Selected quad for the lemma: book_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
book_n	england_n	king_n	law_n	2,440	5	4.6542	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A64753	The reports and arguments of that learned judge Sir John Vaughan Kt. late chief justice of His Majesties court of Common Pleas being all of them special cases and many wherein he pronounced the resolution of the whole court of common pleas ; at the time he was chief justice there / published by his son Edward Vaughan, Esq.	England and Wales. Court of Common Pleas.; Vaughan, John, Sir, 1603-1674.; Vaughan, Edward, d. 1688.	1677 (1677)	Wing V130; ESTC R716	370,241	492

for the Damages in Debt though by several Originals But it may be said That in a Writ of Error in this kind the foundation is destroy'd and no such Record is left Drury's Case 8. Rep. But as to that in Drury's Case 8. Rep. an Outlawry issued and Process of Capias upon the Outlawry the Sheriff retorn'd Non est inventus and the same day the party came into Court and demanded Oyer of the Exigent which was the Warrant of the Outlawry and shew'd the Exigent to be altogether uncertain and insufficient and consequently the Outlawry depending upon it to be null And the Court gave Iudgment accordingly though the Record of the Outlawry were never revers'd by Error which differs not from this Case where the Order of Commitment is Iudicially declar'd illegal though not quasht or revers'd by Error and consequently whatever depends upon it as the Fine and Commitment doth and the Outlawry in the former Case was more the Kings Interest than the Fine in this The Chief Justice deliver'd the Opinion of the Court and accordingly the Prisoners were discharg'd Hill 23 24 Car. II. B. C. Rot. 615. Edmund Sheppard Junior Plaintiff In Trespass Suff. ss against George Gosnold William Booth William Haygard and Henry Heringold Defendants THE Plaintiff declares for the forcible taking and carrying away at Gyppin in the said County the Eight and twentieth of January 22 Car. 2. Five and twenty hundred and Three quarters of a hundred of Wax of the said Edmunds there found and keeping and detaining the same under Arrest until the Plaintiff had paid Forty nine shillings to them the said Defendants for the delivery thereof to his Damage of 40 l. The Defendants plead Not Culpable and put themselves upon the Country c. The Jury find a Special Verdict 1. That before the Caption Arrest and Detention of the said Goods and at the time of the same Edmund Sheppard the younger was and is Lord of the Mannor of Bawdsey in the said County and thereof seis'd in his Demesne as of Fee and that he and all those whose Estate he hath and had at the time of the Trespass suppos'd in the said Mannor with the Appurtenances time out of mind had and accustomed to have all Goods and Chattels wreck'd upon the high Sea cast on shore upon the said Mannor as appertaining to the said Mannor 2. They further say The said Goods were shipped in Forraign parts as Merchandise and not intended to be imported into England but to be carried into other Forraign parts 3. That the said Goods were wreck'd upon the high Sea and by the Sea-shoar as wreck'd Goods cast upon the Shoar of the said Mannor within the same Mannor and thereby the said Edmund seis'd as wreck belonging to him as Lord of the said Mannor They further find That at the Parliament begun at Westminster the Five and Twentieth of April the Twelfth of the King and continued to the Nine and Twentieth of December following there was granted to the King a Subsidy call'd Poundage Of all Goods and Merchandises of every Merchant natural born Subject Denizen and Alien to be exported out of the Kingdom of England or any the Dominions thereto belonging or imported into the same by way of Merchandise of the value of Twenty shillings according to the particular Rates and Values of such Goods and Merchandises as they are respectively rated and valued in the Book of Rates intitled The Rates of Merchandise after in the said Act mentioned and referr'd to to One shilling c. Then they say That by the Book of Rates Wax inward or imported every hundred weight containing One hundred and twelve pounds is rated to Forty shillings and hard Wax the pound Three shillings four pence They find at the time of the Seisure of the Goods That the Defendants were the King's Officers duly appointed to collect the Subsidy of Poundage by the said Act granted and that for the Duty of Poundage not paid at the said time they seis'd and arrested the said Goods until the Plaintiff had paid them the said Fine of Forty nine shillings But whether the Goods and Chattels aforesaid so as aforesaid wreck'd be chargeable with the said duty of Poundage or not they know not And if not They find the Defendants Culpable and Assess Damages to the Plaintiff to Nine and forty shillings ultra misas custagia And if the said Goods be chargeable with the said Duty they find the Defendants not Culpable It is clear Dyer 31 H. 8. 43. b. n. 22. That formerly in the times of Henry the Eighth Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth it was suppos'd that some Customes were due by the Common Law wherein the King had an Inheritance for certain Merchandise to be transported out of the Realm and that such Customes were not originally due by any Act of Parliament so is the Book 31 H. 8. It was the Opinion likewise of all the Justices in the Chequer Chamber when Edward the Sixth had granted to a Merchant Alien That he might Transport or Import all sorts of Merchandise not exceeding in the value of the Customes and Subsidies thereof Fifty pounds paying only to the King his Heirs and Successors pro Custumis Subsidiis oneribus quibuscunque of such Marchandises so much and no more as any English Merchant was to pay That this Patent remained good for the old Customes Dyer 1 Mar. f. 92. a. n. 17. wherein the King had an Inheritance by his Prerogative but was void by the Kings death as to Goods customable for his life only by the Statute of Tunnage c. So upon a Question rais'd upon occasion of a new Imposition laid by Queen Mary upon Clothes Dyer 1 Eliz. f. 165. a. b. n. 57 the Judges being consuited about it 1 Eliz. The Book is Nota That English Merchants do not pay at Common Law any Custome for any Wares or Merchandises whatever but Three that is Woolls Woolfells and Leather that is to say pro quolibet sacco lanae continent 26 pierres chescun pierr 14 pound un demy marke and for Three hundred Woolfells half a Mark and for a Last of Leather Thirteen shillings four pence and that was equal to Strangers and English Merchants This was in those several Reigns the Opinion of all the Iudges of the times whence we may learn how fallible even the Opinion of all the Judges is when the matter to be sesolved must be clear'd by Searchers not common and depends not upon Cases vulgarily known by Readers of the Year Books For since these Opinions it is known those Customes called the Old or Antiqua Custumae were granted to King Edward the First in the Third year of his Reign by Parliament as a new thing and was no Duty belonging to the Crown by the Common Law But the Act of Parliament it self by which this custome was granted is no where extant now but undeniable Evidence of it appears For King Edward

Ne Exeat Regnum de Leproso amovendo de Apostata Capiendo ad quod damnum and Writs to call persons thence as hath been done before they had Burgesses to the Parliament of England And Writs of Error into all Dominions belonging to England lye upon the ultimate Iudgments there given into the Kings Courts of England to reverse Judgments or affirm which is the only Writ which concerns Right and Property between the Subjects that lies The Reasons are First for that without such Writ the Law appointed or permitted to such inferiour Dominion might be insensibly changed within it self without the assent of the Dominion Superiour Secondly Judgments might be then given to the disadvantage or lessening of the Superiority which cannot be reasonable or to make the Superiority to be only of the King not of the Crown of England as King James once would have it in the Case of Ireland ex relatione J. Selden mihi whom King James consulted in this Question The practice hath always been accordingly as is familiarly known by reversal or affirmance of Judgments given in the Kings Bench in Ireland in the Kings Bench here which is enough alone to prove the Law to be so to other subordinate Dominions 21 H. 7. f. 3. And it is as clear That Writs of Error did lye in the Kings Bench to reverse Judgments in Calais and the reason is alike per Curiam for which were divers Presidents This being the state of Wales when it first became an Accession to the Dominion of England under E. 1. and when it was far from the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Justice in England as before it was added to the Dominion of the Crown of England And as other Dominions added to it were 7 H. 4. f. 14. it was questioned only Whether a Protection quia moratur in obsequio nostro in Wallia were good because saith the Book it is within the Realm of England it may be as in the Case of Bastardy the Husband being infra quatuor maria which doubtless was the Isle of Brittain so the Primacy of Bishops in Scotland and Wales was that of England Qu. about this but that gives no Jurisdiction to the Courts There were two ways by which alteration might be wrought The first by Act of Parliament in England making Laws to change either the Laws or Jurisdictions of Wales or both The second by Alterations made in the Laws formerly by him established by E. 1. himself and perhaps by his Successors Kings of England without Parliament by a Clause contained in the Close of that Statute or Ordinance called Statutum Walliae in these words Et ideo vobis Mandamus quod premissa de caetero in omnibus observetis ita tantum quod quotiescunque quandocunque ubicunque nobis placuerit possimus predicta Statuta eorum partes singulas declarare interpretari addere sive diminuere pro nostrae libito voluntatis prout securitati nostrae terrae nostrae predictae viderimus expediri This seems to extend but to the person of E. 1. and not to his Successors and however no such change was made by Him or his Successors But the first remarkable Alteration made seems to have been by Act of Parliament and probably in the time of E. 1. who reigned long after the Statute of Wales but the Act it self is no where extant that I could learn But great Evidence that such there was which in some measure gave a Jurisdiction to the Kings Courts of England in Wales not generally but over the Lordships Marchers there This appears clearly by a Case Fitz. Ass 18 E. 2. pl. 382. not much noted nor cited by any that I know to this purpose being out of the printed year-Year-Books but printed by Fitz-herbert out of the Reports he had of E. 2. as he had of E. 1. and H. 3. all which we want wholly though some Copies are extant of E. 2. which Case is the only light that I know to clear the Question in hand An Assise of Novel Disseisin was brought against C. de libero tenemento in Gowre and the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Glocester and the Plaint was made of two Commots which is mis-printed Commons and comprehends all Gouers-land now part of the County of Glamorgan by 27 H. 8. but was not so then the Assise past against the Tenant before the Iustice assigned to take Assises in the Marches of Wales The Tenant brought his Writ of Error and Assignes for Error 1. That the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Glocester and the Land put in view was in Wales 2 That the Land was out of the Power and Bayliwick of the Sheriff of Glocester 3 That the Assise ought to be taken in the County where the Land lies and that Goures-land was in no County 4 That the Writ was de libero tenemento in villa sive Hamletto de Gouerse and Gouer was no Village or Hamlet but an entire Country consisting of two Commots To these Errors assigned Scroope then Chief Justice made Answer 1. That Gower is a great Barony in the Marches of Wales and That every Barony of the Marches hath a Chancellor and its own Writs whereby one Tenant wronged by another may be righted But when the Lord is outed of his intire Barony he can have no remedy by his own Writ for he is outed of all his Jurisdiction And it is repugnant to demand Iustice of him whose Iurisdiction is questioned that is to give it ut mihi videtur That therefore it was ordained by Parliament when the Baron or Marcher is outed of his Barony in the Marches of Wales he ought to go to the King for Remedy and have a Writ in the Kings Chancery directed to the Sheriff of the next English County and the Sheriff of Glocester served the Writ as being the next English Sheriff This being the most material the other Errors were also answered and the Judgment was affirmed From this Case we may learn and from no other as I believe at least with so much clearness That the Summons of Inhabitants in Wales and the tryal of an Issue there arising should be by the Sheriff of and in the next adjoyning English County was first ordained by Parliament though the Act be not extant now nor is it conceived how it should be otherwise it being an empty Opinion that it was by the Common Law as is touched in several Books who knew the practice but were strangers to the reasons of it For if the Law had been that an Issue arising out of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of England should be tryed in that County of England next to the place where the Issue did arise not only any Issue arising in any the Dominions of England out of the Realm might be tryed in England by that rule but any Issue arising in any Forreign parts as France Holland Scotland or elsewhere that were not of the Dominions of England might pari

the Lords of Wales if it be not of Lands between the Lords themselves There is an ancient Book remarkable to the same purpose 8 E. 3. Term. Mich. 59. speaking of the Common Pleas This Court hath more Conuzance of Pleas of the Welch Shires than it hath of Pleas of the County of Chester for the Pleas of Quare Impedits and of Lands and Tenements held of the King in chief in Wales shall be pleaded here and they shall not be so of the County of Chester Fitz. Jurisdiction p. 34. 6 H. 5. Land in Wales immediately held of the King is pleadable in England per Haukford 6 H. 5. no such Book at large The Law and doubtless the Ordinance made by Parliament mentioned in 18 E. 2. concerning Lordships Marchers was the same concerning Land held in chief of the King and are mentioned in the Books as synonimous and were so for all Lordships Marchers were held from the Crown in chief nor could the King probably have other Lands in chief in Wales beside the Lordships Marchers for all was either of Lordships Marchers or Lands belonging to the Principality and held from it and not from the Crown in chief To this purpose there is an ancient Statute 28 E. 3. very convincing 28 E. 3. c. 2. All the Lords of the Marches of Wales shall be perpetually Attendants and annexed to the Crown of England as they and their Ancestors have been at all times before this in whose hands soever the same principality be or shall come And they being no part of the Principality and consequently not under the Statute and Ordinance of Wales 12 E. 1. It was provided by a Law That they should be impleaded in England and the Summons and Tryal to be by the Sheriff of and in the next adjoyning County Accordingly you find the practice was by many ancient Cases remembred but the year-Year-Books of E. 2 being never printed wherein only that Statute is mentioned otherwise than in Fitz-herbert's Abridgment and the Statute it self not extant gave occasion to men obiter in the time of H. 6. H. 7. long after to say that such impleading for matters arising in Wales in the Courts of England and the Tryals to be in the adjacent Counties because they knew not it came to pass by Act of Parliament was by the Common Law on which had they reflected with seriousness they had found it impossible For that Tryals concerning Lands in Wales quatenus particularly Wales after it became of the Dominion of England should by the Common Law be differing from other Tryals in England and in the adjacent Counties could not possibly be for Wales was made of the Dominion of England within time of memory viz. 12 E. 1. and whatever Tryal was at Common Law must be beyond all memory Therefore no such Tryal for Land in Wales particularly could be by the Common Law It remains then That if such were at Common Law it must be for Lands in all Dominions of the Acquisition of England consequently for Ireland Garnsey and Jersey Gascoign Guyen Calais Tournay as well as Wales but it was never in practice or pretence that any such Tryals should be for any Land in these places Therefore it is evident That it was and it could be no otherwise than by Act of Parliament that Wales differed from the other Dominions belonging to England in these Tryals Nor was it by any new Law made by E. 1. or any his Successors by the Clause in the end of the Statute of Rutland which hath nev●r been pretended For by that Clause power was given to change Laws simply for Wales but this way of Tryals changes the Law of England in order to Tryals for Land in Wales which that Clause neither doth nor could warrant Besides this new way of Tryals concerning Lordships Marchers held in chief from the King the Books are full that in Quare Impedits for disturbance to Churches in Wales the Summons and Tryal must be by the Sheriff of and in the adjacent Counties which is often affirmed and agitated in the Books but with as much confusion and as little clearness as the other concerning Land To this purpose is the Case before 8 E. 3. the Pleas of Quare Impedits 8 E. 3. 59. and of Land and Tenements held in chief of the King in Wales shall be pleaded there A Quare Impedit brought by the King against an Abbot 15 E. 3. Fitz. Jurisdiction p. 24. exception taken that the Church was in Wales where the Kings Writ runs not non allocatur for the King was party by the Book as a reason A Quare impedit cannot be brought in Wales 11 H. 6. f. 3. A B. because a Writ to the Bishop cannot be awarded for they will not obey it and so was the Opinion in that Case of Danby Morton and Newton that Quare Impedits for Churches in Wales must be brought only in the Kings Courts and the Opinion is there that the Prince could not direct a Writ to the Bishops in Wales upon Quare Impedits there brought So is the Book of 30 H. 6. of Churches in Wales 30 H. 6. f. 6. B. a Quare Impedit shall be brought in England the Case was cited before concerning Tryals of Lands in Wales A Quare Impedit was brought in the County of Hereford of a disturbance in Wales to present to a Church 35 H. 6. f. 30. A B. exception was taken by Littleton only to this that the Plaintiff did not shew in his Count or Writ that Hereford was the next adjoyning County but by the Book it was well enough for if Hereford were not the next adjoyning County the Defendant might shew it but no exception was taken to the bringing of the Writ into the County of Hereford if it were the next County 36 H 6. f. 33. A B. Quare Impedits shall be brought here of Churches in Wales and shall be sued in the Counties adjoyning for that the Justices read it Bishops will not obey any man there If a Quare Impedit be brought here of a Church in Wales it shall be tryed in the County adjoyning The reason there given is the same as in many other Books Car nous avomus power ad escrier al Evesque mes ils voylont parront ceo disobeyer It is manifestly mis-printed Car nous navomus power ad escrier al Evesque mes ils voylont parront ceo disobeyer which is not sense By these Books and many other it is clear Quare Impedits were formerly brought in England for Churches in Wales as real Writs were for Land and the Tryal was in the next adjoyning English County But as those Tryals for Land were only for Lordships Marchers held of the King in chief or part of them and that by special Act of Parliament as hath been opened So the Quare Impedits brought in England and Tryals there had upon them were not for all Churches in Wales

wants a Tryal See for this 32 H. 6 25. B. 8 Ass pl. 27. d. Dowdales Case Co. l. 6. Thus bringing Actions in England and trying them in Counties adjoyning to Wales without knowing the true reason of it also bringing Quare Impedits in like manner for Churches in Wales without distinguishing they were for Lands of Lordships Marchers held of the King and for Churches within such Lordships Marchers hath occasioned that great diversity and contrariety of Opinions in our Book and at length that common Error That matters in Wales of what nature soever are impleadable in England and to be tryed in the next adjoyning County When no such Law was ever pretended to be concerning other the Kings Dominions out of the Realm belonging to the English Crown of the same nature with Wales as Ireland the Isles of Garnsey and Jersey Calais Gascoign Guyen anciently Nor could it be pretended of Scotland if it should become a Dominion of the Crown of England it being at present but of the King of England though it was otherwise when the King came to the Crown And to say that Dominions contiguous with the Realm of England as Wales was and Scotland would be is a thing so simple to make a difference as it is not worth the answering for no such difference was assignable before Wales became of the Dominions of England and since the Common Law cannot make the difference as is observed before It remains to examine what other Alterations have been by Act of Parliament whereby Jurisdiction hath been given to the Courts of England in Wales without which it seems clear they could have none 1. And first by Parliament 26 H. 8. power was given to the Kings President and Council in the Marches of Wales in several Cases 2. Power was given to indict outlaw and proceed against Traytors Clippers of Mony Murtherers and other Felons within the Lordships Marchers of Wales so indicted in the adjoyning Counties by the same Statute but not against such Offenders within the Principality of Wales which was not Lordships Marchers 3. Some other Laws are of this nature about the same time to punish the perjury of Jurors in Wales generally before the Council of the Marchers 1 E 6. c. 10. ●1 Eliz. c. 3. That Proclamations upon Exigents should issue into Wales was ordained by the Statute of 1 E. 6. for by a Statute before in 6 H. 8. c. 4. such Proclamations went but to the adjoyning Counties Rastall Exigent but the Capias utlagatum went always as I take it being a Mandatory Writ for the King but by 1 E. 6. c. 10. That if any persons dwelling in Wales shall after the time limited by the Act be outlawed that then Writs of special Capias utlagatum single Capias utlagatum Non molestando and all other Process for or against any person outlawed shall issue to the Sheriffs of Wales as immediate Officers of the King's Bench and Common Pleas. Capias Utlag●tum So as the issuing of a Capias utlagatum into Wales is clear by Parliament 34 H. 8. Persons having Lands in Wales and bound in Statute Staples or Recognizances in England Process to be made against them out of the Chancery in England to the Sheriffs of Wales and for Recognizances acknowledged before either of the Chief Justices by them Process to be immediately pursued from the said Justices 34 H. 8. c. 26. All Process for urgent Causes to be directed into Wales by command of the Chancellor of England or any of the King's Council as hath been used The next is the Alteration made by the Statute of 27 H. 8. which was very great and by which it is commonly taken that Wales was to all purposes united with England and that since all Process may issue out of the Courts here to Wales It is said that the Dominion and Principality of Wales is and always hath been incorporated to the Realm of England that is ut per Stat. Walliae 12 E. 1. jure feodali non proprietatis and so it is expounded in Calvin's Case Cal. C. 7 Rep. f. 21. B. But there it is said by 12 E. 1. which is there taken for an Act of Parliament Wales was united and incorporated unto England and made parcel of England in possession and the Case of 7 H. 4. f. 14. there cited but this is clearly otherwise for unless that Stat. Walliae were an Act of Parliament it could not make Wales part of England which is much questioned for no such Parliament is found summoned nor Law made in it nor is it likely at that time a Parliament of England should be summoned there for Rutland is doubtless in Wales which had it been part of England then made all Laws made or to be made in England without naming Wales had extended to it which they did not before 27 H. 8. The Incorporation of Wales with England by that Act consists in these particulars generally 1. That all persons in Wales should enjoy all Liberties Priviledges and Laws in England as the natural born Subjects of England 2. That all persons inheritable to Land should inherit the same according to the Laws of England thereby inheriting in Gavel kind was abrogated 3. That Laws and Statutes of England and no other should for ever be practised and executed in Wales as they have been and shall be in England And as by this Act hereafter shall be further ordained By this Clause not only all the present Laws of England were induced into Wales but all future Statutes of England to be made were also for the future in like manner induced into Wales which was more than ever was done in Ireland though Ireland before and by Parning's Act had the present Laws then and Statutes of England introduced into Ireland but not the future Laws and Statutes to be made as in this Case was for Wales But this gave no Jurisdiction in general to the Courts of England over Wales more than before nor otherwise than if a Law were made in England That the Laws and Statutes of England now and for the future always to be made should be Laws in Ireland the Courts in England would not thereby have other Jurisdiction in Ireland than they already have in any respect The Vniting of Wales to England and Incorporating Note doth not thereby make the Laws used in England to extend to Wales without more express words Pl. Com. 129. B. 130. A. By this Act it appears That the Lordships Marchers in the Dominions of Wales did lye between the Shires of England and the Shires of Wales and were not in any Shire most of which Lordships were then in the King's possession and some in the possession of other Lords And that divers of them are by the Act united and joyned to the County of Glocester others to the County of Hereford and others to the County of Salop others respectively to the Shires of Glamorgan Carmarthen Pembrook

is not sufficient by the Rule of the Act of 25. unless confirmed by the King It was otherwise in the Popes case before the Act. There are many Presidents in Mr. Noy's Book where in like Obj. 2 case the King after the death of a Bishop holding in Commendam after his translation to another See and after his resignation hath presented All those Presidents are since the Twentieth of the Queen which Answ 1 cannot alter the Law 2. Who knows in the cases of death whether those Presentations were not by consent of the Patrons and doubtless there are Presidents wherein the Patrons did present else this Question had been earlier But Judicandum est legibus non exemplis Vpon Translation of a Bishop holding a Commendam in the Answ 2 Retinere as long as he continued Bishop there the King ought to present for the Dispensation is determined upon his remove and then is as if it had not been and a Dispensation gives no property to the Living nor takes away any But where property is given to the Living as by Presentation Institution and Induction or by Grant as in Appropriations Hob. Colts and Glovers Case and sometimes otherwise by the King such presenting or granting for a year or six is to grant it during life As an Atturnment cannot be for a time nor a Confirmation nor a Denization or Naturalization and the like but such Acts are perfect Manwarings Case 21 Jac. Crook f. 691. as they may be notwithstanding Restriction to time as is agreed well in Manwaring's Case I shall say nothing of the case of Resignation as not being in the present Question Judgment was given by the Opinion of the whole Court That the Avoidance was by Death not by Cession Hill 19 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 1785. Baruck Tustian Tristram Plaintiff Anne Roper Vicountess Baltinglass Vidua Defendant in a Plea of Trespass and Ejectment THe Plaintiff declares That the Defendant vi Armis entred into 20 Messuages 1000 Acres of Land 200 Acres of Meadow and 500 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Thornbury Shalston Evershaw Oldwick Westbury and Looffield and into the Rectory of Thornbury which Thomas Gower Kt. and Baronet and George Hilliard to the said Baruck demis'd the First of Octob. 19 Car. 2. Habendum from the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel last past for the term of Five years next ensuing into which he the said Baruck the same day entred and was ousted and ejected by the Defendant ad damnum 40 l. To this the Defendant pleads Not Guilty And the Jury have found specially That the Defendant is not guilty in all those Tenements besides 5 Messuages 400 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow 100 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Thornbury Shalston Evershaw Oldwick and Westbury and in the Rectory of Thornbury and besides in one Messuage 100 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow and 100 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Looffield And as to the Trespass and Ejectment aforesaid in the said five Messuages c. and in the Rectory of Thornbury the Iury say upon their Oath that before the said Trespass and Ejectment suppos'd 22 Junii 12 Jac. Sir Arthur Throgmorton Kt. was seis'd in Fee of the aforesaid Rectory and Tenements last mentioned and of the said Premisses in Looffield and so seis'd A certain Indenture Tripartite was made 22 Junii 12 Jac. between him the said Sir Arthur of the first part Edward Lord Wootton Augustine Nicholls Kt. Francis Harvey Esq and Rowly Ward Esq of the second part and Sir Peter Temple and Anne Throgmorton Daughter of the said Sir Arthur of the third part To this effect That the said Sir Arthur Throgmorton did covenant and promise with the said Lord Wootton and Sir Augustine Nicholls in consideration of Marriage to be had between the said Sir Peter Temple and the said Anne and other the considerations mentioned in the said Indenture by Fine or Fines before the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel next ensuing or other good Conveyance to be levied by him and the said Dame Anne his wife to the said Lord Wootton c. The scite and precinct of the Priory of Looffield the Rectory of Thornbury and divers Mannors Lands and Tenements in the said Indenture mentioned several yearly Rents therein mentioned and all other his Lands in the Counties of Northampton Buckingham and Oxford at any time belonging to the said Priory to convey and assure To the use of himself for life without Impeachment of Waste Then to the use of Dame Anne his Wife Then to the use of the said Sir Peter Temple and the said Anne his Wife during their natural lives and the longer Liver of them and after both their Deceases To the use of the first Son of the Body of Anne by the said Sir Peter begotten and of the Heirs Males of the Body of the said first Son so to the sixth Son Then to the use of all other Sons in succession in like manner of the Body of Anne begotten by the said Sir Peter And for default of such Heirs To the use of all the Issues Female of the Body of the said Anne by the said Sir Peter begotten and the Heirs of the Bodies of the said Issues Female For default thereof To the first Son of the said Anne by any other Husband and his Heirs Males and so to the tenth In like manner to the Issues Female of the Body of Anne with divers Remainders over A Proviso That it be lawful for Sir Arthur at all times during his life to lett set and demise all or any the said Premisses aforesaid which at any time heretofore have been usually letten or demised to any person or persons for and during the term of One and twenty years or under in possession and not in Reversion or for or during any other number of years determinable upon one two or three Lives in Possession and not in Reversion reserving the Rents therefore now yielded or paid or more to be yearly due and payable during such Lease and Leases unto such person and persons unto whom the said Premises so to be demised shall come and be by virtue of these Presents if no such demise had been made so long as the same Lessees their Executors and Assigns shall duly pay the Rents and perform their Conditions according to the true meaning of their Indentures of Lease and commit no waste of and in the things to them demised The like Proviso verbatim for Sir Peter Temple and Anne his Wife to make like Leases during their Lives and the Life of the longer liver of them after the death of Sir Arthur and Dame Anne his Wife That a Fine was accordingly levied c. to the uses aforesaid They find that all the Messuages Lands Tenements and Rectory in the Declaration mentioned are compris'd in the said Indenture Tripartite They find the death of Sir Arthur Throgmorton and Anne his Wife 2. Septemb.

the matter proceeded upon in such Courts might as well be prosecuted in the Common Bench But if a priviledg'd person in Banco were sued in the Ecclesiastical Courts or before the High Commission or Constable and Marshal for things whereof the Common Pleas had no Conuzance they could not Supersede that proceeding by Priviledge And this was the ancient reason and course of Priviledge 1. Another way of Priviledge by reason of Suit depending in A Superiour Court is when a person impleading or impleaded as in the Common Bench is after arrested in a Civil Action or Plaint in London or elsewhere and by Habeas Corpus is brought to the Common Pleas and the Arrest and Cause retorn'd if it appear to the Court That the Arrest in London was after the party ought to have had the Priviledge of the Common Pleas he shall have his Priviledg allow'd and be discharg'd of his Arrest and the party left to prosecute his cause of Action in London in the Common Pleas if he will 2. If the cause of the Imprisonment retorn'd be a lawful cause but which cannot be prosecuted in the Common Pleas as Felony Treason or some cause wherein the High Commission Admiralty or other Court had power to imprison lawfully then the party imprison'd which did implead or was impleaded in the Common Bench before such imprisonment shall not be allow'd Priviledge but ought to be remanded 3. The third way is when a man is brought by Habeas Corpus to the Court and upon retorn of it it appears to the Court That he was against Law imprison'd and detain'd though there be no cause of Priviledge for him in this Court he shall never be by the Act of the Court remanded to his unlawful imprisonment for then the Court should do an act of Injustice in imprisoning him de novo against Law whereas the great Charter is Quod nullus liber homo imprisonetur nisi per legem terrae This is the present case and this was the case upon all the Presidents produc'd and many more that might be produc'd where upon Habeas Corpus many have been discharg'd and bail'd though there was no cause of Priviledge in the Case This appears plainly by many old Books if the Reason of them be rightly taken For insufficient causes are as no causes retorn'd and to send a man back to Prison for no cause retorn'd seems unworthy of a Court. 9 H. 6. 54. 58. Br. n. 5. 14 H. 7. f. 6. n. 19. 9 E. 4. 47. n. 24. 12 H. 4. f. 21. n. 11. Br. If a man be impleaded by Writ in the Common Pleas and is after arrested in London upon a Plaint there upon a Habeas Corpus he shall have Priviledge in the Common Pleas if the Writ upon which he is impleaded bear date before the Arrest in London and be retorn'd although the Plaintiff in the Common Pleas be Nonsuit essoin'd or will not appear and consequently the Case of Priviledge at an end before the Corpus cum causa retorn'd but if the first Writ be not retorn'd there is no Record in Court that there is such a Defendant The like where a man brought Debt in Banco and after for the same Debt arrested the Defendant in London and became Nonsuit in Banco yet the Defendant upon a Habeas Corpus had his Priviledge because he had cause of Priviledge at the time of the Arrest 14 H. 7. 6. Br. Priviledge n. 19. The like Case 9 E. 4. where a man appear'd in Banco by a Cepi Corpus and found Mainprise and had a day to appear in Court and before his day was arrested in London and brought a Corpus cum causa in Banco Regis at which day the Plaintiff became Nonsuit yet he was discharg'd from the Serjeant at London because his Arrest there was after his Arrest in Banco and consequently unlawful 9 E. 4. f. 47. Br. Priviledge 24. and a man cannot be imprison'd at the same time lawfully in two Courts Coke Mag. Chart. f. 53 55. The Court of Kings Bench cannot pretend to the only discharging of Prisoners upon Habeas Corpus unless in case of Priviledge for the Chancery may do it without question And the same Book is That the Common Pleas or Exchequer may do it if upon Retorn of the Habeas Corpus it appear the Imprisonment is against Law An Habeas Corpus may be had out of the Kings Bench or Chancery though there be no Priviledge Mic. C. 2. Coke f. 55. c. or in the Court of Common Pleas or Exchequer for any Officer or priviledg'd Person there upon which Writ the Gaoler must Retorn by whom he was committed and the cause of his Imprisonment and if it appeareth that his Imprisonment be just and lawful he shall be remanded to the former Gaoler but if it shall appear to the Court that he was imprisoned against the Law of the Land they ought by force of this Statute to deliver him if it be doubtful and under consideration he may be bayl'd The Kings Bench may bayl if they please in all cases but the Common Bench must remand if the cause of the Imprisonment retorn'd be just The Writ de homine replegiando is as well retornable in the Common Pleas as in the Kings Bench. All Prohibitions for incroaching Iurisdiction Issue as well out of the Common Pleas as Kings Bench. Quashing the Order of Commitment upon a Certiorari which the Kings Bench may do but not the Common Pleas is not material in this Case 1. The Prisoner is to be discharg'd or remanded barely upon the Retorn and nothing else whether in the Kings Bench or Common Pleas. 2. Should the Kings Bench have the Order of Commitment certified and quash'd before the Retorn of the Habeas Corpus or after what will it avail the Prisoners they cannot plead Nul tiel Record in the one case or the other 3. In all the Presidents shew'd in the Common Pleas or in any that can be shew'd in the King's Bench upon discharging the Prisoner by Habeas Corpus nothing can be shew'd of quashing the Orders or Decrees of that Court that made the wrong Commitment Glanvill's C. Moore f. 836. 4. It is manifest where the Kings Bench hath upon Habeas Corpus discharg'd a Prisoner committed by the Chancery the person hath been again re-committed for the same Cause by the Chancery and re-deliver'd by the Kings Bench but no quashing of the Chancery Order for Commitment ever heard of 5. In such Cases of re-commitment the party hath other and proper remedy besides a new Habeas Corpus of which I shall not speak now 6. It is known That if a man recover in Assise and after in a Re-disseisin if the first Iudgment be revers'd in the Assise the Iudgment in the Re-disseisin is also revers'd So if a man recover in Waste and Damages given for which Debt is brought especially if the first Iudgment be revers'd before Execution it destroys the Process

the First by his Letters Patents Dated November the Third of his Reign reciteth Cum Praelati Magnates tota communitas quandam novam consuetudinem nobis haeredibus nostris de Lanis Pellibus Coriis viz. de sacco Lanae dimidium Marcae de 300 pellibus dimidium Marcae de lasto Corii 13 s. 4 d. concesserint c. whence Sir Edward Coke rightly observes the Grant was to Edward the First himself and his Heirs from the words Nobis haeredibus nostris in the Patent Coke Mag. Chart. c. 30. f. 58 59. 2. That no such Custome was before from the words quandam novam custumam and some other pertinent Observations he makes And he cites the year of the Letters Patents truly to be the Third year of Edward the First which was the year of the Statute of Westminster the First but he makes the Date of the Letters Patents to be November the Tenth of that year which in truth was November the Fifteenth He cites likewise the Patent Rolls of Edward the First for it M. 1. but omits the n which is n. 1. also He also cites the Fine Roll of 3 E. 1. to the same purpose M. 26. Rot. Pat. 3 E. 1. M 1. n. Rot. finium 3 E. 1. M. 24. But his citation differs in remarkable things from the Patent Roll 3 E. 1. which runs Cum Praelati Magnates tota Communitas Mercatorum Regni nostri and not tota Communitas nobis concesserint quandam novam consuetudinem de lanis pellibus Coriis tam in Anglia quam in Hibernia Wallia Regnum nostrum exeuntibus which are omitted also in Sir Edward Coke in perpetuum nobis haeredibus nostris capiendam sicut in forma inde provisa communiter concessa plenius continetur and the particulars are mentioned of the Grant It appears by the Preface of it the Statute of Westminster the First was made 3 E. 1. A son primer Parliament general apres son coronment lendemaine de la clause de Paschae that is on the Munday of Easter utas in the Third year of his Reign so as there was no Parliament of Edward the First before this his Third year The antiquae custumae upon Wools Woolfells and Leather were granted to Edward the First by Parliament as appears both by the Patent and Fine Rolls of 3 E. 1. Dated November the Fifteenth which must be by a Parliament before the Date of the Letters Patents whence it follows they were granted by the Statute of Westminster the First or by the same Parliament and probably therefore it was by a Rider as Proviso's now usually are annex'd by tacking to the Bill or Law of Westminster the First and from it after casually lost So as it is now clear That Antiqua Custuma upon Woolls Pells and Leather was not by the Common Law but by Act of Parliament 3 E. 1. And if any scruple remain'd of a power at Common Law to charge Merchandise in any other manner the Act of the Twelfth of the King which grants him Tunnage and Poundage clears it from question in these words And because no Rates can be imposed upon Merchandise Imported or Exported by Subjects or Aliens but by common consent in Parliament it Enacts that Rates upon Merchandise shall be according to the Book of Rates establisht by the Act c. Vpon this Supposition That by the Common Law Merchandise might be charged with Custome as Woolls Pells and Leather were Queen Mary by her Absolute Prerogative Dyer 1 Eliz. f. 165. b. laid an Imposition of Fourteen pence upon a Cloath Transported by Natives and One and twenty pence by Strangers as appears in Dyer 1 Eliz. And upon the same ground King James about the Twelfth of his Reign laid an Imposition upon Currans but these obtain'd not for Law and so possibly like Impositions might be laid on Wax or any other Merchandise but no such were laid de facto unless by the Grants of Tunnage and Poundage to the Kings for life by Parliament Nor is it a true Inference That if the Antiquae Custumae were at Common Law as every thing in one sense is taken for Common Law if it be Law when it appears not to be by Act of Parliament therefore it was by Arbitrary Imposition of the King for it might be by Act of Parliament not extant as this of 3 E. 1. and in truth most of the Common Law cannot be conceived to be Law otherwise than by Acts of Parliament or Power equivalent to them whereof the Rolls are lost for alwaies there was a power and practise of making new Laws 1. But it is not pretended that any Custome is laid upon Wax in any manner by the Common Law nor by Statute but by that of Tunnage and Poundage the Twelfth of this King 2. This Seisure and Arrest appears by the Special Verdict to be for Poundage according to the Book of Rates by the Statute made the Twelfth of the King cap. 4. which gives Two shillings to the King for every hundred weight of Wax and therefore not for any other Duty 3. At the Common Law wreck'd Goods as these are found to be could not be chargeable with Custome if other Goods were for at the Common Law all wreck was wholly the Kings and he could not have a small Duty of Custome out of that which was all his own West 1. c. 4. Vid. Stat. And by Westminster the First where wreck belongeth to another than to the King he shall have it in like manner that is as the King hath his It remains clear then That Wax is a Merchandise subject to pay the duty of Poundage by and according to the Act of the Twelfth of this King and not otherwise The Question then before us being narrow'd will be Whether Wax or any other Goods subject to the Duty of Tunnage and Poundage by the Act and Book of Rates the Twelfth of the King ship'd in Forraign parts as Merchandise not intended for England but for other Forraign parts proving to be wreck and cast by the Sea upon a Mannor to which wreck belongs by Prescription ought to answer the Duty of Tunnage and Poundage as if Imported as Merchandise in Ships and not as wreck for if any kind of Merchandise wreck'd be subject to the Duty all Merchandise mentioned in the Book of Rates is To resolve this Question I shall observe That all wreck cast on shoar in the Kingdom must be conceived as Goods Imported for though Goods Exported may be wreck'd at Sea equally as Goods to be Imported yet Goods Exported if wreck'd are not cast upon any shoar of the Kingdom as wreck under the notion of being Exported but under the notion of being some way Imported So as in this Question of wreck to speak of any Goods or Merchandise quatenus Exported will be useless And because the Resolution of this Case depends upon the words and intendment of the Act

made in 17 Car. 1. and many others 17 Car. 1. 25 H. 8. c. 20 21. The Resolution of all the Judges in the Exchequer Chamber That they were bound by and subject to the Laws of England as those of Calais Gascoign and Guien in the Case of the Merchants of Waterford for shipping Staple Goods for Sluce in Flanders to which they pleaded the Kings Licence and Dispensation not pretending freedom from the Statute of 2 H. 6. c. 4. whereupon they were questioned Ireland receiv'd the Laws of England by the Charters and Commands of H. 2. King John H. 3. c. I know no Opinion that Ireland receiv'd the Laws of England by Act of Parliament of England nor had it been to purpose having also a Parliament of their own that might change them Sir Edward Coke is of Opinion Cok. Litt. f. 141. b. Patt 12 H. 3. That they received them by a Parliament of Ireland in several Books in the time of King John and grounds his Opinion upon the words of several Patents of H. 3. which mention King John to have gone into Ireland and carried with him discretos viros quorum communi Concilio ad instantiam Hiberniensium he appointed the Laws of England to be there observed Pat. 18 H. 3. Another Patent of 18 H. 3. he there cites wherein it is said That King John de communi omnium de Hibernia consensu ordained the English Laws to be there observed And the like in effect in 30 H. 3. Cok. 4. Inst f. 349. The same Charters he mentions but not in the same words especially that of 12 H. 3. 1. and to the same purpose that King John by a Parliament in Ireland established the Laws of England there in his 4. Institutes That which occasioned the mistake were the words De communi omnium assensu in the Patents which he conceiv'd to be a Parliament But the Original Act and Command of King John to this purpose and the Charter of 12 H. 3. at large whereof Sir Edward Coke had only short Notes will clear how the English Law came into Ireland and what that Communis assensus meant for they were not received by Act of Parliament in those times Tempore Regis Johannis Pat. 6. Johan m. 6. n. 17. Rex dat potestatem Justic suis Hiberniae quod brevia sua currant per totam terram nostram potestatem nostram Hiberniae quae ibidem nominantur Pat. 6. Johan Johannes Dei Gratia c. Justiciariis Baronibus Militibus omnibus fidelibus suis Hiberniae c. Sciatis quod dedimus potestatem Justic nostro Hibern quod brevia sua currant per totam terram nostram potestatem nostram Hiberniae scilicet breve de Recto de feodo dimidii Militis infra de morte antecessoris similiter de feod Domini Milit. infra Et erit terminus de morte antecessor post transfretationem H. Regis patris nostri de Hibernia in Angl. Et breve de Nova diss cujus erit terminus post primam Coronationem apud Cant. Et breve de fugitivis nativis in quo erit terminus post captionem Dublin Et breve de divisis faciend inter duas villas exceptis Baron Et ideo vobis mandamus firmiter praecipimus quod haec ita fieri firmiter tener per totam potestatem nostram Hiberniae faciatis Teste meipso apud Westmonasteriium secundo die Novembris 17. Claus 7. Johannis Rex M. filio Henr. Justitiar Hiberniae c. Sciatis quod Deremunt exposuit nobis ex parte Regis Connaciae quod idem Rex exigit tenere de nobis tertiam partem terrae de Connacia per C. Marcas per Annum sibi haeredibus suis nomine Baroniae Pat. 6. Johan m. 6. n. 17. Rex c. Justic Baronibus Militibus omnibus fidelibus suis Hibern c. Sciatis quod dedimus potestatem Justic nostro Hiberniae quod brevia sua currant per totam terram nostram potestatem nostram Hiberniae scilicet breve de Recto de feodo Dimidii Mil. infra de morte Antecessor similiter de feod dimid Mil. infra Et erit terminus de morte Antecessor post transfretationem Henr. Regis patris nostri de Hibern in Angl. Et breve de Nova Disseisina cujus erit terminus post primam Coronationem nostram apud Cant. Et breve de Fugit Nativis ejus erit terminus post captionem Dublin Et breve de divisis faciend inter duas villas except Baron Et ideo vobis Mandamus firmiter praecipimus quod haec ita fier firmiter teneri per totam potestatem nostram Hiberniae faciatis Teste meipso apud Westmonast ij die Novembris Claus 12 H. 3. m. 8. Rex dilecto fideli suo Richardo de Burgo Justic suo Hibern salutem De legibus consuetudinibus observandis in Hibernia Mandamus vobis firmiter Praecipientes quatenus certo die loco faciatis venir coram vobis Archiepiscopos Episcopos Abbates Priores Comites Barones Milites Libere tenentes Ballivos singulorum Comitatuum coram eis publice legi faciatis Chartam Domini J. Regis patris nostri cui Sigillum suum appensum est Pat. 6. Joh. n. 17. Dat. apud Westm 2 die Novemb. quam fieri fecit jurari à Magnatibus Hibern de Legibus consuetudinibus Angl. observandis in Hibernia Et praecipiatis eis ex parte nostra quod Leges illas consuetudines in Charta praed contentas de cetero firmiter teneant observent Et hoc idem per singulos comitatus Hibern clamari faciatis teneri prohibentes firmiter ex parte nostra super forisfacturam nostram ne quis contra hoc mandatum nostrum venire praesumat Eo excepto quod nec de morte nec de Catall Hiberniensium occisorum nihil statuatur ex parte nostra circa quindecim dies à die Sancti Michaelis Anno Regni nostri xij super quo respectum dedimus magnatibus nostris Hiberniae usque ad terminum praed Teste meipso apud Westmonast 8. die Maii Anno xij Patentes 30 H. 3. m. 1. Quia pro communi utilitate terrae Hibern unitate terrarum Regis Rex vult de communi Consilio Regis provisum est quod omnes Leges consuetudines quae in Regno Angliae tenentur in Hibern teneantur eadem terra eisdem Legibus subjaceat per easdem regatur sicut Dominus Johannes Rex cum ultimo esset in Hibernia Statuit fieri mandavit Quia etiam Rex vult quod omnia brevia de Communi jure quae currunt in Angl. similiter currant Hibernia sub novo Sigillo Regis Mandatum est Archiepiscopis c. quod pro pace tranquilitate ejusdem terrae per easdem Leges eos regi deduci permittant

ratione be tryed in the County next adjoyning whereof there is no Vestigium for the one or the other nor sorts it any way with the rule of the Law 2. This Ordinance of Parliament extended not to all Wales but only to the Lordships Marchers there nor any way comprehended the ancient Shires of Wales or Body of the Principality to which the Ordinance of the Statute of Rutland only extended For Lordships Marchers were out of the Shires as appears by Statute 27 H. 8. 3. It appears by the Case that Gower was not within any County at that time Another Case to the same purpose is in Fitz herbert Fitz. Jurisdiction 13 E. 3. pl. 23. Title Jurisdiction and not in any other Reports 13 E. 3. in a Writ of Cosenage the Demand was of Castle of K. and Commot of J. the Defendant pleaded the Castle and Commot were in Wales where the King 's Writ runs not and it was said that the word was not intelligible in the Courts of England and Judgment was prayed if the Court would take Conizance To give the Court Jurisdiction it was urged pressingly 1. That they had given the Court Jurisdiction by alledging the Court knew not what was meant by Commot which the Court was to determine whether it did or not Therefore Jurisdiction was admitted therein 2. Parning pressed they had demanded the view which gave the Court Jurisdiction 3. For that the Original was directed to the Sheriff of Hereford who by his Retorn had testified the Summons and the Tenant had appeared and so affirmed the Summons 4. For that the view was had Notwithstanding all which to give the Court Jurisdiction it was said to Parning He must say more before the Court would have Jurisdiction Which evidently proves that the Court had no Jurisdiction generally of Land in Wales as I observed from the former Case And no act of the party gives Jurisdiction to the Court by elapsing his time to plead to the Jurisdiction if it appear by the Record the Court hath no Jurisdiction as in this Case it did Then Woodstock said Though the Castle and Commot were in Wales the Court ought not to be outed of Jurisdiction for by Commot a great Signiory was demanded consisting of Lands Rents and Services and that the Castle and Commot were held in Capite of the King as of his Crown and said those so held were to be impleaded here and not elsewhere 7 H. 6. f. 36. b. so is 7 H. 6. f. 36. b. And said the King by his Charter had granted the Castle and Commot to the Tenant in tayl and thereupon pray'd aid of the King and it was granted hereupon But before this was shew'd and that it was a great Signiory and held of the King in Capite by which it was no part of the Principality nor held under it the Court would own no Jurisdiction but when that appeared the Case was the same with the former in 18 E. 2. and the Defendant had no remedy but in the Kings Courts This Case was cited by Sir Edward Coke in the Case before cited 11 Jacobi concerning the Sheriff of Radnor but the difference not observ'd of its being a Lordship in Wales held immediately of the King in Capite nor that the Court owned no Jurisdictions generally concerning Lands in Wales by the Summons and view of the next adjoyning Sheriff William de Cosington and Elizabeth his Wife brought a Writ of Dower of the third part of the Land in Gower against the Earl of Warwick as Tenant and the Writ was Quod reddat ei rationabilem dotem de libero tenemento quod fuit Jo. Moubray quondam viri sui in terra de Gowre in Wallia It appears not in the Case to what Sheriff the Writ was directed though this Case be in the Book at large but it appears that those of the Chancery and the Judges of the Kings Bench had been consulted with concerning the Writ in bringing it for Dower in terra de Gower in Wallia therefore it must issue from the High Court of Chancery and must be directed consequently to the Sheriff of Glocester as the Assise was in 18 E. 2. Br. abridging this Case saith The Action was against the Earl of Warwick as being Lord of the intire Signiory of Gower and then he was to be impleaded by Writ out of the Chancery here equally and upon the same reason for a third part of the Signiory as for the whole according to the Case of 18 E. 2. first cited for the Lord could no more make a Precipe to summon himself to his own Minister or to make Execution against himself for a third part of the Royalty than for the whole And therefore the Ordinance of Parliament then mentioned equally extended to this Case as to that of 18 E. 2. This is not strange that Acts of Parliament are lost sometimes Note the Act of 3 E. 1. by which old Customes were granted not extant but clear proofs of it remain These three last Cases therefore wherein the Tenants were impleaded in the Courts here for Land in Wales and Summons and Execution made by the Sheriff of the next adjoyning County are well warranted by an Act of Parliament not extant being for either the Lordships Marchers themselves or some part of them and against the Lord himself as that Case of 18 E. 2. expresly resolves All these were real Actions The first an Assise of Novel Disseisin the second a Writ of Cosenage the third a Writ of Dower The like Case is cited 19 H. 6. 19 H. 6. f. 12. A. That when the Mannor of Abergavenny was demanded the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Hereford as Newton urged for this was a Lordship Marcher and held of the King in Capite as appears by Moore 's Reports in Cornwals Case in that the Barony of Abergavenny was held by the Lord Hastings of the King in Capite to defend it at his charge ad utilitatem Domini Regis Exactly agreeing with this Doctrine is the Book of 21 H. 7. f. 33. b. if a Signiory in Wales be to be tryed 21 H. 7. f. 33. B. it shall be tryed here by the Course of the Common Law but if Lands be held of a Signiory in Wales it shall be tryed within the Mannor and not elsewhere As for that expression by the Course of the Common Law 19 H. 6. f. 12. A. it is also in the Book 19 H. 6. that Deeds and all other things alledged in Wales shall be tryed in the adjoyning Countries at the Common Law otherwise there would be a failer of Right And of this opinion seemed most of the Iustices arguendo obiter the Case before them not concerning Wales but the County Palatine of Lancaster Of Churches in Wales a Quare Impedit shall be brought in England yet the Land and other things in Wales 30 H. 6. f. 6. B. shall be determined before the Stewards of

said William Paul dyed at Oxford That after his death the Defendant was elected Bishop of Oxford and after and before the Writ purchased viz. the 27. of November 1665. Gilbert now Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of all England by his Letters of Dispensation according to the said Act and directed to the said Walter the Defendant now Bishop under his Seal then elect and upon the Bishops petition of the means of his Bishoprick Graciously dispensed with him together with his Bishoprick the Rectory of Whitney in the Diocess and County of Oxford which he then enjoyed and the Rectory of Chymer aforesaid which he by the Kings favour hoped shortly to have to receive hold retain and possess in Commendam as long as he lived and continued Bishop of Oxford with or without Institution and Induction or other solemnity Canonical and to take and receive the profits to his own use without Residence Quantum in eodem Archiepiscopo fuit jura regni paterentur The Letters of Dispensation not to be effectual without the Kings Confirmation That the King after the 28 of Novemb. 17. of his Reign under the great Seal to the said Church so void by Cession presented the Defendant then as aforesaid Bishop Elect and after that is the 28. of Novemb. 17. Car. 2. the King by his Letters Patents under the great Seal dated the same day and year and duly inrolled in the Chancery according to 25 H. 8. did confirm the Letters of Dispensation and that the said Bishop might enjoy all things contained in them according to the form and effect thereof with clauses of non obstante aliquo Statuto or other matter Then averrs that the cause of Dispensation was not contrary to the word of God and that the Pope in H. 8. time did use to grant the like Dispensations to the Kings Subjects which he is ready to averr c. The Plaintiff replys That true it is William Paul Praedict was elected Bishop of Oxford being Incumbent of Chymer but that after his election and before his creation he 2 Decemb. 1663. obtained Letters of the Archbishop under his seal of Faculties for causes therein mentioned of Dispensation to hold the Church of Brightwell and the Rectory of Chymer both which he then lawfully had and to retain the same with his Bishoprick after his consecration c. durant vita sua natural Incumbentiâ suâ in Episcopatu praedict quamdiu eidem Episcopatui praeesset The King 9. Decemb. 15. of his reign confirmed the Letters Patents under the great Seal with non obstante according to the Ordinary form 30. Decemb. 15. Car. 2. was created Bishop Vpon this Replication the Defendant demurs and the Plaintiff joyns in Demurrer Note the Defendant doth not shew to whom he was presented He doth not say that he enter'd by vertue of the Presentation of the King in Chymer In discussing the Case as it appears upon this Record I take it granted 1. If a person Incumbent of one or more Benefices with Cure be consecrated Bishop all his benefices are ipso facto void 2. Vpon such voidance the King and not the Patron is to present to the benefices so void by Cession 3. That any Dispensation after the Consecration comes too late to prevent the Voidance 4. That the Pope could formerly and the Arch-bishop now can sufficiently dispense for a Plurality by 25 H. 8. I shall therefore first make one general Question upon the Case as it appears Whither William Paul Rector of Chymer and elected Bishop of Oxford and before his Consecration dispensed with by the Archbishop to retain his said Rectory with the Bishoprick and having the said Letters of Dispensation confirmed by the King and inroll'd Modo forma prout by the Record did not by virtue of the said Dispensation and Confirmation prevent the voidance of his said Rectory by Cession upon his Consecration For if he did the Rectory became not void until his death and by his death the Plaintiff being Patron hath right to present To determine the General Question I shall make these Questions as arising out of it 1. Whether any Dispensation as this Case is be effectual to prevent an avoidance after Consecration 2. Whether the Archbishop hath power with the King's Confirmation to grant such a Dispensation 3. Whether this Dispensation in particular be sufficient to prevent a voidance of Chymer after Consecration of the late William Paul 1. This Case differs from the Bishop of Ossory's Case in Sir J. Davies's Reports who had a faculty accipere in Commendam with odd power and executed it by collating himself into a Living void by Lapse 2. It varies from the Case of Colt and Glover in the Lord Hobarts Reports and the Dispensation there to the Bishop elect of Lichfield and Coventry which was to retain one Benefice which he had and propria authoritate capere apprendere as many as he could under a certain value The defects of that Dispensation are numerous and excellently handled by the Lord Hobart in that Case of Colt and Glover But in our Case there is no affinity with the defects of those Dispensations but is barely to retain what legally was had before Obj. 1 Per Thyrning The Bp. of St. Davids Case 11 H. 4. f. 37. b. 38. a. Rolls f. 358. ob 1. 11 H. 4. f. 60. B. per Hill An Incumbent of a Church with cure being consecrated Bishop his Living was void by the Law of the Land therefore the Pope could not prevent the voidance after consecration for then the Pope could change the Law of the Land and if the Pope could not the Archbishop cannot The better opinion of that Book 11 H. 4. is contrary and Answ 1 so agreed to be in the Irish Case of Commendams and Rolls his opinion is grounded only upon 11 H. 4. If an Incumbent with cure take another Benefice with cure the first is void by the Law of the Land and the Patron hath right to present therefore the Pope could not grant a Dispensation nor the Arch-bishop now can to hold a Plurality for that were to alter the Law of the Land and to prejudice the Patron But the Law was and is otherwise therefore that reason concludes not in the case of a Bishop A second reason in that case of 11 H. 4. is that such a Dispensation Obj. 2 cannot prevent the avoidance 11 H. 4. f. 59. bi per Skreen because there is no use of it until Consecration for before the Incumbent retains his Living without any Dispensation and when consecrated his Benefices are void and then it is too late to dispense as is agreed This reason is as effectual against a Dispensation for a Plurality Answ 2 for before a man takes a second Living there can be no use of it and after by this reason it comes too late for the Patron hath right to present It was in that great Case endeavoured to avoid the pressure of

this Argument by saying the Dispensations in cases of Plurality were not alike with that of retaining the former Benefice when the Incumbent was created Bishop because in the case of Plurality there was no actual voidance and consequently no title to the Patron to present before Deprivation and that the Dispensation prevented the Deprivation which was a Spiritual Act wherewith the Patron had not to do and by a Consequent only prevented the voidance It is resolv'd in Holland's Case Digby's Case Hollands Case 4. Rep. Digby's Case 4. Rep. and many others that the Patron may present assoon as the Incumbent is Instituted in a second Living without deprivation and that the Law was anciently so therefore that evasion is not material Another answer hath been likewise offered and passeth in the New Books for current that in the case of Pluralities the voidance is by the Canon Law and therefore may be dispensed with by the same Law but in the case of a Bishop made the voidance is by the Common Law If Canon Law be made part of the Law of this Land then is it as much the Law of the Land and as well and by the same Authority as any other part of the Law of the Land And if it be not made the Law of the Land then hath it no more effect than a Law of Utopia therefore the Canon Law in force here is Law of the Land Besides their meaning is to be learn'd who say an Incumbents Benefice made a Bishop is void by the Common Law and not by the Canon Law The words of Thyrning in that case 11 H. 4. are who was then Chief Iustice 11 H. 4. f. 60. b. Da. Rep. f. 81. a. f. 68. b. I suppose that when a man Benefic'd is made a Bishop it is by the Law of holy Church that his Benefice becomes void and the same Law which gives the voidance may cause that it shall not be void and that concerns the power of the Apostle The Common Law doth not prohibit Pluralities nor make a voidance of his Benefice when the Incumbent is Bishop but the ancient Ecclesiastical Law of England Obj. 3 11 H. 4. f. 77. a. per Hill It is a Contradiction that the Incumbent being the Bishops Subject and the Bishop his Soveraign should be united the Servant qua Servant may as well be Master the Tenant qua Tenant Lord the Deputy the Deputor the Delegator the Delagated which is impossible Answ It is a Contradiction that a person Subject being so should not be Subject but no contradiction that a person Subject should cease to be so the subjection of the Incumbent ceaseth when the Rectory is in the Bishop the Deputy is not when the principal Officer executes the office in person and relation of Lord and Tenant destroy'd when the Lord occupies the Land himself If an Act of Parliament should enable every Bishop to hold his former Benefices no contradiction would follow nor doth now by the Dispensation And note all these Reasons deny the Popes power formerly the Arch-bishops now and the King 's also for they are not Reasons against the power of the party dispensing but that the Subject matter is capable of no dispensation There is no inconsistence for a Bishop to be an Incumbent for he is a Spiritual Corporation and being Patron of a Living might and may have it appropriate that is to be for him and his Successors perpetual Incumbents Da. Rep. f. 80. b. The Rectories of Eastmeane and Hambleden are appropriate ad Mensam of the Bishop of Winchester and many others in England and Ireland so appropriated Selden Hist of Tithes ● 6. par 3. f. 8● b. c. 9. par 2. f. 253. Every Bishop many hundreds of years after Christ was universal Incumbent of his Diocess received all the profits which were but Offerings of Devotion out of which he paid the Salaries of such as officiated under him as Deacons or Curates in places appointed Quest 2 Second Question Whether the Pope formerly used to dispense in such a case and consequently the Arch-bishop now can by the Stat. of 25 H. 8. c. 21 1. Bishop of St. Davies Case The particular dispensation granted to the Bishop of St. Davies in 11 H. 4. is a full instance nor was it in the Argument of that case insisted that the Pope could not dispense with a Bishop to retain or receive a Benefice But the sole Question was Whether in that particular case because the Benefice to be retain'd belong'd to the presentation of a Church-man viz. the Bishop of Salisbury the Dispensation did not amount to a provision and so was within the Statute of Provisions 25 E. 3. 2. By the Statute of 28 H. 8. it appears the Bishop of Rome did grant Faculties and Dispensations to the King's Subjects 28 H. 8. c. 16. as Pluralities Unions Tryalities Appropriations Commendams Exemptions where Commendams are enumerated and by that Act all granted by the Pope are made void but to be renew'd in the Chancery 3. Procuring Commendams were so frequent in Ireland 7 E. 4. c. 2. that a special Act of Parliament was there made 7 E. 4. against all such as should purchase Bulls for any Commendam to put them out of the Kings protection 4. A Bastard instituted and inducted before Deprivation 11 H. 4. f. 78. a. f. 60. a. 11 H. 4. f. 76. b. a Secular Priest before he became regular whereof many were in England and Thyrning saith he knew that Edmond Monk of Berry who was with Edward the Third held many Benefices though a Monk and Pluralities were ordinarily dispensed with by the Pope 5. 11 H. 4. f. 38. a. Hankford saith he hath seen that the same man was Abbot of Glastenbury and Bishop of another Church simul semel Horton 11 H. 4. f. 76. a. The Pope may grant that one man may hold three Bishopricks at a time which Hankford agreed if with consent of the Patrons For if without their consent it was not dispensing to hold them but granting away the property of the Patrons which a Dispensation could not Henry Beaufort Vncle to Henry the Sixth Da. Rep. f. 80. 77. b. had a Dispensation to retain the Bishoprick of Winchester being Cardinal but it was ineffectual because obtained after he was Cardinal Cardinal Woolsey obtained before he was Cardinal a Dispensation to hold the Arch-bishoprick of York and the Abbey of St. Albans together with his Cardinalship Lindwood Titulo de Praebendis cap. Audistis Lindwood f. 100. b. Potestas quae secundum antiqua jura dabatur Episcopis ad dispensandum super pluralitate Beneficiorum restricta est saltem in dignitatibus Beneficiis curatis sed circa beneficia simplicia bene poterunt Episcopi dispensare And in the same Gloss In dignitatibus curatis solus Papa dispensat Authority in the point that a Rector of a Church dispens'd with according to 25 H.

f. 33. Letter H. if he cannot alledge a Presentation in himself or in his Ancestor or in another person through whom he claims the Advowson and that in his Count unless it be in a special Case Then puts that special Case As if a man at this day by the Kings Licence makes a Parochial Church or other Chantry which shall be presentable if he be disturbed to present to it he shall have a Quare Impedit without alledging any presentment in any person and shall Count upon the special Matter And the Law in this is the same in Case of the King with a Common Person by all the Books and Presidents in the Books of Entry To this add the Lord Hobarts Judgment which is alwaies accurate for the true reason of the Law Know that though it be true that a Presentation may make a Fee without more as a Presentation by Vsurpation doth that you never have a Declaration in a Quare Impedit L. Hobart Digby's Case f. 101. that the Plaintiff did present the last Incumbent without more but you declare that the Plaintiff was seis'd in Fee and presented or else lay the Fee-simple in some other and then bring down the Advowson to the Plaintiff either in Fee or some other estate The reason is That the Presentment alone is militant and indifferent and may be in such a Title as may prove that this new Avoidance is the Defendants and therefore you must lay the Case so as by the Title you make the Presentation past joyn'd to your Title shall prove that this Presentation is likewise yours as well as the last Whence it follows That to Count of an Estate and Seisin without a Presentation or of a Presentation without an Estate are equally vicious and naught be it in the Case of the King or of a Common Person and was never in Example or President 2. A second necessary Premise is this and is both natural and manifest When you will recover any thing from me it is not enough for you to destroy my Title but you must prove your own better than mine For it is not rational to conclude you have no right to this and therefore I have for without a better right melior est conditio possident is regularly Hobar 1. f. 162. Colt Glovers Case ad sinem paginae 3. Every Defendant may plead in a Quare Impedit the General Issue which is ne disturba pas because that Plea doth but defend the wrong wherewith he stands charg'd and leaves the Plaintiffs Title not only uncontroverted but in effect confess'd and the Plaintiff may upon that Plea presently pray a Writ to the Bishop or at his choice maintain the Disturbance for damages Hob. Digby versus Fitzherbert f. 103. 104. But if a man will leave the General Issue and controvert the Plaintiffs Title he must then enable himself by some Title of his own to do it but yet that is not the principal part of his Plea but a formal Inducement only And therefore there is no sense if you will quarrel my possession and I to avoid your Title effectually do induce that with a Title of my own that you shall fly upon my Title and forsake your own for you must recover by your own strength and not by my weakness The Lord Hobart goes further in giving the reason of this course of Pleading in Colt and Glovers Case in the place before cited of this form of pleading in Law there is one reason common to other Actions wherein Title is contain'd to the Land in question specially which is that the Tenant shall never be receiv'd to Counter-plead but he must make to himself by his Plea a Title to the Land and so avoid the Plaintiffs Title alledg'd by Traverse or confessing and avoiding But in the Quare Impedit there is a further reason of it for therein both Plaintiff and Defendant are Actors one against another and therefore the Defendant may have a Writ to the Bishop as well as the Plaintiff which he cannot have without a Title appearing to the Court And so are the Presidents Rastal L. Intratio f. 484. a.b. when a Quare Impedit is brought against the Patron for disturbance of his Clerk not being in possession The Case in brief and the Question upon it Vpon the Record as it hath been open'd and the pleading therein between the King and the Patron upon which all the Question ariseth first I shall not make the Question to be Whether there may be a Traverse taken upon a Traverse though that Question be in truth in the Case for that is a Question rather upon terms of Art than a Questio Forensis and rising upon the naked fact of a Case depending in Iudgment I shall therefore make the Question upon this Case such as nakedly it is without involving it in any difficulty of terms The King brings a Quare Impedit and declares That Queen Elizabeth was seis'd of the Advowson of the Church of Norfield in gross as of Fee and presented and derives the Advowson to himself and the Church became void by the death of the Queens Presentee and he is disturbed to present by the Defendant Jervis The Defendant saith That before the Queen presented R. Jervis his Ancestor was seis'd in Fee of the Mannor of Norfield to which the Advowson of this Church is appendant that it became void by the death of one Squire and continued so for two years and that the Queen then presented White her Clerk by lapse That the Mannor and Advowson descended from Richard to Thomas Jervis from Thomas to Sir Thomas Jervis who granted the next avoidance to one Phineas White who presented upon the death of James White one Timothy White who was instituted and inducted and then derives the Mannor and Advowson to himself and that the Church becoming void upon the death of the said Timothy he presented the other Defendant Hunckley and Traverseth the Queens Seisin of the Advowson in gross The Law in Case of a Common Person If a Common Person brings a Quare Impedit and counts his Title to present and that he is disturbed The Defendant to counter-plead the Plaintiffs Title makes as he must a Title to himself to present and confesses and avoids or Traverseth the Plaintiffs Title 1. The Plaintiff shall never desert his own Title and by falling upon and controverting the weakness only of the Defendants Title ever recover or obtain a Writ to the Bishop though the Defendants Title do not appear to the Court to be sufficient for the unanswerable Reasons given by the Lord Hobart in the first place 2. If you will recover any thing from another man it is not enough for you to destroy his Title but you must prove your own better than his 3. There is no sense if you will quarrel my Possession or Right and I to avoid your Title effectually either by Traversing it which is denying or confessing and avoiding

And if such Debts were not justly to be so demanded and paid it had been against the Iudges Oath to pass such Iudgments for the Defendant is not bound to Demurr but leaves the Iustice of the Plaintiffs demand to the Court. In Decimo H. 6. Cotsmore 10 H. 6. f. 24. b. 25. a. who gave the Rule in the Case in question hath these words The Law will not charge Executors with a duty due by a simple Contract made by the Testator Then if such Action be brought against Executors upon a simple Contract made by the Testator and they will not take advantage at the beginning of the Pleas in abatement of the Writ but plead other matter which is found against them they never shall have advantage to shew that before Judgment that is in Arrest of Judgment and that I have known adjudg'd in this place once before this time Here is not only his own Opinion but a Iudgment by him cited in that Court formerly in the point I shall add another Case to this purpose A man brought a Writ of Debt against another 15 E. 4. f. 29. 2. and counted that he sold certain Goods to his Testator for the Sum in demand Littleton caus'd the Attorney of the Plaintiff as printed but should be Defendant to be demanded and so he was and Littleton demanded of him Si'l voyl avoyder son Suite not his own but his who counted against him que dit que voyl and after Littleton said to the Attorney of the Plaintiff The Court awards that you take nothing by the Writ for know that a man shall never have an Action against Executors where the Testator might have wag'd his Law in his life time quod nota It was not proper to ask the Plaintiffs Attorney Whether he would avoid his Clyents Suit and an unlikely answer of his to say Yes but a rational demand to the Defendants Attorney Whether he would avoid his Suit who counted against him and probably he should answer Yes and after Littleton said to the Attorney of the Plaintiff the Court awards you take nothing by your Writ If he had been the person to whom the question was first asked and who immediately before had answer'd Yes the Book had not been that after Littleton said to the Attorney of the Plaintiff but that Littleton said to him who was the same he discours'd with The Print thus rectified this Case agrees with the Law deliver'd by Cotsmore An Executor is sued and declared against in Court for so was the Course then upon a simple Contract of his Testators the Iudge asks his Attorney Whether he had a mind to avoid the Suit who answer'd Yes If the Iudge had thought fit he might have avoided the Suit without making any question but knowing it was not consonant to Law to avoid a Suit upon a simple Contract unless the Executor himself desired it He therefore asked him the Question and finding he did desire it the Iudge presently told the Plaintiffs Attorney He could take nothing by the Writ Else you see the Consequence of this Iudgment That the Iudges ex officio should prevent any Iudgment for the Plaintiff in Debt brought upon a simple Contract against an Executor whether the Executor would or not against former and subsequent usage Brook in Abridging this Case and not reflecting upon it rightly abridges it that Littleton demanded the Plaintiffs Attorney If he would avow his Suit whereas the word is clearly avoid not avow and to what purpose should he ask that Question for sure it was avow'd as much as could be when counted upon at the instant in Court Then Brook makes a Note Br. Executor pl. 80. Nota cest Judgment ex officio And this Note of Brooks mis-led the Lord Anderson once to the same mistake if the Report be right but the like hath not been before or since Rob. Hughson's Case Gouldsboroughs Rep. 30 Eliz. f. 106. 107. An Action was brought against an Administrator upon a Contract of the Intestates who pleaded fully administred and found against him Anderson said that ex officio the Court was to stay Iudgment and did so because the Administrator was not chargeable upon a simple Contract But since that Case of Hughson one Germayne brought an action of Debt against Rolls as Executor of Norwood for Fees as an Attorney in the Common Bench and for soliciting in the Queens Bench Germayne versus Rolls 37 38 El. Cro. 425. pl. 24. and for mony expended about a Fine for Alienation Rolls pleaded Ne unque Executor which was found against him and Judgment given Vpon which Rolls brought a Writ of Error and the Error assign'd was That the Action lay not against an Executor because the Testator could have waged his Law But it was resolv'd That for Attorney's Fees the Testator could not wage his Law but for the rest he might and that the Executor might have demurr'd at first but pleading a Plea found against him it was said he was Concluded some difference of Opinion was But agreed That the Executor confessing the Action or pleading nil debet in such Case and that found against him he hath no remedy And Popham remembred Hughson's Case in the Common Pleas and would see the Roll for he doubted that both in that Case and this of Germayne the Executor had not confessed the Debt in effect But after it was moved again and all the Judges Hill 38 Eliz. Cro. 459. pl. 4. but Gawdy were of Opinion that the Judgment was well given as to that Cause but it was revers'd for a Cause not formerly mov'd which was That an Action of Debt would not have layn against the Testator himself for part of the mony in demand and recovered that is for the mony for soliciting which was not a certain Debt but to be recovered by Action on the Case Some Cases in the Old Books may seem to colour this Opinion That the Judges ex officio in an Action of Debt brought against an Executor or Administrator for a simple Contract of the Testators or Intestate ought to abate the Writ 25 E. 3. f. 40. The first is 25 E. 3. f. 40. where an Action was brought against an Executor upon a Tally struck by the Testator The Iudges said Nil Capiat per breve if he have no better specialty 12 H. 4. f. 23. The like Case is 12 H. 4. f. 23. where a like Action was brought against the Executor or Administrator upon a Tally of the Testators and there it appears the Defendants Council would have demurr'd and the Cause is mentioned That the writing of the Tally might be washed out by water and a new put in the place and the Notches chang'd and the Iudgment was Nil capiat per breve This being the same Case with the former the reason of the Iudgment was the same of grounding an Action upon a Specialty not good in Law Besides it appears in the latter

meaning can be given to his Covenant Accordingly the new Authorities run grounded upon that sound and ancient Reason of Law That the Lessor shall not be charg'd with an Action upon his express Covenant for enjoyment of the term against all men where the Lessee hath his proper Remedy against the wrong doer Against this Truth there is one Book that hath or may be pretended which I will cite in the first place because the Answer to it may be more perspicuous from the Authority I shall after deliver to redargue that Case Dyer 15 16 Eliz. 328. a. pl. 8. It is the Case of Mountford and Catesby in the Lord Dyer Catesby in consideration of a Sum of mony and a Horse made a Lease to Mountford for term of years Et super se assumpsit quod the Plaintiff Mountford pacifice quiete haberet gauderet the Land demis'd durante termino sine evictione interruptione alicujus personae after Catesby's Father entred upon him and so interrupted him whereupon Mountford brought his Action upon this Assumpsit and Catesby pleaded he did not assume and found against him It was moved in Arrest of Judgment for the Defendant That the entry might be wrongful for which the Plaintiff had his Remedy but disallowed and Iudgment affirmed for the Plaintiff because saith the Book it is an express presumption and assumption that the Plaintiff should not be interrupted And this Case is not expresly denied to be Law in Essex and Tisdales Case in the Lord Hobart as being an express Assumption Though the Lord Dyers Case be an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit and out Case an Action of Covenant yet in the nature of the Obligation there seems no difference but in the form of the Action For to assume that a man shall enjoy his term quietly without interruption and to covenant he shall so enjoy it seems the same undertaking But if the reason of Law differ in an Assumpsit from what it is in a Covenant as seems implyed in Tisdales Case then this Case of the Lord Dyer makes nothing against the Case in question which is upon a Covenant not an Assumpsit Hob. f. 34 35. 1. Elias Tisdale brought an Action of Covenant against Sir William Essex and declared That Sir William convenit promisit agreavit ad cum praedict Elia quod ipse idem Elias haberet occuparet gauderet certain Lands for Seven years into which he entred and that one Elsing had Ejected him and kept him out ever since Resolv'd because no Title is laid in Elsing he shall be taken to enter wrongfully and the Lessee hath his Remedy against him Therefore adjudg'd for the Defendant Essex Here is a Covenant for enjoying during the term the same with enjoying without interruption for if the enjoyment be interrupted he doth not enjoy during the term the same with enjoying without any interruption the same with enjoying without interruption of any person which is the Lord Dyers Case but here adjudg'd the interruption must be legal or an Action of Covenant will not lye because there is remedy against the Interrupter So is there in the Lord Dyer's Case And a Rule of that Book is That the Law shall never judge that a man Covenants against the wrongful acts of strangers unless the words of the Covenant be full and express to that purpose which they are not in our present Case because the Law defends against wrong Brocking brought an Action upon an Assumpsit against one Cham and declared Brocking versus Cham Cr. 15 Jac. f. 4. 5. p. 10. That the Defendant assumed the Plaintiff should enjoy certain Lands according to his Lease without the lett interruption or incumbrance of any person and shews in Fact That this Land was extended for Debt due to the King by process out of the Exchequer and so incumbred After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment That no good breach was assigned because he did not shew that the Incumbrance was a lawful Incumbrance for else he might have his Remedy elsewhere and Iudgment was given for the Defendant This Case was upon an Assumpsit as the Lord Dyers was and by as ample words for the Land was to be enjoyed without any lett which is equivalent to the words of quiete pacifice in the Lord Dyers Case which is a Case in terminis adjudged contrary to that in the Lord Dyer and upon the same reason of Law in an Assumpsit as if it had been a Covenant viz. because the Plaintiff had his Remedy against the wrong doer Chauntfloure brought an Action of Covenant against one Pristly and Doctor Waterhouse as Executors of John Mountfitchett Cr. 45 El. f. 914. pl. 4. and declared That the Testator had sold him Nine and twenty Tuns of Copras and agreed That if the Testator faild of payment of a certain Sum of mony upon a day certain That the Plaintiff might quietly have and enjoy the said Copras that the money was not paid at the day and that he could not have and enjoy the said Nine and twenty Tuns of Copras Iudgment was given by Nihil dicit against the Defendants and upon a Writ of Enquiry of Damages 260 l. Damages given Vpon motion in Arrest of Iudgment It was resolved by the whole Court That the breach of Covenant was not well assign'd because no lawful disturbance was alledg'd and if he were illegally hindred or disturbed of having the Copras which he had bought he had sufficient remedy against the wrong doers Dod was bound in an Obligation to Hammond conditioned that Hammond and his Heirs might enjoy certain Copyhold Lands surrendred to him The Defendant pleaded the Surrender and that the Plaintiff entred and might have enjoyed the Lands To which the Plaintiff replyed That after his Entry one Gay entred upon him and outed him It was adjudg'd the Replication was naught because he did not shew that he was evicted out of the Land by lawful Title for else he had his Remedy against the wrong doer This was in an Action of Debt upon a Bond condition'd for quiet enjoyment So as neither upon Covenant upon Assumpsit or Bond condition'd for quiet enjoying unless the breach be assign'd for a lawful Entry or Eviction and upon the same reason of Law because the lessee may have his Remedy against the wrong doers an Action of Covenant cannot be maintain'd Cok. 4 Rep. Nokes's Case To these may be added a Resolution in Nokes his Case in the fourth Report where a man was bound by Covenant in Law That his Lessee should enjoy his term and gave Bond for performance of Covenants in an Action of Debt brought upon the Bond the breach was assign'd in that a stranger had recover'd the Land leas'd in an Ejectione firmae and had Execution though this Eviction were by course of law yet for that an elder and sufficient Title was not alledg'd upon which the Recovery was had

not first discover that the Verdicts of Juries were many times not according to the Judges opinion and liking But the Reasons are I conceive most clear That the Judge could not nor can Fine and Imprison the Jury in such Cases Without a Fact agreed it is as impossible for a Judge or any other to know the Law relating to that Fact or direct concerning it as to know an Accident that hath no Subject Hence it follows That the Judge can never direct what the Law is in any matter controverted without first knowing the Fact and then it follows That without his previous knowledge of the Fact the Jury cannot go against his Direction in Law for he could not direct But the Judge quà Judge cannot know the Fact possibly but from the Evidence which the Jury have but as will appear he can never know what Evidence the Jury have and consequently he cannot know the matter of Fact nor punish the Jury for going against their Evidence when he cannot know what their Evidence is It is true if the Jury were to have no other Evidence for the Fact but what is depos'd in Court the Judge might know their Evidence and the Fact from it equally as they and so direct what the Law were in the Case though even then the Judge and Jury might honestly differ in the result from the Evidence as well as two Judges may which often happens But the Evidence which the Jury have of the Fact is much other than that For 1. Being return'd of the Vicinage whence the cause of Action ariseth the Law supposeth them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in Issue and so they must though no Evidence were given on either side in Court but to this Evidence the Judge is a stranger 2. They may have Evidence from their own personal knowledge by which they may be assur'd and sometimes are that what is depos'd in Court is absolutely false but to this the Judge is a stranger and he knows no more of the Fact than he hath learn'd in Court and perhaps by false Depositions and consequently knows nothing 3 The Jury may know the Witnesses to be stigmatiz'd and infamous which may be unknown to the parties and consequently to the Court. 4. In many Cases the Jury are to have View necessarily in many by consent for their better information to this Evidence likewise the Judge is a stranger 5. If they do follow his direction they may be attainted and the Iudgment revers'd for doing that which if they had not done they should have been fined and imprisoned by the Judge which is unreasonable 6. If they do not follow his direction and be therefore fined yet they may be attainted and so doubly punisht by distinct Iudicatures for the same offence which the Common Law admits not Chevin and Paramours Case 3 El. Dyer 201. a. n. 63. A Fine revers'd in Banco Regis for Infancy per inspectionem per testimonium del 4. fide dignorum After upon Examination of divers Witnesses in Chancery the suppos'd Infant was prov'd to be of Age tempore finis levati which Testimonies were exemplified and given in Evidence after in Communi Banco in a Writ of Entry in the quibus there brought And though it was the Opinion of the Court That those Testimonies were of no force against the Iudgment in the Kings Bench The Progress in this Writ of Right till Judgment for Paramour the Defendant is at large 13 El. Dyer f. 301. n. 40. yet the Jury found with the Testimony in Chancery against direction of the Court upon a point in Law and their Verdict after affirmed in an Attaint brought and after a Writ of Right was brought and battle joyn'd 7. To what end is the Jury to be retorn'd out of the Vicinage whence the cause of Action ariseth To what end must Hundredors be of the Jury whom the Law supposeth to have nearer knowledge of the Fact than those of the Vicinage in general To what end are they challeng'd so scrupulously to the Array and Pole To what end must they have such a certain Free-hold and be probi legales homines and not of affinity with the parties concern'd To what end must they have in many Cases the view for their exacter information chiefly To what end must they undergo the heavy punishment of the villanous Iudgment if after all this they implicitly must give a Verdict by the dictates and authority of another man under pain of Fines and Imprisonment when sworn to do it according to the best of their own knowledge A man cannot see by anothers Eye nor hear by anothers Ear no more can a man conclude or inferr the thing to be resolv'd by anothers Vnderstanding or Reasoning and though the Verdict be right the Jury give yet they being not assur'd it is so from their own Vnderstanding are forsworn at least in foro conscientiae 9. It is absurd a Jury should be fined by the Judge for going against their Evidence when he who fineth knows not what it is as where a Jury find without Evidence in Court of either side so if the Iury find 14 H. 7. f. 29. per Vavasor in Camer Scace without contradiction Hob. f. 227. upon their own knowledge as the course is if the Defendant plead Solvit ad diem to a Bond prov'd and offers no proof The Jury is directed to find for the Plaintiff unless they know payment was made of their own knowledge according to the Plea And it is as absurd to fine a Jury for finding against their Evidence when the Judge knows but part of it for the better and greater part of the Evidence may be wholly unknown to him and this may happen in most Cases and often doth as in Graves and Shorts Case Error of a Iudgment in the Common Bench Graves vers Short 40 El. Cro. f. 616. the Error assign'd was The Issue being whether a Feoffment were made and the Jurors being gone together to conferr of their Verdict one of them shew'd to the rest an Escrow pro petentibus not given in Evidence by the parties per quod they found for the Demandant upon Demurrer adjudg'd no Error for it appears not to be given him by any of the parties or any for them it must be intended he had it as a piece of Evidence about him before and shew'd it to inform himself and his Fellows and as he might declare it as a witness that he knew it to be true They resolv'd If that might have avoided the Verdict which they agreed it could not yet it ought to have been done by Examination and not by Error That Decantatum in our Books Ad quaestionem facti non respondent Judices ad quaestionem legis non respondent Juratores literally taken is true For if it be demanded What is the Fact the Judge cannot answer it if it be asked What is the Law in the Case the Jury

cannot answer it Therefore the parties agree the Fact by their pleading upon Demurrer and ask the Iudgment of the Court for the Law In Special Verdicts the Jury Inform the naked Fact and the Court deliver the Law and so is it in Demurrers upon Evidence in Arrest of Judgments upon Challenges and often upon the Judges Opinion of the Evidence given in Court the Plaintiff becomes Nonsuit when if the matter had been left to the Jury they might well have found for the Plaintiff But upon all general Issues as upon not Culpable pleaded in Trespass Nil debet in Debt Nul tort Nul disseisin in Assize Ne disturba pas in Quare Impedit and the like though it be matter of Law whether the Defendant be a Trespassor a Debtor Disseisor or Disturber in the particular Cases in Issue yet the Jury find not as in a Special Verdict the Fact of every Case by it self leaving the Law to the Court but find for the Plaintiff or Defendant upon the Issue to be tryed wherein they resolve both Law and Fact complicately and not the Fact by it self so as though they answer not singly to the Question what is the Law yet they determine the Law in all matters where Issue is joyn'd and tryed in the principal Case but where the Verdict is Special Hob. f. 227. To this purpose the Lord Hobart in Needler's Case against the Bishop of Winchester is very apposite Legally it will be very hard to quit a Jury that finds against the Law either Common Law or several Statute Law whereof all men were to take knowledge and whereupon Verdict is to be given whether any Evidence be given to them or not As if a Feoffment or Devise were made to one imperpetuum and the Jury should find cross either an Estate for Life or in Fee-simple against the Law they should be subject to an Attaint though no man informed them what the Law was in that Case The legal Verdict of the Jury to be recorded is finding for the Plaintiff or Defendant what they answer if asked to questions concerning some particular Fact is not of their Verdict essentially nor are they bound to agree in such particulars if they all agree to find their Issue for the Plaintiff or Defendant they may differ in the motives wherefore as well as Judges in giving Iudgment for the Plaintiff or Defendant may differ in the Reasons wherefore they give that Iudgment which is very ordinary I conclude with the Statute of 26 H. 8. c. 4. That if any Jurors in Wales do acquit any Felon Murderer or Accessary or give an untrue Verdict against the King upon the Tryal of any Traverse Recognizance or Forfeiture contrary to good and pregnant Evidence ministred to them by persons sworn before the Kings Justiciar That then such Jurors should be bound to appear before the Council of the Marches there to abide such Fine or Ransome for their Offence as that Court should think fit If Jurors might have been fined before by the Law for going against their evidence in matters criminal there had been no cause for making this Statute against Jurors for so doing in Wales only Objections out of the Ancient and Modern Books 1. A Juror kept his Fellows a day and night 8 Ass pl. 35. without any reason or assenting and therefore awarded to the Fleet. This Book rightly understood is Law That he staid his Fellows a day and a night without any reason or assenting may be understood That he would not in that time intend the Verdict at all more than if he had been absent from his Fellows but wilfully not find for either side In this sense it was a Misdemeanor against his Oath For his Oath was truly to try the Issue which he could never do that resolv'd not to conferr with his Fellows And in this sense it is the same with the Case 34 E. 3. where Twelve being sworn and put together to treat of their Verdict 34 E. 3. Bra. Title Jurors n. 46. one secretly withdrew himself and went away for which he was justly fined and imprison'd and it differs not to withdraw from a mans duty by departing from his Fellows and to withdraw from it though he stay in the same Room and so is that Book to he understood But if a man differ in Iudgment from his Fellows for a day and a night though his dissent may not be as reasonable as the Opinion of the rest that agree yet if his Iudgment be not satisfied one disagreeing can be no more criminal than four or five disagreeing with the rest 2. A Juror would not agree with his Fellows for two dayes 41 Ass p. 11. and being demanded by the Judges If he would agree said He would first die in Prison whereupon he was committed and the Verdict of the Eleven taken but upon better advice the Verdict of the Eleven was quasht and the Juror discharg'd without Fine and the Justices said the way was to carry them in Carts until they agreed and not by fining them and as the Judges err'd in taking the Verdict of Eleven so they did in imprisoning the Twelfth and this Case makes strongly that the Juror was not to be fined who disagreed in Iudgment only Much of the Office of Jurors in order to their Verdict is ministerial as not withdrawing from their Fellows after they are sworn not withdrawing after challenge and being tryed in before they take their Oath 36 H. 6. f. 27. Br. Jurors 18. not receiving from either side Evidence after their Oath not given in Court not eating and drinking before their Verdict refusing to give a Verdict and the like wherein if they transgress they are finable but the Verdict it self when given is not an Act ministerial but judicial and according to the best of their judgment for which they are not finable nor to be punisht but by Attaint 3. The Case of 7 R. 2. Title Coronae Fitz. 108. was cited where upon acquittal of a Common Thief the Judge said The Jury ought to be bound to his good behaviour during his life But saith the Book quere per quel ley but that was only gratis dictum by the Judge for no such thing was done as binding them Hob. f. 114. 4. Bradshaw and Salmons Case was urg'd where a Jury had given excessive Damages upon a Tryal in an Action of Covenant and the Court of Star-Chamber gave Damages to the Complainant almost as high as the Jury had given upon the Tryal But the Jury who gave the Damages were not question'd Though saith the Book they might have been because they receiv'd Briefs from the Plaintiff for whom they gave Damages which was a Misdemeanor but the express Book is That the Jury could not be punisht by Information for the excessive Damages but only by Attaint therefore not for their false Verdict without other Misdemeanor which answers some other Cases alledg'd Nor can any man shew

and thereby declared to be prohibited by Gods Law are all the Degrees of marriage prohibited by Gods Law For take the words at most advantage for that purpose viz. Since many inconveniences have fallen by marrying within the Degrees prohibited by Gods Law That is to say The Son to marry the Mother the Brother the Sister c. and that the enumeration in the Act of prohibited Degrees had gone no further than to the Degrees of Consanguinity not enumerating any Degrees of Affinity as then it had been no Inference to conclude that there were no more prohibited Degrees by Gods Law intended by the Statute than the Degrees of Consanguinity only So now no Degrees being mentioned in the Statute to be prohibited by Gods Law but those which are express'd it cannot thence be concluded That the Statute intended no other than those to be prohibited by Gods Law For those are therefore mentioned to be prohibited because they were Degrees signally expressed and concerning which no question or doubt could be made In the same manner is it if a Statute should say Since many Inconveniences have happen'd by doing things prohibited by the Kings Laws that is to say By Depopulation of Farms by subtracting of Tithes by committing Dilapidations and of many other things forbidden by the Law It would not be concluded That the things so enumerated were all the things prohibited by the Kings Laws no more can it that the enumerated Degrees of prohibited Marriages in the Act by Gods Law are all the Degrees by Gods Law prohibited The next Statute is an Act of the same Parliament 28 H. 8. c. 16 28 H. 8. c. 16. making invalid Licences Dispensations Bulls and other Instruments purchas'd from Rome Which Act hath these words That all Marriages solemnized within this Realm By this Act the Levitical Degrees are made the third time of Lay Conizance or in any the Kings Dominions before the Third day of November in the Six and twentieth year of the King whereof there is no Divorce had by the Ecclesiastick Laws of the Realm and which be not prohibited by Gods Law limited and declared in the Act made this present Parliament for establishing the Kings Succession or otherwise by Holy Scripture shall be lawful and effectual by Authority of this present Parliament 1. By this Law all Marriages made before that Third of November 26 H. 8. no divorce being had are made good and lawful 2. All Marriages made before that time and not prohibited in the Degrees limited and declared in the Act of 28 H. 8. c. 7. if the Act had rested there and gone no further had been made good and if any of them had been questioned a Prohibition would have lain out of the Temporal Courts because the unlawfulness of marrying was restrained to the Degrees limited in 28 H. 8. c. 7. whereof the Temporal Judges had perfect Conizance as of a lay Law But the Act going further and saying Prohibited by Gods Law limited in the Act of 28. or otherwise by Holy Scripture leaves as is objected all Conuzance of Marriages as before to the Ecclesiastick Courts though not so amply So by those added words Or otherwise by holy Scripture the Act made all Marriages solemnized before that time not prohibited by Holy Scripture good and lawful by which Act though Marriages prohibited only by the Canon Law divided from Scripture were made good Yet the tryal was Whether the Marriage was prohibited by Holy Scripture which being only of Ecclesiastick Conizance they only could judge of the lawfulness And that the Temporal Courts could by that Act no more judge what Marriage was lawful or Incestuous by the Holy Scripture than what was Schism or Heresie by the Holy Scripture 3. By this Act it is evident The Law-makers thought some Marriages were or might be prohibited by Gods Law not limited in the Act of 28 H. 8. So if the Act had limited all Marriages lawful but those forbidden in the Five Books of Moses or in the Book of Moses called Leviticus though the unlawfulness of Marriage had been more restrain'd under that expression than under the general expression of Holy Scripture Yet Those Books being part of Holy Scripture the Secular Iudges had no more Conuzance of the parts than of the whole And so would it have been if the Act had restrained the unlawfulness of Marriage to the Eighteenth Chapter of Leviticus that being a part of the Book called Leviticus the Temporal Courts could have no more Conuzance of that part or Chapter of the Book than of the whole Book This I think is the full of the Objection The last Law and which is Cardo Questionis as being pleaded by the Plaintiff Harrison in the Books is the Act of 32 H. 8. cap. 38. consisting of several parts 32 H. 8. c. 28. some whereof are Repeal'd as the branch concerning Pre-contracts I shall therefore examine that Act as it stands in force 1. Marriages between Cosen Germans and all Marriages onwards between Collateral Cosens which were prohibited very far before the Council of Lateran and since it those to the fourth Degree to the making of this Act are made lawful and declared not to be against the Law of God viz in these words And be not prohibited by Gods Law 2. Restraining of Marriage by reason of Carnal Knowledge within any of those Degrees is expresly taken away Coke's Mag. Chart. f. 6. 84. and the Marriages declared not to be against the Law of God In these Sir Edward Coke in his Comment upon this Statute in his Magna Charta is express So if any Marriage within those Degrees shall be questioned as Incestuous in the Spiritual Courts a Prohibition will lye upon this Act because the Marriages by one part of the Act are declared expresly 1. Not to be against the Law of God 2. By another All Marriages contracted between lawful persons as we declare all persons to be lawful that are not prohibited by Gods Law to marry are lawful Ioyning then those two Clauses together That all Marriages are lawful not prohibited by the Law of God and that such Marriages of Cosen Germans and so onwards are not prohibited by Gods Law It is manifest that Prohibitions will lye in such Cases But these Marriages concern not the Case in question The next Clause in the Act and upon which the present Case stands That no Reservation or Prohibition Gods Law except shall trouble or impeach any Marriage without the Levitical Degrees The clear sense of which Clause must be That all Marriages are lawful which are not prohibited within the Levitical Degrees or otherwise by Gods Law So as the prohibiting of Marriages within the Levitical Degrees and within Gods Law whereof the Levitical Degrees are a part is no more or less in effect than to say All Marriages shall be lawful that Gods Law doth not prohibit Whence is collected That of Gods Law in general or of the Levitical Degrees in

constancy speak of such Laws as given to all mankind in this particular matter of marriage and carnal mixture and derive them traditionally through all antiquity as binding all Nations and People by Gods Precept and therefore call them among others so given Leges Noachidarum or the Laws of all the Sons of Noah by which men were from the beginning prohibited 1. Marriage or Copulation with their Mother 2. With the Fathers wife 3. With a Sister by the same Mother or with a Soror uterina 4. With the Wife of another man 5. Man with man 6. Man or Woman with Beast From these Laws they justifie Abrams marrying his Sister by the same Father Amrams marrying his Fathers Sister Jacob marrying two Sisters at the same time Thamars endeavouring to marry her Husbands brother as not prohibited before the Levitical Law or any other marriage those before mentioned excepted And as to Adams Sons marrying their Sisters by the same Mother the Law was given in the beginning prohibiting it but God dispens'd with it until the World was competently peopled as they receive it And it is observed by Mr. Selden That upon the Tradition of this general Law 1 Cor. 5. v. 1. St. Paul rebukes the Corinthians for permitting among them such a Fornication that is such an Incest as was not named among the Gentiles That a man should have his Fathers wife Some Examples of which were in Syria as in Antiochus and Stratonice In this sense it is said A man is a natural Subject when he is so born and is bound by the Law of his Allegiance as soon as he is and that a Prince is that Subjects natural Soveraign because he is bound to protect him as soon as he can be protected Of which kind of Law of Nature much is said in Calvins Case but confusedly and without clearness of conception For these Laws of a mans subjection as soon as he is born being the immediate means of his preservation and good cannot but be assented to as soon as it is possible to assent and in that are called Natural Laws Of the Natural Laws in this sense given to all Mankind by the Deity from the beginning of time concerning Marriage and bodily knowledge See excellent matter in that incomparable Work of Mr. Selden De Jure Naturali Gentium Juxta disciplinam Ebraeorum And under this sense of Natural Laws hath he titled that Book De Jure Naturali Gentium Juxta disciplinam Ebraeorum for so the Iews accounted the Laws or Leges Noachidarum given in the beginning to all Mankind Natural Laws though they were in truth but positive Divine Laws because with relation to Mankind there was no time wherein they oblig'd not In what sense a man is said to act unnaturally against Civil Laws or Agreement There is a fourth way whereby a man is said to act unnaturally which acting is subsequent to Human Laws and Contracts between man and man which is when after Laws made and Contracts civilly setled a man shall oblige himself diametrally repugnant and contrary to his former Obligation As when A Subject shall by Oath promise or otherwise bind himself to judge or force his King when by his Obligation to his King he is bound to obey him and be judg'd by him When a Servant shall command and compel his Master by whom he ought to be commanded To contract marriage with two Husbands when plenary duty and obedience is to be paid to each and therefore impossible to be performed to both So is it with a Servant who contracts his absolute Service to two Masters at the same time those things are unnatural as not consisting with the nature of the Obligation a man or woman is under whereof much hath been already said The Levitical Prohibitions of Marriage are no general Law but particular to the Israelites 1. All the Prohibitions of the Levitical Degrees were not coeval with mankind as some were viz. Marriage with the Mother the Soror uterina the Step-mother 2. They were not in the restoration of mankind declared to Noah as a Law for mankind Both these appear by the marriages of the holy men before mentioned within many of those Degrees 3. They were undoubtedly deliver'd by Moses to the Jews but not to mankind for Moses neither did nor could publish them as the World was then peopled to mankind And a Law not published is no more obligative than a Law only conceal'd in the mind of the Law-giver is obligative 4. As they were delivered to the Jews only by Moses they bind other Nations no more than other laws of the Jews do concerning other Subjects as the laws of succession and inheriting lands or goods 5. They must then be made obligative if at all to the generality of Christians by the New Testament but by what medium can that be proved 6. They are not obligative to Christians any where as to the Jews which appears by the law of raising seed to the Brother vid. Canon to that purpose de Divortiis And by the marriage of two Sisters successively but not together 7. Were they obligative to Christians as to the Jews then all Christians would be bound to the same punishment as the Jews were for transgressing them which was never heard It remains then that Christians are bound to them upon another account Besides it is manifest in the Fifteenth Chapter of the Acts that when divers taught That if the Gentiles would be saved they must keep the Law of Moses It was upon that very Question resolv'd in a Council of the Apostles It was a yoke neither they nor their Fathers were able to bear It seem'd good to the Holy Ghost and to them to lay no more burthen on the Gentiles than to abstain from some necessary things that is 1. From things offered to Idols 2. From things Strangled 3. From Blood 4. From Fornication Which necessary things are after clearly expounded by St. Paul to the Corinthians not to be things unlawful simply but convenient to keep a Communion between the Jews and Gentiles that is the Old Church and the New It is further cleared That this law was no more than the other Judicial laws given to the Gentiles For when the Gentiles which have not the law Rom. 2. v. 14. do by nature the things contained in the Law What is then the preferment of the Jew or what is the profit of Circumcision Rom. 3. v. 1 2. Much every manner of way chiefly because unto them were committed the Oracles of God There is no colour of Argument That the Prohibitions in the Eighteenth of Leviticus were universal laws but that it is said Lev. 18. v. 24. Ye shall not defile your selves in any of these things for in all these things the Nations are defiled which I cast out before you Lev. 18. v 27. For all these Abominations have the men of the Land done c. How could the Land be defiled or the men

entred and were seis'd before the Trespass suppos'd prout Lex postulat That Mary one of the daughters of the said William Rose July the First 1 Car. 2. died and that Katherine her Sister surviv'd her and is still living That the said Katherine October the First 20 Car. 2. at East-Grimsted entred into the said Tenements and was seis'd prout Lex postulat and the same day and year demis'd the same to the said Thomas Gardner the Plaintiff from the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel then last past for the term of Five years then next following By virtue whereof the said Thomas Gardner entred and was possessed until the said Joseph and Daniel Sheldon the same First day of October 20 Car. 2. entred upon him and Ejected him If upon the whole matter the Justices shall think the said Joseph and Daniel Sheldon culpable they find them culpable and assess Damages to Six pence and Costs to Twenty shillings But if the Justices shall conceive them not culpable they find them not culpable upon the words My will is if it happen my Son George Mary and Katherine my Daughters do dye without Issue of their Bodies lawfully begotten then all my Free Lands which I am now seised of shall come remain and be to my said Nephew William Rose and his Heirs for ever The first Question is Whether by this Will any Estate be Q. 1 devis'd to the Son and Heir of the Testator or to his Sisters If any Estate be devis'd what Estate is so devis'd to them Q. 2 or any of them The third Question is What Estate is by this Will devis'd Q. 3 to the Nephew and if any be how it shall take effect whether as a Remainder or as an Executory devise 1. As to the first it is clear That no Estate is devis'd to the Son or Daughters or any of them by express and explicit devise but if any be it is devis'd by implication only and collection of the Testators intent 2. If any Estate be given by this Will by Implication to the Son or Daughters or any of them it must be either a Joynt Estate to them for their lives with several inheritances in tayl or several Estates tayl to them in Succession that is to one first and the Heirs of his or her body and then to another and so successively 3. Such an Intail in Succession cannot possibly be because it appears not by the Will who should first take and have such Estate and who next c. and therefore such an Intail were meerly void for the incertainty of the person first taking as was rightly observ'd and assented to at the Bar. It remains then That the Estate devis'd by this Will if any be to the Son and his two Sisters must be a joynt Estate for their lives with several Inheritances to them in tayl by implication only And I am of Opinion That no such Estate is devis'd by this Will to the Son and two Daughters and I shall first observe That the Law doth not in Conveyances of Estates admit Estates to pass by implication regularly as being a way of passing Estates not agreeable to the plainness requir'd by Law in transferring Estates from one to another And for that the Case is A man according to the Custome of the Mannor Seagood and Hones Case 10 C. 1. Cr. f 336. surrendred to the use of Francis Reeve and of John Son of the said Francis and of the longest liver of them and for want of Issue of John lawfully begotten the Remainder to the youngest Son of Mary Seagood John had only an Estate for life and no Estate tayl by implication it being by conveyance Though as the Book is it might perhaps be an Estate tayl by Will which shews Estates by implication are not at all favour'd in Law though in mens last Wills they are allow'd with due restrictions In a Will Estates are often given by implication But I shall take this difference concerning Estates that pass by implication though it be by Will An Estate given by implication of a Will if it be to the disinheriting of the Heir at Law is not good if such implication be only constructive and possible but not a necessary implication I mean by a possible implication when it may be intended that the Testator did purpose and had an intention to devise his Land to A. but it may also be as reasonably intended that he had no such purpose or intention to devise it to A. But I call that a devise by necessary implication to A. when A. must have the thing devis'd or none else can have it And therefore if the implication be only possible and not necessary the Testators intent ought not to be construed to disinherit the Heir in thwarting the Dispose which the Law makes of the Land leaving it to descend where the intention of the Testator is not apparently and not ambiguously to the contrary Spirt Bences C. 8 Car. 1. Cro. 368. To this purpose the Case is 8 Car. 1. where Thomas Cann devis'd to Henry his youngest Son Item I give to the said Henry my Pastures in the South-fields and also I will that all Bargains Grants and Covenants which I have from Nicholas Welb my Son Henry shall enjoy and his Heirs for ever and for lack of Heirs of his Body to remain to my Son Francis for ever It grew a Question Whether this were an Intayl to Henry of the South-fields or only of the Bargains and Grants which the Testator had from Welb which was a very measuring Case and in determining this Case All the Four Judges agreed That the words of a Will which shall disinherit the Heir at Common Law must have a clear and apparent intent and not be ambiguous or any way doubtful So are the very words of the Book and therefore they resolv'd in that Case That only the Bargains and Grants had from Welb were intayl'd to the youngest Son and that he had only an Estate for life in the Pastures in the South-fields 1. I shall therefore now clear the difference I have taken That the Heir shall never be disinherited by a devise in a Will by implication and not explicit where the implication is only a possible implication and not a necessary implication 2. In the second place I shall shew That the words of this Will do not import a devise to the son and the two daughters for their lives joyntly with respective Inheritances in tayl to the Heirs of their several bodies by any necessary implication but only by an implication that is possible by construction 3. In the third place I shall shew That being so as to the Case in question it is not material whether the devise by way of Remainder to the Nephew be void or not 4. In the fourth place ex abundante and to make the Will of the Testator not ineffectual in that part of the Will I shall shew That the Nephew hath

Relatives and if an Act of Naturalization should thereby make a man a natural Subject the same Subject would have two natural Soveraigns one when he was born the other when naturalized which he can never have more then two Natural Fathers or two Natural Mothers except the Soveraigns be subordinate the Inferior holding his Kingdome as Liege Homager from the Superiour And perhaps in the Case of Severing the Kingdoms Calvins Case 27. as Sir Edward Coke saith Nor can an Act of Parliament in one place take away the natural subjection due to another Prince for want of power And the Law of England being That an Antenatus shall not inherit because an Alien without an Act of Parliament making him none The fiction of an Act in another Kingdom to which England never consented shall not alter the law here because he is made in Ireland as if born there If there were an Act of Parliament in England That persons naturalized in Ireland or Scotland should be no Aliens in England no man thinks that thereby Scotland or Ireland could naturalize a man in terminis in England But a man naturalized there would by consequent be naturalized in England because the law of England did warrant that consequent But to say That a man naturalized in Ireland is not directly naturalized in England but by consequent when the question is Whether one naturalized in Ireland be thereby naturalized in England is to beg for a proof that which is the question Therefore it must be first proved That there is a Law of England to warrant that consequent Inconveniences The Law of England is That no Alien can be naturalized but by Act of Parliament with the assent of the whole Nation 1. Now if this naturalization in Ireland should be effectual for England then a whole Nation should become Natives in England without Act of Parliament of what Country Religion or Manners soever they be by an Act of Ireland 2. If the Parliament of England should refuse to naturalize a number of men or Nation as dangerous or incommodious to the Kingdom yet they might be naturalized whether the Houses of Parliament would or not by an Act of Ireland 3. By this invention the King may naturalize in England without an Act of Parliament as well as he may Denizen for if the Parliament of Ireland enact That the King by Letters Patents shall naturalize in Ireland then they so naturalized in Ireland by Patent will be naturalized in England by consequent so they may enact the Deputy or Council of Ireland to naturalize 4. If an Alien hath Issue an Alien Son and the Father be denizen'd in England and after hath a Son born in England the Law hath been taken That the youngest Son shall inherit the Fathers Land Co. Litr. f. 8. a. Doct Stud. l. 1. Cr. 17 Jac. f. 539. Godfrey Dixons C. So is Sir Edward Coke Litr. f. 8. a. and other Books yet if the elder be naturaliz'd in Ireland the Estate which the youngest hath by the Law of England will be plucked from him Having thus opened the Inconveniences consequent to this Irish Naturalization the next is That Judges must judge according as the Law is not as it ought to be But then the Premisses must be clear out of the established Law and the Conclusion well deduc'd before great Inconveniences be admitted for Law But if Inconveniences necessarily follow out of the Law only the Parliament can cure them 1. I shall begin with the admitted Doctrine of Calvin's Case By that Case He that is born a Subject of the King of England in another Dominion than England is no Alien in England So the Scots born when the King of Scots was King of England are no Aliens those born before in Scotland are Therefore Nicholas Ramsey who is not born the Kings Subject of Ireland must be an Alien in England whose Law by the Rule of that Case makes only Subjects born and not made of another Dominion not to be Aliens in England 2. It is agreed to my hand That an Alien naturalized at this day in Scotland remains an Alien in England notwithstanding 3. By the Doctrine of Calvin's Case a natural born Subject to the Kings person of a Forraign Dominion is not priviledg'd in England from being an Alien else the Antenati of Scotland were priviledg'd for they are natural born Subjects to the Kings person as well as the Postnati 4. It stands not with the Resolution of that Case That the natural born Subjects of the Dominions belonging to the Crown of England qua such should be no Aliens in England which was the principal matter to have been discuss'd but was not in Calvin's Case and chiefly concerns the point in question The Case relied on to justifie the Iudgment in Calvins Case are several Authorities That the King of England's Subjects formerly were never accounted Aliens in England though they were all out of the Realm of England and many within the Realm of France But all these are admitted in that Case as most of them were Dominions belonging to the Crown of England and if so Of Normandy Brittain Aquitain Anjou Gascoigne Guien Calais Jersey and Gernsey Isle of Man Berwick and other Parts of Scotland Ireland Tourney c. What Inference could be made for the Resolution of Calvin's Case That because the Kings natural Subjects of Dominions belonging to the Crown of England as these did were no Aliens in England Therefore that Subjects of a Dominion not belonging to the Crown as the Postnati of Scotland are should be no Aliens in England Non sequitur Therefore it is for other reason then because natural Subjects of Dominions belonging to the Crown of England they were no Aliens by the meaning of that Resolution And the Adequate Reason being found out why they are not Aliens will determine the point in question 1. It was not because they were natural Subjects to him that was King of England for then the Antenati of Scotland would be no Aliens they being natural Subjects to him that is King of England as well as the Postnati 2. It was not because they were natural Subjects of Dominions belonging to the Crown of England for then the Postnati would be Aliens in England for they are not Subjects of a Dominion belonging to the Crown of England 3. It remains then the Reason can be no other but because they were born under the same Liegeance with the Subjects of England which is the direct reason of that Resolution in Calvins Case Calvins Case f. 18. b. a. The words are The time of the birth is of the essence of a Subject born for he cannot be a Subject to the King of England that is to be no Alien unless at the time of his birth he was under the Liegeance and Obedience of the King that is of England And that is the reason that Antenati in Scotland for that at the time of their birth they were not under the

taking from another which the word Stealing imports to be lawful unlawful Swearing which Perjury imports to be lawful an unlawful Entry upon a mans House or Land which the word Trespass imports to be lawful and so of the rest So the same thing at the same time would be both lawful and unlawful which is impossible For the same reason a Law making Murther Stealing Perjury Trespass or any the rest of the mala instanc'd in lawful would be a void Law in it self For a Law which a man cannot obey nor act according to it is void and no Law And it is impossible to obey contradictions or act according to them Therefore I may conclude those things to be mala in se which can never be made lawful The instances in that Book of 11 H. 7. are none of these but near them the words are But malum in se the King nor any other can dispense And instanceth Si Come si le Roy voyloit pardon de occider un homme ou de faire nusance in le haut chemin ceo est void Where by the way pardon is mis-printed for pocar done for the King may pardon killing a man but if the King will give power to kill a man or to make a nusance in the High-way it is void And upon the same reason a licence to imprison a man to take his Land his Horse or any thing that is his from him is void For in life liberty and estate every man who hath not forfeited them hath a property and right which the Law allows him to defend and if it be violated it gives an Action to redress the wrong and to punish the wrong-doer Therefore a dispensation that is to make lawful the taking from a man any thing which he may lawfully defend from being taken or lawfully punish if it be must be void For it is a contradiction to make it lawful to take what may be lawfully hindred from being taken or lawfully punished if it be And that were to make two men have several plenary rights in the same thing at the same time which no Law can effect Therefore to do a thing which no Law can make lawful must be malum in se But these instances differ from the former for killing a man or taking from him his Lands or Goods do not import ex vi termini that which is unlawful as Murther and Stealing do for in many Cases killing a man or taking his liberty or goods from him is lawful and where it is not may by a Law be made so which the other can never be As every new capital punishment ordained by Law makes killing a man lawful where it was not before every new aid granted out of mens estate makes a taking from men lawful that was not before But this is because a Law can alter change or transferr a mans property in life liberty estate or any interest as it will which cannot be done without a Law and thereby nothing unlawful is made lawful But the property which a man had and was the subject matter of the unlawful doing or taking before is alter'd or transferred to another either in toto or in tanto So as to violate mens properties is never lawful but a malum per se as that Book is of 11 H. 7. and according to that of Bracton Bract. l. 3. f. 132 Rex non poterit gratiam facere cum injuria damno aliorum quod autem alienum est dare non potest per suam gratiam But to alter or transferr mens properties to others is no malum per se it is daily done by the owners express consent and by a Law without their express consent And as the Law is the Lord of a Villain may transferr his Villains property in Lands or Goods to himself by entry or seisure And it is the signal difference between a Freeman and Villain that it cannot be done to a Freeman nor yet to a Villain to the use of any but his Lord. The Learned and Judicious Grotius in his excellent Work de Jure belli ac pacis is most apposit upon this subject Grot. de Jure belli ac pacis l. 1. c. 1. Sect. 5 6. Sicut ergo ut bis duo non sint quatuor ne à Deo quidem potest effici ita ne hoc quidem ut quod intrinseca ratione malum est malum non sit And then follows after some further explanation of his notion Ita si quem Deus occidi praecipiat aut res alicujus auferri non licitum fiet Homicidium aut furtum quae voces vitium involvunt sed non erit Homicidium aut furtum quod vitae rerum supremo Domino auctore fit And it is the same to say Si quem Lex occidi praecipiat aut res alicujus auferri non licitum fiet homicidium aut furtum quae voces vitium involvunt sed non erit homicidium aut furtum quod a lege vitae rerum potestatem habente auctore fit If any need further satisfaction concerning what hath been said on this occasion he may resort with success to the place quoted of that great Lawyer But it is to be observed That altering or changing property is no subject matter for a dispensation A man is not dispens'd with to do an act which he cannot do but to do an act which simply he can do but the Law prohibits his doing it penally But altering or changing property is an act simply out of his power to do which should be dispens'd with in that behalf And thus we see violation of property is a malum per se by that Book of 11 H. 7. and the reason why it is so and cannot be dispens'd with A third kind of malum per se by that Case of 11 H. 7. 11 H. 7. is that which the Law of the Land admits to be specially prohibited Jure Divino Et Isint le Roy ne nul Evesque ou Presbiter poit doner licence a un de faire Lechery Quia est malum in se saith the Book that is Coition without wedlock which offence when by mutual consent injures no property having two husbands or two wives at the same time but that is also against the property of the first husband or wife marriage within the Levitical degrees 32 H. 8. c. 38. All which are admitted by the Law of the Land to be prohibited Jure Divino and cannot be dispenc'd with For no Human authority can make lawful what Divine authority hath made unlawful without Gods leave and then it is by his authority Many more particulars fall under this head which I shall not now mention Hence I infer mala in se to be only such as imply a contradiction to be made lawful and consequently what may be made lawful by Human Law to be no malum in se as not differing from other things which may be permitted or prohibited occasionally at the

bono populi complicati as the King in his discretion shall think fit to order them for the good of the whole In this notion the estate of every Pater familias may be said to be pro bono Communi of his Family which yet is but at his discretion and management of it and they have no interest in it but have benefit by it Offences not to be dispens'd with There are other penal Laws by Acts of Parliament and punishable at the Kings Suit by Indictment or Presentment the transgressing of which is to the immediate wrong of particular persons and for which the Law gives them special Actions with which the King cannot dispense As he cannot licence a man to commit maintenance to make a forcible entry to carry distresses out of the hundred 8 H. 6. c. 9. Stat. 1 2 P. M. c. 12. contrary to the Statute which yet are no Mala in se for it is no Malum in se to maintain in a just cause to enter forcibly where the entry is lawful to carry a distress farther or nearer but are mala when prohibita and non when permissa as they would be w●re the Laws repeal'd and were before they were made From whence it is clear there are mala prohibita by Acts of Parliament with which the King cannot dispense And next it follows not that a Malum with which the King cannot dispense is a Malum in se which are the exceptions I took to the receiv'd Rule out of the Case of 11 H. 7. No non obstante can dispense in these Cases 8 H. 6. f. 19. The Chancellor of Oxfords Case Br. Pat. n. 15. and many the like for that were to grant that a man should not have lawful Actions brought against him or be impleaded at least in certain Actions which the King cannot grant For the same reason the King cannot licence a Baker Brewer or Victualler to break the Assise of Bread or Ale Stat. de Pistoribus c. 7. 31 E. 1. nor a Miller to take more Toll than the Law appoints nor a Taverner to break the Assise of Wine nor a Butcher to sell measled Swines flesh or Murrain flesh nor any man to forestall the Market by a non obstante of the Statute de Pistoribus which prohibits all these under severe penalties Nor can he licence Butchers Fishmongers Poultrers or other sellers of Victuals nor Hostlers to sell Hay and Oats at what price they please Stat. 23 E. 3. c. 6. 13 R. 2. c. 8. 9 Car. 1. Cam. Stell by a non obstante of the Statute of 23 E. 3. c. 6. and 13 R. 2. c. 8. which require that the prises be moderate And it was so resolved and decreed in the Star-Chamber by opinion of all the Judges 9 Car. 1. and that the Iustices of the Peace in the respective Counties were to ascertain the prises of Hay and Oats He cannot licence a Labourer to take more wages Regist f. 190. a tit de Servientibus In the Table of the Register the Title is de Laborariis nor any Officers to take more Fees than the Law allows nor to distrain a mans Plough-Beasts where there is other distress for in these and multitudes of like cases the damaged person hath his Action equally as for a Nusance to his particular hurt And even in the Case of a Common Informer who cannot sue but in the King's Name as well as his own when he is once intitled to Action which he never is but by commencing Suit for then the Action popular is become his proper Action the King can neither pardon release or otherwise discharge his right in the Suit as is fully resolved 1 H. 7. 1 H. 7. f. 3. and in many other Books much less can he discharge or prevent the Action of any other man The Statute of 12 Car. 2. c. 25. upon which this Case ariseth hath examples of penal Laws in both these kinds 12 Car. 2. c. 25 1. Every man is prohibited to sell Wine by retail contrary to the Act upon forfeiture of Five pounds for every offence from which offence no third man can possibly derive a particular damage to himself for which he can have an Action upon his Case 2. If any man should have an Action because another sold a pint of Wine without licence every man should have the like Action which the Law permits not Whence it follows That the offence wrongs none but the King and therefore he may as in like Cases dispense with it By a second Clause in that Act the mingling of Wine with several Ingredients therein mentioned is penally prohibited as by another Clause the sale of Wine at greater prizes than the Act limits He that shall offend either by unlawful mixtures or by selling dearer than the Law admits doth a particular wrong to the buyer for which he may have his Action and therefore the King cannot dispense with either of those Offences Dispensations void against Acts of Parliament for maintaining Native Artificers The Case of Monopolies the eleventh Report If Forreign Manufactures or Forreign Corn as by the Acts of 3 E. 4. c. 4. ● 3 E. 4. c. 3. be prohibited for support of those Artificers and the Husbandmen within the Kingdom a Licence to one or more to bring them in if general is void by the Case of Monopolies notwithstanding a Non obstante 1. All penal Laws when made and in force are equally necessary and in things necessary there is no gradation of more or less necessary 2. If any penal Laws were possibly less dispensable than others but upon the differences already given those capitally penal were less dispensable than those less penal but it is not so 11 H. 7. f. 11. for coyning mony of right Alloy in imitation of the Kings Coyn is capitally penal without licence but it may be licenced 1 H. 7. f. 3. If transporting Wooll were Felony yet the King may licence it It is capital to multiply Gold or Silver by the Statute of 5 H. 4. c. 4. but may be licenc'd Cok. plac Coronae f. 74. c. 20. as was done to John Faceby tempore H. 6. the Dispensation with a non obstante of that Statute may be seen Coke's placita Coronae f. 74. c. 20. If an Ad quod damnum issue to enquire ad quod damnum vel praejudicium a licence for a Mortmain will be One Inquiry is Si patria per donationem illam magis solito non oneretur c. Though the Retorn be that by such licence patria magis solito oneretur yet the licence if granted will be good which shews that Clause is for Information of the King that he may not licence what he would not and not for Restraint to hinder him to licence what he would Fitz. Nat. Br. Ad quod damum f. 222 b. Letter D. For by Fitz-herbert the usual licence now is with Et hoc absque aliquo

the first Cestuy que use nor his Heir the last Cestuy que use in the Case could nor can have any benefit of this warranty because William the first Cestuy que use nor his Heir could not nor can warrant to himself but as to William and his Heirs the warranty is clearly extinct The Argument And as to the first Question I conceive the Law to be that the warranty of William the Tenant in tayl descending upon Elizabeth and Sarah the Demandants his Heirs at Law is no barr in the Formedon in Reverter brought by them as Heirs to William their Grandfather the Donor though it be a Collateral warranty I know it is the perswasion of many professing the Law That by the Statute of Westminster the second De donis conditionalibus the Lineal warranty of Tenant in tayl shall be no barr in a Formedon in the Descender but that the Collateral warranty of Tenant in tayl is at large as at the Common Law unrestrain'd by that Statute Sir Edward Coke in his Comment upon Section 712. Sect. 712. of Littleton A lineal warranty doth not bind the right of an Estate tayl for that it is restrain'd by the Statute de donis Conditionalibus And immediately follows A lineal warranty and assets is a barr of the right in tayl and is not restrain'd But the reason why the warranty of Tenant in tayl with Assets binds the right of the Estate tayl is in no respect from the Statute de donis but is by the Equity of the Statute of Glocester by which the warranty of Tenant by the Courtesie barrs not the Heir for the Lands of his Mother if the Father leave not Assets to descend in recompence And therefore it was conceived after the Statute de donis was made That if Tenant in tayl left Assets to descend in Fee-simple his warranty should bind the right of the Issue in tayl by the equity of that preceding Statute of Glocester Whereas if the Statute of Glocester had not been the Lineal warranty of Tenant in tayl had no more bound the right of the Estate tayl by the Statute de donis with Assets descending than it doth without Assets For the better clearing therefore of the Law in the Case in question I shall preparatorily assert some few things and clear what I so assert without which the truth of the Conclusion I hold will not appear so naked to the Hearers as it should Ass 1. The first is That at the Common Law the distinction of a lineal and collateral warranty was useless and unknown For though what we now call a Collateral and a lineal warranty might be in speculation and notionable at the Common Law as at this day a Male warranty or a Female warranty may be yet as to any effect in Law there was no difference between a Lineal warranty and a Collateral but the warranty of the Ancestor descending upon the Heir be it the one or the other did equally bind And this as it is evident in it self so is it by Littleton whose words are Litt. Sect. 697. Before the Statute of Glocester all warranties which descended to them who are Heirs to those who made the warranties were barrs to the same Heirs to demand any Lands or Tenements against the warranties except the warranties which commence by disseisin Therefore if a Question had been at the Common Law only Whether in some particular Case the Ancestors warranty had bound the Heir It had been a sensless Answer to say it did or did not because the warranty was Lineal or Collateral for those warranties were not defined at the Common Law nor of use to be defined But the proper Answer had been That the warranty did bind the Heir because it commenc'd not by disseisin for every warranty of the Ancestor but such descending upon the Heir did bind him So if after the Statute of Glocester Tenant by the Courtesie had aliened with warranty had it been demanded if the Heir were barr'd by that warranty it had been an absurd Answer That he was not because it was a Collateral warranty of his Father without Assets For all Collateral warranties of the Father were not restrained but his warranty in that Case which could be no other than Collateral was restrained by the Statute Therefore The adequate Answer had been That the Fathers warranty bound not in that Case without Assets because the Statute of Glocester had so restrained it My second Assertion is Ass 2. That the Statute de Donis restrains not the warranty of Tenant in tayl from barring him in the Remainder in tayl by his warranty descending upon him 1. For that the mischief complained of and remedied by the Statute is That in omnibus praedictis casibus therein recited post prolem suscitatam habuerunt illi quibus Tenementum sic conditionaliter datum fuit hucusque potestatem alienandi Tenementum sic datum exhaeredandi exitum eorum contra voluntatem Donatoris But the warranty of the Donee in tayl descending upon him in the Remainder who regularly claims by purchase from the Donor and not by descent from the Donee in tayl could be no disinheriting of the Issue of the Donee claiming by descent from him against which disinheriting only the Statute provides which is evident by the Writ of Formedon in the Descender framed by the Statute in behalf of such Issue of the Donee whom the Statute intends 2. The Statute did not provide against Inconveniences or Mischiefs which were not at the time of making the Statute but against those which were But at the making of it there could be no Remainder in tayl because all Estates which are Estates tayl since the Statute were Fee-simples Conditional before the Statute upon which a Remainder could not be limited So is Sir Edward Coke in his Comment upon the Statute de Donis The Formedon in Reverter did lye at Common Law Cok. part 2. f. 336. but not a Formedon in Remainder upon an Estate tayl because it was a Fee-simple Conditional whereupon no Remainder could be limited at Common Law but after the Statute it may be limited upon an Estate tayl in respect of the Division of the Estates 3. The Statute formed a Writ of Formedon in the Descender for the new Estate tayl created by the Statute and mentions a Formedon in the Reverter as already known in the Chancery for the Donor for whom the Statute likewise intended to provide but formed or mentioned none for the Remainder in tayl And the Cases are common in Littleton Litt. Sect. 716 718 719. and in many other Books that the warranty of Donee in tayl is Collateral to him in the Remainder in tayl and binds as at the Common Law But thence to conclude That therefore the warranty of the Donee in tayl shall barr the Donor of his Reversion because it is a Collateral warranty also is a gross Non sequitur for the Donees warranty doth not therefore barr

Warranty unless he hath Assets by descent in Fee-simple by the same Ancestor that made the warranty But saith not he that demandeth Fee-tayl by Formedon in Remainder shall not be barr'd quod nota as to the Case Sect. 719. But Collateral warranty is a barr to him that demandeth Fee and also to him that demandeth Fee-tayl without any other descent of Fee-simple Whence it was concluded That the Collateral warranty must barr the Donor without Assets who demands a Fee-simple But Littleton's words end not there but immediately follow Except in Cases which are restrain'd by the Statutes in the plural number which words taken in as Littleton's Case is make his Authority directly for me For when Littleton wrote there were but two Statutes which restrain'd any warranty from binding as at Common Law namely the Statute of Glocester and Westminster the second de Donis now there is a third 11 H. 7. c. 20. So as those words of Littleton are the same as if he had said Except in Cases restrain'd by the Statutes of Glocester and Westminster the second de Donis Whence it follows That by Littleton both Statutes did restrain some Collateral warranties but the Statute de Donis restrains no other than the Collateral warranty of the Donee descending upon the Donor it leaving all other Collateral warranties as at the Common Law Ergo it doth restrain that which is the solution of the Question and according to Littleton I have examined several Editions of Littleton and the words are the same in all Si non in Cases restrained per les Estatutes No man will say that by those words Except in Cases restrained by the Statutes Littleton meant Statutes that were not then made nor perhaps never would be For that were to make him say in instructing his Son for and to whom he writ his Books what the Law was But a Collateral warranty doth bind both for Fee and Fee tayl except in Cases restrain'd by Statutes yet to be made and which perhaps never will be made Besides the words restrain'd per les Estatutes by the Statutes always denote Statutes which signally are and not which are not 3. The third Objection was from Littleton Sect. 716. where it is shewed the Collateral warranty of Tenant in tayl doth bind him in Remainder in tayl which is agreed for the Statute de Donis restrains not the warranty of Donee in tayl descending upon him in Remainder as hath been cleared 4. The fourth Objection was the Case of 41 Ed. 3. Fitz. tit Garranty pl. 16. whence it was urg'd as Justice Herles Opinion and by him spoken 1. That he was at the making of the Statute de Donis 2. That the makers of the Statute intended that the Donees warranty should not barr a Donor stranger in blood to the Donee but should barr a Donor of kindred to the Donee This Case is of no Credit in several respects For 1. The Statute makes no such difference of a Donor stranger and a Donor privy in blood to the Donee as is urg'd in that Case 2. The Statute is That the Donors will was to be observ'd expressed in his Charter of Gift and if a Donor were privy in blood yet his will in his Charter might be the same as that of a stranger Donor and was equally by the Statute to be observed 3. The warranty of Donee in tayl could never descend upon a stranger Donor for such could never be his Heir nor needed any help of the Statute against his warranty 4. The Donor in Frank-marriage who might be Cosen to either party married and must be of kindred to one or both Donees is expresly named as a Donor wronged by the Donees alienation in the Statute Therefore a Donor of the Donees blood was within the remedy of the Statute 5. Nor could this be Herle's Opinion in 41 E. 2. but in the Context of the Report Finchden saith Il est dit in terms Comment Herle que fuit un Justic dit que il fuit al fesanc del Stat. dit as before And for that the name of Herle is written in the Report in large Letters as the Judges Names use to be it was mistaken at the Barr as if the Context had begun Herle que fuit un Justic dit which could not then be an Opinion of Herles For if he were at the making of the Statute de Donis 13 E. 1. he could not then be less than Four and twenty or Five and twenty years old and must have liv'd after until 41 E. 3. above Eighty years But the truth is he died in or soon after 7 E. 3. So it is not Herle's Opinion but Finchden saith It is said in Terms that is of the Year Books how Herle who was a Iustice said He was at the making of the Statute which was made to redress the Mischief to the Donor who was a stranger And therefore he said that the Donor in the Case being no stranger he saw no reason why he should not be barr'd being out of the mischief of the Statute but gave no Rule but the Debate was adjourn'd Another Reason proving this is That it is said Herle que fuit un Justic which no Reporter ever said of a Iustice at present and reporting his Opinion What Finchden said is grounded upon what he had heard was said by Herle in former terms But no such Opinion of Herles appears any where but the contrary clearly in several places The Reporter at the end of the Case 7 E. 3. f. 34. Fitz. Garranty p. 44. hath vid. 5 E. 3. Opinion Herle que le warranty le Ten. in tayl n'est pas barr al donor pour ceo que le statut reherse le mischief quod Donatores fuerunt exclusi de Reversionibus hucusque les heires disherit issint à restrainer tiel point fuit le stat de Donis Conditionalibus fait quod voluntas donatoris observetur Here is Herle's own Opinion expresly contrary to what Finchden by hearsay only said it was In another Case upon question Fitz. 7 E. 3. f. 48. p. 46. Whether the warranty of Tenant in tayl barr'd him in Remainder Herle saith Le statute voet que ceux as queux les Tenements sont done ne eient power de alienation quo minus il descendra al Issue ou retorn al Donor in ceo point le statute voet que le volunt del donor in omnibus observetur mes le statute ne parle riens de cestuy in le Remainder and so rul'd Here is the Opinion of Herle in another Case That the warranty of the Donee in tayl barr'd not the Issue in tayl nor the Donor by the Statute but barr'd him in Remainder as not aided by the Statute In a question Fitz. p. 61. Garranty 6 E. 3. f. 56. Whether the King were barr'd by the warranty of Tenant in tayl his Ancestor for a Reversion descended to him with Assets Herle gives his Opinion as known Law

of the Court if the name of the County be familiar to them as those of Wales are but not those of Ireland We must then look higher and search for surer Premisses than those late Awards of the Courts at Westminster to determine this Question And first it must be agreed That when Wales was a Kingdom or Territory governed by its own Laws and the people subject to a Prince peculiar to themselves immediately and not to the Crown of England no Process of any nature could issue thither from the Courts of England more than to any other Forreign Dominion that is not of the Dominion of England In which Assertion I neither do nor need affirm any thing Whether Wales were held from the Crown of England by Feodal Right or not and what sort of Liegeance the Princes of Wales and from what time did owe to the King of England For whatever that was yet Wales was governed by its own Laws and not bound by any Law made in England to bind them more than Scotland was when yet the King of Scotland did homage to the King of England for that very Kingdom of Scotland I begin then with the time that Wales came to be of the Dominion of the Crown of England and was obliged to such Laws as the Parliament of England would enact purposely to bind it This was not before the entire submission of Wales de alto basso as the words of the Statute of Rutland are to King E. 1. which a little in time preceded the making of those Laws for Wales called the Statute of Rutland Whether it was really a Statute by Parliament or concession of the King by his Charter for the future Government of Wales is not material for so at least it appears to be But by what transaction soever either of voluntary submission or partly by force of Arms it was effected it is evident that from that time Wales became absolutely of the Dominion of the Kingdom of England and not only of the Empire of the King of England as it might possibly have been for now Scotland is The words of the Statute of Rutland are Divina Providentia quae in sui dispositione non fallitur inter alia suae dispensationis munera quibus Nos Regnum Nostrum Angliae decorari dignata est terram Walliae cum incolis suis prius nobis jure feodali subjectam jam sui gratia in proprietatis nostrae Domin obstaculis quibuscunque cessantibus totaliter cum integritate convertir coronae regni praed tanquam partem corporis ejusdem annexit univit So as from this time it being of the Dominions of the English the Parliaments of England might make Courts to bind it but it was not immediately necessary it should but its former Laws excepting in point of Soveraignty might still obtain or such other as E. 1. should constitute to whom they had submitted and accordingly their Laws after their Submission were partly their Old Laws and partly New ordained by him Preamble Stat. Walliae Leges Consuetudines partium illarum hactenus usitatas coram nobis proceribus Regni nostri fecimus recitari quibus diligenter auditis plenius intellectis quasdam illarum de consilio procerum praedictorum delevimus quasdam permisimus quasdam correximus etiam quasdam alias adjiciendas faciendas decrevimus eas de caetero in terris Nostris in partibus illis perpetua firmitate teneri Observari volumus in forma subscripta Then follow the Ordinances appointing Writs Original and Judicial in many things varying from those of England and a particular manner of proceeding and a particular Justiciar to administer Justice and particular Chancery out of which the Writs for those parts were to issue So as though Wales became of the Dominion of England from that time yet the Courts of England had nothing to do with Administration of Justice there in other manners than now they have with the Western Islands Barbadoes St. Christophers Mevis New England which are of the Dominions of England and so is Ireland the Isles of Garnsey and Jersey at present all which may be bound by Laws made respectively for them by an English Parliament but all or most of them at present by Laws appointed and made by the King's Letters Patents and the King's Writs Original or Judicial from the Courts of Westminster go not there so anciently were Gascoign Guyen and Calais of the Dominions of England but governed by the Customes and Laws used there and out of the Jurisdiction of the Kings Courts And it is observable That these Territories of France were not held by the Crown of England by that right it had to all France as is much mistaken and particularly by Sir Edward Coke in Calvin's Case For those Territories by an Act and Conclusion of Peace made by E. 3. with the French which was ratified by the Parliaments of both Kingdoms those Territories were then annexed thereby to the Dominion of the Crown of England whereof I had a fair and ancient Copy from Mr. Selden but lost it by the fire And that Gascoign Guyen 2 R. 3. f. 12. and Calais were of the Dominions of England and Ireland appears by the Book 2 R. 3. f. 12. But to all Dominions of Acquisition to the Crown of England some Writs out of the King's Chancery have constantly run Sir Edward Coke in Calvin's Case Calvin's Case 7. Rep. f. 20. calleth them Brevia mandatoria non remedialia distinguishing Writs into Brevia mandatoria remedialia Brevia mandatoria non remedialia The first sort he saith never issue into Dominions belonging to England but not parts of it the other do More intelligibly it may be said That Writs in order to the particular Rights and Properties of the Subject which he calls Brevia mandatoria remedialia for this Writ is a Mandate issue not to Dominions that are no part of England but belonging to it For surely as they have their particular Laws so consequently they must have their particular Mandates or Writs in order to them And though their Laws should by accident be the same with those of England as hath happened to Ireland some times and now to Wales yet the Administration of them is not necessarily by and under the Jurisdiction of the Courts of England Brevia mandatoria non remedialia are Writs that concern not the particular Rights or Properties of the Subjects but the Government and Superintendency of the King Ne quid Respublica capiat detrimenti such are Writs for safe Conduct and protection Writs for Apprehension of persons in his Dominions of England and withdrawing to avoid the Law into other of his Dominions as he instances in such Writs to the Dominions of Gascoign viz. to the Major of Bourdeaux there to certifie concerning a person Outlaw'd in England if he were in Servitio Regis there of like nature are the Writs of

but for Churches only within the Lordships Marchers whether of the Kings Patronage or others for there it is certain according to the reason given in the Books that the Stewards of the Lordships Marchers to whomsoever they belonged could not write to the Bishops And Newton was right 19 H. 6. That if Action of Dower once brought in the Court of any Signiory real it should be Royal in Wales and there issue should be upon usque accouple in loyal Matrimony which must be tryed by the Bishop but the Court had no power to write to the Bishop but therefore saith he The King shall write to the Marshal to remove the Record hither and then we shall make Process to the Bishop But this is against the Resolution of all the Judges in Cr. 2 Car. 1. f. 34. So as either of Necessity this was a provision in the same Act That as well Quare Impedits should be brought in England of Churches in the Lordships Marchers of Wales as that Writs should be brought in England of Lordships Marchers or any part of them in question because Justice could not be had in Wales either concerning such Lordships or Churches or else Churches within Lordships Marchers being in the same Case for a failer of Justice they were comprehended and ought to be so within the equity of that Act of Parliament for Iustice to be had touching the Lordships themselves and that the Law was such appears 1. That only Quare Impedits for Churches in Lordships Marchers in Wales and not for Churches in the ancient Shires or of the Principality of Wales whereof submission and render was made to E. 1. were to be brought and tryed in England 2. That Tryals and Writs in England for Land in Wales were only for Lordships Marchers and not for any Land in Wales which was of the ancient Principality for the Lordships Marchers were or most of them of the Dominion of England and held of the King in chief as appears by the Statute 28 E. 3. c. 2. and by the Title of the Earl of March before the rendition of the Principality to E. 1. That the Law was so for the Quare Impedits appears in the first place by the Book before cited 11 H. 6. f. 3. where Danby Martin and Newton were of Opinion argued about a Church in Garnsey for the Case before them was not of a Church in Wales That Quare Impedits for Churches in Wales were to be brought in England which was true but not for Churches which were not in any Lordships Marchers Strange affirms positively in the same Case in these words It is frequent to have Quare Impedits in Wales Per Strange 11 H. 6. f. 3. and the Bishops there do serve the Writs directed to them which I my self have often seen And what he said was most true for Churches within the Principality as what the other Judges said was also true concerning Churches within the Lordships Marchers for those Courts had no power to write to the Bishops But this is most manifest by the Statute of Wales 12 E. 1. That the Kings Justiciar there had power within the County where he was Justiciar to write to the Bishops which the Lords Marchers could not do The words of the Law are upon demand of Dower in Wales before the Kings Justiciar Stat. Walliae f. 17. Si forte objiciat quare non debet dotem habere eo quod nunquam fuit tali quem ipsa vocat virum legitimo matrimonio copulata tunc mandabitur Episcopo quod super hoc inquirat veritatem inquisita veritate certificet Justitiarios Walliae secundum certificationem Episcopi procedatur ad judicium It is clear also 10 H. 4. f. 6. That the Bishops of Wales were originally of the Foundation of the Princes of Wales as is the Book of 10 H. 4. and their Courts did write to their own Bishops as the Courts in England did to the Kings Bishops And when the Dominion of Wales was lawfully vested in the King of England his Justices there must have the same power as to the Bishops that the Justices of the Courts of the Prince of Wales had before How the same stands in this point since the Statute of 27 of the Vnion of Wales with England shall be shewed after Besides what hath been already shewed That the Writs out of the Chancery in England issued not into Wales for Tryals of Land other than the Land of Lordships Marchers and by a special Law that was provided but neither for other Lands nor for other Issues arising in Wales Tryals were not to be in the English Counties 11 H. 6. f. 3. A B. In 11 H. 6. Danby saith That if a Church in Wales which is out of the Jurisdiction of the Common Law and a Franchise of the Prince cannot award a Writ to the Bishop and for this cause it must be brought here But other Actions are not maintainable here of a thing done in Wales which was true of a thing done within the Principality and of a Church within the Principality also a Quare Impedit was not to be brought in England 19 H. 6. f. 12. A. In 19 H. 6. Fortescue takes a difference between Wales which was once a Kingdom of it self and the Counties Palatine which were parcels of England and therefore saith The King may send a Record to be tryed in the Counties Palatine because he might do so at Common Law but could not into Wales because he could not at Common Law And then he saith That is the cause that the Statute wills that of things pleaded there as of a Release bearing date there it shall be tryed in the next adjoyning County What this Statute should be he means unless it be the same mentioned in the Case 18 E. 2. is not intelligible for the Statute of 9 E. 3. which speaks of Releases pleaded in Franchises within the Realm That they should be tryed in the County where the Action was brought he cannot intend for that Wales was no Franches nor Franchis of the Realm and Tryals where the Action is brought is not a Tryal in the next adjoyning County to the place where the Issue arises And by Ascue expresly in that Case that Statute proves in it self it doth not extend to a Deed bearing date in Wales but all such Deeds and all other things alledged in Wales shall be tryed in the County next adjoyning by the Common Law for so he adds which could not be So as an Action brought upon a Bond or Deed made in Wales Ireland Normandy Dutchland or upon a matter there alledged cannot possibly be for want of Tryal but a Plea in Barr to an Action brought arising there some question hath been Whether such a Plea shall not be tryed where the Action is brought and in such a Case if the Plea in Barr arise wholly out of the Realm of England the better Opinion is that such Plea