answer that the consequence holdeth not of a metaphorical improper Instrument who hath somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality and somewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God besides the nature of a pure instrument such are sinners to God Therefore it holds not that the horse halteth ergo the rider halteth no nor causeth it Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove and the very same that I say The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all but only as it is Motion in genere so doth God by sinful acts That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another is not at all of God but that they are Actions in genere is of God 637. So p. 256. he well sayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be ascribed to the Writer nor the effect as from that fault nor of the Saw to the Sawyer And so of the Sabeans robbing Job And he asserteth p. 257. that Diabolus Impii homines sunt causae principales in actu peccandi And what need we more Remember then that sin is an effect and hath a Cause and to make man a Principal Cause in actu peccandi is not to deifie him And he saith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent he were the principal cause of sin But if you mean by moral impulse only commanding it let others judge whether Physical premotion be not much more than command And whether I cause not my pen to write though I command it not And quoad terminum to impel a man physically to moral acts is moral impulse 638. But the plausiblest argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin * * * Vid. Aureol in 2. d. 37. p. 300 301. shewing six wayes how sin is a punishment of sin without God's willing the sin But if we make it sin he will make it be a punishment ergo he willeth that the sin come to pass or be And indeed Augustine saith much contr Julian to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin But I answer this 1. Even these men themselves oft say that God willeth not the formale peccati but the materiale And forma dat nomen ergo he willeth not sin as a punishment in proper sence 2. Sin it self though denyed by many Arminians is verily a Punishment and more to the Sinner himself than to any other †††Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth 1. Omne peccatum est poena 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena viz. non prima 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris causa nisi ultimum fuerit posterioris And Bonavent there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth poenam damni sensus And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment the formale peccati being first and the formale poena next in the same act And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former as being an effect of it For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin Biel. ib. In a word God antecedently so formed nature that if we will sin that sin shall be our misery and as a voluntary self-wounding cause our pain and let out our blood and life And it is the most difficult part of the question how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself which yet I have plainly opened before and here repeat it To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities but are two Relations of one and the same Act but not as referred to one and the same correlate God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful in its forbidden mode and circumstances as Claudicatio equi before said but only in genere actus or hujus actus when two sins are compared But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment God is the Cause of both That is he maketh mans nature first and in that and by revelation his Law by which he first maketh mans duty and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it And next he doth by his threatning tell him that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it As if as aforesaid God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him ex natura rei And then commandeth him to avoid it And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it Here now God maketh the Man and the Law God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique or as that circumstantiated act But when the act is caused by Man God by his Law causeth two Relations to result first that of sin and then that of punishment So that man first causeth the sinful act and then that it is quid prohibitum and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before Now if God cause not that sin which is a punishment to our selves he causeth not that which is a punishment to others And yet supposing it he maketh it a punishment to us and them on several accounts 639. But though God cause not the sin yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and spirit if we sin without which grace and spirit we will sin If God now for former sin do deny us or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it he is morally and improperly said to cause that sin as a punishment because that penally he refuseth or forbeareth to save us from it and so permitteth it as is said 640. The Arminians grosly erre if he cite them justly Remonst in Script Synod art 1. p. 202. saying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obstinate and rebellious to sin by his penal judgement and yet those sins are not be reckoned to them for sins nor increase their guilt unless the word sin be used equivocally For to have sin and no sin are contraries Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to those acts which would be sin in others as he doth Bruits I leave to others 641. I am weary of pursuing this ungrateful dispute As to his controversie Q. Whether things be good because God willeth them or he will them because they are good against Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Justice and holiness because it is good or whether it be good because God willeth it It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious disputes about that which one easie distinction putteth past all controversie Of things ad extra Gods will is first the efficient and then the ultimate end as is oft said Gods will as efficient giveth first the Being and then the Order to all things or else they could never be
the Natural power in it self but by so doing formaliter relativè it maketh it no power ad hoc to the contrary in that instant Of which more anon § 10. Such grace of God as cometh from his Absolute Will or Decree of the due Event is never overcome For Gods decree is not frustrate § 11. Gods gracious operations are never overcome by any contrary Act but what he himself is the Agent Cause of as an Act For in Him we Live and Move and Be. Yet man is the only Cause of the Inordination of that act by which it is set in opposition to Gods other acts For God doth not militate against himself § 12. The case lyeth thus God antecedently to his Laws framed Nature that is the Being and Natural Order of all the World and so he became the Head or Root of Nature the first Cause who by his wise decree was to concurr to the end with that Natural frame and to continue to things their proper forms and motions And man is one of his creatures having a Nature of his own to which God as the God of Name doth Antecedently concurr By this natural concurse of God the fomiâ— cator the murderer the thief c. are naturally able to do those acts But being free agents that can do otherwise God maketh them a Law to restrain and regulate them And when they break this Law they resist that gracious concurse which suitable to the organical cause God conjoyneth with the means But they do this by their Natural power and activity not used as God requireth them but turned against his own Law So that if God would withdraw his sustentation and destroy mâ—ns Nature they could not resist his grace But that he will not do being his antecedent work and so God is resisted by his own-given-power and act disordered and turned against his grace § 13. The Will of God which is thus resisted is only 1. His Preceptive or Legal will de debito 2. And his will of purpose to give man so much help and no more by which he can and ought to believe and Repent is said to be resisted or frustrate so far when by mans fault it doth him not that good which it might have done § 14. Gods Grace and Spirit are said to be resisted when the Word and other Means are * * * That God doth govern inseriora per superiora and work by means not for want of them but from the abundance of his Goodness so as to communicate to his creatures the dignity of causality See Aquin. 1. q. 103. a. 8. q. 104. a. 2. Alexand. 1. p. q. 26. m. 5. a. 2. 3. m. 7. Albert. 1. p. q. 67. m. 4. a. 1. Richard 1. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Agid. Rom. 2. d. 1. p. 1. q. 2. a. 6. ibi Gabritl d. 1. q. 2. resisted which call him to his duty For these themselves are gifts and acts of grace § 15. But it is not the barâ— Word or Means alone but the Spirit working in and by those means which is so resisted For though no moâ—tal man can clearly know just how the Spirit concurreth and operateth by the Word and Means yet we may know that God doth limit his own operation to the aptitude of the means ordinarily and that he worketh with and by them not according to his Omnipotency in it self considered but according to the means or organs And as in Nature he operateth nor quantum potest but agreeably to the order and aptitude of Natural Causes so in Grace he operateth non quantum potest but according to the aptitude and order of the sapiential frame of Governing-means of grace § 16. When the preaching of the Word Education Company and other visible Means seem equal God hath innumerable means supernal internal external invisible and unknown to us by which he can make all the difference that he maketh in men So that we cannot prove that ever he worketh on souls without any second cause or means at all though we cannot prove the contrary neither And therefore he that resisteth all means for ought we know in so doing resisteth all Gods gracious operations on his soul § 17. * * * I know not how to find both sense and concord in the words of your Alvarez de Aâ—x l. 7. disp 59. p. 264. Eadâ—m contritio que est ultima dispositio ad gratiam in genere cause materialis antecedit illam In genere tamen causae formalis efficientis est effeclus ejusdem gratiae propterea quamvis non sit meritoria gratiae est tamen meritoria vitae aeternâ— Et p. 265. Contritio qua penitens disponitur ad infusionem gratiae habitualis est meritoria vitae aeternae ut Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. a. 2. ad 1. Ergo est effectus gratiae habitualis Nulla enim operatio hominis est-meritoria vitae aeternae nisâ— procedat à gratiâ— habituali ordine saltem naturae sit ea posterior How can the Act be the ultima dispositio to the infusion of that habit which it floweth from Unless he mean eadem specie and not numerically which yet is false For it is not eadem or else he falsly supposeth that the same Love of God may go before Grace Whereas Dr. Twisse so frequently asketh Whether Gods condional will and so his operation be Volo te velle modo velis or credere modo credas to give us faith if we believe and so maketh non credere or non velle to be the only resistance and the Arminians to be ridiculous in making the effect antecedent to the cause as a condition of the causation and itself This semi-subtilty though it beget voluminous confidence must cry peccavi if a little more subtilty do but detect the defectiveness of it We are not now enquiring of the Rationes fidem habendi but of the Rationes non habendi nor are we enquiring Whether God have made a Covenant or formal Promise of giving faeith upon antecedent conditions But whether he deny or give-not grace for actual faith effectual or sufficient to any but those that resist and wilfully omit the preparatory acts which they were able to perform even preparatory Volitons Or if you will make the question to be de ratisnibus fidem habendi not de causis Actus donandi Whether God do not ordinarily give or produce the act of faith in that soul which doth not wilfully resist and omit such preparatory acts as it could do even Volitions And so I answer 1. It is not I will give thee faith if thou wilt believe or I will make thee willing if thou be willing of the same thing But it is 1. If by resisting common preparing grace thou so harden â—hy heart or increase the privation of receptive aptitude in thy self as that the same degree of grace means help impress will not change thee which otherwise would
is the greatest Lover of Sin in all the world judge by their confuted words in the former Book 1. They deny not nor can do that Love and Volitiâ—â— in God are all one Gods Love is not a Passion but his Will 2. They say that God willeth that sin exist 3. And that as summè unicè conducible to his Glory 4. And that this great conducibility is a great good 5. That God is pleased finally in what he willeth antecedently 6. And that as God is infinitely above man in his Being so is he in the greatness and power and efficacy of his Volitions 7. And that man loveth not nor willeth not evil as evil or sin as sin but for inferior good infinitely below Gods Glory for which he willeth its existence And is not this to say that he is the greatest Lover of it that is C. Yet it sticks with me that God should be the Omnipotent Governor of the World and all Sin which is the common work of the World should be without or against his Will Providence is wronged by this B. You mistake the matter 1. That he decreed to leave any men ordinarily to their Free-will under moral Government was not from impotency as if he could have made man no better or more necessary an Agent But of his Wisdom and Freedom by which he made the Bruits without Reason and Stones without Sense 2. All sin is done against the Law or commanding Will of God which determineth only of Duty and not directly of Event But it is not done against his absolute Will de eventu For God is not overcome nor frustrate of his Decrees 3. I pray you once for all remember what I have told you in the first â—ook that Gods Providence doth about mans sin and then you will â—ot say that he is Idle or neglecteth his Government unless he cause Sin I. It is God that made man an Intellectual free Agent in his own Image and the Lord of his own Acts as a Creature morally governable by Laws And so all his free power is of God who still upholdeth it II. As God is the Fons Naturae he is the Principium motus and he concurreth as the first cause to all Action as Action in genere and so to all that hath a physical entity and reality in sin And I do not believe that Aureolâ—â— Duraâ—d or Lud. à Dola thought otherwise though they differ in expressing the mode of concurse III. God giveth men all the mercies which they turn to sin and is the cause of all those Objects which they inordinately love and abuse IV. God himself concurreth with Sinners in causing the same effects which they cause also by prohibited Volitions and Actions as in generation c. even when custom giveth one name to the sin and the effect And that by all the ways fore-named and many more V. God as the Worlds Governor and Benefactor maketh mens sins the occasions of much good and ordereth and over-ruleth all Wills and Events so as not to miss of any of his ends But will attain all his ends while the Sinner seeketh his own VI. All this that God doth he decreeth to do And all that Sinners do he fore-knew And neither his Wisdom Goodness or Power is ever over-come by sin or defective in any thing about it And is not all this enough for you but yet God must be the chief willer of sin C. I confess that God can govern the sinful World by this much B. Take in but one thought more which I afterward suggest Ockam laboriously endeavoureth to prove that the outward Act hath no peculiar sinfulness in it self distinct from that of the Will I have told you my Opinion of his tenet But this is granted him that no outward Act hath any sinfulness but secondary and participative as animated by the Will and that sin is primarily in the Will alone Now in abundance of the Scripture Texts alledged by Dr. Twisse and Rutherford it is not the Will of the Sinner that God is made the Author of but seemingly of the Act indeed of the Effect Now God cannot be the cause of any mans sin unless he cause the sinful Volition But I have anticipated our Dispute of Providence in all this because it is here usually handled as the matter decreed And therefore when we come thither you must excuse me from repeating it or pardon what you put me to do The sixth Crimination C. My next offence against them is that they make Gods Will and Decrees conditional and so make God dependent upon man B. This is opened in the Second Book * Vasquez in 1. Tho. disp 91. c. 1. Cum quaeritur an divinae praedestinationis detur causa qu. non est de actu divinae voluntatis quatenus est ipsa essentia divina res increata sic notant scholastici omnes clarum enim est divinae praedestinationis hoc modo non esse causam sed est de effectibus Et perinde est quaerere causam praedestinationis ex parte nostra atque causam aliquam totiuâ— effectus praedestinationis in nobis quae effectibus illis non sit annumeranda Nam si quidpiam ponitur effectus praedestinationis nequit illud ulla ratione esse causa totius effectus In Deo 1. Ipsa essentia Dei 2. Respectus rationis ad res cognitas et volitas Hic nascitur ex objectis Ejus igitur possunt esse causae Indeed they differ not from the Synodists or Dr. Twisse himself I think in this That is 1. They hold that God hath made conditional Donations Promises and Threatnings in his Word 2. And that God may truly be said to Will and Decree his own Word and all that is in it with its conditional mode 3. And as Aquinas and Twisse and all say Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc sed non hoc vult esse propter hoc Gods Will doth not depend on the Condition but Gods Will is that the Effect or Event shall depend on the Condition When the Condition is performed it is not a medium of Gods Volition but of the Effect 4. But yet this all must confess that as to the bare extrinsick denomination from the Object as Gods Will is variously denominated from things past present and future so it may be from absolute and conditional Grants and Promises which you will not deny but God hath made 5. And in case of sin and damnation sin fore-seen is an objective condition disposition or qualification sine qua non of such as Gods velle damnare is immediately terminated on as they confess at the Synod at Dort and Molinaeus there openeth in his judgment at large C. But this decreeing upon fore-sight of somewhat in man maketh God to follow the Creature and depend upon it B. It maketh him no way dependant at all For the Creature neither causeth any Act of God nor hindreth him from any thing which he would do It is
Possible and Future we must be very fearful and not unreverent and rash in ascribing such a dance or lusus of notions to God unless as used with great impropriety after the manner of weak man 70. God knoweth his own Power Knowledge and Will And so knoweth what he can do what he knoweth to be eligible and what he will do And if any will call this knowledge of God by the name of the Possibility or Futurity of the thing known or will denominate Nothing as an Imaginary something as Possible and Future relatively from Gods Power Will or Knowledge Let them remember 1. That Nothing hath no relation 2. That properly they should but give the denomination to that which is that is to Gods Power Will and Knowledge and say God Can e. g. make a World or Will do it and not to that which is not And when they say that e. g. the world is eternally possible or future they can justly mean no more but that God can and will make it 3. And that this is but lis de nomine and not a real difference whether futurition be thus from Eternity 71. And especially let them remember that nothing in God is Caused There are no effects in God Therefore as there is nothing from Eternity but God and therefore possibility and futurition must needs be names of God himself or some Divine perfection or conception which is himself if they be said to be eternal so such Possibility and futurity can have no eternal cause For God hath no Cause nor any thing in God 72. If the Futurity of sin must have an eternal Cause then God causeth Pennot l. 3. c. 14. citeth many Fathers saying that things are not future because fore-known but fore-known because future And Augustine Greg. M. Boetius Ansâ—lm Lomb. Aquin. saying the contrary And he citeth the four wayes of the Schoolmens reconciling them and concludeth that in regard of the Creatures being the first is true and in regard of free acts the second I think that in regard of sin neither is true Unless Because signifie only rationem denominationis objectivam And even if so it is dubious whether they be not simultaneous as Relations are the futurity of all sin But that is not so For none is the Cause that sin will be but he that mediately or immediately causeth the being of it when it is 73. Imagine per possibile vel impossibile that a thousand years hence a free created agent that can do otherwise will cause such an act It may be denominated Future without the taking in of any antecedent cause into the notion It is called Future because it will be and not because there is at present existent any cause from whence it will be mediately or immediately 74. Though Futurity be Nothing yet this Proposition is something This or that Will be And to know the futurity of a thing is most properly to know the truth of that proposition It will be 75. God knoweth not by Propositions for that is the imperfect mode of man But he knoweth Propositions when they are existent as humane instruments or conceptions And therefore he knoweth the truth of all true propositions of futurity 76. What man knoweth by Propositions God knoweth otherwise by a more transcendent perfect but incomprehensible way Therefore God knoweth that every thing will be which will be 77. There were â—o Propositions from Eternity For man that useth them was not And God useth them not though he know them as used by man Therefore this proposition Hoc futurum est was not from Eternity Because non entis non sunt affectiones 78. But if there had been such Propositions from Eternity as The world will be made Christ will be incarnate c. they would have been true And so the eternal Futurity of things as commonly disputed of can be nothing but the Eternal Verity of a Proposition de futuritione which was no proposition because then there was none only in time mans brain Imagineth or feigneth that then there might have been Creatures who might have used propositions de futuritione rerum which if they had they would have been true 79. All Verity is either 1. Rei 2. Conceptus 3. Expressionis And 1. Ubi non est Res ibi non est Veritas Rei The thing which was not from Eternity was not a True Thing from Eternity 2. The Divine knowledge that such and such things will be was True from Eternity by an incomprehensible way above propositions 3. If there had been any Propositions Mental or Verbal de rerum futuritione they would have been true And this is all that can truly be said of the Eternity of futurition 80. Only this being added that so far as Gods will was the first Cause determining of any thing that will be so far he was eternally the Cause of the truth of this proposition Hoc erit when such a proposition shall be 81. But where Gods Will is not the first cause of the Thing which will be there it is not his causing the truth of the proposition that is the cause that it will be Though his Knowledge be a medium from whence it may Logically be inferred that it will be 82. Moreover whatever is from eternity must be Res or modus rei or Relatio But from Eternity there is no Res futura no modus rei futurae no Relatio rei futurae * * * I know that the Judicious Greg. Arim. 1. d. 28. q. 3. pag. 122 c. asserteth these four things 1. That aliquid potest reserri realiter ad non ens 2. Non ens potest realiter referri ad ens 3. Quod Deus aeternaliter referebatur ad Creaturam quae non erat 4. Quod Deus realiter reserlur ad creaturam ex tempore And his reasons are very considerable for three of them But as to the second which concerneth our case he faileth For 1. his first reason that relations are ever mutual or convertible I deny his proof as vain as to the reality of the relation 2. And that res non existens is causa I deny Fuit causa non est 2. And remember that he instanceth only in things as caused or foreknown Sin therefore can be called future but as fore-known 3. Remember that his Master Ockam hath oft in Quodl proved that Relations are Nothing besides the quid absolution and Reason Being nothing but Comparabilitas all is but to say that God fore-knew what would be and therefore had there been such a proposition from Eternity as This will be it had been true Vid. Aquin. 1. p. d. 38. q. 1. a. 1. Bonav ib. a. 1. q. 1. 2. Durand 1. d. 38. q. 1. Scot. ib. q. 1. Cajet Bannes Rip Zumel Nazar Molin Vasqu Arrub. c. 1. p. q. 14. a. 8. Greg. Valent. 1. p. d. 1. q. 14. punc 5. s 3. Alvar. de Auxil disp 16. Snarez de Aâ—xil l. 1. c. 13.
no Power used to produce it which is not given by God 160. An Act as such hath no Morality in it but is quid naturale And so it is from God as he is fons naturae But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it referred to Gods Governing Will or Law and to his amiable Goodness or Will as it is mans End And Materially it is not the Act as such but the Act as exercised on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one or to an undue End rather than a due End or else the Omission of the Act as to the due End and Object which is the sin and the fundamentum of the sinfulness and so è contra 161. This Comparative mode of exercise addeth no proper Physical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as such In Omissions of Loving Trusting Fearing Serving God there is no Natural Act but a privation of it In committed sins to Love this Object rather than that hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this and no more than is in the general nature of Love as such A modus Entis is not Ens But this Comparative choice is but the Modus Modi entis For an Action is but Modus Entis and this is but a modus actionis 162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans that Man should be a Causa prima and so be God if he could determine his own will without Gods pre-determining pre-motion and there should be some being in the world which God is not the Cause of For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as such 163. If any will litigate de nomine entis let them call it Being or no-being as they please but it is such as God can make a Creature able to do And he that dare say that God Almighty who made all the World is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that under Divine Universal Influx without Divine pre-determining pre-motion on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it is bolder against God than I shall be And if God can do it we have no reason to doubt whether it be done 164. Men seem not in denying this to consider the signification of the word * * * It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. Twisse who oft saith that God denyed to Adam no grace ad posse but he denyed him grace necessary ad agere For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is necessary to the act Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. art 1. pag. 457. POWER when they confess that God giveth man the Power to choose or refuse and yet say that it is Impossible for him to Act by it without the said pre-motion If so It was only a Power to Choose when predetermined to it He that hath a proper Power to Choose is Able to Choose and Can Choose by that Power 165. God therefore is truly the first Cause of the Act by Giving the Power and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exercise And he is the first Cause of our Liberty in making us free-free-agents and he is the first Cause of the Moral Goodness of our actions by all that he doth by his Laws Providence and Grace to make them good But he is no way the first Cause of them as evil 166. When we say that God causeth the Act of sin as Causa universalis * * * Bellarmin's Universal Cause seemeth the same wiâ—â— what Durandus meaneth And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion saith l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter sequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia Multi enim Philosophi ut Plato Aristot â—gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium tamen non agnoverunt istud primum principium essâ— causam immediatam omnium esseâ—luum Causarum secâ—ndarum the sense of this word must needs be opened by this distinction A Cause is called Universal 1. In praedicando Logically And so Artifex is causa universalis rei artificialis Statuarius est Causa particularis Polycletus est causa singularis hujus statuae 2. In causande as to the effect And so that is an Universal Cause whose causality extendeth to many effects And this is two-fold 1. When it is the cause of some-what common to all those effects but not of all that is proper to each unless its causality be otherwise as by the dispositio recipientis determined And so the Sun is causa universalis of the sweetness of the Rose and the stink of the Dunghill c. And so God is the Causa universalis ut fons naturae by his common sustaining and moving Influx of all sinful actions 2. When it is the Cause of those actions not only as to that which is common to them all but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another and that of it self and not as determined by the dispositio recipientis or by any other cause And so God is the Universal Cause of all that is meerly physical in all beings and actions As in Generation c. which is properly to say that he is at once both Cause universalis particularis singularis And how far he is thus also the Cause of all the moral Good of all Actions I must open to you more distinctly in the third part But of the sinful morality of Actions he is not such a Cause but only a meer Universal as aforesaid 167. They that denying our self-determining power do make Volition and free-Volition to signifie the same and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the same act do seem rather to jeast than seriously dispute And to define Free-will to be only Lubentia vel Volitio secundum rationem is no other For Velle juxta rationem is no more than Velle the Will being the Rational Appetite distinct from the sensitive And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one why do we blind the World with words and do not plainly put the case whether man hath any will and not whether his Will be free And if to take away its Liberty or constrain it be nothing else but to make the same numerical act which is a Volition simultaneously to be no Volition or not the Volition of another thing the question whether the will may be constrained is ridiculous If the will be not forced as long as it willeth or willeth juxta rationem then to question whether it can will by constraint is to question whether it can at once will and not will †††Of this see Ie Blanks excellent Theses de lib. arbitrio absolut The definition of Alvarâ—â— of Free-will is lib. arbitrium est facultas voluntatis
528. 3. Others say as Camero that the Intellect necessitateth the will and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect and God causeth the Objects and Laws and permitteth the Tempter 529. 4. Others say that God only as the Cause of Nature 1. By Support and Concurse necessary to all agents causeth the Act as an Act in general 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects of which mens sins are also a cause 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil 6. But as to the sin it self he is no cause of it either as sin or punishment either of the form or of the Act as morally specified that is as it is about this Forbidden object or End rather than another And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth 530. Let it here be noted 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part in respect to the events which we see And unnecessaries are not to be asserted 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World and all therein 4. And yet to be no Author of sin Let us consider of the particulars 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent and therefore a self-actor under him and an Intellectual Agent and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone And a Free-willing Agent and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic nunc or to choose or refuse or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions which I acknowledged and enumerated before which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their servato ordine finis Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale it is of God as the first Cause of Nature * * * Vid. Gregor Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 8. 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. Mâ—tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse co-operatione determinatione nostra in operibus bonis at in operibus peccati etiam secundum substantiam seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determinationâ—m codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternitaâ—â— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante detâ—rminatiâ—nâ—m nostram ullo modo praevisam sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis Vid. Marsil in 1. q. 45. ar 2. post 4. conclus And so when a sinner acteth it is not without this Universal first Cause Whether God do it only as Durandus thought by the meer continuation of the nature of all things Active and Mobile or by any superadded concurse besides is nothing to our present business which only sheweth that God is the Cause 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil Every thing is turned into sin by sinners †††Titus 1. 15 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified Bad stomachs corrupt the wholsomest food All Gods mercies are abused to sin 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life or take it away lest they abuse it or deny men all those mercies or remove them which he foreseeth that they will turn to sin 535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth and so is as a concause of it with sin And this effect is so near to the Act of sin as that the sin it self is ost called by its name as if it were its nearest matter which it is not And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case that cannoâ— distinguish Of which more anon in the instances 536. V. And it is certain that God as the Governour of the World doth do much good by the occasion of mens sin But this is not to turn the sin it self into good 537. VI. And to these five operations of God I add as to his Volitions that all this which he doth he willeth or decreeth to do And he hath no contrary will at all 538. But that which we deny is that He is any proper cause of the sin it self efficient or deficient culpable or not culpable Physical or Moral For the opening of which we must enquire what sin is and what goeth to its being or constitution 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus Amabilissimus and that he is our absolute Owner And that as rational free agents we that are his own are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end and of obeying his Laws And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws with our denying God our selves as his Own and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End 540. As Logick hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot so that it 's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them so hath it done here Men may more easily know what sin is and what it is to disobey a Law and that either by doing what we should not or by not doing what we are commanded than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called Whether a privation or a relation an act or no act c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them and torment them for their sin 541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God For the soul is an Active nature and can no more cease all action than to be though it can forbear a particular act as to this object and at this time And God is the Cause of Acts as such 542. I have shewed before that as Action it self is no substance but the mode or motion of a substance so to choose this object rather than that hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other or than Ex to verb quod Dâ—us concâ—â— at nobiscum ad actum peccati prout facultas liberi
soever that God is not the Cause of sin except some odd presumers who are condemned by the generality One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia whom the Synod of Dort rejected Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod Beza himself in Rom. 8. 28. passim abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin Yea more very much more than wicked men or Devils are which is not true 578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second pre-moved predetermined Cause of the Act of Volition and Execution whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin His saying Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin when they are committed which they would not be without the Law 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat and is the first predetermining Cause even the total Cause of all that is in the act and all its circumstances without which predetermination it could not be So that man doth but will what God first willeth and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act as the pen in my hand 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result and hath no other cause 579. And note here what Estius before cited after Aquinas saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat is all that the Sinner himself doth when he willeth sin And therefore it 's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin and willing the event futurity and existence of it ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction For he willeth sin who willeth the existence of it or that it be or come to pass 580. And note that it is both matter and form Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat For it is sin And forma dat nomen It is not sin but by the form of sin But if they had said otherwise it had been all one For he that willeth the fundamentum relate and correlate Saith Twisse Vindic. Graâ— li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. Posito quod velit perâ—ectiones istas manifestare necesse est non impediat ingressum peccati sed permittat 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws and Illuminating men to know them without execution by the occasion of sin 2. Yet doth he make Christs death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would And is sin better or more necessary than Christs satisfaction 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical should not give so much to sin which were it a means as it is not but a Passive and opposite occasion is but a moral means And himself saith page 136. Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi â—inem à Deo praefixum At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum sive manifestandae Dei misericordiae sive justitiae Media enim ejus sunt naturae ut ad ea facienda movâ—atur quis ex intentione finis Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium as stone and Timber to an House And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae it is not so to Christs Rather if a beggar Want a house is that Want the Materia domus no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propriâ— dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordiâ— sive iâ—stitiâ— potiâ—s quam medium Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this 2. Permission it self is nothing being but non-impedire And is nothing or non-agere a proper means But especially I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed that it is the Permission of sin and not the sin that is the Divine medium only one saith Praedestinationis and the other providentia And yet they will differ while they agree And I that differ from both would agree with both willeth the Relation 581. There is nothing left to be said then but that God willeth that sin be done but not as sin or because it is sin But this is nothing For 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination or for seeming good 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God so doing is but one of their sins which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it and predetermined them to it so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God 582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice and so do not wicked men but for wicked ends or in enmity to God I answer That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat 583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente non faciente Answ The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law And why then do they put in the word permittente Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do but only permit when they mean no such thing For that is my second reason against them 584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin which is false For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause he cannot be said to Permit To do a thing and
delusion to pretend that you are accused for making God a sinner We charge no such thing on you But only for making him the chief insuperable cause of all the sins of men and Devils 655. Pag. 400. he plainly professeth that the Will as a physical agent is the cause of the act as physical and as under a Law and that act is against the Law so he is the cause of the Malitia actûs and culpablo So that God causing by his own confession both Act and Law there is no modest subtersuge left for his not openly professing that he asserteth God to be the cause of all sin the principal cause both as to matter and form 656. The rest of that Disputation striketh me with such horror in the reading that I confess I have not the patience to proceed any further â—n it nor shall further thus exercise my Readers patience The case is plain Either Hobbs or Free-will permitted must carry the cause in the case of sin There is no middle way He that will read Ruiz and Rutherfords answer impartially needeth no more of mine for the confutation of his vain responses 657. But cap. 29. p. 484. he falleth also on our most Learned and Judicious Dr. Field because in his lib. 3. c. 3. of the Church he contradicteth his opinion and it must move just indignation in the Reader that he addeth idque probare conatur contra reformatas Ecclesias Unworthy injury to the Reformed Churches more than to the worthy Dr. Field How falsly are they interessed in your unhappy cause See the Synod of Dort where there is not a word for it Is one Twiss with his Rutherford or Maccovius or a few such the Reformed Churches Let the Reader peruse the Articles of the Churches of England Scotland France and all the rest and see where he can find your Doctrine of Predetermination unto sin Even Jansenius himself is against it among the Papists when his Dominican Predecessors are the Fathers of it Nothing more common with English Divines than as you did before your self to explicate Gods causing the acts of sinners by the similitude of the Riders spurring a halting Horse or the Suns making a Dunghill stink which only speak the cause which we call universal and is the very thing which we assert And it is most unsavourily done to get into the Chair and magisterially say Fieldus vir alioqui doctus in his controversiis minime se versatâ—â— esse prodit Zumelem * * * Zumel in Disp 1. Thom. de Voluntat hom lib. arb pag. 219 220. Quod Dâ—â—s non sit causa peccati though he speak cautesously and as in other mens names yet concludeth plainly that God is but the Causa Universalis of sin and that man is the specifying determining cause even que universalem determinat ad speciem concursus actus ipsius sive solum determinet eam formaliter ad speciem c. Yet this is a high Thomist and defender of absolute grace non satis intelligit quippe non satis gâ—â—rus controversiarum Arminianarum scripsit dum aulam Arminiâ—â— plus aequo faventem haberent †††Thus magisterially did good Dr. Twisse censure Junius and Vossius his Son-in-law as men unskilled in Scholastick Divinity who were both most excellent men and hit upon the reconciling truth above most in their age Junius his Discourse of predetermination is one of the first that ever I found that excellency in and with his Irenicon is most worthy of great esteem But how easie is it for a man to overvalue himself and contemn another I highly value the piety in Mr. â—â—therfords Letters I am no fit arbiter ingeniorum But when I hear other men say that one Field was more Judicious than many Rutherfords I câ—â—fess by reading their several writings I find no temptation to deny it And why should Field and consequently Davenant Usher Carlton Mâ—ton Hall the Synod of Dort and I think the far greatest part of Protestants I verily think fifty if not an hundred for one who are against you be made odious by the supposition of being not far enough from Arminians rather than Maceovius Twisse and Rutherford take it for a disgrace to hold the same opinions against Gods Holiness which the Dâ—â—nican Fryars hold who have been the bloody Masters of the Inquisition and murdered so many thousand Protestants or Waldenses and Alligenses And that which he saith of Fields writing when the Court favoured Arminianism is notoriously false and such insinuations unworthy of so good a man as the speaker Fields Works were printed singly before they were printed together in Folio And his fifth Book was printed Aâ—no 1610. and the words cited are in the third printed before And the Synod of Dort was called An. 1618. and sate 1619. also And King James was a zealous suppressor of Arminianism and sent five or six Divines thither to that end And long after in King Charles his dayes Pet. Heylin in the life of Archbishop Laud will tell you that the Arminiâ—â— Bishops then were but five Neale Laud Buckeridge Corbet and Howsâ—â— to whom Learned Montague was after added So that they durst not trust their Cause with a Convocation Field then shall be a most Judicion worthy Divine when partiality hath said its worst 658. And what is his error Why he saith that it 's a contradiction to say that God causeth the Act in all its state which is the Materialâ— peccati and causeth not the formale which is inseparable A foul error indeed to tell you that he that causeth the subjectum fundamentâ—â— rationem fundandi terminum causeth the relation and that he that maketh an European white and an African black causeth the dissimilitâ—de and so doth he that maketh the straight Rule and the crooked line thâ— forbidding Law and the forbidden act 659. Were it not that the necessity requireth such work because such Books are in mens hands I should think I had injured the Reader by thâ—â— much For my work is not to confute Books but to assert sure reconciling truths Otherwise the confutation of the rest of that Book for Gods willing and causing all forbidden acts in their full state and the existence of sin is most easily answered SECT XX. The old Reconciling Doctrine of Augustine Prosper and Fulgentius And first Prosper ad Gallorum Qu. 660. IT is a strange thing to me that when Pelagius Julian Faustus c. thought Augustine a Novelist and as Usher asserteth would have fastned the title of Predestination-Hereticks on his followers and almost all confess that Augustine was if not the first yet the most notable publick Vindicator of absolute Predestination and Grace yet the Judgement of Austin with his Disciples Prosper and Fulgentius doth not serve turn to quiet if not to end these controversies among those who profess to be their followers when as they have so copiously and plainly written upon the
to make a difference 3. The means much differ which several men have And God usually operateth according to the means upon the soul § 5. If the question be either of the Act or Habit it is no question For that were but to ask Whether all men have equal faith love and other graces which common experience denyeth § 6. Whereas some will stick at my mentioning a Divine Impress on the soul in nature antecedent to Act and Habit I would have them remember that either there is such a thing or not If there be I rightly mention it If not we are instantly at an end of all this sort of Controversies and Calvinists and Arminians cannot differ if they would For then the question must be only about that which is past question viz. 1. Either about Gods Act as in Himself which is his simple Essence 2. Or about the Act and Habit of Faith Love c. in Man which all the World knoweth is not equal For all men have not faith For as for pre-disposition the question will be revolved to the same point It is certain that all are not equally disposed and it is certain that Gods Acts as in him are his Essence SECT X. Whether the said Operation be Physical or Moral § 1. THis paltry question is worthy but a few words though â— make too much stir Of the sense of the words Physical and Moral having spoken before I will not repeat it here 1. If the question be de operatione ut est actus agentis before the effect it were but to ask Whether Gods Essence be Physical or Moral which is unworthy an answer § 2. 2. If the question be of the Action of second Causes as the Preacher c. if truly Acts they are both Physical as they are really actus naturalis and moral as they are the acts of free intellectual agentâ— But the Acts of Laws and other objects meerly as objects on man are called Moral Acts because they are but nominal but indeed are no Acts and therefore neither Physical nor Moral For they are but signa and significare is not agere but is only an objective aptitude by which an Intellectual agent can â—difie it self All the Books in my Library teach me without any Action by being signa objectively to my active Intellect § 3. 3. If the question be of the Divine Impress on the soul it is quid reale and therefore physicum And it is moral as it is the principium actus moralis The same is to be said of our own Acts and Habits They are physical and moral accidents And they cannot be moral unless they be physical § 4. But it must be known that to be quid naturale and quid morale formally differ as Actus qua talis and ordo qua ordo do differ ab ordine seâ— Relatione ad Legem ad finem morum and Moralitas est actus Physici vel privationis Relatio viz. ad Regulam finem morum § 5. But if the question be not of the Morality of the Act but the Morality of the Cause viz. Whether Grace or divine action do cause Physically or Morally I answer plainly that There is no true Cause which is not Physical A moral Cause not physical is but Causa reputata vel â—â—minalis Objects are usually said to Cause morally But if they be meerly objects they cause not efficiently at all but by termination only materially constitute the Act in specie But some things vulgarly called objects as Light Heat c. are Active and so effect And he that doth proponere objectum doth indeed effect by speaking or doing But he doth not effect any thing by the object on the mind as it is a meer object But the Vox loquentis doth more than present an object It doth by agency suscitate the Spirits and operate on the organs of sensation And many mercies afflictions and other means forementioned have their several wayes of active operation But it is readily confessed that nothing corporeal can by any direct efficiency operate on a soul but only Active Spirits like it self Remember therefore that I take the word Physical here as the Schools do largely as comprehending Spiritual or hyperphysical And I plainly say de nomine that Gods operations of Grace are to be called Hyperphysical in respect to God the Agent and Physical as they are Physical effects on man and Moral as the same are in instanti secundo also moral effects And that they are called Moral in two usual senses 1. In that it is Morality or Virtue that is produced by them 2. And in that objects being much of the Means the operation or efficiency of objects as objects is properly none at all They do but materially as it were constitute the Act and terminate it and occasion it as sine quibus non which many call a Moral Reputative Metaphorical Causation And yet diversification is much by objects § 6. If this stumble any who look not at the greater inconveniences on the other side and occasion them to think that it is little efficient operation which we own in the collation of faith and conversion I desire them to consider well 1. That it is no new substance at all that is to be produced but a pre existent substance and faculty to be actuated 2. That it is not an Act as such in genere that is to be caused by Grace but the due ordering of acts as to right objects c. 3. That the soul as such is an Active Spirit not indifferent between Action and cessation but as naturally prone to Act as the earth to rest and as a stone in the air to descend and as the Sun to move and shine so that it is never one minute out of Action even in this earthen tabernacle from its first being to the last breath day or night Though in different manner 4. That God as the God of Nature doth uphold the soul in this Active Nature affording it that Concurse or Influx necessary thereto which in Nature he made due to it As he doth to the Sun in its action and to the souls of Brutes So that Activity as such distinct from the due order of it is given by God in Nature 5. And God hath placed the soul in the Universe as a wheel in a Watch where it must needs have some effects of the co-operation of Concauses or superiour agents 6. And Angels and Devils who have very much to do with our souls do work as Voluntary Agents in Political Order though not without the regulation of Gods Law or Will 7. And God can do what he will on souls without any second cause though whether he do so or what we know not 8. All this being supposed for Efficiency objects duly qualified may do much for the Order of Acts though properly they do nothing so that though they be but ut Materia ad formam occasions sine quibus non yet the reasons
by the effect it must be described Efficacy is Aptitudinal which is the force and fitness of the Efficient Cause Or Actual which is Efficienty it self § 7. Aptitudinal efficacy is 1. In God 2. In the means And 1. In Gods Absolute Power 2. In his Ordinate Power § 8. 1. Gods Absolute Power is Omnipotency or Infinite and therefore was aptitudinally efficacious to make a world before it was made § 9. 2. Gods Ordinate Power is the same Essential Omnipotency denominated from the Connotation of those effects which he hath decreed to produce according to the limited aptitude of second Causes and means or the disposition of the recipient or at least as limited in the effects by his meer free will § 10. In these respects though still Gods power in it self be Omnipotency yet in the limited way of operation it is various 1. As Gods Will quoad terminos is various 2. And as the means are various 3. And as the Receivers capacities are various To one the same operation ex parte Dei mediorum though not from the same Decree is abundantly efficacious and to another not § 11. And thus God so limiteth the effect of his Power as that it shall be effectual sometime on a Condition to be freely performed by man receiving it even by a former help and not absolutely § 12. Therefore all that is Aptitudinally efficacious is not actually efficient of every effect to which it was thus apt § 13. The aptitudinal efficacy of the means being of God falleth in with his ordinate power herein and is not the thing in question § 14. The effects in respect to which Grace is called efficacious are 1. The Giving of the Means themselves 2. The first Impress on the soul 3. The altering of the souls Disposition 4. The production of the act 5. And of the Habit. And it must be some of these effects which are called efficacious or inefficacious to others So that by that time the state of the Question is truly opened this which Dr. Twisse saith Arminius durst never speak out his opinion of and which he and others make to be the very heart of all these Controversies perhaps will appear to be nothing § 15. For what is that Grace whose efficacy you enquire of â— Is it Gratia operans or operata The efficient cause or the effect If it be Gods Gratia operans it is either the Prime Cause or the second Causes If it be the Prime Cause it is Gods essence only Even his Essential Power Vasquez in 1 Tho. â—â—â—â— 19. disp 8c p. 5â—â—â—â—â— Voluntas libera Deâ— â—â—â—â— essentia Divina significata per modum actus vitalis affectus eliciti cum revera sit ipsamet substantia Dei includit tamen habitudinem etiam qúandam rationis ad res futuras quae liberâ— Deo convenit sient etiam res libere futurae sunt Cum enim haec relatio consurgat ex fundamentis non necessaries â—â—â—â— ex rebus ipsis objâ—â—â—â— futuriâ— ipsa etiam habitudâ—â—â—â—â—re Deo convenit non intrinsicè sed extrinsecâ— solum denominationâ— quam Deo convenire non conveâ—ire â—on est absurdum Ergo cum Velle liberam Dei non solum includat essentiam sed cum tali respectâ— â—ti-â—â—sâ— libera Volunt as possâ—â— Dâ—o adesse abesse niâ—il sequitur absurdi quod divina simplicitati immutabilitati repugâ—et This little is all that they can tell us what Gods free Volition of extrinsick effects is And can you tell us any more Bradwardine denying in God any executive power besides meer Volition though he call him oâ—â—nipotent antecedently to his self-knowledge and Volition doth make Grace â—x parts Dâ—â— to be nothing but his Will that we shall do the act and be such and â—â—ch Intellect and will And is that the Question Wherein consisteth the efficacy of Gods essence Why it consisteth in it self if you mean Aptitudinal efficacy It is Gods essential Virtue If you mean Actual efficiency that speaketh the effect of which more anon So that about Gods essential efficacy there is no Controversie § 16. But if you say that It is his Potentia quà ordinata and not quà essentialis vel absoluta that you enquire of the efficacy of Remember that the word Ordinata or Limited signifieth no alteration in Gods Power at all but only An effect which as Limited and ordinate from whence the Power causing it is extrinsecally so named Gods essential Power is never limited but Infinite and to be Ordinate is but to have ordinate effects So that still either the Controversie must be of Gods essence which is past Controversie or of some second cause or some meer effect § 17. And if you transferr the Question to the efficacy of second causes 1. You will deny your selves that means and second causes have any power but from God 2. And that the very nature of those causes is sufficient to the ascertaining of the effect because they cause mostly morallyâ— And it is one of the accuâ—ations against the Aâ—minians right or wrong that they lay all on moral suasion or causality 3. And second causes are so numerous and unknown to us that we are uncapable of judging well of their efficacy 4. But it is I think agreed between you that the force of Means or second causes in Conversion is not such as necessitateth the will Or if some of the Schoolmen and Jesuites which with their Scientia Media do joyn Gratiam per congruitatem mediorum efficacem do make this efficacy to be the chief cause of the effect yet they deny it to cause necessarily at least alwayes when the effect followeth And what if we add that objects effect not as such And therefore this question de efficacia causarum secundarum must extend to some second effective Agents and not only to objects as such nor to those that preach present and offer objects as such And what that Agent Cause must be under God by that time you are agreed you will find that they are new Controversies that will there rise up before you And yet I think that if we will needs wrangle about the efficaciousness of any cause foregoing the first effect it self on the soul it must be of the efficacy of some or all these second causes or we must question whether God be God For I can find nothing else to question § 18. It remaineth then that the question Wherein the efficacy of Grace consisteth must be meant of Gratia operata even of the effect it self And then either you mean that this effect is efficacious to it self or to something else The first is such a contradiction as is not to be imagined that you should think that an effect is its own cause and ask How doth faith e. g. cause it self Therefore there is nothing left but only to question How the first effect of God on the soul in its conversion is efficacious of the second § 19. And here 1.
saith is not willed by the sinner himself § 33. So far as God Causeth not sin he willeth it not and they that say that he Loveth and Willeth the existence of it as a means to his glory abuse Gods Moliness and are confuted before Par. 1. § 34. How God overruleth sinners and the effects of sin and procureth his own ends not by the Means or Causality but Occasion of it I have so largely there opened that I must refer the Reader thither SECT XX. How far God and how far Man himself is the Cause of Hell and other punishments THough somewhat be said of this in the Conclusion of the second Jo. Major in 4. sent d. 50. fol. 289. q. 1. inquit concl 3. Sive actus damnatorum dicantur mali culpâ— vel peccata non patientur aliquam poenam inflictam ratione illorum actuum Quia non sunt in statu merendi demerendi sed addit Signanter de poena inflicta loquor quae à culpa distinguitur ejus est reordinativa per cruciatum De poena enim acta non est possibile dare culpam quin suam poenam habeat annexam eo modo quo idem potest habere se Ipsa scilicet peccandi continuatio est poenae miseriae continuatio Nec mihi probabile videtur quod Demerendi ratio cessat apud inferos Praemium quidem mereri non possunt At quare non Poenam commereri sunt putandi Nonne adhuc sunt subditi etiam ipsi daemones sub quadam Lege ideâ—que peccandi adhuc capaces nonne omne peccatum suâ naturâ meretur poenam Ipsius scilicet Joh. Majoris ibid. Conclus 1. Est Damnati habent multos malos actus in inferno libere An opâ—abilius sit damnà tum esse an non esse vide quae ibidem sequuntur ubi concludit Itaque tenco si daretur viro optio vel non esse vel esse in perpetua flamma quod licitè posset vel alterutrum eligendum est non esse Nam minus malum habet rationem boni See Aureolus in 2. d. 31. a. 2. pag. 301. shewing ten wayes how one sin causeth another and so multiplyeth and continueth it self in the wicked Part I think meet to say more here because I find that the not understanding it doth tempt many to unbelief and others to hard repining disaffected atheistical thoughts of God § 1. Again here consider that God made man such as he is in Nature before either Laws or sins or punishments had any being so that if you can but forgive God for making you men that is Rational Free-Agents you can have no fair pretence of quarrel with him As will appear by these considerations following § 2. Mans Body and sensitive soul are of such a nature as that things inconvenient will be his pain He that will take poison shall be griped and tormented by it and he that will eat unwholsome meat or will surfeit shall be sick and he that will cherish diseases by sloth or excesses or abuses of nature will have the pain of them And he that will wound himself or break his bones will be his own afflicter And he that cuts his throat or hangeth himself must dye And all this without any doing of God besides the making him a man and continuing such a nature under his Government in and with the world § 3. Not only positive hurting but omissions will bring mens bodies unto pain and death As not eating not exercising not keeping warm c. And consequently such a life of prodigality or sloth as tendeth to such wants § 4. The inward senses Imagination and Passions are so constituted as that their inconveniences will be a pain and torment as well as the inconveniences of the outward senses 1. Cares and Melancholy thoughts are distracting 2. Desires breed such care and are themselves like a thirst or hunger to the soul 3. Fears are tormenting 4. Sorrows if deep and long are as a living death 5. Anger is a vexatious feaver of the mind And revengeful malice and envy do prolong it 6. Despair anticipateth eternity of misery c. 7. And Love it self how pleasing soever at first is the strength of them all § 5. The superiour faculties as they are more noble are capable of greater misery and their corruption and disorder is the worst To have an ignorant erring mind that taketh evil for good and good for evil To have a carnal malignant wicked obstinate froward Will and sinful Affections and by these to have mens actions misguided and so the sensitive soul it self brought into the foresaid misery through bad government is a misery to man in the Nature and immediate effects of the thing § 6. Man liveth among multitudes of fellow Creatures in the world which will all be tormentors of him if he will make them such As a post will hurt him if he knock his head to it The fire will burn him if he touch his flesh with it The water will drown him if he will leap into it over-head The Sun will scorch him the frost will pain him if he expose himself to them A Lyon or Mastiff will tear him if he avoid them not His neighbours will hurt him likely if he hurt them and cross their interest Men in power will hurt him if he offend them And all things will be to him as he behaveth himself to them § 7. All this being Natural let us now consider what sin doth to the sinner here and you will find that almost all his calamity consisteth in his very sin it self and the natural effects of it But yet it is sin as mans and it is punishment as from God when yet God is no Cause of the sin § 8. This is plain if you consider that Gods Act by which he maketh sin a Punishment was Before the sin though the Relation of a Punishment come after the relation of sin Here are two Agents 1. God making Nature and a Law therein 2. Man disordering his actions by transgressing 3. Hence Immediately followeth Guilt or the form of sin 4. And with it even in the change or after it the natural pain of loss or hurt 5. And this is Related to man as a punishment for the sin in the last place For instance God made man and God made meat wine and poyson God telleth Man in Nature I have made thee such a Creature as that excess of Meat will make thee sick excess of Wine will make thee mad and Poyson will torment and kill thee I have given thee self-love and command thee that thou avoid all these and I will not deny thee necessary help But if thou wilt not it will be thy pain which I will that thou suffer for and by thy sin I need not further apply it here the application is obvious § 9. All this I speak only of natural punishments which by the Law of nature follow sin what is supernatural is after to be considered §
charge them not to say all the words which I here lay down but only that the reason why I my self do above all others shun their principles is because I take this following to be the true sense and complexion of them which I must also believe if I do believe them And I suppose the Reader to be acquainted with their own words and to have their Books at hand * * * At least that he have read Bradwardine and Alvarez and Dr. Twisse and Rutherford de Prov. Better saith Joh. Racon in 1. sent d 40. art 2. Deâ—s aliqua futura non vult vâ—lie efficaci sed soluâ— permissive respectu sic productorum voluntas divina est Causa per Generalem trâ—buens agenti particularâ— facultatem agendt sic vel sit non tamen determinat agens ad aliquam neque efficienter vult banc vel illam istâ— modo Voluntas divina est causa actuum nostrorum quantumcunque deformium Talium actuum est causa determinans Voluntas humana praesuppositâ influentiâ generali Del Unde ideo pecco quia volâ— pèccáre ità quod actus voluntatis mâ—ae est jam determinans me ad peccandum And Gab. Biel post Scotum Ità est caâ—sa effectiva rectitâ—dinis quod quantum est de se daret illam actâ—â— sâ— voluntas cooperaretur Universaliter enim quicquid Dâ—us dedit antecedenter daret etâ—am consequenter qâ—antum est ex sâ— si non esset impedimentum Vcluntas autem quantum est ex sâ— non dat rectitudinem actul Gal. in 2. d. 37. a. 3. q. 1. dub 1. Ità Okam in 1. d. 46. 38. ferâ— iisdem verbiâ— Orbellis m. 2. d. 37. ita Fr. Mayro 1. d. 37. q. 1. ad 4. q. 2. ad 4. q. 3. concl 4. Greg. Arim. 2. d. 37. q. 1. a. 3. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 12. alil quamplurimi â— Bradwardine l. 1. c. 34. p. 300 301 c. speaketh too plainly to this purpose with Hugâ— 1. de Sacâ— 4. part 1â— being more careful to make people think well of his Deus vult malum than to deny it Non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur sâ—d quia quod bâ—ne dicitur non recte iâ—telligitur And his mollification is that God willeth sin only secundum quid for Gods Velle simplicâ—ter as it 's commonly taken is to Love and approve it as good and to reward it And because the Vulgar so take it we must not before them say that God wiâ—â— leth sin because they too much abhorr it No act is unjust simply but all just and all the consequents of it just in respect of God the Author Therefore simply in the Universe there is no sin or deordination God willeth sin as a Physicion doth poyson in his medicine for the exercise of the good the punishment of the evil the contemplation of the beauty of the world He is not the author of evil as he is of good for of that he is the sole giver of faith charity c. creating it And God constraineth not men to sin against their wills nor doth he cause it unjustly and culpably c. Is not this meer Hobbs 1. Doth God will any thing but good Is not sin good then if he will it 2. Is Gods not Rewarding it a not willing it What if he rewarded not men for loving him You feign God to will and cause all sin and then damn men for it and then prove that he is not culpable or did not properly will it because he damned men for it 3. Do you not make God as much the cause of evil habits and acts as of good when you make him the total cause of all that is in them 4. Do you not say that the sinner doth evil for good ends and not for evil as well as God 5. Is not man an agent in Loving God as well as in hating him 6. Is it any better to make a man sinful and miserable by making him willing than to make him so by force against his will Nay could a man be made a sinner by force without making him willing Is it not a contradiction 7. Why call you it poyson which God maketh a medicine of You mean not that there is any evil in it which God caused not as you say more immediately than man and so that God first made it poyson and then put it into his medicine 8. And why are you afraid of speaking your opinion to the world Is it not because you are conscious that you speak against the common principles of nature in which the vulgar are founder than your self 9. And much of this is because you cannot tell how God punisheth sin with sin unless he cause sin What if by the Law of nature in Creation he ordain that he that is a glutton shall be sick and that Arsenick shall corrode his bowels that eateth it c. and drinking too much Wine shall breed the Gout c. Doth he therefore cause men to eat and drink too much or is not the excess from them and yet the penal relation and consequents from God And suitably to all this he defineth Grace and Free-will viz. Grace effectual without which no one sin can be avoided is Gods will that it shall be done And so no man can any more do any thing than what he doth than he can make a world And free-will li. 2. c. 1. is Potentia rationalis rationaliter judicandi voluntarit exeâ—quendi so that to will and freely to will is all one And so man is moved to every sin by necessitating premotion to do it freely that is he is made willing that is sinful So c. 32. In omni nonactione Deo creaturae communi prius naturaliter est Deum non-agere quam ipsam quia Deus certam actionem per creaturam non agit ideo creatura illam non agit non è contra So that all omissions of faith repentance obedience c. are fully resolved into Gods first non-agency p. 611. Quis nesciat quod quia Deus non fecit unum Angelum aliam Stellam coelum majus ideo non facta sunt Ità quioquid non fit à causa secunda Deus vult non fieri non vult positivé Scilicet habet nollâ— illud fieri ab ta Prius ergo naturaliter causaliter est Deum nolle positive quare non vâ—lle non facere causam secundam agere quam ipsam non agere This is plain dealing All men that Love not God and all that hate him are such because God will have it so and make them do as they do It would save many tedious volumes and intricate disputes if all would speak as plainly But what is the Christian Religion then I. Their fundamental Principle is that It is naturally Impossible for any agent Natural or free to do any act or vary any comparatively or
circumstantially but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency as the first Cause besides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and concauses and affordeth them his general Concurse or premotion to the act as an act in genere only And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermined by physical premotion not to act in all the circumstances that it is so moved to act in II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances or can forbear to act when so predetermined is by consequence to say that such a creature is God the first cause For it is as impossible as to be God or to make a World III. Yea the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to must be stronger than God and overcome him or do contradictions IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion he could not have known any future acts No though with Scotus we say that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience it would not serve unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them V. Yet we will say that the Will is free but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth and his Willing is not a Nilling VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis rationis â—d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum ad agendum unum vel alterum sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur That is it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will by making it will yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive but also Active because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth God predetermineth the will to determine it self VII We will call this the wills Power but it is but hypothetically a Power viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it else not at all As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them or rather as the hand can move if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it VIII The will is said to be free partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God and then by it self ad utrumlibet and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction IX The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God is not constrained because it willeth not unwillingly that is so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant X. Yet the will that was one way enclined habituated and acted in the precedent instant is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant which it could not resist As he that in this instant wilâ—eth Chastiâ—y may in tâ—e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipâ—tency to will fornication or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by God to hate him the next moment But we will not call this irresistible efficiency coaction because it is ad Volendum and so in ipso actâ— there is no reluctancy or resistance XI When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill or not will to will this or that and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such yet the moral specification of that Act to this proposed object rather than that as to hate God rather than to hate sin or to this Act rather than to that as to hate God rather than to Love him or to speak a lye rather than the truth hath so much Entity in it that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say that man can do it without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion XII God made the Law which forbiddeth sin and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law and God made and ordereth all the objects temptations and concauses and God by the said efficient physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances As when David was deliberating Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it or else he could not possibly have done it And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum fundamentum terminum nor can it possibly be but it must exist per nudam resultantiam hisce positis And yet though God make the man the Law the act the object and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a meer relation we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin XIII Yea though the Habits of sin are certain Entities and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature according to our principles who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity yet we are resolved to say that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin XIV Yet we will say that he is an enemy to Gods Providence that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness unless God thus predetermine both Will Tongue Hand and every active part to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale but not as to the formale And yet we must confess that the Relation is caused by causing the subject foundation and term all which God principally doth and can be caused no otherwise XVI But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation which is nothing Therefore man and not God is the cause of it For God cannot be a deficient cause nor have any privation And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience in curvity as in rectitude in disconformity as in conformity 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations such as death is though not a subject of them even such a cause as they can have 3. Nor that some of ours even Alvarez say that sins of commission and habits are positive in their formale 4. And sin is such a Nothing as is mans misery and he is damned for and by And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause man can no more be the cause of it than God 5. And that the Reason of non existences negations or privations is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the first necessary cause of the contrary as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency And if a man cannot
this hold for my part I must confess that I think the Religion which agreeth with it must neither be so good as Dr. Twisses Rutherfords Bradwardines or Alvarez's nor yet so bad as Hobbes's or Spinosa's but just such as Mr. Sterry's or the old Platonick or Stoick Philosophers I mean not such as Mr. Sterry's was for I hear he was an excellent person but such as his Book though obscurely intimateth And if any of that judgement have a better or worse it is not in consistency with his own principles FINIS Catholick Theology The Second BOOK The SYNODISTS and ARMINIANS CALVINISTS and LUTHERANS DOMINICANS and JESUITES Reconciled OR AN END OF THE CONTROVERSIES ABOUT GODS DECREES and GRACE and MANS FREE-WILL MERIT c. If men are willing A RETREAT TO THE MILITANT DIVINES WHO HAVE TOO LONG WARRED ABOUT WORDS and UNREVEALED THINGS and KEPT THE CHURCH OF GOD IN FLAMES and DRAWN CHRISTS MEMBERS TO HATE REPROACH and PERSECUTE EACH OTHER FOR THEY KNEW NOT WHAT In a Dialogue between C. a â—alvinist A. an Arminian and B. the Râ—concâ—ler and others By Richard Baxter Tim. 2. 14 15 16. Of these put them in remembrance charging them before the Lord that they strive not about words to no profit but to the subverting of the hearers Study to shew thy self approved unto God a Workman that needeth not to be ashamed rightly dividing the word of Truth But shun prophane and vain bablings for they will encrease unto more ungodliness and their word will eat as doth a Canker LONDON Printed for Nevil Simmons at the Princes Arms in St. Pauls Church-Yard 1675. THE CONTENTS OF THE Second Book The first days Conference about Predestination THe need of conciliatory endeavours p. 1 2. What this undertaking is p. 3. Predetermination to Sin excluded the case briefly opened p. 4. The first Crimination by the Arminian Of eternal absolute Reprobation p. 6. Whether a thing not existent may be a Moral cause or God's Acts have Causes p. 7. How far Gods Decrees may be said to have extrinsick Causes p. 8. The second Crimination Of God's decreeing Sin either to predetermine it or the event or his permission p. 9. The third Crimination Necessitution of Sin by Negative decrees Negation of decrees opened p. 11. The fourth Crimination The pure Masse whether the object of Predestination p. 12. Decrees distinguished p. 13. The fifth Crimination Do the Decrees proceed according to the order of Intention or of Execution p. 14. The sixth Crimination Denying all Conditional Decrees p. 16. The seventh Crimination Of absolute Election p. 17. The eighth Crimination Leading men to presumption hereby p. 18. The ninth Crimination Setting necessity and fate p. 19. The tenth Crimination Making God a Respecter of persons by unequal Decrees p. 21. The eleventh Crimination Making God and Ministers Dissemblers p. 22. Crim. 12. Of a vain power given p. 23. The second days Conference The Criminations by the Calvinist What good this conciliatory attempt may do p. 24. The first Crimination Denying election uncomfortable The second Crim. An election of Things instead of Persons p. 26. The third Crim. Denying a decree of the first special Grave The fourth Crim. of Scientia Media p. 27. The fifth Crim. Denying Absolute Reprobation Reprobation opened p. 29 30. Whether God will Sin p. 30. or the Act p. 31. How far man can cause his act undetermined p. 32. Pretences for Gods causing Sin answered How God causeth the effect and not the Volition p. 85 c. What God doth about Sin p. 37. The sixth Crim. Of Conditional decrees p. 38. The seventh Crim. Of foreseen Merit p. 39. The eighth Crim. Of making many Elections p. 40. The ninth Crim. Ordering the Decrees according to Execution p. 41. How God doth Velle finem The Case opened p. 42. The tenth Crim. denying an eternal cause of futurition p. 45. Whether futurity be any thing and have any cause p. 48. The third days Conference Of Universal and Special Redemption The first Crim. Of the Armin. denying Christ's office to the world p. 50. Calvinists for universal Redemption what all agree in p. 54. * To which I here add the Church of England Homil. li. 2. p. 185. God so loved the world that he gave his only Son c. But to whom did he give him He gave him to the whole world that is to say to Adam and to all that should come after him O Lord what had Adam or any other man deserved at God's hands that he should give us his only Son We are all miserable Sinners damnable persons justly driven out of Paradise justly excluded from Heaven and justly condemned to Hell See a Learned Gentleman's Reasons for Univers Redemp yet living Mr. Polehill of Gods Decrees Did Christ die equally for all p. 55. The second Crim. Denying express Scripture p. 57. The Synod of Dort vindicated p. 59. The third Crim. They deny the Gospel Covenant it self p. 61. The fourth and fifth Crim. Making an impossibility or falshood the object of faith p. 62. The sixth seventh and eighth Crim. Disabling Ministers to Preach leaving most men remediless teaching Infidels impenitence p. 63. The ninth tenth eleventh and twelfth Crim. Exempting men from Hell torments justifying Ingratitude denying Christ's Kingdoms tempting men to Infidelity p. 64 65. The fourth days Conference The Calvinists first Crim. Making Christ dye in vain for them that he knew would perish p. 66. The second Crim. An imperfect Saviour p. 67. The third Crim. Dying for men in Hell p. 67. The fourth Crim. To die for those whom he would not pray for p. 68. The fifth Crim. Making Christ not to purchase faith p. 69. The sixth seventh eighth and ninth Crim. Uncertain conditional Redemption no more for the saved than the damned Christ's sheep to know him before he know them Pardoning Original Sin to all p. 70. Crim. 10. To die for the Seed of the Serpent p. 72. The fifth days Conference Of Man's Sinfulness and Impotency and of Free-will The Armin. Crim. 1st Denying all free-will they deny all Morality p. 73. What Liberty is here meant largely discussed to p. 79. What Liberty we hold p. 79. Doth Original Sin necessitate all evil p. 82. The second Crim. Denying Power to believe p. 85. What Power can and cannot mean p. 86. fullier opened p. 87 c. Questions hence answered p. 96 c. The advantage of some by denying Habits besides Power and Acts p. 99. Habits proved p. 100. Crim. 3. Making all men utterly and equally bad p. 101. Crim. 4. Infants Heathens and most men made and necessitated to sin and damnation p. 103. Of Infants remedy p. 104. Parents sin defileth them p. 105. Of Heathens Case p. 106. Crim. 5. That none can do more good or less evil than he doth p. 107. The sixth days Conference The Calvinists Crim. 1. Denying original sin p. 109. Original sin opened p. 111. Crim. 2. That men can use their Naturals to prepare for Grace p. 113.
Opinion hold it will allow no other Religion in the World but this much To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil which God doth cause aâ— a free Benefactor differencing his Gifts in various proportions as he seeth meet as he differenceth Stars from Stones and Men from Dogs and equally causeth the wisdom of Man and the poyson of the Toad or Serpent and so will make such differences in this World and the next if there be any as pleaseth him as he doth here between one Horse that 's pampered and another that is tired out with labour Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way It hath pleased God by permitting Hobbs to reduce this Principle of the Wills necessitation unto its proper practice thereby to cast more shame upon it in our Times for this Authors sake than we could have expected if none but such excellent persons as Alvarez * And more plainly yet Bradwardine who maketh the necessitating cause of Sin and Hell that God will have it so and none can resist him and his Brethren Dr. Twisse and Rutherford had maintained it But as Davenant well saith It is an Opinion of the Dominicans which Protestants have no mind to own And there are two sorts that thus subject the Will to absolute caused necessity 1. Those aforesaid the Dominicans who assist the predetermining premotion of God as necessary to every act natural and free 2. Those that make the Will as much necessitated by a train of natural second Causes which is Hobbs his way and alas the way of great and excellent healing Câ—mero For they hold That the Will is necessitated by the Intellect and the Intellect by the Object â— and God made both Will and Intellect and Object and Law And so Camero hath nothing to resolve the necessitating cause of Adams sin into but the Devil But who necessitated the Devil to sin This will be all one when it is discussed And if self-determining freedom of Will in Man be impossible it will be impossible in the Angels for they are not Gods Therefore I now deal with none but those who confess that God made Man's Will at first with a natural self-determining power and freedoâ— suited to this earthly state of government and that Adam's Will by that same measure of Grace which he had could have forborn his sin at the instant when he sinned II. The other extream which I reconcile not but confute * Yet I am not â—â—â—tating the old way of anaâ—â—â—â—a thing all the hard sayings or opinions of others that being it that I write this against of which course the Epistles of Joan. Antioch 5. 6 c. and of cyril Aâ—ix to Proâ—â—â—s against his so using Theoaâ—â— Mops in Proâ—â—â—â—â—â—â— are worth the reaâ—â—ing besides the fore named T is the Pelagians who deny Original Sin and acknowledge not the pravity of vitiated nature and consequently must deny the need of Grace in the same proportion and so far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier And how far this also subverteth Christianity you may perceive A. But both these Parties have a great deal of very plausible reason for their Opinions as you may see in the Domâ—nâ—oans on one side and Hobbes against Braâ—hall and in Dr. Jeremy Taylor his Treâ—â— of Repentance on the other and therefore are not to be so slighted B. I do not slight them but confute them I confess that the cases are not without difficulty yea not a little But I am surer that Religion is not to be renounced than they can be of the truth of their Opinions And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cause of â—â— liâ—n Porphyrie or Celsus against Christ that they would not have spoken as plausibly and made the case seem as difficult at least to be argumentatively answered as they here do A. Now let us here your way or terms before mentioned what they are B. II. I suppose every sober man will allow me 1. To distinguish Names and Words from Things and * Vasâ—u in 1. Tho. q. 2â— a. 3. d. 4â— c. 1. Bona pars hujuâ— controversiâ— an reprobationis detur causa ex partâ— reprobi dâ— vâ—ce est nominal Controversies from real and to that end to open the aâ—biguity of words as I go along And to â—â—ew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion or an enâ— rationâ—â— only that men contend about instead of a reality 2. I may be allowed when confusion lapeth up many doubtful questions in one to distinguish them that each may have its proper answer 3. I may be allowed to â—ast by as unfit for contention all those unâ—evealed and unsearchable Points which none of the Contenders know at all nor ever will do in this World 4. And I will take leave to lay by the rash words of particular Writers as not to be imputed to any others nor to the main Cause or as that which I am not obliged to defend reconcile nor at all to meâ—dle with 5. And when all this is done you shall see what Aâ—toâ—â— the remaining differences will prove A. Begin then with the first Article of Prâ—dâ—stination B. Remember my â—ndertaking that it is not to justifie every â—â—â—â— words that hath written on the Point and therefore I will not lose time in citing or defending Authors But produce you all your Accâ—sations as against the Cause of the sober moderate Calâ—â—â—ists and suppose me to be the person with whom you have to do The first Crimination A. 1. My first Charge is That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men without respect See the conclusion of the Canons of the Synod at Dort where this very Charge is denied with detestation And can you tell better what men hold than they themselves Episcop Justit Theol. l. 4. Sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 412. Col. 2. 52. Sect. 2. Statuitur Deum cos secundum â—perasua judicare â—b rebellionem contumaci-am corum dolere irasci c. damâ—are c. cum tamen non modo absolute eos perirâ— peccare voluerit sed originario tali labe infectos nasci fecâ—rit unde omnia ista peccata scaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter necesse erat Quod quid aliud esse potest quam histrionica quaedam scâ—nica actio to any fore-seen Sin or cause in them but meerly because â—â—â—â— pleaseth him to do it This is your Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation B. That words may not deceive us let us in the beginning onâ—â— for all know what you mean by the word Decree A. I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will de eventâ— thaâ— this shall be B. And I suppose we are agreed 1. That Gods Will is nothing but his Essence denominated with respect to some Good as its Object 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity
God knoweth all Names Notions Propositions and Syllogisms with their modes as they are the measures organs or actings of Humane Understandings 8. †I refer the Reader to Blank de Concord lib. cum â—ecretis 1. Thes 25. c. where by citing their own words at large he proveth that the most famous and resolute Antiarminians were for this scientia media conditionata viz. Fr. Gomarrus Arminius's chief Antagonist in Mat. 11. 21. Antonius Walaeus loc com de sctent Dei pag. 160. Paulus Ferrius Scholast Orth. vindic p. 203 209 210. Besides Rob. Baronius Metaph. sect 12. disp 2. num 55 56. who in his last days was nearest to the Arminians as appeareth in those Metaphysicks And Jo. Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p 675. nameth also Lud. Crocius Dyodecad dis 7. It is therefore undeniable to all Christians that the thing which they call * Could Alvarez and his fellows well prove that the permission of the first sin is an effect of Reprobation as the word is used in a fit and ordinary sense they would do more to overthrow the Doctrine de scientia media circa malum than is yet done But they fail in their attempts of proving this Of which after scientia media is as certainly in God as is the scientia simplicis Intelligenâ—iae Purae visionis that is that God knoweth the truth of all true conditional Propositions and knoweth what would be done by such and such causes or upon such and such alterations if they were put Doth any Christian doubt of this 9. Whether this should be called scientia media is a question de nomine and that of no great importance and not at all de re 10. Whether it be of any necessity or use in this Controversie is a question only about the order of argumentation as long as the thing it self is confessed to be true 11. Some that cashier it as an useless Engine in this matter do go as far from you as the Jesuites and Arminians who use it As you may see at large in Ludov. à Dola and Durandus himself 12. I am one that fear Presumption both in their and your distributions of the Knowledge and Decrees of God and dread the taking of his Name in vain And one that think that we need not the notion of scientia media for our satisfactory explication of these matters But as the truth of the thing is confessed so if it be applied only to the Doctrine of Reprobation as it is commonly called and not at least always to the Doctrine of Election I see no untruth that it inferreth nor no real difference that it will prove between us The fifth Crimination C. They deny absolute Reprobation at least and say that God reprobateth no men but upon fore-sight of sin And so that he hath no Decree that men shall sin nor that he will permit them to sin nor that they shall do the act in particular which is sin As if God had not decreed the hardening of Pharaohs heart the sin of Sihon of Rehoboam of the Jews in killing Christ c. B. 1. I told you before Reprobation is a word that signifieth several acts You dare not but grant them that God decreeth or willeth to damn no man but for sin and as a Sinner And this is the same thing that they mean 2. If by Reprobation you mean Gods Decree to give them no Faith or Repentance 1. You must prove that God hath such a Decree or Will for a meer negation where not-decreeing or not-willing to give them Grace will do as much 2. All Christians must needs confess that God made a Covenant of Grace with fallen Mankind in Adam and Noah And that no man is now under the meer Obligations of the Law and Covenant of Innocency which saith Be perfect and live sin and die for ever And that there is some common mercy extended to all the World which obligeth them to repent in order to Salvation He subverteth Scripture and all experience that denieth this Therefore all must grant that God denieth no special Grace to any but the abusers of this common Grace And he decreeth to do but what he doth * Thus our Brittish Diviâ—es at Dâ—rt in their suffrage on Ar. 3. at large Therefore the persons whom he decreeth to deny special Grace to are none but the abusers of common Grace or the rejecters of that special Grace when offered 3. If by Reprobation you mean Gods Will or Decree to permit them to sin and perish willfully 1. You can prove no such Decree or Will Because permission being a negation or nothing needs it not but will be as certainly without it upon a bare not decreeing to hinder them from sin 2. And you mistake in saying that Arminius denieth it For he * Arminius himself expresly professeth that in case God permits a man velle pâ—ccatum necâ—sse est ut nullo argumentorum geneâ—e persuadeatur ad volendum Exam. Perk. pag. 153. Dr. Twisse against Hoord li. 1. pag. 70. saith with you That God decreeth his own permission 3. You must take the pains to distinguish between negative and privative Unbelief and between negative and privative not-hindring Sin or not-giving Faith Negative Unbelief is meer not-believing And so none of us did believe from eternity or before we were born He that is not believeth not nor yet in the first instant that the Promise and Law of Faith was given us Our unbelief is not sin or privative but on supposition that we are men and have reason and have a Law and Object of Faith And Gods permitting us in this negative Non-belief is not to be called a privative but only a negative permission For God did from eternity so permit me to be no man and no Believer and yet this was not Reprobation So God did negatively not hinder Adams first sin but not privatively because not penally for any evil done nor yet by denying him any thing that was naturally or morally his due Therefore this was not an Act of Reprobation But when the New Covenant of Grace and the common Grace of the Covenant are once given men and they are obliged to believe then sometimes God penally denieth them Grace and that is all which the Arâ—inians put against absolute denial because this denial is only for mens fore-going sin But he also still negatively only and not privatively or penally denieth some Grace to some yea to all And that is only such Grace as is neither morally their due nor naturally due or necessary to them And the denial of such is no Act of Reprobation 4. If by Reprobation you mean meerly Gods Preterition that is his â—â—t-willing or not-decreeing to give men Grace 1. Not to Will or Decree is nothing And how can you call nothing absolute or conditional These are the modes of Acts and not of not-acting or of nothing All grant that Gods non-agency non-volition not-decreeing hath no cause much
Ledesm de Aâ—xil dis 2. Ruiz de scient d. 15 16 33 36 c. For non entis non est Modus vel Relatio If you add that it is Denominatio extrin eca I answer it must be then God himself only as denominated Knowing or Willing that This or that shall be which is not properly the futurity of the thing For otherwise it must be a denomination of Nothing 83. Obj. The Object is before the Act of Knowledge Therefore a thing is future before God knoweth it to be future Answ 1. To be future is a word whose sound deceiveth men as if it signified some being which is not so 2. God cannot know that a thing will be unless it will be But this signifieth no more but that he cannot know this proposition to be true This or that will be unless it be true But 1. there were from eternity no propositions 2. And the proposition is not true before it is a proposition 3. And therefore not before it is conceived in the mind whence it hath its first being 4. But if you might suppose God to have eternal propositions their Being is considerable before their Verity and the Verity hath its Cause But that cause is nothing but what is in God himself which is either his Decree of what he will Cause or his foreknowledge of what will be caused by a sinning Creature And neither of them as a cause of the truth of the proposition causeth that the Thing will be nor yet is any other existent Cause supposed but only that God knowing that he will make the free agent knoweth also that this agent will freely sin In all which the futurity is Nothing nor is any existent cause of it necessary But only the truth of the proposition would result from the Infinite perfection of Gods knowledge 84. Obj. The futurity of things is True whether God or man know it or think of it or not Answ 1. Futurity being Nothing is neither true nor false * * * According to Greg. and the Nominals sence of Relations before cited two Nothings may eternally be Related to each other One as a future Cause and another as a future effect And if there were now no Being but hereafter per impossibile a Being would arise of it self it is future though there be none to know it But this futurity hath no Cause And it is no more but that this Proposition Hoc erit would be True if there were any to conceive it 2. But all that you can truly mean is but this that whether it be thought on or not this is a true proposition Hoc vel illud futurum est Which is true when there are propositions extrinsecal which no man thinketh of But 1. God hath no propositions 2. Much less extrinsecal from Eternity But if he had any they would be nothing but the acts of his own knowledge 3. And they have no Cause 4. If they had been uttered by words they needed no Cause but his perfect knowledge 85. Obj. Futurity is the Object of Gods knowledge and the object is a †††To the Question An praescientia Dei sit Causata à rebus Bonavent answereth in 1. dist 38. q. 1. a. 1. Praescita Causa sunt praescientiae Divinae non essendi sed aut Inserendi aut Dicendi Secundum rationem essendi Praescientia potest esse Causa aliquorum praescitorum licet non omnino sed nullo modo è converso Secundum rationem Inferendi sunt mutuo causae quia mutuo antecedunt consequuntur antecedens est causa consequentis Secundum rationem Dicendi futurum est causa praescientiae non è converso Nam praescientia dicitur scientia ante rem constat ergo quod importat ordinem ad posterius si scitum esset semper praesens esset scientia sed non praescientia Bonavent 1. dist 38. dub 3. saith Gods knowledge called Approbation connoteth effectum bonitaâ—em but when it is called simplex Notitia it connoteth only the event but in it self is one Thus denominations by Connotation and relation may be many wayes diversified both of Knowledge and Will cause of the act God knoweth things to be future because they are future as he knoweth existents because they exist Answ Still I say 1. Futurity is Nothing and Nothing hath no Cause 2. Nothing is eternally in God but God and God hath no Cause nor is an Effect 3. At least that which is Nothing cannot be the Cause of God 4. It is not true that God foreknoweth things because they will be but only that he fore-knoweth that they will be 86. Gods meer fore-knowledge nor his meer Will without efficient Power or Action causeth not the thing future and therefore is not the Cause that It will be But where Knowledge and Will with Active Power cooperate they are true Causes of the thing And nothing is a proper Cause that It will be but what will Cause its being 87. By all this it is evinced that God Causeth not the futurity of sin And that there needeth no Decree of God to make Sin pass è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum And consequently that the Learned and pious Dr. Twisse his Achillean argument which is the strength of his Book de Scientia Media is but delusory As the excellent Strangius also hath fully manifested And his admired Bradwardine is as weak in his attempts on the same subject and proveth God the Cause of all futurition by no better reasons than he proveth that without him there would be no impossibles yea that non posset esse impossibile When it were impossible any thing should be were there no God and yet that impossibility is nothing and needeth no cause It 's strange how some Learned men confound Things and Nothings and the Notions and Names of Nothings with the Nothings named So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 18. p. 221. will tell us how God knoweth complex objects and distinguisheth those that are antecedent to Gods Intellection from those that are consequent The former sort are such as these God is God is eternal omnipotent c. These he saith are the Causes that God knoweth them being before his knowledge of them The other about Creatures are after it and caused by it Yet doth the good man thus humbly Preface Non proprie distincte sed similitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio ignarus homuncio excelsa scientiae Dei mirabilis resonare But see how the world is troubled with this prophane * * * Hervtus in his Quodlib puts the question Whether it be not a Mortal sin in a Divine to omit things necessary and to treat of curiosities But he was too guilty himself to answer it as plainly as he ought presumption and how justly Paul cautioned us against seduction by vain Philosophy and what danger the Church is in of losing Faith Religion and Charity and peace in a game
him But it followeth not necessarily that this will be done because it 's possible no nor because it is easie or not difficult to be done 150. * * * Ruiâ— de praedet Tr. 2. diâ—p 12. §. 1 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed viz. Increatam permissionem Deus non praedâ—finit Creata permissio simul complecâ—itur quâ—rundam rerum productionem aliarum rerum negationem quibus positis peccatum permittitur And if by permission they will mean quid positivum it must have a positive Will and Cause but what 's that to the Negative or meer non impedire Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguoâ—s words His reason §. 2. is Permission of sin is good 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum And he said that permissio increata is not decreed 2. Negatio motivorum c. 3. Prodâ—ctio Constitutio circumstantlarum 4. Generalis concursus Ans 1. Nothing is not Good meer Negations are Nothing 2. Moral Negations or Logical that is Denyal and restraints are something and have a Cause 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause but so is not a meâ—r non-impedition which is proper permission But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent and an indifferent agent and a contrarily disposed agent To permit a stone to ascend will not make it ascend To permit the Air to move will not make it move But to permit a stone in the Air to fall I think with Durandus is enough to make it fall supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin 151. But yet here we must distinguish 1. Between a necessary and a free agent 2. Between Adams sinning and ours 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly or that hath many disswasions or but few 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general that is of not living innocently yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth nor is it a valid consequence He is a bad man Ergo he will do this and that and the other Sin Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin than to the contrary So that bare permission will not inferr the Certainty of all sin atleast and therefore will not here serve turn 152. But saith Rada it is not common permission but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin Answ 1. God did not so by Adam at first 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn as well as effectual If so then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God as he was to dye by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin as to live without God But if not so then while Necessary Grace called sufficient is continued the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him till Adam cast it away It is therefore no good Illation Deus permittit aliquem peccare ergo peccat unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help which is more than proper permission 153. And it must be remembred that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin He alwayes hindereth it so far as to forbid it to threaten damnation to affright men from it to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it And his daily mercies and corrections should withhold men from it Only by doing no more nor effectually changing or restraining sinners but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means he permitteth sin 154. But it is also confessed that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited some of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given And so some are without that Teaching those mercies or those corrections which others have But yet they are still under a Law of Grace 155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity Truth and Goodness which is Natural doth continue Otherwise it is confessed that Permission would inferr sin materially but no sin formally if by permission be meant Gods withdrawing Reason Free-will or executive power 156. But I easily confess that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion * * * Or Bradwardines Effective Volition as necessary and productive of all that cometh to pass in sinful actions could be proved that would certainly inferr the event of sin And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will sin may be fore known in that decree And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind they had never omitted that easie solution of the Case How God fore-knoweth sin But this I have elsewhere confuted and shall add a little here 157. But first having disproved all these presumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future sin I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfie us which is That Gods Understanding is Infinite and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible But How his understanding reacheth them what Idea's he hath of them how they are Intelligible to him with such like are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men who know not their own ignorance And no manner of understanding is properly Divine which mortals can comprehend SECT IX Of Predestination and Free-will of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford 158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods Execution and be after his Volitions in order yet because I am now only to speak of it as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin and as quid decretum I shall touch it here It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of besides himself Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause 159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of humane Actions in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties and a Power to Act or not act at this time or to choose this or that and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency So that when ever any Act is done as an Act in genere God is the first Cause of it For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth and by his Vital Influx And there is
rationis ad utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum agendum unum vel alterum which Rivet resteth in and fitteth the doctrine of necessitation but I think expresseth not Liberty strictly taken It may be ad utrumlibet if Satan had a power to move it as I move my pen. Bellarmine's is lib. arb est libera potestas ex his quae ad finem aliquem conducunt unum prae alio eligendi aut unum idem respuendi vel acceptandi pro arbitrio nostro ad magnam Dei gloridm concessa which Paraeus dissenteth not from But all defining is vain â—ill the ambiguous word Freedom be distinguished and the sense accordingly variously stated yet is this description only of Liberty and constraint too common with some 168. But if this were so then ☞ 1. The suspension of the will might be nevertheless by force or restraint which is a non velle And so when they say Voluntatem ab ipso Deo non cogi posse because when it acteth it acteth willingly that is when it willeth it willeth the consequence holdeth not because it may be forced from all action unless they mean that it cannot nolle non agere at once 2. And if this were so then either they mean that God cannot naturally necessitate the will to act or that such a natural necessitation consisteth with its Liberty If the first they destroy their doctrine of Predetermination For what is that but Gods Physical irresistible efficacious premotion determining the will to act And what is natural necessitation if this be not If the latter then they contradict their own definition of Liberty which they oft give us that it is Liberty from natural necessity which Twiss calleth Libertas naturae distinct from Libertas conditionis vel civilis And what more natural necessity than that which refulteth from that premotion of God as the first cause of all action without which no agent natural or free can act and which none can resist 169. Their opinion of Liberty also leaveth no difference between bruitish appetite or spontaneity and free-will save only that this doth follow reason which indeed is a difference of Guides but not of Liberty 170. And according to this opinion if God gave Satan power to move any mans will to sin by as true a physical motion and as unresistible as I move my pen it were no constraint nor loss of natural Liberty because it is moved to be Willing 171. And if they lay all on the Acts congruity to the Habit or Inclination then if Satan could infuse unresistibly into the Will an Inclination to hate God or to any sin and then physically determine it according to that inclination it were no force or loss of natural liberty 172. But I think he that by irresistible efficiency makes a mans will wicked both in its Inclination and Acts doth incomparably more against him and his liberty than he that could force his tongue or hand against his will or he that only tempted and perswaded him 173. The grand Reasons why we cannot receive the Dominicans doctrine of predetermining premotion are elsewhere given I now name but these three 1. Because whatever vain talk is used to blind men it maketh God the sole-total-first-necessitating cause of all the sin that is committed in the world or can be 2. It unavoidably destroyeth the Christian faith For if God be really the said determining Cause of all lyes and other sins in the world then his Veracity which is the formal object of faith is gone And no mortal man can tell whether Prophets and Apostles are predetermined to speak true or false nor when God moveth them to the one or the other For to Call their motion by the name of Inspiration will satisfie no man that Gods Inspiration can do any more at least to interest himself in the act than his necessary physical premoving determination 3. Because it feigneth God to damn most of the world for not-conquering God who insuperably predetermined them to the forbidden act that is for not being Gods or greater than God And that he sent Christ to die only for those sins which he thus pre-moved us to irresistibly and it was as impossible to forbear as to touch the Moon 174. In the issue of all these Controversies the sharpest contenders seem agreed whether they will or no Arminius granteth that all events of sin or damnation are from eternity necessary necessitate consequentiae * * * Bonavent in 1. d. 38. q. 1. Resol Praescientia Dei rebus praescitis necessitatem non imponit cum â—o modo res cognoscat quo futurae sunt Duplex est necessitas Absoluta quae opponitur Contingentiae dicitur necessitas consequentis Respectiva dicitur necessitas consequentiae haec non opponitur contingentiaeut si ambulat movetur In praescito non est necessitas absoluta sed solum consequentiae Nicol. D'Orbellis 1. d. 38. dub 1. Duplex est necessitas Consequentiae consequentis Bene sequitur necessitate consequentiae Deus novit me cras sessurum ergo sedebo consequens tamen est contingens ut homo currit ergo movetur Nos concedimus Liberum arbitrium in â—o quod agit liberum esse ab omni necessitate ut proprie non possit necessario agere quoad exercitium sui actus quamvis respectu Divinae ordinationis certo infallibiliter agat Ames Bellarm Enervat To. 4. l. 4. c. 1. He meaneth it of a caused physical necessity no doubt which is as is said but a Logical necessity in ordine probandi that is It is a good consequence This God fore-knoweth ergo it will come to pass And it is only the necessitas consequentis which he denyeth which Rob. Baronius Metaph. calleth necessitas causata and I had rather call necessitas effecti which is in ordine productionis And Dr. Twiss doth sharply reprehend him for feigning that he or any others do assert any more than necessitas consequentiae And bringeth in the testimony of many Schoolmen professing concordantly that there is no more than this which also fore-knowledge it self will inferr It 's worth the reciting Vindic. Grat. Li. 2. p. 1. Digres 5. Quid quod ab eruditis eadem statuitur necessitas ab utraque profluens tam à praescientia Dei quam ab ipsius Voluntate Nam licet Arminius voluerit necessitatem à Dei voluntate profectam esse necessitatem Consequentis à praescientia verò promanantem duntaxat Consequentiae aliter tamen visum est magnis Theologis Sic enim Durandus Non bene dicunt illi qui dicunt quod omnia de necessitate eveniant per comparationem ad Voluntatem divinam quia omnia respectu Voluntatis Divinae eveniunt libere ideo absolute loquendo possunt non evenire Expressius Bonaventura Dei voluntatem absolutam necesse est impleri conditionalem verò minime sed advertendum quod est necessitas consequentiae sicut praedictum est
have fled so high in making Grace supernatural feigning a state of pure Naturals that had none and talk so phanatically of the Deification of the soul as I think hath ensnared some Sectaries among us to imitate them seigning that the first Covenant is Moral as a Law and the second Covenant is the very in-being of a Divine Nature which they though obscurely seem to describe as somewhat above all Habits and Inclinations put into our own nature like another form or soul Which over-doing tendeth to tempt men to Infidelity by doubting whether mans Nature was made by the Creator to enjoy God in Heaven or not when it must be made another thing to attain it SECT XII Of Scientia Media 255. AFter this Digression about our Will and Powers as the objects of Gods Knowledge and Decrees I return to the Doctrine de Scientia Media And that God knoweth from Eternity the truth of all conditional propositions that are true is past all doubt If we may suppose that God had eternal propositions No doubt but he knoweth now that such propositions are true If such Causes be put they will or will not produce this or that as the effect 256. But if it be an Imperfection to have mental propositions to know by and God knoweth not by them but only knoweth them as the instruments and way of humane knowledge For no doubt but he knoweth all that 's ours Then it must be said that he had from eternity but the foreknowledge of the Creatures conditional propositions And who can well determine this 257. And this will lead the arrogant disputers to other enquiries no less difficult Whether it be only or primarily the Proposition it self as ens rationis humanae or as the Thought of mans mind which God knoweth or the res ab homine cognita that is futurition it self And if the former How God knoweth them to be True If the latter How he knoweth futurition 258. And here inextricable difficulties will still arise before them Whether to have the notion of futurity be not a part of the Creatures imperfection Whether God know not all things as present Whether Nothing be properly Intelligible in it self Whether it be not only Propositions de nihilo that are known and not the ipsum nihil such as futurition is Whether to ascribe such knowledge of Nothing and such notions or propositions to God be to ascribe perfection or Imperfection to him 259. If we may or must say that God from eternity fore-knew our Propositions of future contingents which are Conditional yet we must not say or think that his knowledge quoad actum is conditional so as that the Creatures * Nic. D'Orbellis saith Communiter distinguitur triplex cognitio Dei viz. approbationis visionis intelligentiae Cognitio approbationis est tantum Bonorum Cognitio Visionis est corum quae sunt fuerunt vel crunt Cognitio intelligentiae seu simplicis notitiae est omnium quae possunt esse Hujusmodi autem cognitiones non differunt secundum se sed secundum distinctionem connotatorum Et Bonavent 1. d. 38. dub 3. Dicendum quod in nobis notitia simplex notitia beneplaciti dicunt diversas cognitiones diversos modos cognoscendi A Deo autem una tantum cognitio est Sed illa una facit Deus quod homines multis Et â—â—â—o illa una dupliciter significat state is the condition of Gods Knowledge in it self But only that the object is a conditional proposition speaking the Condition of the event fore-known From which Gods Act is denominated conditional only denominatione extrinsecâ not as an Act but as This act 260. We deny not but God may be said as truly to know the truth of hypothetical as of absolute propositions If one be the object of his Knowledge the other is Which proveth the hypothetical proposition to be less perfect than an absolute but not Gods knowledge of it to be less perfect 261. Nor doth Gods fore-knowledge that Adam will sin in such circumstances make his understanding depend on the Creature but only to be terminated on the Creature as an object And so it doth in all Acts where the Creature is the object This objection therefore belongeth also to the dispute Whether God know any thing but himself or out of himself 262. The seigning God to have in himself so many acts of knowledge really distinct and to lye in such an order is intolerable seeing God is most simple But by extrinsecal denomination his Knowledge may by us through our weakness and necessity be distinguished according to its respect to diversity of objects by inadequate conceptions But on that pretence to feign many needless distributions is profane 263. They that think it a good confutation of scientia mediae that Non decreta non sunt futura therefore no futurition can be known but as Decreed do err much in the antecedent For it is false that sin is Decreed and are either erroneous or uncertain in the conclusion For God fore-knoweth sin so far as it is intelligible 264. The sense of the question de Scientiae Media is not de conditionatis Vide Pet. à Sanct. Jos Disp. 4. Sect. 1. p. 465. de Scient Med. necessariâ—s as If the Sun set it will be night Nor yet of such conditionals as are meerly disparate and have no kind of dependence or connexion as If Peter dye quickly John will live long But of such conditionals as have some reason of the Connexion and yet leave the will in an undetermined power to act or not But we know no difference between these ex parte Dei Scientis but only denominatione extrinseca ex parte objecti 265. Much less dare we conclude with them that Gods knowledge See all this modestly and judiciously handled by Fr. Zumel Disput. in Tho. p. 1. especially his Conclus 6. p. 127. And Ockam 1. d. 38. q. 1. Et. Greg. Arim. ib. q. 2. a. 2. Et Gabr. Biel ib. qu. 1. a. 1. Et Ant. Cordub quaest q. 55. dub 10. of Conditionals is in God before his will to concurr or that they exist For we are not acquainted with such priorities and posteriorities in God except by such denomination 266. Methinks it is but sumbling to say with Pet. à S. Joseph Suav Concord Disp 4. p. 484. A nemine dubitari quin ad cognitionem futurorum sub conditione necessarium sit aliquo modo decretum divinum cum nâ—hil possit esse futurum sive absolute sive sub conditione nisi Deus ut prima Causa dut absolute aut sub conditione velit ad ista concurrere At See the short answer in Pet. à S. Joseph Suav Concord p. 576. the first look this seemeth to be spoken of the cause of futurition or of the knowledge of it And if not the Decree seemeth mentioned to no purpose For futurum tantum sub conditione is not as such futurum For the condition suspendeth the
ab objecto denominata 3. And his efficient Volition and Power is terminated on objects in time without mutation in God 4. And N. B. that God doth suspend his own Possible Volitions in many cases As he doth Not will to make more Worlds more Men more Suns more Laws c. than de facto he will make 5. And it is no more defectiveness in God to suspend a Volition for a time than thus to do it for ever 6. And it is no more Dependence on the Creature to Terminate his Volition only on a qualified subject performing the Condition than to terminate his Efficient Power and will on such or such a qualified subject As e. g. He terminateth his Omnipotent Concurse for Generation only on the materia seminalis recte disposita He concurreth to burn by fire c. And if his Acts effectively Transient may be terminated only and temporarily on disposed objects If he did so in acts Objectively Transient and did freely not-will the damnation of man till he had actually sinned but suspended his will freely till then and then de novo terminated it on the said qualified object I see no shew of Dependence or Mutability For I oft cleared it before that the termination of Gods Knowledge Will or Power on any particular Object is in him no addition to its estence And doing it de novo is no change in him but in the Creature only no more than it would be a change in the Sun or its active Emanations if a thousand new creatures newly receive its Influx and are moved by it variously according to their several Conditions Yet I have before given reasons why incipere jam praedestinare is more incongruous language 358. I put in this only to deprecate the blind uncharitable censures of dissenters in this point who think that Gods Volitions are New and Conditional and suspended quoad actum hunc ad hoc objectum and cry out It is blasphemy and maketh God mutable and dependent I am against their opinion as well as you as to Conditional Acts But false charges prove you not to have more truth but less love and sobriety than others 359. XI The next distinction of Gods Will is into Effectual and Uneffectual And here he that would see a great deal said on the question Whether God have any uneffectual Will and whether mans will can frustrate it may see too much in a multitude of Schoolmen on 1 Sent. q. 45. 46. Some answer as D'Orbellis c. that the Voluntas Beneplaciti is Aq. a. 1. Scot. q. un Durand q. 1. Bonav art 1. Greg. Arim. q. un ar 3. Pennot l. 4. c. 22. Alvar. de Aux disp 32. Ruiz de Volunt disp 18. Gran. de Vol. Dei Tract 4. disp 3. Suar. l. 4. de Pradest c. 8. Gr. Val. disp 1. q. 19. p. 6. Cajct Nazar Ban. Zum Navar. Gonzal Molin Vasqu c. in 1. p. q. 19. ar 6. Ripa Arrub. Fasol ibid. Nic. D'Orbel 1. d. 46. and many other Scotists c. ever effectual but not the Vol. signi which yet seeing he well explaineth to be only the making of Duty he might well have said is still effectual to its proper primary effect Greg. Arimin and many others distinguish of the will of Complacency and Displicency and that Prosecutionis fugae and say the latter is effectual and not the former which others say of the Absolute Will as distinct from the Conditional The plain truth I have oft opened before Gods Will is the first Efficient the chief Dirigent and the Final Cause in which the three Principles Power Wisdom and Goodness are eminet 1. His efficient will is ever effectual and never frustrate Whatsoever pleased the Lord to do that he did in Heaven and in Earth in the Sea and in the depths Psal 135. 6. And who hath resisted this his will Rom. 9. 19. 2. His Directing will is ever effectual as to the making of the Law or Rule and of Due or Right thereby For so far it is efficient of that effect But it is too oft violated by our sin 3. His final will or Complacency is Gods being pleased with the Being or Action or relation of the Creature and supposing it is not efficient and therefore not effectual And I know no need of more upon this question 360. XII The last now to be named is The Antecedent and Consequent will This also is handled by many Schoolmen and much used by the Jesuits and Arminians To pass by others Pennottus handleth it propugn l. 4. c. 21. having first shewed c. 20. p. 225. that Chrysostom and Damascene first used it His explicatory Propositions are 1. Vol. Antec Chrys in Eph. Hom. 1. Damasâ— fid Orthod l. 2. c. 29. cont Manich. ad â—â—nem Cons non est in Deo respectu omnium Volitorum sed solum respectu â—orum quae aliquo modo pendent ex lib. arbitrio creaturae 2. Voluntas antecedens est illa qua Deus vult hominis salutem quantum in ipso est qua illum ad salutem ordinat media ad salutem necessaria praeparat quibus nisi per ipsum hominem steterit salutem assequatur 3. Non semper Voluntas antecedens Consequens circa objecta contraria versantur sed potest idem objectum esse Volitum à Deo Voluntate tum antecedente tum consequente 4. Voluntas antecedens in Deo est Voluntas beneplaciti non solum voluntas signi 5. Voluntas antecedens est formaliter Alliaco Camerac 1. q. 14. D. E. tells you the sense of Thom. Scotus Ockam Gregor of this distinction and that of Scotus and Ockam is to the same purpose with what I here say of it including that antecedent Grace which they call sufficient which God giveth to perswade men to consent The Schoolmen are disagreed of the sense of this distinction and not understanding it contend about it See Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 19. §. 2 3 4 5. p. 195 196 c. proprie in Deo existens non solum per metaphoram ad eum modum quo Voluntas signi 361. I tell you their sense that I may the better open the plain truth to you which is as followeth 1. This distinction of Vol. antec cons is not applyed to God as he is our Creator or End nor as he is meer Proprietor or Benefactor but only as he is Rector or Moral Ruler of man 2. As Government hath an Antecedent and Consequent part viz. Legislation and Judgement with Execution so Gods Antecedent will is nothing but his Legal will or his Will as Rector signified by his Laws And his Consequent will is his Judicial will or expressed in Judgement One Antecedent to Mans part obedience or disobedience and the other Consequent to it 3. It is most certain that God willeth Antecedently all that is in his Law that is that all that believe and repent shall be saved And that
properest sense of created Goodness because he cannot make it any other than what he willeth it to be But he might make it otherwise and might diversifie it and make particular creatures Better to themselves and one another which is a lower sense of Goodness But in all diversifications they would be still perfectly Agreeable to his Will and so be still equally Good or Best 10. The Goodness of the third rank of beings The Acts of Free-Agents is their Conformity to his Law or Governing Regulating Will. 11. God hath as Creator and Motor become the Voluntary Root or Spring of Nature and natural motion and accordingly stablished all second causes as natural agents under him and doth by them operate in a natural necessitating and constant way And this is antecedent to his Laws to free agents And this natural course of agency we must not expect that he should alter but rarely by miracles 12. Nothing is at enmity and Actively opponent to Gods natural agency or motion for else there should be something besides God and his works which he must overcome Though some natural motions may oppose each other yet all concurr to one end 13. Non-entity or Nothingness is not contrary to God as an opponent 14. Therefore seeing * * * * * * Saith Alliac Camerac 1. q. 12. a. 1. B. Reprobatio secundum aliquos est non-propositum dandi vitam aeternam Et ille dicitur Reprobatus secundum aliquos cui Deus non proposuit dare vitam aeternam Et postea Certum est de multis quod Deus non vult quod in bonis meritoriis perseverent Et non vult quod conditio impleatur Quia si vellet utique impleretur But he saith not Vult non impleri c. Gregorius non debuit inferre quod non misereri est effectus Reprobationis cum sit ipsa Reprobatio Id ibid. Nolle is not a meer Non velle but a Velle-non which is the war of the will against an opponent and the root of opposition ad extra it is an unmeet phrase to say that God doth Nil any Non-entity or any meer Natural opposition to him or that he Willeth any natural entity or motion which he effecteth not 15. But God being secondarily the Rector of free-agents and making them Laws to Rule their own Volitions and actions he doth by those Laws oblige their reason and will to restrain and resist some natural or sensitive appetites and inclinations and so to resist some natural motions of God in nature in which he is pleased to operate by second causes but in tantum and resistibly as a stronger natural motion may resist a weaker 16. And God doth by his grace and help internal and external assist them in that resisting agency which he obligeth them to 17. Therefore God may two wayes be said to resist his own natural motion by his Laws and by his assisting grace But his Laws contradict not one another 18. To God as meer Rector therefore two things may be said to be opponent 1. Such sensitive and natural inclinations and actions as are by Grace to be resisted 2. And all moral evil 19. And therefore as God may be said to Resist these so also first to Nill them And so to have Decrees against them 20. Gods Volitions and Nolitions here are his essential will denominated from the effects and objects And that effect of God from which he is said to Nill both these is as is said 1. His Laws 2. His grace or help And in this we are agreed 1. That he forbiddeth sin and commandeth us the restraint of appetites and senses c. 2. And that he helpeth us so to do Therefore the rest of the School-Controversies here that trouble the world are but logomachies about the Names of Nolitions and Nolitive Decrees 21. The thing properly willed by God in a Law is but the debitum the duty of the subject to do what is commanded and not to do what is forbidden 22. It is not a meer non-agency that is meant by a prohibition but a positive nolition of the subject restraining him from the forbidden act And all proper moral obedience or disobedience Good or Evil is primarily in the will and no further secondarily in the exteriour act or restraint than as they are Voluntary and in non-agency but in a third sense or instance as the consequent of nolition and the refraining act 23. If any therefore will say in this sense that God doth positively Nil the forbidden Act and so will a non-entity sub ratione mali moralis in this remote sence we will not contradict him but say as he 24. And accordingly we may say that God hath a positive Decree of non-entities or against moral evil where non-agency is loco materiae that is in tantum so far as to do all that he doth against it but not absolutè ne eveniat ubi evenit 25. But we may not therefore speak so unaptly as to say that he willeth positively all or any non-entity or non-futurity of meer naturals that are non-futura 26. Therefore we may much less say it of his own Natural Impeditions that he positively willeth non-impedire ubi non impedit For he is not to be thought of as a restrainer of himself by Law or self-opposition It is enough to say that non-vult impedire 27. Much less may we say that positively vult non velle-impedire lest we make another Velle necessary to that Velle and so in infinitum â—annes in 1. q. 23. a. 3. p. 2â—â— confeâ—â—eth that the sense of all this question is but which way God who is one pure act unvaried about all varieties is most conveniently to be mentioned by us and that Deus respectâ— culpae quae futura â—â—at in reprobiâ— non habuit aâ—â—um voluntatis affirmatiâ—um quo voluerit esse pecâ—ata aâ—â— illos pâ—ccaturos Whence it followeth that All futures or existents are not positively willed Even the formale pâ—â—cati is quid â—uturum But he thinks it most fit to say that God positively willeth the permission of sin 1. Because it is Good Ansâ—r Nothing is â—â—â—ther Good nor bad 2. Bâ—â— ause else the difference between the predestinate and reprobate would not fall under providence Answ As if giving that grace to onâ— which is not given to another made no diffeâ—â—â—â—e 3. Because else â—n would come by chaâ—â—â—e as to Gods foreknowledge Answ As if nothing would not be nothing without a positive dâ—â—râ—e that it shall be nothing or God could not know a nothing or a crime as such so far as it is quid intellectâ—i perfeâ—â—â—â—imâ— intelligibile without positive willing it How then knoweth he the foâ—male peccati 28. It is proper to say that Deus non vult permittere peccatum ubi id non permittit and that vult permittere aliquid indifferens quod per legem positive permissum est quia permissio ista est quid positivum 29. After the manner of men
I am told to my face that our Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation we have learned from the Papists Another professeth that the Jesuits ten of them for one favour the absolute irrespective decree follow herein as they think S. Austin but especially their S. Thomas and Scotus with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen and the whole tribe at this day of the Dominicans who are busie Zealots for the Cause of whose consent some among us are not ashamed to brag Twisse against Hoard li. 1. pag. 85. This reporter maketh us at one with Jesuites and Dominicans And yet may we not be so with Protestants that he must have a subtile contentious wit that can find any great intolerable difference herein between him and the Synod of Dort I Write not for them that will revile Gods truth if Bellarmine do but own it De Grat. lib. arb li. 2. cap. 9. this is his proposition Though a Grace sufficient be given to all yet no reason from us or our part can be given of Gods predestination By which we exclude not only Merits properly so called but also the good use of free-will oâ—â—â— grace or both as foreseen of God though it be not called Merit but de congruo and though it be not called a Cause but a Condition â—â—â—â— qua non praedestinaretur And what else would you have excluded And he goeth on in divers Chapters at large to prove from Scriptures Augustine Tradition Reason that there is no foreseen Cause or Condition of predestination in our selves 685. And I desire the Reader to note his Order of the Decrees for they must all be medling with the Order of Gods inward acts But he doth iâ— most briefly and plainly thus ib. cap. 9. According to our mode of understanding this seemeth to be the Order of Predestination in Gods mind 1. God foreseeth that if he make man he will fall with all his posterity And withal he seeth thâ—â— he can deliver all or some as he please 2. He decreeth or willeth to create man and to permit him to fall and mercifully to deliver some of the number of the fallen leaving others justly in the mass of perdition 3. He contrived apt remedies for the saving of the elect Iâ— which the incarnation and passion of our Saviour hath the first place 4. He approved those remedies and then chose Christ and us in him before the Constitution of the World 5. He disposed ordained and in a sort commanded that so it should be done Is not this as high as the Synod of Dort goeth yea more rigid than many of the Suffrages For he mentioneth no giving of Christ or any remedy at all to any but the Elect nor carrying the rest any further thaâ— the common mass of perdition before they be forsaken contrary to what Martinius Crocius Molinaeus the Brittish Divines and others delivered to or in that Synod And indeed it is unsound 686. If you say that he begins with a Scientia Conditionalis I answer It 's no more than what all sober men will grant de re that is that God knew from eternity that if he so made man as he did he would fall or if there were eternal propositions God eternally knew the truth of this hypothetical proposition If I so make man he will fall If this was quid intelligibile no doubt but God knew it But de ordine de nomine whether it be fit to parcell out Gods knowledge and Volitions into such shreds and atoms and so denominate them let them look to it on both sides that trouble us with their divisions 687. And note Bellarmines further explication Of these acts saith he the first is of the understanding the second of the will the third of the understanding the fourth of the will and the fifth of the understanding and in that last the essence of predestination especially consisteth 688. Yea cap. 15. whereas many distinguish predestination to faith or grace from election to glory and say that the latter is upon the foresight of faith as a condition though the first be absolute he opposeth them and copiously laboureth to prove that election to glory is absolute without any foreseen condition in us as well as that to grace Though without something in us we have not a Right to glory Even saith he as if a Physicion were sure that by such a Medicine he can cure a man and so resolveth to give it him the Medicine is the Cause that he is cured but not that it was ascertained by the decree of the Physicion before 689. And c. 15. ad obj 2. he proveth Gods certain foreknowledge â—erein because Though all have pro loco tempore sufficient grace to be converted if they will yet indeed no man is converted and no man persevereth but he that hath the special gift of Repentance and Perseverance which is not given to all but to those only for whom God decreed it 689. And to them that say the Elect can refuse grace he answereth â—hat They can indeed but it 's certain that they will not because God will call them so as he seeth so congruous that they may not refuse his call For thus true grace is refused by no hard heart because it is given with a purpose to mollifie it And there is no danger lest God should want skill or arguments to perswade any man to what he please 690. And indeed before de Gratia efficaci li. 1. cap. 12. he tells us that â—here are three opinions wherein the efficacy of grace consisteth The first is that it is called effectual only from the event through mans conâ—ent which he disproveth The second that it is only efficacious by necessitating physical predetermination which he thinks to be an error on â—he other extream And the third which he defendeth is that it is efficacious by Gods will that it shall be so and by the Congruity or moral â—ptitude of inward and outward perswasions and means which God useth with a decree to turn the will And who can say that God cannot do this or if he can that he doth not Is here yet any room left for quarâ—elling and bitter censures in this point * * * When even Bradwardinâ— holdeth that Gods Volition of mans act alone which Bellarmine includeth is the effectual unresistible Grace â—â— parte Dei operantis 691. Lib. 2. cap. 16. he maketh two acts of Reprobation the very same that almost all the suffrages in the Synod of Dort assign and the same doctrine that Davenant and the Synod deliver His first act of Reprobation is Negative the second Positive 1. Non habet Voluntatem eos salvandi 2. Habet Voluntatem eos damnandi And as to the first Nulla datur ejus causa ex parte hominum sieut neque praedestinationis Posterioris causa est praevisio peccati They are unmerciful contenders that this much Reprobation will not satisfie 692. He proveth as the Calvinists do that it
naturally happy is proper to God therefore Adam was to be led to it freely by a Covenant An. To be happy necessarily and independently and primarily is proper to God But you can never prove it any contradiction or impossible for God to make a Creature naturally happy nor that there are not such § 9. Here the M. S. citeth some words of his Gibieuf making our Being in God initially and finally to be our state of amplitude and liberty and our going out from God to be our particularity and state of necessity as if we were pre-existent in God and our individuation ceased upon oâ—â— return into him as our End An. But these are Platonick Phantasms And Gibieuf who was a devout Oratorian and talketh too oft of our Deification as Benedictâ—â— de Benedictis Barbanson Baker and other Fryers that talk phanatically must be read with caution and exception and as the Soul need not fear too near a Union with God as the loss of its individuation so neither must it desire or hope for such § 10. M. S. An unchangeable state of Happiness in the love of God is called Eternal Life An. No doubt but that is called Eternal Life in the fullest sense which actually endureth to eternity as to that particular Subject And so 1. The life of Glory perfectively 2. And a confirmed state of Sanctity here initially are usually called Eternal Life But 3. Whether the lossable state which the Angels fell from and Adam fell from or that measure of Grace which the ancient Fathers thought the justified may fall from be never so called also I cannot prove § 11. M. S. Adam's promised Happiness was 1. Essential in this perfect holiness or love of God 2. Complemental in the enjoying God iâ— all the sanctified Creatures in that Paradise but not to be translated to Heaven which Christ only procureth us An. I inclined to that Opinion 26 years ago when I wrote the Aphorisms which you oppose But I now incline more to the contrary and rather think man should have been translated to Heaven as Henoch and Elias were upon many reasons which I now pass by Though I take it yet to be scarce certain to us § 12. M. S. The Holiness of God is his loving himself as his End And the third Person proceeding by a reflex act of the infinite Will and self-love of God is therefore called the Holy Spirit An. 1. This notion of Gods Holiness that it is his Self-love is not to be contemned It seemeth to be so with this limitation that you confine not his Holiness to this but take this only as the most eminent among the inadequate conceptions of it For his whole Transcendency in Being Life and Knowledg as being adoreable by the Creature and its End and the Fountain of all created Goodness and specially of Morality is also Gods Holiness 2. But the saying that God is his own End seemeth improper though tolerable if spoken but analogically For God neither hath nor is to himself a Cause nor an Effect a Beginning nor an End 3. That the third Person proceedeth by a reflex Act of the infinite Will many School-men boldly say And so some say that he is Gods actual self-love which is â—he same that you call his Holiness And some say that he is the Divine Will or Love considered in it self as distinct from Vital Power and Intellect or Wisdom But of this I have spoken more largely else-where § 13. M. S. Adam's promised Reward was to be fixed in an unchangeable state of pleasing God by this Holy Spirit not by infusing any new quality which should unchangeably fasten him to the Rule for no created thing can unchangeably keep a man from falling An. 1. The promise to Adam is very obscure But Happiness it must needs be and everlasting 2. But it is past my reach to conceive how the Spirit of God can fix man in perfect holiness without any fixing quality as it 's called on his Soul A constant Act the Soul must have And 1. If that Act be caused by any Divine Impulse disposing the Soul so to act then that disposition is a quality 2. And if there be not both disposition and habit then the Soul will not in Glory be habitually or qualitatively holy but only actually 3. And a habit-acting being perfecter than an act without a habit or inclination the Soul will be more imperfect in Glory than in this state of Grace 4. Operari sequitur esse God fitteth all his Creatures to their works And as when he will give Immortality he will give a Nature fit for Immortality even indissoluble and incorruptible so when he giveth perpetuity of Love he giveth a nature or habits fit for perpetual Action Christ saith A good Tree bringeth forth good fruit and an evil Tree evil fruit Make the Tree good and his fruit good 5. The Operations of Love in Glory should be ex potentia aut violentia aut neutra if there were no intrinsick disposition or inclination to them In a word it is a contradiction for a Soul to be perfectly holy and not have the perfection of inclination to its Acts. 3. But if the meaning were that no holy quality alone sufficeth without Gods Influx that were no more than what must be faid of every Creature without Divine Influx no Creature can be or operate a moment No created thing of it self without God can continue How then should it keep a man from falling But if the Soul have any more goodness of nature or inclination in it than the Devils have it must be a created thing or God himself If only God that proveth not a Saint to be himself better than a Devil as to nature or disposition but only that God in him is better His reason why the Sun is naturally fixed to its Operations but not a glorified Soul is § 14. M. S. that one is a natural and the other a voluntary Agent One as Gibieuf saith Non agit sed agitur the other doth agere non tantum agitur An. 1. Gibieuf and you were deceived in thinking that such naturals non agunt Passive matter doth not Act ex principio essentiali unless Dr. Glissons and Campanellas Doctrine hold true But the three Active Natures Intellectual Sensitive and Vegetative and so Fire and the Sun do ex principio Activo essentali agere but nothing doth Act without an Antecedent Influx to action from the first Cause in which it is passive For no Creature is Independent 2. Voluntas est quaedam Natura quamvis libera To move naturally only and not freely is proper to Agents meerly natural distinct from free But to move freely and yet from a fixed principle which shall infallibly determine the Soul to act freely is not a contradiction nor that which Gibieuf should deny to the glorified § 15. M. S. Man though a Creature is the first Cause of his own action He moveth and sets himself on work else he were
justified by Faith it connoteth and includeth that we are justified by Christ and his Sacrifice Merits and Covenant respectively believed in But yet it is not Christ nor his Sacrifice or Merits or Promise that is meant by the word Faith It was a gross abuse of the Text so to expound it Faith connoteth the Object but it is not Christ that is called Faith 140. But the meaning is that man having forfeited Life Christ's Righteousness habitual active and passive hath merited that it shall be given us as a free Gift but yet regularly under a Law But the Law maketh nothing but believing acceptance the condition of our Right and he that doth that much shall without perfection be esteemed and used as righteous for the sake of the said Righteousness of Christ So that in point of Merit as to the value of the thing Christ's Righteousnesâ— is instead of our Innocency But as to the order of collation something being still to be required of us as a condition of Right so our Faith now is instead of our Innocency as being all that is laid on us instead of â—â— that we may have right to Justification And to assign this condition oâ— our part Paul saith That Faith is imputed to us for righteousness To deny this sense is to use violence with the Text. 141. Christ's Righteousness is made ours as our Sins were made his which is not in themselves as is aforesaid God forbid we should think that Christ was ever reputed by God to be a Sinner a Blasphemer a Murderer an Enemy to God and Goodness one that had Satan's Image and was his Servant a Persecutor of himself c. But only our sin was imputed to him as to the punishment deserved that is he assumed the Reatum poenae the punishment and a dueness occasioned by our sin but made his own by his voluntary sponsion But never had he the reaâ—um culpae in its self but meerly as aforesaid respectively to the punishment Even so we have the Righteousness of Christ not in its self as Proprietors of it but in relation to the effects that is we have the effects even our Justification and other benefits as purchased by it and for its sake And as our guilt or obligation to punishment was not Christ's till his voluntary sponsion or consent did make it so Even so his Righteousness is not ours in the effects till our voluntary consent accept it Because iâ— is not a natural but a contracted Relation that is between Christ and us And as it is not a strict propriety in Christ's Righteousness that we have so it is much less a plenary and absolute propriety nor have we it in the Relation of a meritorious cause to all uses as if it had been fully our own but only limitedly to those uses which God accepted it for and hath assigned to it in the Gospel that is it is but a certain sort and measure of mercies that are given us from it in Gods time and way 142. To the asserting of the rigid sense of Imputation they are necessitated to say that which supposeth Gods repute of the matter to be false that is that he reputeth us to have done that in and by Christ which we never did by him But God judgeth nothing to be otherwise than it is that he judgeth Christ to have been the Sponsor and Mediator and in that person to have done and suffered as he did is because it is true But he judgeth him not to have been the legal Person of the Sinner and as many persons as there be redeemed Sinners in the world because that is not true 143. They say that what the Surety doth the Debtor doth in Law-sense and to judge so is not to err But there are several sorts of Sureties much more of Instruments in paying a Debt 1. There be free Sureties who are not obliged to the Debtor as his Dependents and these either by counter-security or by right of the thing may recover all of the Debtor again And therefore the Law supposeth not the Debtor to have payed the Debt by them but that the Creditor made them both Joynt-Debtors for his own security 2. There are Sureties antecedently and Sureties consequently One that before the Debt doth conditionally make himself a Joynt-Debtor in case the Principal pay it not And there is a Surety more properly called an undertaking-Friend who after payeth the Debt being disobliged before Christ was not a Surety of the first sort in Law-sense And if you call Gods Decrees which are his Essence Suretiship your liberty of words changeth not the case 3. There is a Surety who payeth the Debt in the name and person of the principal Debtor And he is not properly called a Surety but an Agent or Substitute And Christ was none such nor is any proper Surety such And there is a Surety which by the Creditors consent doth pay the Debt in his own name agreeing that the chief Debtor shall have no benefit by it but from him as he shall give it on certain terms And this was Christ's case 4. There is a Surety that payeth the same debt that was due from the Principal And there is a Surety or Friend that undertaketh only to make the Creditor satisfaction because the Debtor cannot pay And this is the case 5. Lastly There is a pay-master that is the Debtors Instrument whether Servant Delegate or whoever at his command or request doth pay it in his name and person And this is not the case And there is a proper Surety who is a third person and no Instrument and payeth it in his own name though for another This as I said is the case and therefore it is not we that paid it Therefore to the Objection I say that to judge Christ such an Instrument or Delegate of ours or Surety that did all in our legal person is to misjudge and err as is proved which God cannot do 144. Christ did and suffered in the common nature of man though not in the person of each Sinner And mans nature is so far redeemed by him that for the meer Original Sin of nature alone no man shall perish unless he add the rejection of Grace of which somewhat is said before But yet as Nature existeth only in persons so it is all persons who have this much benefit and more But that he merited and satisfied in our Nature is a proper speech and truer than that he did it in our persons 145. But all this similitude of a Creditor and Debtor is to be limited in the application according to the great difference of Sin and Debt which will infer a great diversity in the consequents which may easily be collected by the Reader 146. As to the great and weighty question whether Christ died for How far Christ died for sins against the Law of Grace sins against the New Covenant or only for those against the old I answer Distinction is here notoriously
There is no Place where any Corporeal being is where some Active created Nature is not with it so that considering the proximity and the natures we may well conclude that we know of no corporal motion under the Sun which God effecteth by himself alone without any second Cause § 6. Joh. Sarisburiensis and some Schoolmen liken Gods presence with the Creature in operation to the fire in a red hot Iron where you would think all were Fire and all Iron But the similitude is too low The SUN is the most Notable Instrument in visible Nature And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx God and the Sun do what the Sun doth and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth that 's corporeal without it § 7. But the Sun moveth nothing as the Cartesians dream by a single Motive Influx alone but by emission of its Threefold Influx as every Active Nature doth that is Motive Illuminative and Calefactive which are One-radically in Three-effectively § 8. This Efflux of the Sun is universal and equal ex parte sui But causeth wonderful diversity of effects without diversity in God the prime Cause or in it self The same Influx causeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to stink and the Flowers of the sweeter Plants to be sweet some things to live and some to dye some things to be soft and some hard c. In a word there are few changes or various actions below in bodies which the Sun is not the Cause of without difference in it self But not the specifying Cause § 9. The reason why one equal Influx causeth such wonderful diversity of motions is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures Recipitur ad modum recipientis So one poise maketh various Motions in a Clock c. § 10. God operateth on second Causes as God Omnipotently but not ad ultimum potentiae but Freely as he pleaseth § 11. God worketh by second Causes according to the said Causes aptitude so that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the second cause which God useth § 12. There is a superiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as Bodies And whether God work on all our souls by superiour Spirits as second Causes is unknown to us It is not improbable according to the order of his providence in other things But we know little of it certainly § 13. But certain we are that superiour Voluntary Agents Angels and Devils have very much to do with our souls and operate much upon them It is a wonderful power which wise observers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination or Thinking faculty of which I could give some instances enough to convince a rational Sadducee And it is not like that good Angels have less power skill or will § 14. And we are sure that God hath ordained One Great Universal second Cause to convey his Spirit and Grace by which is JESUS CHRIST As the Sun is an Universal Cause of Motion Light and Heat to Inferiour creatures and God operateth by the Sun So is Christ set as a Sun of Righteousness by whom God will convey his spiritual Influx to mens souls and there is now no other conveyance to be expected § 15. Christs Humane Nature united personally to the Divine and Glorified is by the Office of Mediator Authorized and by Personal Union and the Fulness of the Holy Spirit enabled and fitted to this communication of Gods Spiritual Influx to mankind § 16. Object A Creature cannot be a Cause of the Operation of the Holy Ghost who is God the Creator Sending is the Act of a Superiour But Christs humanity is not superiour to the Holy Ghost Answ 1. Christ as a Creature is no Cause of any Essential or purely Immanent Act of God for that hath no Cause But 1. He is a Cause of the Spirits operation as it signifieth the effect 2. And so the cause why his Act is terminated on the soul and 3. Of the ordering of these effects why rather on this soul than on that and at this time measure c. And 2. This Christ doth not as a superiour sender of the Spirit but a Ministerial and a second cause As a Master payeth his servants as his Steward determineth § 17. It is certain that Christ is the Political Cause or Head of this spiritual Influx on souls that is As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the Persons measure time conditions of the Communication of the Spirit But whether he be a Physical Head of this Influx by proper efficiency giving the Spirit from himself as the Sun giveth us its Influx is all that is disputable That is Whether the Spirit be first given Inherently to Christ and pass from his person as his unto us as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members § 18. This question may be put either of all Natural Being and Motion or only of Spiritual Motion in the soul of man Whether Christ be so the Head of Nature as that all Nature in Heaven and Earth is sustained and actuated by him as the physical efficient Cause or whether this be true of this Lower World which was curst for sin or whether it be true at least of Humane nature or whether it be true only of Gracious operations § 19. 1. That Christ hath the Political dispose of the whole Universe contained in the words Heaven and Earth the Scripture seemeth to assert 2. That he hath the Political disposal of humane nature and of all other creatures that belong to man so far as they belong to him Angels Devils Sun Air Earth c. is past dispute 3. That the real â—hysical effects acts and habits of the Spirit on mens souls are caused by Christs Moral Causation by his Merit and his Political Mission is past dispute 4. That besides all this the Spirit it self by Baptism is in Covenant with all the members of Christ and that as they are such and is in a prior Covenant first Related to Christ himself and so by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Christ is past dispute 5. And that Christ himself doth make such Physical changes on our souls by Means and by the foresaid Political Mission of the Spirit by which we are made Receptive of more of the Spirits operations is past dispute 6. But whether moreover any Action of Christs own Humane soul glorified do physically reach our souls or whether the Holy Ghost may in its own essential Virtue which is every where be said to be more in Christ than elsewhere and communicated to us as from the root or the Spirits effects on the soul to come by Reflection from the first effects on Christ as Light and Heat from the Sun by a Speculum or Burning-glass are questions not for me to determine § 20. Christs spiritual Influx on souls is not single but is ever Three in One as the Sun 's aforesaid which are according to
the Threefold Divine Excellencies Communicated and the Threefold humane Receptive faculties viz. LIFE LIGHT and LOVE or spiritual Vivification Activity and Power spiritual Illumination of the Intellect and spiritual Conversion or Sanctification of the Will by holy Love § 21. It is certain that it is not only on believers that Christ operateth by the spirit For he draweth men by it to believe and many wicked men that are not his elect have common even miraculous gifts of the spirit * * * Mat. 7. 21 22 23. Gal. 3. 1 2 3. Heb. 6. 5 6. 1 Cor. 14. which are all communicated by Christ § 22. As Nature it self is in his Political power and is delivered to him so far as it is reparable and belongeth to the reparation of man so all gifts and operations Received by any in the world which are Mercies contrary to commerit are the effects of Christ Even as the Sun shineth in the night by the Moon and in the dawning of the day by it self unseen and after by it self appearing so Christ shineth to the Heathen world in abundance of natural and providential mercies and by the help of many Creatures and experiences and to some by nearer approaches as well as to the Church by the manifestation of himself All which is evident 1. Because the whole lapsed world in Adam and Noe were brought under his own Covenant of Grace according to which he operateth 2. In that so much mercy after sin will not stand with Gods regiment by the meer Law of Innocency violated 3. In that Christ is expresly called the Saviour of the World and the Saviour of all men especially of them that believe who dyed for all in that all were dead that they that live should live to him who tasted death for every man c. And Joh. 1. 9 10 11 12. That was the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world or coming into the world lighteth every man He was in the world and the world was made by him and the world knew him not And v. 4 5. In him was life and the Life was the Light of man and the Light shineth in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not c. § 23. This threefold Influx of Christs Spirit for LIFE LIGHT and LOVE is not equally effectual on all nor equally effectual on the same person at several times nor each part of the influx equally effectual on the same person at the same time The Reasons anon SECT III. Of the Operations and Principles as compared § 1. THough Power Wisdom and Goodness or Love all co-operate by the spirit of Christ yet in the work of Mans Recovery their Impressions are not equal But as POWER with Wisdom and Love more appeared in the CREATION as is aforesaid so WISDOM with Power conveying Love appeareth more in our Redemption and LOVE with Power and Wisdom is most conspicuous and illustrious in our Renewed state begun indeed by Sanctification but perfect in our GLORIFICATION * * * As to the Question between the Schoolmen define beatitudin undoubtedly the Thomists err in placing it chiefly in the Intellect And Medina and others give silly reasons for it and the Scotists of whom Rada well handleth it are far righter And Agid. Romanus briefly and clearly tells us the truth Quodlib 3. q. 18. p. 187. Btatitudo est in aliquo finaliter in aâ—â—quo formaliter Naâ— si ipsum objectum principaâ—â— Voluntatis prout habit rationem finis sit beatitudo oportet quod beatitudo principaliter sit in hoc objecto coâ—sequenter formaliter in actu Voluntatis Nam Voluntas in suum objectum tendit finaliter sed per suum actum teadit in objectum formaliter Ex quo apparet quod be â—titudo sit magis in ipso objecto Voluntatis quam in actu quia ratio finis est magis in objecto quam in actu This is clear truth if you put but finis alone for beatitudo For Beatitudo qua talis is not the principal end of man but God as God in his perfect Goodness and the fulfilling of his will next and then our own beatitude with that of the blesâ—ed And he maketh Vision and not Love to be the secondary final object of all The Omnipotent Father as is said Createth Nature with the Son and Holy Spirit The Son the Wisdom of the Father is the Physicion of souls and healeth them by SKILL with Power and Love The Holy Ghost called by the Schoolmen The LOVE of God dwelling and working peculiarly in us to and in perfection with power and Wisdom is the PERFECTION of the soul And so Natura Medela Sanitas are the various effects of the Divine operation § 2. Therefore the SONS operation in procuring and communicating the SPIRIT of Love and Holiness is eminently sapiâ—â—tial § 3. The Impressions of all the Divine Virtues are excellent in their several kinds And it 's hard for us to say that this is simply more excellent than that But we can say which is more suitable to the nature of man to be esteemed and Loved by him And so we esteem the Impressions of Wisdom and Love as most suitable to us § 4. A Horse or Oxe excelleth Man in strength and a Bird or Hare or Dog in swiftness and a Mountain and an Oak in Greatness And yet we account the Wisdom and Moral Goodness of man to be a greater excellency and to make him the more noble Creature § 5. And God seemeth to tell it us 1. By calling these his Image 2. And by making man the Lord of these stronger Creatures § 6. And among men we take him not for the most excellent who is the strongest but who is the Wisest and the Best And therefore the Wisest and Best are by Aristotle said to be born by Nature to Rule the rest and by all sober men are thought to be the Fittest to Guide and Rule others how seldom soever it cometh to pass while the Robuster sort are Labourers and Mechanicks § 7. Yet I deny not but the effect is answerable to the Cause And as Active-Power causeth Action and Wisdom and Government causeth the Order and Rectitude of action and Love and Goodness the Perfection of it and the agent so Gods Vital-Power Wisdom and Goodness are equal which are the Principles of all As the Father Son and Spirit are coequal And God is indeed glorious in the Motion of Sun and Stars c. as well as in the Wisdom and Holiness of man But besides the foresaid suitableness this difference must be considered that as Life Intellect and Will Power By special Grace some mean two distinct things viz. 1. Our Love to God and other holy Habits and acts or an Inclination to them 2. Gods favour to us and acceptation of us and that as relating to the Glory which he will give us so that the first they call the Habit of Grace quâ— ens qualitas
morally attracting even inwardly but also efficaciously and truly effecting that the will moved and excited of God determine it self and act well Answ We know what mans perswading and moral operations are a little But the difference between these interiour acts of God named by you no man knoweth You cannot prove that his Interiour swasion is not truly efficient of the act nor know you how God proâ—ureth our determination as to the mode of his interiour operation Your arbitrary names have no signification of your true formal conceptions of the matter This Controversie therefore is vain XVI The efficacy of the help of preventing grace and the infallible connexion of it with the free co-operation of the will is totally founded and taken as from its first root from the Omnipotency of God and from the absolute and efficacious decree of his will willing that the man whom he moveth be converted and work piously nor doth this efficacy any way depend no not as on a condition sine qua non on the future co-operation of the created will though the free act by which man persevereth depend effectively on his will moved by God Answ 1. I grant that all the good that cometh to pass is fore-decreed by God 2. But Gods meer will effecteth it not without his Power 3. His power effecteth it not from eternity before it is effected 4. You leave out one of the causal Attributes The effect of Grace is as well from the Wisdom of God as from his Will and Power 5. Gods act dependeth not on mans will But mans co-operation which is his own act you must confess dependeth on his will as the effect on the nearest efficient 6. The non-efficiency of sufficient Grace dependeth on the sinners will It was not meerly nor principally from an absolute efficacious Decree or predetermination of God that Adams will omitted his duty first or committed sin first And if any run to the common shadow that sin hath no efficient cause and man only is deficient I answer 1. He is the first Reputative Deficient though not culpable because under no Law who must be the first efficient of the contrary and is not As if Adams body had never had a soul God was the first Non-efficient Cause that is into whose will and non-agency the whole ratio defectus is to be resolved 2. Forget not that Alvarez himself saith lib. 6. disp 45. p. 210. Licet peccatum originale non sit pro formali aliquid positivum sed privativum peccatum tamen actuale est pro formali aliquid positivum causat in anima habitum vitii XVII Supposing effectual Grace in free-will it infallibly followeth that free-will will consent and act piously so that these two are incompossible that effectual Grace be in a man and that he actually dissent Answ True because it is not called properly effectual unless either 1. Because it effecteth 2. Or as it cometh from an absolute decree of effecting 3. Or is of such a nature and degree that it cannot but effect And in all these cases it is true But such Grace may be eventually uneffectual which had a sufficiency ex parte sui to effect XVIII The gift of perseverance as such and the efficacy of it dependeth not no not as on a Condition sine qua non on the co-operation of our free-will but on the absolute decree of God effecting mans perseverance Answ This needeth no other explication or observation but as aforesaid Only that the Jus ad gratiam quâ ad finem perseveremus is given on condition in the Gospel from how absolute a decree soever it proceed XIX Effectual aid and a Power of dissenting are compossible in the same subject and consist in the same will Answ True And remember that a true Power is that quâ verè possumus and not that faculty which could do this or that if God will predetermine it and otherwise cannot no more than the Sun can shine without him When God withholdeth the Influx necessary to action such a faculty is no true power as to that action in that State XX. By preventing Grace efficacious as aforesaid the Liberty of the will is not destroyed nor the actual use of it hindered but is wonderfully perfected and roborated Answ There is a Liberty that is perfected by some even necessitating Free-will in name is owned by you all I say as August Enchir. c. 105. Sic oportebat prius hominem fierl ut bene velle posset male nec gratis si bene nec impune si male postea vero sic erit ut male velle non possit Quia ordo praetermittendus non suit in quo Deus voluit ostendere quam bonum sit animal rationale quod etiam peccare possit quamvis sit melius quod peccare non possit predetermination of God And there is an inferiour Liberty of Imperfect Viators which some efficient Divine predetermination feigned by you would destroy And if God did by that insuperable premoving influx which omnipotently moveth all things predetermine all men and Devils to all the wicked Volitions and actions that ever were done with all the circumstances and as respecting every object comparatively so that no creature ever did nor can resist such a predetermination any easier than make a World this were to destroy the true Liberty of that Creature with his innocency and felicity however you may at pleasure put the name of Liberty on and deny the name of Necessity to such an absolutely necessitated Volition and act and then may say that they are premoved and predetermined to do the Act of all sin freely or constrained to do it without constraint and so the liberty of the will is established For I see not but cogere ad Volendum is as apt a phrase as cogere nolentem ad agendum when a will formerly innocent is irresistibly predetermined by physical efficiency to all those comparate circumstantiate acts which are forbidden in Gods Law and that on pain of mans damnation But note how wisely Alvarez left out the great difference about predetermining to the acts of sin from this summary of his disputations §. III. Of the three other wayes and I. Of the Jesuits way Quest AS you have past your judgement on Alvarez and his Dominican way tell us how much you think well or ill of in the other three wayes mentioned by Alvarez and recited by you sect 8 Answ I. I have said enough before to answer this Briefly as to the Jesuits way de scientia media 1. It is certain that God knoweth all that Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 22. d. 99. c. 6 7. after the rejection of many opinions holds this the only way of Concord 1. Gods preventing operating grace is Vocatio Congrua with good cogitations and the primus motus voluntatis ante actum liberum 2. Gods co-operating Grace ad consensum liberum is neither before nor after our act but concomitant simul And so
to be simply necessary to motion Here the Reader must know that the Controversie is equally of Natural and Free agents and action And first let us enquire of natural action I. Fire is an Active nature as much Inclined to Action as Earth to non-action or rest Yea it s Active Virtue and Inclination is its very Essential Form and this as to a threefold action viz. Motion Light and Heat If God then make Fire and continue its Nature or Essential Inclination For I have before shewed how many wayes this is certainly done The whole experience of the world sheweth that God doth operate by second causes according to their natures and wayes of operation Therefore it more concerneth us here to know what second causes do on the soul in good and evil actions than in these disputes is usually observed Adrian Quodl 3. fol 18. Sententia Durandi plurium aliorum certum tenet c. Quam opinionem ultimo tradit Magister 37. d. 2. judicium relinquens prudentis lectoris examini to these acts and continue fuel approximate with all necessary concauses and media without impediments to say that this Fire yet cannot burn or act without another kind of Divine premotion besides all this even an Immediate physical impulse besides the described Influx is a plain contradiction For Fire is essentially an Inclined Power to act And that which hath a true Power to act can act It 's a contradiction to say It hath power but it cannot And a Power naturally inclined to act will act caeteris paribus The question then is Whether it be an impossibility for fire to burn if God do but as the first Cause of Nature continue its burning power and inclination with all concauses or rather Was it not a Miracle for the three Confessors Dan. 3. not to be burnt in that fiery Furnace If you say that the Miracle was in Gods withholding his additional premotion you then imply that God as principium vel causa prima Naturae doth ordinarily give that additional premotion For that is no Miracle which is not dissonant from the common course of nature But nothing can belong to God as the Cause of Nature but to continue Nature as he made it and he actually premoveth and concurreth while by his Influx as the first cause he continueth all its Moving Nature both Power and Inclination In the motus projectorum so far as the moving vis impressa continueth and prevaileth the motion continueth accordingly And who can prove that though the vis impressa continue e. g. in a Bullet shot out of a Gun and all concauses yet there can be no motion unless God otherwise thrust it on or move it by some other impulse Suppose a Stone or Rock hang in the Air quasi per filum or by somewhat that hindereth its descent If God continue the Natural Gravity of that Rock which is not only a power but an inclination to descend and if he continue all concauses and media and if the thred be cut or the impediment removed that held up the stone yet saith the Dominican this Stone cannot fall unless God moreover by another action thrust it down or by an efficient physical premotion predetermine it or as the Jesuits say unless God concurr with a further moving Impulse A plain contradiction That a Power of motion strongly inclined to act so as a greater power is necessary in the impediment that will hinder it and this in genere Agentis continued by Divine Influx yet cannot act unless otherwise moved God worketh so constantly by Natural Inclinations of second causes as fully proveth to us that ut prima Causa Naturae he hath decreed so to work And how is that then but by his Influx into Nature as Nature If my house cannot fall when the foundations and pillars are gone unless God otherwise thrust it down If I cannot fall though I leap down from the house top unless God otherwise thrust me down If the Town cannot be fired unless God predetermine it or concurr besides his continuation of Nature why should we fear it when we know not that God decreeth any more than the continuation of natural causes and that action which is by them and by him as the upholder of them II. And the case of free-Free-agents is here confessed to be the same The Influx into their Natures and Virtues is it that continueth them in esse substantiali and in esse movente moto An Act is but the modus substantiae And it surpasseth my understanding to conceive what it is for God physice influere in actum immediate non in potentiam seu virtutem agentem nor how he can be said to move the faculties to act that doth cause the act and not meddle with and therefore not move the faculty Nor know I how an Act immediately and not the agent can be the terminus of a physical motion Though it 's easie to conceive how God should cause an act by moral and extrinsick objective means Therefore as God moveth things Natural by his Influx into their moving Virtues or into the moving Virtues of second Causes which being Active operate on passive matter so as the Soul and its Will is quadam natura inclined to Action in genere and to will good in special God as the cause of nature moveth it by his Influx into the faculty as he doth other natural agents But having made it a Free self-determining Agent his Influx upholdeth and moveth it as such And the same Influx is upholding and moving and moving as upholding seeing God as Motor also doth influere in naturam vitalem liberam Besides which supporting and moving Influx no other predetermining premotion is necessary to an Act as an Act that I know of But the very natures or dispositions of lapsed man being depraved the reparation of them is necessary to holy actions And here also God operateth on the faculties by right disposing them and by that grace which Augustine and Jansenius well call Gratia medicinalis his special Influx causing maintaining and actuating it he causeth the holy actions of believers I do verily believe that Durandus and his followers under the name of supporting the natural and free faculties did mean inclusively that which Bellarmine pleadeth for A General Concurse to the Act as an Act And that they differ in words and not in sense And if his doctrine hold not true I cannot see how God can be said to Permit mens sinful Actions or any action at all For if neither the Inclination of natural agents as of Fire to burn a Stone to descend c. nor the Inclination of the most wicked nature would cause any act unless God otherwise cause it by premotion then there is no place for Impedition for we cannot be said to Hinder a Stone from speaking or a Mountain from walking nor anything from any act which it could not as And permittere is non impedire And
the days of Arminius to this day especially between Prince Maurice and the States at the death of Barnevelt the imprisonment of Grotius c. The Synod at Dort and all the strife and discontent before and after it 3. Peruse but the Volumes written on one side by Suecâ—nus Arminius Grevinchovius Corvinus Tilenus Episcopius Curcellaeus Grotius c. with many Lutherans And on the other side by Gomarrus Lubbertus Macchovius c. Molinaeus Amesius Dr. Twisse Rutherford Spanhemius c. and think how sad such Combats are 4. Think what a lamentable distance to this day is kept up between the Lutherans and Calvinists in all Countries and much upon the account of these same Controversies And what bitter Books the Lutherans have written comparing the Calvinists to Papists Turks c. and how little Mr. Ducy by forty years Labour did to reconcile them and how small success all other Reconcilers have had though excellent learned judicious men such as Calixtus Johan Bergins Conrad Bergins Ludov. Crocius Mat. Martinius Isleburg Testaidus Amyraldus Placens Capellus Dallaeus Blondel Davenant Hall Carlton Abbot Morton Preston c. 5. Think of the great Conflicts in France and Flanders between the Jansenists and their Adversaries and the multitude of elaborate Volumes between the Dominicans and the Jesuites And of how many Ages continuance those contests have been 6. Then rise up to the Time and Case of Faustus Rhegiensis Cassianus and the Massilienses and their Adversaries and the hard Characters left by those controversies on the names of worthy men 7. From thence ascend to Chrysostome and his Reproaches and Austin's Censures on the other side with all the Conflicts which he and his Abettors Prosper and Fulgentius had with the Pelagians and Semipelagians of those times 8. And lastly read and pity almost all the Fathers especially of the Greek Church whose Names are now blotted with the censure of speaking too like our Arminians and Jesuites and after all this you will sure think this Contention was a very ill work if it be proved causless and you will think that it's time to end it if it be possible To which end an attempt is not discommendable if it should prove lost as to the greater part of men And some I doubt not God will bless it to at least to increase their love of peace A. I pray you tell me what is your Undertaking and in what measure it is that you think this Work may be accomplished B. My Undertaking is this To prove that in the points of Predestination and Redemption there is no difference between moderate men of each Party * Eadem enim difficultas fuit semper donationis in tempore praefinitionis aut praedestinationis in praescientia Cum ergo in tempore detur nobis prima gratia sine ulla causa ratione aut conditione sine qua non sic etiam praedestinatur Neque solum negari debet ratio cur unus praedestinetur alii verâ— non ut quidam dicebant sed etiam quare aliquis praedestinetur nulla facta comparatioâ—â— siquidem nulla ratio esse potuit ob quam Deus dederit primam gratiam nisi per modum sinis Vasquez in 1. Them Disp 91 c. 7. You see how much a Jesuite granteth but what is resolved into the points of Grace and Free-Will and in the points of Grace and Free-Will there is no real difference but what is resolved into the question of the degree of Gods co-operating influx compared with mans agency and with it self as on several Objects which will prove either no difference at all or else about a thing past mans Understanding And that only in the point of perseverance there is a real perceptible difference but such as is not worthy to be insisted on to the breach of Charity or the Churches peace but must consist with toleration and mutual love A. I know not whether this great Undertaking look more smilingly on the Times to come or frowningly on the Times past For if this be true what thoughts what names do we deserve for troubling the Christian World so perniciously and distractingly with a feigned difference But I pray you tell me in general how you will manifest all this B. 1. You must give me leave to tell you who they are that I undertake this Reconciliation of 2. And then how I shall perform it I. It is not every violent Contender that runneth into such palpable Errors as the common cause needeth not and will say any thing rather than agree that I am speaking of About these matters there are two Parties that stand on each extream who are not to be called Calvinists and Arminians but by other Names for their other Opinions These I intend to confute distinctly instead of reconciling them which iâ— impossible but by reforming them 1. On the one side I undertake not the Reconciliation of the Predeterminants who hold That Free-will is nothing but will a related to Reason Lubentia juxta rationem and that all its acts are as truly necessitated by the efficacions premotion of God as is the motion of a Clock or other Engine or of a Bruit though they will needs call them free because they are Volitions as if willing and free-willing were words of the same signification and that is deifying of mans Will or any Creature to say that it can move or determine it self to this Object rather than another without a Physical perdetermining efficient premotion by God at the first total Cause notwithstanding God should uphold its natural power and â—â— the cause of Nature afford his necessary universal Concourse and that to think that a Will thus predetermined by God could have forborn its act it to deifie it also They that think that God cannot make a Creature whose Will can determine it self without his predetermination to that act as circumstantiated though God uphold all its powers and all natural concurrentâ— else and that a self-determined not predetermined by premotion is a God or a Contradiction I am to confute and not to reconcile A. How will you confute them B. That is to be the work of a Disputation on that Point It shall now suffice to mind you that it seemeth to me very plainly to subvert Christianity if not all Religion For when Adam's sin and all the sin in the World of Men or Devils is resolved into the absolute unresistible Will and efficiency of God as the first total Cause and that it had been as impossible to have done otherwise as to be Gods or to Conquer God it 's easie to perceive whether God â—ate such sin and whether Christ died to signifie his hatred of it and whether he will damn men for not being Gods and whether he that is said unresistibly to predeterminâ— by immediate efficiency the thought will and tongue of every Lyar to every lye that ever was spoken can have any word delivered by man which we can be sure is true In a word if this
but God himself 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man nor of the same formal Conception And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man and not as in God and so this to us is the prius significatum 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sence formaliter but only eminenter 6. And lastly That Mortals know not just how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man All this you must grant me or be singular and ignorant A. All this is past denial but proceed to the Case B. Do you differ from us de eventu whether there be a Hell or yet of the number of those that are damned A. No or if we do about the Case of Heathens that belongeth not to this Point B. Do you differ from us about the Cause of mens Damnation We say that God damneth no man but for Sin yea for Sin impenitently continued in to the last against all the mercy which tended to their Cure A. So far we are agreed But it 's not the cause of damnation which I speak of but the cause of the Decree B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth he willeth to do A. Yes God doth nothing without a will to do it at least consequently B. Do you think that God willeth any thing to day which he willed not yesterday and so from eternity A. No we do not with Vostius make God mutable B. Good still you grant then that God damneth men that he damneth them for sin that he doth it willingly that he willed it from eternity And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God A. No. B. Then can that which is not be a cause was there any thing but God himself to be the Cause of Gods Will from eternity A. Not in esse reali but there was in esse cognito B. So now the game begins Thus the World is cheaâ—ed and troubled by Logical Notions and meer words Is that esse cognitum any thing or nothing If nothing it is no Cause If any thing is it God or a Creature It can be no Creature because it is eternal If God you do but say That God caused his own Will A. It is Gods fore-knowledge of Sin which causeth his Decree or Will B. 1. Even fore-knowledge it self say the Schools is but the same with knowledge and spoken say they but to the respect and sense of man There being neither priâ—s vel postoriâ—s before or after in eternity But this I now insist not on 2. It is commonly taken for blasphâ—my to talk of a Cause of God or any thing in God If Gods Will be his Essence it hath no Cause He causeth not himself being no Effect 3. If this were so as you say yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge * Vasquer in 1. Thâ— d. 91. saith of the Cause of Gods Decree Divinâ— voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem motivam per modum objecti sed etiam nullum esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud sed solam suam bonitatem Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem causam alterius italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam quia â—na est causa altâ—rius Non ergâ—â—â—â—â— mus an aliud â—â—â—â— ratio â—â—tiva Deo per modum â—â—â—â— ut velit nos prâ—dâ—stinare praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest Id. ib. disp 91. c. 4. Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cujâ—s gratia ratio nolendi aliquid sed propter quod câ—tera esse vult Deus For Siâ— fâ—re-seen is no Sin and nothing is no Cause so that you your self resolve all into God And indeed what can be a cause of the first Cause or any thing in him Use not tergiversation and vain words now and tell me what you have to say A. A thing not existent but fore-seen may be â— moral Cause though not a physical and so fore-seen Sin may be to God B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God There is nothing in God but God To be a cause of his Will is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence And shall so base a thing aâ— Sin cause God 2. We are still at the cheating Game of playing with â—rbitrary Notions What mean you by a moral Cause If a true cause of moral Being that 's one thing If any thing that is not physically or properly but by moral imputation only a cause of any event that 's another thing The first you dare not own as if any thing which is nothing Sin not existent were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica It is really no Cause but that for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that â—â—â—â— equivocally a Cause 3. Therefore if you use not the word Cause equivocally your rule is false Nothing is no moral Cause You will instance in good destrâ—d in fine nondum existente c. But I answer you Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes which are never found but in an existent entity or subject A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum That which is not is not good or amiable Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause But if we will let go the toy and come to the matter It is no other good but the desire of good or the apprehension of the â—â—â—â—rity of good which causeth so that all the Cause is in the Agent 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge that when any mâ—n saith That sin which is no sin and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will he must needs mean no real cause Because to be a cause is tertium Adjectum and presupposeth to be That which is not is not a cause much less of God or of his Will A. I can shew you that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logick For if this hold true then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings c. was no moral true cause of Gods Will to pardon Sin and save Souls to â—hose under the Promise before the Incarnation B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter but advantageth you not at all Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this that nothing can do nothing nor cause nothing It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering not yet existent that caused Gods Will tâ— pardon Sinners Nor had Gods Will any proper cause But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another he willed that
comparativa ita de adultis 4. Non solum comparative sed etiam absolute loquendo nulla datur causa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus Where note that he granteth that there is in man a cause of Reprobation as to some effects viz. punishment For by a cause he meaneth any prerequisite condition For no doubt there is no efficient cause of any thing in God And all his stress is laid on this that the permission of the first sin is the first effect of Reprobation and this permission hath no cause in man Ergo Reprobation quoad omnes effectus hath no cause in man But the truth is 1. A man may put such a sence on the word Reprobation as to include what he please But it 's usually taken for Gods Decree to damn men and to deprive them of somewhat necessary to their salvation and so is 1. A positive Act as a Volition 2. And privative objectively and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative 4. And some most ineptly extend it to that which is negatio actus no Act that is to nothing And so a man that will play with words may say that 1. Gods non-agere nonâ—igere is an Act. 2. That his non-impedire is an effect which is nothing and therefore no effect And Alvarez utterly faileth iâ— this proof either that non-eligere is an Act or permittere vel non impedire an eâ—â—ect or that it is fitly called Reprobation which hath â—â— privation but a negation for its Object e. g. that Judas shall not be an Angel nor iâ—â—eccabilâ— but have natural free-will is no act of his Reprobation And so of the permission of the first sin Arminius himself exam Perâ—ins pag. 568. saith Voleâ—et Deus Israelem punire Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere Propria â—mmediata adâ—quata causa cur permiserit ut Achaâ— iâ—â—â— cadem perpetraret est illa quam dixi mensâ—ra sâ—elerum implenâ—â— erat â—â—â—â— Dâ—â—â—â—â—tra peccatum hominis per aliam â—â—em Nabothum ad se evocare Which Dr. Twisse useth through all his Writings against him ad hominem in stead of argument â—â—-thinks this concession should seem enough which is too much And I conjecture that Arminius wrote it by over-sight and woâ—ld have said that God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth because he would â—â—â—â— him to â—â—â—â— up the measure of his sin making permission the res Voâ—â—ta But all theiâ— assigning Causes of Gods â—â—â—â— are â—â—â—â—â—â—ld God being above all causeâ— B. I wonder not that Dr. Twisse holdeth that God willeth it when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act clothed with all its circumstances That which God causeth he must needs will But when he saith Nostri Theologi affirmant he must mean but some few such as Maccovius Spanhemius Rutherford and perhaps Piscator or Beza of his own mind But the generality of Protestants either are against him or meddle not with it He that will read Davenant and such others shall find the difference I remember but few English Divines at all that own it besides the forenamed and Mr. Norton But having written both an answer to this Digression of Dr. Twisse and to his and Alvarez and other mens Doctrine of physical predetermining premotion I may pretermit that here C. But by this they make God an idle Spectator of sin in the World and so deny a great part of his Providence or Works B. 1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation but of Gods Works 2. Take heed of such unreverent words of God Who will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain Dare you reproach God as Idle if he do not all that your shallow thoughts will cut out for him C. The blasphemy is theirs that give the cause by their unsound Doctrine and not mine that do but denominate their consequents B. Let us try that Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do that he made the World as soon as he was able and could have done it no sooner or that he is able to make no one Man or Beast or Plant or Atome more than he hath made nor to do any one action more than he doth C. No I hold no such thing For God is Omnipotent and Free B. I pray you then study it and tell me if God be not to be blasphemed as Idle for such a total Non-agency or Free-suspension of his own Acts as to all such possibles why should you call him Idle if by the same Wisdom and Free-will he only suspend some degree of his co-operation with man in the case of sinning And if God freely decree that man shall be made a free Agent able by Gods common generical concurse as the cause of nature to determine or suspend his own Volitions without any predetermining efficiency of God If God will delight himself in making such a Creature will you dare to say that he is Idle because he moveth him not in another manner you will not so reproach a Watch-maker for not moving the Watch all day with his finger C. I confess I cannot answer that But how then is God the Governor of the World if so much sin be done without his Will and Operation B. The Work of a Governor as such is only 1. By Legislation to make the Subjects Duty 2. And by Judgment to try and decide the case of each Subject whether he do that Duty 3. And to see to the execution of that Judgment But not to be the determining cause of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions C. It is so with man because he can do no more but not with God B. Indeed God governeth all meer Naturals and Bruits by physical motion as Engins are moved as a Clock or Watch by natural necessitation And so he doth the meer naturals of man As his Concoction Pulse circulation of Blood generation in the Womb c. But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent ruleth him as such agreeably to his nature even by moral Agency by Laws and Judgment And this is that Regency of which we speak If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind or King of the World you deny him to be God and overthrow all Religion and Morality C. But what say you to all the Texts that tell us that God willed and caused that which wicked men did as in the case of Pharaoh Sihon Rehoboam Absolom the death of Christ and many others B. One of the greatest over-sights of them that thus Object is that they distinguish not between the sin and the effect of the sin or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him and the reception of this Act in passo in the recipient God can many ways concur to the causing of the reception and the effect without causing the Volition or Act as Agents by a specifying determination Especially
a sweet connatural manner like as an effectual perswader doth not forcing the Will but preserving its liberty and as the Arminians speak not irresistibly or by necessitation leaving the act to be contingent 4. But withal it is most certain that God operateth on the Mind and Will it self and not on the Preacher of the Word only 5. But no mortal man knoweth how nor is able to comprehend his way of operation 11. But next tell me what you mean by Physical which is the other branch of your distinction C. What should I mean but Natural by Real Contact attingency or influx on the Recipient B. 1. God is above Nature and not included in your Physicks How then do you call his operations Physical ex parte agentis No Physicks pretend to treat of God 2. Contact and proper attingency belongeth to Bodies But God is not a Body and therefore the Contact or Influx by which he operateth is utterly unknown to mortal man any farther than that it is by his Essence 3. God is immense and essentially every where and therefore such a Metaphysical Attingency or Contact as may be spoken of him he hath to all things in the world and therefore must do all that he any way doth in such attingency C. Explain it and resolve it your self if you like not my Explication B. Gods operations are called Physical or Moral 1. In regard of God the Agent 2. In regard of the means or second causes 3. Or in respect of the effect I. In respect of God the Agent they are not properly either Physical or Moral but transcendently they are above both for they are his Essence The Papists who are most for meer moral operations in this Controversie yet have such strange opinions about the physical operations of Sacraments e. g. Baptism on Infants as that they make them to be instruments of Miracles the Miracle being first wrought upon them e. g. the water and then on the receiver Yea they seem to make God to operate miraculously with every Sacrament and Will which is the transcendent Head of all operations and causes Physical and Moral II. As to the Means or second Causes those acts of God that have no such means or causes are not here concerned And as for all those that have such means no doubt but they are to be called both Physical and Moral for Morality is but Modality or Relation ex rerum ordine And all Order Mode and Relation is Alicujus entis ordo Modus Relatio And e. g. preaching the Gospel is such an act of a Physical and Moral Agent as is it self both Physical and Moral Man is quaedam natura and yet Intellectual and Free And his act is quid physicum in genere entis and yet quid morale in genere moris imputanda juxta lâ—egem morum III. And as to the Effect it is no doubt both quid physicum for Faith is actus realis and quid morale For it is morale bonum ita reputanda And will any Arminian deny any of this that understandeth words Where then is your difference in this C. But when you dispute about Pre-determination you can say it is not Physical what mean you by it then B. We marvail that men should say that God physically pre-determineth the Will to all acts of sin in the specifying circumstances when as he pre-determineth it not really to them at all either physically or morally So that it is here a Real efficient motion of God to the evil act which we deny C. And it is a Real efficient motion of God to the act of Faith and Repentance which we assert and mean by the word Physical B. And this your Adversaries will not deny and so you are in this agreed The fourth Crimination C. I doubt they hold not Faith to be infused but acquired whereas Arminius professeth Faith and Repentance Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse Exam. Perk. pag. 57. and that both of them are denied to the Reprobates by the Decree of Reprobation See his own words At Deus statuit Dâ—ereto reprobationis reprobis fidem poenitentiam non dare concedo lubens illam assumptionem sed recte intellectam Twisse against Hord p. 70. l. 1. Dr. Twisse sheweth the difference to be so great that an unjustified person may have an Acquired Faith about the same objects when yet only an Infused Faith will justifie B. 1. Tell not me what you Doubt but what you Prove unless you mean no more than to tell me of your injustice and uncharitableness I find the Jesuites and Lutherans commonly asserting an Infused Faith and I have met with few Arminians if any that deny it though the word be not so much in use with them 2. But because you that are the Accuser are supposed to understand what you speak against I pray help me to understand it Quest 1. What mean you by Acquired Faith C. That which we our selves get by our use of means and consideration B. Quest. 2. Is there any man in his wits that denieth Faith to be the effect of consideration Do you not think what and why you must believe and even believe in and by Thinking or Considering Do you believe and not think what or why C. No but it is by Infusion that we have those thoughts B. Infused Faith then is by Infused Thoughts Be it so but then it is not without Thoughts or Consideration But further Quest 3. Is there any Christian that denieth that Faith cometh by hearing and the use of the means which God hath appointed us I pray you hear Dr. Twisse against Hord pag. 169. God in his Covenant of Grace requireth obedience to salvation but of his Free Grace undertakes to regenerate them and work them to obedience But how agreeable to their rational natures that is by admonition instruction exhortation that is to work Faith and Repentance by exhorting and perswading them to repentance All this he performs by his Ministers Do you not believe that the Apostles were sent to open mens eyes and turn them from darkness to light and from the power of Satan unto God Acts 26. 17 18. And that Ministers must The Schoolmen-men and even the Jesuites ordinarily profess the necessity of infused Grace yea many of them in a higher sense than many Protestants dare own Even Molina himself asserteth the supernaturarality of Grace thus Ut consensus liberi arbitrii Deo excitanti vocanti per gratiam praevenientem nihil in re sit qd non supernaturale quod non simul a Deo emaâ—et non solum tanquam ab allicâ—ente excitante invitante ad id arbitrinm sed etiam tanquam a co-operanee per auxilium gratiae And he pronounceth Anathema on them that affirm Consensum arbitrii nostri Deo excitanti vocanti per auxilium Gratiae praevenientis esse actum naturalem aut posse elici sine auxilio co-operatione ejusdem praevenientis Gratiae
by it self anon Before we come to that these things I here conclude of 1. That the Diversity of Nature or Receptive Dispositions being presupposed God hath an established order of means and a congruous established universal Concurse which quantum in se as far as belongeth to it to do worketh equally on all 2. That this established measure of aid or concurse recipitur ad modum recipientis and operateth variously as to the effects according to the various disposition of the Recipients from whom the ratio diversatis is to be fetcht and not from it 3. That this established measure of Concurse or aid may by the greatness of the Passive and Active Indisposition and Illdisposition of the Recipient be both resisted and overcome or frustrate 4. That as Adam did resist and overcome such Grace so do all wicked Hi praecedanâ—i effectus virtute verbi spiritusque in hominum mentibus producti rebellis voluntatis vitio suffocari penitus extingui pâ—ssuâ—t in multis solent adeâ— ut nonnulli in quorum mentibus virtute verbi spiritusque impressâ— fuit aliqualis notitia veritatis divinae c. mutentur plane in contrarium c. And even Alvarez Disp 18. n. â—0 saith Si non operatur actione qui est in praeceptâ— imputabitur illi ad culpam eo quod suâ— culpa se impedivit ne dareter illi auxilium efficax quod necessarium erat ut actualiter operaretur sicut si Deus imponeret homini prâ—ceptum volandi quantum est ex parte sua offerret illi alas adjutorium necessarium uâ— volaret ipse autem responderet Dâ—mine nec vâ—lâ— alas accipere nec volâ—re meritâ— reputaretur reus etiamsâ— non possit absque alis volare qâ—ia sua culpaâ—se impedirit ne illi dâ—narentâ—r a Deâ— men in some cases now And so do all godly men in most of the sins if not all which they commit 5. As God rarely worketh Miracles and we hardly know when he violateth his established course of nature though we may know when he worketh beyond the power of any second cause known to us and when he leaveth his ordinary way but ordinarily keepeth to his established course and use of the second causes even in his wonders So it is very probable that in the Works of Grace Recovery and Salvation he ordinarily keepeth to his established order his Ordinances and fixed degree of Concurse 6. Yet as God is still above all his Works and a free Agent and is no further tied to one constant order and measure of Concurse than he tieth himself by his Wisdom and Free-will so God is free in the conveyance of his Grace and can when he please forsake that order and work Miracles by Grace as well as on natural things above nature He can strike down Saul and convert him by a voice from Heaven and in a word can do what he will 7. And as in most wonders its past our power to know whether and when God doth indeed forsake his established order and work contrary to it or without such second causes as are unknown to us though we can tell when he acteth unusually So is it in this case about his works of Grace A Comet or Blazing Star is an unusual thing whose necessary antecedent cause we know not And yet it is but a natural effect of second causes operating in their established course so are ecclipses better known and unusual Tempests and terrible Lightnings c. So great and sudden unusual and wonderful changes may be made by Grace on sinners and yet all in Gods established course of working and by those second causes which are to us unknown C. But God is not a natural but a voluntary Agent and Grace is hiâ— immediate work or off-spring B. 1. He is a voluntary Agent in Creation Preservation and in all the works and changes of nature and yet he operateth constantly in his appointed course 2. It s unknown to us what means he useth out of our reach in his operations upon souls as well as in nature 3. We find that Grace keepeth a harmony with nature yeâ— as morality is but the modality of things natural so we may conceive that God may possibly work it by the modifying of physical Agents and their actions and the recipients 4. Immutability and constancy is one of Gods perfections and the expression of it in the constant order of his Works is part of his glory in the world Though our mutable Free-wills are better than the fixed or necessitated appetite of Bruits that is not as they are mutable and the acts contingent but as they have a higher object But the fixed unchangeable wills of the Glorified Angels and Saints are far better than ours And why should we think unsetled mutability of efficiency to be the best discovery of Gods Immutability 5. But yet we grant that God is free to do what he please C. But it is by fixed second causes that God keepeth a fixed order of natural productions and alterations in the world But you can name no such universal second cause of Grace affording under God a resistible Influx as the Sun doth in Nature B. What will you say if I name you such a second universal cause though if I could not it followeth not that therefore there is none such I think I can name you one that all Christians should know and yet it seems is not well by Divines themselves considered JESUS CHRIST as MAN and MEDIATOR is Gods Administrator General of the humane world and is compared to the Rising Sun which illuminateth all the world with a light suitable to it and them So Christ is the light of the world the Sun of Righteousness that ariseth with healing Grace and enlightneth every man that cometh into the world or as Crotius and Hammond render it which coming into the world enlightneth every man supposing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the Nominative Case and Neuter Gender and not the Accusative Masculine In him was Life and the Life was the light of men not only to the sanctified who received but uneffectually though quoad se sufficiently the light shined in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not The world that was made by him knew him not He came to his own and his own received him not yet he came to them But as many as received him to them gave he power to become the sons of God John 1. 3 10 11. It is apparent in Scripture that all power in Heaven and Earth is given to Christ Matth. 28. 19 20. that all things are delivered into his hands John 13. 3. and God hath given him power over all flesh John 17. 2. and he is head over all things to the Church Ephes 1. 22 23. C. We all grant that Christ is an universal light and Saviour 1. Objectively 2. And as to his Doctrine Covenant and Example But what 's that to internal efficient Grace which is immediately from God
finem Now either there is such a middle Impulse or not If not then besides Gods essence there is no effect on us antecedent to our consent but the said cogitation and passion And 1. These are commonly said not to necessitate the will 2. And if they do it must be but Morally which is commonly held to be no way of necessitating though it may be of ascertaining the event And so consent or our Volition it self would be but of co-operating Grace And if there be such a middle Impulse as Gregory holdeth it is confessed by him and the Dominican praedeterminants to determine the will only to act freely and therefore not to necessitate it to consent but only to ascertain it and so the Volition will be as free as but by co-operating Grace though the Impulse would be necessary which tendeth to it of a special Grace for every preparatory Act. But of the rest I doubt B. And then 2. Sure you cannot deny it as to well prepared Souls 1. Because you granted that the same degree of help may be effectual to a disposed Soul 2. And so the Help though universal will to a prepared Soul be proportionable to the desired effect and is nevertheless Grace or powerful to such for being universal or uneffectual to others 3. And it seems that such a kind of degree of Grace was effectual on Adam before his fall and uneffectual in his fall 4. And it seemeth congruous to Gods other works that he give Grace suitable to his Law and Promise which shall not be always uneffectual So that it is most probable that to prepared Souls that ordinary established degree of the Spirits Influx from Christ which is universal but uneffectual to the unprepared is not only sometimes but ordinarily effectual I think none can prove the contrary And the same Grace you confess to be effectual to preparation But to unprepared Souls whom God will suddenly convert out of the ordinary way a special extraordinary operation seemeth necessary But wherein the extraordinariness of it consisteth antecedent to faith the second effect besides the extraordinary means I think it past mans reach to know C. Well now tell us Unde Gratia fit Efficax B. Any ordinary Logician will tell you that the effect is from all the causes and not from any one alone It is effectual in that it produceth the effect To which each cause doth its proper part and one is not all The effect in question now is Faith Faith is caused as is said 1. By Gods will as the Original 2. By Christ as sending the Spirit and meriting Grace first 3. By the Spirit as the Operator 4. By the Gospel as the Instrument 5. By the Preacher as a Sub-Instrument 6. But all this effecteth ordinarily in materia disposita and no other Having before wrought that preparation 7. But extraordinarily in materia indisposita working disposition and all at once Now here 1. Gods Will doth its part without any cause Velle ex parte Dei sicuâ— agere is his essence and the termination of it in rem Volitatam hath no efficient but only an Objective Cause 2. This prime Cause is the prime reason of all the efficacy of Inferior Causes Not qua voluntas simply moving them but qua voluntas cum potentia executiva moving them and qua volitio inferreth the necessitatem consequentiae of the effect So that plainly I think that no Good cometh to pass in the world but what God forewilled and nothing which he absolutely willeth cometh not to pass what he fore-knoweth is necessary necessitate Infallibilitatis and what he absolutely willeth necessitate Imutabilitatis and what he worketh from such a will is necessary necessitate invincibilitatis 3. Though all the other Causes are the reason of the effect and not only the first yet none of them operate on the first Cause and put any force into it for the act So that its force is from it self but theirs from it And having said this much preparatorily I thus resolve your great question Here are three things before us whose cause may be enquired of 1. The necessitas Logica consequentiae ex quo in ordine probandi necessario sequitur eventum futurum esse And this is the Decree or Will of God yea and his fore knowledge This is presupposed 2. The prime effect of Gods Will and Active power operating And this prime effect is not our Faith or Act but the Impression or Received Influx of God on the Soul For the Soul receiveth its like some Impression by the Divine Influx by which it believeth or acteth it self It doth not Receive its own Act as if that act had been first pre-existent in the Donor but it performeth that Act because it is premoved to it Now if the question be of this first effect Unde operatio Gratiosa sit efficax I answer 1. The whole efficient reason is in the operator and operation it self It is effectual ad impressionem ex natura rei because it is an Act If it did nothing it were no Act transient 2. And the specification and individuation is from the terminating object It is denominatively and Relatively one Act which is on a Stone and another on a Soul de specie And it is numerically one which is on Peter and another on John If the Sun did shine in vacuo there being no other creature to be objective or passive it would still agere but it would nihil efficere quia nihil afficere So God is one Infinite act and ex parte sui never begineth to act nor ever ceaseth nor is divided But transiently he doth nihil afficere vel efficere but first by making objects and then acting on them So that were there no mobile Gods act would not movere This first effect then of Impress hath an Effective and an Objective Cause The Effective Cause is Gods Essence that is his Active Power Intellect and Will and nothing else Supposing now that it be not Gods operation on the Instrument or medium that we speak of but immediately on the Soul it self But Man's Soul is the Objective Recipient Cause of this first effect which is the Impress or Influx received 3. The Secondary effect is Mans Act Faith and Repentance it self If the question Unde Gratia sit efficax mean this as with most it doth then it is all one as to ask Unde hic Effectus For that Gods Influx on the Soul immediately is the sole Cause is false Therefore the answer is that this effect is from all the Causes conjunct From Gods Will or Law and Power and Wisdom from Christs mission of the Spirit before merited from the Spirits Impress or Influx from the Gospel from the Ministry usually and from the Agent Believer all these as the efficient Causes And it is from or on the prepared Soul ordinarily as the Materia disposita vel Causa Receptiva Objectiva of the Divine operation And from or on God Christ the promise
world tell us that he pleaseth to make very much V. Forget not that the Humane Nature of Christ Glorified is made of God the Universal Sun or Cistern of all Grace by whom it is to be given out to all mankind to draw them to God and to rule and Sanctifie them further when converted And do not think of any Recovering Influx of God but by the Holy Ghost nor of the Spirit given any way but by and from Christ who first draweth men to him by the same Spirit which dwelleth in them as a Divine Nature when they are united to him VI. And as Christ is the Healing Sun of righteousness and the universal Medium or Mediator and Administrator both of Rule and Influx so forget not that he giveth out this Spirit and Recovering Grace much by a Law or Conditional promise which hath its terms which must be observed And as the measures of Christs Influx are oft resistible so it is specially by all wise Christians to be noted that the Giving or Denying of the Grace or operations of the Spirit are the grand Rewards and Punishments in this world above all Corporal ones and those which all Christians should daily and principally respect in their Hopes and Fears Marking when the Spirits operations are denyed them that they may find out the Cause and with David cry betimes Cast me not away from thy presence and take not thy Holy Spirit from me Ps 51. VII Lastly forget not that as man is not moved as a stone but governed as a Moral agent * Melanct. Loc. Com. de Lib. arb c. 7. Joh. 6. Nemo venit ad me Resp Cyrillus l. 4. Non vi quadam cogi trahique credentes putandum est sed monitione doctrina revelatione Omnis qui audit discit a patre venit ad me ubi auditus disciplina doctrina adest ibi fides non vi sed persuasione oritar Non enim possum secundum Ecclesiae veritatisque dogmata liberam potestatem hominis quod lib. arb vocamus ullo modo negare Ita Aug. tr in Joh. 26. Non traheris Ora ut traheris Addit Strigel p. 389. Sicui non placent haec Cyrilli August is amet sua somnia quoad volet Utrumque crederâ— Velle est Dei quia ipse praeparat Voluntatem nostri qâ—ia non fit nisi nobis volentibus Aug. Retract li. 23. and as the wonderful changes by motion in the world are made recipiendo ad modum recipientium by the diversity of Receptive dispositions which are no efficient causes of what they receive so Man can and must do somewhat yea much under God to the due Receptivity of Divine Influx not without God nor by any Power which is not freely given him of God But by a Power which he may or may not use And that the neglect of what we can do and doing the evil which we could avoid is much at least of the daily sin of good and bad in all the world And that though the faithful Servant be laudable he is yet unprofitable and hath nothing to boast of And even the young Birds must open their mouths if they will be fed which man must do freely as they do necessarily And when God giveth Man not only the Gold if he will open his hand and the Meat if he will open his mouth or not turn away and spit it out and also giveth him all his Vital power by which he can do this if he will and also can will it and giveth him both Freedom to use this power and manifold perswasions and helps to use it All this must not be reproached as no Grace nor the world instructed in Ingratitude by them that should Preach that Gospel of Christ which maketh Gratitude he universal complexion of all our duties which must give life and beauty to them all And to take off your prejudice against Dissenters remember that I have after told you and oft in the Margin that even many Jesuits and Monks and Friars profess that the Efficacy of Grace is in and from the Nature or Power of it and the Will of God and not from the free will and co-operation of man See Bellarm. de Grat. lib. arb c. 12. Vasquez oft cited Pet. a Sancto Joseph in Suat Concord elsewhere cited and Idea Specul Theol. l. 4. c. 7. Ruiz elsewhere cited and abundance of Schoolmen And what say any Calvinists herein more THE Ninth Days Conference Between A. and B. OF PERSEVERANCE B. We are now come to that point where I confess that the difference between you is real But I maintain it to be so small as that no breach of Christian Love or Communion should be made for it but it should be taken for a tolerable difference among Brethren If you think it greater say your worst of it The first Crimination A. By making it impossible to fall from Grace they make fear and care and endeavour to be folly or unnecessary at least For what use is there of fearing an impossible hurt or of care and endeavour to prevent it And so all religious Duties and diligence as means are made to be but vain B. 1. You wrong them in your supposition Except a few ignorant men Aegid Colum. Rom. Quodlib 3. qu. 3. p. 135. Verum est quod ita erit sicut Deus praevidit sed non est quod non possit aliter esse Propter quod si praedestinavit videt me salvandum verum est quod ego salvabor sed hoc non est verum quod non posset aliter esse potest ergo praedestinatus finaliter peccare potest damnari Quia infallibilitas divinae praescientiae non imponit ei necessitatem Attamen finaliter non peccabit nec damnabitur Nulla est autem necessitas simpliciter nisi conditionis sicut omne quod est quando est necesse esse Ita futura quae sunt praesentia praescientiae divinae Necesse est evenire quae Deus praevidit non necessitate simpliciter sed quia jam sunt praesentia Divinae praescientiae Ita Malderus in 12. Tho. q. 103. a. 10. dub 3. Jastus qui babet donum pâ—seâ—eran iae excidere finaliter potest sed nunquam excidet Yet saith that quodammodo it may be said Eum qui habet perseverent a donum excidere non posse eum autem qui non habet non posse non excidere So Aug. de correp grat c. 12. dicit eos qui preseverantiae donum non habet non posse perseverare So that this is but a strife about equivocal words that understand not the state of the Controversie I meet with few or none that say It is impossible to sin or fall away but only de eventu that it will never come to pass For they say as I remember I heard Mr. Vines once preach that our falling away is not only possible but too easie in respect to us and the habits of Grace which we have
causeth no antecedent necessity but concomitant existentiae 3. This supposeth Gods Scientia futuri conditionalis Against this Dr. Twisse hath said much in a peculiar Digression And surely God ever operateth as God which is ut Causa prima But how far he determineth is the doubt i a capable object of knowledge And therefore he knoweth what conditional propositions of future contingents are true 2. Whether this should be called scientia media or not is a vain question 3. Gods acts ex parte sui being but his Essence and all one can no otherwise be distinguished nor ordered as to the denominations of priority or posteriority than as the objects are distinct and by their order of priority and posteriority allow us by Connâ—tation so to denominate the acts 4. The Intelligibility and the Amability of things are in themselves simultaneous though from the order of humane operations we say that things are first Intelligible before they are Amiable And so we may say of God after the manner of men but not otherwise 5. God doth not will the form or the act of sin as circumstantiated and as the form necessarily resulteth from it neither for it self nor propter aliud the essence or existence 6. Therefore God doth not foreknow sin as willed and decreed by him nor therefore foreknow it because he willeth it 7. God fore-knoweth or knoweth the formale peccati as well as the materiale yet almost all confess that he willeth not the formale Therefore he knoweth that which he willeth not Therefore his Volition of it is not necessary to his knowledge of it 8. There is no effect in God for all that is in God is God who is not effected Therefore there is no Cause in God of any thing in God Therefore Gods will or decree of Good is not the cause that he foreknoweth it noâ— his foreknowledge the cause that he willeth it But he both knoweth and willeth all that is Good at once 9. Gods inward operations on the soul are real efficiencies and yet moral and to us unsearchable They cause the will to determine it self to Good when it doth so but how we know not But we know that he ordinarily worketh by means and according to their aptitude 10. God useth such means with the free wills of his elect as he foreknoweth will prevail with them and setteth them in such circumstances as he foreknoweth they will freely act aright in But his inward grace is the principal or chief cause And he doth not will or decree to give them such means and circumstances because he foreknoweth they will prevail That is Gods will and decree as in him hath no cause 11. But the word because is in Scripture applyed sometimes to Gods Love or hatred and sometimes to his outward acts as John 16. 27. The Father loveth you because ye have loved me and believed And in the first case that which is meant is that the qualification of the object is the material constitutive cause of the act of God not as it is Himself but as relatively denominated ab extra from the object in specie vel individuo And in the second case It meaneth that the effects of God ad extra called his transient acts as in passo have their proper uses and we our commanded ends in using them And so God is said to send Ministers e. g. because he would save the hearers that is the Ministry is a cause of mens â—â—lvation 12. From all this it appeareth that they err who think that their scientia media is equally useful in the points of Election and of Reprobation and that they run pari passa For all Good is both willed and known and so Election supposeth not the foresight of our faith or obedience as causal or antecedent if we speak of that Act of Election which is to faith and obedience But Evil is foreknown and not willed at all And therefore there is no such Reprobation which is a will or decree that men shall sin And the non-impedition of sin being no act needeth no positive act of will or decree * * * Yet none of the stress of their differences lyeth on this And the Jesuits with the rest assert a Positive Volition de peccato permittendo without proof which I leave to â—uens various opinions But Reprobation which is the decree of damning ever supposeth the object to be a foreseen-sinner finally rejecting grace The rest about this is spoken to sufficiently before §. IV. II. Of Durandus 's way II. AS to the way of Aureolus Durandus Ludov. à Dola c. I conceive it is commonly rejected because not understood or because the wording of it soundeth disgracefully But it is a great matter that all confess how easily it would end all these controversies were it true And by Lud. à Dola's Explication and what Capreolus saith of Aureolus I conceive that they are commonly mistaken Durandus thinketh that to the motion of the Creature it is necessary 1. That God by his continued No doubt but God is quoad praesentiam Immediate in all his efficiency and as Near to the effect as if he used no second cause But yet he is not so immediate as to exclude second causes as media And while he useth them he operateth on us according to their kind of operations even as if they were between him and the effect And this is the sense of Durandus and à Doâ—a and easily reconcileth all Amyraldus de lib. Arbit c. 4. concurreth with Durandus It is consâ—derable that all confess that if Durandus's way did hold it easâ—ly ended all the controversie As Lud. le Blank noteth Thes 3. de Concurs Juxta hos doctores nulla est difficultas in conciliando divino concursu cum libertate c. And this way is as consistent with Gods certain disposal of events as predetermination it self influx continue the being and the nature and properties of the agent 2. And that he continue all the circumstant creatures concauses and objects and the media of action 3. And that no powerful impediment hinder the action Now say the Jesuits and Dominicans and the rest God doth moreover concurr as the first cause to the Act it self by an Immediate efficient Influx besides that by which he upholdeth the Power and second Causes But I think that Durandus meaneth as much as they that is that God doth not only uphold the creature in its meer esse but in its Nature which is its Mobility and its principium motus And this Nature is not only a Power to Action but also an Inclined Power So that for God by constant Influx to continue a Natural Power and Inclination to Action or motion with all necessary concurrents without impediments is truly by his Influx to concurr to the motion as the first Cause while his Influx is not only as to Being but as to the Motive force and inclination And no more than this doth seem to me