answer that the consequence holdeth not of a metaphorical improper Instrument who hath somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality and somewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God besides the nature of a pure instrument such are sinners to God Therefore it holds not that the horse halteth ergo the rider halteth no nor causeth it Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove and the very same that I say The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all but only as it is Motion in genere so doth God by sinful acts That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another is not at all of God but that they are Actions in genere is of God 637. So p. 256. he well sayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be ascribed to the Writer nor the effect as from that fault nor of the Saw to the Sawyer And so of the Sabeans robbing Job And he asserteth p. 257. that Diabolus Impii homines sunt causae principales in actu peccandi And what need we more Remember then that sin is an effect and hath a Cause and to make man a Principal Cause in actu peccandi is not to deifie him And he saith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent he were the principal cause of sin But if you mean by moral impulse only commanding it let others judge whether Physical premotion be not much more than command And whether I cause not my pen to write though I command it not And quoad terminum to impel a man physically to moral acts is moral impulse 638. But the plausiblest argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin * * * Vid. Aureol in 2. d. 37. p. 300 301. shewing six wayes how sin is a punishment of sin without God's willing the sin But if we make it sin he will make it be a punishment ergo he willeth that the sin come to pass or be And indeed Augustine saith much contr Julian to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin But I answer this 1. Even these men themselves oft say that God willeth not the formale peccati but the materiale And forma dat nomen ergo he willeth not sin as a punishment in proper sence 2. Sin it self though denyed by many Arminians is verily a Punishment and more to the Sinner himself than to any other †††Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth 1. Omne peccatum est poena 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena viz. non prima 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris causa nisi ultimum fuerit posterioris And Bonavent there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth poenam damni sensus And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment the formale peccati being first and the formale poena next in the same act And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former as being an effect of it For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin Biel. ib. In a word God antecedently so formed nature that if we will sin that sin shall be our misery and as a voluntary self-wounding cause our pain and let out our blood and life And it is the most difficult part of the question how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself which yet I have plainly opened before and here repeat it To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities but are two Relations of one and the same Act but not as referred to one and the same correlate God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful in its forbidden mode and circumstances as Claudicatio equi before said but only in genere actus or hujus actus when two sins are compared But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment God is the Cause of both That is he maketh mans nature first and in that and by revelation his Law by which he first maketh mans duty and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it And next he doth by his threatning tell him that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it As if as aforesaid God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him ex natura rei And then commandeth him to avoid it And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it Here now God maketh the Man and the Law God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique or as that circumstantiated act But when the act is caused by Man God by his Law causeth two Relations to result first that of sin and then that of punishment So that man first causeth the sinful act and then that it is quid prohibitum and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before Now if God cause not that sin which is a punishment to our selves he causeth not that which is a punishment to others And yet supposing it he maketh it a punishment to us and them on several accounts 639. But though God cause not the sin yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and spirit if we sin without which grace and spirit we will sin If God now for former sin do deny us or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it he is morally and improperly said to cause that sin as a punishment because that penally he refuseth or forbeareth to save us from it and so permitteth it as is said 640. The Arminians grosly erre if he cite them justly Remonst in Script Synod art 1. p. 202. saying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obstinate and rebellious to sin by his penal judgement and yet those sins are not be reckoned to them for sins nor increase their guilt unless the word sin be used equivocally For to have sin and no sin are contraries Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to those acts which would be sin in others as he doth Bruits I leave to others 641. I am weary of pursuing this ungrateful dispute As to his controversie Q. Whether things be good because God willeth them or he will them because they are good against Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Justice and holiness because it is good or whether it be good because God willeth it It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious disputes about that which one easie distinction putteth past all controversie Of things ad extra Gods will is first the efficient and then the ultimate end as is oft said Gods will as efficient giveth first the Being and then the Order to all things or else they could never be
the Natural power in it self but by so doing formaliter relativè it maketh it no power ad hoc to the contrary in that instant Of which more anon § 10. Such grace of God as cometh from his Absolute Will or Decree of the due Event is never overcome For Gods decree is not frustrate § 11. Gods gracious operations are never overcome by any contrary Act but what he himself is the Agent Cause of as an Act For in Him we Live and Move and Be. Yet man is the only Cause of the Inordination of that act by which it is set in opposition to Gods other acts For God doth not militate against himself § 12. The case lyeth thus God antecedently to his Laws framed Nature that is the Being and Natural Order of all the World and so he became the Head or Root of Nature the first Cause who by his wise decree was to concurr to the end with that Natural frame and to continue to things their proper forms and motions And man is one of his creatures having a Nature of his own to which God as the God of Name doth Antecedently concurr By this natural concurse of God the fomiâ— cator the murderer the thief c. are naturally able to do those acts But being free agents that can do otherwise God maketh them a Law to restrain and regulate them And when they break this Law they resist that gracious concurse which suitable to the organical cause God conjoyneth with the means But they do this by their Natural power and activity not used as God requireth them but turned against his own Law So that if God would withdraw his sustentation and destroy mâ—ns Nature they could not resist his grace But that he will not do being his antecedent work and so God is resisted by his own-given-power and act disordered and turned against his grace § 13. The Will of God which is thus resisted is only 1. His Preceptive or Legal will de debito 2. And his will of purpose to give man so much help and no more by which he can and ought to believe and Repent is said to be resisted or frustrate so far when by mans fault it doth him not that good which it might have done § 14. Gods Grace and Spirit are said to be resisted when the Word and other Means are * * * That God doth govern inseriora per superiora and work by means not for want of them but from the abundance of his Goodness so as to communicate to his creatures the dignity of causality See Aquin. 1. q. 103. a. 8. q. 104. a. 2. Alexand. 1. p. q. 26. m. 5. a. 2. 3. m. 7. Albert. 1. p. q. 67. m. 4. a. 1. Richard 1. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Agid. Rom. 2. d. 1. p. 1. q. 2. a. 6. ibi Gabritl d. 1. q. 2. resisted which call him to his duty For these themselves are gifts and acts of grace § 15. But it is not the barâ— Word or Means alone but the Spirit working in and by those means which is so resisted For though no moâ—tal man can clearly know just how the Spirit concurreth and operateth by the Word and Means yet we may know that God doth limit his own operation to the aptitude of the means ordinarily and that he worketh with and by them not according to his Omnipotency in it self considered but according to the means or organs And as in Nature he operateth nor quantum potest but agreeably to the order and aptitude of Natural Causes so in Grace he operateth non quantum potest but according to the aptitude and order of the sapiential frame of Governing-means of grace § 16. When the preaching of the Word Education Company and other visible Means seem equal God hath innumerable means supernal internal external invisible and unknown to us by which he can make all the difference that he maketh in men So that we cannot prove that ever he worketh on souls without any second cause or means at all though we cannot prove the contrary neither And therefore he that resisteth all means for ought we know in so doing resisteth all Gods gracious operations on his soul § 17. * * * I know not how to find both sense and concord in the words of your Alvarez de Aâ—x l. 7. disp 59. p. 264. Eadâ—m contritio que est ultima dispositio ad gratiam in genere cause materialis antecedit illam In genere tamen causae formalis efficientis est effeclus ejusdem gratiae propterea quamvis non sit meritoria gratiae est tamen meritoria vitae aeternâ— Et p. 265. Contritio qua penitens disponitur ad infusionem gratiae habitualis est meritoria vitae aeternae ut Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. a. 2. ad 1. Ergo est effectus gratiae habitualis Nulla enim operatio hominis est-meritoria vitae aeternae nisâ— procedat à gratiâ— habituali ordine saltem naturae sit ea posterior How can the Act be the ultima dispositio to the infusion of that habit which it floweth from Unless he mean eadem specie and not numerically which yet is false For it is not eadem or else he falsly supposeth that the same Love of God may go before Grace Whereas Dr. Twisse so frequently asketh Whether Gods condional will and so his operation be Volo te velle modo velis or credere modo credas to give us faith if we believe and so maketh non credere or non velle to be the only resistance and the Arminians to be ridiculous in making the effect antecedent to the cause as a condition of the causation and itself This semi-subtilty though it beget voluminous confidence must cry peccavi if a little more subtilty do but detect the defectiveness of it We are not now enquiring of the Rationes fidem habendi but of the Rationes non habendi nor are we enquiring Whether God have made a Covenant or formal Promise of giving faeith upon antecedent conditions But whether he deny or give-not grace for actual faith effectual or sufficient to any but those that resist and wilfully omit the preparatory acts which they were able to perform even preparatory Volitons Or if you will make the question to be de ratisnibus fidem habendi not de causis Actus donandi Whether God do not ordinarily give or produce the act of faith in that soul which doth not wilfully resist and omit such preparatory acts as it could do even Volitions And so I answer 1. It is not I will give thee faith if thou wilt believe or I will make thee willing if thou be willing of the same thing But it is 1. If by resisting common preparing grace thou so harden â—hy heart or increase the privation of receptive aptitude in thy self as that the same degree of grace means help impress will not change thee which otherwise would
this hold for my part I must confess that I think the Religion which agreeth with it must neither be so good as Dr. Twisses Rutherfords Bradwardines or Alvarez's nor yet so bad as Hobbes's or Spinosa's but just such as Mr. Sterry's or the old Platonick or Stoick Philosophers I mean not such as Mr. Sterry's was for I hear he was an excellent person but such as his Book though obscurely intimateth And if any of that judgement have a better or worse it is not in consistency with his own principles FINIS Catholick Theology The Second BOOK The SYNODISTS and ARMINIANS CALVINISTS and LUTHERANS DOMINICANS and JESUITES Reconciled OR AN END OF THE CONTROVERSIES ABOUT GODS DECREES and GRACE and MANS FREE-WILL MERIT c. If men are willing A RETREAT TO THE MILITANT DIVINES WHO HAVE TOO LONG WARRED ABOUT WORDS and UNREVEALED THINGS and KEPT THE CHURCH OF GOD IN FLAMES and DRAWN CHRISTS MEMBERS TO HATE REPROACH and PERSECUTE EACH OTHER FOR THEY KNEW NOT WHAT In a Dialogue between C. a â—alvinist A. an Arminian and B. the Râ—concâ—ler and others By Richard Baxter Tim. 2. 14 15 16. Of these put them in remembrance charging them before the Lord that they strive not about words to no profit but to the subverting of the hearers Study to shew thy self approved unto God a Workman that needeth not to be ashamed rightly dividing the word of Truth But shun prophane and vain bablings for they will encrease unto more ungodliness and their word will eat as doth a Canker LONDON Printed for Nevil Simmons at the Princes Arms in St. Pauls Church-Yard 1675. THE CONTENTS OF THE Second Book The first days Conference about Predestination THe need of conciliatory endeavours p. 1 2. What this undertaking is p. 3. Predetermination to Sin excluded the case briefly opened p. 4. The first Crimination by the Arminian Of eternal absolute Reprobation p. 6. Whether a thing not existent may be a Moral cause or God's Acts have Causes p. 7. How far Gods Decrees may be said to have extrinsick Causes p. 8. The second Crimination Of God's decreeing Sin either to predetermine it or the event or his permission p. 9. The third Crimination Necessitution of Sin by Negative decrees Negation of decrees opened p. 11. The fourth Crimination The pure Masse whether the object of Predestination p. 12. Decrees distinguished p. 13. The fifth Crimination Do the Decrees proceed according to the order of Intention or of Execution p. 14. The sixth Crimination Denying all Conditional Decrees p. 16. The seventh Crimination Of absolute Election p. 17. The eighth Crimination Leading men to presumption hereby p. 18. The ninth Crimination Setting necessity and fate p. 19. The tenth Crimination Making God a Respecter of persons by unequal Decrees p. 21. The eleventh Crimination Making God and Ministers Dissemblers p. 22. Crim. 12. Of a vain power given p. 23. The second days Conference The Criminations by the Calvinist What good this conciliatory attempt may do p. 24. The first Crimination Denying election uncomfortable The second Crim. An election of Things instead of Persons p. 26. The third Crim. Denying a decree of the first special Grave The fourth Crim. of Scientia Media p. 27. The fifth Crim. Denying Absolute Reprobation Reprobation opened p. 29 30. Whether God will Sin p. 30. or the Act p. 31. How far man can cause his act undetermined p. 32. Pretences for Gods causing Sin answered How God causeth the effect and not the Volition p. 85 c. What God doth about Sin p. 37. The sixth Crim. Of Conditional decrees p. 38. The seventh Crim. Of foreseen Merit p. 39. The eighth Crim. Of making many Elections p. 40. The ninth Crim. Ordering the Decrees according to Execution p. 41. How God doth Velle finem The Case opened p. 42. The tenth Crim. denying an eternal cause of futurition p. 45. Whether futurity be any thing and have any cause p. 48. The third days Conference Of Universal and Special Redemption The first Crim. Of the Armin. denying Christ's office to the world p. 50. Calvinists for universal Redemption what all agree in p. 54. * To which I here add the Church of England Homil. li. 2. p. 185. God so loved the world that he gave his only Son c. But to whom did he give him He gave him to the whole world that is to say to Adam and to all that should come after him O Lord what had Adam or any other man deserved at God's hands that he should give us his only Son We are all miserable Sinners damnable persons justly driven out of Paradise justly excluded from Heaven and justly condemned to Hell See a Learned Gentleman's Reasons for Univers Redemp yet living Mr. Polehill of Gods Decrees Did Christ die equally for all p. 55. The second Crim. Denying express Scripture p. 57. The Synod of Dort vindicated p. 59. The third Crim. They deny the Gospel Covenant it self p. 61. The fourth and fifth Crim. Making an impossibility or falshood the object of faith p. 62. The sixth seventh and eighth Crim. Disabling Ministers to Preach leaving most men remediless teaching Infidels impenitence p. 63. The ninth tenth eleventh and twelfth Crim. Exempting men from Hell torments justifying Ingratitude denying Christ's Kingdoms tempting men to Infidelity p. 64 65. The fourth days Conference The Calvinists first Crim. Making Christ dye in vain for them that he knew would perish p. 66. The second Crim. An imperfect Saviour p. 67. The third Crim. Dying for men in Hell p. 67. The fourth Crim. To die for those whom he would not pray for p. 68. The fifth Crim. Making Christ not to purchase faith p. 69. The sixth seventh eighth and ninth Crim. Uncertain conditional Redemption no more for the saved than the damned Christ's sheep to know him before he know them Pardoning Original Sin to all p. 70. Crim. 10. To die for the Seed of the Serpent p. 72. The fifth days Conference Of Man's Sinfulness and Impotency and of Free-will The Armin. Crim. 1st Denying all free-will they deny all Morality p. 73. What Liberty is here meant largely discussed to p. 79. What Liberty we hold p. 79. Doth Original Sin necessitate all evil p. 82. The second Crim. Denying Power to believe p. 85. What Power can and cannot mean p. 86. fullier opened p. 87 c. Questions hence answered p. 96 c. The advantage of some by denying Habits besides Power and Acts p. 99. Habits proved p. 100. Crim. 3. Making all men utterly and equally bad p. 101. Crim. 4. Infants Heathens and most men made and necessitated to sin and damnation p. 103. Of Infants remedy p. 104. Parents sin defileth them p. 105. Of Heathens Case p. 106. Crim. 5. That none can do more good or less evil than he doth p. 107. The sixth days Conference The Calvinists Crim. 1. Denying original sin p. 109. Original sin opened p. 111. Crim. 2. That men can use their Naturals to prepare for Grace p. 113.
Opinion hold it will allow no other Religion in the World but this much To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil which God doth cause aâ— a free Benefactor differencing his Gifts in various proportions as he seeth meet as he differenceth Stars from Stones and Men from Dogs and equally causeth the wisdom of Man and the poyson of the Toad or Serpent and so will make such differences in this World and the next if there be any as pleaseth him as he doth here between one Horse that 's pampered and another that is tired out with labour Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way It hath pleased God by permitting Hobbs to reduce this Principle of the Wills necessitation unto its proper practice thereby to cast more shame upon it in our Times for this Authors sake than we could have expected if none but such excellent persons as Alvarez * And more plainly yet Bradwardine who maketh the necessitating cause of Sin and Hell that God will have it so and none can resist him and his Brethren Dr. Twisse and Rutherford had maintained it But as Davenant well saith It is an Opinion of the Dominicans which Protestants have no mind to own And there are two sorts that thus subject the Will to absolute caused necessity 1. Those aforesaid the Dominicans who assist the predetermining premotion of God as necessary to every act natural and free 2. Those that make the Will as much necessitated by a train of natural second Causes which is Hobbs his way and alas the way of great and excellent healing Câ—mero For they hold That the Will is necessitated by the Intellect and the Intellect by the Object â— and God made both Will and Intellect and Object and Law And so Camero hath nothing to resolve the necessitating cause of Adams sin into but the Devil But who necessitated the Devil to sin This will be all one when it is discussed And if self-determining freedom of Will in Man be impossible it will be impossible in the Angels for they are not Gods Therefore I now deal with none but those who confess that God made Man's Will at first with a natural self-determining power and freedoâ— suited to this earthly state of government and that Adam's Will by that same measure of Grace which he had could have forborn his sin at the instant when he sinned II. The other extream which I reconcile not but confute * Yet I am not â—â—â—tating the old way of anaâ—â—â—â—a thing all the hard sayings or opinions of others that being it that I write this against of which course the Epistles of Joan. Antioch 5. 6 c. and of cyril Aâ—ix to Proâ—â—â—s against his so using Theoaâ—â— Mops in Proâ—â—â—â—â—â—â— are worth the reaâ—â—ing besides the fore named T is the Pelagians who deny Original Sin and acknowledge not the pravity of vitiated nature and consequently must deny the need of Grace in the same proportion and so far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier And how far this also subverteth Christianity you may perceive A. But both these Parties have a great deal of very plausible reason for their Opinions as you may see in the Domâ—nâ—oans on one side and Hobbes against Braâ—hall and in Dr. Jeremy Taylor his Treâ—â— of Repentance on the other and therefore are not to be so slighted B. I do not slight them but confute them I confess that the cases are not without difficulty yea not a little But I am surer that Religion is not to be renounced than they can be of the truth of their Opinions And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cause of â—â— liâ—n Porphyrie or Celsus against Christ that they would not have spoken as plausibly and made the case seem as difficult at least to be argumentatively answered as they here do A. Now let us here your way or terms before mentioned what they are B. II. I suppose every sober man will allow me 1. To distinguish Names and Words from Things and * Vasâ—u in 1. Tho. q. 2â— a. 3. d. 4â— c. 1. Bona pars hujuâ— controversiâ— an reprobationis detur causa ex partâ— reprobi dâ— vâ—ce est nominal Controversies from real and to that end to open the aâ—biguity of words as I go along And to â—â—ew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion or an enâ— rationâ—â— only that men contend about instead of a reality 2. I may be allowed when confusion lapeth up many doubtful questions in one to distinguish them that each may have its proper answer 3. I may be allowed to â—ast by as unfit for contention all those unâ—evealed and unsearchable Points which none of the Contenders know at all nor ever will do in this World 4. And I will take leave to lay by the rash words of particular Writers as not to be imputed to any others nor to the main Cause or as that which I am not obliged to defend reconcile nor at all to meâ—dle with 5. And when all this is done you shall see what Aâ—toâ—â— the remaining differences will prove A. Begin then with the first Article of Prâ—dâ—stination B. Remember my â—ndertaking that it is not to justifie every â—â—â—â— words that hath written on the Point and therefore I will not lose time in citing or defending Authors But produce you all your Accâ—sations as against the Cause of the sober moderate Calâ—â—â—ists and suppose me to be the person with whom you have to do The first Crimination A. 1. My first Charge is That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men without respect See the conclusion of the Canons of the Synod at Dort where this very Charge is denied with detestation And can you tell better what men hold than they themselves Episcop Justit Theol. l. 4. Sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 412. Col. 2. 52. Sect. 2. Statuitur Deum cos secundum â—perasua judicare â—b rebellionem contumaci-am corum dolere irasci c. damâ—are c. cum tamen non modo absolute eos perirâ— peccare voluerit sed originario tali labe infectos nasci fecâ—rit unde omnia ista peccata scaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter necesse erat Quod quid aliud esse potest quam histrionica quaedam scâ—nica actio to any fore-seen Sin or cause in them but meerly because â—â—â—â— pleaseth him to do it This is your Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation B. That words may not deceive us let us in the beginning onâ—â— for all know what you mean by the word Decree A. I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will de eventâ— thaâ— this shall be B. And I suppose we are agreed 1. That Gods Will is nothing but his Essence denominated with respect to some Good as its Object 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity
God knoweth all Names Notions Propositions and Syllogisms with their modes as they are the measures organs or actings of Humane Understandings 8. †I refer the Reader to Blank de Concord lib. cum â—ecretis 1. Thes 25. c. where by citing their own words at large he proveth that the most famous and resolute Antiarminians were for this scientia media conditionata viz. Fr. Gomarrus Arminius's chief Antagonist in Mat. 11. 21. Antonius Walaeus loc com de sctent Dei pag. 160. Paulus Ferrius Scholast Orth. vindic p. 203 209 210. Besides Rob. Baronius Metaph. sect 12. disp 2. num 55 56. who in his last days was nearest to the Arminians as appeareth in those Metaphysicks And Jo. Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p 675. nameth also Lud. Crocius Dyodecad dis 7. It is therefore undeniable to all Christians that the thing which they call * Could Alvarez and his fellows well prove that the permission of the first sin is an effect of Reprobation as the word is used in a fit and ordinary sense they would do more to overthrow the Doctrine de scientia media circa malum than is yet done But they fail in their attempts of proving this Of which after scientia media is as certainly in God as is the scientia simplicis Intelligenâ—iae Purae visionis that is that God knoweth the truth of all true conditional Propositions and knoweth what would be done by such and such causes or upon such and such alterations if they were put Doth any Christian doubt of this 9. Whether this should be called scientia media is a question de nomine and that of no great importance and not at all de re 10. Whether it be of any necessity or use in this Controversie is a question only about the order of argumentation as long as the thing it self is confessed to be true 11. Some that cashier it as an useless Engine in this matter do go as far from you as the Jesuites and Arminians who use it As you may see at large in Ludov. à Dola and Durandus himself 12. I am one that fear Presumption both in their and your distributions of the Knowledge and Decrees of God and dread the taking of his Name in vain And one that think that we need not the notion of scientia media for our satisfactory explication of these matters But as the truth of the thing is confessed so if it be applied only to the Doctrine of Reprobation as it is commonly called and not at least always to the Doctrine of Election I see no untruth that it inferreth nor no real difference that it will prove between us The fifth Crimination C. They deny absolute Reprobation at least and say that God reprobateth no men but upon fore-sight of sin And so that he hath no Decree that men shall sin nor that he will permit them to sin nor that they shall do the act in particular which is sin As if God had not decreed the hardening of Pharaohs heart the sin of Sihon of Rehoboam of the Jews in killing Christ c. B. 1. I told you before Reprobation is a word that signifieth several acts You dare not but grant them that God decreeth or willeth to damn no man but for sin and as a Sinner And this is the same thing that they mean 2. If by Reprobation you mean Gods Decree to give them no Faith or Repentance 1. You must prove that God hath such a Decree or Will for a meer negation where not-decreeing or not-willing to give them Grace will do as much 2. All Christians must needs confess that God made a Covenant of Grace with fallen Mankind in Adam and Noah And that no man is now under the meer Obligations of the Law and Covenant of Innocency which saith Be perfect and live sin and die for ever And that there is some common mercy extended to all the World which obligeth them to repent in order to Salvation He subverteth Scripture and all experience that denieth this Therefore all must grant that God denieth no special Grace to any but the abusers of this common Grace And he decreeth to do but what he doth * Thus our Brittish Diviâ—es at Dâ—rt in their suffrage on Ar. 3. at large Therefore the persons whom he decreeth to deny special Grace to are none but the abusers of common Grace or the rejecters of that special Grace when offered 3. If by Reprobation you mean Gods Will or Decree to permit them to sin and perish willfully 1. You can prove no such Decree or Will Because permission being a negation or nothing needs it not but will be as certainly without it upon a bare not decreeing to hinder them from sin 2. And you mistake in saying that Arminius denieth it For he * Arminius himself expresly professeth that in case God permits a man velle pâ—ccatum necâ—sse est ut nullo argumentorum geneâ—e persuadeatur ad volendum Exam. Perk. pag. 153. Dr. Twisse against Hoord li. 1. pag. 70. saith with you That God decreeth his own permission 3. You must take the pains to distinguish between negative and privative Unbelief and between negative and privative not-hindring Sin or not-giving Faith Negative Unbelief is meer not-believing And so none of us did believe from eternity or before we were born He that is not believeth not nor yet in the first instant that the Promise and Law of Faith was given us Our unbelief is not sin or privative but on supposition that we are men and have reason and have a Law and Object of Faith And Gods permitting us in this negative Non-belief is not to be called a privative but only a negative permission For God did from eternity so permit me to be no man and no Believer and yet this was not Reprobation So God did negatively not hinder Adams first sin but not privatively because not penally for any evil done nor yet by denying him any thing that was naturally or morally his due Therefore this was not an Act of Reprobation But when the New Covenant of Grace and the common Grace of the Covenant are once given men and they are obliged to believe then sometimes God penally denieth them Grace and that is all which the Arâ—inians put against absolute denial because this denial is only for mens fore-going sin But he also still negatively only and not privatively or penally denieth some Grace to some yea to all And that is only such Grace as is neither morally their due nor naturally due or necessary to them And the denial of such is no Act of Reprobation 4. If by Reprobation you mean meerly Gods Preterition that is his â—â—t-willing or not-decreeing to give men Grace 1. Not to Will or Decree is nothing And how can you call nothing absolute or conditional These are the modes of Acts and not of not-acting or of nothing All grant that Gods non-agency non-volition not-decreeing hath no cause much
And the sum of his opinion about the nature and cause of our holy actions is 1. That Gods universal influx or causation is necessary on our will to make them acts 2. That Free-Will is the cause that they are these particular acts about this object rather than another 3. That Gods particular or special influx of Grace is the cause that they are supernatural acts And that preventing Grace doth give men good thoughts and the first motion of the affections before deliberation and choice or liberty as Vasquez also saith which seemeth the same with the Doctrine of Ockam Buridane and the rest of the Nominals who call it Complacency as antecedent to Election yea and Intention To be pleased with the thing simply on the first apprehension they call a necessary natural act Though the Scotists say that quoad exercitium actus vel libertatem contradictionis even that is free And it seems the same which Augustine and Jansenius call primam aelectationem But converting Grace it self Molina takes to be a habit wrought by Gods special help in and with the word or means His words are of men that are hearing Gods Word or thinking on it Influit Deuâ— in â—easdem notitias inâ—luxâ— quodam particulari ac supernaturali quo cognitionem illam adjuvat tum ut res melius dilucidius expendatur peâ—etret â—umâ—etiam ut notitia illa jam limites notitia supernaturalis ad finem supernaturalom in suo ordine attingat Inde oritur in voluntate motus affectionis c. Yet no Jesuite is supposed to go further from the Calvinists than this man In truth I cannot perceive but that Jesuites Arminians Lutherans and all such are willing to ascribe as much to Gods Grace as they think consistent with mans Free-will and Gods not being the cause of sin which is the same thing that the Calvinists also endeavour thoughâ—hey seem not to hit on the same names and notions to do the thing desired save themselves and those that hear them 1. Tim. 4. 16. And that he that converts a sinner doth save a soul from death James 6. ult And that the word is the immortal incorruptible seed by which we are begotten again and which remaineth in us Are you now in doubt of this C. It is one thing for God to work with the Word and another thing to work by the Word The first we confess But if God work by the Word then he must operate first on the Word which is the Preachers act and so by that Word on the soul and not immediately Therefore I rather think that the word is a concomitant than an instrumental cause B. 1. You wrong your self and Christ in that you will not believe him John 3. that we mortals know not the way and manner of the Spirits accesses and operations on the soul any more than the cause of the wind whose sound we hear Do you not know that you do not know how Gods Spirit moveth our intellect and wills and how he maketh use of instruments except secundum quid in some particles revealed 2. An hundred Texts of Scripture which I omit lest I be tedious tell us that the Word is a means or subordinate cause to God of his informing and reforming operations on mens souls And it 's dangerous to dream of any second cause that is so concomitant as to be but co-ordinate with the first cause and not subordinate to it And the word is not only subordinate to God as Instituter by Legislation and Declaration but also to God as efficient operator 3. God can work two ways by the Word which are within our reach besides others 1. As it is the act of the speaker by exciting and illuminating him 2. As it is the species as they call it received by the senses and imagination which God can by his power set home to the attainment of the due effect 4. And yet I know not any or many of your Adversaries that deny that besides this Divine operation by the VVord God hath another immediately on the soul exciting it to operate upon the VVord as the vis plastica vitalis materna operatur in semen jam receptum But I will here forbear to trouble you with the physical difficulties whether the VVord heard be only objectum intellectus or also causa efficiens as light is both to the eye And whether it be operative on the intellect or only terminative with other such like C. Well I must grant you that all Infused Faith as to the act is Acquired But all Acquired Faith not Infused but infusion is added to our own endeavours like the creation of the humane soul B. I am glad that we are got so far on towards peace But Quest. 4. What mean you by Infusion Is it not a Metaphor C. Yes and we mean that immediate perswasion of God which you even confess to be besides his operation by the Word and by our Cogitations Even a Creation of an act or habit B. Quest. 5. Is it the name Infusion or the thing that you plead for C. The name though I confess Metaphors must not be used unnecessarily in Disputes is yet convenient but that I leave indifferent B. Quest 6. Do you not think that the act of Faith is the act of mans own Intellect and Will or Soul and that immediately C. Yes that cannot be denied B. If so then when you say that our act is Infused I hope you will confess the term to be none of the plainest and you only mean that Gods Grace doth so operate on the faculty as to excite it so to act and consequently that the thing first and properly infused is not the act of Faith it self but the vis impressa facultatem before described by which the act is caused And so in a secondary sense the act may be called Infused but not most immediately C. I confess it is the habit which we commonly take to be Infused and therefore we use to distinguish habitus infusos ab habitibus acquisitis rather than actus infusos ab actibus acquisitis B. Is that Habit before the Act or after it C. You know that it is a Controversie among our selves Mr. Pemble saith it is before and the common opinion is that it is after the first special Act. B. 1. I once received that from Mr. Pemble ignorantly But that cometh to us by not distinguishing the vis impressa or first received influx of the spirit from a Habit when as Amesius well saith it is fitter called semen fidei vel dispositio quaedam than a Habit of Faith For 1. no man can prove such an antecedent habit and therefore none should assert it 2. The true nature of a Habit consisteth in a promptitude to perform that special act with facility But that we should have such a promptitude and facility not only while we are Infant Christians but no Christians as having not yet believed in Christ is not probable according to our
Ministers and serious Christians not only for Ceremonies but for holy practices of life Being under these apprehensions when the Wars began though the Cause it self lay in Civil Controversies between King and Parliament yet the thoughts that the Church and Godliness it self was deeply in danger by Persecution and Arminianism did much more to byass me to the Parliaments side than the Civil interest which at the heart I little regarded At last after two years abode in a quiet Garrison upon the Invitation of some Orthodox Commanders in Fairfax's Army and by the Mission of an Assembly of Divines I went after Naseby Fight into that Army as the profest Antagonist of the Sectaries and Innovators who we all then too late saw designed those changes in the Church and State which they after made I there met with some Arminians and more Antinomians These printed and preached as the Doctrine of Free Grace that all men must presently believe that they are Elect and Justified and that Christ Repented and Believed for them as Saltmarsh writeth I had a little before engaged my self as a Disputer against Universal Redemption against two antient Ministers in Coventry Mr. Cradock and Mr. Diamond that were for it But these new notions called me to new thoughts which clearly shewed me the difference between Christs part and Mans the Covenant of Innocency with its required Righteousness and the Covenant of Grace with its required and imputed righteousness I had never read one Socinian nor much of any Arminians but I laid by prejudice and I went to the Scripture where its whole current but especially Matth. 25. did quickly satisfie me in the Doctrine of Justification and I remembred two or three things in Dr. Twisse whom I most esteemed which inclined me to moderation in the five Articles 1. That he every where professeth that Christ so far dyed for all as to purchase them Justification and Salvation conditionally to be given them if they believe 2. That he reduceth all the Decrees to two de fine de mediis as the healing way 3. That he professeth that Arminius and we and all the Schoolmen are agreed that there is no necessity consequentis laid on us by God in Predestination but only necessity consequentiae or Logical but in Election I shall here suspend 4. That the Ratio Reatus in our Original Sin is first founded in our Natural propagation from Adam and but secondarily from the positive Covenant of God 5. That Faith is but Causa dispositiva Justificationis and so is Repentance These and such things more I easilier received from him than I could have done from another But his Doctrine of Permission and Predetermination and Causa Mali quickly frightned me from assent And though Camero's moderation and great clearness took much with me I soon perceived that his Resolving the cause of sin into necessitating objects and temptations laid it as much on God in another way as the Predeterminants do And I found all godly mens Prayers and Sermons run quite in another strain when they chose not the Controversie as pre-engaged In this case I wrote my first Book called Aphorisms of Justification and the Covenants c. And being young and unexercised in writing and my thoughts yet undigested I put into it many uncautelous words as young Writers use to do though I think the main doctrine of it sound I intended it only against the Antinomians But it sounded as new and strange to many Upon whose dissent or doubtings I printed my desire of my friends Animadversions and my suspension of the Book as not owned by me nor any more to be printed till further considered and corrected Hereupon I had the great benefit of Animadversions from many whom I accounted the most judicious and worthy persons that I had heard of First my friend Mr. John Warren began next came Mr. G. Lawson's the most judicious Divine that ever I was acquainted with in my judgement yet living and from whom I learned more than from any man next came Mr. Christopher Cartwright's then of York the Author of the Rabbinical Comment on Gen. chap. 1 2 3. and of the Defence of King Charles against the Marquess of Worcester Answers and Rejoinders to these took me up much time next came a most judicious and friendly MS. from Dr. John Wallis and another from Mr. Tombes and somewhat I extorted from Mr. Burges the answers to which two last are published To all these Learned men I owe very great thanks and I never more owned or published my Aphorisms but the Cambridge Printer stole an Impression without my knowledge And though most of these differed as much from one another at least as from me yet the great Learning of their various Writings and the long Study which I was thereby engaged in in answering and rejoyning to the most was a greater advantage to me to receive accurate and digested conceptions on these subjects than private Students can expect My mind being thus many years immerst in studies of this nature and I having also long wearied my self in searching what Fathers and Schoolmen have said of such things before us and my Genius abhorring Confusion and Equivocals I came by many years longer study to perceive that most of the Doctrinal Controversies among Protestants that I say not in the Christian World are far more about equivocal words than matter and it wounded my soul to perceive what work both Tyrannical and unskilful Disputing Clergie-men had made these thirteen hundred years in the world And experience since the year 1643. till this year 1675. hath loudly called to me to Repent of my own prejudices sidings and censurings of causes and persons not understood and of all the miscarriages of my Ministry and life which have been thereby caused and to make it my chief work to call men that are within my hearing to more peaceable thoughts affections and practices And my endeavours have not been in vain in that the Ministers of the Countrey where I lived were very many of such a peaceable temper though since cast out and a great number more through the Land by Gods Grace rather than any endeavours of mine are so minded But the Sons of the Coal were exasperated the more against me and accounted him to be against every man that called all men to Love and Peace and was for no man as in a contrary way And now looking daily in this posture when God calleth me hence summoned by an incurable Disease to hasten all that ever I will do in this World being uncapable of prevailing with the present Church disturbers I do apply my self to posterity leaving them the sad warning of their Ancestors distractions as a Pillar of Salt and acquainting them what I have found to be the cause of our Calamities and therein they will find the Cure themselves II. I Have oft taken the boldness constrainedly to say that I doubt not but the Contentions of the Clergie have done far more
Slothfulness in Students in seeking truth 3. Hastiness in Judging before digested conceptions and proof II. Nearly Want of 1. Humility and self-acquaintance Pride 2. Knowledge Ignorance and Error 3. Love to others Envy Malice and Bitterness III. Instruments or Engines 1. In General Corrupt departing from Christian Simplicity 2. Particularly 1. From Simplicity of Doctrine by DOGMATISTS Words Notions 2. From Simplicity of Practice by SUPERSTITIOUS additions 3. From Simplicity of Discipline by CHURCH-TYRANNY II. CONSTITUTIVE Causes viz. DISCORD 1. In JUDGMENT of things necessary ALIENATION 2. In WILL and AFFECTION viz. 1. Privative by denying due Communion 2. Positive 1. By Contention 2. Malice 3. Hurtfulness to each other DIVISION 3. In Necessary PRACTICE III. The EFFECTS viz. I. On THINGS viz. on Church 1. Doctrine Preaching and Writing turning it into vain and hurtful wrangling 2. Worship Prayer Sacraments corrupting them by faction partiality and wrath 3. Discipline corrupting it into Secular or factious Tyranny or a dead Image II. On PERSONS viz. I. Particular 1. Themselves 2. Their followers 1. The Guilt and Deceit of false-Religious zeal 2. The Death of true Holiness and Heavenly Conversation 3. The Death of Love and Life of Wrath and injuries 3. Rulers viz. 1. Corrupting them by factious clamours against their Subjects 2. Tempting them unto persecuting Laws and Executions 3. Engaging them in bloody Wars abroad 4. The Innocent viz. Injuries to 1. Private persons 1. By censures slanders backbitings making them hated 2. Denying them due Love Communion and help 3. Persecution silencing and other mischiefs 2. Princes 1. Weakning and grieving them by the Subjects discords 2. Dishonouring them by defaming Excommunications 3. Urging them to be the Clergies Lictors or Executioners 5. Enemies and Strangers scandalizing and hardning them in Infidelity sin II. Societies I. Churches 1. Corrupting them in Doctrine Worship and Order 2. Weakning them by discord and division 3. Shaming them before the World 4. Making them less fit for Gods Love and Communion II. Kingdoms Weakning them dishonouring them and drawing them into the Guilt of Feuds Wars and Persecutions IV. The REMEDIES I. Persons 1. Christ the Prince of Peace and the Churches Head and Center 2. Wise Princes who understand the Interest of 1. Christ 2. Their people 3. Themselves 3. Able Wise Holy and Peaceable Pastors 4. The Mature Experienced Mellow Peaceable sort of the people II. Qualities 1. Diligent Study under wise Teachers 2. Sincere Holiness A dying life 1. Humility 2. Knowledge 3. Love to others as our selves 3. Deliberate Judging upon tryal III. Means 1. Returning to Christian Simplicity 1. In Doctrine The antient Creed c. 2. In Worship 3. In Discipline 2. Magistrates forcing the Clergie to keep the peace and forbear strife 3. Subjects obedience in all lawful things required by Authority V. HEALTH or Cure 1. Rulers Pastors and people of one MIND 2. One HEART in Love 3. One MOUTH and practice in things Necessary in Communion and mutual help And mutual loving forbearance in Infirmities and things unnecessary edified in Love VI. The EFFECTS hereof I. GLORY to God 1. In the Hallowing of his Name and Honour of Religion 2. In the increase of his Kingdom and Conversion of the World 3. In the Doing of his Will on Earth as it is done in Heaven II. Peace on Earth 1. Increase of Holiness Heavenliness and Love 2. Mutual Delight herein The Joy of Health and Concord 3. The Churches Strength and Glory III. Gods WELLPLEASEDNESS in MEN His Church will be meet for his Love Delight and Communion and be liker to Heaven and enjoy its foretastes An Appendix to this Premonition SInce the Printing of this the World hath seen a specimen of such contention as I lament in a contest between a young insulting Assailant and a jocular contemptuous Defendant in my judgment both running into extreams whether verbal or real their own explications must further tell us The extreams of the former are reprehended by many By the later a person of great wit and piety I perceive that some men have such conceptions of the Covenants of God as will give occasion to some Readers to think that by mis-describing them I have erred and misled men through this and many other Writings And men that are not able to conquer the obscuring and tempting notions of their Authors are still calling for Answers to every inconsiderable objection or contradicting word that is suggested to them and little things puzzle and stop such Readers though otherwise pious and worthy persons who have not by long and accurate studies methodized and digested the matter that is disputed of Not therefore to offend any man by opposition or to defend other mens extreams but to prevent the frustration of some of these Writings and the scandal or trouble of my Reader I must take notice I. That some think that the Covenant of Grace must be considered 1. in its Constitution and 2. in its Execution The Constitution of the Covenant is God's firm and unchangeable purpose of saving his Elect to the praise of his glorious Grace For the word signifieth a disposition appointment or ordering of matters whether there be a restipulation or no the English word Covenant seduceth our understandings The fixed purpose and determinate counsel of God in Scripture is called a Covenant Jer. 33. 20. II. The execution of this fixed Constitution is God's wise and gracious managing of all things for the accomplishment of that glorious design which he had in the prospect of his eternal counsel which he steadily and regularly pursueth through all the vicissitudes that his mutable creatures are obnoxious to c. pag. 718 719. 1. On God's part whatever grace and mercy was in his eternal purpose that is given out to us by Christ c. III. 1. Christ cannot be the foundation of the Covenant because Christ himself is promised in the Covenant as the great comprehensive blessing Isa 49. 8 9. 2. Free Grace is given as the true reason of the Covenant Heb. 8. 8. IV. The Constitution of the Covenant in God's purpose and counsel hath no condition at all nor is that the Condition of the Covenant required of us on our part which God promiseth to work in us on his part nor that which God in Covenant bestoweth nor that which presupposeth other Covenant mercies antecedent c. V. A promise of pardon and life on condition of believing and obeying is no Covenant of Grace at all and neither better nor worse than a threatning of condemnation c. It 's no more a Covenant of Grace than a Covenant of Wrath. It 's no great matter where it is founded p. 584 586. VI. God hath not dispensed with one jot or title of the moral Law but Do this and live is as strictly exacted as ever so that unless a Surety be admitted and the righteousness of another owned the case of all the sons of Adam is deplorable and desperate To deny the righteousness wherein
have fled so high in making Grace supernatural feigning a state of pure Naturals that had none and talk so phanatically of the Deification of the soul as I think hath ensnared some Sectaries among us to imitate them seigning that the first Covenant is Moral as a Law and the second Covenant is the very in-being of a Divine Nature which they though obscurely seem to describe as somewhat above all Habits and Inclinations put into our own nature like another form or soul Which over-doing tendeth to tempt men to Infidelity by doubting whether mans Nature was made by the Creator to enjoy God in Heaven or not when it must be made another thing to attain it SECT XII Of Scientia Media 255. AFter this Digression about our Will and Powers as the objects of Gods Knowledge and Decrees I return to the Doctrine de Scientia Media And that God knoweth from Eternity the truth of all conditional propositions that are true is past all doubt If we may suppose that God had eternal propositions No doubt but he knoweth now that such propositions are true If such Causes be put they will or will not produce this or that as the effect 256. But if it be an Imperfection to have mental propositions to know by and God knoweth not by them but only knoweth them as the instruments and way of humane knowledge For no doubt but he knoweth all that 's ours Then it must be said that he had from eternity but the foreknowledge of the Creatures conditional propositions And who can well determine this 257. And this will lead the arrogant disputers to other enquiries no less difficult Whether it be only or primarily the Proposition it self as ens rationis humanae or as the Thought of mans mind which God knoweth or the res ab homine cognita that is futurition it self And if the former How God knoweth them to be True If the latter How he knoweth futurition 258. And here inextricable difficulties will still arise before them Whether to have the notion of futurity be not a part of the Creatures imperfection Whether God know not all things as present Whether Nothing be properly Intelligible in it self Whether it be not only Propositions de nihilo that are known and not the ipsum nihil such as futurition is Whether to ascribe such knowledge of Nothing and such notions or propositions to God be to ascribe perfection or Imperfection to him 259. If we may or must say that God from eternity fore-knew our Propositions of future contingents which are Conditional yet we must not say or think that his knowledge quoad actum is conditional so as that the Creatures * Nic. D'Orbellis saith Communiter distinguitur triplex cognitio Dei viz. approbationis visionis intelligentiae Cognitio approbationis est tantum Bonorum Cognitio Visionis est corum quae sunt fuerunt vel crunt Cognitio intelligentiae seu simplicis notitiae est omnium quae possunt esse Hujusmodi autem cognitiones non differunt secundum se sed secundum distinctionem connotatorum Et Bonavent 1. d. 38. dub 3. Dicendum quod in nobis notitia simplex notitia beneplaciti dicunt diversas cognitiones diversos modos cognoscendi A Deo autem una tantum cognitio est Sed illa una facit Deus quod homines multis Et â—â—â—o illa una dupliciter significat state is the condition of Gods Knowledge in it self But only that the object is a conditional proposition speaking the Condition of the event fore-known From which Gods Act is denominated conditional only denominatione extrinsecâ not as an Act but as This act 260. We deny not but God may be said as truly to know the truth of hypothetical as of absolute propositions If one be the object of his Knowledge the other is Which proveth the hypothetical proposition to be less perfect than an absolute but not Gods knowledge of it to be less perfect 261. Nor doth Gods fore-knowledge that Adam will sin in such circumstances make his understanding depend on the Creature but only to be terminated on the Creature as an object And so it doth in all Acts where the Creature is the object This objection therefore belongeth also to the dispute Whether God know any thing but himself or out of himself 262. The seigning God to have in himself so many acts of knowledge really distinct and to lye in such an order is intolerable seeing God is most simple But by extrinsecal denomination his Knowledge may by us through our weakness and necessity be distinguished according to its respect to diversity of objects by inadequate conceptions But on that pretence to feign many needless distributions is profane 263. They that think it a good confutation of scientia mediae that Non decreta non sunt futura therefore no futurition can be known but as Decreed do err much in the antecedent For it is false that sin is Decreed and are either erroneous or uncertain in the conclusion For God fore-knoweth sin so far as it is intelligible 264. The sense of the question de Scientiae Media is not de conditionatis Vide Pet. à Sanct. Jos Disp. 4. Sect. 1. p. 465. de Scient Med. necessariâ—s as If the Sun set it will be night Nor yet of such conditionals as are meerly disparate and have no kind of dependence or connexion as If Peter dye quickly John will live long But of such conditionals as have some reason of the Connexion and yet leave the will in an undetermined power to act or not But we know no difference between these ex parte Dei Scientis but only denominatione extrinseca ex parte objecti 265. Much less dare we conclude with them that Gods knowledge See all this modestly and judiciously handled by Fr. Zumel Disput. in Tho. p. 1. especially his Conclus 6. p. 127. And Ockam 1. d. 38. q. 1. Et. Greg. Arim. ib. q. 2. a. 2. Et Gabr. Biel ib. qu. 1. a. 1. Et Ant. Cordub quaest q. 55. dub 10. of Conditionals is in God before his will to concurr or that they exist For we are not acquainted with such priorities and posteriorities in God except by such denomination 266. Methinks it is but sumbling to say with Pet. à S. Joseph Suav Concord Disp 4. p. 484. A nemine dubitari quin ad cognitionem futurorum sub conditione necessarium sit aliquo modo decretum divinum cum nâ—hil possit esse futurum sive absolute sive sub conditione nisi Deus ut prima Causa dut absolute aut sub conditione velit ad ista concurrere At See the short answer in Pet. à S. Joseph Suav Concord p. 576. the first look this seemeth to be spoken of the cause of futurition or of the knowledge of it And if not the Decree seemeth mentioned to no purpose For futurum tantum sub conditione is not as such futurum For the condition suspendeth the
ab objecto denominata 3. And his efficient Volition and Power is terminated on objects in time without mutation in God 4. And N. B. that God doth suspend his own Possible Volitions in many cases As he doth Not will to make more Worlds more Men more Suns more Laws c. than de facto he will make 5. And it is no more defectiveness in God to suspend a Volition for a time than thus to do it for ever 6. And it is no more Dependence on the Creature to Terminate his Volition only on a qualified subject performing the Condition than to terminate his Efficient Power and will on such or such a qualified subject As e. g. He terminateth his Omnipotent Concurse for Generation only on the materia seminalis recte disposita He concurreth to burn by fire c. And if his Acts effectively Transient may be terminated only and temporarily on disposed objects If he did so in acts Objectively Transient and did freely not-will the damnation of man till he had actually sinned but suspended his will freely till then and then de novo terminated it on the said qualified object I see no shew of Dependence or Mutability For I oft cleared it before that the termination of Gods Knowledge Will or Power on any particular Object is in him no addition to its estence And doing it de novo is no change in him but in the Creature only no more than it would be a change in the Sun or its active Emanations if a thousand new creatures newly receive its Influx and are moved by it variously according to their several Conditions Yet I have before given reasons why incipere jam praedestinare is more incongruous language 358. I put in this only to deprecate the blind uncharitable censures of dissenters in this point who think that Gods Volitions are New and Conditional and suspended quoad actum hunc ad hoc objectum and cry out It is blasphemy and maketh God mutable and dependent I am against their opinion as well as you as to Conditional Acts But false charges prove you not to have more truth but less love and sobriety than others 359. XI The next distinction of Gods Will is into Effectual and Uneffectual And here he that would see a great deal said on the question Whether God have any uneffectual Will and whether mans will can frustrate it may see too much in a multitude of Schoolmen on 1 Sent. q. 45. 46. Some answer as D'Orbellis c. that the Voluntas Beneplaciti is Aq. a. 1. Scot. q. un Durand q. 1. Bonav art 1. Greg. Arim. q. un ar 3. Pennot l. 4. c. 22. Alvar. de Aux disp 32. Ruiz de Volunt disp 18. Gran. de Vol. Dei Tract 4. disp 3. Suar. l. 4. de Pradest c. 8. Gr. Val. disp 1. q. 19. p. 6. Cajct Nazar Ban. Zum Navar. Gonzal Molin Vasqu c. in 1. p. q. 19. ar 6. Ripa Arrub. Fasol ibid. Nic. D'Orbel 1. d. 46. and many other Scotists c. ever effectual but not the Vol. signi which yet seeing he well explaineth to be only the making of Duty he might well have said is still effectual to its proper primary effect Greg. Arimin and many others distinguish of the will of Complacency and Displicency and that Prosecutionis fugae and say the latter is effectual and not the former which others say of the Absolute Will as distinct from the Conditional The plain truth I have oft opened before Gods Will is the first Efficient the chief Dirigent and the Final Cause in which the three Principles Power Wisdom and Goodness are eminet 1. His efficient will is ever effectual and never frustrate Whatsoever pleased the Lord to do that he did in Heaven and in Earth in the Sea and in the depths Psal 135. 6. And who hath resisted this his will Rom. 9. 19. 2. His Directing will is ever effectual as to the making of the Law or Rule and of Due or Right thereby For so far it is efficient of that effect But it is too oft violated by our sin 3. His final will or Complacency is Gods being pleased with the Being or Action or relation of the Creature and supposing it is not efficient and therefore not effectual And I know no need of more upon this question 360. XII The last now to be named is The Antecedent and Consequent will This also is handled by many Schoolmen and much used by the Jesuits and Arminians To pass by others Pennottus handleth it propugn l. 4. c. 21. having first shewed c. 20. p. 225. that Chrysostom and Damascene first used it His explicatory Propositions are 1. Vol. Antec Chrys in Eph. Hom. 1. Damasâ— fid Orthod l. 2. c. 29. cont Manich. ad â—â—nem Cons non est in Deo respectu omnium Volitorum sed solum respectu â—orum quae aliquo modo pendent ex lib. arbitrio creaturae 2. Voluntas antecedens est illa qua Deus vult hominis salutem quantum in ipso est qua illum ad salutem ordinat media ad salutem necessaria praeparat quibus nisi per ipsum hominem steterit salutem assequatur 3. Non semper Voluntas antecedens Consequens circa objecta contraria versantur sed potest idem objectum esse Volitum à Deo Voluntate tum antecedente tum consequente 4. Voluntas antecedens in Deo est Voluntas beneplaciti non solum voluntas signi 5. Voluntas antecedens est formaliter Alliaco Camerac 1. q. 14. D. E. tells you the sense of Thom. Scotus Ockam Gregor of this distinction and that of Scotus and Ockam is to the same purpose with what I here say of it including that antecedent Grace which they call sufficient which God giveth to perswade men to consent The Schoolmen are disagreed of the sense of this distinction and not understanding it contend about it See Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 19. §. 2 3 4 5. p. 195 196 c. proprie in Deo existens non solum per metaphoram ad eum modum quo Voluntas signi 361. I tell you their sense that I may the better open the plain truth to you which is as followeth 1. This distinction of Vol. antec cons is not applyed to God as he is our Creator or End nor as he is meer Proprietor or Benefactor but only as he is Rector or Moral Ruler of man 2. As Government hath an Antecedent and Consequent part viz. Legislation and Judgement with Execution so Gods Antecedent will is nothing but his Legal will or his Will as Rector signified by his Laws And his Consequent will is his Judicial will or expressed in Judgement One Antecedent to Mans part obedience or disobedience and the other Consequent to it 3. It is most certain that God willeth Antecedently all that is in his Law that is that all that believe and repent shall be saved And that
I am told to my face that our Doctrine of Absolute Reprobation we have learned from the Papists Another professeth that the Jesuits ten of them for one favour the absolute irrespective decree follow herein as they think S. Austin but especially their S. Thomas and Scotus with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen and the whole tribe at this day of the Dominicans who are busie Zealots for the Cause of whose consent some among us are not ashamed to brag Twisse against Hoard li. 1. pag. 85. This reporter maketh us at one with Jesuites and Dominicans And yet may we not be so with Protestants that he must have a subtile contentious wit that can find any great intolerable difference herein between him and the Synod of Dort I Write not for them that will revile Gods truth if Bellarmine do but own it De Grat. lib. arb li. 2. cap. 9. this is his proposition Though a Grace sufficient be given to all yet no reason from us or our part can be given of Gods predestination By which we exclude not only Merits properly so called but also the good use of free-will oâ—â—â— grace or both as foreseen of God though it be not called Merit but de congruo and though it be not called a Cause but a Condition â—â—â—â— qua non praedestinaretur And what else would you have excluded And he goeth on in divers Chapters at large to prove from Scriptures Augustine Tradition Reason that there is no foreseen Cause or Condition of predestination in our selves 685. And I desire the Reader to note his Order of the Decrees for they must all be medling with the Order of Gods inward acts But he doth iâ— most briefly and plainly thus ib. cap. 9. According to our mode of understanding this seemeth to be the Order of Predestination in Gods mind 1. God foreseeth that if he make man he will fall with all his posterity And withal he seeth thâ—â— he can deliver all or some as he please 2. He decreeth or willeth to create man and to permit him to fall and mercifully to deliver some of the number of the fallen leaving others justly in the mass of perdition 3. He contrived apt remedies for the saving of the elect Iâ— which the incarnation and passion of our Saviour hath the first place 4. He approved those remedies and then chose Christ and us in him before the Constitution of the World 5. He disposed ordained and in a sort commanded that so it should be done Is not this as high as the Synod of Dort goeth yea more rigid than many of the Suffrages For he mentioneth no giving of Christ or any remedy at all to any but the Elect nor carrying the rest any further thaâ— the common mass of perdition before they be forsaken contrary to what Martinius Crocius Molinaeus the Brittish Divines and others delivered to or in that Synod And indeed it is unsound 686. If you say that he begins with a Scientia Conditionalis I answer It 's no more than what all sober men will grant de re that is that God knew from eternity that if he so made man as he did he would fall or if there were eternal propositions God eternally knew the truth of this hypothetical proposition If I so make man he will fall If this was quid intelligibile no doubt but God knew it But de ordine de nomine whether it be fit to parcell out Gods knowledge and Volitions into such shreds and atoms and so denominate them let them look to it on both sides that trouble us with their divisions 687. And note Bellarmines further explication Of these acts saith he the first is of the understanding the second of the will the third of the understanding the fourth of the will and the fifth of the understanding and in that last the essence of predestination especially consisteth 688. Yea cap. 15. whereas many distinguish predestination to faith or grace from election to glory and say that the latter is upon the foresight of faith as a condition though the first be absolute he opposeth them and copiously laboureth to prove that election to glory is absolute without any foreseen condition in us as well as that to grace Though without something in us we have not a Right to glory Even saith he as if a Physicion were sure that by such a Medicine he can cure a man and so resolveth to give it him the Medicine is the Cause that he is cured but not that it was ascertained by the decree of the Physicion before 689. And c. 15. ad obj 2. he proveth Gods certain foreknowledge â—erein because Though all have pro loco tempore sufficient grace to be converted if they will yet indeed no man is converted and no man persevereth but he that hath the special gift of Repentance and Perseverance which is not given to all but to those only for whom God decreed it 689. And to them that say the Elect can refuse grace he answereth â—hat They can indeed but it 's certain that they will not because God will call them so as he seeth so congruous that they may not refuse his call For thus true grace is refused by no hard heart because it is given with a purpose to mollifie it And there is no danger lest God should want skill or arguments to perswade any man to what he please 690. And indeed before de Gratia efficaci li. 1. cap. 12. he tells us that â—here are three opinions wherein the efficacy of grace consisteth The first is that it is called effectual only from the event through mans conâ—ent which he disproveth The second that it is only efficacious by necessitating physical predetermination which he thinks to be an error on â—he other extream And the third which he defendeth is that it is efficacious by Gods will that it shall be so and by the Congruity or moral â—ptitude of inward and outward perswasions and means which God useth with a decree to turn the will And who can say that God cannot do this or if he can that he doth not Is here yet any room left for quarâ—elling and bitter censures in this point * * * When even Bradwardinâ— holdeth that Gods Volition of mans act alone which Bellarmine includeth is the effectual unresistible Grace â—â— parte Dei operantis 691. Lib. 2. cap. 16. he maketh two acts of Reprobation the very same that almost all the suffrages in the Synod of Dort assign and the same doctrine that Davenant and the Synod deliver His first act of Reprobation is Negative the second Positive 1. Non habet Voluntatem eos salvandi 2. Habet Voluntatem eos damnandi And as to the first Nulla datur ejus causa ex parte hominum sieut neque praedestinationis Posterioris causa est praevisio peccati They are unmerciful contenders that this much Reprobation will not satisfie 692. He proveth as the Calvinists do that it
justified by Faith it connoteth and includeth that we are justified by Christ and his Sacrifice Merits and Covenant respectively believed in But yet it is not Christ nor his Sacrifice or Merits or Promise that is meant by the word Faith It was a gross abuse of the Text so to expound it Faith connoteth the Object but it is not Christ that is called Faith 140. But the meaning is that man having forfeited Life Christ's Righteousness habitual active and passive hath merited that it shall be given us as a free Gift but yet regularly under a Law But the Law maketh nothing but believing acceptance the condition of our Right and he that doth that much shall without perfection be esteemed and used as righteous for the sake of the said Righteousness of Christ So that in point of Merit as to the value of the thing Christ's Righteousnesâ— is instead of our Innocency But as to the order of collation something being still to be required of us as a condition of Right so our Faith now is instead of our Innocency as being all that is laid on us instead of â—â— that we may have right to Justification And to assign this condition oâ— our part Paul saith That Faith is imputed to us for righteousness To deny this sense is to use violence with the Text. 141. Christ's Righteousness is made ours as our Sins were made his which is not in themselves as is aforesaid God forbid we should think that Christ was ever reputed by God to be a Sinner a Blasphemer a Murderer an Enemy to God and Goodness one that had Satan's Image and was his Servant a Persecutor of himself c. But only our sin was imputed to him as to the punishment deserved that is he assumed the Reatum poenae the punishment and a dueness occasioned by our sin but made his own by his voluntary sponsion But never had he the reaâ—um culpae in its self but meerly as aforesaid respectively to the punishment Even so we have the Righteousness of Christ not in its self as Proprietors of it but in relation to the effects that is we have the effects even our Justification and other benefits as purchased by it and for its sake And as our guilt or obligation to punishment was not Christ's till his voluntary sponsion or consent did make it so Even so his Righteousness is not ours in the effects till our voluntary consent accept it Because iâ— is not a natural but a contracted Relation that is between Christ and us And as it is not a strict propriety in Christ's Righteousness that we have so it is much less a plenary and absolute propriety nor have we it in the Relation of a meritorious cause to all uses as if it had been fully our own but only limitedly to those uses which God accepted it for and hath assigned to it in the Gospel that is it is but a certain sort and measure of mercies that are given us from it in Gods time and way 142. To the asserting of the rigid sense of Imputation they are necessitated to say that which supposeth Gods repute of the matter to be false that is that he reputeth us to have done that in and by Christ which we never did by him But God judgeth nothing to be otherwise than it is that he judgeth Christ to have been the Sponsor and Mediator and in that person to have done and suffered as he did is because it is true But he judgeth him not to have been the legal Person of the Sinner and as many persons as there be redeemed Sinners in the world because that is not true 143. They say that what the Surety doth the Debtor doth in Law-sense and to judge so is not to err But there are several sorts of Sureties much more of Instruments in paying a Debt 1. There be free Sureties who are not obliged to the Debtor as his Dependents and these either by counter-security or by right of the thing may recover all of the Debtor again And therefore the Law supposeth not the Debtor to have payed the Debt by them but that the Creditor made them both Joynt-Debtors for his own security 2. There are Sureties antecedently and Sureties consequently One that before the Debt doth conditionally make himself a Joynt-Debtor in case the Principal pay it not And there is a Surety more properly called an undertaking-Friend who after payeth the Debt being disobliged before Christ was not a Surety of the first sort in Law-sense And if you call Gods Decrees which are his Essence Suretiship your liberty of words changeth not the case 3. There is a Surety who payeth the Debt in the name and person of the principal Debtor And he is not properly called a Surety but an Agent or Substitute And Christ was none such nor is any proper Surety such And there is a Surety which by the Creditors consent doth pay the Debt in his own name agreeing that the chief Debtor shall have no benefit by it but from him as he shall give it on certain terms And this was Christ's case 4. There is a Surety that payeth the same debt that was due from the Principal And there is a Surety or Friend that undertaketh only to make the Creditor satisfaction because the Debtor cannot pay And this is the case 5. Lastly There is a pay-master that is the Debtors Instrument whether Servant Delegate or whoever at his command or request doth pay it in his name and person And this is not the case And there is a proper Surety who is a third person and no Instrument and payeth it in his own name though for another This as I said is the case and therefore it is not we that paid it Therefore to the Objection I say that to judge Christ such an Instrument or Delegate of ours or Surety that did all in our legal person is to misjudge and err as is proved which God cannot do 144. Christ did and suffered in the common nature of man though not in the person of each Sinner And mans nature is so far redeemed by him that for the meer Original Sin of nature alone no man shall perish unless he add the rejection of Grace of which somewhat is said before But yet as Nature existeth only in persons so it is all persons who have this much benefit and more But that he merited and satisfied in our Nature is a proper speech and truer than that he did it in our persons 145. But all this similitude of a Creditor and Debtor is to be limited in the application according to the great difference of Sin and Debt which will infer a great diversity in the consequents which may easily be collected by the Reader 146. As to the great and weighty question whether Christ died for How far Christ died for sins against the Law of Grace sins against the New Covenant or only for those against the old I answer Distinction is here notoriously
by the effect it must be described Efficacy is Aptitudinal which is the force and fitness of the Efficient Cause Or Actual which is Efficienty it self § 7. Aptitudinal efficacy is 1. In God 2. In the means And 1. In Gods Absolute Power 2. In his Ordinate Power § 8. 1. Gods Absolute Power is Omnipotency or Infinite and therefore was aptitudinally efficacious to make a world before it was made § 9. 2. Gods Ordinate Power is the same Essential Omnipotency denominated from the Connotation of those effects which he hath decreed to produce according to the limited aptitude of second Causes and means or the disposition of the recipient or at least as limited in the effects by his meer free will § 10. In these respects though still Gods power in it self be Omnipotency yet in the limited way of operation it is various 1. As Gods Will quoad terminos is various 2. And as the means are various 3. And as the Receivers capacities are various To one the same operation ex parte Dei mediorum though not from the same Decree is abundantly efficacious and to another not § 11. And thus God so limiteth the effect of his Power as that it shall be effectual sometime on a Condition to be freely performed by man receiving it even by a former help and not absolutely § 12. Therefore all that is Aptitudinally efficacious is not actually efficient of every effect to which it was thus apt § 13. The aptitudinal efficacy of the means being of God falleth in with his ordinate power herein and is not the thing in question § 14. The effects in respect to which Grace is called efficacious are 1. The Giving of the Means themselves 2. The first Impress on the soul 3. The altering of the souls Disposition 4. The production of the act 5. And of the Habit. And it must be some of these effects which are called efficacious or inefficacious to others So that by that time the state of the Question is truly opened this which Dr. Twisse saith Arminius durst never speak out his opinion of and which he and others make to be the very heart of all these Controversies perhaps will appear to be nothing § 15. For what is that Grace whose efficacy you enquire of â— Is it Gratia operans or operata The efficient cause or the effect If it be Gods Gratia operans it is either the Prime Cause or the second Causes If it be the Prime Cause it is Gods essence only Even his Essential Power Vasquez in 1 Tho. â—â—â—â— 19. disp 8c p. 5â—â—â—â—â— Voluntas libera Deâ— â—â—â—â— essentia Divina significata per modum actus vitalis affectus eliciti cum revera sit ipsamet substantia Dei includit tamen habitudinem etiam qúandam rationis ad res futuras quae liberâ— Deo convenit sient etiam res libere futurae sunt Cum enim haec relatio consurgat ex fundamentis non necessaries â—â—â—â— ex rebus ipsis objâ—â—â—â— futuriâ— ipsa etiam habitudâ—â—â—â—â—re Deo convenit non intrinsicè sed extrinsecâ— solum denominationâ— quam Deo convenire non conveâ—ire â—on est absurdum Ergo cum Velle liberam Dei non solum includat essentiam sed cum tali respectâ— â—ti-â—â—sâ— libera Volunt as possâ—â— Dâ—o adesse abesse niâ—il sequitur absurdi quod divina simplicitati immutabilitati repugâ—et This little is all that they can tell us what Gods free Volition of extrinsick effects is And can you tell us any more Bradwardine denying in God any executive power besides meer Volition though he call him oâ—â—nipotent antecedently to his self-knowledge and Volition doth make Grace â—x parts Dâ—â— to be nothing but his Will that we shall do the act and be such and â—â—ch Intellect and will And is that the Question Wherein consisteth the efficacy of Gods essence Why it consisteth in it self if you mean Aptitudinal efficacy It is Gods essential Virtue If you mean Actual efficiency that speaketh the effect of which more anon So that about Gods essential efficacy there is no Controversie § 16. But if you say that It is his Potentia quà ordinata and not quà essentialis vel absoluta that you enquire of the efficacy of Remember that the word Ordinata or Limited signifieth no alteration in Gods Power at all but only An effect which as Limited and ordinate from whence the Power causing it is extrinsecally so named Gods essential Power is never limited but Infinite and to be Ordinate is but to have ordinate effects So that still either the Controversie must be of Gods essence which is past Controversie or of some second cause or some meer effect § 17. And if you transferr the Question to the efficacy of second causes 1. You will deny your selves that means and second causes have any power but from God 2. And that the very nature of those causes is sufficient to the ascertaining of the effect because they cause mostly morallyâ— And it is one of the accuâ—ations against the Aâ—minians right or wrong that they lay all on moral suasion or causality 3. And second causes are so numerous and unknown to us that we are uncapable of judging well of their efficacy 4. But it is I think agreed between you that the force of Means or second causes in Conversion is not such as necessitateth the will Or if some of the Schoolmen and Jesuites which with their Scientia Media do joyn Gratiam per congruitatem mediorum efficacem do make this efficacy to be the chief cause of the effect yet they deny it to cause necessarily at least alwayes when the effect followeth And what if we add that objects effect not as such And therefore this question de efficacia causarum secundarum must extend to some second effective Agents and not only to objects as such nor to those that preach present and offer objects as such And what that Agent Cause must be under God by that time you are agreed you will find that they are new Controversies that will there rise up before you And yet I think that if we will needs wrangle about the efficaciousness of any cause foregoing the first effect it self on the soul it must be of the efficacy of some or all these second causes or we must question whether God be God For I can find nothing else to question § 18. It remaineth then that the question Wherein the efficacy of Grace consisteth must be meant of Gratia operata even of the effect it self And then either you mean that this effect is efficacious to it self or to something else The first is such a contradiction as is not to be imagined that you should think that an effect is its own cause and ask How doth faith e. g. cause it self Therefore there is nothing left but only to question How the first effect of God on the soul in its conversion is efficacious of the second § 19. And here 1.
morally attracting even inwardly but also efficaciously and truly effecting that the will moved and excited of God determine it self and act well Answ We know what mans perswading and moral operations are a little But the difference between these interiour acts of God named by you no man knoweth You cannot prove that his Interiour swasion is not truly efficient of the act nor know you how God proâ—ureth our determination as to the mode of his interiour operation Your arbitrary names have no signification of your true formal conceptions of the matter This Controversie therefore is vain XVI The efficacy of the help of preventing grace and the infallible connexion of it with the free co-operation of the will is totally founded and taken as from its first root from the Omnipotency of God and from the absolute and efficacious decree of his will willing that the man whom he moveth be converted and work piously nor doth this efficacy any way depend no not as on a condition sine qua non on the future co-operation of the created will though the free act by which man persevereth depend effectively on his will moved by God Answ 1. I grant that all the good that cometh to pass is fore-decreed by God 2. But Gods meer will effecteth it not without his Power 3. His power effecteth it not from eternity before it is effected 4. You leave out one of the causal Attributes The effect of Grace is as well from the Wisdom of God as from his Will and Power 5. Gods act dependeth not on mans will But mans co-operation which is his own act you must confess dependeth on his will as the effect on the nearest efficient 6. The non-efficiency of sufficient Grace dependeth on the sinners will It was not meerly nor principally from an absolute efficacious Decree or predetermination of God that Adams will omitted his duty first or committed sin first And if any run to the common shadow that sin hath no efficient cause and man only is deficient I answer 1. He is the first Reputative Deficient though not culpable because under no Law who must be the first efficient of the contrary and is not As if Adams body had never had a soul God was the first Non-efficient Cause that is into whose will and non-agency the whole ratio defectus is to be resolved 2. Forget not that Alvarez himself saith lib. 6. disp 45. p. 210. Licet peccatum originale non sit pro formali aliquid positivum sed privativum peccatum tamen actuale est pro formali aliquid positivum causat in anima habitum vitii XVII Supposing effectual Grace in free-will it infallibly followeth that free-will will consent and act piously so that these two are incompossible that effectual Grace be in a man and that he actually dissent Answ True because it is not called properly effectual unless either 1. Because it effecteth 2. Or as it cometh from an absolute decree of effecting 3. Or is of such a nature and degree that it cannot but effect And in all these cases it is true But such Grace may be eventually uneffectual which had a sufficiency ex parte sui to effect XVIII The gift of perseverance as such and the efficacy of it dependeth not no not as on a Condition sine qua non on the co-operation of our free-will but on the absolute decree of God effecting mans perseverance Answ This needeth no other explication or observation but as aforesaid Only that the Jus ad gratiam quâ ad finem perseveremus is given on condition in the Gospel from how absolute a decree soever it proceed XIX Effectual aid and a Power of dissenting are compossible in the same subject and consist in the same will Answ True And remember that a true Power is that quâ verè possumus and not that faculty which could do this or that if God will predetermine it and otherwise cannot no more than the Sun can shine without him When God withholdeth the Influx necessary to action such a faculty is no true power as to that action in that State XX. By preventing Grace efficacious as aforesaid the Liberty of the will is not destroyed nor the actual use of it hindered but is wonderfully perfected and roborated Answ There is a Liberty that is perfected by some even necessitating Free-will in name is owned by you all I say as August Enchir. c. 105. Sic oportebat prius hominem fierl ut bene velle posset male nec gratis si bene nec impune si male postea vero sic erit ut male velle non possit Quia ordo praetermittendus non suit in quo Deus voluit ostendere quam bonum sit animal rationale quod etiam peccare possit quamvis sit melius quod peccare non possit predetermination of God And there is an inferiour Liberty of Imperfect Viators which some efficient Divine predetermination feigned by you would destroy And if God did by that insuperable premoving influx which omnipotently moveth all things predetermine all men and Devils to all the wicked Volitions and actions that ever were done with all the circumstances and as respecting every object comparatively so that no creature ever did nor can resist such a predetermination any easier than make a World this were to destroy the true Liberty of that Creature with his innocency and felicity however you may at pleasure put the name of Liberty on and deny the name of Necessity to such an absolutely necessitated Volition and act and then may say that they are premoved and predetermined to do the Act of all sin freely or constrained to do it without constraint and so the liberty of the will is established For I see not but cogere ad Volendum is as apt a phrase as cogere nolentem ad agendum when a will formerly innocent is irresistibly predetermined by physical efficiency to all those comparate circumstantiate acts which are forbidden in Gods Law and that on pain of mans damnation But note how wisely Alvarez left out the great difference about predetermining to the acts of sin from this summary of his disputations §. III. Of the three other wayes and I. Of the Jesuits way Quest AS you have past your judgement on Alvarez and his Dominican way tell us how much you think well or ill of in the other three wayes mentioned by Alvarez and recited by you sect 8 Answ I. I have said enough before to answer this Briefly as to the Jesuits way de scientia media 1. It is certain that God knoweth all that Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 22. d. 99. c. 6 7. after the rejection of many opinions holds this the only way of Concord 1. Gods preventing operating grace is Vocatio Congrua with good cogitations and the primus motus voluntatis ante actum liberum 2. Gods co-operating Grace ad consensum liberum is neither before nor after our act but concomitant simul And so
the days of Arminius to this day especially between Prince Maurice and the States at the death of Barnevelt the imprisonment of Grotius c. The Synod at Dort and all the strife and discontent before and after it 3. Peruse but the Volumes written on one side by Suecâ—nus Arminius Grevinchovius Corvinus Tilenus Episcopius Curcellaeus Grotius c. with many Lutherans And on the other side by Gomarrus Lubbertus Macchovius c. Molinaeus Amesius Dr. Twisse Rutherford Spanhemius c. and think how sad such Combats are 4. Think what a lamentable distance to this day is kept up between the Lutherans and Calvinists in all Countries and much upon the account of these same Controversies And what bitter Books the Lutherans have written comparing the Calvinists to Papists Turks c. and how little Mr. Ducy by forty years Labour did to reconcile them and how small success all other Reconcilers have had though excellent learned judicious men such as Calixtus Johan Bergins Conrad Bergins Ludov. Crocius Mat. Martinius Isleburg Testaidus Amyraldus Placens Capellus Dallaeus Blondel Davenant Hall Carlton Abbot Morton Preston c. 5. Think of the great Conflicts in France and Flanders between the Jansenists and their Adversaries and the multitude of elaborate Volumes between the Dominicans and the Jesuites And of how many Ages continuance those contests have been 6. Then rise up to the Time and Case of Faustus Rhegiensis Cassianus and the Massilienses and their Adversaries and the hard Characters left by those controversies on the names of worthy men 7. From thence ascend to Chrysostome and his Reproaches and Austin's Censures on the other side with all the Conflicts which he and his Abettors Prosper and Fulgentius had with the Pelagians and Semipelagians of those times 8. And lastly read and pity almost all the Fathers especially of the Greek Church whose Names are now blotted with the censure of speaking too like our Arminians and Jesuites and after all this you will sure think this Contention was a very ill work if it be proved causless and you will think that it's time to end it if it be possible To which end an attempt is not discommendable if it should prove lost as to the greater part of men And some I doubt not God will bless it to at least to increase their love of peace A. I pray you tell me what is your Undertaking and in what measure it is that you think this Work may be accomplished B. My Undertaking is this To prove that in the points of Predestination and Redemption there is no difference between moderate men of each Party * Eadem enim difficultas fuit semper donationis in tempore praefinitionis aut praedestinationis in praescientia Cum ergo in tempore detur nobis prima gratia sine ulla causa ratione aut conditione sine qua non sic etiam praedestinatur Neque solum negari debet ratio cur unus praedestinetur alii verâ— non ut quidam dicebant sed etiam quare aliquis praedestinetur nulla facta comparatioâ—â— siquidem nulla ratio esse potuit ob quam Deus dederit primam gratiam nisi per modum sinis Vasquez in 1. Them Disp 91 c. 7. You see how much a Jesuite granteth but what is resolved into the points of Grace and Free-Will and in the points of Grace and Free-Will there is no real difference but what is resolved into the question of the degree of Gods co-operating influx compared with mans agency and with it self as on several Objects which will prove either no difference at all or else about a thing past mans Understanding And that only in the point of perseverance there is a real perceptible difference but such as is not worthy to be insisted on to the breach of Charity or the Churches peace but must consist with toleration and mutual love A. I know not whether this great Undertaking look more smilingly on the Times to come or frowningly on the Times past For if this be true what thoughts what names do we deserve for troubling the Christian World so perniciously and distractingly with a feigned difference But I pray you tell me in general how you will manifest all this B. 1. You must give me leave to tell you who they are that I undertake this Reconciliation of 2. And then how I shall perform it I. It is not every violent Contender that runneth into such palpable Errors as the common cause needeth not and will say any thing rather than agree that I am speaking of About these matters there are two Parties that stand on each extream who are not to be called Calvinists and Arminians but by other Names for their other Opinions These I intend to confute distinctly instead of reconciling them which iâ— impossible but by reforming them 1. On the one side I undertake not the Reconciliation of the Predeterminants who hold That Free-will is nothing but will a related to Reason Lubentia juxta rationem and that all its acts are as truly necessitated by the efficacions premotion of God as is the motion of a Clock or other Engine or of a Bruit though they will needs call them free because they are Volitions as if willing and free-willing were words of the same signification and that is deifying of mans Will or any Creature to say that it can move or determine it self to this Object rather than another without a Physical perdetermining efficient premotion by God at the first total Cause notwithstanding God should uphold its natural power and â—â— the cause of Nature afford his necessary universal Concourse and that to think that a Will thus predetermined by God could have forborn its act it to deifie it also They that think that God cannot make a Creature whose Will can determine it self without his predetermination to that act as circumstantiated though God uphold all its powers and all natural concurrentâ— else and that a self-determined not predetermined by premotion is a God or a Contradiction I am to confute and not to reconcile A. How will you confute them B. That is to be the work of a Disputation on that Point It shall now suffice to mind you that it seemeth to me very plainly to subvert Christianity if not all Religion For when Adam's sin and all the sin in the World of Men or Devils is resolved into the absolute unresistible Will and efficiency of God as the first total Cause and that it had been as impossible to have done otherwise as to be Gods or to Conquer God it 's easie to perceive whether God â—ate such sin and whether Christ died to signifie his hatred of it and whether he will damn men for not being Gods and whether he that is said unresistibly to predeterminâ— by immediate efficiency the thought will and tongue of every Lyar to every lye that ever was spoken can have any word delivered by man which we can be sure is true In a word if this
comparativa ita de adultis 4. Non solum comparative sed etiam absolute loquendo nulla datur causa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus Where note that he granteth that there is in man a cause of Reprobation as to some effects viz. punishment For by a cause he meaneth any prerequisite condition For no doubt there is no efficient cause of any thing in God And all his stress is laid on this that the permission of the first sin is the first effect of Reprobation and this permission hath no cause in man Ergo Reprobation quoad omnes effectus hath no cause in man But the truth is 1. A man may put such a sence on the word Reprobation as to include what he please But it 's usually taken for Gods Decree to damn men and to deprive them of somewhat necessary to their salvation and so is 1. A positive Act as a Volition 2. And privative objectively and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative 4. And some most ineptly extend it to that which is negatio actus no Act that is to nothing And so a man that will play with words may say that 1. Gods non-agere nonâ—igere is an Act. 2. That his non-impedire is an effect which is nothing and therefore no effect And Alvarez utterly faileth iâ— this proof either that non-eligere is an Act or permittere vel non impedire an eâ—â—ect or that it is fitly called Reprobation which hath â—â— privation but a negation for its Object e. g. that Judas shall not be an Angel nor iâ—â—eccabilâ— but have natural free-will is no act of his Reprobation And so of the permission of the first sin Arminius himself exam Perâ—ins pag. 568. saith Voleâ—et Deus Israelem punire Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere Propria â—mmediata adâ—quata causa cur permiserit ut Achaâ— iâ—â—â— cadem perpetraret est illa quam dixi mensâ—ra sâ—elerum implenâ—â— erat â—â—â—â— Dâ—â—â—â—â—tra peccatum hominis per aliam â—â—em Nabothum ad se evocare Which Dr. Twisse useth through all his Writings against him ad hominem in stead of argument â—â—-thinks this concession should seem enough which is too much And I conjecture that Arminius wrote it by over-sight and woâ—ld have said that God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth because he would â—â—â—â— him to â—â—â—â— up the measure of his sin making permission the res Voâ—â—ta But all theiâ— assigning Causes of Gods â—â—â—â— are â—â—â—â—â—â—ld God being above all causeâ— B. I wonder not that Dr. Twisse holdeth that God willeth it when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act clothed with all its circumstances That which God causeth he must needs will But when he saith Nostri Theologi affirmant he must mean but some few such as Maccovius Spanhemius Rutherford and perhaps Piscator or Beza of his own mind But the generality of Protestants either are against him or meddle not with it He that will read Davenant and such others shall find the difference I remember but few English Divines at all that own it besides the forenamed and Mr. Norton But having written both an answer to this Digression of Dr. Twisse and to his and Alvarez and other mens Doctrine of physical predetermining premotion I may pretermit that here C. But by this they make God an idle Spectator of sin in the World and so deny a great part of his Providence or Works B. 1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation but of Gods Works 2. Take heed of such unreverent words of God Who will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain Dare you reproach God as Idle if he do not all that your shallow thoughts will cut out for him C. The blasphemy is theirs that give the cause by their unsound Doctrine and not mine that do but denominate their consequents B. Let us try that Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do that he made the World as soon as he was able and could have done it no sooner or that he is able to make no one Man or Beast or Plant or Atome more than he hath made nor to do any one action more than he doth C. No I hold no such thing For God is Omnipotent and Free B. I pray you then study it and tell me if God be not to be blasphemed as Idle for such a total Non-agency or Free-suspension of his own Acts as to all such possibles why should you call him Idle if by the same Wisdom and Free-will he only suspend some degree of his co-operation with man in the case of sinning And if God freely decree that man shall be made a free Agent able by Gods common generical concurse as the cause of nature to determine or suspend his own Volitions without any predetermining efficiency of God If God will delight himself in making such a Creature will you dare to say that he is Idle because he moveth him not in another manner you will not so reproach a Watch-maker for not moving the Watch all day with his finger C. I confess I cannot answer that But how then is God the Governor of the World if so much sin be done without his Will and Operation B. The Work of a Governor as such is only 1. By Legislation to make the Subjects Duty 2. And by Judgment to try and decide the case of each Subject whether he do that Duty 3. And to see to the execution of that Judgment But not to be the determining cause of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions C. It is so with man because he can do no more but not with God B. Indeed God governeth all meer Naturals and Bruits by physical motion as Engins are moved as a Clock or Watch by natural necessitation And so he doth the meer naturals of man As his Concoction Pulse circulation of Blood generation in the Womb c. But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent ruleth him as such agreeably to his nature even by moral Agency by Laws and Judgment And this is that Regency of which we speak If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind or King of the World you deny him to be God and overthrow all Religion and Morality C. But what say you to all the Texts that tell us that God willed and caused that which wicked men did as in the case of Pharaoh Sihon Rehoboam Absolom the death of Christ and many others B. One of the greatest over-sights of them that thus Object is that they distinguish not between the sin and the effect of the sin or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him and the reception of this Act in passo in the recipient God can many ways concur to the causing of the reception and the effect without causing the Volition or Act as Agents by a specifying determination Especially