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A94173 Ten lectures on the obligation of humane conscience Read in the divinity school at Oxford, in the year, 1647. By that most learned and reverend father in God, Doctor Robert Sanderson, Bishop of Lincoln. &c. Translated by Robert Codrington, Master of Arts. Sanderson, Robert, 1587-1663.; Codrington, Robert, 1601-1665. 1660 (1660) Wing S631; ESTC R227569 227,297 402

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defective in those things which are beyond its Sphear of which nature are the mysteries of Faith and weak in those things which are a little more remote from those precepts which are most universal in those cases I say we must have recourse to the light of the word as to a light shining in a dark place 2 Pet. 1. 19. To the Law and the Testimony if they speak not according to this word it is because there is no light in them Ifa 8. 20. Thy word is a Lantern unto my feet and a light unto my path Ps 119. 105. If I should enlarge my self upon the perfection and the profit of this Law there would be no end of my discourse See on this Subject the nineteenth Psalm where there you shall find much in few words and concisely And the hundred and nineteenth Psalm where you shall find the same things in more words and more largely represented XXVII Moreover there are two parts of this Law the Law properly so called and the Gospel I do not here understand the Law and the Gospel in that sence as for the most part it is taken by Divines for the two Covenants made by God with man The covenant of Works and the covenant of Grace but in the more common acceptation for the Books of the old and new Testament which the Fathers not unaptly for this purpose have called the old Law and the new Law but both these Laws all the whole Law of Moses and the new Law of Christ for that part of it which containeth moral institutions is cryed down by the Antinomians the Anabaptists and Enthusiasts and other prodigious names of a generation of people of our age as altogether unprofitable and unworthy of the care and study of a Christian after he is come to be of age in Christ and annoynted with the unction of the Spirit They will admit of no Law but only the Law of Faith and the Dictates of the Spirit I am not at leasure now to confute them neither indeed is it very needfull seeing that the Apostle James hath long since so opposed the Monsters of such errours as if by some Prophetick Spirit he had on purpose undertaken the Confutation of them XXVIII The old Law which is called the Mosaical Law is distinguished into three parts the Moral the Ceremonial and the Judicial Of every one whereof many things are diversely disputed by many men I shall at this time passe them by and briefly propound unto you what I conceive of the obligation of them reserving in the mean time to every man his own Judgment I say therefore in the first place That no Law at all delivered by Moses doth formally directly and by its self oblige the Conscience of Christians as it is the Law delivered by Moses my reason is that every Mosaical Law as Mosaical was positive and a Law positive doth oblige none but those only on whom it is imposed Seeing therefore that the Law delivered by Moses was only imposed on the peculiar Nation of the Hebrews as may easily appear to any man that will observe but the beginning of it Hear Israel and the whole Addresse of the folowing discourse it cannot so appertain unto those who are out of the number of that Nation as by that account to oblige them because delivered by Moses But if any part of that Law doth now oblige Christians as certainly the Commandements of the Decalogue are obliging it commeth to passe by Accident and ratione materiae by reason of the matter not because Moses so commanded but because that which hath been commanded by him is either agreeable to the Law of Nature or confirmed in the new Law by Christ himself XXIX I say in the second place That the Ceremonial Law of Moses doth oblige the Jewes in their Consciences before the Gospel of Jesus Christ was preached to them but not other men unlesse those only who were Proselytes of the Jewish Religion and worship who consisting of two kinds Proselytae Portae and Proselytae Justitiae so called by the Jews that is to say Proselytes of the Gate and Proselytes of Righteousnesse were obliged to the observation of the Ritual precepts Those of the former kind were obliged to the fewer but those of the latter as the Jews themselves were obliged to the observation of them all Now from the time of the Death and Resurrection of Christ since the Gospel began first to be preached to the Jews and afterwards to the Gentiles until the eversion of the Temple of Jerusalem and the Jewish Common-wealth this Law indeed was dead if we love to speak after St. Augustine but not deadly which is to say that it had lost the force of obliging but the Rites and Ceremonies delivered by Moses were not altogether unlawful but left as indifferent to the observation of every man so that it was lawful for any one according to the emergency of the occasion to use the freedom of his own will and to use them or not to use them a due respect being always had to Prudence and Charity And that this was the sence of St. Paul is so manifest both by his constant Doctrine and his Practice that there needeth no proof of it And after the eversion of the Temple it was spoken by diverse men that this part of the Law of Moses was not only dead but mortiferous which unlesse it be rightly applyed and with a prepared Distinction I am affraid will be found to be more wittily than solidly expressed For all Ceremonies are not alike to be esteemed But those which concern Order and Decency are wisely to be severed from those which were the Figures of Christ to come for those figurative Ceremonies which were instituted by God to be Types of Christ our Redeemer to come in the Flesh such as were Circumcision sacrifices and many such like became certainly of no use after Christ did really fulfill all things which were typically figured in those Ceremonies and sufficiently declared to the whole world by the Preachers of his Gospel that all those things were rightly fulfilled they are therefore to be taken away not only as dead and rotten but are most carefully to be shunned by every true Christian as deadly and pestiferous and above all things it must most precisely be taken heed unto that they be not observed with any opinion of necessity according to that Gal. 5. 2. I Paul say unto you if you be circumcised Christ will profit you nothing But those Ceremonies which pertain only to the outward Decency in the solemnity of the Divine-worship although peradventure it were better not to use them where a just cause of offence may be given yet they are not simply to be condemned as unlawfull upon this bare account that they are a part of the Mosaical paedagogy XXX I say in the third place That although many do distinguish betwixt those Political Laws of Moses which were of a common right of which they
some suddain and unexpected Emergencies those Laws may be defective in some particular cases not foreseen And in this Case if there be not a person orsome persons to exercise a kind of an arbitrary Power there will be no other effectual Remedy to relieve the endangered Country and provide for the publick safety And this is the reason why wise men have always determined and Reason also perswadeth to it that in exigent points of necessity Legal Justice ought to give place to Equity Equity according unto Aristotle being nothing else then the rectifying 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist ib●d or the correcting of legal justice or even of the Law it self as presently afterwards he explains that Definition by supplying its defect in particular cases in which it comes to pass that by too much generality it falls short of either Justice or the publick Profit For it is necessary that Laws should be constituted generally out of a respect to those things which generally and for the most part are done but not out of a respect to all those things which may be contingent in particulars in many of which if Laws were strictly and by a praes●ript of words accommodated they must necessarily be defective also and fall short of either moral Justice or of Common Profit or of both of them XVII This being then granted that the safety of the People that is the publick profit doth require that there be some Authority in the Common-wealth which is to be above the Laws and to supply the defects thereof it will necessarily follow by Consequence Aistot 3. which Aristotle asserteth in his politicks Polit II. that this supreme Authority cannot appertain to any one else than to him alone who is set over the whole Commonalty and invested with the chiefest Power Whether he be a single person as in a monarchial Government or many as in other Forms of Common-wealths Shall it be lawful therefore now for Subjects under pretence of of publick liberty and safety to break all the Bonds Ordinances Laws and Fidelity and by an intolerable rage of Pride 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to tread under their Feet the Authority of Laws and Princes and for the Defence of so great a Villany impudently to abuse and pervert that Aphorism which tho●e factious men are always boasting of and repeating to one another viz. Salus populi est suprema Lex Homer Illiad ● The safety of the people is the supreme Law How comes it to pass that on the contrary they will not understand that even by the very same Axiom it is acknowledged that the Prince hath a Power even over the Laws themselves so that it is lawful for him out of the fulnesse of his Power if necessity compels and the Affairs admit of no delay for the defence of his own and his Peoples safety against forein or domestick Enemys to lay aside for awhile the stricter observation of the Laws lest by a too superstitious and too unreasonable Reverence of them he suffers both himself and his people and at last the Laws themselves to fall into the power of his Enemies XVIII As to that Question whether a Ptince be free himself from the Laws he hath made which are confirmed and approved by the Consent of the People received by common Use and how far he is bound ordinarily to observe them I shall hereafter God willing give you my Judgement therein It is now only here demanded whether it be lawful for him without order and in case of necessity for the defence of his Country to do some thing either besides or against the Law it self That it is lawful for him so to do and that in good Conscience he may do it it is first proved by the Examples of the best Kings and by the Histories of all Nations that have been remarkable throughout the world And secondly Reason it self doth dictate it from the defect of the Laws in respect of the whole and from the uncertainty and multiplicity of particular events both which but even now I mentioned And thirdly those things do sufficiently prove it which are all●ged by Sam. on the Right of Kings 1. Sam. 6. which cannot well be interpreted otherwise although many in vain have attempted so to do But that the least scruple may not arise nor remain from any thing which hath here been spoken and is misunderstood Give me leave I pray you to call back this so divulged an Axiom to its first Original And if I shall not so perform it that you your selves may confesse that the Care of the publick safety the Laws somtimes laid aside doth according to the meaning and sence of the Axiom it self depend wholly on the will of the Prince and nothing at all on the will of the People proclaim me to grow dark in the cleare● light and that I have hitherto been not the Defendor but a Prevaricator and Betrayer of the best of Causes XIX I have declared already that this Axiom was derived from the Romans unto us I shall now add that which first of all as I know of is written in the first Book of Marcus Cicero de Legib. But by himself as he affirmeth taken out of the antient Laws of that Nation and described by him in the very word of the Law it self Having therefore in the former explained the Laws belonging to Religion and the worship of the Gods in his third Book he proceeds to give an account of those which belong to the Magistrates and Common-wealth Where amongst other things he hath these words I must beseech you to give due attention to them Regio Impereo duo sunto iique praecundo judicando consulendo Praetores Judices Consules appellantor Militiae summum jus habento Nemini parento Ollis Salus Populi suprema Lex esto Let there be two in the Soveraign Command and for their going before Ruling or Judging and Counselling let them be called Praetors Judges and Consuls Let the chief Right of the Militia be theirs let them be under none Let the Safety of the People be a supreme Law unto them To them that is to them that are invested with the soveraign Command who had the chiefest Power of the Militia and acknowledged not any Power above their own to which they were to be obedient That is to the two Consuls who although by the Constitution of that Common-wealth did exercise only a yearly Magistracy yet for that time they had the chiefest Power over the City the greatest part of the world which was in Subjection to the Roman Empire Come hither all you whosoever you are who amongst these or other Nations are assertors and Patrons of popular Licence Read and● read overagain every period weigh every sentence clause and point Examine every word syllable and tittle Where will you find the Prince being unwilling the least sign of any Power granted to the Subject either of judging of the safety of the People or of
proper unto Potentia's but to Habits to be obtained to be assumed to be layd down or to be lost but men are said to find to lose to take up and to depose their Consciences The Conscience therefore is not a Potentia but a Habit. XVII I do therefore thus state it The Conscience properly and formally and by a direct praedication is a Habit yet notwithstanding it may be a Potentia and that two ways first materially because it is in the Potentia as in the Subject 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say in which Secondly by approximation for being placed as it were in the midst betwixt Habitum acquisitum and puram potentiam a Habit acquired and a pure potentia it can assume the name of either as the Mediums do participate of either of the Extreams And hereupon it is that Conscience is found in little Children who are not capable of acquired Habits Neither is it altogether necessary that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the mind and the Conscience in Tit. 1. be contradistinct as bare Potentia's but it seems rather that both words are there taken by a Synecdoche the mind for the speeulative Intellect with all its pertinences as the Schoolmen speak it and the Conscience for the practicall Intellect with all its pertinences that is with all the faculties Habits and Acts and what do respectively pertain to any of them XVIII In the Definition of Conscience I have placed the word Faculty which in some measure doth seem to me to be common to the Potentia's and Habits and is very proper to signifie Habits innate Peradventure you will object that every Habit is acquired by often actings and therefore this doth so appertain to the essence of a Habit that Habits are especially to be known from Potentia's by it as by a specifical difference to wit that the Potentia's are accquired and the Habits natural therefore unless a man will maintain meer contradictions he ought not to say that Conscience is a Habit innate To this I answer that it must be indeed confessed that all Habits whatsoever both are and ought to be called accquired nay even those Habits which seem to be most natural and for this cause because they want the assistance of the sences and many praevious sensible actions that so the Species of things sensible in respect whereof the Soul of it self is like a clear table-table-Book may be conveyed into the Phantasy and become at last intelligible Neverthelesse some Habits may be called and with great reason too innate for as much as the mind by an inbred-light doth immediately give an assent to the thing propounded without any fear of the opposite to it only the Apprehension of the Terms being supposed neither to procure its assent doth it want the helps of internal study or external institution For example The Intellective Habit of this Principle Omne totum est majus qualibet sui parte Every thing that is whole is greater then any part of it is a Habit innate so far as by the force of the light of Nature and only out of the apprehension of the Terms the truth thereof of its own accord doth enter into the mind without any study or Teacher And yet nevertheless this Habit is acquired so far as it needeth the assistance of the sences that so by often actions in sensible things one may arrive unto the knowledge of the Terms that is to say what belongeth to the whole and what unto the parts XIX If it may be yet objected that the Conscience cannot be called an Innate Habit for those things which are Innate are not capable of errour neither can they be defective and they are the same in all in whomsoever they are but the Conscience can erre and be evil neither is it the same in all men I make answer that it doth indeed follow from this that the Conscience is not a Habit simply innate which no reasonable man will affirm for it is repugnant to Nature but as partly as before mentioned it is innate so also it is partly acquired The Soul of man doth bring with it as it were some seeds of knowledge of good and evil which grow up and are perfected by study and institution In the same manner natural agility is compleated by Exercise and natural Logick by Logick artificial the Conscience therefore in respect of those morall Agibles which as the School-men speak are of the first Dictates of Nature and are its primary objects is a natural or an innate Habit and is alike in all men and is always right without any errour or depravation but in respect of those things which are afterwards learned and come close up unto those first principles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether it be by an internal and proper meditation or an external institution it is a Habit acquired and may be erronious and defective XX. But this is enough if not too much of the Genus of Conscience I shall more briefly dispatch the rest The second member of the Definition is the Subject which is twofold viz. Subjectum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Subjectum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Subject in which and the Subject of which The Subject 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or of which is man or rather a reasonable creature Math. 8 29. if we will speak more exactly for it is found in holy Writ that the Angels themselves are conscious of their Rebellion James 11 12. and of the punishments thereby due unto them 1 Corinth 6. 3. and that they know they shall be tormented yet neverthelesse they tremble at the revealed word of God as also that they are to be judged at the comming of the Lord and to give an account of all things they have done But because it belongeth not much to this discourse to know the nature of Angelick minds and it hath pleased the most wise God to make but little mention of it in the Scriptures I have appropriated this Definition of the Conscience unto man only For although in brutish creatures there appeareth a shadow of Conscience as of reason and many things are performed by them which do bear a show of Justice and Prudence as indeed what is reported of Elephants and of the policy of Bees and Dogs and of some other living Creatures is much to be admired yet they are all but the works of the Phantasy and not of Reason and they proceed from a natural Instinct and not from Conscience Man therefore is the proper Subject as well of Reason as of Conscience and every man is so the very Heathens the Reprobates and even Infants themselves being not excluded As for the Heathens St. Paul Rom. 2. 15. expressly speaketh that they do show the works of the Law to be written in their hearts their Consciences bearing them witnesse And the same Apostle Tit. 1 15. declareth that the filthiest persons have a Conscience although an impure one for the
assign some Notes and Critisms and betwixt those which were of a particular right it is not necessary that any such distinction should be made Nay we may roundly affirm that those Laws of Moses which are called Political or Judicial do none of them oblige Christian Magistrates to a strict observation of them but it is lawfull for them according to their own discretion and as they shall find find it expedient for the safety and profit of the Common-wealth either to revive them into power or to make them of no effect XXXI I affirm in the fourth place That the moral Law delivered by Moses that is to say the praecepts of the Decalogue or the ten Commandements do oblige all Christians as well as Jews to the observation of them All Protestants that I do know of do with one mouth acknowledge this truth Bellarmine therefore doth us the greater injury who feigneth that we do make Christian liberty to consist in this not to be bound in Conscience to be subjected to any Law and that Moses with his Decalogue doth not pertain unto us Let him see how he can clear himself of this scandal and vindicate those of his part from this crime if we are in it For the Controversie amongst his School-men is agitated Whether Christians are bound to the praecepts of the Decalogue only as they are the Declaratives of the Law of Nature or as they were also delivered by God to Moses and by Gods Commandement given by Moses to the people of God and transmitted into the holy Books Some there are of them that do deny the one others that do affirm both And in our Churches the same diversity of opinions is to be found if it be not rather a diversity in words than in opinions For seeing they amongst themselves and we do agree with them in this which is the main of all that the Moral Law which is delivered by Moses and is contained in the precepts of the Decalogue hath the power to oblige the Consciences of Christians it will peradventure be not worth our labour from whence it doth obtain that power to oblige In my judgement they speak more unto the purpose who say that this Law of Moses doth not oblige Christians formally and as it is delivered by Moses but onely by reason of the matter as it is the Declarative of the Law of Nature and it receiveth therefore all its force of obliging not from Moses bringing or delivering it but from the Dictates of the Law of Nature which God in the first Creation did inspire into our minds and after the Fall would have it to remain in them as the Remembrancer of his will And this may suffice to be spoken of the old Law or the Law of Moses XXXII The new Law or the Law of Christ that is to say the Gospel doth contain these three things 1. Mysteries of Faith to be believed in which chapter I comprehend the promises of God by Grace 2. Sacred Institutions Ceremonial and Ecclesiastick And 3. The Moral Precepts of which I speak and universally of all of them That the Gospel obligeth none but those only who are called those only to whom it is preached For where there is no Law there can be no transgression for moraly especially in Supernaturals it is the same thing Non esse et non apparere not to be and not to appear or not to be so sufficiently propounded as it may be known The words of our Saviour are expressly to this sence Ioh. 15. 22. If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin that is they had not been guilty of despising the Gospel But it obligeth all men to whom it is preached to an obedience as well of Faith as of Life so that we are all bound to whom the Gospel is preached both to believe in Christ as our Redeemer and to obey him as our Law-giver And whosoever shall fail in the performance of these two things shall suffer everlasting punishment for the neglect of his duty XXXIII I say in the third place That the Christian Church is obliged to the Sacred Institutions that is to the preaching of the word the administration of the Sacraments the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel and the exercise of the Keyes as well of Knowledg as of Power it is bound I say in all those things which pertain to the essence of them according to the institution of Christ and the Apostles so that it is not lawful for the Church much lesse for any particular congregation or person either willingly to diminish or to change any thing at all therein But the external circumstances of the Sacred Institution are so free that any particular Church may determine of them according to Time and Place and to the custome of the People of God and as it shall seem most expedient to Edification XXXIV In the third place I affirm That the Moral Precepts of the New Testament are the same according to their substance with the Morals of the Old Testament and they are both of them to be reduced to the Law of Nature which is contained in the ten Commandements as omnia Entia realia all real Beings are reduced to the ten Predicaments But the Precepts of Christ in the new Law as the holy Fathers of the Church do every where acknowledge are in many things far more excellent than the Precepts of Moses in the old Law not onely in that respect that they are propounded more fully and clearly but because they ascend also higher and do advance the true Christian to a more eminent degree of perfection and that with most effectual inducements on both sides the past Example of Christ being propounded to him on the one side and the inestimable reward to come in the Kingdom of Heaven on the other And this most clearly may appear in those two great Duties of a Christians life commanded in the new Law viz. of loving our enemies and taking up the cross For as some have dreamed these are not so onely to be esteemed as if they were onely Counsels to a more perfect life propounded to all men under the condition of a more large reward and oblige no man under sin and punishment but those onely who by a vow have obliged themselves to the observation of them But they expresly in themselves are Precepts and properly so called and universally obliging to the observation whereof all those who profess the Name of Christ are bound under the guilt of the most grievous sin to wit the abnegation of Christ and the punishment of eternal damnation unless they truly do repent And thus much concerning the second Light of the mind XXXV The third remaineth which we call the light acquired which surely is nothing else but an addition or increase of that light whether of Nature or Revelation which was before in the minde to some more eminent degree of clearness as when the will of God the
Duty so from a double Duty there ariseth a double Obligation for every Duty doth infer an Obligation and every Obligation doth suppose a Duty Therefore one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws is that by which Subjects are bound to obey the precepts of the Law it self and the other by which they are bound to submit themselves to the power of the Law-giver one of the Obligations belongeth to Active Obedience the other unto that Obedience which is called passive and to which we give the Name of Submission III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane Laws can oblige the Consciences of the Subject It is to be said in the first place that all Laws made by one invested by a lawful Power do oblige to Subjection so that it is not lawful for a Subject to resist the Supreme Power by force of Arms whether things just or unjust be commanded This w●● evermore the mind and practice of the Christians in the first Age of the Church living under the most griev●us Tyranny of the greatest Enemies to the name of Christ to make no mention herein of the Conduct and the instinct of Nature and the light of right Reason this is most manifest by the Doctrine of the two chiefest of the Apostles For so Peter the Apostle of Circumcision doth diligently instruct the Jews And so Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles doth as carefully instruct the Gentiles St. Peter in the first book and second chapter commands Servants to be subject to their Masters not only good and gentle Masters but those severer ones who would punish them with Scourges when they had not deserved it Saint Paul Rom. 13. doth urge in many words the necessity of Subjection but granteth unto none the Liberty of Resistance be their case or their pretence never so good In the second place I say That although this Subjection is simply necessary yet it is not satisfactory as to Duty unlesse the command of the Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience in Conscience in all things that are lawful and honest Hence it is that this word be Obedient is so often and so expressely inculcated by the Apostle Eph. 6. Col. 3. and in other places In the third place I say Where the precept of the Law cannot be observed without sin if the Subject shall patiently submit himself to the Power of the Law-giver he hath satisfied his Duty and is not obliged in Conscience to perform that which the Law commandeth nay he is obliged not to do it for there can be no Obligation to things unlawful It is alwayes necessary therefore to be subject but not alwayes necessary to obey IV. Furthermore seeing both are certain that the Consciences of Men are free Servitus in totum hominem uon descendit Sen. de Bencf 20. and ought to be so which Liberty no Humane Power can or may infringe And that an Obligation is a kind of a Bond and doth induce a necessity which seemeth to be opposite and to fight with just Liberty for neither is he any wayes free who is bound neither can he be free to both who by some necessity is bound to either that it plainly may appear that this Obligation of Conscience of which we now do treat may consist with the just Liberty of Conscience we must necessarily in this place give you another distinction which is that the Precepts of Humane Law may be taken two wayes either formally for the Act it self of giving the precepts or materially for the thing precepted If the Law-giver therefore should intend an Obligation or impose on the Subject a necessity of obeying from giving the Precept of his Law taken materially that is from the necessity of the thing it self which is precepted which notwithstanding in the truth of the thing was not necessary before that Law was made he in that very fact should lay a force upon the Conscience of the Subject which should be repugnant to the Liberty of it But if he should derive his Obligation from giving the precept of his Law taken formally th●● is from the legitimate Authority with w ch he himself is invested that gives it a moral indifferency of the thing precepted in the mean time remaining and in the same state in which it was before the Law was made although the obligation followeth which imposeth on the Conscience a necessity of obeying yet the inward Liberty of the Conscience remaineth uninjuried and intire V. If this seems obscure to any I will illustrate it unto him by an Example A Civil Law being made that no man should eat flesh during all the time of Lent if the Law-giver either in the preface or in the body of that Law should signify that he laid this Command upon his Subjects because it were ungodly and unlawful for them in that time to eat flesh This were to throw a Snare on the Consciences of his Subjects as much as in him lay to weaken their Liberty But if expressely he should signify that the thing being otherwise free in it self he did so ordain it for the profit of the Commonwealth that his Subjects according to the Example of the antient Church should thereby take an occasion to exercise a more abstemious and severer Discipline or if by the words of the Law it self or elsewhere it might appear that the Law-giver intended not by that Law to fasten any opinion of necessity on the thing so commanded there would on this account no injury be done to the Consciences of the Subjects and the liberty thereof For there is a great difference when one thing is commanded by the Magistrate because it is thought to be necessary oris prohibited because it is conceived to be unlawful And when another thing begins then only to be thought necessary and lawful after that it is commanded by the Magistrate and unlawful because it is forbidden by him The first Necessity which anteceded the Law and is supposed by it to be some cause of it is contrary to the liberty of the Conscience but the other which followeth the Law and proceedeth from it as an essect thereof is not repugnant to it The reason of this difference is because the antecedent necessity which the Law supposeth doth necessarily require some assent of the practical judgement but to the following necessity which proceedeth from the Law the consent of the will is sufficient to the performance of that outward work which by the Law is commanded Now an Act of the Will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conscience as an Act of the judgment doth for the Act of the Will doth follow the dictates of the Conscience as the effect followeth its cause but the Act of the Judgment doth precede those Dictates as the Cause goeth before its effect VI. These distinctions being premised I proceed unto the Doubts where in the first place those which we meet with concerning the material Cause