Protagoras and Gorgias Yea and not only assaulted them with his arguments but persecuted them by his reproaches calling the Philosophy of Empedocles and all the Antients Stuttering Xenocrates and Melissus Rusticks Anaxagoras simple and inconsiderate yea and all of them in an heap as Patricius testifies gross Ignorants Fools and Madmen How fit then think you is it that the World should now be obliged to so tender and awful a respect to the Libeller of the most Venerable Sages as that it should be a crime next Heresie to endeavour though never so modestly to weaken his textuary and usurp'd authority and how just think you is your charge of my Reflections as a piece of irreverence to Antiquity when my veneration of the greater Antiquity extorted from me those strictures against the proud Antagonist of all the ancient and more valuable Wisdom of whose unworthy and disingenuous usage of the Elder Philosophers I 'le present you among many with some particular instances that most easily offer themselves to my pen and memory Briefly then he accuses Zeno for making God a Body because he call'd him a Sphear in a Metaphor He sayes of Parmenides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he made hot and cold Principles and yet in two long Chapters falls upon him as making all things one These two Principles of Parmenides Aristotle interprets of Fire and Earth when 't is clear enough that the Philosophers meant Light and Darkness 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He says of Parmenides and Melissus that they denyed all generation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And yet in another place having it seems forgot this charge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He accused Empedocles for constituting the Soul of Elements for which he took occasion from that verse of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 When as the Elements he means are not corporeal as Aristotle would suggest to force an absurdity on that Philosopher but Intellectual ones as Simplicius one of his own Interpreters expounds Empedocles He blasphemes Anaxagoras's Mind in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And yet after gives excellent attributes to that Mind of Anaxagoras He accuses the Pythagoreans of making Numbers the Principles of things when as 't is evident that Numbers were intended by Pythagoras but as Symbolical representations of them which serv'd him but for the same purposes the Hieroglyphicks did the Aegyptians from whom that Sage had his Method of Philosophy as Philoponus himself confessingly affirms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But of all the Philosophers he quarrel'd with there was none he pursued with so much gall and animosity as his incomparable Master Plato whom he not only insolently opposed and ingratefully thrust out of his School while he lived but with a severe pen persecuted his very ashes and followed him with injuries beyond the grave And all for no other reason but because that Venerable old Man reproved his evil life and preferr'd the better deserving Speucippus Xenocrates and Amyclas before him The particular instances of those ungrateful abuses are too numerous to be insisted on therefore I shall only pitch my observation on Plato's Doctrine of Idea's which Aristotle in all his Books inveigh's against and hath render'd ridiculous among his credulous Sectators Concerning which you may please to take notice that this Opinion was not originally Plato's though Aristotle charge him as the Author but was the Doctrine of the Pythagoreans Aegyptians and Chaldaeans We have it in Timaeus Locrus the Pythagorean 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And before him Trismegistus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But originally this Doctrine of Idea's was Chaldaean for which I offer you the ensuing Testimonies which will also clear the antient sense and nature of those Idea's We have them then in the Oracles of Zoroaster 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And these Idea's by which we may understand their natures he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Briefly then the Chaldaeans by their Idea's understood the forms of things as they were in their Archetypa Mente which answers to the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Christian Trinity They called them also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as they were in this primaeval Mind In the Soul of the World they call'd them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Nature they were Seeds and in Matter Forms Thus therefore In the Seeds of all things there is heat in that Spirit in this Nature which depends on the Universal Soul and that on God in whom 't is Jynx or Idea This was the Chaldaean notion of Idea's and this was the Platonical which how unlike it is the Chimaera of Universal abstract notions Aristotle and his Peripateticks falsly affix upon the Divine Philosopher is of easie apprehension So that Aristotle in his impugnation of the Platonical Idea's fights against notions of his own creating and no assertions of his Venerable Master And I must confess the reverence I have for that Excellent Sage and his Philosophy lessens my esteem of Aristotle and his Which I cannot without some regret behold so Sacred in Christendom while the incomparable Prince of Philosophers with his divine Theories seems to be neglected and forgotten especially since this latter is so consonant in his Dogmata to the principles of Christianity and the other so opposite to most the articles of our belief in his Of which Patricius has presented the World with a large Catalogue of Instances and I 'le offer you a few of them Plato affirms God to be one Aristotle make's one first mover but 56 other Gods movers of the Orbs. Plato own 's God under the notion of the Father which Aristotle no where acknowledges Plato that God is the Supreme Wisdom Aristotle that he is ignorant of particulars Plato that God is Omnipotent Aristotle that he can do nothing but move the Heavens Plato that God made the World Aristotle that the World is uncreated and eternal Plato that God made the World of nothing Aristotle that of nothing is made nothing Plato that God is free from all body Aristotle that he 's tyed to the first Orb. Plato that Providence is over all things Aristotle that 't is confin'd to the Heavens Plato that God governs the Universe Aristotle not God but Nature Chance and Fortune Plato that God created the Soul Aristotle that 't is the Act of the body Plato that the happiness of a Man is in his likeness to God Aristotle that a Man is happy in the goods of Fortune Plato there will come one that shall teach us to pray a prophecy of our Saviour Aristotle prayers are in vain because God knows not particulars Plato that after death good Men shall enjoy God Aristotle no pleasure after this life Plato the Souls of the wicked shall be punish't after death Aristotle they shall perish with the body and suffer nothing Plato the dead shall rise Aristotle à privatione ad habitum Plato that
Promptuary and element of Soules in Heaven whence they supposed them to descend by the North-Pole and to ascend by the South Hence the saying of the Cabbalists Magnus Aquilo scaturigo Animarum And probably that other Omne malum nobis ex Aquilone From which tradition 't is likely also Homer had this notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 4. What was the opinion of Pythagoras Plato and the greatest of the Greek Philosophers in this particular is notoriously known to all men that know any thing of these matters And I need no testimonies in so clear a business It appears then from the allegations I have produced that the most valuable wisdom of the antient world asserted a Doctrine which necessarily inferres and supposeth their opinion of the Souls being a distinct substance from the body Which also 2 Must be supposed by all that believe it 's natural Immortality For separability is the greatest argument of real distinction especially that which the Schools call mutual Now the Souls immortality is a truth that hath had an unanimous reception from the better and wiser world The Aegyptians Chaldaeans Assyrians Indians Jews Greeks and universally all that ever had a name for wisdom among the Antients believed it And what hath been the apprehension of latter ages I need inform no body that is capable of judging in such inquiries A Councel of the Church of Rome it self hath determin'd it and recommended it's proof and demonstration to all Christian Philosophers But what need of more 't is the belief of Sir K. Digby and our Authors own And how real separability can consist with identity and indistinction I know no possibility of apprehending For that a thing can be separated from it self can never be believed by any but those that make a Religion of absurdities 3. The Sacred and Mosaical Philosophy supposeth the like real distinction of which the expression of God's breathing into Adams nostrils the breath of life is sufficient evidence Yea and all the Arguments that are alledg'd to prove it's immediate creation do strongly conclude it an other substance from the body Yea 4 Aristotle himself affirmes it for saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And yet more clearly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And once more 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Other testimonies I could bring to like purpose but these are sufficient to evince that if Aristotle be consistent with himself he believed the real distinction I contend for And his Peripateticks I 'me sure unanimously affirm it To all which if I can add Sir K. Digby's opinion I shall bid fair for our Authors assent to my conclusion that 't was Aristotle's and the Truth 5 Then That noble and celebrated friend of our Authors affirmes in his Immortality that the soul is a substance and a substance besides the body Yea almost all that discourse of his leans upon that supposal Yea 6 Our Philosopher himself in his Peripatetical Institutions affirms as much as ever I supposed For he saith that 'T is most evident that the mind is something of an other kind from Quantity and Matter that 't is noble and wholy opposite to the nature of Quantity that 't is a substantial Principle of Man and no mode or determination of divisibility and that there is nothing common to Body and Spirit Besides which in the Fifth Book of the same Institutions he discourses of the Souls separation from the body and asserts it to be evident that it perisheth not with it because it hath actions that belong not to a body but hath of it self the vertue of a being And that it's power of existence is not taken away when the body fails the soul being apart from and besides it And that matter is not necessary to the Souls existence Many other expressions there are in that discourse to like purpose which seem to speak the Souls real distinction from the Body in as great variety of phrase as diversity and distinction can be spoken So that how such passages consist with the doctrine of it's Identity with the body I confess I am not Metaphysical enough to comprehend And I believe very few else can perceive the consistency besides this Philosopher whose Metaphysicks of whole and part have yet been entertain'd by none that I know of and therefore though this should be acknowledged a good account yet 't is an Argument of the weakness of humane understanding that it hath not yet comprehended it I think by this time 't is clear then that the supposition of my procedure the Souls distinction from the Body is not peccant except all the world both Antient and Modern hath been mistaken and our Author also which if it be granted 't is an instance of what I plead for If not my supposition is good and the emergent doubt unanswer'd And if our learned Author yet thinks it plain that either Man is no being or that the soul and body are not two I must acknowledge such Palams to be the Dogmatizing I suppose And I am willing to put it upon the issue whether it be so to any body else but this Philosopher But 2 besides all this it seems to me very clear from the nature of the Things themselves abstracting from Authority That the Soul is a substance distinct from the body For I think 1 'T is strongly concluded by the common Arguments that prove it immaterial for perception perception of spirituals universals and other abstracts from sense as Mathematical lines points superficies congenit notions Logical Metaphysical and Moral self-reflection Freedom indifferency and universality of action these I say are properties not at all competible to body or matter though of never so pure a mixture Nor is it conceiveable how any of these should arise from modificaiions of quantity being of a diverse kind from all the Phaenomena of motion But 2 If the soul be not a distinct substance from the body 't is then a certain disposition and modification of it which this Gentteman in the 10 Lesson of his Institutions seems to intimate saying That since the soul is a certain affection which is introduced and expell'd by corporeal action he thence inferrs some thing that is not to our purpose to relate And if so since all diversities in matter arise from motion and position of parts every different preception will require a different order and position of the parts of the matter perceiving which must be obtained by motion I demand then when we pass from one conception to another is the motion the cause of this diversity meerly casual or directed by some act of knowledge The former I suppose no Man in his wits will affirm since then all our conceptions will be non-sense and confusion chance being the cause of nothing that is orderly and regular If therefore there be a knowledge in us that directs
the motions that form every distinct conception I demand concerning that knowledge Whether it be in like manner directed by some other or is it the effect of meer casual motions If the former we must run up in infinitum in our inquiry and the latter admits the alledged absurdities There is no way then of defending the assertion of the souls being matter or any modification of it but by affirming with Master Hobbs a certain connexion between all our thoughts and a necessary fate in all things which who ever affirmes will find difficulties enough in his assertion to bring him to mine That there 's a Vanity in Dogmatizing and Confidence is unreasonable But of this I have had occasion to discourse more in an other Treatise and I shall not repeat what I have there written or what others have said on the subject Especially since perhaps this learned Gentleman will not think himself concern'd in the Proof of this Conclusion he having in his writings asserted it But whether he have not unsaid it again in this I appeal to any equal Decerner And that the soul should be a substance of another kind from matter that hath nothing common with it a substance separable from all body to which matter is not necessary and actually in the other state divided from it all which and more to like purpose our Author hath in some of his Books affirmed and yet not be a distinct substance but really the same with the body to which it is united which he asserts in this I say how these so opposite affirmations can be reconciled I have either not wit or not charity enough to help me to imagine I know this Authors doctrine is that there are no parts before separation and division and therefore no real distinction But whether things in their natures so divers as body and spirit which almost in nothing even according to this Philosophy communicate are not essentially divided though not locally distant I am willing to leave to the Readers judgment And I would fain know whereupon the separability of the soul and body is founded if not upon the real distinction of their natures so that though this notion may be less obnoxious when it relates only to substances of the same kind and quality yet when it concerns those that are so essentially distinct as body and spirit it seems most strangely lyable Yea though it should be supposed a Truth yet it must be acknowledged unconceiveable which sufficeth to satisfie my Conclusion A. Neque me terret distinctio quae pueris philosophiam garrientibus in sacco parata est Entis perfecti imperfecti pag. 58. THe distinction of the Schools of a Being perfect and G. imperfect is not I think so childish and impertinent as our Author would have believed For though Ens Imperfectum in the Metaphysical sence be non-sence and a contradiction yet in genere Physico as they speak 't is no absurdity since a being may want some circumstances of natural compleatness and perfection and yet be Metaphysically compleat and perfect so that to affirm the soul an imperfect Being nakedly in it self is to say no more then that 't was made with a natural aptitude and congruity to a body by union with which 't is perfected and compleated being then furnish't with the requisites of its nature which in like manner may be said of a body in humane form viz. that 't is defective and incompleat till it be furnished with the principle of Humane actions for which it was designed So that there 's no absurdity in affirming That a thing may be one in a Physiological and natural sense and two in a Metaphysical And so out Philosopher's inference is no sequel A. 2. Quando itaque petit Unde Anima veniat Reponendum est An dubitet unde Homo veniat pag. 59. G. THe Foundation of our learned Authors Answers to the proposed difficulties being overthrown and it being made secure enough That the soul is a distinct substance from the body 't is a pertinent and material enquiry to ask whence the Soul is And if our Philosopher will call this the Man according to the Maxim let the question be proposed in his own phrase and there 's no danger of an absurdity A. Neque Majorum quamtumvis Reverendorum me quatit Authoritas non dico illorum qui pag. 59. G. IT seems the learned Gentleman would fain reconcile the Authority of the Church asserting the Souls Creation to his main conclusion that 't is no distinct substance from the body and to his inference thereupon that 't is improper and impertinent to inquire whence It came But whether what is said be a clear salve or a shuffle let it be determin'd by any equal judgment For either by Homo quatenus intellectivus our Author means something that is the same with the body or really distinct and diverse If the former he hath not satisfied the Authority of the Church which affirms the Soul as a distinct substance to be the immediate subject of Creation founded upon that clear distinction in the inspired writings The body to the dust and the Soul to God that gave it But if he mean the latter he hath not provided for his own assertion and hypothesis Besides 2. If man as intellective be created then either he means the whole man or only that by which he 's intellective the former is against all sense and experience And the latter overthrows all our Author's Answers with the Proposition upon which they are erected For if there be some thing in man which is the subject of divine power and action and some other thing that is the subject of natural production and generation it seems to me apparent that these must be two things really distinguish't For the same thing cannot be created and naturally produced For Creation supposeth the production of the whole ex nihilo both sui subjecti as the Schools phrase it without the co-operation of any thing with the divine superlative power whereas all generation according to truth and the same Hypothesis at least supposeth one of them and is perform'd by natural agents And I think the case is plain enough when 't is brought to this Whether the same thing can be produced of something and nothing with created assistance and without it Since the Actions then are so infinitely diverse I think I shall not be reprehensibly Dogmatical in affirming the terms distinct What the Gentleman says more seems to be involv'd and looks like a designed evasion And if one action produceth a man a Creature equivalent to a Beast and Angel I demand Whether this one action be divine or natural from God or the generant If the former every man is as immediately created as the first And the latter quite excludes crea ion and supposeth God no otherwise to act in giving being to our Souls then in each common production 'T is necessary therefore that the terms produced be
the Soul and Body of the wicked shall be punish't in Hell Aristotle knew no such matter These are some instances among many of the divine temper of the Platonical Philosophy and the impiety of the Aristotelian for a further account of which I referre you to the fore-mentioned learned Author So that I doubt not but when you have duly consider'd the matter you 'l judge those Reflections the effects of a laudable zeal for Antiquity and what is more sacred Truth To which I adde 5. That the Aristotelian was not the antient Philosophy but the Corpuscularian and Atomical which to the great hinderance of Science lay long buryed in neglect and oblivion but hath in these latter Ages been again restored to the light and it 's deserv'd repute and value And that the Atomical Hypothesis was the First and most Antient of which there is any memory in Physiology is notoriously known to all that know the Age of Democritus who was one of those Four Sages that brought the learning of the Aegyptians among the Grecians Orpheus bringing in Theology Thales the Mathematicks our Democritus natural Philosophy and Pythagoras all Three with the Moral Now the learning of the Aegyptians came from the Chaldaeans and was convey'd to them as some learned Men affirm by Abraham who was of kin to Zoroaster the great Chaldaean Legislatour and Philosopher which Zoroaster lived 290 years after the Flood and as Pliny saith was the Schollar of Azonaces whom Antiquáries affirm to have been of the Schoole of Sem and Heber The Atomical Philosophy then coming from the Aegyptians to the Grecians and from the Chaldaeans to them is without doubt of the most venerable Antiquity and the Aristotelian a very novelty in compare with that grey Hypothesis at the best a degeneracy and corruption of the most antient Wisdom Yea and 't is the complaint of several learned Men which whoever knows any thing of Aristotles Sectators will justifie That the Modern Peripateticks have as farr receded from his sense as from the Truth of Things For it hath been the Fashion of his Interpreters both Greeks Latins and Arabians to form whole Doctrines from catches and scraps of sentences without attending to the analogy and main scope of his Writings From which method of interpretation hath proceeded a spurious medly of nice spinose and useless notions that is but little of kin to Aristotle or nature So that whatever of genuine Aristotelian is in those works that bare his name There 's little of Aristotle in his Schools And 't is no indignity to Antiquity or the Stagyrite to oppose the corruption and abuse of both And to endeavour to restore the Antients to their just estimation which hath been usurp't from them by a modern and spurious Learning And though I grudge not Aristotles esteem while it is not prejudicial to the respect we owe his Betters yet I regret that excessive and undue veneration which fondly sets him so much above all the more valuable Antients And I 'le propose it to your judgment 6. Whether 't was likely that Aristotle was so farr beyond other Philosophers in his Intellectuals as these latter Ages have presumed when he came so farr short of most of them in his Morals I believe there 's a near connection between Truth and Goodness and there 's a taste in the soul whereby it relisheth Truth as the Palate Meats which sence and gusto vice depraves and viâ—iates So that though Witt may make the Vicious cunning Sophisters and subtile Atheists yet I doubt seldom the best and most exercised Philosophers Now what the Ancients have related of Aristotle's manners I 'le present you in an Instance or two and dismiss this displeasing subject Suidas then accuseth him of Sodomy with Hermias Aeschriones Palephatus and Abydenus St. Jerome of Drunkenness Lycus and Aristocles two of his own disciples charge him with Avarice Aelian of Cavelling Loquacity Scoffing and Ingratitude of which last there are two notorious instances in his usage of Alexander and Plato How he used his venerable Master I have already noted And what return he made to the kindnesses of his Glorious Schollar you may see in these few words from Arrian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to sum up much in one Timaeus the Historian in Suidas gives this Account of him That he was forward impudent saucy unwise indocile and hatefully glutinous or in the words of Suidas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But to conclude these ungrateful remarques Plutarch makes him a Traytor to Alexander and Eusebius to his Countrey And being at last banisht for his impiety He made himself away by poyson according to the Testimony of Laertius Thus then you see an ill Character of Aristotle's manners from disinteressed Authorities on consideration of which 't is to me matter of some wonder that the memory of the Vitious should be so blessed and his authority so irreproveable Unto all which may be added Lastly That there is less reason that Aristotle should be valued beyond all others that have had a name for wisdom if we consider that he borrowed almost all he writ from the more antient Philosophers though he had not the ingenuity and gratitude to acknowledge it Particularly from Architas and Ocellus transcribing them word for word in many places especially the latter and yet never as much as mention'd him in all his writings And I think you ascribe more to Aristotle then is his due when you call him the INVENTOUR of SCIENCES for we owe that honour to others of the Antients particularly to Zeno the Invention of Logick and of Rhetorick to Empedocles according to his own Testimony in Laertius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 speaking of Zeno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Perictione a Pythagorean woman writ Metaphysicks before Aristotle Stobaeus in his Morals hath a Fragment of her Book de Sapientia of which she declares the subject in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Besides whom Plato Parmenides Xenophanes Pythagoras the Aegyptians Trismegistus and before all the Chaldeans writ of this Science long before Aristotle was extant And Democritus brought natural Philosophy as did Pythagoras the Moral from the Aegyptians before the Stagyritè was an Infant And for the Mathematicks they were studied in Aegypt before He was born in Greece 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is his own confession Thus then you see Sir we are not so much beholden to Aristotle as most men have presumed And perhaps by this time you may be convinc't that we have no reason so passionately to revere his Authority But whither you are or not I am not much concerned being willing to leave all men to the liberty of their own sentiments It sufficeth for my purpose that I have given you some of the grounds of my dissatisfactions in Aristotle and his Hypotheseis If you are convinced at the bar of your judgment I am justified if you are not your dissent I presume is rational and when I have seen your reasons I shall either be more disposed to your apprehensions or be more confirm'd in the justice and reasonableness of mine own To which I 'le add no more but my desires of your pardon of this voluminous trouble and acceptance of the affectionate regards of SIR Your Humble Servant J. G. FINIS