which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
2 Al second Causes if compared with the first are but instruments of his principal concurse Thus not only Aquinas Bradwardine and the more sane Scholastics but also Averroes de Somno Vigilia where he affirmes That second causes are moved by the first as instruments by the Artificer But here occurs a spinose knotty question much ventilated in the Scholes Whether the Wil in the reception of supernatural habits be an instrument or principal cause According to the former distinctions I should answer 1 That according to the general notion of an Instrument the Wil may be termed such in the reception and acting of Grace As it receives Grace it is a passive instrument yet as it actes Grace it is an active instrument 2 That the Wil in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital instrument Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Instrument a rational Instrument an Instrument composed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God In receiving the first Grace the Wil is only naturally remotely and passively vital as it is a piece of human Nature but in the actuating what Grace is received it is a spiritually vital instrument Grace received elevates the human Soul to a spiritual Vitalitie and Instrumentalitie for the acting of Grace Hence 3 the Wil may as to the acting of Grace so far as it is clothed with Divine habits be termed in some respect a principal Agent under God specially if compared with the effect produced It 's true if the Wil be compared with God even in the acting of Grace received it is but a mere instrument because both Habit and Act are received from God yet if we consider the Wil as invested and qualified with supernatural habits which are the same to the Soul that it is to the Bodie whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce such or such supernatural Acts and Effects in this regard we may stile it a principal cause though I must confesse the notion of an Instrument used by Aquinas and others seems more adequate and genuine to expresse its causalitie by in as much as al is from God by supernatural infusion § 3. Having inquired into the Concurse of God in regard of its object Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with Gods Wil. we now procede to consider it as relating to its Subject or Principe which wil afford to us great notices of its genuine nature The Scholastic Theologues in their debates about the concurse of God to the supernatural Acts of the Wil are greatly divided some placing it in a certain efficacious impulse or motion of God whereby the Wil is determined to consent and act others in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a transient qualitie together with the operation of the Wil others in the very operation of the second cause or Wil as it procedes from the influxe of God premoving These make it to be an efficacious premotion or physic predetermination whereby the first cause makes the second to act others place this concurse as to gratiose effects in certain pious inspirations cogitations and indeliberate motions of love injected by God Albeit some of these scholastic sentiments may have their place if we consider the concurse of God with relation to its passive Attingence or as it terminates on the second cause and effect yet if we take it strictly according to its formal Idea I conceive no one of these opinions explicate the true nature thereof Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concurse we must consider what relation it has to the Divine Wil whether it be really distinct therefrom or not And here we must in the first place reflect on what was asserted and proved in the former C. 5. § 4. touching the ordinate or executive power of God and its Indentitie with the Divine Wil which being supposed as it has been demonstrated it naturally follows that Gods concurse as to is active Attingence and effective principe is nothing else but the omnipotent efficacious volition of God For Gods executive power being the same with his Effective Wil it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is the same also Hence Sacred Philosophie every where makes Gods Wil the Effective Principe whereby althings are made and governed or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Psal 39.9 and 115.3 and 135.6 Mat. 8.2 3. 2 Chron. 20.6 and elsewhere as before C. 5. § 4. Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogising with young Alcibiades that Athenian Gallant in this manner Doest thou know saith Socrates by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind Alcibiad Yes Socrat. How Alcibiad If thou wilt O Socrates i. e. by thy precepts and institutes Socrat. Thou mayst not say so Alcibiad How then Socrat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if God wil. Meaning that Gods wil was omnipoten and so could without more ado merely by his act of volition worke virtue in young Alcibiades But now to explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis namely That the Divine Wil is of it self operative we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God as the first cause of althings doth not concur by his Essence absolutely considered Gods concurse not his essence absolutely considered For 1 If God should concur by his Essence absolutely considered he should act althings by a natural necessitie not with any precedent Libertie and then Gods making the world yea things most contingent would be as absolutely and naturally necessary as his loving himself It 's true Gods loving himself and al other immanent Acts have a concomitant Libertie or Divine spontaneitie attending them yet they admit not any Antecedent Libertie or Indifference of any kind But now Gods workes ad extra such as terminate on the Creature have not only a Concomitant but also Antecedent Libertie or some kind of Indifference so that God could according to a signum rationis or prioritie of nature not have willed them 2 If God should worke althings by his Essence absolutely considered things possible should have one and the same Idea with things future and so Gods Science of simple Intelligence should be the same with his Science of Vision And the reason of the consequence is most evident because the Essence of God absolutely considered is equally indifferent to things possible which shal never be as to things future which are to be 3 Again Gods Absolute Power should be the same with his Ordinate and his Sufficience the same with his Efficience if he wrought al things by his Essence absolutely considered 4 Hence also it would follow that God should alwaies worke and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmost extent in al operations For Causes that worke from a Necessitie of Nature worke to the utmost of their power 2. Prop. Gods concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God No executive
concurse Thence in sacred Philosophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God as the Word of Creation Gen. 1.3 Conservation Psal 107.20 Gubernation Destruction Restitution c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine Wil as mans Wil is expressed by his word of which hereafter § 4.6 Prop. See this Hypothesis wel demonstrated in Bradward Caus Deil l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensiâ— Sent. 1. Distinct 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest 3. § 4. Having discussed the Concurse of God The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation which wil give us great indications and notices of its nature 1. The concurse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concurse for it being nothing but the simple volition of God Particularly as to gratiose effects it thence necessarily follows that it must be immediate as to al objects and effects Esa 55.10 11. This immediation of Divine Concurse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie So Esa 55.10 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven and returneth not thither but watereth the earth and maketh it to bring forth and bud that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater so shal my word that goeth forth out of my mouth it shal not returne unto me void but it shal accomplish that which I please and it shal prosper in the thing whereto I sent it 1 This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word but also of his efficacious word of concurse productive of things Psal 72.6 So Psal 72.6 2 Gods effective operative word or concurse is compared to the Rain which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth straining it self through the liquid Air as through a Sieve dividing it self into millions of drops and immediately watering every inch of earth that so every herbe may receive its proportion of moisture gradually and immediately according to its exigence just so proportionably doth the efficacious concurse of God immediately insinuate it self into al second causes operations and effects specially such as are gratiose Hos 14.5 The like allusion we find Hos 14.5 I wil be as the dew to Israel he shal grow as the lillie Esa 26.19 The like Esa 26.19 For thy dew is as the dew of herbes The dew you know fals in a silent quiet night in millions of smal imperceptible drops and being of a gentle insinuating nature gradually and insensibly sokes into the erth tempers and allays the heat thereof specially in those hotter countries and immediately insinuates it self into the roots of plants which by reason of its moist benigne nitrose qualitie it comfortes refresheth and encourageth calling forth the fruits hereof and causing the face of things to flourish with beautie and delight much more efficaciously than sudden great shours or land-flouds which are more violent but lesse beneficial Thus Christ's gratiose concurse and influence fals like dew on the Believers heart in millions of drops which gradâ—aly insensibly and immediately insinuate thereinto causing it to fructifie and flourish much more effectively than al the shours of Divine wrath or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences but soon drie up again and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before The Greek Theologues expresse this immediation of Divine Grace various ways sometimes they terme it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitant or indwelling Grace sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the inhabitation of the holy Spirit because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart But to treat more generally of Divine Concurse and its immediation as to al Objects Operations and Effects Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us That according to the ancient Tradition God has not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the beginning and the end but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the middle of althings i. e. God by his efficacious concurse penetrates althings and is more intimate and immediate to them than they are to themselves So also in his Parmenides he tels us That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with althings influencing al both smal and great Whence he termes al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Co-operators with God But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation 1 When we say Gods concurse to al second causes and effects is immediate we do not thereby exclude al means as if God did so concur as not to make use of second causes and instruments but that God concurs immediately in and with al means As in order to health God prescribes and useth means yet he concurs immediately in and with those means so in supernatural effects God useth Ministers and Ordinances yet concurs immediately in and with them 2 God concurs immediately to al second causes and effects not only by the immediation of Virtue but also immediatione suppositi by the immediation of his Essence for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence or Wil as the effective Principe of althings The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguished from his Virtue which is his effective omnipotent Wil. These premisses being laid down we procede to explicate and demonstrate the Immediation of Gods Concurse in the following Propositions 1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause God concurs immediately to every Act of second Causes This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomistes but also by the Jesuites Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. sect 1. and others And the reasons are invincible 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Aristotle in his Physics l. 8. c. 5. Metaphys l. 2. c. 12. assures us That in Agents per se and properly subordinate the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurse of the superior cause And the reason is evident because if the inferior cause could act without the influxe of the superior it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act Neither is it sufficient to say that the second cause is subordinate to God as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators for such a subordination of the second cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its acting And who knows not that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause Al proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior not only quando but quatenus agit both when and as it actes 2 From the limitation
and dependence of al second causes Every Being by participation is limited and where there are limits of essence there necessarily are limits of Activitie and Operation A Creature can as wel give Being to it self as actuate it self independently as to the First cause whatever receives its Being by participation receives also its Operation in the same mode of Participation Dependence on God in Operation is as essental and intrinsec to the nature of a Creature as dependence on God in essence and conservation of that essence Yea it is no lesse than an implicite contradiction to say that a Creature actes without dependence on God for that act as Suarez and others prove And the reason is most demonstrative for as Aristotle tels us The mode of operating alwaies follows the mode of essence If the essence depend on God for its production and conservation so must the operation Whatever is a Being by participation must also be an Agent by participation Yea the very Act of the second cause is a Being by participation and therefore it requires the concurse and influxe of the First cause for its production conservation and promotion 3 From the nature of the First cause and its perfection If God concur not immediately to every Act of the second cause he is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent and most perfect For that very Act is a real Being or if you wil a mode of Being and so reducible to real Entitie it cannot be pure nothing because pure nothing cannot be the terme or effect of a real production If then the Act of the second cause be a real positive Entitie or Mode and yet God not the First cause thereof then it necessarily follows that God is not the universal cause of althings neither is he omnipotent because he cannot produce that real Act neither is he most perfect because there is something in nature physically perfect which he is not the cause of Dependence on God as the First cause albeit it implies something of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature yet it importes perfection in God neither can his absolute perfection as the First cause be preserved and maintained without it 4 From the Providence of God If God as the First cause concur not immediately to al Acts of second Causes how can he order direct and governe them so as they shal al determine in his own glorie Again how can he hinder such Acts as impugne his own ends and designes Doth not this Antithesis of Durandus and others who denie God to concur immediately to al Acts of second causes cut off the chiefest part of Divine Providence which consistes in the ordering and directing al human Acts for his own glorie 2. Prop. God as the First cause immediately concurs not only to the Act but also the second cause it self and its wil if it be a free Agent God immediately concurs to second Cause self This Proposition may be demonstrated 1 by al the fore mentioned Arguments which prove Gods immediate concurse to the Act of the second cause for every efficient cause producing in a subject an Act connatural to the power of he subject must needs influence and actuate that power wherefore God the First cause producing in the wil of man an act connatural thereto must necessarily actuate and influence the said wil in such a production 2 That gods immediate concurse reacheth the human Wil and not only its Act is evident because it determines the Wil to act For grant but this that the human Wil is not the First cause of its own act but dependent on God for the production thereof which the Jesuites grant it necessarily follows that it is actuated and determined by God in al its Acts. It 's true the human Wil is a free Agent and so a self-determining power but yet this hinders not but that it is also determined by God as the First cause God determines the Wil to determine it self as he moves the Wil to move it self If God did not determine and move the Wil it could not determine and move it self 3 Sacred Philosophie is expresse herein that God workes immediately on the Wil as wel as on its Acts and Effects So Philip. 2.13 God is said to worke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to wil and to do And how can he worke to wil unlesse he worke upon the wil Can there be any way assigned how God should worke to wil and yet not immediately determine and move the wil Psal 139.9 10. So Psal 139.9 10. If I take the wings of the morning i.e. slie most swiftly as the morning and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea even there shal thine hand lead me and thy right hand shal hold me His mind is that he cannot flie from the immediate presence of God because whereever he goes his immediate hand or concurse must lead him To lead a man by the hand and to hold him here denotes Gods immediate concurse on the Wil and its Acts. 3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the same act with the second cause The Act of the first and second cause the same For the explication of this Proposition we are to note that the causation of the first cause is not the same with that of the second but only the action whereby the first and second cause concur to the production of the effect For albeit the influxe of the first cause be distinct from that of the second yet the Act whereby the first and second cause produce the effect is one and the same Duo individuo opere operantes necessario agant unum idem cùm indivisa sit corum actio si autem agerent diversis actionibus oporteret operata esse divisa ficut è contrà actio indivisa non potest sacere divisa opera Grossetesle de Libero Arbitrio This is incomparably wel demonstrated by our Learned and great Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne in his Tractate De Libero Arbitrio in M. SS where he acutely proves That the Action of God and the second cause whereby the effect is produced cannot be deverse because the Effect is but one and the same which procedes totally from God as the first cause and totally from the second cause as hereafter Prop. 4. For the more ful explication whereof we must distinguish between the Active and Passive Efficience of God Gods Active Efficience is nothing else but the immanent efficacious Act of his Wil which without al peradventure differs infinitely from the efficience of the second cause yet Gods Passive efficience as it relates to the Act of the second cause is not really distinct therefrom for it 's no way incongruous or inconsistent that one and the same act procede from two different total causes of different kinds such as the first and second cause is Whence it follows that one and the same act both of first and second cause
immediately and essentially depend on both in their kind That the first and second cause immediately concur to the same effect by one and the same indivisible Act may be demonstrated 1 from the Dependence which the Act of the second cause has on the active causation of the first cause The Act of the second cause doth not as some conceive depend on any real influxe or concurse transient from the first cause and distinct from the act of the second cause but on the mere efficacious volition of the first cause which is the effective principe of al effects This is acutely demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 21. sect 3. p. 568. where he proves That the action of God is not the way or fluxe to the action of the Creature but to the effect neither is an action the terme of an action Therefore to the universal influxe of the first cause there is no more required but that the action of the second cause procede from his Wil not that it procede by another externe action but it can procede immediately by it self from the wil of God Whence when the action of the Creature is said to depend on the influxe of God either this influxe must be taken for the immanent interne Act as it influenceth the externe Act of the second cause or the manner of speech must be taken not transitively save according to some rational conception If we would speak properly it must be said that the action of the Creature is from God Whence he concludes in the same page thus By comparing the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the second cause Whence it 's said that the concurse of the first cause is before that of the second because the second cause doth not act but in the virtue of the first Hence 2 we may farther demonstrate the Identitie of the act whereby the first and second cause concur to the effect by the Independence which the act of the second cause has as to al transient acts of the first cause distinct from it self For if the action of the second cause be from God by some transient influxe distinct from it self then that influxe being a Creature wil necessarily require some other transient influxe for its production and preservation and so into infinite 3 That the action whereby the first and second cause concur to any effect is one and the same may be demonstrated from the Inutilitie and needlesse supposition of any distinction between them For if there be supposed two distinct actions one of God another of the second cause as necessarily concurring to the production of one and the same effect then the action of the second is from God or not It cannot be said that it is not from God but only from the second cause because then it would be said that the Effect of the second cause is from God but not the Act which is against the nature of a finite limited Being as we have proved in the precedent Propositions If it be said that the act of the second cause is from God then there is no necessity of supposing any other act of God distinct from this whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect Is it not every way superfluous and unnecessary to suppose two distinct actions one of the first and another of the second cause as concurring to the same effect when as it is granted and cannot rationally be denied that the very act of the second cause is from God This Argument is wel managed by Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. S. 3. p. 567. The sum of al is this Both the first and second cause concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the same action yet the influxe or concurse of the first and second cause considered formally as to the effective principes is really distinct 2. Having dispatcht the Immediation of the Divine concurse Gods concurse Independent and Absolute we now procede to a second Adjunct or mode of operation appendent thereto namely its Independence and Absolutenesse That the concurse of God is Independent and Absolute we are assured both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophie The Absolute Independence of Divine concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophie Psal 51.10 Hence we find a creative efficace asscribed to Independent Medicinal Grace Esa 43.1 So Psal 51.10 Create in me a clean heart Esa 43.1 The Lord that created thee O Jacob c. So Esa 57.19 as elsewhere Now what more Independent and Absolute than a Creative concurse 1 Workes of Creation are out of nothing and so their Efficient must needs be Independent as to mater 2 Workes of Creation require an infinite independent Agent which admits no social cause for Creation being the production of something out of nothing which are termes as to Efficience infinitely distant none but an Infinite independent cause can effect the same who can reconcile something and nothing but he who has al Being in himself 3 Workes of Creation are in an instant and therefore depend not on any Preparations or material Dispositions of the subject 4 Workes of Creation are Perfect and therefore require the most perfect independent absolute concurse How Independnet and absolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working is farther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it useth in the conversion of sinners Doth it not oft let some run on in ful career til they have one foot in Hel and then snatch them as flaming torches out of that sire Thus Ezech. 16.6 Ezech. 16.6 I said unto thee when thou wast in thy bloud Live Christs Omnipotent Independent Word carries a vivisie efficace in it How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambes What timber or heart is there so crooked knottie and crabbed out of which he cannot frame a Vessel of Mercie What heart so stonie so rocky out of which he cannot raise up a Son to Abraham as Mat. 3.9 Mat. 3.9 Now to change one species or kind of Creature into another a Lion into a Lamb a stonie heart into a Son of Abraham doth not this argue Independent Absolute and Omnipotent Efficace So little is this gratiose concurse tied to or dependent on the least Moral Dispositions Obligations Merits Causes Conditions or moving Considerations without it self it is the freest thing in the world and therefore compared to the motion of the wind which bloweth where it listeth Joh. 3.8 Can we suppose Joh. 3.8 that any thing the Creature performes should lay the least obligation on Soverain Free Grace Is it not a childish thing to suppose that the infinite occan of Independent Grace should ebbe and slow according to the various changes and conditions of Mans Free Wil that most mutable Moon But that not only Essicacious Grace but al Divine concurse is Independent
Mat. 7.18 How did Paul when he was a Persecutor become a Preacher How did Peter when he had abjured Christ get off this spot By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive Rom. 11.17 Rom. 11.17 How did the Thief get admission into Paradise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide every one that wils both labors and moves althings for a naked wil sufficeth not and learnes and attains Salvation Wherein he assertes 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Salvation 2 That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good Chrysostome in Genes Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace that seeks what is lost and is found by such as seek it not Basil termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipant Grace So de Baptis lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties according to saith by love This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated 1 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause because eternal and independent as before 2 From the efficace of the Divine Concurse as it infallibly determines the second cause to act and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto not only simultaneous as the Jesuites hold 3 From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First Al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses dependent on and subordinate to the First cause as Plato now where there is dependence and subordination here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes Thus Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing saith he the action of the Creature to the interne action of God it is clear that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature whence it is said that the first cause doth first influence or concur because the second cause actes not but in and by its virtue Yet it cannot be denied but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil because otherwise as they conceit the libertie of the Wil cannot be preserved This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause as it procedes from God Burgersdicius Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause and dependence of the second for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie there is posterioritie c. 4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total Gods Concurse total This Totalitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the second cause in its kind but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind For it 's a trite Rule in Philosophie that in causes subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect but not in the same kind So we say that God and the Sun and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man because they al have different kinds of causalitie When therefore we say that Gods Concurse is total we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination but not to be a coordinate social or copartial cause with God Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects workes al totally and solitarily it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner it is no partial cause but workes the whole effect though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments As in natural causes you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause specially if the instrument be purely passive without any inherent virtue of its own As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword but to his Valor so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive they have no efficace but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient and therefore they cannot be partial social causes This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist even in the darkest times of Poperie Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio Efficacious Grace so workes with the Freewil that at first it prevents the act of the Wil and afterwards concurs yet not so as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil but each in its kind workes the whole for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same effect when their action is indivise This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced so the Action of God and of the Wil concur totally And so in every effect of every Creature God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart or one this part and that the other part c. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues Thus Chrysostome Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We see houses beautifully built Hoc inquit Bonaventura piarum mentium est ut nihil sibi tribuant sed totum Gratiae Dei unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est ibi potest periculum intervenire Cassandri Consuloat Art 18. and we say the whole is the Artificers albeit he has worke men under him so the whole of good must be ascribed to God So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The whole is from the Grace of God So ad Ephes Hom. 18. speaking of Paul he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own and ascribes al to God So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he ascribes al to God Thus also Cyril Alexandr and others as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. § 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causalitie which is repugnant both to the nature of God as also to the condition of the Creature 1 This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent simple perfect nature of God as also to his prime soverain efficacions causalitie What more incongruous and unbecoming
moreover working immediately both by the immediation of Virtue and Essence in and with those means Hence Esa 28.26 God is said to teach the Husbandman to plough i. e. how to cultivate and manage his Ground as also to sow his Seed c. That no inferior Agent or second cause can execute any piece of Divine Providence No second cause can act but in subordination to God and by his Providence but in Virtue received from and subordination to God the prime Cause is most evident 1 Because where diverse Agents subserve one Supreme Agent it 's necessary that the effect be produced by them in commun as they are united in the participation of motion and influence from the Supreme Agent For many cannot produce one effect but as one Now the subservient Agents of Providence are so far one in their executions as they are subordinate to and influenced by God the Supreme Agent 2 The complement of the Virtue and Efficace of the Second Agent is from the Virtue and Influxe of the First Agent and is not God the first Agent in al executions of Providence 3 Al Operation consequent to any influence is ascribed to that which gave the influence as the proper cause thereof And do not al second Causes receive their influence from God Must not then al their Executions and Operations be ascribed to him as the prime Cause 4 Al Actions that cannot subsiste without the Impression and Influence of some Agent must be attributed to that Agent as the cause thereof Now can any executions of second Causes subsist without the impression of the first Cause must they not then al be attributed to him 5 Whatever applies the active Virtue or draws it forth to act may be said to be the cause of that Act as an Artificer by applying the virtue of any natural thing to any action is said to be the cause of that action Now is not al application of any Virtue in providential executions from God Is he not then the cause of al such executions 6 Doth not the Virtue of every inferior Agent depend on the Virtue of the Superior Agent as such And are not al second Causes in providential executions inferior Agents as to God the Supreme Agent 7 Is not every Worker by its operation ordained to its last end And who in al Providential Operations ordains things to their last end but God the first cause of al 8 As particular Causes are referred to particular Effects so the universal Cause to universal Effects and is not God the Universal Cause of al Effects 9 To substract or withdraw any providential execution from Gods Ordination and Efficience what is this but to subvert the best Order even the subordination of second Causes to the first 10 God is intimely present with and in al providential executions and therefore cannot but influence the same The mover and moved are always together God is the prime mover in al motions and therefore present with al the application of Actives unto Passives is by him That there is not the least execution of Providence but what is influenced by God see Aquinas contra Gent. Lib. 3. Cap. 67 68 70 76 77. Not to mention the various means Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit instruments and second causes which God employs in his Providential Efficience there is one which deserves a particular disquisition namely Fire which is in its kind an Vniversal Mundane Spirit the most potent Instrument of Nature and Art and that which subserves the Spirit of God the Supreme increate Universal Spirit in al material productions of Providence As for the Origine of this create Mundane Spirit Gen. 1.3 Moses gives it us Gen. 1.3 under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light or Fire part of which was dispersed among the Celestial Lights or Fires and part diffused into the bowels of the Earth for the Conservation Animation Vivification and Nutrition of al parts of the Universe Plato makes frequent mention of Fire as the most potent natural principe or Mundane Spirit whereby althings are fomented agitated animated and perfected So in his Timaeus p. 31. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Nothing seems void of Fire c. So p. 56 58. he makes Fire to be the Universal Spirit diffused throughout al parts of the Universe And elsewhere he cals Fire 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the great Opificer of various effects And not only the Chymists but also the Stoics and most of the Ancient Philosophers ascribe to Fire an Universal Efficience as to al corporeous Effects Whence do al Minerals Metals and Stones receive their Origine but from subterraneous Fires What gives rise to al Vapors and Fountains but Fire Whence procede the Fluxes and Refluxes of the Sea with its saltnesse but from Fire What gives Life and Motion to al Insects but Fire either Celestial or Terrestrial Whence springeth the fermentation of humors in the bowels of the Earth at Spring with the vegetation and fructification of Plants but from Fire What are the Animal Souls of Brutes and of Mans Bodie but a more pure aethereous Fire These things are more largely demonstrated in our Philosoph General P. 1. l. 3. in Plato's Physics May we not then hence conclude That Fire is a second Mundane Vniversal Spirit under the Spirit of God most Efficacious and Potent in al natural corporeous productions and executions of Providence § 4. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal Having finisht the principal and instrumental effective Principes of Providence we now procede to its Object which according to sacred Philosophie is of the most universal latitude according to the extension of Divine Omnipotence and Efficience There is nothing so high as to be above Divine Providence nothing so low as to be beneath it nothing so ample and extensive as that it cannot be limited by it nothing so free as to second causes but it is necessarily determined by it nothing so natural and necessary but its operation may be suspended by it as the fiery Furnace wherein the three Children were lastly nothing so evil but this Divine Providence can bring good out of it Among the ancient Philosophers there were different persuasions about the object of Divine Providence and its latitude Epicurus and some before him altogether denied the Providence of God as before Aristotle as Grotius affirmes confined the Providence of God to Celestial bodies yet Laertius saith he held That the Providence of God did reach 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. even to things celestial and that he disposed things terrestrial according to the Sympathie they have with things celestial Some among the Hebrews held that Gods Providence extended to men but not unto bestes which sentiment some impute to Pythagoras who much imitated the Hebrews Some also among the Arabians asserted a Providence about Universals or things in commun but not about Singulars which sentiment Justin Martyr in the beginning of his Colloque with
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the
clamors barke at and with cruel Teeth endeavor to rend in pieces this Paper or Book A PROEMIAL SCHEME OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE § 1. WHereas I sometimes intended to have cast the whole of Reformed Philosophie into one Systeme I am herein in part disappointed in that I have communicated the principal part of what I intended in my Philosophia Generalis But what I could not wel digest therein I have now made public in this Part IV. Of Moral and Metaphysic Philosophie So that to speak the truth I have now put my last period to Philosophie without the least Intention of making any farther progresse therein only to give the Reader a Breviarie of the Forme and Method I would assume were I to cast Philosophie into one entire Systeme or Idea as also to give him an Index where to find al the parts of Reformed Philosophie more professedly discussed by me I judge the following Scheme of Philosophie most necessary Philosophie is either General or Particular Particular Philosophie is either Notional or Real Real Philosophie is either Natural Moral or Supernatural This General Distribution of Philosophie taken from its object seems to me of al most genuine and natural and that which reduceth it to one uniforme Syntagme or Systeme as it may appear by the following particulars Philosophie in its General Idea comprehendes the following particulars 1 The General Historie of Philosophie General Philosophie and Philosophers with their several Sects Dogmes Modes of Life Discipline and Characters Of which we have treated copiosely Court of the Gentiles P. 2. and Philos General P. 1 2. l. 1. 2 The Generic Idea of Philosophie Cognition which takes in al the Intellectual Habits As 1 Opinion which is a kind of Medium between Ignorance and Science arising either from Sense or Affection or Considence or Conjectures It s object is things Physic Sensible Singular c. Its Attributes Infirmitie and Incertitude Obscurite Instabilitie and Inquietude Of which see Philos Gen. P 2. l. 2. c. 1. 2 Experience its Diguitie Object Subject Extension Qualities and Effects Of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 1. s 3. 3 Imitation wherein are considerable its Nature Origine Subject Object Effects namely Images and Signes regular Use and Abuse of which Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2 c. 2. 4 Faith it s Generic Nature Object both Material and Formal Act Subject Proprieties Differences and Species of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 3. 5 Sapience its prime Cause Object Act Proprieties Effects Conveniences with and Differences from other Sciences and Corollaries of which Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4. 6 Intelligence which is said to be an Habit of or Assent to first Principes not Practic but Speculative which give al evidence to but receive no evidence from conclusions as Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s 1. 7 Science which is a certain assent to necessary conclusions by some certain Medium as Philos General P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s 2. 8 Art which is an Imitamen of Nature or habitual Idea and Exemplar inherent in the Mind of the Artificer whereby he is directed unto a regular Operation as Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s 3. 9 Prudence wherein we have considered its Subject the Practic Judgement or Conscience consisting of two parts Synteresis and Syneidesis its Object both End and Means its End and Offices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Its Species 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good Counsel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Experience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sensate and reflexe Cognition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Providence its Material parts Ethic Oeconomic Politic its Causes both Dispositive and Proxime its Opposites and Differences specially from Carnal Policie or Craft in 20 Particulars its Effects Characters and Corollaries Al which we have copiofely considered Philos General P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. Also Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. 3 The General part of Philosophie includes also the Examen of its Object Subject Ends Adjuncts Difference from Philosophie and Theologie Excellence Effects Corruption Right use Parts as also the Characters and Offices of Philosophers which we have largely discussed Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 3. § 2. Philosophie considered in its Particular Ideas Notional Philosophie or Logic is either Notional or Real Notional Philosophie termed by the Platonistes Dialectic or Rational because the ancient mode of Reasoning was by Dialogues is now communly stiled Logic which properly treats of Notions either Simple or Complexe Simple Notions are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Imitamens or Ideas of things impressed on the mind without either Affirmation or Negation as the Notion or Idea we have of a Man Horse or the like Complexe Notions are either Propositions which being composed of simple Notions give some judgement of things or Syllogismes and Discourses which are composed of Propositions or Method which is composed of simple Notions Propositions and Discourses These are the four parts of Logic which are taken from its proper End and answer to the four great Operations of the Mind For what is the End of al Logic The End of Logic. but to direct and conduct the Mind into the Cognition of things Hence Logic is termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Art of Introduction i. e. whereby Men are conducted into the knowlege of things also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Way and Method for the Acquirement of Sciences and al useful knowlege Yea Aristotle as wel as Plato defines Logic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Method for the right disposing of every Probleme proposed Whence also Aristotle stiles Logic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Organ or Key of al Sciences whereby we are introduced into the Cognition of althings Aristotle made Logic the Organ of Philosophie yet no part thereof but Plato made it both an Organ and Part. So Ammonius as Court Gent. Part. 2. B. 3. c. 8. § 3. Of what great use Logic is not only for the Acquirement of Sciences but also for the Restauration of the mind to its native Claritie and Acumen in order to a right Apprehension Judgement Discourse and Method in the Cognition or Disquisition of things is most evident to any that understandes the Nature and Use thereof Yea according to the Idea I frame of Logic the Clarifying and Rectifying of the Mind is its principal End and that of the Acquisition of Sciences much inferior thereto For of what use are al natural Sciences but to Clarifie and Elevate the Mind for the contemplation of more Sublime and Noble Objects So that to make use of Logic only as an Instrument or Key to Sciences is to deprive ourselves of the principal use thereof which is to Purifie and Refine the Intellect in order to the more distinct real and perfect knowlege of things specially such as are most Sublime and Divine I no way dout but that a judicious person by the
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
God alone is to be embraced with a love of Fruition as our last end because he alone is to be loved for himself He that loves any thing with God and not for God loves him not as he ought 2. Vnion The next part of Fruition is Possession of and Vnion with the Object beloved Al complete Fruition supposeth Possession and Vnion Frui est terminus desiderii Suar. for if the object be absent there can be only love of desire not perfect Fruition because to enjoy a thing is the terme of desire Plato in his Timaeus informes us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beatitude consistes in nothing else but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to have a good Demon dwelling in himself c. whereby he understands God The like also in his Politicus pag. 309. he shews how the Soul being united to the first Beautie or chiefest Good it thereby becomes happie And Thales being asked What was most sweet answered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to possesse meaning the chiefest Good This possession of the supreme Good which belongs to Fruition is wel expressed by Aristotle Eth. lib. 4. cap. 4. art 37. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the virtue of possession and of worke is not the same For the virtue of possession is that it might be most estimed precious and dear Where by Possession he seems to mean Fruition as by worke Vse So Aristotle Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. speaking of Rich men their Fruition of riches as their last end saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They receive a great impression from the possession of riches for they are so affected as if they enjoyed al good i. e. possessing Riches they enjoy them as their chiefest good and so have their spirits formed by yea transformed into them for althings are fashioned and framed into the image and idea of those good things which they possesse and enjoy as their last end Fruition breeds first imitation of or likenesse unto and then union with what we enjoy Neither doth Fruition import possession only but also union with its last end i. e. moral and objective union at least if not physic and real for without union there can be no Fruition of that good we possesse Now the union which the Soul has with its chiefest Good is most intimate firme and inviolable For the Union of Spirits is far more intimate and firme than that of bodies among themselves or with Spirits The senses in extracting pleasures out of sensible good are conversant only about the externe accidents Moreover the pleasures taken in by the senses come not in altogether but gradually and by parcels therefore the union of object and subject is more remote and partial only But the Soul in the Fruition of the chiefest sweetest good being spiritual and of the same nature with its object has a more complete reception thereof and intimate union therewith whence the pleasures that attend the same are of al the most spiritual pure intense and permanent as hereafter 3. Al Fruition importes Communion with our chiefest Good Communion Frui ex vi nominis est capere fructum à re Suar. For to enjoy a thing according to the origination of the word among the Latines is to participate of the fruits thereof And may any participate of the fruits of the chiefest Good without communion therewith Indeed al union at least with the supreme Good is in order to communion which doth formalise yea consummate the Souls Beatitude in its most perfect state It is not the possession of any good can make them happy that have it unlesse they enjoy what they possesse This is lively illustrated by Plato in his Phaedo pag. 80 c. This Phaedo coming to Socrates at the time when he was ready to die Socrates philosophiseth even to admiration on the Souls immortal state after death and its felicitie in communion with the chiefest Good His words are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the Soul being a thing invisible departs to such a place as is most generous pure and invisible namely to the state of the dead where it enjoys God the most wise and choicest Good where if God wil my Soul must immediately go Thence he addes pag. 81. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Doth not therefore the mind thus qualified go to that divine Being like it self I say that divine immortal and wise Being Where when it arrives doth it not evade altogether happy being freed from Error Ignorance Terrors wild Loves and other human Infirmities and as we say of those who are initiated in Sacreds spend the rest of its time in communion with God This he makes to be the state of pure Souls separated whereas impure polluted Souls passe unto their place of punishment as he in what follows demonstrates This Communion with God Plato Contemplation Tim. 90. makes to consiste 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in giving the Soul its proper food and motions which he chiefly placeth 1 in the Contemplation of God This he more fully explicates Conviv pag. 211. where he makes The Contemplation of the first Beautie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. that divine sincere uniforme simple pure incontaminate perfect Beautie to be the most ravishing spectacle and that which makes us perfectly happie Acts of Contemplation on God are most tranquille pleasant congenial to the Soul uniforme self-sufficient and permanent Thus Aquinas 2.2 Quaest 179. Art 1. Every thing manifestes its life by that operation which is most proper to it and whereunto it is chiefly inclined Now in as much as Contemplation is the proper act of man whereunto he is most inclined and wherein he delights most it follows that herein the main of his life consistes To contemplate the first cause and last end of althings how delicious and agreable is it Contemplation binds the mind to its object and thence insensibly transformes it thereinto Is it not sweet to the eye to contemplate light And is not the last end the prime light of the Soul Doth not the contemplation of our last end give us a divine light to improve al other objects we converse with And are not althings hereby turned into God Doth not the Contemplation of God as our choicest Good enable us to live in God and to him 2 But yet together with Contemplation there must be divine Love and Complacence Love which is another part of the Souls communion with its last end Contemplation brings in the chiefest Good into the Soul but divine Love carries out the Soul to it by adherence to and delight in it The amorous Soul living in God by love dies in it self How many artifices doth divine Love use for the enjoyment of its choicest Good As man lost God by loving the Creature more than God so by loving God more than the Creature he again finds God and satisfaction in him Love to God settles the Soul in one point out of which it needs not stir to find Felicitie
which follows the enjoyment of the chiefest Good rejoiceth in a twofold Puritie 1 Objective as it is fed and maintained by pure objects whereas al the pleasures of sense are but seculent and dirtie in that their mater is only sensible terrene good but the joys and pleasures which flow from the sweetest original good partake of the crystalline puritie of their object which is most pure 2 Effective as it doth banish al sorrows and grief So Plato Phileb 53. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al pleasure so far as it is free from grief it is more pleasant true and fair Thus Repub. 9. he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasure to be the cessation of grief and grief the cessation of pleasure So also Phileb pag. 66. he avoucheth true pleasures to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without mixture of sorrow and pure Which is the peculiar privilege of those pleasures that attend the fruition of the sweetest Good for al other pleasures are mixed with much grief and sorrow they being indeed but bitter-sweets yea more bitter than sweet 5 The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good are most intense and strong Thus Plato 5 Strong Pleasures Phileb p. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must look not to the least pleasures but to such as are supreme and most vehement if we wil make a true judgement of pleasure For the stronger any pleasures are the better they are and the more pure they are the stronger they are Sensual pleasures are feeble and impotent because impure and mixed but spiritual joys are most potent and vehement because most pure Again the vehemence and intensnesse of any pleasure is proportionable to the energie power and activitie of the subject which is assected with such pleasure and to the Pondus Bent or Impetus that it hath to the object it takes pleasure in Now how vehement is the Pondus Impetus and Energie of the Wil whereby it shooteth it self into its sweetest Good which when it enjoyeth what an ecstasie rapture and transportt of joy is it affected with Doth not Plato stile this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The best and strongest of al Ecstasies 6 The Delectation which attends the fruition of our last end is infinite and without excesse 6 Joys without Excesse Thus Plato Phileb pag. 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For pleasure is not al good unlesse it partake of an infinite nature His designe is to prove that pleasure is not the chiefest good because it is not in its nature infinite so as to partake of al good yet so far as it is a consequent that attends the fruition of the chiefest good so far it is infinite For as the chiefest good admits of no excesse in our fruition because it is in it self infinite and al good so by a paritie of reason the joy and pleasure that attends the fruition of the chiefest good is infinite without excesse because the object is infinitely sweet and amiable The pleasure the Soul takes in the fruition of inferior goods soon admits excesse which it endeavors to cure by change of objects Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 2. Corporal delectations when augmented and continued do excede the natural habitude and therefore become nauseous as it is evident in the delices of food whence the appetite desires change and varietie But spiritual delectations never excede the natural habitude but perfect nature whence the more they come to a consummation the more they delight us How soon are men glutted with the best of pleasures that sense can afford And what remedie have they but intermission or exchange of objects But now in the fruition of the sweetest Good there can be no excesse either in the act of fruition or in the pleasures that attend it and therefore there is no need either of intermission or exchange § 8. 3. The Effects of Delectation Having explicated Delectation in its Causes and proper Adjuncts we now procede to the Effects thereof thereby to demonstrate that the most perfect delectation is that which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good There are two great Effects of this divine Delectation 1 Amplitude and Enlargement 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 1. 1. Enlargement The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it Amplitude and Enlargement Indeed al delight and joy brings Enlargement which ariseth from the Sympathie between the object and the subject or sacultie specially if the object be ample how doth the facultie spread it self to enjoy the same When the animal or vital Spirits are recreated what enlargement follows thereon How diffusive are they Whereas Grief and Sorrow contracts and coarctates the Spirits This is in an higher degree verified of that spiritual Joy which attends the fruition of the best Good There is a twofold Enlargement that follows spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the chiefest Good 1 There is an Enlargement of the Facultie or Subject The more pleasure the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end the more its desires are enlarged Thus Plato Phileb pag. 45. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But what are not those pleasures most excellent whereof the greatest desires are kindled in us Whereby he shews that those are the greatest and best pleasures that most enlarge the heart in desires after them Indeed there is an intime connexion between true joy and enlargement and therefore in sacred Philosophie one word is expressive of both So Psal 4.1 Thou hast enlarged me when I was in distresse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to exhilarate and dilate or to dilate by exhilarating His spirit was straitned narrowed and confined by distresse but dilated and enlarged by spiritual joys from Gods presence This Dilatation or Enlargement which follows on spiritual Delectation is wel explicated by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 33. Art 1. Dilatation is a motion unto Latitude and it agrees to Delectation both in regard of its apprehensive and appetitive virtue for as man apprehends the conjunction of some convenient good so his Soul is dilated towards it in order to its perfect fruition thereof and satisfaction therein c. 2 Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the sweetest good brings with it also enlargement in Operation and Acting Al joy is vigorous and active as it is the effect of precedent so the cause of subsequent operation Delight is the Spring of motion it puts the Soul into a continual agitation for by how much the more we delight in any object by so much the more vehement and strong are our operations about it Delectation makes us ardently and vehemently to move in the fruition of our sweetest good and in al acts that tend thereto What divine suavities doth it infuse into al our acts Thus Plato Conviv pag. 210. The mind that converts its eyes to that so great amplitude of the first Beautie doth no longer regard human affairs but is as it were captivated thereby c. 2. The Delectation which
Bonitie and Vice But what a vast distance there is between Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason and that maintained by the Jesuites and some other Schole-men we shal when we come to discourse of moral Bonitie sufficiently evince For the present we shal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie so much darkened by scholastic niceties in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament Moralitie is but a mode or relation which cannot subsist of it self without a subject and foundation in Nature Can a man know and love God without reason and wil 2 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil. For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence And wherein consistes the essence of moral Acts but in their conformitie to if good or difformitie from if bad the perfect measure of Morals and what is the perfect measure of Morals but the moral Law 3 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode not absolute but relative appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason but something real is generally confessed and that on invincible grounds because it has real influences and effects Moreover that Moralitie is not an absolute mode but relative is as evident because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else Hence 4 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe Forme and Measure It 's a great Effate in the Scholes That the End specifies in Morals Althings are defined and measured by their last End but this by nothing The last end as a pregnant universal Principe conteins al Morals in its wombe 5 Prop. The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence saith Aquinas A moral Act receives its species from the object and end And Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 165. addes That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object not considered in its being but morally as subject to the Rules of Moralitie To this of the object we may adde al essential moral circumstances which oft adde much to the being and intension of Moralitie 6 Prop. But yet we must conclude That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of al Moralitie formally considered is the Law of God This comprehends and gives measure to al other Rules of Moralitie the last end object and circumstances are al measured hereby Thus Scotus and other of the Schole-men determine That the Esse morale or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law unto which it is referred And the reason is most evident because al Moralitie speaks a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation to some Rule And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts but some moral Law And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers as also some late Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law wil be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its measure § 2. Moral Goodnesse in conformitie to the Divine Law Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general we descend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule but evil so far as it comes short thereof And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonitie but the divine Wil and Law Thus Plato Repub. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is most distant from reason which is most remote from Law and Order i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good as they are conformed to Law and Order Whence Definit Platon pag. 4.13 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an obedience of virtuose Laws And on the contrarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit that over looks Laws This Plato more fully explicates Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie consistes may as it seems to me wel be termed Salubritie whence the bodies health ariseth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodnesse of the mind consistes we cal legal and Law whence men become legitime and orderly He compares the Bonitie of the Soul to the sanitie or health of the Bodie which as it consistes in the order and regular temperament of al humors so the goodnesse of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformitie to Law This is wel explicated by his Scholar Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art 9. pag. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own and as the Law establisheth But Injustice by which men possesse what is not their own against the precepts of the Law What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of al other Virtue and Bonitie or Vice But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophie touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law we shal determine the whole in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law whether objective or subjective and formal denotes a conformitie to some Law The Scholes distinguish moral Bonitie or Honestie into objective and formal The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object but the later that which constitutes an act as an act morally good 1 In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodnesse which agrees thereto as objects as Suarez 1.2 Tract 3. Disp 2. strongly proves And the reasons are demonstrative For 1 If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful the act conversant thereabout can never be good because al moral good requires an integritie of causes an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular 2 The object of the Wil is good as good therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot slow from it but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects 3 This moral goodnesse of the object doth not only agree to human Acts but also to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced
1 2. come under contemplation at present this may suffice to demonstrate that al moral Good requireth a moral Principe virtuously inclined for the production thereof And had we no other evidence hereof but what sacred Philosophie doth assord it might suffice Thus Solomon the wisest of mere men since the Fal Prov. 4.23 Above al keeping keep thine heart Prov. 4.23 for out of it are the issues of life i. e. al spiritual life and moral good issueth from the heart rightly disposed and qualified with virtuose graciose Principes where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring there no Act is morally or spiritually alive towards God but dead Be the actions never so seemingly splendid and gloriose as to the mater of them yet if they flow not from this living Fountain they are but as your Automata those artificial Machines or Images called Puppits which seem to move their eyes hands feet c. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial forrein impresses such are al moral Acts that flow not from a vital Principe virtuosely disposed morally dead albeit they may seem to have shadows of life Or look as no member of the bodie performes any action of natural life wherein a pulse derived from the heart beats not so no action is morally good wherein there beats not some pulse of a virtuose rightly disposed Wil. Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they spring no living virtuose Act can procede from a dead corrupt Principe Being life and motion go together in Morals as wel as in Naturals such as the Facultie Spring and Principe is such wil the motion and operation be both in Grace and Nature as Medo has wel observed on Prov. 4.23 Thus Augustine on Mat. 7.18 where by the good Tree he understands a believing Wil which he makes essential to every good Act for if the Wil be bad the Act cannot be good and every unbelieving Wil is a bad Wil for where there is no Faith in Christ as the first Principe of life there can be no love to God as the last End as the end formes the Wil so Faith formes the End Thence that of the supposed Ignatius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Faith is the Principe of life Love the end these two in unitie perfect the man of God And Chrysostome saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothing is good without Faith 3. The best End essential to moral Good To the Constitution of moral Good there is also essentially requisite the best End Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 499. assures us That al Acts must be undertaken for the last end and best good as before Sect. 1. § 2. This is wel explicated by Aquinas 2.2 Quaest 2.3 Art 8. It must be said that in Morals the forme of an Act is principally to be attended in regard of its end and the reason is most evident because the Wil is the Principe of moral Acts and the End the main Object and as it were the forme of the Wil but now the forme of an Act always follows the forme of an Agent whence in Morals it is necessary that what gives an Act its order to an end give it is also forme c. This is more nakedly laid down by Angustine Whatever good is done by man but not for that end for which it ought to be done albeit the office it self i. e. the mater of the Act seem good yet the end being not right it is sin This is wel explicated by Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. Two things are to be regarded in every act of a virtuose Wil 1 The office or worke it self done 2 The cause for which it is done or the End In the weighing the Bonitie of any Virtue our main regard must be to the End This is as it were the last rest and scope of the mind in acting that which the Wil its habit and act most incline unto This deservedly rules al Offices which flow from its Empire are tinctured with its color and sapor and ought to be referred to it This is the genuine cause why so many vexatious litigations were found among the Gentile Philosophers touching the chiefest Good So again he saith That the Office it self is but as the Corps of Virtue which is animated by the End which gives forme and life without which the office is but as mater without forme or a carcasse without Soul Aristotle wel instructes us That the end is the measure of althings which is true as to moral Good Thence Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 166. assertes That an human action takes its Bonitie or pravitie not only from the intrinsec end of the worke which is coincident with the object but also from the extrinsec which is the end of the Worker Certainly Offices are to be weighed not so much by their Acts as Ends And what is the last end of al good workes but the Glorie of God which though last in Execution yet ought to be first in Intention at least virtually if not formally in al we do Thence saith Angustine That is not true Virtue which tends not to that end wherein the best Good of man consistes And Gregor Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 29. Quaest 1. proves that Every volition which refers not to God for himself or to other things for God is vitiose 4. The last Cause The Forme of moral Good conformitie to the moral Law or rather constitutive part of moral Good is its Forme which consistes in its Conformitie to the divine moral Law This may deservedly be termed the Forme of moral Good because it gives forme and measure to al the former Principes and parts For wherein consistes the Goodnesse of the Mater Principes and End but in their Conformitie to the Divine Wil and Law This therefore is the formal Idea or Reason of al moral Good whereby al difference and perfection is to be measured Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or formal Reason Hence Conformitie to the Divine Law being the formal Reason or Idea of al moral Good by this we are to take our measures of al differences or perfection therein This Conformitie of moral Good to the Divine Law is described by Plato under various emphatic notions as 1 it is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So Protag pag. 326. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al the life of man ought to consist of Concent and Harmonie i. e. of Uniformitie and Conformitie to the Divine Law Hence 2 In his Phaedo he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Virtue consistes in Harmonie whereas vice is a confused inordination or irregularitie So in his Timaeus pag. 47. he saith That Harmonie being very near akin to the motions of the Soul it is given us to reduce the disorders of the Soul to a decorum So Stobaeus Serm. 1. de Virtut pag. 15. 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Virtue has for its rule a decorum or that which is most convenient i.e. agreable or conformable to the Law of Nature Hence 3 This Conformitie is stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Symmetrie and Symphonie Al these notions Aristotle comprehended under his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mediocritie of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. § 30. and Philos General P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect 4. § 4. Others place the Forme of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing namely that it be done wel How the Forme of Good consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wel doing and we find some foundation for this Hypothesis in Plato's Theaetetus pag. 187. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's better to a little wel than much il Where he seems to make the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wâ—l doing the forme and measure of good So Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. He therefore shal be a Grammarian who doth what is Grammatic Grammatically i.e. according to Rules of Grammar But yet he addes by way of caution That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of Arts is not the same with that of Virtues for the perfection of Arts is included in themselves without regard to the perfection of the Artificer but the perfection of Virtue requires that the subject be so and so qualified And then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is a righteous and temperate man not that doth those things but doth them in such a manner as righteous and sober men do them i.e. rightcously and soberly Hence that vulgar Effate That good workes are to be judged by Adverbes for al must be done with those adverbial conditions of sacred Philosophie Tit. 2.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 soberly and righteously and piously This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions where the mater is indifferent because such have no goodnesse at al but what is from the Adverb So that it sufficeth not that the Act be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good but it must have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right manner of being done and herein according to some the Forme of its goodnesse doth consiste even in the manner of it and any defect herein wil render the action evil according to those scholastic Maximes The forme gives being and any omission or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good So in the Canon Law they tel us That the forme must be precisely and punctually observed And indeed this notion of the forme of moral Good amounts to the same with the former and must be resolved thereinto For a moral Act may be said then to have its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or bene factum wel done when it is in al points exactly conformable to the moral Law for al moral Good is a relation of conformitie with the rule of Morals but the least privation thereof is sin But How far Circumstances formalise moral Good to descend to particulars an human Act is then conformable to the Law and wel done when it is not only good for the mater but also clothed with al those Circumstances which necessarily attend its moral goodnesse The particular forme of moral Good consistes much in the Circumstances that attend it The Circumstances oft formalise and specisie the Act making it good or evil sometimes they only make it better or worse But the Circumstances have the greatest sway in things indifferent where the manner of doing doth chiefly specifie the Act. We find the Circumstances of human Acts wel expressed by Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue saith he consistes in the wel doing of things for we may fear trust desire hate despise be angrie pitie rejoice and grieve 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not duely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But truly to be moved with these affections when and in what things and towards whom and for what end and in that manner as we ought this is the golden mean and that which is best wherein Virtue consistes Whence also Aristotle Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art 5. pag. 160. assures us That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But sins may be committed some when that is done that ought not others when not as it ought others because not at that time when it ought or the like Thence art 10. he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a valiant man suffers and acts according to the dignitie of the mater and when and in that manner as reason or the Law of Nature dictates Thus we see how Plato and Aristotle require to the constitution of moral Good not only a right mater but that it be clothed with al due Circumstances whereby it may be rendred conformable to the Law as to manner This Hypothesis has been generally maintained among the more sound Schole-men Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 7. Art 2. A Circumstance is a condition or accident of an human Act which toucheth it extrinsecally And seing human Acts are disposed towards their last end by circumstances the contemplation hereof greatly concernes Theologues For a Theologue considers human Acts as a man is thereby ordained to Beatitnde Now whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportionate thereto But Acts are rendred proportionable to their end by a certain commensuration which they receive from due circumstances whence the consideration of circumstances chiefly belongs to a Theologue What these circumstances are he addes Art 3. In human Acts Who did it By what aides or instruments What Why How When and Abour what he did it are to be inquired into Some explain these Circumstances thus 1 Quis who must not be taken for the efficient cause but for his condition and qualitie as a private person or public c. 2 Quid what must not be understood of the mater or object but of the qualitie thereof 3 Neither must Quomodo how be taken for the forme or manner but whether it be done openly or secretly c. Greg. Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 38. Quaest 1. Art 1. strongly assertes and proves That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good By an Act morally good I understand saith he no other according to the Doctors than an Act conforme to right Reason objective i.e. the Divine Law according to al circumstances requisite to this that the Act be truly virtuose When therefore a moral operation is not conforme to right Reason or the Law according to al due circumstances it is vitiose and morally evil This his Hypothesis he proves by two Conclusions 1. Conclus That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance is truly virtuose This he proves by shewing that the contrary implies a contradiction For if a moral Act want any one due circumstance it is not as it ought to be therefore it is evil Due circumstances are communly said to be such things as are required to this that
the Act be truly virtuose and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason or the moral Law and if such then it wants not any due circumstance wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose it wil then necessarily follow That it doth want and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance or That it is truly virtuose and yet that it is not truly virtuose 2. Conclus That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse namely its due circumstance For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law Thus much also Suarez grants us That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei as to the physic being are yet essential in esse moris as to its moral being So Suarez 1.2 Tract 2. Disp 5. pag. 169. The first opinion saith he is That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural not the moral being of the Act but that al these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such He mentions this as the opinion of some Scholemen namely that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth whereunto though not fully yet thus far he assents It is true saith he what the first opinion asserted That some conditions may be accidental to the act in esse rei as a natural act and yet essential to it in esse moris morally considered And the reason addes he is taken à priori because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason we say of the Law but now it oft happens that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumstances are essential Right Reason which must be understood objectively is the rule of human acts and their circumstances therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated than by their order or regard to right Reason I would say the Divine Law And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances but essential namely when they are such as according to right Reason are altogether necessary not only as to degrees but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act it changeth its Species In which he plainly grants That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act are specific and essential Which is al that we need contend for because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstances but such as belong to the act morally considered which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil By the whole of which it is most evident that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act are essential and specific such as concur to formalise moral Good which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law not only in Mater Principes and End but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act For al good as has been sufficiently demonstrated requires an integritie of Causes whereas sin ariseth from the least defect according to that knowen Effate of the spurious Dionysius Divin Nom. cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is from one and complete cause but sin from many and singular defects § 4. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al moral Good Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts and Attributes which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries 1. Al moral Good Virtues and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes tend to one and the same End and are formalised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me as it were in a Watch-tower 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the face or forme of Virtue is one but that of Improbitie manifold and almost infinite His mind is that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face but sins have varietie yea almost infinite deformed shapes This Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Vniformitie he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moreover we may sin many ways for as the Pythagoreans conjecture sin is infinite and boundlesse but good is terminate and bounded but there is but one way of doing good Wherein we may observe 1 That al sin is difforme boundlesse and endlesse it hath no forme measure or number 2 But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For good men truly are simply and uniformely such but wicked men are difformely and variously so Thus also Aristotle Mag. Moral lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes That al Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uniforme but al Vice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme Hence Plato asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is just is equal and uniforme Whence that Stoic Hypothesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al moral goods are equal and uniforme i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie Al this is wel expressed by Augustine who makes al Good to consiste in Modo Specie Ordine in Mode Species and Order i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie Hence 2. Al moral Good and Virtue supernatural There is no real moral Good or natural Virtue but what is supernatural This Corollarie evidently follows from the former and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law thence it necessarily follows that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing Thence Chrysostome Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature And Cyril in Esa termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above proper Nature as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above Nature I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen and
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a practice against right reason which must be understood objectively of the Law of Nature as before Whence Plato himself Rep. 9. saith That Sin is most distant from Law and Order Again Leg. 10. he affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections For look as Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul so sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Asymmetrie and Ataxie Hence also Plato in his Epinom pag. 978. cals Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A motion void of reason order decorum measure yea a confused agitation whereby the Soul is depraved and contaminated Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit over-looking or despising Laws Yea Plato Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transgression of the Law as sacred Philosophie 1 Joh. 3.4 Thus also Aristotle 1 Joh. 3.4 both in his Ethics and Rhetoric stiles sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Transgression of the Law But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes Thence in the O. T. al the notions whereby sin is expressed signifie a Transgression of the Law We find three several notions of sin together Psal 32.1 2. 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 32.1 2. which denotes Defection Rebellion Prevarication against God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which importes Perversitie Obliquitie Iniquitie Privation of Rectitude 4 Sin is stiled Psal 101.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 101.3 a mater of Belial i. e. a lawlesse mater such as wil not come under the yoke From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without a yoke which the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whereto Paul seems to allude 2 Cor. 6.14 15. 5 Sin is stiled a Violation or making void the Law Psal 119.126 Zeph. 3.4 Hos 4.2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They break the bounds of the Law An allusion to Inundations and Land-flouds that break down al bounds So great is the violence which sin offers to the Divine Law 6 Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law Psal 125.5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquations or crooked ways 7 Sin is called a Declination Aberration Deflexion Psal 119 51 67. Psal 101.3 yea v. 4. it is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perverse 8 It is termed Rebellion Psal 5.10 66.7 Which termes though different in themselves yet they al import Transgression of the Law Thus also in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with other notions whereby sin is expressed do al import Transgression of the Law Hence the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That al sins are equal because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression as wel as the greatest Yet hence it follows not but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins according to their various objects and circumstances Hence it follows Sin as to its formal Reason privative that sin as to its formal Idea Reason or Nature is not positive but privative For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good For albeit there be pure good which has no mixture of evil either natural or moral as the chiefest Good yet there is no pure Evil which has not for its subject some natural good It 's true there are some Acts that are intrinsecally evil that is so far evil as that they can never be good as the hatred of God and the like Yet these Acts are called intrinsecally evil not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts for it 's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin 2 Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being composed of positive and privative The material Subject or natural Act is positive but the formal Reason or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative The positive Act of it self abstracted from the privation is not sinful but both together as mater and forme make up one Compositum It 's a Question in the Scholes Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se or per accidens And Suarez wel solves this difficultie telling us That if we consider sin as a physical real Being it is unum per accidens but if we consider it as a moral Being so it is unum per se because the positive act and privative deficience are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power or mater and forme so that the act cannot be evil without the privation nor the privation without the act 3 Every Privation as such is evil as every Forme or Act good For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it Every thing if it want any good that belongs to it is so far evil 4 When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative the terme formal must not be taken strictly but in a laxe notion and morally For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised and yet not formally intended by the Agent hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful it may in a more laxe notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause 5 Sin as to its formal reason is not a Physic or Logic privation nor yet pure nothing but a moral privation or deficience as to moral rectitude In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive not absolutely as if it were somewhat subsistent but relatively and morally as it is opposed to pure nothing for say they sin is a privation which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful and therefore it is not mere nothing So Suarez saith that sin is not a real Being yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition Thus indeed Plato in his Sophist teacheth us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens may be considered as pure nothing and so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unintelligible and ineffable or else it may be considered as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which truly is not yet not simply
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens or nothing And such is sin not simply and purely nothing yet according to its formal reason not a positive real Being but a moral privation or as others a privative relation That Sin according to its formal Idea and Nature is privative was generally asserted by the ancient Philosophers both Platonists and others Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 380. denies God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the moral cause of sins because there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a positive idea of sin So Proclus argues from this place That there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Idea of sins because then it would follow that God should be the Cause and Author of sin And Plato himself informes us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an irregular affection and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of order also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice against Law Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privative Being and lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of moral Being as the night is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the privation of the Suns light But among the ancient Philosophers none hath more acutely and solidly defended this Hypothesis than Simplicius on Epicbet cap. 34. pag. 171. where he largely demonstrates that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin really is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of good Of which see Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Among the Schole-men this is strongly proved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dâ—st 34. Quaest 1. Suarez in 1.2 Tract 3. Disput 7. sect 3. pag. 275-278 Barlow Exercit. 2. § 2. Having discussed the formal Nature of moral Evil or Sin we now procede to its Causes among which Mans Defectibilitie the first Origine of Sin if we wil ascend up to its first Origine we must reckon first the Defectibilitie of the human Creature as the original cause of al sin For to speak in the Platonic mode Man as al other Creatures being composed of something and nothing yea more of nothing than something hence passive power and defectibilitie is essential to his Being For whatever sprang out of nothing is capable of returning to its originary nothing Where there is place for Proficience there also remains a capacitie of Deficience Every Creature because made by God is capable of Proficience but because made out of nothing it is also capable of Deficience It 's true Man as made by God was void of al moral deficience or sin yet as Man he was never void of Defectibilitie and Mutabilitie he had a moral free-wil for good but a natural free-wil or defectibilitie as to sin which passing from power into act gave being to the first sin This is wel explicated by Suarez In a free Agent saith he the mode of failing in an act ariseth from the dominion he has over his act hence sin in a free cause doth not always suppose the like sin in the same cause for it may arise merely from the libertie of the Creature which is good That the Wil of Adam in his innocent state was capable of sinning was a natural defect conjoined with a natural perfection for it was also capable not to sin and this mutable capacitie being drawen forth towards a prohibited object was the first origine and root of al sin Thus moral Evil sprang out of natural libertie in it self good but evilly applied Adam's person being vitiated by that first Sin The Vitiositie of human Nature he thereby vitiated his own and our Nature Yea his personal actual sin is originally ours by imputation whence there adheres a vitiositie to our natures whereof we find frequent and great notices in Plato and other Philosophers Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. makes mention of a Sin contracted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in our head which I understand of Adam whereby our nature from the first generation is corrupted And Timaeus Locrus from whom Plato borrowed many physic Philosophemes pag. 103. explicates the origine of this Vitiositie thus Vitiositie comes from our Parents and first Principes rather than from negligence and disorder of public manners because we never depart from those actions which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our Parents A great confession of a Pagan beyond what many that professe Christianitie wil allow So Plato in his Critias saith That in times past the Divine nature flourished in men i. e. in the state of Innocence but at length it being mixed with mortal i. e. upon the Fal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 human custome or sin prevailed to the ruine of mankind and from this source there followed an inundation of evils on men So Leg. 5. pag. 731. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The greatest Sin is ingenite in mens Souls And Grotius assures us That the Philosophers confessed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it was congenite or connatural to men to sin whence the Platonist makes mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of an evil nature which Definit Plat. pag. 416. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Vitiositie in nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the natural disease or disease of nature Thence Plato in his Politicus pag. 274. being about to treat of Civil Politie gives this demonstration of its necessitie because the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved and al manner of disorders infeste human Nature and men being impotent are torne in pieces by their own lusts as by so many wild Horses And thence he concludes That from this plague of vitiositie men were driven to great straits and confusions The like Stobaeus Serm. 2. pag. 31. out of Lycurgus's Dictates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Phy how depraved is mans nature altogether otherwise there were no need of Laws Dost thou thinke that man is any thing more excellent than Bestes Truly but little except only in figure Brutes look towards the earth but man has an erect countenance Thus also Plato Leg. 10. pag. 906. affirmes That Souls living on the earth are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a brutish nature And it is said of Democritus that he affirmed The diseases of the Soul to be so great that if it were opened it would appear to be a sepulchre of al manner of evils Yea Aristotle albeit he were too much a friend to corrupt nature yet he hath left this ingenuous confession of its vitiositie Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 64. That there is in us somewhat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naturally repugnant to right reason But Seneca doth greatly illustrate this Vitiolitie of Nature So Epist. 50. Why do we deceive our selves our evil is not from without it is fixed in our very bowels Again Al Sins are in al men but al do not appear in each man He that hath one Sin hath al. We say that al men are intemperate avaricious luxurious maligne
〈◊〉 that every one counts his ignorance his wisdome Hence it comes to passe that whiles we know nothing we thinke we know althings And are not those greatly to be pitied who make no other use of their reason but to render themselves more unreasonable and ignorant Is any thing more worthy of compassion than the blindnesse of such as seem most quick-sighted and sage in the World And whence comes this proud affected ignorance but from mens not knowing God and themselves Is it not a strange thing that the Soul which knows althings else should be so ignorant of it self and of its Maker Thence Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 144. saith It is no wonder that they who are ignorant of God should account that which is worst best Whence he concludes That the ignorance of the best good is the worst evil And as to the ignorance of our selves he openly affirmes Theaecet pag. 176. That those are by so much the more what they thinke they are not i. e. ignorant by how much the lesse they thinke they are so And that this proud affected practic Ignorance of God and our selves is the root of al sin he further demonstrates Alcibiad 1. pag. 117. Thou seest therefore that Sin is appendent to action by reason of that ignorance whereby a man thinkes he knows what indeed he is ignorant of And he subjoins the reason Those are left under error 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who knowing nothing thinke they know every thing Confidence of knowlege is a sure marque of ignorance Whence he concludes pag. 118. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This very ignorance therefore is the cause of Sins and most opprobriose Lastly Leg. 5. pag. 732. he assures us That when we attemt those things whereof we are ignorant we grossely erre Such a venimous maligne efficacious influence has proud conceited practic Error on al sin Indeed the power of sin lies in the power of darknesse or ignorance practic Errors foment and maintain lusts The mind like a silk-worme lies intangled in those errors that came out of its own bowels when lust hath put out Reason it soon takes the Chair men of corrupt minds are men of sinful lives Mind and Wil do reciprocally vitiate each other whiles lust bribes conscience out of office it cooperates with sin Divine light is a burden to a corrupt conscience which delights to spin out of it self sick dreaming errors thereby to create its own chains and fetters a carnal mind vainly puffed up out-reasons al good convictious of dutie surely there is no dutie done by that man whose conscience doth not its dutie for there is nothing in man active for God when conscience is not first active It 's evident then that practic error of conscience opens the door to al sin And as Plato so Aristotle his Scholar hath greatly explicated and demonstrated the pestiferous influence which practic error hath on al sin Thus Eth. l. 3. c. 2. pag. 121. where he makes this difference between Sins of ignorance and ignorant Sins A drunken man that kils another in his drunken fit sins ignorantly and yet his sin is not a Sin of Ignorance because that ignorance was voluntarily contracted Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and from what he ought to abstain and by this they are made unjust and wicked And Eth. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 144. he distributes this practic ignorance into its several kinds 1 There is saith he an ignorance the cause of which is in our selves As when drunken men sin ignorantly which ignorance was contracted by their voluntary drunkennesse 2 There is an Ignorance of Right or Law when men are ignorant of their dutie which they ought to know 3 There is an ignorance from our own neglect which had we been diligent in the use of means we might have avoided 4 There is an ignorance from depraved affections and custome in sinning We may reduce these Philosophemes of Plato and Aristotle to this more formal distribution Man is directed in his action by a twofold knowlege the one universal the other particular a defect in either of these causeth sin Whence it follows that a man may have an universal knowlege that this or that is sinful in general and yet want a particular judgement of its sinfulnesse in this or that case So that particular ignorance is very wel consistent with universal knowlege But now sithat universal knowlege though most certain is not so influential on our actions as particular because actions are about singulars hence it follows that particular ignorance has more force to lead men into sin than universal knowlege has to prevent it This particular ignorance may be again distributed into natural or voluntary and voluntary may be again divided into that which is antecedent or that which is consequent to the act Yea al ignorance which ariseth from the Wil may be looked on as voluntary For what is involuntary if it arise from some precedent voluntary act it may be judged voluntary according to moral estimation As in that instance which Aristotle gives of a Drunkard whose ignorance is voluntary because arising from the act of his own Wil. For it is a good Rule of Aristotle That those Acts whose Principe is in us may be said to be ours and voluntarily undertaken by us Lastly we may with Aristotle distinguish between sins which are per ignorantiam i. e. when ignorance is the cause of the sin and such as are cum ignorantia i. e. when albeit ignorance attends the sin yet the proper cause of that ignorance lies in the sinners wil The former are those which we cal sins of ignorance but the later not because the ignorance is voluntary Men want not so much means of knowing what they ought to do as wil to do what they know Reason may rightly discerne the thing which is good and yet the wil of man not incline it self thereto as oft as sensual passions prejudice or affected ignorance prevail So that some practic error or inconsideration lies at the root of every sin either because men do not practically consider al circumstances or if they do consider them yet they do not practically determine this or that Act to be evil but instead thereof they foist in another false Conclusion That this or that sinful Act is sweet or profitable A corrupt Conscience may assent to good premises and yet dissent from the conclusion yea consent to a bad conclusion Lusts pervert Conscience and sil it with partialitie and prejudice in its inquiries The light of a carnal mind is easily reconciled with lust for a secure Conscience takes up such a Religion as wil not distaste its lusts nor yet its lusts molest it There is a peace between the lust and light of a carnal heart It 's easie for a secure Conscience to cast light into prison and detain the truth of God in unrighteousnesse to believe as
has had no smal influence on Atheisme in that some of the principal Masters in these Sciences have endeavored to reduce al natural products and effects either to the accidental Concurse of Atomes or to some hidden virtues and spirits in Nature or to the various modifications of mater or to some mundane Spirit exclusive as to the first Cause and divine Providence Thus we find the first appearance of Atheisme to be among those philosophic Wits of Grece Democritus Epicurus c. who did al ways possible trie if they could salve the Phenomena of Nature without a Deitie 3 Eristic Logic has had too great influence on Atheisme as Plato Repub. 7. pag. 539. seems to intimate telling us That young men by frequent Dialectic litigations and contradictions each of other at last come to disbelieve every thing For Scepticisme naturally tends to Atheisme he that disputes every thing at length comes to believe nothing even in things divine 4 But yet the principal Parent and Nurse of Atheisme has been in al Ages carnal Policie The chief lineaments of Atheisme were formed at Rome when it became the Seat of State-policie For the secular Politician ascribes al the revolutions of States and human Affaires to some politic contrivement or defect therein And what makes the present Conclave at Rome and al their adherents so much to abound with Atheisme but the great confidence they have in their carnal policie Neither hath this politic Atheisme infected Rome only but also diffused it self throughout the European World Hence Machiavel that great secular Politician of Florence layeth Atheisme at the foundation of his carnal policie And it is to be feared there are too many such politic Atheists amongst us some are so bold and daring as that they are not ashamed openly to professe it others by their doutful Scepticisme give cause of suspicion I wish we had not too strong motives to force such a belief that a great part of those who professe themselves Christians had they but the advantages of interest and such like selfish motives could with as much facilitie turne Atheists It is natural to carnal reason and policie to step up into the Throne of God and take the Sceptre of his Providence out of his hand as we find it exemplified in Nebuchadnezar Dan. 4.30 Dan. 4.30 Is not this great Babylon that I have built i. e. by my wisdome and power c. 3. 3. From the carnal Mind Pride c. Atheisme springs not from true Philosophie but from the abuse thereof by the carnal mind of man This Plato has wel observed in the place fore-cited de Leg. lib. 12. pag. 967. where he shews that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Atheists who opposed the existence and providence of God as also overthrew the main fundaments of Religion were but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophistic spurious Philosophers Hence that grand Effate of Sr. Francis Bacon That a little Philosophie makes a man an Atheist but a great deal cures him of Atheisme And indeed to speak the truth it is not Philosophie simply in it self but the infidelitie carnal reason and spiritual pride of mans heart that makes men Atheists Psal 10.4 This we are assured of by sacred Philosophie as Psal 10.4 The wicked through the pride of his countenance The Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through is causal denoting the proper interne impulsive cause of the wicked's Atheisme The countenance here is brought in not as the formal subject or proper seat but as the Index of his pride that wherein it doth chiefly discover it self though the proper subject of it be the heart Thence the Thargum thus paraphraseth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through the pride of his spirit Thence it follows wil not seek after God This notes his practic Atheisme founded in speculative Whence it follows al his thoughts are that there is no God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies mischievous thoughts politic designing imaginations The wicked through the pride of his heart is ful of politic Atheistic imaginations that there is no God Thus Psal 14.1 Psal 14.1 The fool hath said in his heart there is no God The fool here is not such an one as wants reason but he that abuseth it unto practic Atheisme This I am bold to assert that the genuine and proper cause of that overspreading Atheisme which covers the face of this politic World is the carnal Reason Infidelitie and spiritual Pride of mens hearts not any defect of evidence in the objects of our Faith This is very clear because the most of your moderne Atheists are as credulous in their way as any other of the simplest of men Why else do they so greedily assent unto any infirme Hypothesis of those they admire upon as sleight and trivious reasons as may be imagined Certainly this so great credulitie in things natural or politic is a sufficient demonstration that it is not so much the want of evidence in maters of Faith that makes men Atheists as the pride and folie of their carnal reasons which they idolise It is a thing most prodigiose that those who abound with such soft facile credulous humors and inclinations to believe yea idolise false Deities created by their own lusts should have their minds prepossest with an incredulitie so obstinate and unpenetrable by al the impressions of the true Deitie 2. Plato gives us an account not only of the origine of Atheisme Threesorts of Atheisme but also of its kinds Thus de Leg. lib. 10. pag. 888. with mild and soft words he endeavors to convince the proud Atheists of his Age under the Symbol of a young man in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. My Son thou art yet young neither do I dout but that progresse of time wil make thee change thy opinion Expect therefore I beseech thee that now thou give thy judgement of the highest points 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which thou now judgest a mater of no moment is indeed a point of the highest consequence namely that any one thinking rightly of God lives wel or il But first touching this mater I wil signifie to thee one great thing lest I should seem to thee a lyer in this mater and it is this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Not thou alone nor thy friends have been the first who have entertained this Atheistic sentiment of God but from al memorie there have been more or fewer who have labored under this disease And I wil tel thee what has happened to them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 namely no one of them who from their youth entertained this opinion that God is not hath persevered therein even unto old age We find a great instance hereof in Bion mentioned by Laertius in his Life who in his health said The Gods were nothing but being worne out by a long disease and fearing death he acknowleged their existence c. Plato addes As for the two other opinions about God namely 1
c. But that God is without cause without end sempiterne and e4ternal increate immutable inalterable simple incomposite incorporeous invisible intangible incircumscripte infinite incomprehensible good just ommipotent the Opificer of al Creatures comprehensive of althings provident of althings the supreme Soverain and Judge we both acknowledge and confesse Also that God is one namely in Vnitie of Essence which is known in three Persons Father Son and holy SPirit c. § 3. The first Attribute that occurs for explication of the divine Being is Vnitie The Divine Vnitie whereof we find great and lively notices both in sacred and Platonic Philosophie Thus Moses Deut. 6.4 Deut. 6.4 Hear O Israel the Lord our God is one Lord. Mose here first cals for their solemne attention and then laies down his assertion touching the Unitie of the divine Essence which he seems to bottome on the very name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subjoined as a part of the predicate denoting that he who is the first independent Essence and Essentiator of althings can be but one Thus frequently in the N. T. Mar. 12.32 Rom. 3.29 30. 1 Tim. 2.5 c. And we find much in Platonic Philosophie of the same import Thus Plato in his Parmenides where he lays down his prime metaphysic Philosophemes pag. 142. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. If there be One can it possibly be but that it should part ake of Essence Where he seems to make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ens unum convertible namely that Ens is one and one Ens. So he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For ONE always embraceth ENS and ENS ONE with mutual embraces His plain naked mind is that the first Being and One admit of reciprocation i. e. God the first Being is the prime Unitie Aristotle also and his sectators make Ens and Vnum convertible but in a far different manner from Plato who understood both of God Thus also Pythagoras held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Vnitie is the first principe of althings It 's true Plato as others makes mention of many Gods yet he tels us That it was from the Autoritie of their Ancestors and by reason of the severitie of Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without Demonstration or Oriental Tradition yea he confesseth that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polytheisme was repugnant to right reason And this he learned from his Master Socrates who was so zelose and warme in this particular that he was content to suffer a Pagan Martyrdome for the avouching the Vnitie of God against the Laws and Customes of the Athenians Plutarch on the INscription 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E 1 Thou art engraven on the dores of the Delphic Temple assures us that the ancient name given unto God was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 EN THOV ART ONE For there cannot be many Gods but one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One ought to be Being as Being one For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diversitie or Alteritie is placed with the difference of Being but One is sincere and without mixture for by the mixture of another with another a thing is made compound and impure Wherein he strongly proves that God can be but one because a pure necessary absolute Being or Act without mixture and composition Plutarch also in the Life of Numa Pompilius assures us That some learned Romans and that not without cause do attribute the order of the beginning and end of mans life to one self-God and Power divine So Laertius in the Life of Zeno informes us That the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that there was one God called by diverse names according to his Proprieties or Attributes and Operations Thus Seneca There are so many Names of God as there are Offices Hence they stiled their Jupiter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. not that they intended to assert many Deities but one and the same Deitie with regard to his various opertions So Aristotle in his Book de Mundo confesseth There was but one God called by diverse names from his effects Thus also Augustin de Civit. l. 7. c. 11. Al these names they imposed on the one God by reason of his diverse powers and causalities not that from the diversitie of effects they asserted diverse Gods And that almost al the learned Philosopher asserted one God is maintained by Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. sect 10. pag. 97. As for rational Arguments the Vnitie of God may be thus demonstrated 1 That there is a God who is a necessary independent Being has been already proved hence it is evident that he can be but one For a Being absolutely necessary and from it self has a necessitie of Being so far as it is singular therefore it is not multiplicable or more than one For if a singular is not multiplicable then whatever agrees to any thing as singular admits not of multiplicabilitie That a Being absolutely necessary and independent has its necessitie of Being as singular is evident because singularitie is essential and necessary to a Being absolutely necessary as such for a Being absolutely necessary is such so far as in act and it is in act as singular whence singularitie intrinsecally and essentially belongs thereto as Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. sect 10. Thus the Author of the Book de Fundament l. 2. c. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. There is therefore in the World a Being necessarily existing of it self which hath no cause nor equal seing it is the Cause of althings from which their substance and existence is but his existence dependes not on any thing without himself This is the blessed God who is therefore one because an Ens necessarily existing 2 Again if there be two or more Gods then they are al infinite independent and self-Beings or some produced and finite The first implies a coutradiction because there cannot be many infinites the later also because such Beings should be produced by real efficience and yet eternal also essentially diverse from the first Being that produced them and yet equal because God 3 That which is most singularly perfect self-sufficient and infinite can be but one For if there were two things or more singularly perfect and infinite then they would differ really or be the same If the same then they are not two if they really differ then one has somewhat which the other has not if so then neither is most singularly perfect and infinite For infinite comprehendes al perfection Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The Divinitie is perfect and indeficient every way If then we assert many Gods they must be different but if there be a difference among them where is their perfection For if one be different either in Bonitie Wisdome Virtue c. he so far comes short of perfection See more of Gods Unitie Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 42. § 4. Next to the Unitie of God
perfect and noble their life is The animal life is indeed composed of vital and animal Spirits in agitation Hence vigor health strength sense vegetation and al the issues of life procede And by how much the more potent and vigorous the Spirits are by so much the more active and perfect is the life So in the rational Life the more spirituose the exercices of Reason and Wil are the more perfect the life is 2 Life in its generic notion importes also Actuositie Life consistes not in a mere spirituose principe but in the agitation of that principe And the more actuose the spirituose principe is the more perfect the life is 3 But the main character that seems most essential to life in the general is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-motion This Plato makes commun to al life as wel create as increate Brutes they have an animal self-motion men rational Angels intellectile but God absolute essential and independent Thus much being premissed of Life in its generic notion we now procede to explicate how far the Life of God participates hereof 1. The Life of God carries in it the most perfect Spirituositie The Life of God most spirituose as he is the most simple pure Spirit without the least shadow of Mater either physic or metaphysic The lesse any thing has of mater the more spirituose it is Angels and human Souls are called Spirits because they are void of al physic mater but yet they have metaphysic mater or passive obediential power and therefore are not pure simple Spirits metaphysically considered Though I cannot without inhuman violence to mine assent take in that notion of a Spirit given us by Learned More in his Divine Dialogues Dialog 1. Sect. 24. pag. 94 c. where he makes extension agreable to a Spirit and so not proper and essential to Mater solely according to the Cartesian and ancient Hypothesis For if a Spirit be capable of extension in a strict and physic notion which he seems to defend I cannot imagine how it should be exemt from physic mater and al those laws of physic corporeitie dissolution and corruption which attend Mater yet I can easily persuade my self and grant that learned Author that al Spirits have according to the degree of Spiritalitie an Amplitude of Essence which is not confined to the narrow space of a Needles point as the Scholes of old dreamed As for create Spirits both Angels and human Souls we may justly allow them without injurie offered to their spiritalitie metaphysic accidental extension according to the space they occupie as also metaphysic mater as composed of Act and passive obediential power without the least physic extension or mater But now God being void not only of physic but also of metaphysic Mater or al passive Power whatsoever therefore he is said to be a pure simple Spirit in the most eminent transcendent degree Joh. 4.24 as Joh. 4.24 God is a Spirit i. e. the most simple spirituose Being and therefore the most living Being Hence Christ in regard of his Deitie is stiled a quickening Spirit Joh. 6.63 or Spirit that gives life Joh. 6.63 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is the Spirit i. e. the Deitie which they were ignorant of that quickeneth or gives life Althings give and have life so far as they are spirituose Christ as God being the most pure Spirit he must therefore necessarily be the most living and life-giving or quickening Spirit 1 Cor. 15.45 So 1 Cor. 15.45 Christ as Mediator is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a quickening or life-giving Spirit as he is the Fountain of al spiritual life and gives out al to his Members Again Heb. 9.14 Heb. 9.14 it 's said that Christ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the eternal Spirit i. e. by the infinite efficacitie of his Deitie offered up himself So that the Life of God consistes much in his Spiritualitie or Spirituositie 2. 2. The Life of God most actuose The Life of God carries in it the most pure and perfect Actuositie This Character of the Divine Life follows on and flows from the former for by how much the more spirituose things are by so much the more actuose they are and by how much the more actuose they are by so much the more living Nothing can be said to live farther than it is actuose when it ceaseth to act it ceaseth to live Life may be considered either in actu primo the first act or in actu secundo the second act the first Act of life consistes in the spirituose Principe or Spirituositie of the Agent before mentioned the second Act of life consistes in the Actuositie or Operation that flows from the first Act or Principe But in the Life of God which is most perfect the first and second Act are one and the same because he is a pure Act without the least composition of Act and Power or first and second Act. In al created life the Principe or first Act is distinct from the Operation or second Act and both together make an accidental composition of Cause and Effect or Act and Power but in the Life of God there is an Actuation without any true causalitie or proper motion We must conceive therefore of the Life of God as having the most perfect Actuositie and Actuation yet so as to exclude al real Causalitie Composition and Imperfection which attendes every create life by reason of the distinction between its first and second Act which God admits not because he is pure Act without al Power either essential or accidental active or passive his Esse and Agere are the same his Act is his Essence which can be said of no create Being but of God it must be affirmed because he is the first most pure and perfect Act without al power either objective or receptive The pure Actualitie of God is demonstrated by this that pure Act is more perfect than Act and Power but God is most perfect therefore pure Act. Every power is indigent needing an Act to actuate the same whence it necessarily follows that we must either admit a progresse into infinite or grant some first pure Act which needs no other Act for its actuation as Bradwardine acutely demonstrates l. 1. c. 2. pag. 163 c. Whence we conclude that the Life of God is most actuose and perfect because it is a pure Act without al potentialitie Hence 3. The life of God is of al most 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-moving The Life of God self-moving Plato aboundes much in this Character of Life which he makes to be most essential thereto So in his Phaedrus pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Every bodie that is moved by an externe pulse is inanimate but that which is moved by it self from an interne Principe is animate Wherein he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self motion from an interne Principe the essential character of life And by how
every facultie is by so much the more extensive by how the more immaterial it is hence the human Intellect by its act of understanding is said to become althings how much more true is this of the Divine Intellect which is in the highest degree spiritual The Divine Science albeit it be one most simple Act in it self yet it is most universal and infinite as to its object Thus Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 78. proves that Gods knowlege extendes to an infinitie of things because God perfectly knows his own Virtue and Power which is infinite Again by how much the more efficacious and clear any Intellect is in knowing by so much the more able it is from one to gather many things But now the Divine Intellect being infinitely efficacious it must therefore necessarily extend to an infinitude of objects So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 1. pag. 7. proves That the Scientivitie of God and his Intellect is never satisfied with any finite or infinite number of existent singulars of any one species or al but infinitely excedes each of them yea a whole multitude of al if they could be congregated together That the Science of God is most perfect essentially intensively and extensively see Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. Sect. 15. pag. 121. Having largely discussed the essential Modes or Characters of the Divine Science we now procede to its distinctions Gods simple Ditelligence with relation to its objects For albeit the Divine Science be in it self one simple Act identified with the Divine Essence yet this hinders not but that we may by some inadequate conception of reason distinguish this Science by reason of its object into different kinds The commun distribution of Gods Science is into simple Intellience and Science of Vision 1. Gods Science of simple Intelligence is of althings possible which he contemplates in the Alsufficience of his Essence For God being in the highest degree Intelligent he must necessarily understand althings that are intelligible but now whatever may be may also be known where-ever there is a possibilitie of existence there is some intelligibilitie Again God perfectly knows his own Essence and Power therefore he perfectly knows not only what is future but also whatever is possible Not that the existence of things possible is known by God but only their Essence which he contemplates in his own EssEnce Hence this Science of simple Intelligence is called by some Abstractive because it abstractes from the actual existence of its object 2. Gods Science of Vision Gods Science of Vision as to things future is that whereby he knows things as future in and upon the Decree of his Wil. Here we must premit that when we say Gods Science of Vision terminates on things as future the conjunctive Particle As must be taken not formally as if it denoted any reason of the Divine Cognition taken from the futurition of the thing but only materially and so it denotes only thus much that Gods knows things future to be future and that by the determination of his own Wil. Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 18. pag. 220 c. largely demonstrates these Propositions 1 That God doth not know things future merely by his Essence without the determination of his Wil because nothing is in its own nature future but by the Decree of the Divine Wil. 2 That God doth not know things future by the Divine Intellect only because the Divine Intellect considered in it self is not practic but only as subsequent to the Divine Wil. 3 That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie of the Divine Science because the Infinitie of the Divine Science being supposed it doth not thence necessarily follow that this or that thing be future 4 That God doth not know things future by the knowlege of their second Causes For such a knowlege implies discourse from the cause to the effect again such a knowlege would be contingent when the second causes are such 5 That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie or Immensitie of his own Scibilitie or Scientivitie 6 That god doth not know things future by the sole permission of his own Wil because then Gods knowlege should not be certain Hence he positively concludes God knows things future by his Wil. 7 That God knows things future by that which gives them their futurition namely by his Divine Wil. For as Aristotle 1. Post 2. instructes us To know a thing is to know it by its cause and is not the Wil of God the first Cause that gives futurition to althings Again how can God certainly know future contingents such as al human acts are but in and by some necessary certain cause And what certain necessary cause can there be of future contingents but the Divine Wil We may not then search for the causes of Divine Prescience in things future but in the cause of their futurition the determination of the Divine Wil. Not as if the decree or determination of the Divine Wil whereby things become future did in any moment of Nature precede the Divine Prescience but in one and the same moment of Nature God decrees what shal be future and foresees it future Thence he takes the reason of his knowing things future not simply from his Essence or sufficience nor yet from their presentialitie to God as the Dominicans persuade us but from the determination of his own Wil. Certainly Gods Wil is most efficacious omnipotent immutable and most known to himself and therefore it is necessary that whatever he wils should be future be so and known to him to be so for he wils not only the things themselves but also al their modes and conditions of contingence necessitie libertie c. Whatever gives any thing its futurition must necessarily also give it its cognoscibilitie or intelligibilitie as future wherefore the Divine Wil giving the former it cannot also but give the later Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 12. tels us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God may be deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for nothing can be hid from God yea he is the Inspector of althings And then he gives us the mode how God comes to know althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he beholdeth althings before they are produced eternally understanding every thing according to his voluntary eternal Intelligence i. e. his eternal Intelligence grounded on his own Wil. Thus Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 19. pag. 226. But here we must know that a thing as future in the Divine Wil and Predestination causally and not extrinsecally in its own proper nature is the cause or object of the Divine Science or Prescience For God no way needs extrinsec things as objects of his knowlege but he hath althings future with himself intrinsecally cognitivè causativè intuitivè seu scientificè cognitively causatively intuitively or scientificly from himself only and so he knows althings c. So
condition that men by their corrupt Wil embrace him 3 It overthrows efficacious Grace in the vocation and conversion of sinners in that it resolves al into a moral capacitie or power in corrupt Nature to convert it self 4 It subvertes the Covenant of Grace in resolving the whole of it into a Covenant of Workes 5 It destroyes the Grace of Perseverance in that it makes the perseverance of the Saints dependent on their own mutable Free-wil § 3. As for the Wil of God The Wil of God although it be not really different from his Vnderstanding and Essence yet we may in regard of its effects conceive of it as in some manner distinct The Wil of God is taken either properly for the Divine Volition Intention or Decree whereby althings receive their Futurition and Existence or else improperly for the legislative declarative significative Wil of God which is the measure of our dutie The former is that which we are first to discourse of whereof we find lively notices in Sacred Philosophie and something also in Plato Phileb p. 16. where being about to Philosophise of the Divine Wil as the original Exemplar or Idea of althings future he makes this Preface 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For althings that ever were invented being joined together by a certain affinitie and cognation with Art by means hereof are declared His meaning seems to be this that look as althings made by Art have their Idea in the mind of the Artificer according to which they are framed so althings of Nature have their Idea in the Divine Mind and Wil according to which they are accurately formed Thence he addes And truly the Ancients who were better than we and lived nearer to God delivered to us this report or Tradition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That althings consist of ONE and MANY which are said ever to be 1 That by these Ancients whence this Oriental Tradition came we must understand primarily the Hebrews has been sufficiently demonstrated P. 2. B. 3. C. 2. and elsewhere 2 That by this ancient tradition of One and Many we must understand the Divine Essence and Ideas or Decrees of the Divine Wil seems also manifest Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That we ought things being thus constituted alwaies to inquire after one Idea of every thing in particular and accurately to observe the same c. That by this ONE IDEA which we are to inquire after must necessarily be understood the Decree of the Divine Wil I think wil be evident to any that seriously considers Plato's Philosophemes of the Divine Ideas delivered in his Timaus and Parmenides of which before P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. § 4. And indeed he seems positively to assert Parmenid p. 134. That the Origine of these Ideas cannot be in the object but must be in the Divine Essence and Wil. We shall reduce the whole of our Philosophemes about the Divine Wil to the following Propositions 1. Prop. God primarily Wils himself and althings else in subordination to himself The Object of the Divine Wil. 1. That the Divine Essence is the primary object of the Divine Wil. is most evident 1. because the principal thing willed is to every one the cause of willing if therefore God should have any other principal object of his Wil besides himself he should have something besides himself as the cause of his willing which is impossible for nothing can move the Divine Wil but his own Bonitie 2 The Divine Essence is most amabile and appetible for it self therefore the primary object of the Divine Wil. 3 The primary object of the Wil ought to be equally proportionable thereto for the virtue and efficace of a facultie is measured by its commensuration and Adequation to its primary object and what is equally proportionable to the Divine Wil but the Divine Essence Hence 2 God by willing himself wils althings else in subordination to himself For he that wils an end wils althings else in order thereto God wils althings in order to his own Bonitie The Wil of God terminates on other things so far as they relate to the Divine Bonitie and participate thereof God wils himself Necessarily but althings else so far as they relate to himself Hence 1 God wils al singular Goods so far as they partake of goodness For God willing himself as his last end wils althings so far as they conduce to himself but every thing so far as it is good participates of and tends to the Divine goodness therefore as such it is willed by God Hence 2. Prop. The Wil of God considered in it self is but one simple indivisible pure Act. The Divine Wil one pure Act. Thus Plato Phileb 16. saith we ought always to inquire after 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one idea of althings Whereby he notes that the Divine Wil as the origine of all things is but one The multitude of objects willed is no way repuguant with the Unitie and Simplicitie of the Divine Wil for God by one simple act wils himself and althings else Althings are one in the Divine Wil and Bonitie in as much as the Divine Bonitie is the exemplar of al Bonitie and the Divine Wil by one and the same act wils both the Divine Bonitie and al other Bonitie It is otherwise with the Humane Wil which by one act wils the end and by another the means conducing to the end whence the willing the end is the cause of willing the means but in the Divine Wil there is no such causalitie of end and means to be found in as much as by one and the same simple act it wils both end and means and al grant that the same thing cannot be the cause of it self Thence Suaxez Metaple Disput 30. § 16. p. 127 c. proves That Gods Wil is not a real power but the last pure Act for there is no receptive power in God althings that are in God are as actual as his effence and as pure from all Potentialitie Hence 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is most Soverain and Independent The Divine Wil Independent Thus the Platonistes generally assert that the Divine Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without cause and Independent and Plato makes his Divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Self-subsistent and Independent because althings else depend on them but they on nothing else This Independence and Self-subsistence of the Divine Wil is set forth in Sacred Philosophie under the notion of a Foundation 2 Tim. 2.19 2 Tim. 2.19 The foundation of the Lord standeth sure the Lord knoweth who are his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes the firm purpose of the Divine Wil As those that build great Palaces lay a firm foundation which dependes not on any part of the Structure but the whole Structure dependes on it so God being to build a Celestial House layes the eternal purpose of his own Wil as a self-subsistent independent foundation on which the whole
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
here cannot signifie disposed or prepared as the Remonstrants and their Sectators would perswade us for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differs much from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither is it any where in Scripture or any Greek Author as I can learne used to signifie an interne Qualitie or Disposition but it generally signifies to Ordain primarily in military affaires and thence in any other maters So Act. 22.10 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be here taken nominally but must signifie Ordained is most evident from the sense For it 's said they were ordained to eternal life as the terme not unto faith only as the means wherefore if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should signifie disposed the sense must be they were disposed to eternal life as many as were disposed for what is faith but a disposition to eternal life It 's most evident therefore that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must signifie not nominally but participally such as were ordained unto eternal life as the terme and unto faith as the means by the absolute and antecedent wil of God That Gods Wil properly so termed is ever Antecedent and never Consequent may be demonstrated 1 From the Eternitie of Gods wil. According to Plato the Idea or Decree of the Divine Wil is ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eternal and sempiterne Now if the wil of God and its Ideas be al eternal then not any one of them can be consequent to any act of the Creature which is in time 2 From the Simplicitie Independence and Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in God supposeth his Divine Wil to hang in suspense and dependent on the mutable ambulatorie wil of man and is it possible that the prime cause should depend on or be influenced by the inferior second cause What must the Supreme Soverain Wil attend yea subserve the nods and becks of human created wil The act of willing in God cannot depend on any act of the creature as something consequent thereto because then as oft as the act of the creature is changed the wil of God must be changed 3 From the perfection of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in God as stated by the Jesuites and their Followers supposeth an Antecedent imperfect wil consisting only in a natural Velleitie or imperfect inclination which is unworthy of the most perfect wil. 4 From the Omnipotence of God If God wils a thing antecedently to the act of the creature which shal never be then the wil of God is not Omnipotent but in the power of the Creature either to fulfil or frustrate the same And Oh! how incongruous are such Sentiments to the Divine Omnipotent Wil If Gods Wil be in the power of the Creature and dependent thereon then it may be wholly frustrated as to al its counsels and decrees touching the rational world 5 This distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is contumelious to the Beatitude of God For every one is so far blessed as he has his wil fulfilled To have our wils crossed or frustrated is accounted by al no smal portion of miserie may we then imagine that the Divine Wil properly so termed is ever frustrated 6 This distinction of Gods wil into antecedent and consequent is also injurious to his Bountie and goodnesse Sacred Philosophie compareth God to a liberal Prince who deviseth liberal things Esa 32.8 and thereby establisheth his Throne Esa 32.8 But the liberal deviseth liberal things and by liberal things he shal stand It 's spoken of Christ as Mediator or the great King of Sion as appears vers 1. who deviseth al manner of liberal things and thereby stands or is established on his Throne as the word denotes in the Hebrew Did not Christ keep open house and distribute al his gifts and good things liberally and freely his Throne would not be established he would have no Subjects to fil up his Kingdome But now the distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent cuts asunder al the nerves and ligaments of Christs Liberalitie in that it makes him to have an imperfect Antecedent wil towards al but a Consequent Wil towards none but those who can by their good merits purchase his favor This distinction of Gods Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is excellently wel refuted by Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 1. Distinct 46 47. where he concludes thus Al the good things that we have are given us by God out of his Bountie and Grace and this speakes that God wills them to us by an Antecedent Wil because no cause antecedes in us but al our good things flow from his Bonitie 7. The Divine Wil most perfect Prop. The Divine Wil is most perfect This Adjunct of the Divine Wil is but the result of the former and that which makes way to what follows The perfection of the Divine Wil may be considered intensively extensively or effectively 1. Intensively 1 The perfection of the Divine Wil considered intensively consistes in its not admitting any intension and remission or latitude of degrees but being alwaies intense in the highest degree For the Divine Wil having one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence it is one simple pure Act without the least gradual remission or intension Hence it is stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the perfect Idea of good which admits no latitude of degrees no velleitie or incomplete wil. That Gods Wil is always perfect and complete without the least velleitie or conditionate volition may be demonstrated 1 from the Simplicitie and pure Actualitie of God For al composition and latitude of degrees is inconsistent with a pure Act. 2 From the Identitie of the Divine Wil with the Divine Essence which admits not the least latitude of degrees 3 From the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. For al Velleitie being but an imperfect wil denotes a progression to a more perfect and so mutation 4 From the Wisdome of God For al Velleitie implies ignorance and supposeth that God understandes not fully what the issues and events of the human wil may be 5 From the Omnipotence of God Al Velleitie notes impotence to accomplish what we wil. We may not therefore imagine that Gods Wil is capable of any Velleitie or conditionate incomplete volition either formally or eminently but that it is ever most perfect as to degrees because it is the same with the Divine Essence 2 The Divine Wil is most perfect extensively 2. Extensively as to Objects in that it extendes it self to al objects So in sacred Philosophie Act. 17.26 Acts 17.26 And hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation It is said that God hath determined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. by his soverain perfect Wil given termes bounds measures and limits to althings the Divine Wil is infinite and unlimited it receives limits and termes from nothing but gives bounds and termes to althings Hence God is
encourageth nor by any other Moral causalitie produceth sin albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entitie of sin which is naturally good yet he doth not at al concur to the moral production obliquitie or deordination of sin which has indeed no real efficient cause but only deficient according to that of Proclus There is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea of moral evils But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctitie of God we are to know that his original Essential and Absolute Holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or supereminence of his Divine Majestie as separate from althings else For al Sanctitie and al the notions thereof specially Grecanic and Hebraic implie separation and discretion Whence the Sacred Majestie of God being in regard of its infinite Perfection and Dignitie infinitely exalted above al Beings and Dignities whatsoever it must necessarily be the prime sanctitie Yea Holiness is so far appropriated to the first Being as that the Heathens ascribed a fictitious sanctitie and eminence to al their spurious Deities whereby they generally acknowleged that the prime Holinesse belongs only to the first Being It 's true good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation but they are not Holinesse in the abstract this appertains only to he prime original essential Holinesse who is infinitely separate from al other Dignities and Eminences in whom al Holinesse is in the abstract and essentially from whom also al Holinesse flows as from the source and spring § 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Essence and Attributes Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie but also some dark notices of the Trinitie which I no way dout were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philosophie We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinitie mentioned more expressely in his Sectators Plotinus Porphyrie Iamblichus and Proclus And the whole is wel explicated by Cyril Alexandr Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For Porphyrie expounding the Sentiment of Plato saith that the essence of God procedes even to three Hypostases but that the Supreme God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Supreme GOOD and that after him the second is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the prime Opificer or Creator moreover that the third is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mundane Soul or Universal Spirit For the Divinitie extended it self to the Soul of the Vniverse This Platonic Trinitie Cyril refutes as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianisme as hereafter I am not ignorant that Learned Cudworth in his New Book against Atheisme B. 1. C. 4. § 34. p. 590 c. endeavors to apologise for this Platonic Trinitie and reconcile it with the Christian Yet he ingenuously acknowledgeth pag. 580 and 601 c. That the most refined Platonic Trinitie supposeth an Essential Dependence and Subordination of the second Hypostasis to the First and of the Third to the Second Yea he grantes that the Platonists generally held these three Hypostases to be three distinct Gods as in what follows I conceive those endeavors to reconcile the Christians Trinitie with the Platonic to be of most dangerous consequence and that which proved Origen's Peste as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. § 8. The chief place I find in Plato wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a Trinitie is Epist 6. p. 323. Let this Law be constituted by you and confirmed by an Oath not without obtesting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both God the Imperator of althings both which are and which shal be and the Father of that Imperator and Cause whom indeed if we truely Philosophise we shal al distinctly know so far as that knowledge may fal within the power of blessed men This description of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father and God the Son who is indeed the Imperator of althings We find also in Plato's Epinom mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which they attribute to the second person in the Trinitie Whence the Poets make Minerva to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mind of Jupiter or his Wisdome produced out of his head without Mother as the true Messias was stiled by the Hebrews The wisdome of God without Mother Plotinus Ennead 5 Lib. 1. Philosophiseth copiosely of this Platonic Trinitie the Title of which Book runs thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the Three Principal or Causal Hypostases And he begins Cap. 2. with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mundane Soul its Dignitie and Office and Ennead 5. l. 5. c. 3. speaking of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mind the second Hypostasis in the Platonic Trinitie he saith that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Second God And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he saith That this Second God the First Mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Being now begotten by the first God begot also al entities with himself namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas which were al intellectile Gods Furthermore we must conceive that this Begotten Mind is ful of althings begotten by him and doth as it were swallow up althings begotten Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the progenie of this Mind is a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Hypostasis consisting in cogitation c. Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. cals this Platonic Trinitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the tradition of the Three Gods and he makes according to Numenius the First God to be the Grandfather the Second to be the Son the Third to be the Grandson i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the First and the Third by the Second Porphyrie also explicating Plato's mind cals God the Creator of althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Paterne Mind who also makes three subsistences in the essence of the Divinitie the first he cals the Supreme God the second the Creator the third the Soul of the Vniverse The like Iamblichus his Scholar concerning the Egyptian Mysteries The first God the prime being the Father of God whom he begets remaining in his solitarie unitie c. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Persons or Subsistences whereof the first he makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being who generated the second namely the eternal and perfect Mind as before So in his Book of Providence he saith That althings were framed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Divine Mind Thus Plato in his Phaedo saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Divine Mind is the framer and cause of althings That these Platonic Philosophemes were the Seminarie of Arianisme we have endeavored to demonstrate Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. § 9. And this is wel observed by Cyril contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit Paris 1638. where speaking of Plato and his Trinitie he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truely he contemplated not the whole rightly but in
Principe Durandus's Objections answered Divine Concurse as to the human Wil and al create Objects Gods Concurse principal How second Causes are Instruments Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative Gods Concurse 1 Immediate both as to the second Cause its Act and Effect 2 Independent 3 Previous 4 Total 5 Particular 6 Efficacious 7 Connatural § 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes God the first Cause of althings we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophie Thence Sapience which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic according to Aristotle consistes in the contemplation not only of most excellent Beings but also of the prime Cause of althings That God is the prime Cause of althings not only sacred but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us As for sacred Philosophie it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis Thus Esa 66.2 For al these things have my hands made and al those things have been So Psal 104.24 of which more in Gods Creation Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience So in his Phaedo pag. 96. he demonstrates how great the ignorance and folie of such is who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause who is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal supreme Cause but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Cause of causes whereas al second Causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause Thence pag. 97. he addes But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings and is the cause of althings I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause and it seemed to me to be rightly determined namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings and thus I reasoned with my self if it be so that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings it doth therefore place each particular in that place where it may be best constituted If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing both of its existence and corruption he must also inquire in what regard it may be best either as to being or as to suffering or doing any other thing Vpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after either concerning himself or other things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than what is best and most excellent for it is necessary that such an one also know what is worst because the science of these things is the same When I pondered these things in my mind I much pleased my self in this that I had got a Master who would instruct me in the causes of things according to mine own mind namely Anaxagoras In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables 1 These contemplations about the first Cause were some of his dying thoughts and therefore such as his mind were most intent on 2 He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras derived originally from sacred Philosophie That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings 3 That the Divine Mind disposed ordered and governed althings in the best manner 4 That he who would inquire into the causes of this must have his eye on those two the mater and efficient For Plato makes but two Principes of things the Mater out of which things were made and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence This Efficient he elsewhere stiles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idea making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings So the Stoics made two Principes of althings the Efficient and Patient Plato sometimes makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Efficient and Cause termes synonymous so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the efficient precedes and the effect follows 5 That as to efficients we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent namely God the first Cause for he that knows the best i. e. God may easily know the worst i. e. second Causes So Plato Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Principe and End of althings Thus in his Sophista pag. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Namely doth Nature by the force of some casual fortuitous cause without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind produce these things Or on the contrary shal we not determine that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God Wherein note 1 that he layes down an Hypothesis contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes 2 That althings existe by the Divine Mind Hence 3 That althings are framed and disposed in the best order with the highest wisdome 4 He makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinitie but I should rather take it here for wisdome as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of Science The like in his Theaetetus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must remember that nothing can be of it self therefore althings are from some first Cause of which more fully before C. 2. § 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving essence to althings for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer Again Repub 2. pag. 379. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God So pag. 380. he proves That God is the cause of al good whether natural or moral And Epist pag. 312. he expressely saith That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of althings good or beautiful Thus Damascene out of Dionysius Areopagita who doth much Platonise Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God is the cause and principe of althings the essence of Beings the Life of things living the Reason of things rational the Intellect of things intellectile the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fal from him but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation of such things as stand the stabilitie of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of the illuminated the splendor the perfection of the perfect the Deification of the deified the peace of the discordant the simplicitie of the
simple the union of the united the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe For the more distinct demonstration that God is the prime Cause of althings these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus formed into Arguments 1 That which is such by Essence is necessarily before that which is such by Participation but now God is a Cause by Essence whereas al other causes are such only by participation God gives essence to althings but receives it from nothing Thus Plato Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things not only for their being known but also for their existence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when yet that chief good is not properly Essence but superessential because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create both in dignitie and virtue 2 Al Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings Must not althings then receive their origine from God 3 That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man but that which gave Being to him that which is last in order of final causes must needs be first in order of Efficients And is not God the last End of althings Are not althings so far good as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse Is not God to speak in Plato's language 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Idea and measure of al good And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good It 's true there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inferior derivative goods but is there any universal essential independent good but God And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends If God as the last End gives blessed Being must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being Can any thing returne to God as the last end but what flows from him as the first Cause Thus Simplicius a Sectator of Plato in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good for that which is desired by althings and unto which althings are referred that is the Principe and End of althings Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the one first Being Principe chiefest Good and God are one and the same for God is the first and cause of althings 4 Must not every multiforme variable defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme simple invariable indefectible Being as its first Cause And is there any uniforme simple immutable Being but God Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that the first Being be most simple for whatever is composite as composite it is after one and multitude and so produced c. Whereby he proves that the first Cause is most simple 5 Do not al finite dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them And is there any infinite independent cause but God Can any thing be the first cause but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without al cause 6 Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects Where then there is an universalitie of effects must there not also be an universal first Cause which gives Being to al those effects Is it possible that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause Thus Simplicius in Epictet cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that the first cause have the highest and universal influence for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him so that he can produce althings of himself § 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of althings The Object of Divine Concurse we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie Concurse and Efficience The prime Causalitie and Concurse of God may be considered with respect to 1 Its Object 2 It s Subject or Principe 3 Its Mode of Operation 4 Its Termes or Effects produced First we may consider the prime Causalitie Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object and that 1 Negatively 2 Positively We shal state and determine both in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods concurse as to its object Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause and conservation of the same The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomistes and Scotistes in Sent. l. 2. Distinct 1. q. 5 who supposed That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes than a virtue or power to act and the conservation thereof without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or principal motive ground and reason of this Antithesis is this If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil and so be the cause of sin This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schole-men both Thomistes and Scotistes and is stil by the more sober Jesuites Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius in his Book De rerum aeternitate triumpho Philosophiae has undertaken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis with this advance even to the subversion not only of the concurse but also of the conservation of God And since there has started up another Lud. A Dola a Capucine Friar who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this commun instance On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed it would notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concurse move naturally downward or to the same purpose Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes which the Scholes of Theologie as wel as Philosophie now ring of yet this Antithesis being as I conceive of dangerous consequence I cannot but with modestie expresse my just aversation from yea indignation against it with the reserve of that respect and honor which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis having reserved this taske if the Lord favor my desires for another subject and stile
power in God distinct from his Wil. This Proposition has been already demonstrated C. 5. § 4. Yet for more abundant conviction let us examine the Origine Necessitie and Vse of an executive Power in the Creature and then we shal see what little ground there is to ascribe the same to God The great Assertors and Promotors of executive power have been Aristotle and his Sectators who on false Hypotheses presume That a substance cannot act immediately without some executive power which they make a species of Qualitie Albeit such kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by al who resolve not to serve an Opinion of Aristotle yet there stil remains a place for executive powers in nature when the principal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately Thus the Soul of Man puts forth al Acts of sense and motion by some executive powers Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately specially in its immanent acts without any executive power And thus God in al his Effects actes immediately by his omnipotent wil without any executive power For he is present in and with al effects and therefore needs no executive power to supplie his absence Again the Wil of God is Omnipotent as c. 5. § 3. and we shal anon prove it more fully and therefore it needs no executive power to execute what it wils Is not the Divine Wil proposed to us in Sacred Philosophic as Irresistible and if it be so can it not then execute its own pleasure without any executive power Indeed the greatest Scholastic wits have espoused and defended this Hypothesis namely That the Wil and Executive Power of God are really the same and not so much as rationally or formally distinct Thus Joan. Major 2. Sent. Dist 1. q. 1. proves That God Created the World by his Intellect and Wil without any executive Power formally distinct of which hereafter § 5.4 Prop. Thus Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. with others of whom in the next Proposition And indeed Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypothesis in that he acknowlegeth That the concurse of God as it regardes the effective principe is the same with the Divine Wil which concurs with the Creature to its act This he cals concursus ad intrà the interne concurse which he makes to be the principe of al Acts adextrá Yet I must confesse elsewhere namely Disp 30. S. 17. he makes mention of an executive power in God the same with his Essence containing in it eminently al create perfections And so some Divines as wel as Philosophers assert an executive power in God Thus Heereboord Select Ex Philosoph Disp 8. endeavors to prove that Gods concurse whereby he influenceth things ad extra is not simply his volition because Gods volition simply is an immanent Act but his concurse is a transient Act ad extra But this Argument seems to be of no weight because we easily grant that the concurse of God quoad Attingentiam passivam as to its passive Attingence is distinct from God and the same with the concurse of the second cause or effect but that which we are now discoursing of is the concurse of God in regard of its active Attingence as it regardes God the Principe and in this respect we only assert That the concurse of God is the same with his volition simply considered This wil be further evident by the next Proposition 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self Omnipotent and Efficacious The Divine Wil Omnipotent This Proposition is most evident 1 because the Divine Wil cannot be frustrated Thus Suarez 1.2 ae Tract 3. Disput 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. We must say saith he that when God wils absolutely and efficaciously that man wil somewhat the human Wil cannot discord from the Divine The reason is clear because the Divine Wil efficacious and simply absolute cannot be fruitrated seeing it is infinite So Bradward l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing nor impedible and frustrablein any manner Who knows not that it necessarily follows if God can do any thing and wils it he doth it 2 The Divine Wil being the universal first cause of althings it cannot but be most efficacious For is not this the main difference between the first and second cause the universal and particular cause that this may fail of its effect but that can never A particular cause oft comes short of its effect by reason of the interposition of some other particular cause that may impede the same but the first universal cause can never come short of its effect because there is no other cause can interpose to hinder it 3 The Wil of God is infinite therefore Omnipotent and Irresistible for where the power of the Patient doth not excede or equalise the power of the Agent there can be no prevalent resistence what then can resist the Divine Wil which is infinite 4 If the Divine Wil were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy For every one is so far happy as his Wil is fulfilled as Aristor Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. 5 It 's a common Hypothesis in the Scholes grounded on the highest Reason That it is impossible but that the Divine Wil should attain its effect So Aquinas Part. 1. q. 19. a. 6. as others Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self operative and influential on al second causes and effects Thus Augustin De Trinit l. 3. c. 4. The Wil of God operative of it self The Wil of God is the first and supreme cause of althings Again A thing is said to be done by God acting when it is done by God willing Apud Dominum hoc est velle quod facere qura ex ejus voluntate res habent esse Augustin in Psal 144. And the reasons of this Hypothesis are most manifest For 1 if Gods Wil were not of it self Operative and Effective it were not the first principe and cause of althings 2 The wil of man is in some things Operative of it self and must we not allow the same Prerogative to the Wil of God And if it be in somethings operative of it self why not in althings May we not then hence conclude That there is no active operation or motion received from God into the Wil or any other second cause but from the simple volition of God the motion of the human Wil or any other second cause necessarily follows This is evident in the first Creation of althings for by Gods fiat or volition which is eternal althings were made in time without any other impression or concurse received and if Gods first Creation of althings was by his simple volition without any transient concurse what hinders but that al other efficience of God should in the same manner consiste in the simple volition of his wil without any transient
the concurse of God be only General and Indifferent it then hangs in suspense and has not efficace enough to reach its effect unlesse it be so or so disposed Whence also it follows that it is in the power of the second cause to resist or frustrate the concurse of God so that it shal not reach its effect Hence lastly it follows that the concurse of God is not efficacious and omnipotent which we shal anon prove 3 That the concurse of God as to its manner of working is not general but particular is asserted and demonstrated by some of the most acute of the Scholastic Theologues So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 4. and l. 3. c. 7. Joan. major in Sentent 2. Dist 28. q. 1. p. 122. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 23. with several others But here it is objected 1. by Burgersdicius and others Objections against Gods particular concurse 1 If God concur by a particular concurse to the specification of the action then he may be said to walke discourse eat c. To this Objection we respond 1 by denying that God concurs to the specification of the action albeit he concurs by a particular concurse for an action is specified from its particular cause not from the first universal cause So that here is that which they cal a fallacie of many interrogations whereof one is true the other false Or we may cal it a begging of the Question in that they suppose That if God concur by a particular concurse he concurs also to the specification of the action which is an inconsequent consequence 2 Those Animal acts of walking eating c. ascribed to the second cause cannot be ascribed to God the first cause albeit they more principally belong to him because they procede not from pure efficience but from information to use the Aristotelean phrase or a bodie so organised Those actions signifie a relation to the particular subject whence they slow and therefore cannot be properly attributed to God as Bradward l. 1. c. 4. p. 178. and Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. S. 3. acutely replie shewing that ambulation eating c. do not denote pure efficience but a subject informed by such motions which are therefore proper to the said subject 2 But the main objection of Burgersdicius and others against Gods particular concurse is taken from sinful actions unto which say they God cannot be said to concur by a particular concurse unlesse we make him the author of sin This objection makes a great noise but has little of weight in it For 1 The deordination of any sinful act can only be ascribed to the second cause who is the Author of it not unto the first cause who only produceth the physical entitative Act. 2 That which is most sinful in regard of the second cause is so ordered by God as that it shal conduce to the greatest good as before and hereafter in the providence of God 6. Gods Concurse Efficacious Gods concurse is most Potent and Efficacious This Adjunct and Mode of operation is most expresse in Sacred Philosophie specially as to gratiose Influences which are most potent Sin is a mighty strong poison ay but medicinal Grace is a much stronger Antidote The powers of darkenesse and Hel are very strong but Christ the Captain of our Salvation hath Samson-like carried away the Gates of Hel upon his shoulders and led captivitie captive His Grace is most potent irresistible and victorions Thus Jansenius Augustin Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. p. 43. having in what precedes sufficiently refuted the Conditional Grace of the Molimstes he addes This therefore is the true reason why no medicinal Grace of Christ ever wants its effect but al workes both to wil and to do because with Augustin Grace and the good worke are so reciprocated that as from Grace conferred the effect of the worke may be inferred so on the other hand from the defect of the worke it may be inferred that Grace was not given By which manner of reasoning it appears that Grace as the cause and the operation of the Wil as the effect are as the Philosophers speak convertible and mutually inseparable each from other For so Augustin speakes of the Conflict against Tentations Agis si ageris bene agis si à â—bono ageris so efficacious is medicinal Grace Yea Jansenins a voucheth that there is no manner of speech among the Scholastic Theologues so efficacious to expresse that the determination or predetermination of the Wil is from the Grace of God but Augustin assumes the same to demonstrate that the Grace of Christ is not such that the effect should be suspended or dependent on any condition to be performed by the human Wil but that the effect is most potently produced by it not if the Wil willeth but by working and determining the Wil to wil. So Habak 3.4 Habak 3.4 And his brightnesse was as the light he had bornes coming out of his hand and there was the hiding of his power And his brightnesse was as the light The brightnesse of Christ was exceding gloriose even like the brightnesse of the Sun in its meridian glorie Thence it follows he had hornes coming out of his hands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies to send forth beams as hornes to irradiate and shine forth Beams and hornes have some analogie and ressemblance and therefore the same word among the Hebrews signifies both Hence the vulgar Version renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exod. 34.29 hornes whereas it signifies there beams as here Whence it follows out of his hands Hands here denote Christ's power as Act. 11.21 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hand signifies power the hand being the instrument of the bodie whereby it puts forth its power Thence he addes There was the hiding of his power i. e. his secret power lay wrapt up in his efficacious rays or concurse which is exceding influential and potent like hornes We find something analogous hereto in Plato Repub 6. pag. 509. where treating of God as the first Cause of al good he compares him to the Sun and his concurse to the rays thereof in this manner Thou wilt say I presume that the Sun doth not only cause that things are seen but also that they are generated do grow are nourished although it be not the generation of those things Thus therefore determine that the chiefest good namely God doth give to those things that are known not only that they are known 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but also force and efficace for their existence c. Wherein he compares the efficacious Concurse of God to the spermatic potent influxe of the Sun which gives life sense motion nutrition angmentation and vigor to al manner of Insects Whence those blind Gentiles made the Sun under the fictitious names of Apollo and his Son Esculapius the supreme God of Medicine because the Virtues of Plants depend on the Sun See Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. its heat
contradiction for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal and being from eternitie Is not that which is without beginning eternal And can we imagine that to have a beginning which is from eternitie Can any effect and product of the Divine Wil be commensurate to it in point of Duration 2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God For 1 the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of al Actions Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent God Creation is the most perfect of al actions by which a participate Being may be communicated because it primarily speakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude whence it is manifest that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any but the first cause who is Being essentially and of himself no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being 2 That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator in as much as he has no passive power or mater to worke on but only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created which requires an infinite active power in the Agent For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be whence where there is no preexistent mater to worke upon but a mere obediential objective power or nothing there the distance between the Power and Act is as to efficience infinite and impertransible by any finite power therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together 3 From the Nature of Creation which is not a successive but a momentaneous Action but al the productions of second causes as they are inferior to and Instruments of the first cause are successive motions for al Instruments act and move in a way of succession 4 From the limitation of al second causes For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being and therefore have not in themselves virtue or force enough to Create the least of Beings To Create requires a virtue of the most Supreme Order invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude And the reason is evident because the Creative Power extendes it self to every thing creable neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be This wil more fully appear from the following Thesis 3. Creation the production of something out of nothing Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another for Creation is but an instantaneous eduction but only the negation of a material cause Now that God Created althings without any preexistent mater may be demonstrated 1 From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act must necessarily precede al mater and thence be the cause thereof that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the rest whence it follows that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing 2 From the universal efficience of God as the first cause Every Agent so far as it is confined to mater so far it is particular and limited for to be confined to mater in acting is to act in order to some determinate species whereunto that mater refers wherefore that Agent which is universal and commensurate to al effects possible cannot be confined to mater such is the first cause 3 From the universalitie of Effects produced by Creation By how much the more universal the effect is by so much the higher the cause is and by how much the higher the cause is by so much the more it is extended to al effects Whence the effects of Creation being of al most universal and the cause most high there cannot be supposed any preexistent mater out of which they are educed 4 Al productions out of mater suppose successive motion and Transmutation but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once Al successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede as to Duration the effect produced by such a mutation or motion but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created therefore it cannot be successive out of preexistent mater 4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Wil Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. as the effective principe of althings This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated Chap. 5. § 4. of Gods executive power as c. 7. § 3. And albeit it may seem to carrie a novitie with it yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophie its very mode of expressing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly shews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil. Gen. 1.3 Thus Gen. 1.3 and God said Let there be light Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here and elsewhere ascribed to God thereby to expresse the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings Thus Maimonides More Nevochim Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates That this Speech or Word whereby althings were made must be understood of the Divine Wil not of any proper Speech because al Speech whereby any thing is commanded must necessarily be directed to some Being existent and capable of receiving such a command but there was no Being then existent therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil. Thus Hebr. 11.3 The world was framed by the Word of God So 2 Pet. 3.5 By the Word of God the Heavens were of old An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expressed by the Word of God but to shew that as we when we wil have any thing done expresse our Wil by our word of command so God expressed what he wil have accomplisht by his Fiat or Creative Word See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God § 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues Thus Joan. Major Sentent 2. dist 1. q. 3. proves That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition without any other productive power And his Arguments are these 1 The Human Wil doth not want any
which being cast out of the neast by their Parents and very much affected with hunger slie up and down the Air making loud cries Which seems to agree to that of Job 38.41 Thus Aristotle and Elian tel us that the young Ravens are expelled from their neast by the old ones To this sense Vossius Mcy and others incline The former sense of the Hebrews is refuted by Calvin as also by Bochart de Animal Tom. 2. p. 203 c. who makes this case of the young Ravens the same with that of the young Lions Job 39.39 Psal 34.10 and 104.21 both of which by reason of their vehement appetite and unskilfulnesse to acquire food suffer great hunger and are in a more than ordinary manner supplied by the Providence of God What extraordinary provision God makes for the conservation of his own People wil hereafter occur in the Gubernation of God 6. Prop. The Conservation of a Creature and its first Creation or Production as they refer both to God differ only mentally Conservation continued Creation Creation gives Being and Existence unto things Conservation Continuation in Being Something 's are conserved immediately by God becuase subject only to him as Spirits That the conservation of such differs only mentally from their Creation is evident Other things are conserved by God not so immediately as to exclude Means yet so as that God conserves them immediately in and by those means Now that the conservation of such things also as to Gods immediate conservative influxe differs not really but only mentally from thier first production is manifest because conservation as to God whether it be by means or without means is but one act continued from the first instant of its Creation or Production not that there is any real intrinsec succession in Gods Active Conservation which is no other than his most simple volition but we conceive Gods Passive Conservation as successive in regard of the Creatures Duration Thonce Aquinas and his Sectators hold That Conservation is a continued Creation Which must not be understood of proper continuation but according to our manner of understanding or by reason of its coexistence to true continued succession For continuation properly so termed is only in things divisible but Creation and Conservation are one indivisible act without any successive duration or real continuation as to God but only a most simple indivisible permanence as Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. Sect. 2. p. 343. demonstrates Hence we may easily understand how Creation or the first production of things and their Conservation as to God differ only Mentally For the difference is only according to the different mode of our conception and expression Things are not said to be conserved in the first moment of their production nor to be Created in regard of their subsequent continuation For Creation connotes a negation of precedent Being but conservation on the contrary connotes the possession of Being before produced Creation includes a Novitie of Essence which conservation excludes and conservation includes precedent Existence which Creation excludes Nehem. 9.6 Thus Conservation is continued Creation as Nehem. 9.6 where God is said to preserve althings made by one and the same Act. John 5.17 So John 5.17 My Father hitherto worketh and I worke i. e. for the Conservation as wel as the first production of things neither are these Acts as to Divine Efficience really distinct albeit we may distinguish them as to second causes and means used by God for the production and conservation of things 7. Prop. Divine Conservation as to its Objects and Effects is various The Object of Divine Conservation Albeit the Conservation of God be in it self one simple Act not different from the first production of things save by some connotation only yet it admits various Objects and Effects 1 God conserves Individuals some to al Eternitie without the least corruption or alteration as Angels and Human Souls Other Individuals shal be conserved for ever yet not without some alteration and resinement as the celestial Bodies c. 2 Pet. 3.10 12. 2 Such Individuals as are the effects of Natural Generation or Production God conserves in their Species and in the whole for the corruptions and defects of some parts belong to the Constitution and Continuation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the whole Vniverse unto which there is more regard to be had than to any part albeit the parts also are conserved in their Species when they decay as to their individual Natures 3 God conserves also the vigor virtue and efficacitie of al second causes together with their Operations so long as they are existent CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin God the Supreme Gubernator The end of Divine Gubernation It s Order most perfect and immobile It hath the force of a Law Its use of means It s extent to althings Gods Gubernation as to Men particularly as to Sinners and Sin The Origine of Sin and its causes God not the Author of Sin How God is the cause of the material act of Sin How far Sin fals under the Divine Wil. Gods Wil about Sin Permissive not merely Negative but Ordinative Gods Judicial Gubernation of Sin What Attributes of God are most illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin § 1. HAving discussed the Conservation of God Divine Gubernation we now descend to his Gubernation whereof we find illustrious notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie As for Sacred Philosophemes touching Divine Gubernation they are very many and great as it may appear in the particulars thereof I shal at present give only the mention of Platonic Contemplations concerning it Thus Plato Phileb p. 28. What O Protarchus may we determine that althings and this which is called the Vniverse are governed by a certain temerarious power void of Reason as Fortune wil Or rather on the contrary should we not affirme with our Ancestors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the eternal Mind and a certain admirable Wisdome ordering al in the most accurate manner doth governe He saith that according to the Opinion of the Ancient Wise Men the Providence of God governes and moderates althings in the wisest manner and with the best order Thus also Iamblichus saith That the Egyptians when they introduce God under the Symbolic Image of one that governes a Ship thereby signifie his Domination and Empire as Gubernator of the Universe For as a Gubernator of a Ship in one moment doth easily move governe and direct the Ship so doth God the world We find the same similitude used by Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 as before Hence this Gubernation of God is that act of Divine Providence whereby he directes governes and brings al his Creatures to their proper ends in the most orderly manner This general Idea of Divine Gubernation may be resolved into the following Propositions 1. Prop. God is the Supreme Moderator God the Supreme Gubernator Eccles 8.4 Soverain Gubernator and absolute
so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation they fulfil another If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept which brings happinesse with it what more just than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment against their Wils Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence He is not an Absolute much lesse a Lawful Monarch but Usurper who has a restraint upon his Power though not upon his Malice He cannot Act as he would And as the persons of the wicked Gods Gubernation about sin both Men and Devils fal under the Providential Gubernation of God so also their Sins And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God For the solution whereof we shal first premit some Distinctions and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions As for Distinctions 1 We may consider Sin 1 in regard of its Causes Essicient and Final or 2 in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts Mater and Forme 2 We may consider the Permission of Sin which is either merely Negative or Positive and both as belonging to a Legislator or to a Rector 3 We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation These Distinctions being premissed we shal resolve our Question in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al Sin as other things has its Origine Causes and Constitutive parts The Causes and parts of Sin The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates touching the Origine of Evil or Sin and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius an acute Philosopher in his Commentaric on Epicterus C. 34. p. 175. c. And he seems to state it thus That Sin being a privation has no proper principe or cause though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him denie that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any Cause or Idea of Evils because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is an irregular passion or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin for as to is substrate mater Plato and his Followers grant that al good has its Causes Suarez Metaphys Disp 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel 1 That al Sin must have some Cause 1 Because nothing is Evil of it self therefore from some Cause 2 Because nothing is Evil but as it recedes from some perfection due to it but nothing fails of its due perfection but from some cause either Agent or Impedient Now 2 this being granted That al Sin has some Cause it thence necessarily follows That some Good must be the Cause of Sin For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause we must necessarily stop at some Good which is the cause of Evil. Hence 3 to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause we must know 1 that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause is evident because consisting in a privation and defect it is not properly and of it self intended in things Thus Simplicius in Epictet C. 34. pag. 174. tels us That al Act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does participate of Good and therefore Evil can have no end And yet that Sin may have a final Cause in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent is as evident because the Agent may intend what is Evil for some end for what is Evil in one kind may be conducible or utile in some other 2 As to the Efficient Cause al Sin has some Efficient Cause yet not per se of it self and properly but by Accident and beside the primary intrinsec intention of the Agent Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin by producing that Action to which Sin is appendent or annexed God is said to be the Efficient not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie 4 As for the constitutive parts of Sin namely its Mater and Forme 1 Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause or Substrate Mater which is alwayes naturally Good Whence that great Effate in the Scholes Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good Thence Augustin said That Evil cannot be but in some Good because if there were any pure Evil it would destroy it self And the Reason is manifest because Sin as to its Formal Reason is not a thing purely Positive neither is it a pure Negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due And must not this subject then be something naturally good Is not every real positive Being naturally good because the Effect of Divine Efficience Can any perfection be due to any Subject unlesse that Subject be naturally good 2 As for the Forme of Sin such as it has it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evil is the privation of Good or substance So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good as Darknesse is a secession from Light Of which see more B. 1. C. 4. § 1. and Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Indeed to speak properly Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause because it is a privation Thus Plato Rep. 2. and Proclus denie that Sin has any Formal Idea as before Yet according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason we make its Deordination or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof Hence 2. God not the Author of Sin Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin Thus Plato Repub. 10. saith That God is the principal cause of al good but as to sin he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no cause thereof because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion that God who is most good is the Author or moral cause of sin neither must we concede that any speak or hear any such opinion in the Citie if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel understood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin but only of
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man
Law of their natures apt to obey the first independent Cause namely God in the receiving or acting any possible effect that implies not a contradiction albeit it may excede the natural capacitie force or efficace of their Beings So that this obediential power regardes supernatural effects which the second cause cannot reach by its own Virtue and Activitie but only as elevated by the efficacious Concurse of God Thus the Humanitie of Christ had an obediential power to the Hypostatic Union unto which it was elevated by the supernatural efficacitie of the Spirit of God This obediential power which is essential to every dependent Being is founded in the participation and limitation of a Creature and its subordination to the absolute Dominion of God of which more anon Hence 4 every dependent Being is contingent For whatever has any passive or obediential power is obnoxious to the soverain pleasure and concurse of its first cause to which it owes absolute obedience even to annihilation Hence 5 every dependent Being is defectible For as it is essential to the first independent Being to be indefectible so also to al second dependent Beings to be defectible The supreme God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-being and self-sufficient a pure simple Act without the least mater or passive power it is impossible that he should ever fail in any thing but every Creature being Ens or Being by participation and so composed of Something and Nothing or of Act and Pfassive Power it cannot be but that it should be Defectible or apt to fail which is the root of its Dependence as it wil appear by the next Proposition § 4. The Origine of Dependence 1. Passive Power The Root and origine of al Creatural Dependence is the creatures passive power and Gods Absolute Dominion ever it 1. One Root and Origine of al creatural Dependence is that passive power which every Creature is invested with For the explication whereof we are to consider that all Creatures being educed by God out of Nothing stil retain a tincture or mixture of their Primitive Nothing so that no Creature can be said to be pure Being for this is an attribute peculiar to the first Independent Being whose name is Exod. 3.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who is or according to Plato's Phraseologie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being Every Creature has something of Nothing contempered with its Being yea more of Nothing than of Being which makes it obnoxious to Limitation Contingence Mutabilitie Defectibilitie and Dependence Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. L. 2. C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The increate being solely is interminate or unlimited in nature for every Creature is terminated or limited by God who created it Now al limits as to Nature and Essence speake a mixture of Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence resulting therefrom whence Damascene addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Deitie only is impassible namely because exemt from Nihilitie Passive Power and Dependence This Nihilitie or Nothingnesse of the Creature is the same with its Passive Power either Physic or Metaphysic Natural or Obediential whereby it is limited and confined to such or such a degree of Entitie Existence and Operation For where-ever there is any mater or passive power of any kind there is ever coarctation and confinement Nothing is or can be Infinite but the first pure simple Act who is void of al power and composition and therefore of al finitude and limitation But every Creature being compound of Something and Nothing i.e. of Act and Power it 's thereby rendred finite and limited to such a degree of Essence and Activitie and according to the Degree of its Entitie and Actualitie such is the Degree of its Amplitude and Perfection Angelic and human Spirits have of al Creatures least of Nihilities or Nothing and most of Entitie and Actualitie and therefore they have least of passive power and confinement But yet because they retain something of their Primitive Nothing and Passive Obediential power therefore they have something also of limitation and confinement So for al other Creatures which are by so much the lesse or more limited and confined in Essence and Operation by how much the more or lesse they partake of mater or passive power So that al Dependence ariseth from the Nihilitie Passive Power and limitation of the Creature Hence 2. Another main root of Dependence is the Dominion of God the first cause of althings For al Creatures having been educed 2. The Dominion of God by the Omnipotent Power of God out of Nothing and invested only with a finite limited Being composed of Something and Nothing or Act and Passive Power hence it necessarily follows that al are subject to the Absolute Dominion of their Creator and impedible according to his pleasure Where ever there is passive Power there is impedibilitie There is nothing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible but God who is Pure Act and Lord of all God has an Absolute Dominion over his Creature for al uses that implie not a contradiction This plenary and absolute Dominion of God appertains to his Infinite Omnipotence and Supremacie as the first Cause of althings For no Dominion is complete and perfect unlesse it include a Power for al possible use May we estime that a perfect Dominion which has not an absolute dispose of al under its Dominion And to this absolute Dominion of God must there not correspond an absolute subjection in the Creature Are not these two correlates And doth not this absolute subjection of the Creature to God speak its absolute dependence on God Is it possible that any Creature made by God should be exemted from his Absolute Dominion And doth not Absolute Dependence on God necessarily follow hence Neither doth this absolute Dependence on God regard only the Essence and Conservation of the Creature but also al its operations for otherwise the Creature were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible which is against the Law of its Creation and Dependence as § 11 12. Thus every Create Being is under the Absolute Dominion of God both as to its Essence Existence Activitie and Operation God can deprive it of each of these as he pleaseth yea reduce it to its first Nothing Hence Dependence on God as to each of these is essential to every Creature as in what follows § 5. Every Creature as such is Dependent on its Creator or first Cause Every Creature Dependent For the Demonstration of this we shal lay down this Hypothesis which I conceive al wil grant That it is impossible the same thing should be and not be This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition thus 1 Dependence both in Essence and Operation is so essential to a Creature as that the negation of it supposeth the Creature not to be a Creature The force and evidence of this Argument wil more fully appear in the explication of the next Proposition wherein we are to demonstrate the intime connexion
between Dependence and the Essence of a Creature At present it may suffice that we assert that Dependence is so intrinsecally essentially and formally included in the very notion and essence of a Creature that the negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject or an Opposite in an Apposite For what doth the notion of a Creature importe but its eduction out of nothing by the Infinite Power of its Creator And he that educed althings out of nothing is it not in his power also to reduce althings back to their primitive nothing And doth not this speak an obediential power in althings as to their Creators Soverain pleasure And where there is an obediential power is there not also subordination and subjection And doth not al this formally speak Dependence Thus Aquinas contra Gent. L. 2. C. 25. demonstrates That God cannot make a thing which shal want any essential principe for upon the remotion of any essential principe follows the remotion of the thing it self So that if God should make a thing without any one essential principe he should make a thing to be and not to be And in what follows he proves that dependence is an essential principe or mode of a Creature as Suarez and that not only as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to operation of which § 10. 2 The Creatures absolute subjection and subordination to God demonstrates its dependence on God That God has an absolute Dominion over the Creature has been demonstrated in the precedent Proposition and if the Dominion of God be Absolute then the Creatures subjection to and dependence on God must also be absolute and necessary It belongs to the Being of a Creature as such to be subject to and dependent on God for the receiving and acting whatever implies not a contradiction As it is impossible that God should make a Creature whereof he has not a ful and absolute Dominion so it is as impossible that a Creature should be made which may not depend on him as Suarez Metaphys Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 215. 3 The Indigences and Exigences of the Creature demonstrate its dependence on God Is not every Creature Multiforme Mutable and Defectible And must not every Multiforme Mutable and Defectible Being be reduced to some Vniforme Immutable and Indefectible Being as the Original principe of its dependence is there not a natural levitie and vanitie in every Creature which renders it fluxible variable and inconstant was it not a great and most true saying of Heraclitus That althings are in fluxe or motion Do not althings then need some first Being and Cause to fixe their Beings and Motions Again doth not every potential Being need some pure Act to actuate the same And is not every Creature a potential Being which needs God the most simple pure Act to actuate the same Doth not every Recipient as Recipient need the active influxe of that principe from wom it receives al And is not every Creature a mere passive recipient as to God who is the first influential Cause of its existence motion and al Yea is not every Creature a mere passive Instrument in regard of the Divine Influxe Can it subsist or act without Divine concurse Cut off the dependence of a Creature from its Creator and what an endlesse Agitation yea Annihilation would it fal into See Aquinas contra Gent. L. 3. C. 91. and Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. 4 The Dependence of the Creature on God may be demonstrated from its Connaturalitie What more connatural to the Creature than dependence on its Creator Doth not the Stream naturally depend on its Fountain for derivations and is it not a violence to it to be cut off from this dependence Where doth the infirme member go for animal Spirits in order to sense and motion but to the Head And is it not most natural to the Ray to hang on the Sun which gave it existence O then how natural is it to the Creature to depend on its Creator the prime Cause of its existence and operation What a violence is it to the Creature to be taken off from this dependence Hence § 6. Creatural Dependence is not really distinct from the Essence of the Creature Dependence the same with the Essence That the Creatures Dependence is not really distinct from its Essence is evident because every Creature being Ens by participation it must necessarily follow that dependence on the first cause from whom it participates of Being is most essential to it As it is essential to the first cause to be Being by Essence and so Independent so it is also essential to the second cause to be Being by Participation and so Dependent So that the very notion and Idea of a Creature doth inseparably essentially and formally include Dependence on God as that which is not really distinct therefrom This is incomparably wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 214. As to the root of this Dependence it must be said that it is really nothing else but the very essence of a create Being as such because if we by the force of our Intellect remove whatever is superadded to such an essence we shal find that of it self it has Limitation and Imperfection so that of it self it is not sufficient to act or cause any thing and therefore according to the absolute power of God there cannot be such a create Being which should not have such a subordination to the increate Being Therefore it is a signe that is founded in the very essential Reason of a create Being Wherefore albeit we may by the precision of Reason and some inadequate conception of mind apprehend Dependence in Essence in regard of some moment of reason before Dependence in causing yet this later really superaddes nothing to the Essence of a Create Being Wherein note wel that he makes not only dependence as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to Causation and Operation the same with the Essence of the Creature Which Hypothesis he demonstrates and establisheth against Durandus and his Sectators who assert the Creatures dependence on God as to Essence and Conservation but yet denie it as to causation and operation specially as to the substrate mater of sin It may not be denied but that Suarez in his first Tome of Metaphys Disput 20. Sect. 5. p. 530. saith That this Dependence of the Creature on the Creator is not altogether the same with the Creature but a mode distinct therefrom Yet these thing he grants 1 That this Dependence of the Creature on God is something really and intrinsecally existing in the Creature For al confesse that passive Creation is in the Creature But now Dependence is nothing else but passive Emanation or Creation if we speak of the first Creation from God 2 That this Dependence is a substantial or essential mode affecting the substance of the Creature albeit it constitute not the same 3 He
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause