions As first that the Soul cannot perfectly know Infinity Secondly that she can have no distinct Knowledge of many things at once For as a piece of Wax is incapable of admitting at the same time a great number of different Figures so the Soul is incapable of knowing at the same time a multitude of things And as again a piece of Wax cannot be square and round at the same time but only semi-square and semi-circular and the more different Figures it has the less perfect and distinct they will be so the Soul cannot perceive many things at once and her Thoughts will be so much more confus'd as they are more numerous Last of all as a piece of Wax which had a thousand Faces and on each Face a different Figure would be neither square nor round nor oval nor could a Man say what Figure it was of So it sometimes happens that a Man has such a multitude of different Thoughts that he fancies he thinks of nothing at all which is exemplify'd in those that fall into
has pretended not to be ignorant of that adventitious Whiteness in the Hairs of Old Men and has given several Reasons for it in several places of his Books But being the Genius of Nature he has not stopt there but penetrated much farther He has moreover discover'd that the Cause which turn'd Old Men's Hairs white was the self-same with that which made some Men and some Horses have one Eye Blue and the other of another Colour These are his Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is very surprizing but there is nothing un-intelligible to this Great Man who gives Reasons for such a vast number of things in almost all parts of his Physics as the most enlightned Men of this Age believe impenetrable which must needs give good grounds for an Author 's saying He was given us by GOD that we might be ignorant of nothing possible to be known Aristotelis est SVMMAVERITAS quoniam ejus Intellectus fuit finis humani intellectûs Quare bene dicitur de illo quod ipse fuit creatus datus nobis divinâ Providentiâ ut non ignoremus possibilia sciri Averroês ought too to have said That Aristotle was given us by Divine Providence for the understanding what was impossible to be understood For certainly that Philosopher teaches us not only the things that may be known but since we must believe him on his word his Doctrine being the Soveraign Truth SVMMAVERITAS he teaches us likewise those things which 't is impossible to know Undoubtedly a Man must have a strong Faith thus to believe Aristotle when he only gives us Logical Reasons and explains the Effects of Nature by the confus'd Notions of the Senses especially when he positively determines upon Questions which we cannot see possible for Men ever to resolve Yet Aristotle takes particular care of admonishing us to believe him on his word it being an uncontroverted Axiom with this Author That a Disciple is to believe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 True sometimes Disciples are oblig'd to believe their Masters But their Faith should reach no farther than to Experiments and matters of Fact For would they become true Philosophers they ought to examine their Master's Reasons and never receive them till they had discover'd their Evidence by their own But to become a Peripatetic Philosopher there is no more requisite than to believe and to remember The same Disposition of Mind going to the reading that Philosophy as to the reading of an History For should a Man take the freedom of using his Mind and his Reason he must not expect to grow any considerable Philosopher 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the Reason why Aristotle and a great many other Philosophers have pretended to know what can never be known is their not well distinguishing the difference betwixt knowing and knowing betwixt having a Certain and Evident Knowledge and only a Probable and Obscure And the Reason of their not having observ'd that Distinction is their being taken up always with subjects of a greater Reach and Comprehension than their own Mind so that they have usually seen only some parts thereof without being able to take them all in together which suffices to the Discovery of many Probabilities but not for the evident Discovery of Truth Besides which Vanity being the Motive to their seeking Science and Probabilities making more for their Esteem among Men than Truth it self as being more proportion'd to the ordinary stature and ability of the Mind they neglected to search for the necessary means of augmenting its Capacity and giving it a greater Growth and Comprehension for which reason they have not been able to go to the bottom of Truths that lay any thing deep and conceal'd The Geometricians only have well discover'd the narrow Capacity of the Mind at least have taken such a Method in their Studies as shews they have a perfect Knowledge of it especially those who use Algebra and Analytics which Vieta and Des-Cartes have re-establish'd and perfected in this Age. Which is herein apparent that these Men never attempted the Resolution of Difficulties very Compound till after having most clearly known the more Simple which they depend on they never fix'd to the consideration of Crooked Lines as of Conick Sections till they we perfect Masters of common Geometry But what is peculiar to the Analysts is that seeing their Mind incapable of Attention to many Figures at once and unable to imagine Solids of more than three Dimensions though there were frequent necessity of conceiving such as had more they made use of common Letters that are very familiar to us to express and abridge their Idea's And thus the Mind being not confounded or taken up with the Representation it would be oblig'd to make of a great many Figures and an infinite number of Lines can survey at a single view what otherwise was impossible to be seen Forasmuch as the Mind can launch out farther and penetrate into a great many more things when its Capacity is manag'd to the best advantage So that all the Skill and Artifice there is in making the Mind deeper-sighted and more comprehensive consists as shall be explain'd in another place in a dexterous management of its Strength and Capacity and in not laying it out impertinently on things not necessary to the discovery of the Truth it is in search of Which is a thing well worthy to be observ'd For this one thing makes it evident that the ordinary Logicks are more proper to straiten the Capacity of the Mind than enlarge it it being visible that by imploying the Rules they give in the finding out any Truth the Capacity of the Mind must be taken up with them and so it must have the less Liberty for attending to and comprehending the whole extent of the subject it examines 'T is manifest enough then from what hath been said that most Men have made but little Reflection on the Nature of the Mind when they would imploy it in The Search of Truth that they have not been throughly convinc'd of its little Extent and the necessity there is of Husbanding it well and increasing it and that this is one of the most considerable Causes of their Errors and of their so ill success in their Studies This is not said with Presumption that there were ever any who knew not their Mind was limited and straitned in its Capacity and Comprehension This doubtless has been known and is still confess'd by all the World But the generality know it only confusedly and confess it no farther than Teeth-outwards For the conduct they take in their Studies gives the Lye to their Confession since they act as if they truly believ'd their Mind was Infinite and are desirous of diving into things which depend on a great many Causes whereof they commonly know not any one There is still another Failing very customary with Studious Men and that is their applying to too many Sciences at once so that if they study
the same Inclinations I know likewise that GOD will never make Spirits undesirous of Happiness or that can be desirous of being Miserable But I know it with evidence and certainty since 't is GOD that teaches me for who could inform me of the Designs and Wills of GOD but GOD Himself But when the Body is a partner in that which occurrs within me I am almost ever deceiv'd if I measure others by my self I feel Heat I see a thing of such a Size or such a Colour I have such or such a Tast upon the application of certain Bodies to my Palate and I am deceiv'd if I judge of others by my self I am subject to particular Passions I have a kindness or aversion to this or that thing and I judge that others have the like but my Conjecture is often false Thus the Knowledge we have of other Men is very obnoxious to Error if we judge of them only from the Sensations we have of our selves Whether there are any Beings different from GOD our selves Bodies and Pure Spirits is unknown to us We can hardly perswade our selves there are and after we have examin'd the Reasons of some Philosophers who pretend the contrary we have found them false Which has confirm'd us in the Notion we had taken up that all Men being of the same Nature we have all the same Idea's as having all need of the Knowledge of the same things CHAP. VIII I. The intimate Presence of the indefinite Idea of Being in general is the cause of all the disorderly Abstractions of the Mind and the most part of the Chimera's of the Vulgar Philosophy which hinder many Philosophers from acknowledging the solidity of true Principles of Physicks II. An Instance concerning the Essence of Matter THAT clear intimate and necessary Presence of GOD I mean that presence of Being without any particular Limitation of Being infinite and in general to the Mind acts stronglier upon it than the preâ—ence of all finite Objects It is impossible to divest it self absolutely of this general Idea of Being since 't is impossible to subsist out of GOD. Perhaps it may be said that the Mind can separate it self from him because it can think on particular Beings But this is a mistake For the Mind in considering any Being in particular does not so much separate and recede from GOD as approach nearer some of His Perfections if I may be permitted so to speak by removing farther off from others However it doth not distance it self in that manner as quite to lose sight of them but is ever in a Capacity of seeking them out and approaching near them They are ever present to the Mind yet the Mind perceives them not but in an unexplicable confusion by reason of its Littleness and the Greatness of the Idea of Being A Man may indeed be some time without thinking on himself but he cannot as I think subsist a moment without thinking on Being and even at the time a Man believes he thinks of nothing he is necessarily full of the indeterminate and general Idea of Being But because the things which are customary to us and which don 't affect us alarum not the Mind with any vehemence nor oblige it to make reflection on them this Idea of being so great so vast so real and positive as it is is so familiar to us and makes so little impression that we fancy that we hardly see it that we make no reflection on it and consequently judge there is little reality in it and that 't is only form'd from a confus'd collection of all particular Idea's though on the contrary it is in this and by this only we perceive all Beings in particular Though that Idea which we receive through our immediate union with the WORD of GOD never deceives us of it self as do those we derive from the union we have with our Body which represents things to us otherwise than they are yet I scruple not to say That we make so bad use of the best things that the indelible presence of this Idea is one of the principal Causes of all the disorderly Abstractions of the Mind and consequently of all that Abstract and Chimerical Philosophy which explains all Natural Effects by the general terms of Act Power Cause Effect Substantial Forms Faculties Occult Qualities Sympathy Antipathy c. For 't is certain these Terms and a great many others excite no other Idea's in the Mind than indeterminate and general Idea's that is Idea's which readily offer themselves to the Mind without any trouble and application on our own part Let a Man read with all Attention possible all the Definitions and Explications given of Substantial â—orms let him do his best to search wherein consists the Essence of all these Entities which the fruitful Imagination of Philosophers produces in such multitudes at pleasure that they are forc'd to divide them and subdivide them over and over again and I dare engage that he shall never excite in his Mind any other Idea of all these things than that of Being and of Cause in general For let us take a view of the customary proceedings of Philosophers They observe some new Effect and presently imagine some new Entity must produce it The Fire heats there is then in the Fire some Entity to produce this Effect which differs from the Matter the Fire is compos'd of And because Fire is capable of many different Effects as of separating Bodies Pulverizing Vitrifying Drying Hardning Softning Dilating Purifying and Enlightning them c. therefore they liberally bestow on Fire so many Faculties or real Qualities as it is capable of producing different Effects But if we reflect on all the Definitions they give of these Faculties we shall find they are nothing else but Logical Definitions which raise no other Idea's than that of Being and Cause in general which the Mind refers to the Effect that is produc'd So that a Man is nothing the wiser when he has studied them never so long For all that is got by this sort of Study is the imagining we know better than others what indeed we know much worse not only because we admit many Entities that never were but also in being prepossess'd we make our selves incapable of conceiving how 't is possible for Matter all alone as that of Fire in being mov'd against Bodies differently dispos'd to produce all the different Effects we see Fire produce It is manifest to all those who have read any thing That almost all the Books of Science and especially those which treat of Physicks Medicine and Chymistry and of all particular things of Nature are full of nothing but Argumentations founded on the Elementary and Secondary Qualities as Attractive Retentive Concoctive Expulsive and such like upon others which they term Occult upon specifick Vertues and many other Entities which Men frame and make up out of the general Idea of Being and out of the Cause of the Effect which they see
it were only that these Beings having no Relation to us the Knowledge of them would be of little use to us as he has not given us Eyes acute enough to reckon the Teeth of an Hand-worm since 't would be useless to the Preservation of our Body to have so penetrating an Eye-sight But though we do not think it fit to judge hastily and rashly that all Being is divided into Spirit and Body yet we think it inconsistent with Reason for Philosophers in explaining Natural Effects to use other Idea's than those that depend on Thought and Extension these in Effect being the only distinct or particular that we have There is nothing more Unphilosophical and Irrational than to imagine vast numbers of Beings from simple Logical Idea's to bestow on them infinite properties and so to go about explaining things which no body understands by things which not only no body conceives but which indeed are impossible to be conceived This is to take the same course that Blind Men would do when intending to discourse of Colours and maintain the Theses that concern them they should make use of the Definitions they receive from the Philosophers and thence make their Inferences and Conclusions For as these blind Men's Arguings and Disputes about Colours must needs be pleasant and ridiculous enough since they could have no distinct Idea's of the Subjects in Question and would only argue from general and Logical Idea's So the Philosophers can never reason justly and solidly upon the Effects of Nature when they only employ general and Logical Idea's as of Act Power Being Cause Principle Form Quality and others of like Nature It is absolutely necessary for them to ground their Disputes and Reasonings only upon the distinct and particular Idea's of Thought and Extension and those which are contain'd in them as Figure Motion c. For we can never expect to arrive to the Knowledge of Nature but by the Consideration of the distinct Idea's we have of it and 't is better not to meditate at all than to throw our Meditation away upon Whimsies and Chimera's We ought not however to assert that there is nothing but Spirit and Body Thinking and Extended Beings in Nature since 't is impossible for us to be mistaken For though these are sufficient for the Explication of Nature and consequently we may conclude without danger of erring That all Natural things as far as our Knowledge goes depend upon Extension and Thought yet absolutely speaking it s not impossible but there may be others whereof we have no Idea nor see any Effect Men are therefore too rash and precipitate in judging as an indisputable Principle that all Substance is distinguish'd into Body and Spirit But they thence infer a rash and unadvis'd conclusion when they determine by the sole light of Reason that GOD is a Spirit 't is true that since we are created after His Image and Similitude and we are taught from several places of the Holy Scripture that GOD is a Spirit we ought to believe and call Him so But Reason all alone can never teach us so much It only tells us that GOD is a Being infinitely perfect and that he ought rather to be a Spirit than a Body since our Soul is more perfect than our Body but it cannot assure us there are not still other Beings more perfect than those Spirits within us and rang'd in an higher order above them than our Minds are above our Bodies But supposing there were such Beings as these as Reason makes it unquestionable that GOD was able to create them 't is evident they would have a nearer resemblance to their Maker than our selves And so the same Reason informs us that GOD would rather have their Perfections than ours which would be reckon'd but imperfections in comparison with them We ought not therefore precipitately to imagine that the word Spirit which we indifferently use to signifie what GOD is and what we are our selves is an univocal Term expressing the same things or very like GOD is farther exalted above Created Spirits than these Spirits are elevated above Bodies and we ought not to term GOD a Spirit so much for a positive Declaration of what He is as to signifie He is not material He is an infinitely perfect Being no Man can doubt of it But as we are not to imagine with the Anthropomorphites that he ought to have an Humane shape because that Figure seems the most perfect though we should suppose Him Corporeal so we ought not to think that the Spirit of GOD has Humane Thoughts and that his mind is like our own because we know nothing perfecter than our own Mind 'T is rather to be believ'd that as he includes in Himself the Perfections of Matter without being material for 't is certain that Matter has a Relation to some Perfection that is in God so He comprehends the Perfections of created Spirits without being a Spirit after our manner of conceiving Spirits that his true Name is HE THAT IS that is being without restriction all Being being Infinite and Universal CHAP. X. Some Instances of Errors in Physicks wherein Men are engag'd by supposing that the things which differ in their Nature their Qualities Extension Duration and Proportion are alike in these things IT has been shewn in the Fore-going Chapter That Men make a rash Judgment in concluding all Beings under two Heads either of Body or Spirit we will make it appear in the succeeding Chapters that they not only make rash Judgments but false too and which are the fruitful Principles of innumerable Errors when they judge that Beings are not different in their Relations and Modes because they have no Idea of these Differences 'T is certain that the Mind of Man searches only after the Relations of things First those which the Objects it considers have to it self and then those which they have with one another For Man's Mind is inquisitive only after its Good and Truth For the finding out its Good it considers carefully by Reason and by Taste or Sensation whether the Objects have any Relation of Agreement with it self For the discovering Truth it considers whether the Objects have any Relation of Equality or Similitude to each other or what precisely is the Quantity that is equal to their Inequality For as Good is not the Good of the Mind any farther than it is agreeable to it so Truth is not Truth but by the Relation of Equality or Resemblance which is found betwixt two things or more whether this Relation be between two or more Objects as between an Ell and a Piece of Cloth For 't is true that this is an Ell of Cloth because of the Equality between the Ell and the Cloth whether it be between two or more Idea's as between the two Idea's of Three and Three and that of Six for 't is true that Three and Three are Six because of the Equality between the two Idea's of Three and Three and the
loose and indefinite Notions engage not into Errour at least they are wholly unserviceable to the Discovery of Truth For though we know that there is in Fire a substantial Form attended with a Million of Faculties like to that of heating dilating melting Gold Silver and other Metals lightening burning roasting the Idea of that substantial Form with all its Faculties of producing Heat Fluidity Rarefaction will not help me to resolve this Question Why Fire hardens Clay and softens Wax There being no Connection betwixt the Ideas of Hardness in Clay and Softness in Wax and those of a substantial Form in Fire and its Faculties of Rarefaction Fluidity c. The same may be said of all general Ideas which are utterly insufficient for resolving any Question But when I know that Fire is nothing else but divided Wood whose Parts are in a continual Agitation by which alone it raises in me the Sensation of Heat and that the Softness of Clay consists in a Mixture of Water and Earth those Ideas being not general and confused but particular and distinct it will not be difficult to perceive that the Heat of Fire must harden Clay nothing being easier to conceive than that one Body may move another if it meet with it being it self in Motion We likewise easily perceive that since the Heat we feel near the Fire is caused by the Motion of the invisible Particles of Wood striking against our Hands Face c. if we expose Clay to the Heat of Fire the Particles of Water that are mixed with those of Earth being more thin and disunited and consequently more agitated by the Action and Impulse of the fiety Corpuscles than the gross Particles of Earth must be separated and expelled and the other remain dry and hard We shall perceive with the same Evidence that Fire must produce a quite contrary Effect upon Wax if we know that it is composed of Particles that are branched and almost of the same Bulk Thus may particular Ideas be subservient to the Enquiry after Truth whilst loose and undeterminate Notions are not only altogether unserviceable but also insensibly engage us into Errour For these Philosophers are not content to make use of those general Terms and uncertain Ideas which answer to them they moreover pretend that those Words signifie some particular Beings they give out that there is a Substance distinguished from Matter which is the Form of it and withal an infinite Number of little Beings really distinguished from that Matter and Form of which they suppose as many as they have different Sensations of Bodies or as those Bodies are supposed to produce different Effects However 't is visible to any attentive Person that those little Beings for instance that are said to be distinguished from Fire and suppos'd to be contained in it for the producing Heat Light Hardness Fluidity c. are but the Contrivances of the Imagination that rebells against Reason since Reason has no particular Idea that represents those little Beings When the Philosophers are asked What is the illuminating Faculty in Fire They only answer That 't is a Being which is the Cause that Fire is capable of producing Light So that their Idea of that illuminating Faculty differs not from the general Idea of Cause and the confused Idea of the Effect they see and therefore they have no clear Idea of what they say when they admit those particular Beings and so say what they not only understand not but what 's impossible to be understood CHAP. III. Of the most dangerous Errour in the Philosophy of the Ancients PHilosophers not only speak without understanding themselves when they explain the Effects of Nature by some Beings of which they have no particular Idea but also establish a Principle whence very false and pernicious Consequences may directly be drawn For supposing with them that there are in Bodies certain Entities distinguished from Matter and having no distinct Idea of those Entities 't is easie to imagine that they are the real or principal Causes of the Effects we see And this is the very Opinion of the vulgar Philosophers The prime Reason of their supposing those substantial Forms real Qualities and other such like Entities is to explain the Effects of Nature But when we come attentively to consider the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of a Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a subordinate Power the Idea of an inferiour Divinity yet a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens supposing it to be the Idea of a true Power or Cause And therefore we admit something Divine in all the Bodies that surround us when we acknowledge Forms Faculties Qualities Virtues and real Beings that are capable of producing some Effects by the force of their Nature and thus insensibly approve of the Sentiments of the Heathens by too great a Deference for their Philosophy Faith indeed corrects us but it may perhaps be said that the Mind is a Pagan whilst the Heart is a Christian. Moreover it is a hard Matter to persuade our selves that we ought neither to fear nor love true Powers and Beings that can act upon us punish us with some Pain or reward us with some Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration it is hard again to imagine why they must not be ador'd For whatever can act upon us as a true and real Cause is necessarily above us according to Reason and St. Austin and by the same Reason and Authority 't is likewise an immutable Law That inferiour Beings should be subservient to superiour Whence that great Father concludes That the Body cannot operate upon the Soul and that nothing can be above her but God only The chief Reasons that God Almighty uses in the Holy Scriptures to prove to the Israelites that they ought to adore that is to love and fear him are drawn from his Power to reward or punish them representing to them the Benefits they have received from him the Punishments he has inflicted upon them and his Power that is always the same He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens as such as have no Power over them and can doe them neither harm nor good He commands them to honour him alone as the only true Cause of Good and Evil Reward and Punishment none of which can befal a City according to the Prophet but what comes from him by reason that natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Hurt they seem to doe us and as it is God alone that acts in them so 't is He alone that must be fear'd and lov'd in them Soli Deo Honor Gloria Lastly The Sense of fearing and Loving what may be the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is not possible to cast it off So that in that
false Supposition of the Philosophers which we are here endeavouring to destroy that the surrounding Bodies are the true Causes of our Pain and Pleasure Reason seems to justifie a Religion like the Pagan Idolatry and approve the universal Depravation of Morals Reason I grant teaches not to adore Onions and Leeks for instance as the Sovereign Divinity because they can never make us altogether happy when we have them or unhappy when we want them neither did the Heathens worship them with an equal Homage as their great Jupiter whom they fansied to be the God of Gods or as the Sun whom our Senses represent as the universal Cause that gives Life and Motion to all things and which we can hardly forbear to look on as the Sovereign Divinity if we suppose as the Pagan Philosophers that he Comprehends in his Being the true Causes of what he seems to produce as well upon our Soul and Body as upon all the Beings that surround us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Worship to Leeks and Onions they deserve at least some particular Adoration I mean they may be thought upon and loved in some manner if it be true that they can in some sort make us happy and may be honour'd proportionably to the good they doe us Surely Men that listen to the Reports of Sense think Pulse capable of doing them good otherwise the Israelites would not have bewailed the loss of them in the Wilderness or look'd on themselves as unhappy for being deprived thereof had they not fansied to themselves some great Happiness in the Enjoyment of them See what an Abyss of Corruption Reason plunges us into when it goes hand in hand with the Principles of Pagan Philosophy and follows the footsteps of the Senses But that the Falshood of that wretched Phylosophy and the Certainty of our Principles and Distinctness of our Ideas may not be longer doubted it will be necessary plainly to establish the Truths that contradict the Errours of the Ancient Philosophers or to prove in few words that there is but one true Cause since there is but one true God that the Nature and Force of every thing is nothing but the Will of God that all Natural things are not real but only occasional Causes and some other Truths depending on them It is evident that all Bodies great and little have no force to move themselves a Mountain a House a Stone a Grain of Sand the minutest and bulkiest Bodies imaginable are alike as to that We have but two sorts of Ideas viz. of Spirits and Bodies and as we ought not to speak what we conceive not so we must only argue from those two Ideas Since therefore our Idea of Bodies convinces us that they cannot move themselves we must conclude that they are moved by Spirits But considering our Idea of finite Spirits we see no necessary Connexion betwixt their Will and the Motion of any Body whatsoever on the contrary we perceive that there is not nor can be any Whence we must infer if we will follow Light and Reason That as no Body can move it self so no Created Spirit can be the true and principal Cause of its Motion But when we think on the Idea of God or of a Being infinitely perfect and consequently Almighty we are aware that there is such a Connexion betwixt his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that it is impossible to conceive he should will that a Body be moved and it should not be moved And therefore if we would speak according to our Conceptions and not according to our Sensations we must say that nothing but his Will can move Bodies The moving force of Bodies is not then in themselves this force being nothing but the Will of God Bodies then have no proper Action and when a moving Ball meets with another and moves it the former communicates nothing of its own to the latter as not having in it self the Impression it communicates though the former be the Natural Cause of the latter's Motion and therefore a natural Cause is not a true and real Cause but only an occasional which in such or such a Case determines the Author of Nature to act in such or such a manner 'T is certain that all things are produced by the Motion of visible or invisible Bodies for Experience teaches us that those Bodies whose parts are in greater Motion are always the most active and those that Cause the greatest Alterations in the World so that all the Forces of Nature are but the Will of God who Created the World because he will'd it who spake and it was done who moves all things and produces all the Effects we see because he has established some Laws by which Bodies Communicate their Motion to each other when they meet together and because those Laws are efficacious they and not the Bodies act There is then no Force Power nor true Cause in all the Material and sensible World Nor need we admit any Forms Faculties or real Qualities to produce Effects which the Bodies bring not forth or to divide with God his own Essential Force and Power As Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing so likewise the most Noble Spirits are subject to the same impotency on that respect They cannot know any thing unless God enlightens them nor have the Sensation of any thing unless he modifies them nor will unless he moves them towards himself They may indeed determine the Impression God has given them to himself towards other Objects but I doubt whether it can be call'd a Power For if to be able to sin is a Power it is such a one as the Almighty wants saith St. Austin somewhere If Men had of themselves the Power of loving Good it might be said that they have some Power but they cannot so much as love but because God Wills it and that his Will is Efficacious They love because God continually drives them towards Good in general that is towards himself for whom alone they are Created and preserved God moves them and not themselves towards Good in general and they only follow that Impression by a free Choice according to the Law of God or determine it towards false and seeming Goods according to the Law of the Flesh But they cannot determine it but by the sight of Good For being able to doe nothing without an Impression from above they are incapable of loving any thing but Good But though it should be supposed which is true in one sense that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truths and loving Good should their Thoughts and Will produce nothing outwardly it might still be said that they were impotent and unoperative Now it seems undeniable that the Will of Spirits is not able to move the smallest Body in the World it being evident there is no necessary Connexion betwixt the Will we may have of moving our Arm for instance and the Motion of the same Arm. It moves
Experience of the ablest Physicians THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Third CHAPTER of the Fifth BOOK That Love is different from Pleasure and Joy THE Mind commonly confounds things that are very different when they happen at the same time and are not contrary to each other As I have shown by many Instances in this Work because herein chiefly consist our Errors in Respect of what passes within us Being we have no clear Idea of â—hat constitutes the Nature or Essence of our Mind nor of any of the Modification it can receive it often falls out that to our confounding different things they need but happen in us at the same time For we easily confound what we know not by a clear and distinct Ideâ— It is not only impossible clearly to conceive wherein consists the difference of our Internal Motions it is even difficult to discover any difference between them For to do this we must turn our Eyes inward and retire into our selves not to consider them with reference to Good and Evil which we do willingly enough But to contemplate our selves with an abstract and barren consideration which costs us great trouble and distraction of Thought We easily conceive that the Roundness of a Body differs from its Motion and though we know by Experience that a Bowl on a plane cannot be press'd without being mov'd and so Motion and Roundness are found together Yet we use not to confound them with one another because we conceive Motion and Figure by clear and distinct Ideas But 't is not so with Pleasure and Love which we almost always confound together Our Mind grows as it were Moveable by Pleasure as a Bowl by it's roundness and because it is never void of an impression towards Good it immediately puts it self in Motion towards the Objects which causes or seems to cause the Pleasure So that the Motion of Love happening in the Soul at the very time of it's feeling this Pleasure is sufficient to make her undistinguish or confound them because she has no clear Idea of her Love and Pleasure as she has of Figure and Motion And for this Reason some are perswaded that Pleasure and Love are not different and that I distinguish too many things in each of our Passions But that it may clearly appear that Pleasure and Love are two very different things I divide Pleasures into two sorts the one sort precedes Reason as are agreeable Sensations and go commonly by the Name of the Pleasures of the Body The other sort neither precede Reason nor the senses and are generally call'd the Pleasures of the Soul Such is the Joy that arise in us in pursuance of a clear knowledge of confus'd sensation we have of some Good that either does or shall accrue to us For Example a Man in tasting a Fruit which he does not know finds pleasure in eating it if it be good for Nourishment Which is a preceding or preventing Pleasure for since he feels it before he knows whether the Fruit be good 't is evident it prevents his Reason An Huntsman when hungry expects to find or actually finds something Eatable which gives him an actual sense of Joy Now this Joy is a Pleasure which follows the knowledge of his present or future good It is perhaps evident by this distinction of Pleasure into that which follows and that which prevents Reason that neither of them but differs from Love For preventing pleasure undoubtedly precedes Love since it precedes all Knowledge which some way or other is always suppos'd by Love On the contrary Joy or the Pleasure which supposes foregoing Knowledge presupposes likewise Love since Joy supposes either a confus'd Sensation or a clear Knowledge of the present or future Possession of what we Love For if we possess'd a thing for which we have no Love we should receive no Joy from it Therefore Pleasure is very different from Love since that which prevents Reason prevent and causes Love and that which follows Reason necessarily supposes Love as an Effect supposes the Cause Moreover if Pleasure and Love were the same thing there could be no Pleasure without Love nor Love without Pleasure otherwise a thing could be without it self Nevertheless a Christian Loves his Enemy and a well-educated Child his Father though never so irrational and unkind The Sight of their Duty the Fear of God the Love of Order and Justice causes them to Love not only without Pleasure but even with a sort of Horrour those Persons that are no ways delightful I own they sometimes have the Sense of Pleasure or Joy upon the Reflection that they perform their Duty or upon the Hopes of being rewarded as they do deserve But besides that this Pleasure is very manifestly different from the Love they bear to their Father and Enemy though perhaps it may be the Motive of it it sometimes is not so much as the Motive of their acting but 't is only an abstract View of Order or a Notion of Fear which preserves their Love In one sense it may be truly said they have a Love for these Persons even whilst they do not think of them For Love remains in us during the Avocations of Thought and in Sleep But I conceive that Pleasure has no longer a Substance in the Soul than she is aware of it Thus Love or Charity remaining in us without Pleasure or Delectation cannot be maintain'd to be the very same thing Since Pleasure and Pain are two contraries if Pleasure were the same with Love Pain would not differ from Hatred But 't is evident that Pain is different from Hatred because it often subsists without it A Man for Instance who is wounded unawares suffers a most real and cutting Pain whilst he is free from Hatred For he knows not even the Cause of his Pain or the Object of his Hatred or rather the Cause of his Pain not deserving his Hatred cannot raise it Thus he Hates not that Cause of his Pain though his Pain moves or disposes him to Hatred 'T is true he deservedly Hates Pain but the Hatred of Pain is not Pain but supposes it Hatred of Pain does not Merit our Hatred as does Pain For the former is on the contrary very agreeable in that we are pleased in Hating it as we are displeased in Suffering it Pain therefore not being Hatred the Pleasure which is contrary to Pain is not Love which is contrary to Hatred and consequently the Pleasure which is precedaneous to Reason is not the same thing as Love I prove likewise that Joy or the Pleasure which pursues Reason is distinguish'd from Love Joy and Sorrow being contraries if Joy were the same thing with Love Sorrow and Hatred would be all one But it is evident that Sorrow differs from Hatred because it sometimes has a separate Subsistence A Man for Example by chance finds himself depriv'd of things that he has need of this is enough to make him sorrowful But it cannot provoke him to Hatred Either
but acts always by the simplest Ways and for that Reason he makes use of the Collision of Bodies in giving them Motion Not that this Collision is absolutely necessary to it as our Senses tell us but that being the Occasion of the Communication of Motions there need be but very few Natural Laws to produce all the admirable Effects we see For by this means we may reduce all the Laws of the Communication of Motions to one Viz. That percutient Bodies being considered as but one at the Moment of their Contact or Collision the moving Force is divided between them at their Separation according to the Proportion of their Magnitude But whereas concurrent Bodies are surrounded with infinite others which act upon them by Virtue and Efficacy of this Law however constant and uniform this Law be it produces a World of quite different Communications because it acts upon infinite Bodies which are all related to one another It is necessary to Water a Plant to make it grow because by the Laws of the Communication of Motions hardly any other than Watry Particles can by their Motion and by reason of their Figure insinuate and Wind up themselves into the Fibres of Plants and by variously fastning and combining together take the Figure that 's necessary to their Nourishment The subtil Matter which is constantly flowing from the Sun may by its agitating the Water lift it into the Plants but it has not a competent Motion to raise gross Earthy Particles Yet Earth and Air too are necessary to the Growth of Plants Earth to preserve the Water at their Root and Air to give this Water a Moderate Fermentation But the Action of the Sun the Air and Water consisting but in the Motion of their Parts in proper speaking GOD is the only Agent For as I have said there is none but He that can by the efficacy of his Will and by the Infinite Extent of his Knowledge cause and regulate those infinitely infinite Communications of Motions which are made every moment and in a Proportion infinitely exact and regular ARGUMENT IV. Can God resist and Fight against Himself Bodies justle strike and resist one another therefore Gods Acts not in them unless it be by his concourse For if it were he only that produc'd and preserv'd Motion in Bodies he would take care to divert them before the Collision as knowing well that they are impenetrable To what purpose are Bodies driven to be beaten back again why must they proceed to recoil Or what signifies it to produce and Preserve useless Motions Is it not an Absurdity to say that God impugns himself and that He destroys his Works when a Bull fights with a Lyon when a Wolf devours a Sheep and a Sheep eats the Grass which God makes to grow Therefore there are Second Causes ANSWER Therefore Second Causes do all and God does nothing at all For God cannot act against himself but Concourse is Action The concurring to contrary Actions is giving contrary Concourse and consequently doing contrary Actions To concur with the Action of Creatures that resist each other is to Act against himself To concur to useless Motions is to Act in vain But God does nothing needless or in vain he does no contrary Actions and therefore concurs not to the Action of Creatures that often destroy one another and makes useless Actions and Motions See where this proof of Second Causes leads us But let us see what Reason says to it God Works all in every thing and nothing resists him He Works all in all things in as much as his Will both makes and regulates all Motions And nothing resists him because he does what ever he Wills But let us see how this is to be conceiv'd Having resolv'd to produce by the simplest ways as most conformable to Order that infinite Variety of Creatures which we admire he will'd that Bodies should move in a right line because that is the most simple But Bodies being impenetrable and their Motions tending in Lines that oppose or intersect one another they must necessarily fall foul together and consequently cease moving in the same manner God foresaw this yet notwithstanding positively will'd the Collision or shock of Bodies not that he 's delighted in impugning himself but because he design'd to make use of this Collision as an Occasion for his establishing the General Law of the Communication of Motions by which he foresaw he must produce an infinite Variety of admirable Effects For I am perswaded that these two Natural Laws which are the simplest of all others Namely that All Motion tends to make it self in a right line and that in the Collision Motions are Communicated proportionably to the magnitude of the Colliding Bodies are sufficient to produce such a World as we see That is the Heaven and Stars and Planets and Comets Earth Water Air and Fire In a Word the Elements and all Unorganiz'd and inanimate Bodies For Organiz'd Bodies depend on many other Natural Laws which are perfectly unknown It may be living Bodies are not form'd like others by a determinate number of Natural Laws For there is great probability they were all form'd at the Creation of the World and that Time only gives them a necessary Growth to make them Visible to our Eyes Nevertheless it is certain they receive that Growth by the General Laws of Nature whereby all other Bodies are form'd which is the Reason that their Increase is not always Regular I say then that God by the first of Natural Laws positively Wills and consequently Causes the Collision of Bodies and afterwards imploys this Collision as an Occasion of establishing the Second Natural Law which regulates the Communication of Motions and that thus the actual Collision is the Natural or Occasional Cause of the Actual Communication of Motions If this be well consider'd it will be evidently acknowledg'd that nothing can be better Order'd But supposing that God had not so Ordain'd it and that he had diverted Bodies when ready to encounter as if there were a Vacuum to receive them First they would not be subject to that perpetual Vicissitude which makes the Beauty of the Universe For the Generation of some Bodies is perform'd by the Corruption of Others and 't is the contrariety of their Motion which produces their Variety Secondly God would not act in the most simple manner For if Bodies ready to meet should continue on their Motion without touching they must needs describe Lines curv'd in a thousand different Fashions and consequently different Wills must be admitted in God to determine their Motions Lastly if there were no Uniformity in the Action of Natural Bodies and that their Motion were not made in a right Line we should have no certain Principle for our Reasonings in natural Philosophy nor for our conduct in many Actions of our Life 'T is not a disorder that Lyons eat Wolves and that Wolves eat Sheep and Sheep grass of which God has had so
living in the Water God to let us understand that his Order constituted them in these Places produc'd them therein From the Earth he form'd Animals and Plants not that the Earth was capable of Generating or as if God had to that intent given it a force and Vertue which it retains till now For we are sufficiently agreed that the Earth does not Procreate Horses and Oxen but because out of the Earth the Bodies of Animals were form'd as is said in the following Chapter Out of the ground the Lord form'd every Beast of the field and every Fowl of the Air. The Animals were form'd out of the gound formatis de humo animantibus says the Vulgar Latin and not produc'd by it Therefore when Moses had related how Beasts and Fish were produc'd by Vertue of the Command which God gave the Earth and Water to produce them he adds that it was God that made them lest we should attribute their Production to the Earth and Water And God CREATED great Whales and every living Creature that moveth which the WATERS BROVGHT FORTH abundantly after their kind and every winged Fowl after his kind and a little lower after he had spoken of the formation of Animals he adjoyns And GOD MADE the Beast of the Earth after his kind and Cattel after their kind and every thing that creepeth on the Earth after his kind But 't is observable by the way That what the Vulgar Translates Producant aquae reptile animae viventis volatile super terram and our English Let the Water bring forth abundantly the moving Creature that hath Life and Fowl that may fly above the Earth the Hebrew has it Volatile VOLITET Let the Fowl fly above the Earth Which distinction shows as is evident from the fore-cited passage of the next Chapter that Fowls were not produc'd from the Water and that it was not Moses's design to prove that the Waters were truly empower'd to produce Fish and Fowl but only to denote the respective place design'd for each by the Order of God whether to live or to be produc'd in Et volatile VOLITET super Terram For commonly when we say that the Earth produces Trees and Plants we only mean to signifie that it furnishes Water and Salts which are necessary to the Germination and increase of Seeds But I dwell no longer on the Explication of these Scripture Passages which Literally taken make for Second Causes For we are so far from being oblig'd that it is sometimes dangerous to take Expressions in the Letter which are founded on common Opinion by which the Language is form'd For the vulgar part of Men speak of all things according to the Impressions of Sense and the Prejudices of Infancy The same Reason which constrains us to interpret Literally such Scripture Passages as directly oppose Prejudices gives us Reason to believe the Fathers never design'd ex proposito to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes or the Nature of Aristotle For though they often speak in a manner that countenances Prejudices and the Judgments of Sense yet they sometimes so explain themselves as to manifest the disposition of their Mind and Heart St. Austin for instance gives us sufficiently to understand That he believed the Will of God to be the Force and Nature of every thing when he speaks thus We are wont to say but not truly that Prodigies are against Nature For the Nature of every Creature being but the Will of the Creator How can that which is done by the Will of God be contrary to Nature Miracles therefore and Prodigies are not against Nature but against what we know of it 'T is true St. Austin speaks in several places according to Prejudices But I affirm that that is no Argument for we are not Literally to explain but those Expressions which are contrary to them for which I have given the Reasons If St. Austin in his Works had said nothing against the Efficacy of Second Causes but had always favour'd this Opinion his Authority might be made use of to confirm it But if it should not appear that he had industriously examin'd that Question we might still have reason to think he had no settled and resolv'd Opinion about the Subject but was it may be drawn by the Impression of the Senses inconsiderately to believe a thing which no Man would doubt of before he had carefully examin'd it 'T is certain for example that St. Austin always speaks of Beasts as if they had a Soul I say not a Corporeal Soul for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction of the Soul and Body to think there were Corporeal Souls I say a Spiritual Soul for Matter is incapable of Sense And yet it would seem methinks more reasonable to employ the Authority of St. Austin to prove that Beasts have not a Soul than to prove they have For from the Principles which he has carefully examin'd and strongly establish'd it manifestly follows they have none as is shown by Ambrosius Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy But the Opinion that Beasts have a Soul and are sensible of Pain when we strike them being consonant to Prejudices for there is no Child but believes it we have still reason to believe that he speaks according to Custom and Vulgar Opinion and that if he had seriously examin'd the Question and once began to doubt and make reflexion he would never have said a thing so contrary to his Principles And thus though all the Fathers had constantly favour'd the Efficacy of Second Causes yet it may be no regard were due to their Opinion unless it appear'd that they had carefully Examin'd the Question and that their Assertions were not the results of common Speech which is form'd and founded upon Prejudices But the case is certainly quite contrary for the Fathers and such as were most Holy and best acquainted with Religion have commonly manifested in some places or other of their Works what was their Disposition of Mind and Heart in reference to the present Question The most Understanding and indeed the greatest number of Divines seeing that on one hand the Holy Scripture was repugnant to the Efficacy of Second Causes and on the other that the Impression of the Senses the publick Vote and especially Aristotle's Philosophy which was had in veneration by the Learned establish it For Aristotle believ'd God unconcern'd in the particulars of Sublunary Transactions That that change was below his Majesty and that Nature which he supposes in all Bodies suffic'd to produce all that was done below The Divines I say have so equally balanc'd these Two as to reconcile Faith with Heathen Philosophy Reason with Sense and to make Second Causes ineffective without the additional concourse of God Almighty But because that immediate concourse whereby God acts jointly with Second Causes includes great difficulties some Philosophers have rejected it pretending that in Order to their Acting there needs no more than
that God should continue to them their Vertue he endow'd them with in their Creation And since this Opinion is exactly agreeable with Prejudice because of the insensible Operation of God in Second Causes it is commonly embrac'd by the vulgar sort of Men and such as have more studied Ancient Naturalists and Physicians than Theology and Truth Most are of Opinion that God created all things at first and gave them all the Qualities and Faculties that were necessary to their preservation that he has for example given the first Motion of Matter and left it afterwards to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions that admirable variety of Forms we see 'T is Ordinarily suppos'd that Bodies can move one another and this is said to be Mr. des Cartes's Opinion though he speaks expresly against it in the Thirty Sixth and Seventh Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Since Men must unavoidably acknowledge that the Creatures depend on God they lessen and abridge as much as possible that dependance whether out of a secret Aversion to God or a strange and wretched stupidity and insensibility to his Operation But whereas this Opinion is receiv'd but by those who have not much studied Religion and have preferr'd their Senses to their Reason and Aristotle's Authority to that of Holy Writ we have no reason to fear its making way into the Mind of those who have any Love for Truth and Religion for provided a Man seriously examin'd it he must needs discover its falsity But the Opinion of God's Immediate Concourse to every Action of Second Causes seems to accord with those Passages of Scripture which often attribute the same Effect both to GOD and the Creature We must consider then that there are places in Scripture where 't is said that God is the only Agent I am the Lord that maketh all things that stretcheth forth the Heavens alone that spreadeth abroad the Earth by my self Ego sum Dominus says Isaiah faciens OMNIA Extendens coelos SOLVS stabiliens Terram NVLLVS Mecum A Mother Animated with the Spirit of God tells her Children it was not her that form'd them I cannot tell how you came into my Womb For I neither gave you Breath nor Life neither was it I that form'd the Members of every one of you But doubtless the Creator of the World c. Nescio qualiter in utero meo apparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI sed mundi Creator She does not say with Aristotle and the School of the Peripateticks that to her and the Sun they ow'd their Birth but to the Creator of the Universe Which Opinion that God only Works and forms Children in their Mothers Womb not being conformable to Prejudice and Common Opinion These Sentences according to the pre-establish'd Principle must be explain'd in the Literal Sense But on the contrary the Notion of Second Causes falling in with the vulgar Opinion and being Suited to the sensible impression the Passages which expresly make for the separate Efficacy of Second Causes must be reckon'd invalid when compar'd with the former Concourse therefore is insufficient to reconcile the different Texts of Scripture and all Force Power and Efficacy must be ascrib'd to God But though the immediate concurrence of God with Second Causes were fit to accommodate the disagreeing passages of Holy Writ yet after all it is a question whether it ought to be admitted For the Sacred Books were not compos'd for the Theologists of these times but for the People of the Jews So that if this People had not understanding or Subtilty enough to imagine a Concourse such as is admitted in School-Divinity and to agree to a thing which the greatest Divines are hard put to to explain it follows if I mistake not that the Holy Scripture which Attributes to God and even to God alone the production and preservation of all things would have betray'd them into Error And the Holy Pen-Men had stood chargeable with writing not only in an unintelligible but deceitful Language For in saying that God Work'd all they would have design'd no more than that God assisted to all things with his concourse which was not probably so much as thought on by the Jews Those amongst them who were not very great Philosophers believing that God Work'd all and not that he concurr'd to all But that we may pass a more certain judgement about this Concourse it would be requisite to explain with care the different Hypotheses of the School-Men upon it For besides those impenetrable Clouds and Obscurities which involve all the Opinions that cannot be explain'd and defended without loose and indefinite Terms there are upon this Matter so great a variety of Opinions that it would be no hard Matter to discover the cause of them But I design not to engage in a discussion that would be so wearisom to my self as well as the greatest part of Readers On the contrary I had rather try to show that my Opinions may in some thing accord with those of the greater number of Scholastick Divines though I cannot but say their Language looks very Ambiguous and confus'd To explain my self I am of Opinion as I have said elsewhere that Bodies for example have no Force to move themselves and that therefore their moving force is nothing but the Action of God or not to make use of a Term which has no distinct import their moving force is nothing but the Will of God always necessarily Efficacious which successively preserves them in different Places For I believe not that God Creates any particular Beings to make the moving force of Bodies not only because I have no Idea of such a kind of Being nor see how they could move Bodies But also because these Beings themselves would have need of others to move them and so in infinitum For none but God is truely Immoveable and Mover altogether Which being so when a Body strikes and moves another I may say that it Acts by the Concurrence of God and that this Concurrence is not distinct from its own Action For a Body meeting another moves it by its Action or its moving force which at bottom is nothing but the Will of God preserving the Body successively in different Places the translation of a Body being not it's Action or moving force but the Effect of it Almost all Divines say too that the Action of Second Causes is not different from that of God's Concurrence with them For though they have a various Meaning yet they suppose that God Acts in the Creatures by the same Action as the Creatures And they are oblig'd if I mistake not thus to speak For if the Creatures Acted by an Action which God Work'd not in them their Action consider'd as such would no doubt be independent But they acknowledge as it becomes them that the Creatures depend immediately on God not only as to their Being but likewise as to
their Operation So likewise in point of free Causes I believe that God incessantly gives the Mind an Impression towards Good in General and that he moreover determines this Impression towards particular Goods by the Idea's or Sensations that he gives us as I have explain'd in the first Illustration which is the same with what the Divines intend by affirming That God moves and prevents our Wills Thus the Force which puts our Minds in Motion is the Will of God which Animates us and inclines us towards Good For God Creates not Beings to constitute the moving force of Minds for the same Reason that he Creates none to be the moving force of Bodies The Wills of God being of themselves Efficacious He need but Will to do And we ought not to multiply Beings without necessity Besides whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions proceeds likewise from the Action of God in us as appears from the first Illustration But all we Act or produce is by our Wills that is by the Impression of the Will of God which is our moving force For our Wills are Efficacious no farther than they are of God as mov'd Bodies impel not others but in as much as they have a moving force that translates them which is no other than the Will of God which Creates or preserves them successively in different places Therefore we Act no otherwise than by the Concourse of God and our Action consider'd as Efficacious and capable of producing any Effect differs not from his but is as say most Divines the self same Action eadem numero actio Now all the Changes which arrive in the World have no other Natural Cause than the Motions of Bodies and Volitions of Minds For First by the General Laws of the Communications of Motions the invisible Bodies which surround the visible produce by their various Motions all these divers Changes whose Cause is not apparent And Secondly by the Laws of Union of our Soul and Body when circumambient Bodies Act upon our own they produce in our Soul a multiplicity of Sensations Idea's and Passions Thirdly Our Mind by its Volitions produces in it self infinite different Idea's for they are our Volitions which as Natural Causes intend and Modifie our Mind Their Efficacy nevertheless proceeds from the Laws which God has establish'd And Lastly when our Soul acts upon our Body she produces several Changes in it by vertue of the Laws of her Union with it and by means of our Body she effects in those about it abundance of Changes by vertue of the Laws of Communication of Motions So that the Motions of Bodies and the Volitions of Minds are the only Natural or Occasional Causes of Natural Effects which no Man will deny who uses any Attention supposing only he be not prepossest by those who understand not what they say who fancy perpetually to themselves such Beings as they have no clear Idea's of and who offer to explain things which they do not understand by others absolutely incomprehensible Thus having shown that God by his Concourse or rather by his Efficacious Will performs whatever is done by the Motions of Bodies and the Wills of Minds as Natural or Occasional Causes it appears that God does every thing by the same Action of the Creature Not that the Creatures have of themselves any Efficacious Action but that the Power of God is in a manner Communicated to them by the Natural Laws which God has establish'd on their account This then is all that I can do to reconcile my Thoughts to the Opinion of those Divines who defend the necessity of immediate Concourse and hold that God does All in all things by an Action no ways differing from the Creatures For as to the rest of the Divines I think their Opinions utterly indefensible and especially that of Durandus together with the Sentiments of some of the Ancients refuted by St. Austin who absolutely deniâ—d the necessity of God's Concurrence pretending that Second Causes did all things by the Power which God in their Creation gave them For though this Opinion be less intricate and perplex'd than that of other Divines yet to me it seems so repugnant to Scripture and so suitable to Prejudices to say no worse of it that I think it altogether unwarrantable I confess that the School-Men who make God's immediate concourse to be the same Action with that of the Creatures do not perfectly agree with my Explication and all those that I have read except Biel and Cardinal d' Ailly are of Opinion That the Efficacy which produces Effects proceeds from the Second Cause as well as the First But as I make it indispensable for me to speak nothing but what I clearly conceive and always to take the side that best comports with Religion I think I am not liable to blame for deserting an Opinion which to many Men seems still more inconceiveable as they strive more to comprehend it and for establishing another which agrees perfectly not only with Reason but also with the Sacredness of our Religion and Christian Morality which is a Truth already prov'd in the Chapter that 's the Subject of these Reflexions However 't is not inconvenient to say something to it that I may fully verifie what I have said upon the present Question Both Reason and Religion evince That God will be Lov'd and rever'd by his Creatures Lov'd as Good and Rever'd as Power Which is such a Truth as it would be Impiety and Madness to doubt of To love God as he requires and deserves we must according to the First Commandment both of the Law and Gospel and by Reason it self as I have somewhere shown Love Him with all our Strength or with the whole extent of our Loving Capacity 'T is not sufficient to prefer Him before all things unless we moreover Love Him in all things For otherwise our Love is not so perfect as it ought to be and we return not to God all the Love that he gives us and gives us only for Himself in whom every one of His Actions Center So to render to God all the Reverence that is due to Him 't is not enough to adore Him as the Supreme Power and fear Him more than His Creatures we must likewise fear and adore Him in all His Creatures all our respects must perpetually tend towards Him to whom alone Honour and Glory are to be ascrib'd Which is what God Commands us in these Words Thou shalt Love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart and with all thy Soul and with all thy Strength And in these Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God and Him only shalt thou serve Thus the Philosophy that convinces us that the Efficacy of Second Causes is a Fiction of the Mind that the Nature of Aristotle and some other Philosophers is a Chimera that none but God is Strong and Powerful enough not only to Act on our Soul but even to give the
The Soul of a Beast is a Substance distinct from its Body This Soul is Annihilated and therefore Substances may naturally be Annihilated Therefore though the Soul of Man be a Substance distinct from his Body it may be Annihilated when the Body is destroyed And thus the Immortality of the Humane Soul cannot be Demonstrated by Reason But if it be own'd to be most certain That no Substance can be naturally reduc'd to nothing the Soul of Beasts will subsist after Death and since they have no reward to hope for and are made for Bodies they must at least pass out of one to another that they may not remain useless in Nature Which seems to be the most reasonable Inference Now 't is Matter of Faith That God is just and Wise That he Loves not Disorder That Nature is corrupted That the Soul of Man is Immortal and that That of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed it is not a distinct Substance from their Body nor consequently capable of Knowledge and Love or of any Passions and Sensations like ours Therefore in the Stile of Monsieur de la Ville who condemns Men upon Consequences that he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may justly charge him with a Crime and all Mindkind besides for believing Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if in his way of proceeding we should tax him of Impiety for entertaining Opinions from whence it might be concluded That God is not Just Wise or Powerful Opinions that overthrow Religion that are opposite to Original Sin that take away the only Demonstration Reason can give of the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should charge him with Injustice and Cruelty for making innocent Souls to suffer and even for Annihilating them to feed upon the Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner but they are Innocent and yet for the Nourishment of his Body he kills Animals and Annihilates their Souls which are of greater Worth than his Body Yet if his Body could not subsist without the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of a Soul should render his Body for ever Immortal this Cruelty as unjust as it is might perhaps be excusable But with what Pretence can he Annihilate Substances altogether innocent to sustain but a few days a Body justly condemn'd to Death because of Sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the Place he lives in But what if his Zeal should carry him into the Indies where the Inhabitants found Hospitals for Beasts and the Philosophers and the better and more gentile Part of them are so charitable to to the smallest Flies that for fear of killing them by Breathing and Walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways through which they pass Would he then fear to make innocent Souls to suffer or to Annihilate them for the Preservation of a Sinner's Body Would he not rather chuse to subscribe to their Opinion who give not Beasts a Soul more Noble than their Body or distinct from it and by publishing this Opinion acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice which these People would charge upon him if having the same Principles he follow'd not their Custom This Example may suffice to shew that we are not permitted to treat Men as Hereticks and dangerous Persons because of Irreligious Consequences that may be deduc'd from their Principles when these Consequences are disown'd by them For though I think it would be an infinitely harder Task to answer the aforesaid Difficulties than those of M. de la Ville's yet the Cartesians would be very Ridiculous if they should accuse Monsieur de la Ville and others that were not of their Opinion of Impiety and Heresie 'T is only the Authority of the Church that may decide about Matters of Faith and the Church has not oblig'd us and probably whatever Consequence may be drawn from common Principles never will oblige us to believe that Dogs have not a Soul more Noble than their Body that they know not their Masters that they neither fear nor desire nor suffer any thing because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths ARGUMENT II. Almost all Men are perswaded That sensible Objects are the true Causes of Pleasure and Pain which we feel upon their Presence They believe that the Fire sends forth that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us and that our Aliments Act in us and give us the Welcome Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which makes the Fruits necessary for Life to thrive and that all sensible Objects have a peculiar Vertue by which they can do us a great deal of Good and Evil. Let us see if from these Principles we cannot draw Consequences contrary to Religion and Points of Faith A Consequence opposite to the first Principle of Morality which obliges us to love God with all our Strength and to fear none but Him 'T is a common Notion by which all Men Order their Behaviour That we ought to love and fear what has Power to do us Good and Harm to make us feel Pleasure and Pain to render us happy or miserable and that this Cause is to be lov'd or fear'd proportionably to its Power of Acting on us But the Fire the Sun the Objects of our Senses can truly Act on us and make us in some manner happy or miserable This is the Principle suppos'd we may therefore Love and Fear them This is the Conclusion which every one naturally makes and is the general Principle of the corruption of Manners 'T is evident by Reason and by the First of God's Commandments That all the motions of our Soul of Love or Fear Desire or Joy ought to tend to God and that all the Motions of our Body may be Regulated and Determin'd by encompassing Objects By the Motion of our Body we may approach a Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that 's ready to devour us But we ought to Love and Fear none but God all the Motions of our Soul ought to tend to Him only we are to Love Him with all our strength this is an indispensible Law We can neither Love or Fear what is below us without disorder and corruption Freely to fear a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to give them some honour to Love a Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the light of the Sun as if he were the true cause of it to Love even our Father our Protector our Friend as if they were capable of doing us good is to pay them an Honour which is due to none but God in which sense it is lawful to Love none But we may and ought to Love our Neighbour by wisâ—ing and procuring him as Natural or Occasional Cause all that may make him happy and no otherwise For we to Love our Brothers not as if able to do
us good but as capable to enjoy together with us the true Good These Truths seem evident to me but Men strangely obscure them by supposing that the surrounding Bodies can Act on us as True Causes Indeed most Christian Philosophers acknowledge That the Creatures can do nothing unless God concur to their Action and that so sensible Objects being unable to Act on us without the Efficacy of the First Cause must not be lov'd or fear'd by us but God only on whom they depend Which Explication makes it manifest That they condemn the consequences which I have now deduc'd from the Principle they receive But if in imitation of Monsieur de la Ville's Conduct I should say 't was a slight and subterfuge of the Philosophers to Cloak their Impiety if I should urge them with the Crime of supporting Aristotle's Opinions and the prejudices of Sense at the expence of their Religion if piercing too into the inmost recesses of their Heart I should impute to them the secret desire of debauching Men's Morals by the defence of a Principle which serves to justifie all sorts of disorders and which by the consequences I have drawn from it overthrows the first Principle of Christian Morality Should I be thought in my Senses whilst I went to condemn most Men as impious upon the strength of the inferences I had deduc'd from their Premises Monsieur de la Ville will no doubt pretend that my Consequences are not rightly inferr'd but I pretend the same of his and to ruine them all I need but explicate some Equivocal Terms which I shall sometime do if I find it necessary But how will Monsieur de la Ville justifie the common Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes and by what sort of concourse will he ascribe to God all that is due to Him Will he make it clearly appear that one individual Action is all of God and all of the Creature Will he demonstrate that the Power of the Creature is not useless though without its Efficacy the sole Action of God would produce the same effect Will he prove that Minds neither ought to Love nor Fear Bodies though the latter have a true Power of Acting on the former and will he make multitudes of Converts hereupon among those whose Mind and Heart are taken up with sensible Objects from a confus'd Judgment they make that these Objects are capable of making them Happy or Miserable Let him confess then That if we might treat as Hereticks and profane Persons all that hold Principles from which Heretical and Impious Consequences may be drawn no Man what ever could secure his Faith from being suspected ARGUMENT III. The Consequence of the Principle propos'd by Monsieur de la Ville as a Point of Faith viz. That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension This negative Principle overthrows the only demonstrative and direct Proof we have of the Soul 's being a distinct Substance from the Body and consequently of her Immortality When this truth is receiv'd which I presume with many other Persons to have demonstrated which Monsieur de la Ville impugns as contrary to the decisions of the Church viz. That the Essence of matter consists in Extension in Length Breadth and Thickness It is easie to comprehend that the Soul or that which is capable of Thought is a distinct substance from the Body For it 's manifest that Extension whatever Division and Motion be conceiv'd in it can never arrive to Reason Will or Sense Wherefore that thinking thing which is in us is necessarily a substance distinct from our Body Intellectual Notices Volitions and Actual Sensations are Actually Modes of some substances Existence But all the Divisions incidental to Extension can produce nothing but Figures Nor all its various Motions any thing but Relations of Distance Therefore Extension is not capable of other Modifications Therefore our Thought Desire Sensations of Pleasure and Pain are Modes of a Substances Existence which is not a Body Therefore the Soul is distinct from the Body which being conceded we thus demonstrate her Immortality No substance can be Annihilated by the Ordinary strength of Nature For as nature cannot produce something out of nothing So she cannot reduce something into nothing Modifications of Beings may be Annihilated Rotundity of a Body may be destroy'd for that which is round may become square But this roundness is not a Being a Thing a Substance but only a Relation of Equality of distance between the terminating parts of the Body and that which is in the Center Which relation changing the Roundness is destroy'd but the substance cannot be reduc'd to nothing Now for the foremention'd Reasons the Soul is not a Mode of a Body's Existing Therefore she is immortal and though the Body be dissolv'd into a Thousand parts of a different Nature and the structure of its Organs broke to pieces since the Soul consists not in that structure nor in any other Modification of matter 't is evident that the dissolution and even the Annihilation of the substance of an humane Body were that Annihilation true could not Annihilate the substance of our Soul Let us add to this another proof of the immortality of the Soul grounded upon the same Principle Though the Body cannot be reduc'd to nothing because it is a substance it may notwithstanding die and all its parts may be dissolv'd Because Extension is divisible But the Soul being a substance distinct from Extension cannot be divided For we cannot divide a Thought a Desire a Sensation of Pain or Pleasure as we may divide a square into two or four Triangles Therefore the substance of the Soul is indissoluble incorruptible and consequently immortal because unextended But if Monsieur de la Ville supposes that the Essence of Body consists in something besides Extension how will he convince the Libertines that she is neither material nor mortal They will maintain that something wherein the Essence of Body consists is capable of thinking and that the substance which thinks is the same with that which is extended If Monsieur de la Ville denies it they 'll show that he does it without Reason since according to his Principle Body being something else than Extension he has no distinct Idea of what that can be and consequently cannot tell but that unknown thing may be capable of Thought Does he think to convince them by saying as he does in his Book that the Essence of Body is to have Parts without Extension Certainly they will not take his Word for it for finding it as hard to conceive parts without Extension as indivisible Atoms or Circles without two Semi-circles they must have more deference for him than he has for God himself For Monsieur de la Ville in the last part of his Book pretends that God himself cannot oblige us to belive contradictory things such as are the Parts of a Body without any Actual extension But the Libertines on their part would
Glory Sin which introduc'd into the World the Miseries of Life and Death which follows it were necessary that Men after their Trial upon Earth might be legitimately crown'd with that Glory the Variety and Order whereof shall make the Beauty of the future World XXXIII 'T is true that Concupiscence which we feel in us is not necessary to our Meriting For Jesus Christ whose Merits are infinite was not subject to it But though He absolutely controll'd it He was willing to admit in Himself the most vexatious Motions and Sensations that He might merit all the Glory that was prepar'd for Him Of all Sensations that which is most repugnant to a Soul willing and deserving to be happy is Pain wbich yet He was willing to suffer in the most excessive degree Pleasure makes actually Happy the Person that actually enjoys it which yet he willingly deny'd Himself Thus he has offer'd like us innumerable Sacrifices through a Body which he took like ours But these Sacrifices were of a different kind from those of the greatest Saints because he voluntarily rais'd in Himself all those painful Sensations which in the rest of Men are the necessary Consequences of Sin which being thus perfectly voluntary were therefore more pure and meritorious XXXIV If I had a clear Idea of the Blessed Spirits who are not embody'd I perhaps could clearly resolve a Difficulty that arises from their Consideration For it may be objected either that there is very little Variety in the Merits or Rewards of Angels or that it was to ill purpose for God to unite Bodies to Spirits which are whilst united so dependant on them I confess I do not see any great Diversity in the Rewards answering the Merits of purely intelligible Substances especially if they have merited their Recompence by one sole Act of Love For being not united to a Body which might be an Occasion to God's giving them by most Simple and General Laws a Train of different Thoughts and Sensations I see no Variety in their Combats or Victories But possibly another Order has been establish'd which is unknown to me and therefore I ought not to speak of it And 't is sufficient that I have establish'd a Principle from whence may be concluded that God ought to create Bodies and unite Minds to them that by the most simple Laws of Union of these two Substances He might give us in a general constant and uniform manner that great Variety of Sensations and Motions which is the Principle of the Diversity of our Merits and Rewards XXXV Lastly 't was requisite that God alone should have all the Glory of the Beauty and Perfection of the future World This Work which infinitely excels all others ought to be a Work of pure Mercy It was not for Creatures to glory in having any other part in it than that the Grace of Jesus Christ had given them In a word 't was fit that God should suffer all Men to be involv'd in Sin that He might shew them Mercy in Jesus Christ. XXXVI Thus the first Man being impower'd by the Strength of His Charity to persevere in Original Righteousness God ought not to have fix'd him to his Duty by preventing Pleasures for having no Concupiscence to conquer God ought not to prevent his Free Will by the Delectation of His Grace In short having all in general that was necessary to his meriting his Reward God who works nothing in vain ought to leave him to himself though He foresaw His Fall since He design'd to raise him up in Jesus Christ put Free Will to confusion and manifest the Greatness of His Mercy Let us now endeavour to discover the Ways whereby God executes His Eternal Purpose of the Sanctification of His Church XXXVII Though God in the Establishment of the future World acts in Ways very different from those by which He preserves the present yet it ought not to be imagin'd that difference is so great as to take from the Laws of Grace the Character of the Cause that made them As it is the same God who is the Author both of the Order of Grace and Nature these two Orders must agree in all those included Symptoms which discover the Wisdom and Power of their â—ounder Therefore since God is a General Cause whose Wisdom has no Bounds He must needs for the Reasons before given act as such in the Order of Grace as well as in that of Nature and His own Glory being His End in the Construction of His Church He must establish most Simple and General Laws and which have the greatest Proportion of Wisdom and Fertility with their design'd Effect XXXVIII The more wise an Agent is the more comprehensive are his Wills A very limited Understanding is constantly taking fresh Designs and in the Execution of any one of them employs more Means than are useful In a word a straitned Capacity does not sufficiently compare the Means with the End the Force and the Action with the Effect to be produc'd by them On the contrary a Mind of great Reach and Penetration collates and weighs all things forms not Designs except upon the Knowledge of the Means to dispatch them and when it has observ'd in these Means a certain Proportion of Wisdom with their Effects he puts them in practice The more simple are the Machines and more different their Effects the more Marks they bear of an intelligent Workman and more worthy they are to be esteem'd The great Number of Laws in a State are commonly a Proof of the want of Insight and Extent of Thought in their â—ounders it being rather the Experience of their Exigency than a wise Fore-sight that establish'd them God therefore whose Wisdom is infinite ought to employ the simplest and most comprehensive Means in the Formation of a future World as well as in the Preservation of the present He ought not to multiply His Wills which are the executive Laws of His Designs save when Necessity obliges Him to it but must act by General Wills and so settle a Constant and Regular Order by which He foresees through the infinite Comprehension of His Wisdom that a Work so admirable as His must needs be form'd Let us see the Consequences of this Principle and the Application we may make of it in the Explication of those Difficulties which seem very puzzling and perplex'd XXXIX Holy Writ on one hand teaches us that God wills all Men should be sav'd and come to the Knowledge of the Truth and on the other that He does whatever He wills and yet Faith is not given to all Men and the Number of those that perish is greater than that of the Predestinate How can this be reconcil'd with His Power XL. God foresaw from all Eternity Original Sin and the Infinite Number of those whom Sin should cast into Hell and nevertheless created the First Man in a State from whence He knew He must fall and likewise has appointed such Relations betwixt this Man and his
the Helps reach'd to them by Jesus Christ but also by natural Forces or ordinary Graces For in brief Nature may be made subservient to Grace in a thousand Instances PART II. Of GRACE XVIII THE Inequality which is found in the Liberty of different Persons being clearly known it will be no hard Matter methinks to discover how Grace works in us if we but affix to the Word Grace distinct and particular Ideas and remember the Difference between the Grace of the Creator and Renovator I said in the preceding Discourse that there is this difference between Light and Pleasure That the former leaves us entirely to our selves whilst the latter incroaches upon our Liberty For Light is something extraneous to us it does not affect and modifie our Soul it does not drive us to the Objects it discovers but only disposes us to move our selves and to consent freely and by Reason to the Impression God gives us towards Good The Knowledge of our Duty the clear Idea of Order separate from all Sensation the Contemplation of naked abstract wholly pure and intelligible Good that is Good without Tast or Fore-tast leaves the Soul to her entire Liberty But Pleasure is an Inmate to the Soul it touches and modifies her And so it diminishes our Liberty makes us love Good rather by a Love of Instinct and Passion than of Choice and Reason And it transports us as I may say to sensible Objects Not that Pleasure is the same thing as Love or the Motion of the Soul towards Good but that it causes this Love or determines this Motion towards the Object that makes us happy But because no Truths are demonstrable save those whereof we have clear Ideas which we have not of our own inward Motions 't is not possible for me to demonstrate what I advance as we demonstrate the Conclusions depending on common Notions Every one therefore must consult his own inward feeling of what passes in his Soul if he would be convinc'd of the difference between Light and Pleasure and must carefully observe that commonly Light is attended with Pleasure which yet he must separate to judge soundly of it But of this I have said enough XIX If then it be true that Pleasure naturally produces Love and is like a Weight which gives the Soul a Propensity to the Good that causes or seems to cause it 't is visible that the Grace of Jesus Christ or the Grace of Sensation is of it self efficacious For though preventing Delectation when but weak works not an entire Conversion in the Heart of those whose Passions are too lively yet it never fails of its Effect in as much as it always inclines them towards God It is in some measure always efficacious but it has not always all possible Effect because of the Resistance of Concupiscence XX. Put for Example in one Scale of a Balance ten pound weight and in the other only six this latter weight shall truly gravitate for adding but so much more weight to this or taking it from the opposite Scale or lastly hanging the Balance nearer the over-weighted and the six pounds shall carry it But though this weight gravitates 't is visible its effect depends still on the resisting weight and the manner of its resisting Thus the Grace of Sensation is always of it self efficacious it constantly weakens the Effort of Concupiscence since Pleasure naturally creates Love for the Cause which produces or seems to produce it But though this Grace be always Self-efficacious yet it depends or rather its Effect depends on the actual Dispositions of the Receiver The weight of Concupiscence resists it and sensible Pleasures which draw us to the Creatures that seem to produce it in us hinder the Pleasures of Grace from uniting us strictly to him who alone can act in us and make us happy XXI But the case is otherwise with the Grace of Light or the Grace of the Creator It is not of it self efficacious It does not move or convey the Soul but leaves her perfectly to her self But though it be not efficacious of it self it nevertheless is persued by many Effects when 't is great and animated by some delectable Grace which gives it Force and Vigour or when it meets with no contrary Pleasure that greatly resists it Such is the difference between the Grace of the Creator and that of the Restorer between Light and Pleasure between the Grace which supposes not Concupiscence and the Grace which is given us to counterpoize the Pleasures of it The one is sufficient to a Man perfectly Free and Fortified with Charity the other is efficacious to a Man Infirm to whom Pleasure is necessary to draw him to the Love of the True Good XXII But the Force and Efficacy of Grace ought always to be compar'd with the Action of Concupiscence with the Light of Reason and especially with the degree of Liberty the Person is endued with And we must not imagine that God bestows it by particular Wills with design to produce certain Effects by it and nothing more For when 't is said that Grace always works in the Heart the Effect for which 't is given we err if we suppose God acts like Men with particular Considerations God diffuses his Grace with a General Design of sanctifying all that receive it or according as the Occasional Cause determines him to refuse it Mean while he knows very well that it will not have so much Effect in some as in others not only because of the Inequality of Force on the part of Grace but also of the Inequality of Resistance on the part of Concupiscence XXIII Since Concupiscence has not utterly destroy'd the Liberty of Man the Grace of Jesus Christ as efficacious as it is is not absolutely irresistible A sensible Pleasure is superable when weak and a Man may suspend the Judgment of his Love when he is not hurried by a too violent Passion And when he stoops to the Lure of an adulterate Pleasure he is culpable through the Abuse of his Liberty So likewise the Delectation of Grace is not ordinarily invincible A Man may decline following the good Motions it inspires which remove us from the false Objects of our Love This Grace fills not the Soul in such a manner as to hurry her to the True Good without Choâ—ce Judgment and Free Consent Thus when we resign up our selves to its Motion and advance farther as I may say than it irresistibly carries us when we sacrifice the Pleasures of Concupiscence which weaken its Efficacy or lastly when we act by Reason or love the true Good as we ought we merit through the good use we make of our Liberty XXIV 'T is true that Delectable Grace consider'd in it self and separate from the Pleasures of Concupiscence which are contrary to it is always invincible Because this holy Pleasure being conformable to the Light of Reason nothing can withstand its Effect in a Man perfectly free When the Mind sees clearly by
full of Obscurity and Darkness are founded on the Ignorance we are in of the Properties of our Soul 'T is from our having as I have elsewhere proved no clear Idea of our Being and that what is in us which gives way to be conquer'd by a Determination not invincible is absolutely unknown to us Furthermore if I cannot clearly answer these Objections I can answer by others which to me seem more incapable of Solution I can from Principles oppos'd to mine deduce more harsh and unlucky Consequences than those which are presum'd to follow from Liberty such as I have suppos'd in us But I engage not on the Particulars of all this as taking no delight to walk in the dark and to lead others upon Precipices THE ILLUSTRATION OR CONTINUATION OF THE TREATISE CONCERNING Nature and Grace What is meant by acting by General and Particular Wills I. I Say that God acts by General Wills when he acts in consequence of the General Laws which he has establish'd For Example I say that God acts in me by General Wills when he gives me the Sense of Pain when I am prick'd since in pursuance of the General and Efficacious Laws of Union of my Soul and Body which he has constituted he makes me suffer Pain when my Body's ill dispos'd So when a Bowl strikes another I say God moves the stricken by a General Will because he moves it in pursuance of the General and Efficacious Laws of the Communications of Motions God having generally Ordain'd that at the Instant of Collision of two Bodies the Motion should be distributed between them according to certain Proportions and 't is by the Efficacy of that General Will that Bodies have the force of moving one another II. I say on the contrary that God acts by Particular Wills when the Efficacy of his Will is not determin'd by some General Law to the producing any Effect Thus supposing God should make me feel the Pain of pricking whilst there happen'd no Change in my Body or in any Creature whatsover which determines him to act in me by some General Law I say that then God acts by Particular Wills So again supposing a Body begins to move without being stricken by another or without any Alteration happening in the Will of Spirits or in any other Creature which determines the Efficacy of some General Laws I say that God would move that Body by a Particular Will III. According to these Definitions it plainly appears that so far from denying Providence I suppose on the contrary that God works all in all things that the Nature of the Heathen Philosophers is a Chimera and that to speak properly Nature is nothing but the General Laws which God has establish'd for the Construction or Preservation of his Work by the simplest ways by an Action always uniform constant perfectly worthy of an infinite Wisdom and an universal Cause But that which I here suppose though certain for the Reasons I have given in The Search after Truth is not absolutely necessary to what I design to prove For if it be suppos'd that God had communicated his Power to the Creatures in such a manner as that surrounding Bodies had a real and true Force by which they might act on our Soul and make her happy and miserable by Pleasure and Pain and that Bodies in Motion had in themselves a certain Entity which they call Impress'd Quality that they can communicate it to those about them and with that Celerity and Uniformity we observe it would be still equally easie to prove what I intend For then the Efficacy of the concurrent Action of the General Cause would be necessarily determin'd by the Action of the Particular Cause God for Instance would be oblig'd by these Principles to afford his Concourse to a Body at the Instant of Collision that it might communicate its Motion to others which is still to act by virtue of a General Law Yet I do not argue upon that Supposition as believing it utterly false as I have shewn in the Third Chapter and Second Part of the Sixth Book of The Search after Truth in the Illustration of the same Chapter and elsewhere Which Truths suppos'd here follow the Notes by which we may discover whether an Effect be produc'd by a General or Particular Will MARKS by which we may judge whether an Effect be produc'd by a General or Particular Will IV. When we see an Effect immediately produc'd after the Action of an Occasionl Cause we ought to judge it produc'd by the Efficacy of a General Will. A Body moves immediately after the Collision the Collision of Bodies is the Action of an Occasional Cause Therefore this Body moves by a General Will. A Stone falls on the Head of a Man and kills him and this Stone falls like all others that is continues its Motion almost in Arithmetical Proportion 1 3 5 7 9 c. Which suppos'd I say it moves by the Efficacy of a General Will or by the Laws of the Communications of Motions as is easie to demonstrate V. When we see an Effect produc'd without the Mediation of the known Occasional Cause we have reason to think it produc'd by a Particular Will supposing this Effect be not manifestly unworthy of its Cause as I shall say hereafter For Example When a Body 's mov'd without being smitten by another there 's great Probability it was mov'd by a Particular Will but yet we cannot be confident of it For on Supposition of a General Law that Bodies should move according to the several Volitions of Angels or the like 't is visible this Body might be put in Motion without Impulsion the particular Will of some Angel being in this case able to determine the Will of the general Cause to move it Thus we may be often positive that God acts by general Wills but we cannot have the like Assurance that he acts by particular Wills even in the most averr'd Miracles VI. Since we have not a competent Knowledge of the various Combinations of Occasional Causes to discover whether such and such Effects arrive in consequence of their Action and are not sufficiently Intelligent to discover for Instance whether such a Rain be Natural or Miraculous produc'd by a necessary Consequence of the Communication of Motions or by a particular Will we must judge an Effect is produc'd by a General Will when 't is visible the Cause did not propose it self a particular End For the Wills of Intelligences have necessarily an End general Wills a general End and particular Wills a particular Design Nothing can be more plain and evident For Example Though I cannot discover whether a Shower of Rain which falls on a Meadow falls in consequence of general Laws or by a particular Will of God I have reason to think it falls by a general Will if I see it fall as well on the neighbouring Grounds or on the River which bounds the Meadow no less than on the Meadow it self For
their Effect The Prayers and diverse Desires of Jesus Christ with reference to the Formation of his Body have likewise most constantly and speedily their Accomplishment God denies his Son nothing as we learn from Jesus Christ himself Occasional Causes produce not their Effect by their own Efficacy but by the Efficacy of the General Cause 'T is likewise by the Efficacy of the Power of God that the Soul of Jesus Christ operates in us and not by the Efficacy of Man's Will 'T is for this Reason that St. Paul represents Jesus Christ as praying to his Father without Intermission For he is oblâ—gâ—d to Pray in order to Obtain Occasional Causes have been establish'd by God for the determining the Efficacy of his General Wills and Jesus Christ according to the Scripture has been appointed by God after his Resurrection to govern the Church which he had purchas'd by his Blood For Jesus Christ became the Meritorious Cause of all Graces by his Sacrifice But after his Resurrection he entred 〈◊〉 the Holy of Holies as High Priest of future Goods to appear in the Presence of God and to endue us with the Graces which he has merited for us Therefore he himself applies and distributes his Gifts as Occasional Cause he disposes of all things in the House of God as a well-beloved Son in the House of his Father I think I have demonstrated in the Search after Truth that there is none but God who is the true Cause and who acts by his own Efficacy and that he communicates his Power to Creatures only in establishing them Occasional Causes for the producing some Effects I have proved for Example That Men have no Power to produce any Motion in their Bodies but because God has establish'd their Wills the Occasional Causes of these Motions That Fire has no power to make me feel Pain but because God has establish'd the Collision of Bodies the Occasional Cause of the Communication of Motions and the violent Vibration of the Fibres of my Flesh the Occasional Cause of my Pain I may here suppose a Truth which I have proved at large in the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book and in the Illustration upon the same Chapter and which those for whom it was principally written don't contest Now Faith assures us that all Power is given to Jesus Christ to form his Church All Power is given unto me in Heaven and in Earth Which cannot be understood of Jesus Christ as to his Divinity for as God he has never received any thing And therefore it is certain that Jesus Christ as to his Humanity is the Occasional Cause of Grace supposing I have well proved that God only can act on Minds and that Second Causes have no Efficacy of their own Which those ought first to examine who would understand my Sentiments and give a Judgment of them XII I say farther that no one is sanctified but through the Efficacy of the Power which God has communicated to Jesus Christ in constituting him the Occasional Cause of Grace For if any Sinner were converted by a Grace whereof Jesus Christ was not the Occasional but only the Meritorious Cause that Sinner not receiving his New Life through the Efficacy of Jesus Christ would not be a Member of the Body of which Jesus Christ is the Head in that manner explain'd by St. Paul by these Words of the Epistle to the Ephesians That we may grow up into him in all things who is the Head even Christ from whom the whole Body fitly join'd together and compacted by that which every Joint supplieth according to the effectual working in the measure of every Part maketh increase of the Body unto the edifying it self in Love Which Words not only say Jesus Christ is the Meritorious Cause of all Graces but likewise distinctly signifie that Christians are the Members of the Body whereof Jesus Christ is the Head that 't is in him we increase and live with an entire new Life that 't is by his inward Operation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that his Church is form'd and that thus he has been constituted by God the sole Occasional Cause who by his several Desires and Applications distributes the Graces which God as the True Cause showers down on Men. 'T is on this Account St. Paul says Christians are united to Jesus Christ as their Root Rooted and built up in him 'T is for the same Reason that Jesus Christ compares himself to a Vine and his Disciples to the Branches that derive their Life from him I am the Vine ye are the Branches On the same Grounds St. Paul affirms that Jesus Christ lives in us and that we live in him that we are rais'd up in our Head that our Life is hidden with Jesus Christ in God in a word that we have already Life Eternal in Jesus Christ. All these and many other Expressions of like nature clearly manifest that Jesus Christ is not only the Meritorious but also the Occasional Physical or Natural Cause of Grace and that as the Soul informs animates and consummates the Body so Jesus Christ diffuses through his Members as Occasional Cause the Graces he has merited to his Church by his Sacrifice For my part I cannot see how these Reasons can be call'd in question or upon what Grounds a most edifying Truth and as ancient as the Religion of Jesus Christ can be treated as a dangerous Novelty I grant my Expressions are novel but that 's because they seem to me the fittest of all others distinctly to explain a Truth which can be but confusedly demonstrated by Terms very loose and general These words Occasional Causes and Natural Laws seem necessary to give the Philosophers for whom I wrote this Treatise of Nature and Grace a distinct Understanding of what most Men are content to know confusedly New Expressions being no farther dangerous than involving Ambiguity or breeding in the Mind some Notion contrary to Religion I do not believe that Equitable Persons and conversant in the Theology of St. Paul will blame me for explaining my self in a particular manner when it only tends to make us Adore the Wisdom of God and strictly to unite us with Jesus Christ. First OBJECTION XIII 'T is Objected against what I have establish'd That neither Angels nor Saints of the Old Testament receiv'd Grace pursuant to the Desires of the Soul of Jesus since that Holy Soul was not then in Being and therefore though Jesus Christ be the meritorious Cause of all Graces he is not the Occasional Cause which distributes them to Men. As to Angels I Answer That 't is very probable Grace was given them but once So that if we consider things on that side I grant there is nothing can oblige the Wisdom of God to constitute an Occasional Cause for the Sanctification of Angels But if we consider these blessed Spirits as Members of the Body whereof Jesus Christ is the Head or suppose them
and absolute Lord of all things by right of Generation These Truths are evident as we are assur'd by Jesus Christ himself who says that his Father has given him power to judge Men because he is the Son of Man So we ought not to think that Scripture Expressions which make Jesus Christ the Author of Grace must be understood of him consider'd in his Divine Person For if so I confess I should not have prov'd him the Occasional Cause since he would be the True Cause of it But whereas it is certain that the Three Persons of the Trinity are equally the True Cause of Grace because all the External Operations of God are common to them all my Proofs are undeniable since Holy Scripture says of the Son and not of the Father or the Holy Spirit that he is the Head of the Church and that in this Capacity he communicates Life to the constituent Members of it Second OBJECTION XIV 'T is God who gives the Soul of Jesus Christ all the Thoughts and Motions relating to the Formation of his Mystical Body So that if on one hand the Wills of Jesus Christ as Occasional or Natural Causes determine the Efficacy of the General Wills of God on the other 't is God himself who determines the several Wills of Jesus Christ. And thus it comes to the same thing For in brief the Volitions of Jesus Christ are always conformable to those of his Father I grant that the particular Volitions of the Soul of Jesus Christ are always conformable to the Wills of his Father not as if there were any particular Wills in the Father which answer to those in the Son and determine them but only that the Volitions of the Son are always conform'd to Order in general which is the necessary Rule of the Will of God and of all those who love him For to love Order is to love God 't is to will what he wills 't is to be Just Wise Regular in our Love The Soul of Jesus desires to form to the Glory of his Father the largest most sumptuous and accomplish'd Temple possible Order demands this since nothing can be made too great for God All the several Thoughts of this Soul perpetually intent on the Execution of its Design proceed likewise from God or the Word to which it is united But its various Desires are certainly the Occasional Cause of these various Thoughts for it thinks on what it wills Now these diverse Desires are sometimes entirely free and probably the Thoughts which excite them do not invincibly determine the Soul of Jesus Christ to apply her self to the Means of executing them For in brief 't is equally advantageous to the Design of Jesus Christ whether it be Peter or John that causes the Effect which the Regularity of his Work requires 'T is true the Soul of Jesus is not indifferent in any thing that relates to his Father's Glory or that Order necessarily demands but is entirely free in all the rest there is nothing extraneous to God which invincibly determines his Love Thus we ought not to wonder if Jesus have particular Wills though there be not the like Wills in God to determine them But let it be granted that the Volitions of Jesus Christ are not free and that his Light invincibly carries him to will and to will always in a determinate manner in the Construction of his Church But it is Eternal Wisdom to which his Soul is united that must determine his Volitions We must not for that Effect suppose Particular Wills in God But all the Wills of Jesus Christ are Particular or have no Occasional Cause to determine their Efficacy as have those of God For the Soul of Jesus Christ having not an infinite Capacity of Thinking his Notices and consequently his Volitions are limited Therefore his Wills must needs be Particular since they change according to his diverse Thoughts and Applications For probably the Soul of Jesus Christ otherwise imploy'd in Contemplating and tasting the infinite Satisfactions of the True Good methinks ought not according to Order desire at once to think on all the Ornaments and Beauties he would bestow upon his Church nor on the different Ways of executing each of his Designs For Jesus Christ desiring to render the Church worthy of the infinite Majesty of his Father would gladly perfect it with infinite Beauties by Ways most conformable to Order He must then constantly change his Desires there being but one infinite Wisdom who can fore-see all and prescribe himself General Laws for the executing his Designs But the future World being to subsist eternally and to be infinitely more perfect than the present it was requisite that God should establish an Occasional Cause Intelligent and Enlightned by Eternal Wisdom to remedy the Defects which should unavoidably happen in the Works that were form'd by General Laws The Collision of Bodies which determines the Efficacy of the General Laws of Nature is an Occasional Cause without Understanding and Liberty and therefore 't is impossible but there must be Imperfections in the World and Monsters produc'd which are not of such account as that the Wisdom of God should descend to remedy them by Particular Wills But Jesus Christ being an Intelligent Occasional Cause illuminate with the Wisdom of the Word and susceptible of Particular Wills according to the particular Exigencies of the Work he forms 't is plain that the future World will be infinitely more perfect than the present that the Church will be without Spot or Wrinkle as we are taught by Scripture and that it will be a Work most worthy of the Complacency of God himself 'T is in this manner that Eternal Wisdom renders as I may say to his Father what he had taken from him For not permitting him to act by Particular Wills he seem'd to disable his Almighty Arm But becoming incarnate he so brings it to pass that God acting in a manner worthy of him by most Simple and General Laws produces a Work wherein the most Illuminate Intelligences cannot observe the least Imperfection PROOFS founded on REASON XV. Having demonstrated by the Authority of Scripture that the diverse Motions of the Soul of Jesus Christ are the Occasional Causes which determine the Efficacy of the General Law of Grace by which God would have all Men sav'd in his Son 't is necessary to shew in general by Reason that we are not to believe God acts in the Order of Grace by Particular Wills For though by Reason separate from Faith it cannot be demonstrated that God has constituted the Wills of Man-God the Occasional Causes of his Gifts yet it may without Faith be shewn that he distributes them not to Men by Particular Wills and that in two manners a priori and a posteriori that is by the Idea we have of God and by the Effects of Grace For there is nothing but serves to prove this Truth First then for the Proof of a priori A wise Being