shall not alien or sell the Lands given to her from the Heirs Male of her Body lawfully to be begotten but to remain upon default of such Issue to W. and the Heirs Males of his Body to be begotten according to the true intent and meaning of this my Will Dorothy Hopkins had Issue Richard who had Issue Henry who had Issue a Daughter now the Defendant The Question was Whether the Son of Dorothy did take an Estate Tail by this Will to him and to the Heirs of his Body in general or an Estate in Tail Male This Case was argued in Michaelmas Term 36 Car. II. And in the same Term a year afterwards by Council on both sides Those who argued for the Plaintiff held that the Son had an Estate in Tail Male and this seems plain by the intention of the Testator that if Dorothy had Issue Daughters they should have no benefit for no provision is made for any such by the Will and therefore the Daughter of her Son can have no Estate who is more remote to the Testator This is like the Case of Conveyances Turnam vers Cooper 2 Cro. 476. Poph. 138. id 25 Ass pl. 14. wherein the Habendum explains the generality of the precedent words as if Lands be given to Husband and Wife and to their Heirs habendum to them and the Heirs of their Bodies Remainder to them and the Survivor to hold of the chief Lord with Waranty to them and their Heirs this is an Estate Tail with a Feé expectant So it is here tho' the first words in the Will extend to Heirs which is general yet in the Memorandum 't is particular to Heirs Males and the words Heirs and Issues are of the same signification in a Will The Memorandum is a confirmation of the Will Ex parte Def. and the construction which hath been made of it is not only inconsistent with the Rules of Law but contrary to the intent of the Testator and against the express words of his Will Cases upon Wills are different from those which arise upon Deeds because in Conveyances subsequent words may be explanatory of the former but in Wills the first words of the Testator do usually guide those which follow As if Land be devised for Life Dyer 171 a. 1 And. 8. id Golds 16. Moor 593. Remainder to F. and the Heirs Males of his Body and if it happen that he dye without Heirs not saying Males the Remainder over in Tail this was held not to be a general Tail but an Estate in Tail Male therefore the Daughter of F. could not inherit Now to construe this to be an Estate Tail Male doth not only alter the Estate of the Sons of Dorothy but of the Issue of W. and nothing is mentioned in this Memorandum of the Limitation over to Jones so that the whole Will is altered by it But this Memorandum cannot enlarge the Estate of Dorothy because 't is inconsistent with the intention of the Testator who gave her only an Estate for Life by the Will but if she should have an Estate Tail she might by Fine and Recovery bar it and so alien it contrary to his express words Besides there is no Estate limited to Dorothy by this Memorandum and she having an express Estate for Life devised to her by the Will it shall never be enlarged by such doubtful words which follow As where a Man had 100 Acres of Land 2 Leon. 226. Moor 593. called by a particular Name and usually occupied with a House which House he lett to S. with 40 Acres parcel of that Land and then devised the House and all the Lands called by that particular Name c. to his Wife Adjudged she should only have the House and the 40 Acres and that the Devise shall not be extended by implication to the other sixty Acres So that to make the design of this Will and Memorandum to be consistent the latter words must be construed only to illustrate the meaning of the Testator in the former Paragraph of the Will and must be taken as a farther declaration of his intention Viz. that the Heirs Males mentioned in the Memorandum is only a description of the Persons named in the Will The Law doth usually regard the intention of the Testator and will not imply any contradictions in his Bequests The Court was of Opinion that it was a plain Case Judicium for in the Limitation 't is clear that 't is a general Tail and it doth not follow that the Testator did not design any thing for his Grandaughters because no provision was made for Daughters For where an Estate is entailed upon the Heirs of a Man's Body if he hath a Son and a Daughter and the Son hath Issue a Daughter the Estate will go to her and not to the Aunt Now this Memorandum doth not come to make any alteration in the Limitation because it directs that the Estate shall go according to the true intent and meaning of the Will and is rather like a Proviso than an Habendum in a Deed. And therefore Iudgment was given accordingly for the Defendant DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Hicks versus Gore ON Tuesday the 17th day of November there was a Trial at the Barr by a Somerset-Shire Iury in Ejectment The Case was thus The Plaintiff claimed the Lands by virtue of the Statute of 4 5 Ph. Mar. cap. 8. by which 't is enacted That it shall not be lawful for any person to take away any Maid or Woman Child unmarried and within the Age of sixteen years from the Parents or Guardian in Soccage and that if any Woman Child or Maiden being above the Age of twelve years and under the Age of sixteen do at any time assent or agree to such person that shall make any Contract of Matrimony contrary to the Form of the Act that then the next of Kin of such Woman Child or Maid to whom the Inheritance should descend return or come after the decease of the same Woman Child or Maid shall from the time of such Assent and Agreement have hold and enjoy all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments as the said Woman Child or Maid had in Possession Reversion or Remainder at the time of such Assent and Agreement during the Life of such person that shall so contract Matrimony and after the decease of such person so contracting Matrimony that then the said Land c. shall descend revert remain and come to such person or persons as they should have done in case this Act had never been made other than him only that so shall contract Matrimony Benjamin Tibboth being seised in Fee of the Lands in question to the value of 700 l. per annum had Issue a Son and four Daughters the Son had Issue Ruth his only Daughter who was married to the Defendant Gore her Father died in the time of her Grandfather and her Mother
the Fine and Non-claim the Substance of which was That Robert Basket was seized in Fee of the Lands in Question who by Will devised it to Philip Basket and others for 99 years with power to grant Estates for the payment hf the Debts and Legacies of the Testator the Remainder in Tail to John Basket his Brother but that if he gave Security to pay the said Debts and Legacies or should pay the same within a time limited that then the Trustees should assign the Term to him c. John Basket entred after the death of his Brother with the assent of the said Trustees and received the Profits and paid all the Legacies and all the Debts but 18 l. The Iury find that John had Issue a Daughter only by his first Wife after whose death he married another Woman and levied a Fine and made a Settlement in consideration of that Marriage upon himself for Life and upon his Wife for Life with divers Remainders over that he died without Issue by his second Wife who entred and five years were past without any claim c. And now the Heir at Law in the name of the Trustees brought this Action The Questions were 1. Whether the Term for 99 years thus devised to the Trustees was bound by this Fine and Nonclaim or not 2. Whether it was divested and turned to a Right at the time of the Fine levied For if it was not then the Fine could not operate upon it It was agreed that as a Disseisin is to a Freehold so is a divesting to a Term and that a Fine and Non-claim is no Barr but where the Party at the time of the levying thereof had a Will to enter and when the Estate of which 't is levyed is turned to a Right That in the Case at the Barr the Entry of John Basket was tortious because the legal Estate was still in the Trustees But if he had gained any Right by his Entry 't is only a Tenancy at Will to them for they took notice of the Devise and he entred by their consent and such a Right is not assignable and then a Fine levyed is no Barr. To prove this 9 Co. 106. Margaret Prodger's Case was cited where the the Lord granted a Copyhold to John Elizabeth and Mary for their Lives and afterwards by Deed enrolled sold the Land to John in Fee and levyed a Fine to him and his Heirs c. and five years passed without any Claim John dyed his Son entred and levyed another Fine to Trustees to the use of himself and Margaret his Wife for Life the Remainder to his own right Heirs the Son died and his Wife survived who having a Freehold for Life distrained and the Husband of Elizabeth brought a Replevin It was adjudged that this Fine and Nonclaim did not barr those in Remainder becase the Bargain and Sale to John did not divest their Estate and turn it to a Right for the Lord did what he might do and John accepted what he might lawfully take who being in possession by virtue of a particular Estate for Life could not by this acceptance divest the Estate of her who had the Freehold and the Fine and Nonclaim could not do it for to what purpose should he make any Claim when he was in actual possession of the thing to be demanded And he who is so in possession need not make any Claim either to avoid a Fine or a collateral Warranty Now though at the Common Law there must be Livery and Seisin to create an Estate of Freehold 3 Co. Fermer 's Case yet any thing is sufficient to make an Estate at Will in which neither the Inheritance or the Title of the Land is concerned and therefore a Fine levyed by such a Tenant is no Barr. 'T is true Sid. 458. Freeman versus Barns if a Lease be made for an hundred years in Trust to attend the Inheritance and Cestuy que Trust continues in possession and devises to another for fifty years and levies a Fine and the five years pass without Claim he being still in possession after the first Lease made is thereby become Tenant at Will and by making the second Lease the other is divested and turned to a Right though he was not a Disseisor and so 't is barred by the Fine because the Cestuy que Trust of the term of one hundred years was also Owner of the Inheritance But in the Case at the Barr John shall not be a Disseisor but at the Election of the Trustees of the Term of 99 years to prove which there are many Authorities in the Books As if Tenant at Will make a Lease for years and the Lessee enters Latch 53. 1 Leon. 121. Lit. Sect. 588. 't is not a Disseisin but at the Election of him who hath the Freehold and even in such Case if the Tenant of the Freehold should make a Grant of the Land 't is good though not made upon the Land it self for he shall not be taken to be out of possession but at his own Election 'T is like the common Case of a Mortgagee for years where the Mortgagor continues in possession twenty years afterwards and pays the Interest and in that time hath made Leases and levyed a Fine this shall not barr the Mortgagee for the Mortgagor is but Tenant at Will to him The Trustees need not make any claim in this Case because there was no transmutation of the possession so they could take no notice of the Fine 'T is true John Basket entred by their consent but still as Tenant at Will to them and the Acts done by him after his Entry will not didest this Term for though he made a Bargain and Sale of the Lands yet nothing will pass thereby but what of right ought to pass He likewise demised the Lands to Vndertenants for years but 't is not found that they entred but admitting they did enter yet that could not displace this Term for these Tenants claimed no more than for one or two years and made no pretence to the whole Term. But if by either of these Acts the Term should be divested yet still it must be at the election of those who have the Interest in it Dyer 61 62 173. The Case of * Cro. Car. 302. 1 Rol. Abr. 661. Blunden and Baugh which is grounded upon Littleton's Text Sect. 588. is an Authority to this purpose which was The Father was Tenant in Tail and his Son was Tenant at Will who made a Lease for years then both Father and Son join in a Fine to the use of the Son for Life and to Elizabeth his Wife for Life the Remainder to the Heirs Males of the Body of the Son who died without Issue Male the Lessee being in possession made a Conveyance of the Estate by Bargain and Sale to Charles Lord Effingham who was Son and Heir of the Tenant in Tail who made a Lease to the Plaintiff who was ousted by the
same to Mrs. Berkley for Life remainder over to Henry Killigrew in Tail and that he made Mrs. Berkley Executrix of his Will which was found in haec verba That afterwards in the year 1645. the said Sir Henry Killigrew made aliud Testamentum in Writing but what was contained in the said last mentioned Will juratores penitus ignorant They find that Sir Henry Killigrew in the year 1646. died seised of those Lands and that Mrs. Berkley conveyed the same to Mr. Nosworthy 's Father whose Heir he is and that the Defendant Sir William Basset is Cosin and Heir to Sir Henry Killigrew c. The Question upon this special Verdict was whether the making of this last Will was a revocation of the former or not It was argued this Term by Mr. Finch and in Michaelmas Term following by Serjeant Maynard for the Plaintiff that it was not a revocation In their Arguments it was admitted that a Will in it's nature was revocable at all times but then it must be either by an express or implied revocation That the making of this latter Will cannot be intended to be an implied revocation of the former for if so then the Land must also be supposed to be devised contrary to the express disposition in the first Will and that would be to add to the Record which finds Viz. that what the last Will was penitus ignorant It is possible that a subsequent Will may be made so as not to destroy but consist with a former for the Testator may have several parcels of Land which he may devise to many persons by divers Wills and yet all stand together A man may likewise by a subsequent Will revoke part and confirm the other part of a former Will and therefore admitting there was such a Will in this case 't is still more natural that it should confirm than revoke the other If the Testator had purchased new Lands and had devised the same by a subsequent Will no person will affirm that to be a revocation of the former Will When a Man hath made a disposition of any part of his Estate 't is a good Will as to that part so is likewise the disposal of every other part they are all several Wills tho' taken altogether they are an intire disposition of the whole Estate Nothing appears here to the contrary but that the latter Will may be only a devise of his personal Estate or a confirmation of the former which the Law will not allow to be destroyed without an express revocation The Case of Coward and Marshal is much to this purpose Cro. Eliz. 721. which was a devise in Fee to his younger Son and in another Will after the Testators Marriage to a second Wife he devised the same Lands to his Wife for Life paying yearly to his younger Son 20 s. It was the Opinion of Anderson and Glanvil that both these Wills might stand together and that one was not a revocation of the other because it appeared by the last Will that he only intended to make a Provision for his Wife but not to alter the Devise to his Son So where a Man had two Sons by several Venters Cro. Car. 24. Hodgkinson vers Whood Co. Lit. 22. b. 1 Co. 104. a. 319. b. and devises the Lands to his eldest Son for Life and to the Heirs Males of his Body and for default of such Issue to the Heirs Males of his second Son and the Heirs Males of their Bodies Remainder to his own right Heirs and then made a Lease of 30 years to his youngest Son to commence after the death of the Testator the youngest Son entred and surrendred the Term to his elder Brother who made a Lease to the Defendant and then dyed without Issue afterwards the youngest Brother entred and avoided this Lease made by his Brother It was held that the Lease thus made to him was not a revocation of the devise of the Inheritance to his Brother tho' it was to commence at the same time in which the devise of the Inheritance was to take effect but it was a revocation quoad the Term only that the elder Brother should not enter during that time for the devise shall not be revoked without express words and that tho' the Testator had departed with the whole Fee without reserving an Estate for Life to himself yet the Law created such an Estate in him till the future Vse should commence and in such case the right Heirs cannot take by Purchase but by Descent so that here the Inheritance in Fee simple was not vested in the elder Brother by Descent for then the Lease which he made would be executed out of the Feé and the younger Brother would be bound thereby But in the Case at the Bar there is no colour of a Revocation 1. Vpon the nature of the Verdict to which nothing can be added neither can it be diminished for whatever is found must be positive and not doubtful because an Attaint lies if the Verdict be false Therefore the Court cannot take notice of that which the Iury hath not found Now here the entry of the Iudgment is Viz. Quibus lectis auditis per Curiam hic satis intellectis c. But what can be read or heard where nothing appears That Case in the Year-Book of the 2 R. 3. 2 R. 3. f. 3. comes not up to this question it was an Action of Trespass for the taking of his Goods The Defendant pleaded that the Goods did appertain to one Robert Strong who before the supposed Trespass devised the same to him and made him Executor c. The Plaintiff replied that the said Strong made his last Will and did constitute him Executor And upon a Demurrer to this Replication because he had not traversed that the Defendant was Executor it was argued for the Plaintiff that this last Will was a Revocation of the former for tho' there were no express words of Revocation yet by the very making another the Law revoked the former and to prove this two Instances were then given viz. That if a Man devise his Lands to two and by another Will gives it to one of them and dies he to whom 't is devised by the last Will shall have it So likewise if the Testator by one Will giveth Lands to his Son and by another Will deviseth the same again to his Wife then makes an Alienation and taketh back an Estate to himself and dieth and in an Assise brought between the Widow and the Son he was compelled by the Court to shew that it was his Father's intention that he should have the Land otherwise the last Devisee will be entituled to it Now both these Instances are not sufficient to evince that the last Will in this Case was a revocation of that under which the Plaintiff claims because those Wills were contradictory to each other for by one the Land was devised to the Son and by the other to
the six Months by this means the Conusee of the Statute is defeated for after the inrollment the Land passeth ab initio and the Bargainee in Iudgment of Law was seised thereof from the delivery of the Deed but not by way of Relation but by immediate Conveyance of the Estate by vertue of the Statute of Vses But the Law will not suffer contingent Remainders to waver about and to be so incertain that no Man knows where to find them which they must be if this Doctrine of Relation should prevail Now suppose the Surrendree had made a Grant of his Estate to another person before he had accepted of the Surrender and the Grantee had entred would this subsequent assent have divested this Estate and made the Grant of no effect if it would then here is a plain way found out for any Man to avoid his own acts and to defeat Purchasors Therefore 't is with great reason that the Law provides that no person shall take a Surrender but he who hath the immediate Reversion and that the Estate shall still remain in the Surrenderor until all acts are done which are to compleat the Conveyance Those who argued against the Iudgment E contra held that the Estate passed immediately without the assent of the Surrenderor and that even in Conveyances at the Common-Law 't is divested out of the person and put in him to whom such Conveyance is made without his actual assent 'T is true in Exchanges the Freehold doth not pass without Entry nor a Grant of a Reversion without an Attornment but that stands upon different Reasons from this Case at the Bar for in Exchanges the Law requires the mutual acts of the Parties exchanging and in the other there must be the consent of a third person But in Surrenders the assent of the Surrendree is not required for the Estate must be in him immediately upon the execution of the Deed if he doth not shew some dissent to it If a Man should plead a Release without saying ad quam quidem relaxationem the Defendant agreavit yet this Plea is good because the Estate passeth to him upon the execution of the Deed. It may be a Question whether the actual assent must be at the very time that the Surrender was made for if it should be afterwards t is well enough and the Estate remaineth in the Surrendree till dis-agreement Presumption stands on this side for it shall never be intended that he did not give his Assent but on the contrary because t is for his benefit not to refuse an Estate Therefore where a Feme Sole had a Lease and married Hob. 203. the Husband and Wife surrendred it to another in consideration of a new Lease to be granted to the Wife and her Sons c. this Estate vests immediately in her tho' a Feme Covert and that without the assent of her Husband for the Law intends it to be her Estate till he dissent 't is true in that Case his assent was held necessary because the first Lease could not be divested out of him without his own consent So a Feoffment to three 2 Leon. 224. and Livery made to one the Freehold is in all 'till disagreement So if a Bond be given to a Stranger for my use and I should die before I had agreed to it my Executors are entituled to an Action of Debt and will recover A Feme Covert and another were Ioint-tenants for Life 1 Rol. Rep. 401 441. she and her Husband made a Lease for years of her moiety reserving a Rent during her Life and the Life of her partner then the Wife died this was held to be a good Lease against the surviving Ioint-tenant till disagreement which shews that the agreement of the Parties is not so much requisite to perfect a Conveyance of this nature as a disagreement is to make it void And this may serve as an answer to the second point which was not much insisted on that Mens Titles would be incertain and precarious if after the assent of the Surrendree the Estate should pass by Relation at the very time that the Deed was executed and that it was not known where the Free-hold was in the mean time for if he had agreed to it immediately it had been altogether as private Then as to the Pleadings 't is true that generally when a Surrender is pleaded 't is said ad quam quidem sursum redditionem the Party adtunc ibidem agreavit which implies that the Surrendree was then present and in such Case he ought to agree or refuse Besides those Actions to which an Agreement is thus pleaded were generally brought in disaffirmance of Surrenders and to support the Leases upon which the Plaintiffs declared and then the proper and most effectual Bar was to shew a Surrender and express Agreement before the Action brought It might have been insufficient pleading not to shew an Acceptance of the Surrendree but 't is not substance for if Issue should be taken whether a Surrender or not Cro. Eliz. 249. and a Verdict for the Plaintiff that defect of setting forth an Acceptance is aided by the Statute of Ieofails In this Case there is not only the Word Surrender but * Grant and Release which may be pleaded without any consent to it and a Grant by operation of Law turns to a Surrender because a Man cannot have two Estates of equal dignity in the Law at the same time Neither can it be said that there remained any Estate in Simon Leach after this Surrender executed for 't is an absurd thing to imagine that when he had done what was in his power to compleat a Conveyance and to divest himself of an Estate yet it should continue in him Therefore the Remainder in Contingency to the Lessor of the Plaintiff was destroyed by this Surrender of the Estate to him in reversion for by that means when it did afterwards happen there was no particular Estate to support it But notwithstanding the Iudgment was affirmed and afterwards Anno quarto Gulielmi Mariae upon a Writ of Error brought in the House of Lords it was reversed Idem versus Eundem THIS Point having received a legal determination the same Plaintiff brought another Action of Trespass and Ejectment against the same Defendant Surrender by a person Non compos is void and at a Trial at the Barr in Easter Term nono Gulielmi Regis another special Verdict was found upon which the Case more at large was viz. That Nicholas Leach being seised in Fee of the Lands in question made his Will in these Words viz. In the Name of God Amen c. I devise my Mannors of Bulkworth Whitebear and Vadacot in Devonshire and Cresby Goat and Cresby Grange in Northallerton in Yorkshire unto the Heirs Males of my Body begotten and for want of such Issue Male I devise the same unto my Brother Simon Leach for Life and after his decease to the first Son of the Body of the said Simon Leach my Brother lawfully to be begotten and to the Heirs Males of the Body of such first Son lawfully to be begotten with like Remainder in
Tail Male to the second third fourth c. Sons and for default of such Issue to Sir Simon Leach my Kinsman being Son and Heir of Simon Leach of Cadley in the County of Devon ' Esquire deceased and to the Heirs Males of his Body lawfully to be begotten and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of me the said Nicholas Leach for ever They find that Nicholas Leach died without Issue that Simon Leach his Brother and Heir with Remainder over in Contingency as aforesaid entered and afterwards married Anne the Daughter of Unton Croke and that after the said Marriage viz. 20 August 25 Car. 2. he executed a Deed purporting a * Two months before a Son was born Surrender of the said Lands and Tenements to Sir Simon Leach in manner following viz. To all Christian People c. I Simon Leach of Elsefield in the County of Oxon Esquire send greeting Know ye that I the said Simon Leach for divers good Causes and valuable Considerations me hereunto moving have granted surrendred remised released and for ever quit claimed and confirmed and by these Presents do grant surrender remise release and for ever quit claim and confirm unto Sir Simon Leach of Cadley in the County of Devon Knight of the Bath and his Heirs and Assigns for ever all and every the Mannors c. To have and to hold the same to the said Sir Simon Leach for ever They find that Simon Leach Brother of the Testator was not compos mentis at the time of the sealing and delivery of the said Surrender That on the 10th day of November 25 Car. 2. which was two Months after this Surrender made the said Simon Leach had Issue of his Body Charles Leach who is his Son and Heir that he after the death of his Father entred and made a Lease to Tompson by vertue whereof he was possessed until the Defendant Sir Simon Leach entred upon him c. Two Questions were made upon this Special Verdict 1. Whether this Surrender by a person Non compos mentis was void ab initio and so could pass no Estate to the Surrendree for if so then though the Ideot himself is estopped by his own Act yet that can be no Barr to him in the Remainder because the Act being void the Estate in Law still remains in him 2. If it is not void in its self then whether it is voidable after the death of the Party by Charles Leach he claiming by virtue of a collateral Remainder and not as Heir at Law to the Devisor As to the first Point it was argued that the Cases of Lunaticks and Infants go hand in hand and that the same Reasons govern both that the Law is clear that a Surrender made by an Infant is void therefore a Surrender made by a person Non compos mentis is also void Fleta lib. 1. c. 11. num 10. the reason is because they know not how to govern themselves And as Fleta saith Semper judicabuntur infra aetatem F.N.B. 202. a. Regist 238. b. if he makes any Conveyance of his Land the Law hath provided a remedial Writ even for himself to avoid his own Alienation His Feoffments are void 39 H. 6.42 Bract. fol. 12. no. 5. fol. 100 120. Brit. cap. 34. fol. 88. Perk. 5. pl. 21. and if Warranties are annexed those they are also void if he granteth a Rent-Charge out of his Land that is likewise void and if the Grantee should distrain for this Rent after the death of the Grantor his Heir shall have an Action of Trespas against him and therefore by parity of Reason this Surrender must be void In Fitzherbert Tit. Grantee pl. 80. there is a Case to this purpose viz. An Assize was brought against the Tenant supposing that he had no right of Entry unless under a Disseisor by whom the Brother of the Demandant was disseised The Tenant pleaded that the supposed Disseisor was the Father of the Demandant whose Heir he then was and that his said Father made a Feoffment of the Land to the Tenant with Warranty and demanded Iudgment c. The Demandant replied that his Father at that time was Non compos mentis and the Tenant was compelled to rejoin and take Issue upon the Insanity which shews that if he was Non compos he could not have made such a Feoffment So if he maketh a Feoffment in Fee and afterwards taketh back an Estate for Life Fitz. Remitter pl. 23. the Non compos shall be remitted to his ancient Title which shews likewise that such Feoffment was void for the Remitter supposeth a former Right 'T is incongruous to say that Acts done by persons of no discretion shall be good and valid in the Law such are Infants and Lunaticks and it stands with great reason that what they do should be void especially when it goes to the destruction of their Estates Therefore 't is held that if a person Non compos releaseth his right that shall not barr the King in his Life time but he shall seize the Land and if he die his Heir may bring the Writ Dum non fuit compos mentis and may enter 'T is for this reason that a Release made by an Infant Executor is no barr because it works in destruction of his Interest 5 Co. 27. Russel 's Case 34 Ass pl. 10. the reason is the same where a person Non compos maketh a Feoffment for that likewise destroys his Estate So likewise an Infant can neither surrender a future Interest by his acceptance of a new Lease Cro. Car. 502. nor make an absolute Surrender of a Term of which he is possessed for such a Surrender by Deed is void 'T is agreed that if a Man Non compos maketh a Feoffment by Letter of Attorny 't is meerly void because 't is not delivered to the Feoffee by the hands of the Feoffor but 't is said that if it be delivered by him in person then 't is only voidable at any time by Action or Entry Finch 's Law 102. And of this Opinion was Sir Henry Finch in his Discourse of the Law who in the Margen of his Book quotes several Authorities in the Year Books to justifie this Opinion and amongst the rest he cites Sir Anthony Fitzherberts Natura Brevium 35 Ass pl. 10. who taking notice of the old Authorities seems to reject their Reasons who affirm a person Non compos shall not avoid his own Act when he recovers his memory because he cannot then tell what he did when he was in his former Condition But certainly when he recovers his Iudgment he is then of Ability to consider what was done during his Insanity and to avoid such Acts by shewing how his indisposition came by the
the Land 211 5. Not granted for Mariners Wages 244 6. Libel for a Tax upon the Parishioners for not repairing of their Church who suggest that they had a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish the Prohibition was denied for of common right they ought to repair the Mother Church 264 7. Proof of Matter of Fact by one Witness denied to be allowed in the Spiritual Court is a good cause for a Prohibition 284 8. Where the Release of a Legacy offered to be proved by one Witness was denied in the Spiritual Court ibid. 9. Proof of Payment or Subtraction of Tythes denied and a Prohibition granted ibid. 10. Whether a Prohibition ought to be allowed after Sentence an Appeal being then the more proper remedy 284 Property See Interest Q. Quorum MUst be one Justice of the Peace of the Quorum otherwise cannot be a Sessions 14 152 Quantum meruit Will lie for Rent reserved upon a real Contract where the Sum is not certain but if a Sum in gross is reserved then Debt must be brought 73 R. Record ERror shall not be assigned against the Essence of a Record 141 Recovery Common Reversed without a Scire Facias to the Tertenants but it seems not to be good 119 2. For there must be a Scire Facias against the Heir and Tertenants when a Writ of Error is brought to reverse it 274 Relation Where an Estate shall pass by Relation where not 299 300 Release Of a Legacy by one Executor and also of all Actions Suits and Demands whatsoever those general words which follow are tied up to the Legacy and release nothing else 277 2. Of a Demand will not discharge a growing Rent 278 3. A Receipt was given for 10 l. in which there was a Release of all Actions Debts Duties and Demands nothing is released but the 10 l. 277 4. Judgment against four Defendants who all joyned in a Writ of Error and the Plaintiff pleaded a Release of Errors by one it shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing but if there had been four Plaintiffs to recover the Release or death of one is a Barr to all 109 135 249 5. A Release of all Actions will discharge an Award of Execution upon a Scieri Facias 185 187 6. Of all Actions and Demands doth not discharge a Legacy it must be by particular words 279 7. One of the Defendants who made Conusance released the Plaintiff after the taking of the Cattle this was held void upon a Demurrer for he had no Demand or Suit against the Plaintiff having distrained in the right of another ibid. Remainder See Entry 3. Fines levied 4. Must take place eo instanti the particular Estate is determined or else it can never arise 309 2. By the Conveyance of the Reversion in Fee to him who had the Estate for Life before the Birth of a Son the particular Estate is merged and all contingent Remainders are thereby destroyed 311 Replevin Where 't is brought by Writ the Sheriff cannot make deliverance without the taking of Pledges de prosequendo retorn ' Habend ' 35 Replication Where the Plaintiff confesseth and avoideth he ought not to traverse for that would make his Replication double 318 Request When a thing is to be done upon Request the time when the person requires it to be done is the time of the performance 295 Reservation Of a Rent upon a Lease for three years payable at Michaelmas and Lady-Day Debt was brought for 2 years without shewing at which of the Feasts it was due 't is good after Verdict but ill upon a Demurrer 70 Resignation See Abeiance To the Ordinary and Patron presented 'ts void if the Ordinary did not accept the Resignation 297 Reversion See Bargain and Sale Surrender 2. Tenant in Tail who had likewise the Reversion in Fee if he acknowledge a Judgment the Reversion may be extended 256 2. But a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets until it comes into possession 257 3. By what words a Reversion in Fee passeth in a Will 228 Revocation A Will shall not be revoked by doubtful words 206 2. It might be revoked by Word without Writing before the Statute of Frauds 207 3. Before that Statute a Will might be revoked by a subsequent Will which was void in it self yet good to revoke the former 207 218 4. A subsequent Will which doth not appear shall not be any Revocation of a written Will which doth appear 204 205 206 5. Whether a subsequent Will which is void in it self may revoke another since the Statute of Frauds 218 6. Such a Will must be good in all circumstances to revoke a former 260 261 Riot See Information Robbery The Hundred was sued and it did not appear that the Parish where the Fact was laid to be done was in the Hundred or that it was done upon the High way or in the day time this was helped after Verdict 258 2. A Servant delivered Mony to a Quaker to carry home for his Master they were both robbed viz. the Servant of 26 s. and the Quaker of 106 l. the Servant made Oath of the Robbery and the Quaker refused the Master brought the Action it doth not lie for him 287 288 S. Scire Facias See Bail 3 4. Baron and Feme 1 4 5. Iudgment 2. Pledges 1. Recovery MUst be to the Tertenants before the Common Recovery shall be reversed by Writ of Error 119 2. Scieri Facias quare Executionem non habet recites the first Judgment but prays no new thing only to have Execution upon that Judgment 187 3. 'T is not an original but a judicial Writ and depends upon the first Judgment 187 4. 'T is suspended by Writ of Error and if the original Judgment is reversed that is so also ibid. 5. Debt will lie upon a Judgment had on a Scire Facias 188 189 6. A Judgment upon a Scire Facias is a distinct Action from the original cause 189 7. Judgment in Dower and a Writ of Enquiry of Damages the Woman marries and dies before the Writ of Enquiry executed the Husband administred and brought a Scire Facias upon the Judgment whether it lieth or not 281 Serjeants at Law See Iudges Surplusage See Inquisition Steward See Court Supersedeas See Parliament Surrender See Assent 1 2. Where it may be pleaded without an acceptance 297 2. No man can take it but he who hath the immediate Reversion 299 3. If pleaded without an Acceptance 't is aided after Verdict which shews 'tis no Substance 301 4. By one Non compos mentis 't is void ab initio 303 T. Tail DEvise to D. for Life the Remainder to her first Son and the Heirs of the Body of such first Son endorsed thus viz. Memorandum that D. shall not alien from the Heirs Males of her Body she had a Son who had Issue a Daughter 't is not an Estate Tail Male for the Memorandum shall not alter the Limitation in the Will
it self 81 83 2. The Testator had two Sons and four Daughters he devised a House to his eldest Son and if he die then he devised his Estate to his four Daughters and if all his Sons and Daughters died without Issue then to A. and her Heirs this is not an Estate Tail in the Daughters by Implication 105 3. Where a Devise is to several persons by express Limitation and a Proviso if all die without Issue of their Bodies the Remainder over this is no cross Remainder or an Estate by Implication because 't is a Devise to them severally by express Limitations 106 4. Devise to his eldest Son and if he die without Heirs Males but doth not say of his Body then to his other Son c. 't is an Estate Tail in the eldest 123 Tenant in Common A Devise to hold by equal parts makes a Tenancy in Common so that there can be no Survivorship in such case 210 Tenant at Will Cestuy que Trust by Deed is Tenant at Will to the Trustees 149 2. Where a Grant by Tenant at Will though void amounts to a determination of his Will 150 3. Whether Tenant at Will can grant over his Estate ibid. 4. What Act shall amount to the determination of his Will ibid. 5. Any thing is sufficient to make an Estate at Will 196 6. Tenant in Fee made a Lease for 100 years in Trust to attend the Inheritance and continued still in Possession he is Tenant at Will to the Lessee for 100 years and if he make any Lease and levy a Fine Sur Cognizance c. the first Lease is displaced and turned to a Right and the Fine barrs it 196 Trade See Grants 2. Prerogative 3 5. Indictment 12. Information 7. Confinement of Staple to certain places was the first regulation of Trade and from thence came Markets 127 2. The King is sole Judge where Fairs or Markets ought to be kept ibid. 3. Custom to restrain a Man from using of a Trade in a particular place is good 128 4. A Man may restrain himself by Promise or Obligation not to use a Trade in a particular place ibid. 5. Regulation of Trade is the chief end of Incorporations ibid. 6. Such incorporate Bodies have an inherent power to judge what persons are fit to use Trades within their Jurisdictions ibid. 7. Whether Grants of the King prohibiting Trade are void 131 8. Cannot be restrained by any By-Law 159 9. At the Common Law any Man might exercise any Trade he please 312 10. Petty-Chapmen are not within the Statute of 5 Eliz. 315 11. Journymen who work for hire are not within the Statute but the Master who sets them to work and pays their Wages is punishable 316 317 12. Subject hath not power absolutely to trade without the King's Licence 127 Travers See Ieofails 3. Presentment Replication Cannot be to a Return of a Writ of Restitution 6 2. He who traverseth the King's Title must shew a Title in himself 146 3. After a Travers 't is not good pleading to conclude to the Country 203 4. Not concluding with a Travers is but matter of form 't is aided by the Statute of Ieofails upon a Demurrer 319 5. Want of a Travers seldom makes a Plea ill in substance but an ill Travers often makes it so 320 6. It must be taken where the thing traversed is issuable 320 Treason See Outlawry Attainder of Treason reversed because on arraignment or demanding Judgment and because there was Process of Ve. fa. instead of a Capias and likewise for that it did not appear that the Party was asked what he had to say why Sentence c. 265 Trespass For breaking and entring a Free Fishery and taking the Fish ipsius querentis not good for he had not such a Property as to call the Fish his own 97 2. In Trespass Quare vi armis clausum fregit to his Damage of 20 s. an Action lyeth let the Damage be never so little 275 Trial See Appeal 2 3. Election 1. Where the Trial and conviction of a Criminal is had he must be executed in that County and not elsewhere unless in Middlesex by prerogative of B. R. which sits in that County 124 2. Where the Court refused to grant a new Tryal in a Case where excessive Damages are given 101 Trover and Conversion Judgment in Trespass is no Bar to an Action of Trover for the same Goods 1 2. They are different Actions in their very nature 2 3. It lies upon a demand and denial but Trespass doth not ibid. 4. Trover pro diversis aliis bonis hath been held good 70 5. 'T is a good Plea in Trover to say that Damages were recovered against another Person for the same Goods and the Defendant in execution though the mony is not paid 86 6. Whether it lies for taking a Ship after a Sentence in the Admiraly for taking the said Ship 194 7. Brought by two and after Verdict one died whether Judgment shall be arrested 249 V. Variance See Appeal 1. Apportionment 2. BEtween the Original in Trespass and the Declaration that being certified three Terms past and no Continuances for that reason not good 136 2. Between Original and the Declaration not aided by the Statutes of Jeofailes ibid. 3. Sci. fa. to have execution of a Judgment obtained in the Court of Oliver late Protector of England and the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging and in reciting the Judgment it was said to be obtained before Oliver late Protector of England and the Dominions c. but left out Territories this was held to be good in substance for the Judicature is still the same 227 Venire Facias The Court would not order the Plaintiff to file a Ve. fa. 246 Verdict See Assumpsit 2. Action for a Tort 5. Amendment 1.6 Common 3. Evidence 6. Prescription 4. Reservation 1. Robbery 1. Surrender 3. The true reason why it helps a defective Declaration 162 2. A Promise to pay quantum rationabiliter valerent instead of valebant at the time of the promise good after Verdict 190 3. It cannot be diminished neither can any thing be added to it 205 4. An Hundred was sued for a Robbery and tho' it did not appear that the Fact in the Declaration mentioned was done in the Hundred or that the Robbery was in the High-way or done in the day-time yet good after a Verdict 258 5. The Defendant sold Cattle affirming 'em to be his own ubi revera they were not but 't is not said that he affirmed them to be his own sciens the same to be the Goods of another or that he sold them fraudulenter vel deceptive yet good after Verdict 261 Vicaridge 'T is not sufficient to alledge Seisin in Fee of a Rectory and that he ought to present to the Vicaridge but he must say that he is Impropriator or that he was seised in Fee of a Rectory impropriate 295 Visitor No Appeal lies from his Sentence for he is Fidei
of setting of so many Letters together but filling up the Blanks makes them of another nature Grants of things of less moment have been adjudged Monopolies 2 Rol. Abr. 215. pl. 5. as a Patent for the sole making of all Bills Pleas and Briefs in the Council of York for by the same reason a like Patent might be granted to make all Declarations in the Courts of Westminster Hall Curia The King hath a Prerogative to Grant the sole Printing to a particular person all the Cases cited for the Plaintiff do not reach the reason of this Case for there is a difference between things of a publick Vse and those which are publick in their Nature even Almanacks have been used to ill purposes as to foretel future Events yet they are of publick Vse to shew the Feasts and Fasts of the Church The Court enclined that the Patent was not good Jackson versus Warren A Motion was made in arrest of Iudgment Amendment for that the day when the Assises were to be held and the place where were left out of the Distringas and so a mis-tryal But the Court were of another Opinion 1 Roll. Abr. 201. for if there had been no Distringas the Tryal had been good because they Jurata is the Warrant to try the Cause which was right and therefore the Distringas was ordered to be amended by the Roll. Dominus Rex versus Sparks 'T IS Enacted by the Statute of 1 Eliz. Where a Punishment is directed by a Statute the Judgment must be pursuant 1 Eliz. cap. 2.13 14 Car. 2. cap. 4. That every Minister shall use the Church-Service in such Form as is mentioned in the Book of Common-Prayer and if he shall be convicted to use any other Form he shall forfeit one whole Years profit of all his Spiritual Promotions and suffer six Months Imprisonment And by the Statute of King Charles the II. All Ministers are to use the publick Prayers in such Order and Form as is mentioned in the Common-Prayer-Book with such Alterations as have been made therein by the Convocation then sitting The Defendant was indicted at the Quarter-Sessions in Devonshire for using alias Preces in the Church alio modo than mentioned in the said Book and concludes contra formam Statuti He was found Guilty and fined 100 Marks and upon a Writ of Error brought Mr. Polexfen and Mr. Shower argued for the Plaintiff in Error that this Indictment was not warranted by any Law and the Verdict shall not help in the case of an Indictment for all the Statutes of Jeofails have left them as they were before Now the Fact as 't is said in this Indictment may be no offence because to use Prayers alio modo than enjoyn'd by the Book of Common-Prayer may be upon an extraordinary occasion and so no Crime But if this should not be allowed the Iustices of Peace have not power in their Sessions to enquire into this matter or if they had power they could not give such a Iudgment because the punishment is directed by the Statute and of this Opinion was the whole Court The Chief Iustice said that the Statute of the 23 Eliz. 23 Eliz. cap. 1. could have no influence upon this Case because another Form is now enjoyned by later Statutes but admitted that Offences against that Statute were enquitable by the Iustices The Indictment ought to have alledged that the Defendant used other Forms and Prayers instead of those enjoyned which were neglected by him for otherwise every Parson may be indicted that useth prayers before his Sermon other than such which are required by the Book of Common-Prayer Clerk versus Hoskins DEbt upon a Bond for the performance of Covenants in certain Articles of Agreement in which it was recited That whereas the now Defendant had found out a Mystery in colouring Stuffs and had entred into a Partnership with the Plaintiff for the term of seven Years he did thereupon Covenant with him that he would not procure any person to obtain Letters Patents within that Term to exercise that Mystery alone The Defendant pleaded that he did not procure any person to obtain Letters Patents c. The Plaintiff replied and assigned for breach that the Defendant did within that term procure Letters Patents for another person to use this Mystery alone for a certain time Et hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam And upon a Demurrer to the Replication these Exceptions were taken 1. That the Plaintiff hath not set forth what Term is contained in the Letters Patents 2. That he had pleaded both Record and Fact together for the procuring is the Fact and the Letters Patents are the Record and then he ought not to have concluded to the Country Prout patet per Recordum To which it was answered That the Plaintiff was a Stranger to the Term contained in the Letters Patents and therefore could not possibly shew it but if he hath assigned a full breach 't is well enough Then as to the other Exception viz. the pleading of the Letters Patents here is not matter of Record here is a plain negative and affirmative upon which the Issue is joyned and therefore ought to conclude hoc petit c. Curia There is a Covenant that the Defendant shall not procure Letters Patents to hinder the Plaintiff within the seven Years of the Partnership Now this must be the matter upon which the breach ariseth and not the Letters Patents so that it had been very improper to conclude prout patet per Recordum Iudgment for the Plaintiff Rex versus Hethersal THE Defendant was Felo de se Melius inquireddum not granted but for misdemeanor of the Jury and the Coroners Inquest found him a Lunatick and now Mr. Jones moved for a Melius inquirendum but it was denied because there was no defect in the Inquisition but the Court told him that if he could produce an Affidavit that the Iury did not go according to their Evidence or of any indirect Proceedings of the Coroner then they would grant it But it was afterwards quashed because they had omitted the year of the King Friend versus Bouchier Trin. 34 Car. 2. Rot. 920. EJectment upon the Demise of Henry Jones What words in a Will make a general Tail of certain Lands in Hampshire The Iury found this Special Verdict following Viz. That William Holms was seised in Fee of the Lands in question who by his last Will dated in the year 1633. devised it to Dorothy Hopkins for Life Remainder to her first Son and to the Heirs of the Body of such first Son c. and for default of such Issue to his Cousin W. with several Remainders over And in default of such Issue to Anne Jones and to her Heirs who was the Lessor of the Plaintiff That before the sealing and publishing of this Will he made this Memorandum Viz. Memorandum that my Will and Meaning is That Dorothy Hopkins
Daughters for the Testator having two Sons and four Daughters it cannot be collected by these words how they shall take and by consequence it cannot be an Estate Tail by implication Now suppose one of the Daughters should dye without Issue 't is uncertain who shall have her part and therefore there being no appointment in what order this Estate shall go it cannot be an Estate Tail and to maintain this Opinion this Case was cited One Collier was seised in Fee of three Houses 2 Cro. 655. Gilbert versus Witty and had Issue three Sons John Robert and Richard he devised to each of them a House in Fee Proviso if all my Children dye without Issue of their Bodies then the Houses to be to his Wife The two eldest Sons died without Issue the younger had Issue a Daughter who married the Lessor of the Plaintiff The Question was Whether by the death of the eldest Son without Issue there was a cross Remainder to Richard and the Heirs of his Body or whether the Wife shall take immediately or expect till after the Death of all the Sons without Issue And it was adjudged that the Wife shall take immediately and that there were no cross Remainders nor any Estate by implication because it was a devise to them severally by express limitation So that if no Estate tail ariseth to the Daughters in this Case by implication Cro. Eliz. Taylor versus Sawyer then 't is no more than a devise to his Issue which extends to them all and gives only an Estate for Life For the Defendant it was argued Ex parte Def. that the Sons and Daughters have no Estate Tail by implication It was agreed that Nicholas had only an Estate for Life and that the word Estate in this case means the Houses and not the Interest in them 'T is true there is no express Limitation of any Estate to them but there is an express determination of it Now if this be not an Estate Tail by implication then the words dying without Issue are void A devise to his Son More 127. and if he dye not having a Son then 't is devised over This is an Estate tail in Remainder It cannot be a doubt who shall take first for the Daughters shall take it Dyer 333. and after them as 't is most natural the eldest Son for where there is the same proximity of Blood the Estate shall go to the eldest As for instance Hob. 33. one Chapman being seised in Fee of two Houses and having three Brothers devised the House which A. dwelt in to his said three Brothers and the House in which his Brother Thomas Chapman did dwell he devised to the said Thomas paying so much c. or else to remain to the Family of the Testator provided that the Houses be not sold but go to the next of the Males and the blood of the Males Thomas died without Issue the eldest of the two surviving Brothers had Issue a Daughter and died the Question was whether that Daughter or the youngest Brother of the Testator should have the House It was adjudged that the Daughter should have it in tail For the Proviso that the Houses be not sold c. made it a tail and the words viz. to remain to the Family must be intended to the eldest If this be not an Estate tail then the Devise over to Anne Warner is void As to the Case of Gilbert and Witty that moves upon another reason for there every one took by a distinct and separate Limitation Curia In that Case all the Estate was limited distinctly to the three Sons but in this 't is otherwise for the Testator had two Sons and no Estate was limited to one of them before then he saith If all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then c. And thus the Cases differ which creates the difficulty But no reason can be given why this Court should not construe Wills according to the Rules of Common Law where an Estate by implication is so incertain for when Men are sick and yet have a disposing power left they usually write Nonsense and the Iudges must rack their Brains to find out what is intended This cannot be an Estate tail in the Daughters and therefore the Heir must come in for his fourth part Iudgment for the Plaintiff Dixon versus Robinson THIS was a special Issue directed out of Chancery Wayhil Fair. and tried this day at the Bar by a Middlesex Iury. The Question was Whether Ballivus probi homines Burgenses Burgi de Andover in Hampshire had power to keep a Fair at Wayehil in any one place where they please the Bill being Exhibited to confine the Fair to a particular place which Fair was granted to them by Charter from Queen Elizabeth They who would have it confin'd to a certain place gave in Evidence that the Hospitaller of Ewelme in Oxfordshire was seised in Fee of the Manor of Rambridge within which Manor the place was where the Fair was always kept and that the Parson of Andover had Glebe there That this place was called Wayehil and that the profits did arise by Piccage and Stallage to the yearly value of 200 l. That it was an ancient Fair held there by Prescription before the Town of Andover had a Charter That upon the late Surrender of Charters the Town of Andover did likewise surrender and took a new Charter in which liberty was given to them to keep this Fair in what place they would That both the Hospitaller and Parson petitioned the King in Council and obtained an Order to Try where the Fair ought to be kept which was tried accordingly at the Exchequer Bar and a Verdict for the Parson Chief Justice If the Fair belongs to Andover they may chuse whether they will keep it at any place and that may create another Question Whether they may not forfeit this Franchise by disuser But certainly if the place be not limited by the King's Grant they may keep it where they please or rather where they can most conveniently and if it be so limited they may keep it in what part of such place they will Dawling versus Venman AN Action on the Case was brought against the Defendant Action for a Scandalous Affidavit in Chancery for making a Scandalous Affidavit in Chancery in which were these words Viz. Mr. Dawling is a Rogue and a Knave and I will make it out before my Lord Chancellor and I will have him in the Pillory Vpon not Guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and damages entire It was moved in arrest of Iudgment for that the truth of on Oath shall not be liable to a Trial in an Action on the Case for the Law intendeth every Oath to be true Before the Statute of 3 11 H. Cro. Eliz. 521 2 Cro. 607. Sid. 50. Hutt 11. 7. which gives power to examine Perjury there was not any Punishment at
an Inn-keeper or common Carrier 't is usual to declare secundum legem consuetudinem Angliae for 't is not a Custom confined to a particular place but 't is such which is extensive to all the King's People The word Consuetudo might have been added 1 Inst 182. but it imports no more than Lex for Custom it self is Law If the Custom of Merchants had been left out the Defendant had then pursued his Covenant for if a Man agrees to pay Mony to such a person or his Assigns and he appoints the payment to another a tender to that person is a good performance of the Covenant But the Court were of Opinion that this was not a good Plea Panton versus the Earl of Bath A Scire Facias to have Execution of a Iudgment obtained in the Court of Oliver late Protector of England and the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging Where the Pleading is good in substance tho' there is a small variation it will not hurt and in reciting the Iudgment 't is said that it was obtained before Oliver Protector of England and the Dominions thereunto belonging leaving out the word Territories And upon a Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen held this to be a variance Yelv. 212. Orde versus Moreton and like the Case where a Writ of Error was brought to remove a Record in Ejectment directed to the Bishop of Durham setting forth that the Action was between such Parties and brought before the said Bishop and seven other persons naming them and the Record removed was an Ejectment before the Bishop and eight others so that it could not be the same Record which was intended to be removed by the Writ E contra E contra It was said suppose the word Scotland should be left out of the King's Title would that be a variance The Iudicature in this Case is still the same and the Pleading is good in Substance and of that Opinion was the whole Court Hyley versus Hyley HYley had Issue W. Where the Reversion in Fee shall pass in a Will by the words viz. Remaining part of my Estate his eldest Son who had Issue Peter Charles John He by Will devised 1000 l. to his eldest Son and several parcels of Land to other Legatees Then he gave to Peter Lands in Tail Male To John a Mansion House now in question in Tail Male He devised another House to his Grandson Charles in like manner And all the rest and remaining part of his Estate he devised to his three Grandsons equally to be divided amongst them that only excepted which he had given to Peter Charles and John and to the Heirs of their Bodies whom he made Executors Then by another Clause he devised viz. That if either of his Executors die without Issue then the part or parts of him so dying shall go to the Survivor or Survivors equally to be divided John the youngest Grandson dyed without Issue and the question was whether the Reversion of his House shall be divided between his surviving Brothers or descend to his Heir And it was adjudged that the Exception in the Will did comprehend the Reversion in Fee and that it did not pass but without such an Exception it had passed * Allen 28. as where a Man devised his Mannor to another for years and part of other Lands to B. and his Heirs and all the rest of his Lands to his Brother in Tail it was held that by these words the Reversion of the Mannor did pass Anonymus NOTA. An Infant having entred into a Statute brought an Audita Querela to avoid it he was brought into the Court and two Witnesses were sworn to prove his Age and then his Appearance and Inspection were recorded he was bound in this Case with two other persons for 1600 l. and had no more than 200 l. for his share Lydcott versus Willows IN Ejectment A special Verdict was found viz. Devise of an Hereditament carries the Reversion in Fee that the Testator being seized in Fee of certain Houses in Bedfor-Bury and in Parker's Lane did by Will devise his Houses in Parker's Lane to charitable Vses then he gave several specifick Legacies to several persons named in the said Will and then he devised his Houses in Bedford-Bury to Edward Harris and Mary his Wife for their Lives then follow these words viz. The better to enable my Wife to pay my Legacies I give and bequeath to her and her Heirs all my Mesuages Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the Kingdom of England not before disposed of c. The Question was whether this Devise would carry the Reversion of the Houses in Bedford-Bury to his Wife Adjudged that it did not but that it ought to go to the Heir of the Testator who was Plaintiff in this Case It being found that Harris and his Wife were dead and that the Wife who was Executrix had sufficient Assets to pay the Legacies without the Reversion But Iustice Powel was of another Opinion for that the word Hereditament imports an Inheritance and if it had devised thus viz. the Inheritance not before disposed of the Reversion had passed Afterwards a Writ of Error was brought in the Exchequer-Chamber upon this Iudgment 2 Vent 285. and according to the Opinion of Iustice Powel the Iudgment was reversed Nota. A Rule of Court was made that no Certiorari should go to the Sessions of Ely without Motion in Court or signing of it by a Iudge in his Chamber But Mr. Pollexfen insisted that the Sessions there did not differ from other Courts and Franchises for the inferior Courts in London are of as large a Iurisdiction as any and yet a Certiorari goes to them and so it ought to go to Ely for 't is the Right of the Subject to remove his Cause hither Their course in the Royal Franchise of Ely is to hold the Sessions there twice a year viz. in March and September in which two Months the Iudges are seldom in Town and if this Court should deny a Certiorari the Court of Common Pleas would grant it Attorney General contra This Franchise of Ely is of greater Priviledge and Authority than any inferior Court for it hath many Regalia though 't is not a County Palatine A Certiorari will not lie to the Grand Sessions nor to a County Palatine to remove Civil Causes 't is true it lyeth to remove Indictments for Riots and this Franchise being truly called Royal hath equal priviledge with a County Palatine and therefore a Certiorari will not lie But no Rule was made Osborn versus Steward TRespass Distress for an Heriot where it may be taken The Case upon the Pleadings was this viz. A Lease was made of Land for 99 years if Margery and Dorothy Upton should so long live reserving a yearly Rent and an Heriot or 40 s. in lieu thereof after the death of either of them Provided that no Heriot shall be paid after the death of Margery living
on the 29th day of April seize the Goods of the said Toplady that after the seizure and before any Venditioni exponas viz. 4 Maij an Extent which is a Prerogative Writ issued out of the Exchequer against two persons who were indebted to the King and by inquisition this Toplady was found to be indebted to them whereupon parcel of the Goods in the Declaration was seized by the Sheriffs upon the said Extent and sold and the Mony paid to the Creditors but before the said Sale or any execution of the Exchequer Process a Commission of Bankrupcy was had against Toplady and that the Commissioners on the second of June assigned the Goods to the Plaintiff The Question was whether this Extent did not come too late And it was held it did or whether the Fi. Fa. was well executed so that the Assignees of the Bankrupts Estate could not have a Title to those Goods which were taken before in Execution and so in Custodia Legis And it was held that they had no Title Fitzgerald versus Villiers WRIE of Error upon a Iudgment in Dower Infant must appear by Guardian and the Error assigned was that the Tenant in Dower was an Infant and no Warrant was alledged of the admission of any Guardian 29 Assise pl. 67. Bridg. 74. Lib. Entr. 45. Hut 92. 4 Co. 53. Lit. 92. Hetl. 52. 3 Cro. 158. Moor 434. Hob. 5. that it might appear to be the act of the Court 't is true an Infant may sue by Prochein Amy but shall not appear by Attorny but by Guardian because 't is intended by Law that he hath not sufficient discretion to chuse an Attorny therefore 't is provided that he appear per Guardianum which is done by the Court who are always careful of Infancy and a special Entry is made upon the Roll. Viz. Per Guardianum ad hoc per Curiam admissum c. 2. The Appearance is by the Guardian in his own Name Viz. Et praedicta Katherina Fitzgerald per Richardum Power Guardianum suum venit dicit quod ipse c. it should have been in the name of the Party quod ipsa c. Adjurnatur Harrison versus Austin A Settlement was made as followeth Viz. What words amount to a Covenant to stand seised That if I have no Issue and in case I dye without Issue of my Body lawfully begotten then I give grant and confirm my Land c. to my Kinswoman Sarah Stokes to have and to hold the same to the use of my self for Life and after my decease to the use of the said Sarah and the Heirs of her Body to be begotten with Remainders over c. The Question was whether this did amount to a Covenant to stand seised so as to raise an use to Sarah without transmutation of the possession The Objection against it was Sid. 26. Moor 687. Dyer 96. 2 Roll. Abr. 786. Winch 59. Plowd 300. that Vses are created chiefly by the intention of the Parties and that by these words grant and confirm the Feoffor did intend the Land should pass at Common Law so it could not be a Covenant to stand seised 't is like the Case where a Letter of Attorny is in the Deed or a Covenant to make Livery there nothing shall pass by way of use but the possession according to the course of the Common Law and therefore there being neither Livery and Seisin or Attornment no use will pass to Sarah It cannot be a Bargain and Sale for that is only where a Recompence is on each side to make the Contract good besides 2 Inst 672. the Deed is not inrolled To this it was answered 1 Vent 137. that it shall be construed to be a Covenant to stand seised though the formal words are wanting to make it so and for that purpose it was compared to Fox 's Case 8 Co. 93. who being seised in Fee devised his Land to C. for Life remainder over for Life reserving a Rent and afterwards by Indenture in consideration of Mony did demise grant and set the same Lands to D. for 99 years reserving a Rent the Lessee for Life did not attorn in which Case there was not one word of any use or any attornment to make it pass by Grant and the Question was whether this Lease for years shall amount to a Bargain and Sale so that the Reversion together with the Rent shall pass to the Lessee without Attornment Hob. 277. and it was held that by construction of Law it did amount to a Bargain and Sale for the words import as much And in this Case it was adjudged that it was a Covenant to stand seised Hexham versus Coniers IN Ejectment the Plaintiff declared de uno Messuagio sive Tenemento An Ejectment will lye for a Tenement and had a Verdict but Iudgment was arrested because an Ejectment will not lye of a Tenement for 't is a word of an uncertain signification it may be an Advowson House or Land but it is good in Dower so is Messuagium sive Tenementum vocat ' the Black Swan for this addition makes it certain that the Tenement intended is a House Rex versus Bunny A Motion was made for a Melius inquirendum to be directed to a Coroner who had returned his Inquisition upon the death of Bunny that he was not compos mentis when in truth he was Felo de se But it was opposed by Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. Pollexfen who said that the Law gives great credit to the Inquest of a Coroner and that a Melius inquirendum is seldom or never granted tho' it appear to the Court upon Affidavits that the Party had his Senses Mod. Rep. 82. It hath been granted where any fault is in the Coroner or any incertainty in the Inquisition returned That there is such a Writ it cannot be denied Cro. Eliz. 371. but 't is generally granted upon Offices or Tenures and directed to the Sheriff 3 Keb. 800. but never to a Coroner in the case of a Felo de se who makes his Enquiry super visum Corporis DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. In Trinity-Vacation last Mr. Justice Holloway and Mr. Justice Thomas Powell had their Quietus and Mr. Serjeant Baldock and Mr. Serjeant Stringer were made Justices of this Court And Mr. Justice Allibon who was a Roman Catholick died in the same Vacation and Sir John Powell one of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of this Court Sir Thomas Jennor another of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of the Common-Pleas and Mr. Serjeant Rotheram and Mr. Serjeant Ingoldby were made Barons of the Exchequer Wright Chief Justice Powel Justices Baldock Justices Stringer Justices Shuttleworth versus Garnet Intratur Trin. 1 Willielmi Mariae Rotulo 965. THE Defendant was Tenant of Customary Lands held of the Manor of A. of which Manor B. was Lord
place as the Parish of St. James Westminster only And upon a Demurrer it was argued that this Plea was not good for it being in Abatement the Appellee ought to have pleaded over to the Murder Cro. Eliz. 694. so it was adjudged in the Case of Watts and Brain the Pleadings of which Case are at large in my Lord Coke's Entries 2. He ought to have pleaded in person and not by Attorney the Statute of Gloucester is plain in this Point Curia If the Plea is in Abatement and the Party doth not answer over to the Murder yet that doth not oust him of his Plea but the Appellant ought to have prayed Iudgment 'T is a Question whether he ought to plead over to the Felony or not for the Presidents are both ways there is no Iudgment entred Proud versus Piper THere was a Libel brought in the Spiritual Court for a Mortuary Mortuary due only by Custom 21 H. 8. c. 6. The Defendant suggests that by the Statute of H. 8. no Mortuary ought to be paid but in such places where it had been usually paid before the making of that Statute and that there was no Custom in this place to pay a Mortuary and it was thereupon moved for a Prohibition Cro. Eliz. 151. for Mortuaries are not due by Law but by particular Custom of places 'T is true 2 Inst 491. 1 Cro. 237. Seld. of Tithes 287. a Prohibition was denied in the Case of * Sid. 263. Mark and Gilbert but it was because 't was admitted that there a Mortuary was due by Custom but they differed in the person to whom it ought to be paid Curia Prohibitions have been granted and denied upon such Suggestions therefore the Defendant was ordered to take a Declaration in a Prohibition as to the Mortuary and to try the Custom at Law Lutwich versus Piggot IN Ejectment for Lands in Northumberland Lease whether made pursuant to the power in the Reservation tried at the Bar the Case was thus viz. Peter Venables was seised in Fee of the Manor of Long Witton in the said County and being so seised made a Settlement thereof by Lease and Release to the use of himself for Life without impeachment of Waste then to the Trustees for seven years to raise Portions for Daughters then to William Venables and the Heirs Male of his Body and if he dye without Issue then to Ann his Daughter for Life with Remainders over In which Settlement there was this Proviso viz. Provided that it shall be lawful for William Venables by Will or Deed to dispose of any part of the said Manor to his Wife for Life And another Proviso to this purpose viz. Provided that it shall and may be lawful to and for the said William Venables by any Deed in Writing under his Hand and Seal to Demise for 3 Lives or 21 years or under or for any time or term of years upon one two or three Lives or as Tenant in Tail in Possession may do all or any part of the said Manor Lands c. which were in Lease for the space of forty years last past The Defendants Title was a Lease for 99 years made by the said William Venables to one Mary Venables if three Lives should so long live And the Question was whether that Lease was pursuant to the power in the last Proviso It was objected that it was not for it ought to be a Lease for 21 and not 99 years determinable for three Lives But the Plaintiff was Non-Suit Rex versus Fairfax al. AN Order made at the Quarter-Sessions of Gloucester Who shall be bound to take an Apprentice in Husbandry was removed hither confirming another made by the Iustices there for placing of a poor Boy to be an Apprentice in Husbandry and it was moved that it might be quashed Mr. Pollexfen argued that the Iustices had no power given them by the Law to compel a Man to take such an Apprentice and this will depend upon the construction of such Statutes which relate to this matter The first is that of Queen Elizabeth which enacts 5 Eliz. cap. 4. Paragraph 25. that for the better advancing of Husbandry and Tillage and to the intent such who are fit to be made Apprentices to Husbandry may be bound thereunto that every person being an Housholder and having or using half a Plough Land at the least in Till age may take any to be an Apprentice above ten and under eighteen years to serve in Husbandry until the Party be of the Age of twenty one or twenty four years the said Reteiner and taking of an Apprentice to be by Indenture Now before the making of this Statute the practice of putting out poor Children was only in Cities and great Towns to particular Trades and Employments The next Statute is 43 Eliz. by which power is given to the Church-Wardens or Overseers of the Poor 48 Eliz. cap. 2. to raise weekly or otherwise by Taxation of every Inhabitant such competent Sum or Sums of Mony as they shall think fit for relief of the Poor and putting out of Children to Apprentice And then in the fifth Paragraph power is given to them by the Assent of two Iustices of Peace to bind poor Children where they shall see convenient c. which words were the foundation for the making of this Order But the construction thereof can be no otherwise than viz. Whereas before the making of this Act poor Children were bound Apprentices to Tillage now the Church-wardens may raise Mony to bind them out to Trades for if they could compel Men to take them what need was there of raising Mony to place them out This must be the natural construction of that Law 1 Jac. cap. 25. Paragraph 23. which appears yet more plain by the words of a subsequent Statute which continues that of the 43th of Eliz. with this addition that all persons to whom the Overseers of the Poor shall according to that Act bind any Children to Apprentice may take receive and keep them as Apprentices 'T is true the general practice of putting out poor Children seems to warrant this Order but this hath been occasioned upon a Mistake in Mr. Dalton 's Book Dalt 114. who Reported the Resolution of the Iudges in 1633. to be That every Man who by his calling profession or manner of living and who entertaineth and must use Servants of the like quality such must also take Apprentices By this Resolution the Iustices of Peace have been governed ever since But Iustice Twisden would often say that those were not the Resolutions of the Iudges as Reported by Mr. Dalton and therefore the Book was mistaken 2. The Order it self doth not mention that the party to whom this poor Boy was bound Apprentice did occupy any Land in Tillage for so it ought to be otherwise the Overseers of the Poor may bind him to a Merchant or to an Attorny which he called a Free
not avoid such Acts done by their Ancestors as well as Privies in Blood because the Incapacity of the Grantor goes to both Those who argued on the other side held that the Acts of Infants and persons non compos were not void in themselves but only voidable E contra 'T is true some Deeds made by an Infant are void not meerly Cro. Car. 502. because executed by him for some are good and those only are void which are made to his prejudice Such also are void which give Authority to a third person to do an Act as if an Infant enter into a Bond Perk. Sect. 139. March 141. and give it to a Stranger to deliver to the Obligee when he shall attain his full Age this is void because the person derived his Authority from an Infant who by reason of his Nonage could not give such a Power but if the Infant himself had delivered the Bond to the Obligee it had been only voidable Lit. Sect. 259. The Father of the Demandant was an Infant when he sold his Estate 46 E. 3.34 his Son brought the Writ Dum fuit infra-aetatem against the Alienee and it was held good which would not have been allowed if the Grant had been void All the old Authorities prove that the Acts of Infants and Ideots are not void but voidable If an Infant is bound in an Obligation 't is not void Cro. Eliz. 127. 2 Inst 483. for he may agree to it when of Age he cannot plead Non est factum and he may refuse to plead his Infancy If he be entituled to a Term for years Cro. Eliz. 126. Cro. Car. 502. and maketh a Surrender by the acceptance of a new Lease 't is good if 't is for his advantage either by the lessening of the Rent or the encreasing of the Term but if he hath no benefit by it 't is voidable only So he may purchase Lands because the Law intends it for his benefit and he can receive no damage by such a Purchase for he may either perfect or avoid it at his full Age which shews that such Acts are not voidable ab intio but only voidable as the Case shall require The Statute of 23 H. 6. Enacts 23 H. 6. c. 10. That Sheriffs shall take no Bonds upon an Arrest but for the Appearance of the Party and to themselves only and that a Bond otherwise taken colore officii shall be void that is not in its self but by pleading the Statute for 't is not to be avoided by pleading Non est factum So upon the Statute of Additions 1 H. 5. c. 5. 3 Co. 59. a. where a Man is outlawed without the addition of his condition or place of abode in the original Writ such Outlawry shall be void not of its self but it may be avoided by Writ of Error In like manner there are many Authorities to prove that the Acts of a person non compos are not void but voidable So is the first Resolution in Beverly 's Case that a Deed or Feoffment made by him is to be avoided by any other person but not by himself Thus stood the Law in the time of E. 35 Ass pl. 10. 3. For in an Assize the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff had released to him by Deed who replied that at the time of the making of the Deed he was Non compos The Court of Common Pleas seemed then to be of Opinion that the Replication was not good which shews that the Deed in its self was not void 't is true the Assize was then adjourned because that Opinion was directly against the Register which is that the Writ of Dum non fuit compos may be brought by the person himself notwithstanding his own Alienation But this hath since been denied to be Law Cro. Eliz. 398. for in Debt upon Bond the Defendant pleaded that he was Non compos and upon a Demurrer the Plea was over-ruled And of this Opinion was Sir William Herle Chief Iustice of the Common Pleas in 5 E. 5 E. 3.70 3. which was long before the Book of Assize So the Law continued till the Reign of H. 35 H. 6. f. 42. 6. viz. that the person himself could not avoid his own Feoffment either by Entry or Action The Writs de Ideota inquirendo and Dum non fuit compos import the same thing viz. that Acts done by them are not void for the first recites that the Ideot alienavit and the other that the Lunatick * Dimisit is there intended where the Estate is conveyed by Livery or for life and Alienavit is a Conveiance by Feoffment 17 E. 2. Stamf. Praerog 34. Dimisit terras Now if their Acts had been void ab initio then they cannot be supposed either to alien or lease their Lands which shews that such Acts are only voidable And as a farther Argument to enforce this the Statute de Praerogativa Regis was mentioned which gives the Custody of the Ideots Lands to the King during their Lives provided that afterwards it be given to their right Heirs ita quod nullatenus per eofdem fatuos alienetur Now to what purpose were these Words added if such an Alienation was void in it self Besides the Cases of Ideots mentioned on the other side and Lunaticks are not parellel for an Ideot hath a different incapacity from one Non compos 't is perpetual in an Ideot and for that reason the Law gives the King an Interest in him But a person non compos may recover his Senses Co. Lit. 2. b. Fitz. tit Issue 53. he may purchase Lands may grant a Rent-charge out of his Estate and shall not plead his insanity to defeat his own act If therefore this Surrender was not void at the time of the execution thereof but voidable only during the Life of the Surrenderor by office found then the Question cannot properly be whether the Lessor of the Plaintiff shall avoid it for that would be to revest the Estate in some body but the Surrender was good and the Estate for Life was utterly determined so that nothing being left to support the contingent Remainders those are also destroied And to prove this Chudleigh 's Case was relied on which was Co. 120. Sir R. C. was seised in Fee of the Manor of Hescot in Devon and having Issue Christopher and three other Sons made a Feoffment to the use of himself and his Heirs on the Body of Mary then the Wife of Mr. Carew to be begotten and for default of such Issue then to the use of his last Will c. for ten years and after the Expiration of that Term then to his Feoffees and their Heirs during the Life of Christopher Remainder to the Issue Male of Christopher in Tail with like Remainder to his other Sons Remainder to his own right Heirs He died without Issue by Mrs. Carew But before Christopher had any Son born the
Sir Thomas claimed a Property whereupon he was ordered to amend his Return and then the Court of Common-Pleas bailed him Banson versus Offley AN Appeal of Murder was tried in Cambridgshire against three persons An Appeal of a Murder was tried not where the Stroak was given but where the Party died and the Count was that Offley did assault the Husband of the Appellant and wounded him in Huntingtonshire of which Wound he did languish and dye in Cambridgeshire and that Lippon and Martin were assisting The Iury found a special Verdict in which the Fact appeared to be that Lippon gave the Wound and that Martin and Offley were assisting The first Exception to this Verdict was that the Count and the Matter therein alledged must be certain and so likewise must the Verdict otherwise no Iudgment can be given but here the Verdict finding that another person gave the Stroak and not that person against whom the Appellant had declared 't is directly against her own shewing 2. This Fact was tried by a Iury of Cambridgshire when it ought to have been tried by a Iury of both Counties The Court answered to the first Exception that it was of no force and that the same Objection may be made to an Indictment where in an Indictment if one gives the Stroak and another is abetting they are both principally and equally guilty and an Indictment ought to be as certain as a Count in an Appeal As to the second Exception 't is a good Trial by a Iury of Cambridgshire alone and this upon the Statute of 2 3 Ed. 6. 2 3 Ed. 6. cap. 24. the Words of which Statute are viz. Where any person c. shall hereafter be feloniously striken in one County and dye of the same Stroak in another County that then an Indictment thereof found by the Jurors of the County where the death shall happen whether it be found before the Coroner upon the sight of the Body or before the Justices of the Peace or other Justices or Commissioners who shall have Authority to enquire of such Offences shall be as good and effectual in the Law as if the Stroak had been in the same County where the Party shall dye or where such Indictment shall be found 'T is true 4 Inst 49 that at the Common Law if a Man had received a mortal Wound in one County and died in another the Wife or next Heir had their Election to bring an Appeal in either County but the Trial must be by a Iury of both Counties But now that mischief is remedied by this Statute which doth not only provide that an Appeal shall be brought in the County where the Party dyed but that it shall be prosecuted which must be to the end of the Suit Adjornatur Dominus Rex versus Hinton and Brown AN Indictment was brought against the Defendants setting forth Subornation of Perjury that a Conventicle was held at a certain place and that they movebant persuadebant subornaverunt a certain person to swear that several Men were then present who really were at that time at another place They were found guilty and a Writ of Error was brought to reverse the Iudgment the Error assigned was that the Indictment doth not set forth that any Oath was made so it could not be Subornation There is a difference between the persuading of a man to swear falsly and Subornation it self for an Indictment for Subornation always concludes contra formam Statuti Curia 'T is not enough to say a Man suborned another to commit a Perjury but he must shew what Perjury it is which cannot be without an Oath for an Indictment cannot be framed for such an Offence unless it appear that the thing was false which he was perswaded to swear The Question therefore is If the person had sworn what the Defendants had persuaded him to do whether that had been Perjury There is a difference when a Man swears a thing which is true in Fact and yet he doth not know it to be so and to swear a thing to be true which is really false the first is Perjury before God and the other is an Offence of which the Law takes notice But the Indictment was quashed because the Words Per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out They held that if the Return had been right upon the File the Record should be amended by it Blaxton versus Stone THE Case was this viz. A Man seised in Fee c. What words make an Estate Tail in a Will had Issue two Sons he devised all his Land to his eldest Son and if he die without Heirs Males then to his other Son in like manner The Question was Whether this was an Estate Tail in the eldest Son Curia 'T is plain the Word Body which properly creates an Estate Tail is left out but the intent of the Testator may be collected out of his Will that he designed an Estate Tail for without this Devise it would have gone to his second Son if the first had died without Issue 'T is therefore an Estate Tail DE Termino Paschae Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687. Herbert Chief Justice Wythens Justices Holloway Justices Powel Justices Dominus Rex versus William Beal MEmorandum A Souldier executed not in the County where he wes condemned That on Saturday April 15. Mr. Attorny moved that this Court would award Execution upon the Defendant who was a Souldier for deserting of his Colours and was condemned for the same at the Affizes at Reading in Berks and reprieved and that he might be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison then was The Chief Iustice in some heat said that the Motion was irregular for the Prisoner was never before the Court. Mr. Attorny then moved for a Habeas Corpus and on Tuesday April the 18th the Souldier was brought to the Barr and Mr. Attorny moved it again But it was affirmed by the Chief Iustice and Iustice Wythens that it could not be done by Law for the Prisoner being condemned in Berks and reprieved by the Iudge to know the Kings Pleasure and now brought hither cannot be sent into another County to be executed it may be done in Middlesex by the Prerogative of this Court which sits in that County but no where else but in the proper County where the Trial and Conviction was so the Prisoner was committed to the Kings Bench and the Record of his Conviction was not filed But it was the King's Will that this Man should be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison was that by this Example other Souldiers might be deterred from running from their Colours SIR Robert Wright who was made Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the room of Sir Henry Beddingfield who died the last Term as he was receiving of the Sacrament was on Friday following being the 21st of April made Chief Justice of this Court in the place of
the Indictment for be it before or after the Offence the Iury ought to find according to the truth of the Case upon the Evidence for they are sworn ad veritatem dicendam c. This must be assigned for Error for if the contrary be said 't is against the Record the Custos Brevium having retorned that the Fine was taken 30 July which could not be in Trinity Term for that ended 8 July otherwise 't is repugnant to it self Econtra It was argued that this is not assignable for Error Dyer 220. b. 12 Co. 124. 't is true if the Party had died before the Entry of the King's Silver it had been Error but if afterwards 't is not so Thus was the Case of Warnecomb and Carril which was Husband and Wife levied a Fine of the Lands of the Wife and this was by Dedimus in the Lent Vacation she being then but 19 years of Age the King's Silver was entred in Hillary Term before and she died in the Easter week and upon a Motion made the first day of Easter Term to stay the engrossing of the Fine it was denied by the Court for they held it to be a good Fine Another reason why this is not assignable for Error 2 Cro. 11. Yelv. 33. is because 't is directly against the Record which is of Trinity Term and can be of no other Term and to prove this he cited Arundel's Case where a Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Fine taken before Roger Manwood Esq in his Circuit he being then one of the Iustices of the Common-Pleas and the Dedimus was returned per Rogerum Manwood Militem for he was Knighted and made Chief Baron the Eerm following the Fine passed and this was afterwards assigned for Trror that he who took the Caption was not a Knight but it being directly against the Record they would not intend him to be the same person to whom the Writ was directed Adjurnatur Afterwards the Fine was affirmed Lock versus Norborne UPon a Trial at Bar in Ejectment for Lands in Wiltshire Verdict shall only be given in Evidence amongst privies the Case was thus Viz. Mary Philpot in the year 1678. made a Settlement by Lease and Release to her self for Life then to Trustees to support contingent Remainders then to her first second and third Son in Tail Male c. then to Thomas Arundel in Tail Male with divers Remainders over It was objected at the Tryal that she had no power to make such Settlement because in the year 1676. her Husband had setled the Lands in question upon her for Life and upon the Issue of his Body c. and for want of such Issue then upon George Philpot in Tail Male with several Remainders over the Remainder to Mary Philpot in Fee Proviso that upon the tender of a Guinea to George Philpot by the said Mary the Limitations as to him should be void George Philpot having afterwards made a Lease of this Land to try the Title the Trustees brought an Ejectment but because the tender of the Guinea could not be proved there was a Verdict for the Defendant And now Mr. Philpot would have given that Verdict in Evidence at this Trial but was not suffered by the Court for if one Man hath a Title to several Lands and if he should bring Ejectments against several Defendants and recover against one he shall not give that Verdict in Evidence against the rest because the Party against whom that Verdict was had may be relieved against it if 't is not good but the rest cannot tho' they claim under the same Title and all make the same defence So if two Tenants will defend a Title in Ejectment and a Verdict should be had against one of them it shall not be read against the other unless by Rule of Court But if an Ancestor hath a Verdict the Heir may give it in Evidence because he is privy to it for he who produceth a Verdict must be either party or privy to it and it shall never be received against different persons if it doth not appear that they are united in Interest Therefore a Verdict against A. shall never be read against B. for it may happen that one did not make a good defence which the other may do The tender of the Guinea was now proved DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687 8. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Powis Attorny General Wm. Williams Sollicitor General THIS Vacation Sir Robert Sawyer had his Quietus and Sir Thomas Powis was made Attorny General and Sir William Williams of Greys-Inn was made Sollicitor General Rex versus Lenthal AN Inquifition was taken in the second year of this King under the Great Seal of England by which it was found that the Office of Marshal of the Kings-Bench did concern the Administration of Iustice and that Mr. Lenthal was seised thereof in Fee and that upon his Marriage he had setled the said Office upon Sir Edward Norris and Mr. Coghill and their Heirs in Truff that they should permit him to execute the same during his Life c. That the said Trustees had neglected to give their attendance or to execute the said Office themselves that this Canveyance was made by Mr. Lenthal without the notice of this Court that he received the Profits and afterwards granted the said Office to Cooling for Life That Cross and his Wife had obtained a Iudgment in this Court against Bromley and had sued forth Erecution for the Debt and Damages for which he was committed to the custody of the said Cooling and being so in Execution did go at large They find that Cooling had not sufficient to answer Cross and his Wise for the said Debt c. whereupon they impleaded Mr. Lenthal in the Common-Pleas for 121 l. 2 s. 4 d. to answer as superior that at the Trial Mr. Lenthal gave this secret Deed of Settlement in Evidence whereupon the Plaintiffs in that Action were non-suited ad dampnum c. They find that Cooling went out of the said Office and the Trustees neglecting the execution thereof Mr. Lenthal granted the same to Glover for Life that during the time he executed this Office one Wordal was convicted of Forgery and commited to his Custody and that he permitted him voluntarily to Escape by which the said Office was forfeited to the King The King had granted the Office to the Lord Hunsdon Sir Edward Norris and Mr. Coghill come in and plead that Mr. Lenthal was seised in Fee and that he made a Settlement of the Office upon his Marriage with Mrs. Lucy Dunch with whom he had 5000 l. Portion viz. upon them and their Heirs in trust prout in the Inquisition and that he did execute the Office by-their permission Mr Lenthal pleads and admits the Grant to Sir Edward Norris and the other Trustee bearing date such a day c. but saith that the next
they are not properly sua 278 Exposition of Words and Sentences See Number Subsequent words may explain a former Sentence in a Deed but in Wills the first words guide all which follow 82 2. Action was brought by Original for that the Defendant prosecut ' fuit adhuc prosequitur in the Admiralty those words adhuc prosequitur shall not be construed to make it subsequent to the Original but must refer to the time of suing it forth 103 157 3. Doubtful Words must be Expounded always against the Lessor 230 4. To make an Assurance to the Obligee and his Heirs the Conjuction and shall be taken in the disjunctive 235 F. Fair See Trade IF the place where it should be kept is not limited by the Grant it may be kept where the Grantee will 108 False Imprisonment It will not lye against a Sheriff for taking the Body by vertue of a Casa upon an Erronious Judgment for the Execution is good till avoided by Writ of Error 325 Fees Of the Clerks of the Crown-Office the Court will not regulate upon a Motion but if oppressive they must be indicted for Extortion 297 Fines levied See Tenant at Will 6. One of the Cognisors died before the return of the Writ of Covenant 't is Error but not in the case of a Purchaser for a valuable consideratino for the Court will interpose 99 2. If the Cognisor doth dye after the Entry of the Kings-Silver the Fine is good 140 3. Writ of Covenant Teste 15th of January returnable in Crastino Purificationis taken by Dedimus 18th of Januarii The Cognizor died in Easter-Week following but four days before her Death the Kings-Silver was entred as of Hillary-Term precedent this was held a good Fine 141 4. Where a person is in possession by vertue of a particular Estate for Life and accepteth a greater Estate it shall not divest the Estate of those in Remainder for Life so as the same may be barred by Fine and Non-claim 195 5. Lease for one hundred years in Trust to attend the Inheritance cestuy que Trust being in possession Demises to another for fifty years and levied a Fine and the five years passed the Term for a hundred years is divested by this Fine and turned to a right and so barred 196 6. In what Cases a Fine is a Bar and what not 198 Fines upon Admittance See Admittance Copihold Debt 2. Infant 9. The Judges are to determine whether it be reasonable or not 134 2. Lord cannot enter for non-payment of an unreasonable Fine 134 Forfeiture If Tenant for years make a Feoffment 't is a Forfeiture but if he make a Lease and Release ' tho 't is of the same Operation yet 't is no forfeiture 151 Fraud See Evidence G. Grants Grantor and Grantee WHere an Interest is coupled with a Trust in a Grant it shall go to the Executor of the Grantee 43 2. Grants must be certain otherwise they are void 134 Grants of the King Not good for the sole Printing of Blank Bonds exclusive of all other Printers 75 2. A Grant to restrain trading to particular places is good 77 3. But of sole making Cards not good because it restrains a whole Trade ibid. 4. A Grant cannot divest the Subject of a Right enjoyed long before it was made ibid. 5. Cannot discharge a person of a Duty to which he is made lyable by a subsequent Act of Parliament 96 6. Difference between his Grants and Prohibitions 7. Where his Grants ought to be taken very strictly 168 8. In a Quo Warranto the Defendant pleaded that the King was seised in Fee of a Franchise who granted it to another Habendum the Hundred whether good or not 199 Gun See Iustice of Peace 3. Conviction before a Justice of Peace upon the Statute of H. 8. for keeping a Gun not having 100 l. per Annum quashed because it was said non habuisset instead of nunquam Habuit 100 l. per Annum 280 H. Habendum WHere it shall be said to explain the general Words preceding 81 2. Nothing passes in the Habendum but what was mentioned in the Premisses 199 Heir Error by the Plaintiff ut Consanguineus Haeres viz. Filius c. 't is sufficient without shewing the descent from more Ancestors 152 2. Where he shall take by Descent and where by Purchase 205 3. In a Bond where the word Heir is a word of Limitation and not a designation of the person 233 4. Reversion in Fee descended to an Heir after the Estate Tail spent and an Action was brought against him upon a Bond of his Ancestor 't is not necessary that the Plaintiff name all the intermediate Remainders but him who was last actually seized of the Fee 255 Heriot Lease for 99 years if A. B. C. so long live paying an Heriot upon the death of either A. assigns the term no Heriot shall be taken of the Assignee 231 2 May seize or distrain for Heriot Service if distrain it may be the Beast of any man upon the Land but if he seise it must be the very Beast of the Tenant ibid. 3. Where an Heriot is reserved upon a Demise it differs from those which are due by Tenure 231 4. Lease for 99 years if M. and D. so long live reserving an Heriot after death of either provided if D. survive no Heriot to be paid but M. survived the Court was divided whether a Heriot should be paid 230 Highways A Man cannot be exempted from repairing by the Grant of the King if made before the Statute of Ph. Mar. which charges him to repair 96 Homine Replegiando Brought for a Monster and upon the Return of the Sheriff that he had replevyed the Body he was bailed 121 2. Brought for a young Woman taken out of her Parents Custody and married against her Consent 169 Hue and Cry See Robbery Hundred Court This Court was first derived from the County Court 200 2 Hundreds were usually granted to Abbots and their Possessions coming to the Crown by dissolution of their Abbies are merged and cannot be regranted 200 I. Ideot HOW it differs from a Lunatick 43 2. The King hath power to grant his Estate to any person without Accompt to be given ibid. 3. Grant of an Ideot by the King the Grantee dieth his Executor hath an Interest in him ibid. Ieoffails See Indictment 8. Travers 4. Variance 2. None of the Statutes help an insufficient Indictment 79 2. Variance between original and declaration not aided by the Statute of Ieofails 136 3. Want of concluding without a Travers is but matter of form and aided 319 Indictment For using of Alias Preces than enjoined by the Book of Common Prayer it may be upon an extraordinary occasion and so no Offence 79 2. For scandalous words whether it lieth as it doth for Libels the one being a private the other a publick Offence 139 3. For Baretry in soliciting of a Suit against another who was not indebted to the person 97