assured the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 z Id. ibid. that he would humble the Nobility and bring down their pride and 't was no reason that such a man as he should be disappointed and not be master of his word Martius being banished at the last their next bout was with Appius Claudius a constant and professed enemy of the popular faction one who had openly took part against them in behalf of Martius and after seeing them apprehend some Gentlemen who opposed their insolencies had openly denied jus esse Tribuno in quenquam nisi in plebeium a Livie l. 2. that they could exercise their power on any but the Commons only Him therefore they accused of Treason or at least sedition in that he had intrenched upon their authority which was made sacred by the Lawes and doubtlesse had condemned him to some shameful punishment had he not died before his triall Which victory on Martius and the death of Appius did so discourage the Nobility and puffe up the Tribunes that from this time forwards as the Historian doth observe the Tribunes cited whom they listed to answer for themselves before the people and to submit their lives to their finall sentence which as it did increase the power of the popular faction in the depressing of the Nobles and weakning the authority of the Senate so did it open them a way to aim at and attain to all those dignities in the Common wealth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 b Dionys Halicarn l. 7. which were most honourable in themselves and had formerly belonged to the Patricians and to none but them And yet the Senate and Nobility did not so give over but that sometimes they put them in remembrance of their first conditions and challenged them of breaking all those bonds and Covenants which were so solemnly agreed on and accepted by them at the first erection of their Office For this did Fabius presse upon them when they went about to make some Law for the restraint and regulating of the power of the Consuls viz. that their authority was given them ad auxilium singulorum for the relief of such particulars as did want their help not for the ruine of the publick and that they should do well to bethink themselves c Livie l. 3. Tribunos plebis se creatos non hostes Patribus that they were chosen Tribunes to protect the people not enemies to oppresse the Senate And the expostulation of the Senate was both just and necessary when they demanded of the Tribunes on the same occasion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 d Dionys Halicarn l. 10. who gave them power to introduce new Lawes and subvert the old and told them in plain terms they had broke their Covenants and that they were not made upon such conditions as to do all things that they listed nor to do any thing at all but only to protect the poor and preserve the Commons from oppression Which put together makes it a most evident truth that in the creation of the Tribunes there was nothing lesse intended then to curb the Senate or to set up a power to oppose the Consuls as vainly and seditiously is supposed by CALVIN though true it is they did abuse their power with the Common people and the authority of their office to suppresse them both 5. And this they were resolved to do although they had no other way to effect the same then by raising seditions in the State and putting the people into Arms upon all occasions at which they were so perfect and so constant in it that seldome the whole year went round without some tumult or sedition of their setting forward as will appear to any one who is versed in Livie If they held quiet for one year as they seldom did till they had brought the City under their obedience they broke out in the next that followed with the greater violence and when the course of the distemper was so intermitted that it held not alwaies a Quotidian it proved a Tertian Feaver or at most a Quartan and therefore like to tarry longer with the afflicted Patient How many seditions did they raise about the law Agaria of which Livie tels us that it was never moved e Hâ—st Rom. l. 2. sine maximis motibus without great tumults and dissensions How many tumults did they raise to oppose the Consuls when they had any wars in hand and were to press the Souldier to pursue those wars How often finde we in that Author Tribunitium bellum domi territare patres f Id. lib. 3. that when the Fathers had no wars abroad they found a Tribunitian war at home which did more affright them how often finde we them complaining non ultra ferri posse Tribunitios furores g Id. lib. 4. that the insolencies of the Tribunes were no longer sufferable and that they could not look to be without continual alarms and renewed distractions whilest the seditions and the authors of them did succeed so prosperously Nay they were so accustomed to it that having had some intermission and that no otherwise obtained but by yeelding all things to the people which they had a minde to Livie takes notice of it as a thing observable permultos annos esse h Id. lib. 10. that many years had intervened since the Patricians and the Tribunes had their last contention And all this while they managed their seditions by the tongues end only seldom proceeding unto blowes and much lesse to bloud But when the two Gracchi came in play and attained the Office they fell from words to blowes and from blowes to murther Tiberius one of the two Brothers and many of his friends and followers being tumultuously slain in the Common Forum as he was acting the part of a busie and seditious Tribune whom Caius the other of the two not long after followed both in life and death And this saith the Historian initium in urbe Roma Civilis sanguinis gladiorumque impunitatis fuit i Velleius Patercul hist was the first time that the sword was suffered to range at liberty in the streets of Rome and to be discoloured with the bloud of the Citizens their differences before that day though not often afterwards being determined by parlies but not by bloudshed Which being put together and considered seriously it will appear to be no Paradox which we finde in Florus where he affirmeth Seditionum omnium causas Tribunitiam potestatem excitasse k Florus histor Rom. l. 3. that the Tribunitian power was the source and fountain of all those seditions wherewith the quiet of the State had been disturbed Nor was it said by Quintius without very good reason that the authority of the Tribunes in seditione ad seditiones nata was born in a sedition and to raise seditions * Cicero de Legibus l. 3. that it was pestifera potestas a pestilent pernicious office and that Pompey did exceeding ill
Commonwealth And as amongst the Archontes in the State of Athens which were nine in number one of them was called the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Archon in the way of excellency after whose name the year was called and their reckonings made as Titio Sempronio Coss in the State of Rome so had the Ephori their Eponymus one who by way of eminency was called the Ephorus c Pausan lib. 3. in Lacon But for this first reason of their institution take it thus from Plutarch d Plutarch in Lycurgo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Lycurgus having thus tempered the form of his Common-wealth it seem'd notwithstanding unto those which came after him that this small number of thirty persons which made the Senate was yet too mighty and of too great authority Wherefore to bridle them a little they gave them as he cites from Plato a bit in their mouthes which was the authority of the Ephori erected in the time of King Theopompus about 130 years after the death of Lycurgus A second reason which induced those Kings to ordain these Ephori was to ease themselves and delegate upon them that remainder of the Royal power which could not be exercised but within the City For the Kings having little or no command but in wars abroad cared not for being much at home and thereupon ordained these Officers to supply their places Concerning which Cleomenes thus discourseth to the Spartans e Id. in Agis Cleomenes after they had destroyed the Ephori and suppressed the Office informing them that Lycurgus had joyned the Senators with the Kings by whom the Common-wealth was a long time governed without help of any other Officers that afterwards the City having great wars with the Messenians the Kings were alwaies so imployed in that war that they could not attend the affairs of the State at home and thereupon made choice of certain of their friends to sit in judgement in their stead whom they called the Ephori 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for a long time did govern only as the Kings Ministers though afterwards by little and little they took unto themselves the supreme authority Another reason hath been given of the institution which is that if a difference grew between the two Kings in a point of judgement there might be some to arbitrate between them and to have the casting voice amongst them when the difference could not be agreed And this is that which Lisander and Mandroclidas two that had been Ephori suggested unto Agis and Cleombrotus the two Kings of Sparta declaring f Id. ibid. That the office of the Ephori was erected for no other reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But because they should give their voices unto that King who had the best reason on his side when the other would wilfully withstand both right and reason and therefore that they two agreeing might lawfully do what they would without controlment that to resist the Kings was a breach of law considering that the Ephori by law had no power nor priviledge but only to arbitrate between them when there was any cause of jarre or controversie And this was so received at Sparta for an undoubted truth that Cleomenes being sole King upon the death of Agis of the other house recalled called Archidamus the brother of Agis from his place of banishment with an intent to make him King not doubting but they two should agree together and thereby make the Ephori of no power nor use So then we have three reasons of the institution and more then these I cannot finde of which there is not one that favoureth the device of CALVIN or intimateth that the authority of the Ephori was set up to pull down the Kings And to say truth it is a most unlikely matter that the Kings of Sparta having so little power remaining should need more Officers to restrain them then they had before that they should make a new rod for their own poor backs and add five Masters more to those eight and twenty which Lycurgus had imposed upon them Which makes me wonder much at Tully who doth acknowledge that the Ephori were ordained by Theopompus as both Aeristotle h Aristot Polit. l. 5. c. 11. and Plutarch do affirm and yet will have them instituted for no other cause nisi ut oppositi sint Regibus but to oppose and curb the Kings i Cicero de legibus l. 3. but more that Plato who had so much advantage of him both in time and place should ascribe the institution to Lycurgus and tell us that he did not only ordain the Senate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 k Plato Ep. 8. edit gr lat To. 3. but that he did also constitute the Ephorate for the strength and preservation of the Regal power 5. For out of doubt it is affirmed by Plutarch l Plut. in Lycurgo confirmed by Scaliger m Scalig. animadvers in Euseb Chron. and may be gathered from some passages in Eusebius Chronicon and the authoritie of Aristotle who refers the same to Theopompus as before was shewed that the first Institution was no less then 130 years after the death of Lycurgus Who was the first that bore this Office hath been made a question but never till these later times when men are grown such Sceptics as to doubt of every thing Plutarch affirms for certain n Plutarch in Lycurgo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the first Ephorus that is to say the first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who had the name of Ephorus by way of excellencie for otherwise there were five in all was called Elatus and hereto Scaliger did once agree as appears expressly pag. 67. of his Annotations on Eusebius where he declares it in these words Primus Elatus renunciatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But after having a desire to controll Eusebius he takes occasion by some words in Diogenes Laertius to cry up Chilo for the man first positively Primus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fuit Chilon and next exclusively of Elatus Quibus animadversis non fuerit Elatus primus Ephorus sed Chilon To make this good being a fancie of his own and as his own most dearly cherished he produceth first the testimony of Laertius and afterwards confirms the same by a new emendatio temporum a Calculation and accompt of his own inventing The words produced from Laertius are these verbatim 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 o Diogen Laeâ—t l. 1. in Chilo Which is thus rendred in the Latine and I think exactly Fuit autem Ephorus circa quinquagesimam quintam Olympiada Porro Pamphila circa sextam ait primumque Ephorum fuisse sub Euthydemo autore Sosicrate primumque instituisse ut Regibus Ephori adjungerentur Satyrus Lycurgum dixit If it be granted in the first place that Chilo was not made Ephorus until the 55 Olympiad as 't is plain he was not and Scaliger affirms as much it must
needs follow upon true account that either Chilo was not the first Ephorus or that the Ephori were not instituted in more then twice an hundred and thirtie years after Lycurgus had new molded the Common-wealth contrary unto that which is said by Plutarch and out of him repeated by Joseph Scaliger For from the time wherein Lycurgus made his Laws which was in the 25 year of Archelaus the eighth King of the elder house unto the death of Alcamenes which was the year before the first Olympiad p Euseb Chron. lib. post p. 114. of Scaligers edit were 112 years just none under From thence unto the last year of the 55. 220 years complete which put together make no fewer then 332 years full a large misreckoning Whereas the second year of the fifth Olympiad in which Eusebius puts the Institution of the Ephori both in the Greek and Latine Copies set out by Scaliger himself q Pag. 115. of the Latine 35. of the Greek Edition that second year I say being added to the 112 before-remembred in which King Alcamenes died makes up the full number of 130 which we finde in Plutarch and agrees punctually with the time of Theopompus who as it is confessed by Scaliger did first ordain them Nor doth Laertius say if you mark him well either that Chilo was the first that was ever Ephorus or the first that joyned the Ephori to the Kings of Sparta both which absurdities are by Scaliger imposed upon him For unto any one who looks upon Laertius with a careful eye it may be easily discerned that he speaks no otherwise of the Ephorate then of an Office instituted a long time before with the condition of the which Chilo was well acquainted and therefore thought himself more fit to undergo it then his Brother was who very earnestly desired it r Laertius in visa Chilon All that Laertius saith is no more but this that Chilo was made Ephorus first not the first Ephorus which was made as Scaliger would have it under Euthydemus and that as Satyrus affirmed who therein questionless was misled by Plato Lycurgus was the first who joyned the Ephori to the Spartan Kings which words viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath left out of purpose to abuse his Author and make him speak the thing which he never meant His other blunderings and mistakes to make good this business first laying the dissolution of the Ephorate by Cleomenes non multo ante vel post initium Philippi s Pag. 67. of the Animadvers either not long before or shortly after the beginning of the reign of Philip the last King of Macedon but one which indeed is true and within nine lines no more laying it in the 13. year of the self same King Philip most extremely false the changing of his Authors words from Fuit autem sub Regibus Lacedaemon annis 350 as they occur in the Translation of S. Hierom printed at Basil into Fuit sub Regibus Lacedaemoniorum Annis 350 against the Authors minde and the rules of Grammar only to bring about his device of Chilo and blinde his Readers eyes with a new Chronologie and others I could point to if my leisure served I purpose to forbear at the present time Nor had I been so bold with Scaliger at all or at least not now but that the proud man is more bold with the Antient Fathers whom he is pleased to look on with contempt and scorn as often as they come before him for which see pag. 255 of his Annotations And so I leave him with that censure which he gives Eusebius as learned and industrious an Antiquarie as any Scaliger of them all no man dispraised Erratis hujus Autoris enumerandis charta non suffecerit t Animadvers in Euseb p. 255. and so fare him well 6. But to proceed the Ephori being thus ordained by Theopompus became not presently of such authority and power as by degrees they did attain to For being chosen by the Kings as their proper Ministers as before was said and many times 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 even from their very neerest friends as we read in Plutarch u Plutarch in Agis Cleomen they were hard thrust at by the Senate and forced to put up many an affront from that mightier body And this was it that Chilo aimed at when he told his Brother who at the same time desired the Office and seemed offended that he lost it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 x Laertius in vita Chilon that he was better skilled in bearing injuries and affronts then his Brother was But this continued for no longer then whilest the Kings served their turns upon them to oppose the Senate and kept the nomination of them in their own hands For afterwards the Kings relinquishing the election to the common people upon a forlorn hope of gaining their affections by so great a benefit they began to set up for themselves and in a very little time gained all the custom of the City And of this new election I am apt to think that Chilo whom before we spake of was the first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which I propose not so much out of a desire to comply with Scaliger who for ought I can see aimed at no such matter as on the credit of Eusebius whom he so much slighteth For in Eusebius Chronicon of Joseph Scaligers own Edition after he hath put down the institution of the Ephori in the second of the fifth Olympiad as before I told you he gives this Item in the third of the five and fiftieth which is the very same that Laertius speaks of Chilo qui de Septem Sapientibus fuit Lacedaemone Ephorus constituitur y Euseb Chronic. lib. poster p. 127. dispositione communus gentis that Chilo one of the seven wise Masters was ordained Ephorus at Sparta by the general consent of all the people But whether this were so or not I am not able to determine absolutely All I observe from hence is this that it is past all question that from this time they took upon them more then they had done formerly and were intent on all advantages to improve their power For whereas at the first they were appointed by the Kings to sit in judgement in their steeds as before was said by little and little 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 z Plutarch in Agis Cleom. they drew that power unto themselves and exercised it in their own name by their own authoritie not as the Ministers of the Kings they would none of that but as the Officers of the Common-wealth And to that end they did erect a Court of Judicature which for power and greatness of authoritie was little inferiour to the Senate drawing unto them all such businesses as were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Pausan l. 3. in Laconicis most worthy of care and consideration By means whereof as they drew many of the people to depend
to re-invest the Tribunes with that height of power of which they had been justly dispossessed by Sylla Upon which grounds it had been formerly averred by the Consuls and the rest of the Senate that the Tribunes were the cause of those distractions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the Authors words which did so miserably afflict the Common-wealth * Dionys Halicarn l. 10. But this to say the truth is so clear a point that it needs no proof I only shall observe and so pass it by how justly the Nobility and Senate were punished by their own example and for how little time they enjoyed that Soveraignty which they had wrested from their Kings From the expulsion of the Kings to the creating of the Tribunes were but sixteen years and from the death of Tarquin to the reign of Brutus and Sicinius but one year no more and in that little span of time the people profited so well in the school of rebellion that they did not only beat the Senate at their own weapon of disloialty but choaked them with their own objection For when it was objected against the Tribunes that their authority was gotten and maintained by seditious courses the Tribunes handsomely replyed that that objection might aswell be made against the authority of the Consuls which had been introduced and established by no other means m Id. lib. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then the rebellion of the Nobles or Patricians against their Kings A very shrewd retortion if you mark it well and fit to be considered of in these present times 6 If any ask to what end all these stirs were raised and these seditions set on foot he may please to know that there was an intent from the first creating of the Tribunes to change the government of the State and to put the Supreme Power of all into the hands of the people that is to say to bring it under the command of a few factious persons on whom the body of the people had devolved their power And this is positively affirmed by Florus where having told us that the Tribunes were the cause of all the tumults and seditions which had been raised within the City he adds that being at first ordained specie quidem tuendae plebis Florus hist Rom. l. 3. under pretence of being Protectors of the Commons and taking care for the preserving of their rights and liberties they sought in very deed to usurp the Soveraignty re autem dominationem sibi acquirere and to get the Supreme power into their own hands To this end as the Tribunes strived to oblige the people by causing new Lawes to be made in their behalf and for the increase of their authority so did the people readily obey the Tribunes and gathered into an head upon all occasions aswell for the protection of their persons as the confirmation of their power When Martius had declamed against them in the open Senate for their factious and seditious courses the Tribunes presently made complaint to the people of it calling upon them to assist them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to save their Tribunes n Plutarch in Coriolano at which the people were so madded and ran on so furiously that they were like to have fallen desperately upon all the Senate And Appius found unto his cost that in offering to attach a Tribune though he well deserved it concio omnis coorta pro Tribuno in Consulem o Livie l. 2. the whole assembly rose against him as one man to defend their Tribune the rascall multitude gathering together out of all the City to do him right against the Consul And Plutarch tels us in the life of Tiberius Gracchus that the people were so sottishly affected to him that many of the needy and seditious rout waited upon him all night long up and down the Town p Plutarch in Tiber. C. Gracchis some of them buying tents and lying about his house to watch it as a guard to his person And on the other side the houses of the Tribunes were kept continually open aswell nights as daies that they might serve as a Protection or a Common Sanctuary for men of all sorts to repair unto whom either debt or misdemeanor or some greater matter had made obnoxious to the Sergeants or other Ministers of justice to the great prejudice of the honest and well meaning Subjects in their suits and businesses And besides this the Tribunes never failed to flatter and bewitch the people by some piece of courtship or by preferring some new Lawes as before was said for their ease and benefit They had no sooner way then that to advance their power or to obtain unto that absoluteness of command and empire which they projected to themselves For doubtlesse that of the Historian is exactly true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 q Dionys Halicarn lib. 6. that he that means to be a Tyrant must be first a flatterer there being no readier way to advance a Tyranny then by being popular a profest servant of that people whom he would command But this confederacy between the Tribunes and the people and the mutual ties that were between them I cannot better lay before you then in Plutarchs words r Plutarch in Agis Cleomen who speaking of the Gracchi doth inform us thus That having received many favours from the peoples hands they were ashamed to be indebted to them and therefore earnestly endevoured to requiâ—e their courtesies by making new Decrees and Lawes which they propounded and obtained for the peoples profit and on the other side the people for their parts were not wanting to admire and honour them the more by how much they perceived them studious of their good and benefit So that with like strife on either side the one to gratifie and oblige the other their interesses were so mingled and their intentions so concorporated that they must needs hold on as they had begun and either stand or fall together By means whereof the people in conclusion became lords of all the majesty of the State and the power of judicature being absolutely vested in them which since they could not manage but by their Atturneys nor otherwise execute and discharge then by their Proxies who but the Tribunes their own creatures must be trusted with it And this is that which Tacitus observes to be the issue of those quarrels which were kept on foot between the Nobility and the Commons modo turbulenti Tribuni s Tacit. hist lib. 2. modo Consules praevalidi sometimes some factious Tribunes carried it away and then again the Consuls had the better and prevailed in power according as they did comply with the peoples humours till Marius and Sylla first and Julius Caesar afterwards by their example by force of Arms subdued both parties and introduced an absolute Government 7 Now for the steps by which the people did asâ—end to this height of power they were not raised at once but
civil pleas to judge of strangers which abused the priviledges which they had in the City of briberie conspiracies false inscriptions in cases of adultery and publick crimes in points of trade and actions which concerned the Sâ—annaries t Jul. Pollâ—x in Onomall l. 8 c. 9. sect 1. as also to review the sentence of the Provost and the decrees of the Senate if occasion were and to give notice to the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Julius Pollux if any man preferred a law which was not profitable and expedient for the Common-wealth Such were the Officers and such the duty of those Officers ordained at Athens upon the last alteration of the Government which before we spake of and amongst these we finde not any popular Magistrate who was to have a care of the Common people and to preserve them in their rights and liberties from the oppression of the greater and more powerful Citizens much less set up of purpose to oppose the Senate And to say truth we must not look for any such amongst the nine nor in these times in which this alteration of the Government was first established They could not fall immediately from a Regal State to a Democratical but they must take the Aristocratie in the way unto it They had been under Kings at first or such as had the power of Kings although not the name And when they chose these Annual Officers they chose them ex nobilibus urbis out of the Nobles only as Eusebius hath it u Euseb Chron. which Scaliger is forced to grant to be so at first x Scaliger in Animadvers though out of a desire to confute his Author he would very fain have had it otherwise Whether or no they had such Officers as Calvin dreams of when they had setled their Democratie we shall see anon having first shewn by whom and by what degrees the government of the State was cast on the peoples shoulders and the form thereof made meerly popular or Democratical For certainly it is most true that never any Democratical State shewed it self at the first in its proper colours or came into the world by a lawful entrance but crept into it secretly at the back-dore either of faction or sedition 3 Now the first man that gave the hint to the Democratie and made the people fall in love with a factious libertie was Theseus a valiant but unfortunate King who the better to induce the people of Attica to desert their dwellings and be incorporated into Athens promised them as before was said that all of them should have some share in the publick government and after the form and manner of a Common-wealth And so far he performed his promise as to devest himself of some parts of Soveraigntie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and laid the first foundation of that popular State which was after built but he paid deer for it y Plutarch in Thâ—seo For the people who before had been so tractable that they would do whatsoever their Kings commanded at the first words speaking began to take more state upon them and became so stub born that they would do nothing on command but looked to be flattered with and courted upon all occasions z Idâ—ibid Which being noted by Menestheus a popular man but otherwise of the Royal bloud he so sed that humor and wrought so finely on them by his wit and cunning that Theseus was in fine deposed and his sons disherited and the remainder of the Royaltie conferred by them upon Menestheuâ— as their deed of gift And though no doubt the people did improve their power both when their Kings became elective and when their Governors were elected but for term of years and specially when the Magistrates were no more then Annual yet they could get no further then an Aristocratie till the time of Solon which were about 170 years after the Annual Officers were first established the Annual Officers being established in the first year of the 5. Olympiad and Solons reformation hapning in the second of the 47. But Solon being chosen Provost or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and finding the Republick much embroyled in dangerous factions which had been long since bred between the Nobles and Commons in the change of Governments took on him by the joynt consent of both parties the emendation of the laws and the reducing of the State of the Common-wealth to a more peaceable and equal temper a Id. in Solone And he so ordered their affairs that the chief Offices of the City remained in the hands of the Nobilitie as before they were which for the time contented them but the election of those Officers and the dernier resort or the admittance of Appeals upon Writs of error as we call them that he confirmed unto the people which did not only please the people for the present time but put them into a condition of drawing to themselves the supreme authority Insomuch that Aristotle though he seem to say that Solon setled in the City a mixt form of Government the Court of Areopagites which he also instituted pretending to an Oligarchie the Annual Officers or Archontes to an Aristocratie and the power of judicature being vested in the common people unto a Democratie b Aristot Politic l. 2. c. 10. yet he confesseth at the last that this power of judicature and the necessity which all men found of applying themselves unto the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 changed the Republick in conclusion to a meer Democratie as it continued till his time But yet it was not brought about but with great adoe Pisistratus first reducing the estate to an absolute Monarchy c Plutarch in Soâ—one which because he got it from them by fraud and force they called a Tyranny and after Clisthenes freeing his countrey from that yoke by driving his posterity out of Attica restoring it unto an Aristocratie d Id. in Aristide in Pericle et Cimâ—nc as before it was At last it seemed good to Aristides though for a time he concurred with Clisthenes in his form of government to cast a more indulgent eye on the common people who had behaved themselves exceeding gallantly in the dreadfull war against the Persians and to cause a law to be enacted that all authority and power of government should be communicated equally to all the Citizens e Id. in Aristide 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that they should be capable of all the Offices and honours in the Common-wealth Which as it added much to the authority of the common people so that authority was increased much more by the Arts of Pericles who bearing a grudge unto the Court of the Areopagites whereof he was never any Member and finding that the power thereof and of the Senate of five hundred did derogate exceeding much from the power of the people to whose faction he was wholly wedded by the help and setting on of Ephialtes a busie and
popular man took from them the hearing and determining of the weightiest causes f Id. in Pericle â—imone and put them over to the judgement and decision of the common people who had no more before but the last appeal and thereby perfected and produced that pure Democratie which had so often been desired but in vain attempted 4 The people being screwed to this height of power and the dignity of the supreme Courts so much diminished a man would think there was but little need of such popular Officers as Calvin speaks of ordained of purpose as he thinks to oppose the Senate and counter-ballance their authority Nor were those Courts at any time so inclined to tyranny or likely in their constitution to oppress the people when their authority was greatest and their power most eminent as that the people needed any special Officers to restrain their insolencies or to confine them to the limits of their Jurisdiction Now for the Senate it consisted at the first of 400 persons an hundred out of every Tribe and to that number was restrained by Solon whose device it was g Id. in Solone but Clisthenes having increased the number of the Tribes to ten added one hundred more which made five in all for each tribe fifty and so continued till the expiration of that Common-wealth A chief part of their business was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. to deliberate and debate of all such matters as were to be commended to the care of the common people that when the whole body of the people was assembled together no point should be propounded to them but what the Councell of five hundred had fitted and prepared for their resolution h Id. ibid. It also appertained to them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. to consult about denouncing war and raising moneys to advise upon the making of new Lawes to judge of any accident which at any time hapned in the City and of such matters which concerned their Allies and neighbours to impose tribute on the Subject and to take care both of the Navie and the Temples and furthermore to inqure into the carriage of the City Magistrates to appoint keepers unto Prisoners taken in the wars to judge of suits concerning Orphans and sometimes in such cases as belonged more properly to a Court of war i Xenophon de Repub. Athen. Other particulars there are which they were to deal in but these the principal and these though points of great concernment and arguments of the power and trust committed to them were little like to tempt them to abuse their power in the oppressing of the people For besides that they were chosen but for one year only k Xenâ—phon de Repub. Athen. and that too not without a previous inquisition into their former life and conversation which were sufficient to induce them to hold fair quarter with the people by all means imaginable they were bound by oath at their admission to that honour to consult the peoples good and benefit in most special manner and not to imprison any of them how mean soever unlesse he were found guilty of some practise to betray the City and diminish the authority and power of the people or that being one of the Farmers of the Tolls and Taxes or a Collector of the Tributes he became non-solvent and had not cleared his accompt with the Common-wealth l Dâ—mosthen in oratione com Nâ—ceâ—am As for the Court or Councell of the Areopagites it consisted from the first beginning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of such and such alone who had formerly been of the number of the nine chief Magistrates m Plutarch in Solone Pericle and they being once admitted held for term of life which made them being men of eminence and reputation to be more able to annoy the people and to intâ—ench upon them in their rights and liberties had their minde been answerable For unto them belonged the general superintendency of all things in the Common-wealth and them did Solon trust with this speciall power that they shou'd be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 n Id. in Solen and see the Lawes to be maintained and to have their course and in particular to judge in the case of murder and man-slaughter and briefly in all Capital causes And with these Courts or Counsels call them which you will the prudent Legislator thought that he had setled and confirmed the Common-wealth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as with two strong Anchors in such a firm and constant manner that neither the fabrick of the State should be easily shaken nor the people apt to take offence or run themselves upon unpeaceable and seditious courses 5 But if the Senate or the Councell should abuse their power and use that sword to the oppression of the common people which was committed to their hands for their weal and benefit might not and did not the Demarchi take the peoples part and save them from the wrongs and injuries intended towards them Calvin so intimates indeed but he speaks without book being more guided to that error by the sound and etymologie of the word then by the nature of the office The best Greek Authors who have written the affairs of Rome do call the Tribunes of the people by this name Demarchi and their authority or Office by the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 also Nothing more common in Polybius Halicarnensis Plutarch and whosoever else have left us any thing of the Roman stories in that language But the Demarchi of Athens were of no such power and had but small authority God wot in affairs of State Measure them by the definition which is given by Suidas and he will tell you that they were certain Officers appointed in the Burroughs and free Towns of Attica being twelve in number o Suidas in Lex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And for his power he tels us that it did especially consist in making a Terrier of the lands of every Township and keeping of the publick Registers which concerned the Burrough in calling the people of the Town together when their occasions did require it and calculating of their voices by the poll or scrutinie and sometimes in distraining on their goods and chattels if any of them were indebted to the State either in amerciaments or contributions But take his own words with you for the more assurance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p Id. ibid. The Author of the Etymologicon magnum saith the same with Suidas but in sewer words and he describes this mighty man of whom Calvin dreams to be no other then the Bailiff of some ancient Burrough is with us in England his power being limited and confined within the perambulation of his own Parish in which he could do little more then take the valuation of his neighbours estate and tell how much he was to be assessed at in the Subsidie Book q
their Priests 3 This brings me on to the power and practise of the Priests in the land of Judah who from the very first beginning of that State and Nation to the final dissolution of it were of great authoritie not only in composing of inferiour difâ—erences which casually did arise amongst the people but in the managerie of the chief affairs both of State and Government and that not gained by connivence of Princes or by entrenching on the rights of the secular powers but by the institution and appointment of the Lord himself When Moses first complained that the sole Government of the people was a burden too heavie for him to bear it pleased God to appoint a standing Consistory of r Numb 11. v. 16. Seventie Elders men of abilitie and wisdom who were to have a share in the publick Government and to decide amongst themselves such weightie businesses great matters s Exod. 18. v. 22. as the Scripture calls them which were reserved to Moses by a former Ordinance Of these the Priests as men who for the most part were at better leisure then the rest to attend the service and generally of more abilities to goe through with it made alwayes a considerable number and many times the major part In which respect it was ordained by the Lord when a matter did arise to be scanned in judgement between bloud and bloud between plea and plea and stroke and stroke being matters of controversie within their gates the people should arise and goe unto the place which the Lord should choose and come unto the Priests the Levites and unto the Judge that shall be in those days and enquire and they shall shew them the sentence of judgement t Deut. c. 17. v. 8 9. The like is also ordered in the case of false witâ—esses where it is said that If a false witness rise up against any man to testifie against him that which is wrong then both the men between whom the controversie is shall stand before the LORD before the Priests and Judges which shall be in those dayes u Deut. 19. v. 17. Which passages are not understood of any particular Priests or Judges dispersed in their several dwellings up and down the Countrey but of the Priests and other Judges united and assembled in that famous Consistorie of the 70 Elders conveened together in that place which the Lord should choose called by the Jews the Sanhedrim by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and was the great Councel of estate for the Jewish Nation To this Josephus doth attest where he informeth us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 x Joseph adv Appâ—on lib. 2. that the Priests of Jewrie had the cognâ—zarce of all doubtful matters more plainly Philo who knew well the customs of his native Countrey where he affirms expressly and in terminis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 y Philo de vita Mesis that the Priests had place and suffrage in this great 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Court of Sanhedrim And this is that which Casaubon doth also tell us from the most learned and expert of the Jewish Rabbins Non nisi nobilissimos â—e sacerdotibus Levitis caeteroque populo in lege peritissimos in Sanhedrim eligi z Casaub Exercit in Baron 1. Sect 3. that is to say that none but the most eminent of the Priests the Levites and the rest of the people and such as were most conversant in the Book of the Law were to be chosen into the Sanhedrim But to return again to the Book of God the power and reputation of this Court and Consistorie having been much diminished in the times of the Kings of Judah was again revived by Jehosophat Of whom we read that he not only did appoint Judges in the laâ—d throughout all the fenced Cities of IVDAH a 2 Chron. 19. 5. but that he established at HIERVSALEM a standing Councel consisting of the Levites and of the Priests and of the chief of the Fathers of ISRAEL for the judgements of the Lord and for controversies b Ibid. r. 8. according to the model formerly laid by God himself in the Book of Deuteronomie Which Court or Councel thus revived continued in full force authoritie and power during the time of the captivitie of Babylon as appears plainly by that passage in the prophesie of Ezekiel where it is said of the Priests even by God himself in controversie they shall stand in judgement c Ezeck 44. v â—24 compared with another place of the same Prophet where he makes mention of the Seventie of the Antients of the house of ISRAEL d Id. c. 8. v. 11. and Jaazaniah the son of Shaphan standing in the midst as Prince of the Senate And after their return from that house of bondage they were confirmed in this authoritie by the Edict and Decree of Artaxerxes who gave Commission unto EZRA to set Magistrates and Judges e Ezra c. 7. â— 25. over the people not after a new way of his own devising but after the wisdom of his God e Ezra c. 7. â— 25. declared in the foregoing Ages by his servant Moses In which estate they stood all the times succeeding until the final dissolution of that State and Nation with this addition to the power of the holy Priesthood that they had not only all that while their place and suffrage in the Court of Sanhedrim as will appear to any one who hath either read Josephus or the four Evangelists but for a great part of that time till the reign of Herod the Supreme Government of the State was in the hands of the Priests In which regard besides what was affirmed from Synesius formerly it is said by Justin Morem esse apud Judaeos ut eosdem Reges sacerdotes haberent that it was the custom of the Jews for the same men to be Kings and Priests f Justin hist l. 36. and Tacitus gives this general note Judaeis Sacerdotii honorem firmamentum potentiae esse that the honour given unto the Priesthood amongst the Jews did most especially conduce to the establishment of their power and Empire g Tacit. hist l 3. And yet I cannot yeeld to Baronius neither where he affirms the better to establish a Supremacie in the Popes of Rome Summum Pont. arbitrio suo moderari magnum illud Conciliâ—m c. h Baron Annal. â—n 57. that the high Priest was alwayes President of the Councel or Court of Sanhedrim it being generally declared in the Jewish Writers that the High Priest could challenge no place at all therein in regard of his office and descent but meerly in respect of such personal abilities as made himself to undergo such a weightie burden for which see Phagius in his notes on the 16. of Deuteronomie 4 Thus have we seen of what authoritie and power the Priests were formerly as well amongst the Jews as amongst the Gentiles we must next see whether they have not
up in the place of those mighty Monarchs And this they did on so good motives and with such success that in short time the Prelates were not only used for advice and counsel but the inferiour Clergie also were called unto imployments of the highest nature and in conclusion with the Prelates made up the third Estate in most Christian Kingdomes For being that the study of Divinitie is diffused and large and that the knowledge of Philosophie and the Arts and Histories is but attendant on the same and subservient to it there was no question made at all in the times we speak of but that a Church-man so accomplished might be as useful in the service of the Common-wealth as those who wanted many opportunities to be so versed in Books the best guides to business especially when to those helps in point of learning were joyned a suddenness of apprehension a perspicacity of judgement and which swayed most of all integritie of life and conversation These when they met together as they often did in men admitted by the Church unto holy Orders it was not either thought or found and indeed how could it that their admittance into Orders did take off from any of those natural or acquired indowments of which before they were possessed or that it was a disabling to them to make use thereof in any matter of debate or action which concerned the publick And that it hath been so of old in all Christian Kingdomes besides that it is intimated by our Author here we shall clearly see by looking over such particulars as have most influence and power in the affairs of Christendom And first beginning as of right with the German Empire Thuanus gives this note in general b August Thuan hist lib. 2. Imperium in tria omnino membra dividi that that Empire is divided into three Estates over all which the Emperour is the head or the Supreme Prince Of these the fiâ—st Estate is ex sacro Ordine of the holy Hierarchie composed of the three spiritual Electors together with the residue of the Archbishops and Bishops and many Abbots Priors and other Prelates The second is of the Nobilitie consisting of the three temporal Electors the Dukes Marquesses Lantgraves Burgraves Earls and Barons of which there is no determinate number the Emperour having power to adde dayly to them as he sees occasion Tâ—e third Estate is of the free or Imperial Cities in number 60. or thereabouts who represent themselves at the General Diets by such Commissioners or Deputies as are authorized to that purpose Now for these Diets for by that name they call their Conventus Ordinum or Assembly of the three Estates they are summoned at the will and pleasure of the Emperour only and at such place and time as to him seems meetest c Id. ibid. Where being met as all the three Estates must meet either in person or by their Ambassadours they use to treat of Peace and War of raising Subsidies and Taxes to support the State of leagues and conâ—ederacies of raising and decrying moneys of making abrogating and expounding laws and of such other points and matters as do pertain unto the honour of the Empire and the publick sasâ—tiâ— Nor is this any new authoritie which the Ecclesiastical Estate hath gained in the latter times but such wherein they were intrusted â—rom the first beginning of that Empire It being affiâ—med by Aventinus a Writer of unquestioned credit that long before the institution of the seven Electors which was in An. 996. the Prelates the Nobilitie and the chief of the people had the election of the Emperour d Aventini Annal Boâ—oâ—um l. 5. And if the Prelates were intrusted in so high a point as the election of the Emperour or the Soveraign Prince no question but they were imployed also in his publick Councels in matters which concerned the managerie of the Common-wealth Next pass we over into France and there we finde the Subjects marshalled into three Estates whereof the Clergie is the first Rex coactis tribus Ordinibus Sacerdotio Nobilitate Plebe subsidia rei pecuniariae petiit e Paul Aemilius hist Franc. l 9. that is to say the King assembling or conveening the three Estates viz. the Clergie the Nobilitie and the Commons demanded subsidies for the support of his Estate So Paulus Aemilius doth inform us Out of these three are chosen certain Delegates or Commissioners some for each Estate as often as the Kings occasions doe require their meeting the time and place whereof is absolutely left unto his disposing and these thus met doe make up the Conventus Ordinum or L' Assemblie des Estats as the French men call it in form much like the English Parliament but in nothing else the power and reputation of it being much diminished in these latter times especially since the great improvement of the Court of Parliament fixed and of long time fixed in Paris Which Court of Parliament as it was instituted at the first by Charles Martell Mayre of the Paâ—ace to the Merovâ—gnian line of France and Grandfather to Charle magne so it consisted at the first of the same ingredients of which the great Assembly des Estats consisteth now that is to say the Prelates and the Peers and certain of the principal Gentrie which they call La nobless together with some few of the most considâ—rable Officers of the Kings houshold f Anâ—â—e du Chosâ—e 8. A Court of such esteem in the former times that the Kings of Sicilie Cyprus Bohomia Portugal Scotland and Navarre have thought it no disparagement unto them to be members of it and which is more when Frederick the second had spent much time and treasure in his quarrels with Pope Innocent the fourth he was content to submit the whole cause in difference unto the judgement of this Court But being at last become sedentaire and fixed at Paris as other ordinary Courts of Justice were which was in An. 1286. or thereabouts the Nobles first and after them the Bishops withdrew themselves from the troubles of it and left it to the ordering of the Civil Lawyers though still the Peeres doe challenge and enjoy a place therein as oft as any point of moment is in agitation the Bishop of Paris and the Abbor of St. Denys continuing constant members of it to this very day But for the Assemblie des Estats or Conventus Ordinum made up of the Clergie the Nobilitie and the Commons as before I told I you he that would see the manner of it the points there handled and that remainder of authority which is left unto them let him repair unto Thuanne g Thuan hist sui temp lib. and look upon the great Assembly held at Bloys An. 1573. He shall finde it there Pass we next over the Pyrenees to the Pealms of Spain and we shall finde in each the same three Estates whose meeting they call there by the name h Bodin de
now goeth were the meetings oftner For whereas there are three Principal if not sole occasions of calling this Assemblie or Conventus Ordinum that is to say the disposing of the Regency during the nonage or sickness of the King the granting aids and subsidies and the redress of the grievances there is now another course taken to dispatch their business The Parliament of Paris which speaks most commonly as it is prompted by power and greatness appointeth the Regent f Contin Thuani An. 1610. the Kings themselves together with their Treasurers and Under-officers determine of the taxes g View of France and they that do complain of grievances may either have recourse to the Courts of justice or else petition to the King for redress thereof And for the making new Laws or repealing the old the naturalization of the Alien and the regulating of his sales or grants of the Crown-lands the publick patrimony of the Kingdome which were wont to be the proper subject and debates of these grand Assemblies they also have been so disposed of that the Conventus Ordinum is neither troubled with them nor called about them The Chamber of Accompts in Paris which hath some resemblance to our Court of Exchequer doth absolutely dispose of Naturalizations and superficially surveyeth the Kings grants and sales * Andr. Du Mesn which they seldom cross The Kings Car tel est nostre plaisir is the Subjects law and is as binding as any Act or Ordinance of the three Estates and for repealing of such Laws as upon long experience are conceived to be unprofitable the Kings sole Edict is as powerfull as any Act of Parliament Of which Bodinus doth not only say in these general terms Saepe vidimus sine Ordinum convocatione consensu leges à Principe abrogatas k Bodin de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 8. that many times these Kings did abrogate some antient laws without the calling and consent of the three Estates but saith that it was neither new nor strange that they should so do and gives us some particular instances not only of the later times but the former ages Nay when the power of this Assemblie des Estats was most great and eminent neither so curtailled nor neglected as it hath been lately yet then they carried themselves with the greatest reverence and respect before their King that could be possibly imagined For in the Assembly held at Tours under Charles the 8. though the King was then no more than 14 years of age and the authority of that Court so great and awfull that it was never at so high an eminence for power and reputation quanta illis temporibus as it was at that time yet when they came before the King Monseiur de Rell being then Speaker for the Commons or the third Estate did in the name of all the rest and with as much humility and reverence as he could devise promise such duty and obedience such a conformity of his will and pleasure such readiness to supply his wants and such alacrity in hearking unto his Commandements that as Bodinus well observes his whole Oration was nothing else quam perpetua voluntatis omnium erga Regem testificatio l Id. ibid. but a constant testimony and expression of the good affections of the subject to their Lord and Soveraign But whatsoever power they had in former times is not now material King Lewis the thirteenth having on good reason of State discharged those Conventions for the time ensuing Instead whereof he instituted an Assembly of another temper and such as should be more obnoxious to his will and pleasure consisting of a certain number of persons out of each Estate but all of his own nomination and appointment which joyn'd with certain of his Counsel and principal Officers he caused to be called L' Assembly des Notables assigning to them all the power and privileges which the later Conventions of the three Estates did pretend unto right well assured that men so nominated and intrusted would never use their powers to his detriment and disturbance of his Heirs and Successors 5. But to proceed Bodinus having shewn what dutifull respects the Convention of Estates in France shewed unto their King addes this note nec aliter Hispanorum conventus habentur that the Assembly of the three Estates in the Realms of Spain carry themselves with the like reverence and submission to their Lord the King Nay major etiam obedientia majus obsequium Regi exhibetur m Id. ibid. the King of Spain hath more obedience and observance from his three Estates than that which is afforded to the Kings of France Which being but general and comparative is yet enough to let us see that the Assembly of Estates in the Realms of Spain which they call the Curia is very observant of their King and obsequious to him and have but little of that power which is supposed by our Author to be inherent in the three Estates of all the Christian Kingdoms But this Bodinus proveth more particularly ascribing to the King and to him alone the power of calling this Assemblie when he sees occasion and of dissolving it again when his work is done according as is used both in France and England And when they are assembled and met together their Acts and consultations are of no effect further than as they are confirmed by the Kings consent Which he declareth in the same form eadem formulà quâ apud nos that hath accustomably been used by the Kings of France which is authoritative enough that is to say n Id. ibid. p. 90. decernimus statuimus volumus We will and we appoint and we have decreed The Kings of Spain though not so despotical in their Government as the French Kings are are as absolute Monarchs and have as great an influence on the three Estates to make them pliant to their will and to work out their own ends by them as ever had the French Kings on their Courts of Parliament a touch whereof we had before in the former Chapter And this we may yet further see by their observance of the pleasure of King Philip the 2d Who having maried the Lady Elizabeth Daughter of Henry the 2d of France Convocatos Castellae reliquarum Hispaniae Provinciarum Ordines o Thuan. â—ist sui temp h 23. l. calling together the Estates of Castile and his other Provinces of Spain he caused them to swear to the succession of his Son Prince Charles whom he had by the Lady Mary of Portugal and after having on some jealousies of State put that Prince to death caused them to swear to the succession of another son by the Lady of Austria And for the power of his Edicts which they call Pragmaticas they are as binding to the Subject as an Act of Parliament or any kind of Law whatever examples of the which are very obvious and familiar in the Spanish Histories For though
be imputed to the three Estates convened in Parliament or to any power or Act of theirs but only praefervido Scotorum ingenio z Rivet cont tenuit as one pleads it for them unto the natural disposition of that fierce and head-strong people yet easilier made subject unto rule and government The three Estates assembled in the Court of Parliament when in the judgement of our Author they are most fit to undertake the business have for the most part had no hand in those desperate courses 7. And now at last we ate come to England where since we came no sooner we will stay the longer and here we shall behold the King established in an absolute Monarchy from whom the meeting of the three Estates in Parliament detracteth nothing of his power and authority Royal. Bodin as great a Politick as any of his time in the Realm of France hath ranked our Kings amongst the absolute Monarch of these Western parts a Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. And Camden as renowned an Antiquary as any of the Age he lived in hath told us of the King of England supremam potestatem merum imperium habere b Camden in Britan. descript that he hath supreme power and absolute command in his dominions and that he neither holds his Crown in vassallage nor receiveth his investisture of any other nor acknowledgeth any Superiour but God alone To prove this last he cites these memorable words from Bracton an old English Lawyer omnis quidem sub Rege ipse sub nullo sed tantum sub deo that every man is under the King but the King under none saving only God But Bracton tells us more than this and affirms expresly that the King hath supreme power and jurisdiction over all causes and persons in this his Majesties Realm of England that all jurisdictions are vested in him and are issued from him and that he hath jus gladii or the right of the sword for the better governance of his people This is the substance of his words but the words are these c Bracton de leg Aâ—gl l. 2. c. 24. Sciendum est saith he quod ipse dominus Rex ordinariam habet jurisdictionem dignitatem potestatem super omnes qui in regno suo sunt Habet enim omnia jura in manu sua quae ad coronam laicalem pertinent potestatem materialem gladium qui pertinet ad Regni gubernandum c. He addes yet surther Habet item in potestate sua leges constitutiones d Id. l. 2. c. 16. that the Laws and constitutions of the Realm are in the power of the King by which words whether he meaneth that the Legislative power is in the King and whether the Legislative power be in him and in him alone we shall see anon But sure I am that he ascribes unto the King the power of interpreting the Law in all doubtfull cases in dubiis obscuris domini Regis expectanda interpretatio voluntas which is plain enough For though he speaketh only de chartis Regiis factis Regum of the Kings deeds and charters only as the words seem to import yet considering the times in which he lived being Chief Justice in the time of King Henry the 3d. wherein there was but little written Law more than what was comprehended in the Kings Grants and Charters he may be understood of all Laws whatever And so much is collected out of Bractons words by the L. Chancellor Egerton of whom it may be said without envy that he was as grave and learned a Lawyer as ever sat upon that Bench. Who gathereth out of Bracton that all cases not determined for want of foresight are in the King to whom belongs the right of interpretation not in plain and evident cases but only in new questions and emergent doubts and that the King hath as much right by the constitutions of this Kingdom as the Civil law gave the Roman Emperors where it is said Rex solus judicat de causa a jure non definita e Case of the Post-nati p. 107 108. And though the Kings make not any Laws without the counsel and consent of his Lords and Commons whereof we shall speak more in the following Section yet in such cases where the Laws do provide no remedy and in such matters as concern the politick administration of his Kingdoms he may and doth take order by his Proclamations He also hath authority by his Prerogative Royal to dispense with the rigour of the Laws and sometimes to pass by a Statute with a non obstante as in the Statute 1 Henr. 4. cap. 6. touching the value to be specified of such lands offices or annuities c as by the King are granted in his Letters patents But these will better come within the compasse of those jura Majestatis or rights of Soveraignty which our Lawyers call sacra individua f Camden in Bâ—it sacred by reason they are not to be pryed into with irreverent eyes and individual or inseparable because they cannot be communicated unto any other Of which kind are the levying of Arms g Case of our Assairs p. 3. suppressing of tumults and rebellions providing for the present safety of his Kingdom against sudden dangers convoking of Parliaments and dissolving them making of Peers granting liberty of sending Burgesses to Towns and Cities treating with forein States making war leagues and peace granting safe conduct and protection indenizing giving of honor rewarding pardoning coyning printing and the like to these But what need these particulars have been looked into to prove the absoluteness and soveraignty of the Kings of England when the whole body of the Realm hath affirmed the same and solemnly declared it in their Acts of Parliament In one of which is affirmed h 16 Rich. 2. c. 5. that the Crown of England hath been so free at all times that it hath been in no earthly subjection but immediatly to God in all things touching the regality of the said Crown and to none other And in another Act that the Realm of England is an Empire governed by one supreme head and King having the Dignity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same unto whom a Body politick compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in terms and by names of Spiritualty and Temporalty been bounden and ought to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience i 24 Henr. 8. c. 12. And more than so that the King being the supreme head of this Body Politick is instituted and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary whole and entire power preheminence authority prerogative and jurisdiction to render and yield justice and final determination to all manner of Subjects within this Realm and in all causes whatsoever Nor was this any new Opinion invented only to comply with the Princes humour but such as is
l. 1. c. 8 because he could not have an Equal but with the losse of his Authority and Regal Dignity considering that one Equal hath no power to command an other Now lest the Fuller should object as perhaps he may that this is spoken of the King out of times of Parliament and of the Members of the Houses seorsim taken severally as particular persons but when they are convened in Parliament then they are Soveraigns and no Subjects first he must know that by the Statute of Queen Elizabeth all of the House of Commons are to take the oath before remembred for the defending of all preheminences and authorities united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm and for bearing faith and true allegiance to the King his Heirs and lawfull Successours and that if any of them do refuse this Oath he is to have no voice in Parliament m Stat. 5 Eâ—iz 1. 2. He cannot choose but know that even sedente Parliamento both the Lords and Commons use to address themselves to his sacred Majesty in the way of supplication and petition and certainly it is not the course for men of equal rank to send Petitions unto one another and that in those Petitions they do stile themselves his Majesties most humble and obedient Subjects Which is not only used as the common Complement which the hypocrisie of these times hath taken up though possibly it might be no otherwise meant in some late addresses but is the very phrase in some Acts of Parliament n â—25 Hen. 8. c. 22. c. as in the Acts at large doth at full appear 3. They may be pleased to know how happy a thing it was for the Realm of England that this Fuller did not live in former times For had he broached this Doctrine some Ages since he would have made an end of Parliaments Princes are very jealous of the smallest points of Soveraignty and love to reign alone without any Rivals their Souls being equally made up of Pompeys and Caesars and can as little broke an Equul as endure a Superiour And lastly I must let him know what Bodinus saith who telleth us this Legum ac edictorum probatio aut publicatio quae in Curia vel Senatu fieri solet non arguit imperii majestatem in Senatu vel Curia inesse o Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. viz. That the publishing and approbation of Laws and Edicts which is made ordinarily in the Court or Parliament proves not the Majesty of the State to be in the said Court or Parliament And therefore if the power of confirmation or rejecting be of a greater trust and more high concernment than that of consulting and consenting as no doubt it is the power of consulting and consenting which the Fuller doth ascribe to the two Houses of Parliament will give them but a sory Title to Co-ordinative soveraignty 10. This leads me on unto the power of making Laws which as before I said is properly and legally in the King alone tanquam in proprio Subjecto as in the true and adequate subject of that power And for the proof thereof I shall thus proceed When the Norman Conqueror first came in as he wonne the Kingdom by the sword so did he govern it by his power His Sword was then the Scepter and his will the Law There was no need on his part of an Act of Parliament much less of calling all the Estates together to know of them after what form and by what Laws they would be governed It might as well be said of him as in the flourish and best times of the Roman Emperors p Justin Institut l. 1. c. Quod Principi placuerit legis habet vigorem that whatsoever the King willed it did pass for Law This King and some of his Successours being then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and having a despotical power on the lives and fortunes of their Subjects which they disposed of for the benefit of their friends and followers Normans French and Flemangs as to them seemed best But as the Subjects found the yoke to be too heavy and insupportable so they addressed themselves in their Petitions to the Kings their Soveraigns to have that yoke made easier and the burden lighter especially in such particulars of which they were most sensible at the present time By this means they obtained first to have the Laws of Edward the Confessor contain'd for the most part in the great Charter afterwards and by this means that is to say by powring out their prayers and desires unto them did they obtain most of the Laws and Statutes which are now remaining of the time of King Henry the 3d. and King Edward the first Many of which as they were issued at the first either in form of Charters under the Great Seal or else as Proclamations of Grace and favour so do they carry still this mark of their first procuring the King willeth the King commandeth the King ordaineth the King provideth the King grants c. And when the Kings were pleased to call their Estates together it was not out of an opinion that they could not give away their power or dispence their favours or abate any thing of the severity of their former government without the approbation and consent of their people but out of just fear lest any one of the three Estates I mean the Clergy the Nobility and the Commons should insist on any thing which might be prejudicial to the other two The Commons being alwaies on the craving part and suffering as much perhaps from their immediate Lords as from their King might possibly have asked some things which were as much derogatory to the Lords under whom they held as of their Soveraign Liege the King the chief Lord of all In this respect the Counsel and consent as well of the Prelates as the Temporal Lords was accounted necessary in passing of all Acts of Grace and Favour to the people because that having many Royalties and large immunities of their own a more near relation to the person and a greater interesse in the honour of their Lord the King nothing should passe unto the prejudice and diminution of their own Estates or the disabling of the King to support his Soveraignty And this for long time was the Stile of the following Parliaments viz. q Preface an 1 Ed. 3. To the honour of God and of holy Church and to the redresse of the oppressions of the people our Soveraign Lord the King c. at the request of the Commonalty of his Realm by their Petition made before him and his Counsel in the Parliament by the Assent of the Prelates Earls Barons and other great men assembled in the said Parliament hath granted for him and his Heirs c. To this effect but with some little and but a very little variation of the words was the usual Stile in all the Prefaces or Preambles of the Acts of Parliament from the
beginning of the Reign of King Edward the third till the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 7th save that sometimes we find the Lords complaining r 10 Ed. 3. c. or petitioning Å¿ 21 Ed. 3. c. and the Commons assenting t 28 Ed. 3. c. as their occasions did require and sometime also no other motive represented but the Kings great desire to provide for the ease and safety of his people upon deliberation had with the Prelates and Nobles and learned men assisting with their mutual Counsell u 23 Ed. 3. And all this while there is no question to be made but that the power of making Laws was conceived to be the chiefest flower of the Royal Diademe to which the Lords and Commons neither joynt nor separate did not pretend the smallest Title more than petitioning for them or assenting to them it being wholly left to the Kings grace and goodness whether he would give ear or not unto their petitions or hearken unto such advise as the Lords or other great men gave him in behalf of his people And this is that which was declared in the Parliament by the Lords and Commons and still holds good as well in point of Law as Reason that it belonged unto the regality of the King to grant or deny what Petitions x 2 Her 5. in Parliament he pleaseth But as the Kings came in upon doubtfull Titles or otherwise were necessitated to comply with the peoples humours as sometimes they were so did the Parliaments make use of the opportunities for the increase of their authoritie at least in the formalities of Law and other advantages of expression So that in the minority of King Henry the sixth unto those usual words by the advise and assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and at the special instance and request of the Commons which were inserted ordinarily into the body of the Acts from the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 6th was added this By the authority of the said Parliament y 3 Hen. 6. c. 2. 8 H. 6. 3. c. But still it is to be observed that though those words were added to the former clause yet the power of granting or ordaining was acknowledged to belong to the King alone as in the places in the Margin where it is said Our Lord the King considering the premises by the advise and assent and at the request aforesaid hath ordained and granted by the authority of the said Parliament 3 H. 6. 2. and our Lord the King considering c. hath ordained and established by authority of this Parliament 8 H. 6. 3. And thus it generally stood but every general rule may have some exceptions till the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 7th about which time that usual clause the special instance or request of the Commons began by little and little to be laid aside and that of their advise or assent to be inserted in the place thereof for which I do refer you to the book at large Which though it were some alteration of the former stile and that those words By the authority of this present Parliament may make men think that the Lords and Commons did then pretend some title unto the power of making laws yet neither advising or assenting are so operative in the present case as to transfer the power of making laws to such as do advise about them or assent unto them not can the alâ—eration of the forms and stiles used in antient times import an alteration of the form of Government unless it can be shewed as I think it cannot that any of our Kings did renounce that power which properly and solely did belong unto them or did by any solemn Act of Communication confer the same upon the Lords and Commons convened in Parliament And this is that which is resolved and declared in our Common law where it is said z Cited in the unlawfulness of resist p 107. Le Roy fait les loix avec le consent du Seigneurs et communs et non pas les Seigneurs et communs avec le consent du Roy that is to say that the King makes Laws in Parliament by the assent of the Lords and Commoni and not the Lords and Commons by the assent of the King And for a further proof of this and for the clearing of this point that the Lords and Commons pretend to no more power in the making of laws than opportunity to propound and advise about them and on mature advise to give their several Assents unto them we need but look into the first Act of the Parliament in the third year of King Charles being a Recognition of some antient Rights belonging to the English subject An Act conceived according to the primitive form in way of a Petition to the Kings most excellent Majesty a Statut. 3 Carol. in which the Lords and Commons do most humbly pray as their Rights and Liberties that no such things as they complained of might be done hereafter that his Majesty would vouchsafe to declare that the Awards doings and proceedings to the prejudice of his people in any of the premises shall not be drawn hereafter into consequence or example and that he would be pleased to declare his Royal pleasure that in the point aforesaid all his Officers and Ministers should serve him according to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm To which although the King returned a fair general Answer assuring them that his Subjects should have no cause for the time to come to complain of any wrong or oppressions contrary to their just Righâ—s and Liberties yet this gave little satisfaction till he came in person and causing the Petition to be distinctly read by the Clerk of the Crown b Ibid. returned his Answer in these words Soit droit fait come est desire that is to say let right be done as is desired Which being the very formal words by which the said Petition and every clause and Article therein contained became to be a law and to have the force of an Act of Parliament and being there is nothing spoken of the concurrent authority of the Lords and Commons for the enacting of the same may serve instead of many Arguments for the proof of this that the Legislative power as we phrase it now is wholly and solely in the King although restrained in the exercise and use thereof by constant custome unto the counsel and consent of the Lords and Commons Le Roy veult c Smith de Rep. Angl. or the King will have it so is the imperative phrase by which the Propositions of the Lords and Commons are made Acts of Parliament And let the Lords and Commons agitate and propound what Laws they please for their ease and benefit as generally all Laws and Statutes are more for the ease and benefit of the Subject than the advantage of the King yet
versari The States saith he of England have a kind of authority but all the rights of Soveraignty and command in chief are at the will and pleasure of the Prince alone 12. And to say truth although the Lords Commons met in Parliament are of great authority especially as they have improved it in these later times yet were they never of such power but that the Kings have for the most part over-ruled them made them pliant conformable to their own desires and this not only by themselves but sometimes also by their Judges by their counsel often For such was the great care and wisdom of our former Kings as not to venture single on that numerous body of the two Houses of Parliament whereby the Soveraignty might be so easily overmatched but to take with them for Assistants as well the Lords of their Privy Counsel with whom they might advise in matters which concerned them in their Soveraign rights as their learned Counsel as they call them consisting of the Judges and most eminent Lawyers from whom they might receive instruction as the case required and neither do nor suffer wrong in point of Law and by both these as well as by the power and awe of their personal presence have they not only regulated but restrained their Parliaments And this is easily demonstrable by continual practice For in the Statute of Bigamie made in the fourth k 4 Ed. 1. year of King Edward 1. it is said expreâ—ly that in the presence of certain reverend Fathers Bishops of England and others of the Kings Counsel the Constitutions under-written were recited and after published before the King his Couusel forasmuch as all the Kings Counsel as well Justices as others did agree that they should be put in writing and observed In the Articuli super Chartas when the Great Charter was confirmed at the request of the Prelates Earls and Barons l 28 Ed. 1. c. 2. we find these two clauses the one in the beginning thus Nevertheless the King and his Counsel do not intend by reason of this Statâ—te to diminish the Kings right m Ibid. c. 20. c. The other in the close of all in these following words And notwithstanding all these things mentioned or any part of them both the King and his Counsel and all they which were present at the making of this Ordinance do will and intend that the right and prerogative of his Crown shall be saved in all things In the 27th of King Edward the 3d. n 27 Ed. 3. The Commons presenting a Petition to the King which the Kings Counsel did mislike were content thereupon to mend and explain their Petition the form of which Petition is in these words following To their most redoubted Soveraign Lord the King praying the Commons that whereas they have prayed him to be discharged of all manner of Articles of the Lyre c. which Petition seemeth to his Counsel to be prejudicial unto him and in disherison of his Crown if it were so generally granted his said Commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of him which should fall in disherison of him or of his Crown perpetually as of Escheats c. but of trespasses misprisions negligences and ignorances c. In the 13 of the reign of King Richard the 2d when the Commons did pray that upon pain of forfeiture the Chancellor or Counsel of the King should not after the end of the Parliament make any Ordinance against the Common law o 13 Rich. 2. the King by the advise of his Counsel answered Let it be used as it hath been used before this time so as the Regality of the King be saved for the King will save his Regalities as his Predecessors have done In the 4th year of King Henry 4. p 4 Hen. 4. when the Commons complained against Sub-poenae's and other writs grounded upon false suggestions the King upon the same advise returned this answer that he would give in charge to his Officers that they should abstain more than before time they had to send for his Subjects in that manner But yet saith he it is not our intention that our Officers shall so abstain that they may not send for our Subjects in matters and causes necessary as it hath been used in the time of our good Progenitors Finally not to bring forth more particulars in a case so clear it was the constant custome in all Parliaments till the Reign of King Henry 5. q Henr. 5 that when any Bill had passed both houses and was presented to the King for his Royal Assent the King by the advise of his Privy Counsel or his Counsel learned in the Laws or sometimes of both did use to crosse ouâ— and obliterate as much or as little of it as he pleased to leave out what he liked not and confirmed the rest that only which the King confirmed being held for Law And though in the succeeding times the Kings did graciously vouchsafe to pass the whole Bill in that form which the Houses gave it or to reject it wholly as they saw occasion yet still the Privy Counsel and the Judges and the Counsel learned in the Laws have and enjoy their place in the House of Peers aswell for preservation of the Kings rights and Royalties as for direction to the Lords in a point of Law if any case of difficulty be brought before them on which occasions the Lords are to demand the opinion of the Judges and upon their opinions to ground their Iudgement As for example In the Parliament 28 of Hen. 6. The Commons made sure that VVilliam de la Pole Duke of Suffolk should be committed to Prison for many treasons and other crimes r 28 Hen. 6 and thereupon the Lords demanded the opinion of the Judges whether he should be committed to Prison or not whose Answer was that he ought not to be committed in regard the Commons had not charged him with any particular offence but with generals only which opinion was allowed and followed In another Parliament of the said King held by Prorogation one Thomas Thorpe the Speaker of the House of Commons was in the Prorogation-time condemned in 1000 l. dammages upon an Action of Trespass at the sute of Richard Duke of York and was committed to Prison for execution of the same The parliament being reassembled the Commons made suâ—e to the King and Lords to have their Speaker delivered to them according to the privilege of Parliaments t The privilege of the Barons p. 15. the Lords demanded the opinion of the Judges in it and upon their Answer did conclude that the Speaker should still remain in Prison according to Law notwithstanding the privilege of Parliament and according to this resolution the Commons were commanded in the Kings name to choose one Tho Carleton for their Speaker which was done accordingly Other examples of this kind are exceeding obvious and for numbers infinite yet neither more
of the whole discourse THE STVMBLING-BLOCK OF Disobedience and Rebellion Cunningly laid by CALVIN in the Subjects way Discovered Censured and Removed CHAP. I. The Doctrine of Obedience laid down by CALVIN and of the Popular Officers supposed by him whereby he overthroweth that Doctrine I The purpose and design of the work in hand II The Doctrine of Obedience unto Kings and Princes soundly and piously laid down by CALVIN III And that not only to the good and gracious but even to cruel Princes and ungodly Tyrants IV With Answer unto such Objections as are made against it V The Principles of Disobedience in the supposal of some popular Officers ordained of purpose to regulate the power of Kings VI How much the practise of CALVIN's followers doth differ from their Masters Doctrine in the point of Obedience VII Several Articles and points of Doctrine wherein the Disciples of CALVIN are departed from him VIII More of the differences in point of Doctrine betwixt the Master and his Scholars IX The dangerous consequences which arise from his faulty Principles in the point or Article of Disobedience X The method and distribution of the following Work SOme Writers may be likened unto Jeremies Figs b Ierem. 24 4. of which the Prophet saith that if they were good they were very good if evil very evil such as could not be eaten they were so evil Of such a temper and esteem was Origen amongst the Ancients of whom it was observed not without good cause that in his Expositions on the Book of God and other learned Tractates which he writ and published where he did well none could do it better and where he failed at all no man erred more grosly And of this sort and composition was Mr. Calvin of Geneva then whom there is not any Minister of the Reformed Churches beâ—ond the seas who hath more positively and expresly laid down the Doctrine of Obedience unto Kings and Princes and the unlawfulness of Subjects taking Arms against their Soveraign nor opened a more dangerous gap to disobedience and rebellions in most States of Christendome In which it is most strange to see how prone we are such is the frailty and corruption of our sinful nature to refuse the good and choose the evill to take no notice of his words when it most concerns us when we are plainly told our duties both to God and man and on the other side to take his words for Oracles his judgement for infallible all his Geese for Swans when he saith any thing which may be useful to our purposes or serve to the advancement of our lewd designs The credit and authority of the man was deservedly great amongst the people where he lived and in short time of such authority and esteem in the world abroad that his works were made the only rule to which both Discipline and Doctrine was to be conformed and if a Controversie did arise either in points Dogmatical or a case of Conscience his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was sufficient to determine in it at least to silence the gain-sayers And as it is observed in the works of Nature that corruptio optimi est pessima and that the sweetest meats make the sowrest excrements so the opinion and esteem which some of the Reformed Churches had conceived of him which to say the truth was great and eminent and the ill use they made of some words and passages in his writings which most unfortunately served to advance their purposes have been the sad occasion of those wars and miseries which almost all the Western parts of Christendome have been so fatally involved in since the times he lived Which words and passages as they are cautelously laid down and compassed round with many fair expressions of affection to the Supreme Powers that they might pass without discovery and be the sooner swallowed by unwary men so by his followers who are exceeding wise in their generations have they been hidden and concealed with all art that may be For though they build their dangerous Doctrines upon his foundation and toss this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this ball of discord and dissension from one hand to another yet do they very cunningly conceal their Author and never use his name to confirm their Tenets And this they do upon this reason that if their Doctrine give offence unto Christian Princes and any of their Pamphlets be to feel the fire or otherwise come under any publick censure as not long since hapned to Paraeus the Patron of their Sect might escape untouched and his authority remain unquestioned to give new life unto their hopes at another time In which respects and withall seeing that the heads of this monstrous Hydra of sedition do grow the faster for the cutting and that the lopping off the Branches keeps the trunk the fresher I shall pass by the petit Pamphleters of these times and strike directly at the head and without medling with the boughs or branches will lay my Axe immediately to the root of the tree and bring the first Author of these factious and Antimonarchical Principles which have so long disturbed the peace of Christendome to a publick trial A dangerous and invidious undertaking I must needs confess but for my Countreys and the Truthes sake I will venture on it and in pursuance of the same will first lay down the doctrine of Obedience as by him delivered which I shall faithfully translate without glosse or descant and next compare his Doctrine with our present practise noting wherein his Scholars have forsook their Master with application unto those who do most admire him and finally I shall discover and remove that Stumbling-block which he hath cunningly laid before us but hid so secretly that it can hardly be discerned at which so many a man hath stumbled both to the breaking of his own neck and his neighbours too This is the race that I am to run the prize I aim at is no other then for as much as in me lieth to do good to all men to those especially who think themselves to be of the houshold of Faith And therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Let us on in Gods Name 2. Subditorum erga suos Magistratus Officium primum est Calvin Instit l. 4. c. 20. sect 22. de eorum functione quà m honorificentissimè sentire c. The first duty of the Subjects towards their Magistrates is to think wondrous honourably of their place and function which they acknowledge to be a jurisdiction delegated by Almighty God and therefore are by consequence to respect and reverence them as the Ministers and Deputies of God For some there are who very dutifully do behave themselves toward their Magistrates and would have all men do the like because they think it most expedient for the Common-wealth and yet esteem no otherwise of them then of some necessary evils which they cannot want But St. Peter looks for more then this 1 Pet. 2. 17. when he commandeth
against the Senate who began sensibly to incroach on the Regal power that the Tribunes were first instituted to no other end but to preserve the people from unjust oppression and that their opposition to the Consuls was accounted alwayes to be against the rules of their institution and a breach of Articles And as for these Demarchi whom we spake of last that neither by their institution nor by usurpation they did oppose against the Senate in behalf of the people but executed their commands upon the people as their duty bound them So that the great imagination which the Author had of shewing to the world a view of such popular Magistrates as might incourage men of place and eminence to think themselves ordained after these examples to moderate their licentiousness of Kings and Princes is fallen directly to the ground without more ado as being built upon a weak nay a false foundation not able to support the building And more then so in case the instances proposed had been rightly chosen and that the Ephori in Sparta had been first ordained to oppose the Kings the Tribunes to oppose the Consuls and the Demarchi to keep under the Athenian Senate yet these would prove but sorry instances of such popular Officers as were ordained ad moderandum Regum libidinem to moderate the licentiousness of Kings soveraign Princes for proof of which they were produced The Ephori were not instituted in the State of Sparta till the Kings were brought under the command of the Senate and the State become an Aristocratie in which the Kings had very little left them of the Royal dignity but the empty name and were in power no other then the Dukes of Venice save that they were to have the command of the Armies which those Dukes have not And for the Tribunes 't is well known to every one who hath perused the Roman story that there were no such creatures to be found in Rome till the Romans had expuâ—sed their Kings were under the command of Coâ—suls the Monarchie being changed to an Optimatie and the people bound by solemn oaths never to admit of a King amongst them The like may be affirmed also of the Demarchi of Athens supposing that they were of as great authority as either the Ephori or the Tribunes that they were instituted in a time when the affairs of State were managed by nine Annual Magistrates all of them chosen by the people and accomptable to them In all these cases â—um non in regno populus esset sed in libertate e Livie hisâ— lib. 2. when the people had sued out their Wardship and thought themselves to be at liberty freed from those bonds which nature and allegiance formerly had laid upon them they did no more then what a wise and understanding people had good cause to do in taking the best course they could for their future safety And in my minde the people pleaded most unanswerably in their own behalf when they alleadged se foris pro imperio libertate dimicantes domi a civibus captos oppressos f Id. ibid. that fighting valiantly abroad both for their own liberty and their Countries honor against their Kings they were oppressed and wronged at home by their fellow Citizens that their condition as things stood was better in times of war then in times of peace their liberty never more assured then when they were amongst their Enemies and therefore being no otherwise bound to submit themselves to that change of Government then as it had been introduced by their own consent they had all the reason in the world to get as good terms as they could and be no losers by the bargain Which though it were the case and plea particularly of the people of Rome might be used also very fitly by the Spartans and Athenians on the self same reasons But this can no way be pretended or alleadged by those who live in an established and successional Monarchie where there is one only to command in chief and nothing left to the Subject g Tacit. Annal. praeter obsequii gloriam but the glory of obedience only and the necessity of submitting with a loyal heart to those commands and impositions which may be â—aid upon them with an unjust hand So that admitting it for true as indeed it is not that the Ephori the Demarchi and the Tribunes were ordained for the ends supposed yet it can follow by no rules of law or logick that because such popular Officers have been sometimes instituted to keep the scale upright and the balance even betwixt the Nobles and the People in an Aristocratie therefore the like are to be fancied in a setled Monarchie for moderating the licentiousness that is to say for that no doubt must be his meaning for regulating the authority of the Soveraign Prince 8 Thus have we seen a manifest discovery of Calvins purpose for setting up some popular Officers in every Kingdom to regulate the authority and restrain the power of Soveraign Princes and we may see a secret and more subtile danger included in that short Parenthesis then what is obvious at first sight to the unwary Reader For by the instances proposed and presented to us it seems to be his meaning that these popular Officers should not hâ—ve power only to restrain their Kings when they transgress the bounds of law or equity and either tyrannically oppress the Subject or wilfully dilapidate the patrimony of the Common-wealth but that they should set themselves against them and control their doings in the same way after the same manner as the Ephori did the Kings of Sparta or the Tribunes did the Roman Consuls Now we have shewn before out of several Authors h Vide chap. 2. that the Ephori did not only take upon them to appoint such Privie Counsellors about their Kings as to them seemed best to limit and prescribe them in the choyce of their wives to send them out unto the wars and recall them home as if they had been hirelings only and of no more reckoning to put them upon fine and ransome if they did any thing which was not pleasing to these humorous Gentlemen to have them at command both to come and goe as often as they whistled for them or held up a finger and finally to look for lowly reverence from them whensoever they vouchsafed to summon them to attend their pleasures but also to imprison next to banish and in fine to murder them And we have shewed you of the Tribunes i Vide chap. 3â— that after they had fortified themselves with large priviledges and grew predominant in the affections of the common people they did not only quarrel and oppose the Consuls under pretence of setting forth new laws for the peoples benefit nor were content to put the people into the possession of all the offices and honors of the Common-wealth which formerly belonged to the Nobles only whether the Consuls
Countrey and true Religion which though they are the words of Paraeus only yet they contain the minde and meaning of all the rest of that faction as his son Philip doth demonstrate e In Append. ad Cap. 13. Epist ad Rom. Hence was it that John Knox delivered for sound Orthodox doctrine Procerum esse propria autoritâ—te Idololatrian tollere Principes intra legum rescripta per vim reducere f Camden Annal Eliz. An. 1559. that it belonged unto the Peers of each several Kingdom to reform matters of the Church by their own authoritie and to confine their Kings and Princes within the bounds prescribed by law even by force of Arms. Hence that Geselius one of the Lecturers of Roterdam preached unto his people that if the Magistrates and Clergie did neglect their duty in the reformation of Religion necesse est id facere plâ—beios that then it did belong to the Common people g Necessaria Respons who were bound to have a care thereof and proceed accordingly And as for points of practise should we look that way what a confusion should we finde in most parts of Europe occasioned by no other ground then the entertainment of these principles and the scattering of these positions amongst the people Witness the Civil wars of France g Jean de Serres inventaire de Fr. the revolt of Holland h History of the Netherlands the expulsion of the Earl of East-Friezland out the City of Embden i Thuan hâ—st l. 114. the insurrections of the Scots k Camden Annal An. 1559. the tumults of Bohemia l Laurca Austriaca the commotions of Brandenbourg m Continuati Thuan. hist l. 8. the translation of the Crown of Sweden from the King of Pole to Charles Duke of Finland n Thuan. hist l. 8. the change of Government in England all acted by the Presbyterian or Calvinian partie in those several States under pretence of Reformation and redress of grievances 11 And to say truth such is the Genius of the sect that though they may admit an equal as paritie is the thing most aimed at by them both in Church and State yet they will hardly be perswaded to submit themselves to a Superiour to no Superiours more unwillingly then to Kings and Princes whose persons they disgrace whose power they ruinate whose calling they indevour to decry and blemish by all means imaginable First for their calling they say it is no other then an humane Ordinance and that the King is but a creature of the peoples making whom having made they may as easily destroy and unmake make again Which as it is the darling doctrine of this present time so is it very eagerly pursued by Buchannan who affirms expressly Quicquid juris populus alicui dederit idem justis de causis posse reposcere o Buchann de â—ure Regni that whatsoever power the people give unto their King or Supreme Magistrate they may resume again upon just occasions Their power they make so small and inconsiderable that they afford them very little even in matters temporal and no authoritie at all in things spiritual CALVIN professeth for himself that he was very much agrieved to hear that King Henry the eight had took unto himself the title of Supreme Head of the Church of England accuseth them of inconsiderate zeal nay blasphemie who conferred it on him and though he be content at last to allow Kings a Ministerial power in matters which concern the Reformation of Gods Publick Worship yet he condemns them as before of great inconsiderateness Qui facerent eos nimis spirituales p Calvin in Amos cap. 7. who did ascribe unto them any great authoritie in spiritual matters The designation of all those who bear publick office in the Church the calling of Councels or Assemblies the Presidencie in those Councels ordaining publick Fasts and appointing Festivals which anciently belonged unto Christian Princes as the chief branches of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction which is vested in them are utterly denied to Kings and Princes in their Books of Discipline In so much that when the Citizens of Embden did expel their Earl they did it chiefly for this reason Quod se negotiis Ecclesiasticis Consistorialibus praeter jus aequitatem immisceret q Thuan. hist l. 114. that he had intermedled more then they thought fit in Ecclesiastical causes and intrenched too much upon their Consistorie As for their power in temporal or civil causes by that time Knoxes Peers and Buchannans Judges Paraeus his inferior Magistrates and CALVINS popular Officers have performed their parts in keeping them within the compass of the laws arraigning them for their offences if they should transgress opposing them by force of arms if any thing be done unto the prejudice of the Church or State and finally in regulating their authoritie after the manner of the Spartan Ephori and the Roman Tribunes all that is left will be by much too little for a Roy d' Ivitot or for a King of Clouts as we English phrase it Last of all for their persons which God held so sacred that he gave it for a law to his people Israel not to speak evill of their Princes saying Thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy people Let us but look upon these men and we shall finde the basest attributes too good for the greatest Kings Calvin calls Mary Queen of England by the name of Proserpine r Calvin in Amos cap. 7. and saith that she did superare omnes Diabolos that all the Devils of hell were not half so mischeivous Beza affords Queen Mary of Scotland no better titles then those of Medea and Athaliah s Beza in Epist ad Jo. of which the last was most infamous in divine the other no less scandalous in humane stories the one a Sorceress and a Witch the other a Tyrant and usurper The Author of the Altare Damascenum whosoever he was can finâ—e no better a tribute for King James of most blessed memorie then infensissimus Evangelii hostis t Didoclavius in Epistola ad Lâ—ctor the greatest and deadly enemie of the Gospel of Christ And Queen Elizabeth her self did not scape so clear but that the zealous Brethren were too bold sometimes with her name and honor though some of them paid dearly for it and were hanged for their labour How that seditious Hugonot the Author of the lewd and unworthy Dialogue entituled Eusebius Philadelphus hath dealt with three great Princes of the House of France and what reproachful names he gives them I had rather you should look for in the Author then expect from me being loath to wade too far in these dirtie pudoles save that I shall be bold to adde this general Character which Didoclavius gives to all Kings in general viz. Naturâ insitum est in â—mnibus Regibus Christi odium that all Kings naturally hate Christ which may
persisting in their former obstinacy excluso e Parliamento Clero Consilium Rex cum solis Baronibus populo habuit totumque statim Clerum protectione sua privavit d Antiqu. Brit. in R. Winchelsey the King saith the Historian excluding the Clergy out of the Parliament advised with his Barons and his people only what was best to be done by whose advise he put the Clergy out of his protection and thereby forced them to conform to his will and pleasure This is the summa totalis of the business and comes unto no more but this that a particular course was advised in Parliament on a particular displeasure taken by the King against the body of his Clergy then convened together for their particular refusal to contribute to his wants wars the better to reduce them to their natural duty Which makes not any thing at all against the right of Bishops in the House of Peers or for excluding them that House or for the validity of such Acts as are made in Parliament during the time of such exclusion especially considering that the King shortly after called his States together and did excuse himself for many extravagant Acts which he had committed e Walsingâ— in Edw. 1. anno 1297. against the liberties of the Subject whereof this was one laying the blame thereof on his great occasions and the necessities which the wars which he had abroad did impose upon him And so much as in Answer unto that Record supposing that the words thereof be rightly senced as I think they are not and that by Clerus there we are to understand Arch-bishops and Bishops as I think we be not there being no Record I dare boldly say it either of History or Law in which the word Clerus serves to signifie the Arch-bishops and Bishops exclusive of the other Clergy or any writing whatsoever wherein it doth not either signifie the whole Clergy generally or the inferiour Clergy only exclusive of the Arch-bishops Bishops and other Prelates Therefore in answer unto that so much applauded Cavil of Excluso Clero from what Record soever it either hath been hitherto or shall hereafter be produced I shall propose it to the consideration of the sober Reader whether by Clerus in that place or in any other of that kind and time we must not understand the inâ—eriour Clergy as they stand distinguished in the Laws from my Lords the Bishops For howsoever it be true that Clerus in the ecclesiastical notion of the word doth signifie the whole Clergy generally Arch-bishops Bishops Priests and Deacons yet in the legal notion of it it stands distinguished from the Prelates and signifieth only the inferiour Clergy Thus do we find the Ecclesiasticks of this Realm divided into Prelates men of Religion and other Clerks 3. Edw. 1. c. 1. the Seculars either into Prelates and Clerks 9 Edw. 2. c. 3. 1 Rich. 2. c. 3. or Prelates and Clerks beneficed 18 Edw. 3. c. 2. or generally into the Prelates and the Clergy 9 Edw. 2. c. 15. 14 Edw. 3. c. 1 3. 18 Edw. 3. 2. 7. 25 Edw. 3. 2. 4. 8 Hen. 6. c. 1. and in all acts and grants of Subsidies made by the Clergy to the Kings or Queens of England since the 32 of Henry 8. when the Clergy subsidies first began to be confirmed by act of Parliament So also in the Latin ideom which comes neerest home Nos Praelati Clerus in the submission of the Clergy to King Henry 8. f Regist Waâ—ham and in the sentence of divorce against Anne of Cleve g Regist Cranmer and in the instrument of the grant of the Clergy subsidies presented to the Kings of England ever since the 27 of Queen Elizabeth and in the form of the Certificates per h Statut. 8 Eliz. c. 17. ever since Praelatâ—s Clerum returned by every Bishop to the Lord High Treasurer and finally Nos Episcopi Clerus Cantuariensis Provinciae in hac Synodo more nostro solito dum Regni Parliamentum celebratur congregati i Stat. 1 Phil. Mar. c. 8. in the petition to K. K. Phillip and Mary about the confirmation of the Abby lands to the Patentees So that though many Statutes have been made in these later times excluso Clero the Clergy that is to say the inferiour Clergy being quite shut out and utterly excluded from those publick Counsails yet this proves nothing to the point that auy act of Parliament hath been counted good to which the Bishops were not called or at the making of which Act they either were shut out by force or excluded by cunning As for Kilbancies book which that Author speaks of k Prerâ—g pract of Paâ—l p. 38. in which the Justices are made to say 7 H. 8. that our Soveraign Lord the King may well hold his Parliament by him and his Temporal Lords and by the Commons also without the Spiritual Lords for that the Spiritual Lords have not any place in the Parliament chamber by reason of their Spiritualties but by reason of their Temporal possessions besides that it is only the opinion of a privat man of no authority or credit in the Common wealth and contrary to the practice in the Saxon times in which the Bishops sate in Parliament as Spiritual persons not as Barons the reason for ought I can see will serve as well to pretermit all or any of the Temporal Lords as it can serve to pretermit or exclude the Bishops the Temporal Lords being called to Parliament on no other ground than for the Temporal possessions which they hold by Barony 9. If it be said that my second answer to the argument of Excluso Clero supposeth that the inferiour â—lergy had some place in Parliament which being not to be supposed makes the Answer void I shall crave leave to offer some few observations unto the consideration of the sober and impartial Reader by which I hope to make that supposition probable and perhaps demonstrative First then we have that famous Parliament call it Concilium magnum or Concilium commune or by what other name soever the old writers called it summoned by King Ethelbert anno 605. which my l Concil Hen. Spelm. Author calleth Commune concilium tam Cleri quam Populi where Clerus comprehendeth the body of the Clergy generally aswell the Presbyters as the Bishops as the word populus doth the lay-subject generally as well Lords as Commons or else the Lords and Commons one of the two must be needs left out And in this sense we are to understand these words in the latter times as where we read that Clerus m Matth. Paris in Hen. 1. Angliae populus Vniversus were summoned to appear at Westminster at the Coronation of King Henry the first where divers Laws were made and declared subscribed by the Arch-bishops Bishops and others of the principal persons that were there assembled that Clero populo
convocato n Rog. Hov. in Hen 2. the Clergy and people of the Realm were called to Clarendon anno 1163. by King Henry the second for the declaring and confirming of the Subjects liberties that in the year 1185 towards the later end of the said Kings reign Convocatus est Clerus populus cum tota Nobilitate ad fontem Clericorum o Matth. paris in Hen. 2. the Clergy Commons and Nobility were called unto the Parliament held at Clerkenwell and finally that a Parliament was called at London in which the Arch-bishop of Canterbury was present cum toto Clero tota secta Laicali p Quadrilog ap Selden Tit. of Hon. pt 2. c. 5. in the time of King John Hitherto then the Clergy of both ranks and orders as well as Populus or tota secta Laicalis the Subjects of the Laity or the Lords and Commons had their place in Parliament And in possession of this right the Clergy stood when the Magna Charta was set out by King Henry the 3d wherein the freedoms rights and privileges of the Church of England of which this evidently was one was confirmed unto her q Magna Charta cap. 1. of the irrefragable and inviolable authority whereof we have spoke before The Cavill of Excluso Clero which hath been used against the voting of the Bishops in the house of Peers comes in next for proof that the inferiour Clergy had their place or vote with the house of Commons if in those times the Lords and Commons made two houses which I am not sure of the Clergy could not be excluded in an angry fit or out of a particular design to deprive them of the benefit of the Kings protection if they had not formerly a place amongst them if we will not understand by Clerus the inferior Clergy which much about that time as before we shewed began to be the legâ—l English of the word we must needs understand the whole Clergy generally the Clergy of both ranks and orders But our main proofs are yet to come which are these that follow First it is evident that antiently the Clergy of each several Diocese were chargeable by Law for the expences of their Proctors in attending the service of the Parliament according as the Counties were by Common law since confirmed by Statute 23 H. 6. c. 11. to bear the charges of their Knights the Burroughs and Cities of their Representees which questionless the Laws had not taken care for but that the Clergy had their place in Parliament as the Commons had And this appears by a Record z Rotul Parent 26 Ed. 3. pt 1. M. 22. of 26 of King Edward the 3d. in which the Abbat of Leieester being then but never formerly commanded to attend in Parliament amongst others of the Regular Prelates petitioned to be discharcharged from that attendance in regard he held in Frank-Almoigne only by no other tenure Which he obtained upon this condition ut semper in Procuratores ad hujusmodi Parliamenta mittendot consentiat ut moris est eorundem expensis contribuat that is to say that he and his Successors did give their voyces in the choyse of such Procuratours as the Clergy were to send to Parliament and did contribute towards their charges as the custom was Next in the Modus tenendi Parliamentum which before we spake of there is amodus convocandi Clerum Angliae ad Parl. Regis r Modus tenendi Parl. Mâ— a form of calling the English Clergy that is the Prelates Clergy as John Selden e renders it to the Court of Parliament said to be used in the time of Edward the Son of Ethelred s V. Titles of hon pt 2. presented to the Conquerour and by him observed which shews the Clergy in those times had their place in Parliament Which being but a general inference shall be delivered more particularly from the Modus it self which informs us thus Rex est caput principum finis Parliamenti c. t Modus tenendi Parl. Ms. c. 12. The King is the head the beginning and end of the Parliament and so he hath not any equal in the first degree the second is of Arch-bishops Bishops and Priors and Abbats holding by Barony the third is of Procurators of the Clergy the fourth of Earls Barons and other Nobles the fifth is of Knights of the Shire the sixt of Citizens and Burgesses and so the whole Parliament is made up of these six degrees But the said Modus tells us more and goeth more particularly to work than so For in the ninth chapter speaking of the course which was observ'd in canvassing hard and difficult matters it telleth us that they used to choose 25 out of all degrees like a grand Committee to whose consideration they referred the point that is to say two Bishops and three Proctors for the Clergy two Earls three Barons five Knights five Citizens and as many Burgesses And in the 12th that on the fourth day of the Parliament the Lord high Steward the Lord Constable and the Lord Marshal were to call the house every degree or rank of men in its several Order and that if any of the Proctors of the Clergy did not make appearance the Bishop of the Diocese was to be fined 100 l. And in the 23d chapter it is said expresly that as the Knights Citizens Burgesses in things which do concern the Commons have more authority than all the Lords so the Proctors for the Clergy in things which do concern the Clergy have more authority than all the Bishops Which Modus if it be as antient as the Norman Conquerour as both Sir Edward Coke conceiveth u Preface to the 9th part of Reports and the title signieth it sheweth the Clergies claim to a place in Parliament to be more antient than the Commons can pretend unto but if no older than the reign of King Edward third as confidently is affirmed in the Titles of Honour x Titles of hon pt 2. c. 5. if sheweth that in the usage of those later times the Procurators of the Clergy had a right and place there as well as Citizens and Burgesses or the Knights of the Shires And this is further proved by the writs of Summons directed to the Arch-bishops and Bishops for their own comming to the Parliament in the end whereof there is a clause for warning the Dean and Chapter of their Cathedralls and the Arch-deacons with the whole Clergy to be present at it that is to say the Deans and Arch-deacons personally the Chapter and Clergy in their Proctours then and there to consent to such Acts and Ordinances as shall be made by the Common counsail of the Kingdom The whole clause word for word is this y Extant ibid. pt 2. c. 5. Praemunientes Priorem Capitulum or Decanum Capitulum as the case might vary Ecclesiae vestrae N. ac Archidiacanos totumque Clerum vestrae Dioceseos
Titles of hon part 2. cap. 5. to give the King their best advice in his great affairs So that the Prelates and Nobility conveened in Parliament made the Kings great Counsel and were called thither to that end What then belonged unto the Commons 1. No more than did belong to the Clergy also that is to say the giving of their consent to such Laws and Statutes as should there be made VVhich notwithstanding in tract of time gave them such a sway and stroak in the course of Parliaments that no law could be made nor no tax imposed without their liking and allowance And this is that which is expressed in the last clause of the said writ by which the Knights and Burgesses are to come prepared g Form a Brevis c. ad faciendum et consentiendum iis quae tune ibidem de consilio dicti Regni nostri super negotiis antedictis contigerint ordinari VVhich is the very same which you had before in the writ directed to the Bishops for summoning the Clergie of their several Diocesses and that here is a faciendum which the other had not A word which if you mark it well hath no operation in the Construction of the text except it be in paying subsidies or doing such things as are appointed to be done by that great Counsel of the Kingdom VVhich clause though it be cunningly left out that I may say no worse in the recital of the writ by the Author of the Book entituled the Prerogative and practice of Parliaments is most ingenuously acknowledged in the Declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled at Oxon h Declaration of the treaty P. 15. where it is said that the writs of summons the foundation of all power in Parliament are directed to the Lords in expresse termes to treat and advise with the King and the rest of the Peers of the Kingdom of England and to the Commons to do and consent to those things which by that Common councell of England should be ordained And thus it stands as with the Common people generally in most states of Christendom so with the Commons antiently in most states of Greece of which Plutarch telleth us i Plutarch in Lyeurgo that when the people were assembled in Counsell it was not lawful for any of them to put forth matters to the Counsel to be determined neither might any of them deliver his opinion what he thought of any thing but the people had only authority 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to give their assent unto such things as either the Senators or their Kings do propound unto them 10. But against this it is objected first that it is not to be found at what time the Clergie lost their place and vote in Parliament and therefore it may reasonably be presumed that they had never any there and 2ly that if they had been called ad consentiendum though no more than so we should have found more frequent mention of their consent unto the Acts Statutes in our printed Books For answer unto which it may first be said that to suppose the Clergie had no voice in Parliament because it is not to be found when they lost that Privilege is such a kind of Argument if it be an argument as is made by Bellarmine k Bellarm. de Eccl. lib. 4. cap. 5. to prove that many of the controverted Tenets of the Church of Rome are neither terroneous nor new because we cannot say expressely quo tempore quo autore when and by whose promoting they first crept in And though we cannot say expressely when the inferiour Clergy lost their place in Parliament in regard it might be lost by discontinuance or non-usage or that the clause was pretermitted for some space of time the better to disuse them from it or that they might neglect the service in regard of their attendance in the Convocation which gave them power and reputation both with the Common people yet I have reason to beleeve that this pretermission and disuse did chiefly happen under the government of the Kings of the house of Lancaster who being the true heirs and successours of Iohn of Gaunt cast many a longing eye on the Church revenues and hardly were perswaded to abstain from that height of sacrilege which Henry the 8 did aftercome to And this I am induced to beleeve the rather in regard that in the confirmation of the Churches rights so solemnly confirmed and ratified in all former Parliaments there was a clog put to or added in these times which shaked the Fabrick the confirmation being first of such rights and liberties as were not repealed 3. Hen. 5. cap. 1. 4 Hen. 5. cap. 1. and afterwards of such as by the Common law were not repealeable 2 Hen. 6. cap. 1. which might go very far indeed And secondly I find that in the 8 of Henry the 6. an Act of Parliament was passed that all the Clergy called to Convocation by the Kings writ and their servants and Family shall for ever hereafter fully use and enjoy such liberty and defence in comming tarrying and returning as the great men and Comminalty of the Realm of England called to the Kings Parliament do enjoy l 8 Hen. 6. cap. 1. c. Which being an unnecessary care or caution when the Clergie had their voice in Parliament and very necessary to be taken formerly if they had never had such voice makes me conceive that it was much about this time that they lost that privilege But this I leave as a conjecture and no more than so For answer to the second argument that if they had been called of old ad consentiendum we should have found more frequent mention of their consent unto the Acts and Statutes of the former times besides that it is a negative proof and so non concludent it strikes as much against the presence and consent of the Knights and Burgesses in the elder Parliaments as it can do against the Clergie For in the elder Parliaments under K. Henry 3. and K. Edward the first there is no mention of the Commons made at all either as present or consenting nor much almost in all the Parliaments till K. Henry 7. but that they did petition for redresse of greivances and that upon their special instance and request m In the Proem to the several Sessions several laws were made for the behoof and benefit of the Commonwealth which part the Clergie also acted in some former Parliaments as before was shewed So that this negative Argument must conclude against both or neither But secondly I answer that in these elder times in which the Proctors for the Clergy had their place in Parliament they are included generally in the name of the Commons And this I say on the authority of the old modus tenendi Parliamentum in which the Commons are divided in the Spiritualty and the Temporalty and where it is expressely said that the Proctors for
first by these who first ventured on the expression or were improvidently looked over I can hardly say Certain I am it gave too manifest an advantage to the Antimonarchical party in this Kingdome and hardned them in their proceeding against their King whom they were taught to look on and esteem no otherwise than as a Joynt-tenant of the Soveraignty with the Lords and Commons And if Kings have partners in the Soveraignty they are then no King such being the nature and law of Monarchy that si divisionem capiat interitum capiat necesse est m Lactant Institut Div. l. 1. c. if it be once divided and the authorities thereof imparted it is soon destroyed Such is the dangerous consequence of this new Expression that it seemeth utterly to deprive the Bishops and in them the Clergy of this Land of all future hopes of being restored again to their place in Parliament For being the Parliament can consist but of three Estates if the King fall so low as to pass for one either the Bishops or the Commons or the Temporal Lords must desert their claim the better to make way for this new pretension and in all probability the Commons being grown so potent and the Nobility so numerous and united in blood and mariages will not quit their interesse and therefore the poor Clergy must be no Estate because lesse able as the world now goeth with them to maintain their title I have often read that Constantine did use to call himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 n Euseb de vita Constant the Bishop or Superintendent of his Bishops and I have oft heard our Lawyers say that the King is the general Ordinary of the Kingdome but never heard nor read till within these few yearrs that ever any King did possess himself of the Bishops place or vote in Parliament or sate there as the first of the three Estates as antiently the Bishops did to supply their absence By which device whether the Clergy or the King be the greater losers though it be partly seen already future times will shew 2. This rub removed we next proceed to the examination of that power which by our Author is conferred on the three Estates which we shall find on search and tryal to be very different according to the constitution of the Kingdome in which they are For where the Kings are absolute Monarchs as in England Scotland France and Spain l Bodin de Repub. l. 1. c. the three Estates have properly and legally little more authority than to advise their King as they see occasion to represent unto his view their common grievances and to propose such remedies for redresse therof as to them seem meetest to canvass and review such erroneous judgements as formerly have passed in inferiour Courts and finally to consult about and prepare such laws as are expedient for the publick In other Countries where the Kings are more conditional and hold their Crowns by compact and agreement betweeen them and their Subjects the reputation and authority of the three Estates is more high and eminent as in Polonia Danemark and some others of the Northern Kingdomes where the Estates lay claim to more than a directive power and think it not enough to advise their King unless they may dispose of the Kingdome also or at least make their King no better than a Royal Slave Thus and no otherwise it is with the German Emperors who are obnoxious to the Laws m Thuan. hist sui temp l. 2. and for their Government accomptable to the Estates of the Empire insomuch that if the Princes of the Empire be perswaded in their consciences that he is likely by his mal-administration to destroy the Empire and that he will not hearken to advice and counsel n Anonym Script ap Philip Paraeu in Append. â—d Rom. 13. ab Electorum Collegio Caesaria potestate privari potest he may be deprived by the Electors and a more fit and able man elected to supply the place And to this purpose in a Constitution made by the Emperor Jodocus about the year 1410. there is a clause that if he or any one of his Successors do any thing unto the contrary thereof the Electors and other States of the Empire sine rebellionis vel infidelitatis crimine libertatem habeant o Goldast Constit Imperial Tom. 3. p. 424. should be at liberty without incurring the crimes of Treason or Disloyalty not only to oppose but resist them in it The like to which occurs for the Realm of Hungary wherein K. Andrew gives authority to his Bishops Lords and other Nobles sine nota alicujus infidelitatis p Bonfinius de Edict publ p. 37. that without any imputation of disloyalty they may contradict oppose and resist their Kings if they do any thing in violation of some Laws and sanctions In Poland the King takes a solemn oath at his Coronation to confirm all the Privileges rights and liberties which have been granted to his Subjects of all ranks and orders by any of his Predecessors and then addes this clause quod si Sacramentum meum violavero incolae Regni nullam nobis obedientiam praestare tenebuntur which if he violates his Subjects shall no longer be obliged to yield him obedience q Bodin de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 8. Which oath as Bodine well observeth doth savour rather of the condition of the Prince of the Senate than of the Majesty of a King The like may be affirmed of Frederick the first King of Danemark who being called unto that Crown on the ejection of K. Christian the 2d An. 1523. was so conditioned with by the the Lords of the Kingdome that at his coronation or before he was fain to swear that he would put none of the Nobility to death or banishment but by the judgement of the Senate that the great men should have power of life or death over their Tenants and Vassals and that no Appeal should lye from them to the Kings tribunal nor the King be partaker of the confiscations nec item honores aut imperia privatis daturum c r Id. ibid. nor advance any private person to commands or honors but by authority of his great Counsel Which oath being also taken by Frederick the second made Bodinus say that the Kings of Danemark non tam reipsa quam appellare Reges sunt were only titular Kings but not Kings indeed Which character he also gives of the Kings of Bohemia Å¿ Id. ibid. p. 88. But in an absolute Monarchy the case is otherwise all the prerogatives and rights of Soveraignty being so vested in the Kings person ut nec singulis civibus nec universis fac est c. that it is neither lawful to particular men nor to the whole body of the Subjects generally to call the Prince in question for life fame or fortunes t Id. ibid. p. 210. and amongst these he reckoneth the kingdoms of France
made for the common use and benefit of the Subject they are left at liberty and may proceed in governing the people given by God unto them according to their own discretion and the advice of their Counsel New Laws are chiefly made for the Subjects benefit at their desire on their importunate requests for their special profit not one in twenty nay I dare boldly say not one in an hundred made for the advantage of the King either in the improvement of his power or the increase of his Revenue Look over all the Acts of Parliament from the beginning of the reign of King Henry 3. to the present time and tell me he that can if he finds it otherwise Kings would have little use of Parliaments and less mind to call them if nothing but the making of new Laws were the matter aimed at And as for raising monies and imposing taxes it either must suppose the Kings to be always unthrifts that they be always indigent and necessitous and behind-hand with the world which are the ordinary effects of ill husbandry or else this argument is lost and of little use For if our Kings should husband their estates to the best advantage and make the best benefit of such escheats and forfeitures conâ—iscations as day by day do fall unto them If they should follow the example of K. Henry 7. and execute the penal Laws according to the power which those Laws have given them and the trust reposed in them by their People if they should please to examine their revenue and proportion their expence to their comings in there would be litle need of subsidies and supplies of money more than the ordinary aids and impositions upon Merchandize which the Law alloweth of and the known rights of Sovereignty backed by prescription and long custom have asserted to them So that it is by Accident not by right and nature that the Parliament hath any power or opportunity to restrain their King in this particular for where there is no need of asking there is no occasion of denying by consequence no restraint upon no baffle or affronting offered to the Regal power And yet the Soveraign need not fear if he be tollerably carefull of his own estate that any reasonable demand of his in these mony matters will meet with opposition or denial in his Houses of Parliament For whilest there are so many Acts of Grace and favour to be done in Parliament as what almost in every Parliament but an enlargement of the Kings favours to his people and that none can be done in Parliament but with the Kings fiat and consent there is no question to be made but that the two Houses of Parliament will far sooner choose to supply the King as allwise Parliaments have done than rob the Subject of the benefit of his grace and favours which is the best fruit they reap from Parliaments Finally whereas it is objected but I think it in sport that the old Lord Burleigh used to say that he knew not what a Parliament in England could not do and that King Iames once said in a Parliament that then there were 500 Kings which words were took for a Concession that all were Kings as well as he in a time of Parliament they who have given us these Objections do either mis-understand their Authors or abuse themselves For what the Lord Burleigh said of Parliaments though it be more than the wisest man alive can justifie he spake of Parliaments according as the word is used in its proper sense not for the two Houses or for either of them exclusive of the Kings presence and consent but for the supreme Court for the highest Judicatory consisting of the Kings most excellent Majesty the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Representees of the Commons and then it will not serve for the turn intended And what King James said once in jest though I have often heard it used in earnest upon this occasion was spoke only in derision of some daring Spirits who laying by the modesty of their Predecessors would needs be looking into the Prerogative or finding errors and mistakes in the present Government or medling with those Arcana imperii which former Parliaments beheld at distance with the eye of reverence But certainly King James intended nothing lesse than to acknowledg a co-ordinative Soveraignty in the two Houses of Parliament or to make them his Co-partners in the Regal power His carriage and behaviour towards them in the whole course of his Government clearly shews the contrary there never being prince more jealous in the points of Soveraignty nor more uncapable of a Rival in those points than he 14. But yet the main objection which we may call the Objection paramount doth remain unanswered For if the three Estates convened in Parliament or any other popular Magistrate whom Calvin dreams of be ordaned by the Word of God as Guardians of the peoples Liberties and therefore authorised to moderate and restrain the power of Kings as often as they shall invade or infringe those liberties as Calvin plainly saies they were or that they know themselves to be ordained by Gods word to that end and purpose cujus se lege Dei Tutores positos esse norunt as he saies they do then neither any discontinuance or non-usage on their parts nor any prescription to the contrary alledged by Kings and supreme Princes can hinder them from resuming and exercising that Authority which God hath given them whensoever they shall finde a fit time for it But first I would fain learn of Calvin in what part of the Word of God we shall finde any such Authority given to those popular Magistrates by what name soever they are called in their several Countreys as he tels us of Not in the old Testament I am sure though in the institution of the seventy Elders there be some hopes of it For when Moses first ordained those Elders it was not to diminish any part of that power which was vosted in him but to ease himself of some part of the burthen which did lie upon him And this appears plainly by the 18. Chapter of the Book of Exodus For when it was observed by Jethro his Father in Law that he attended the businesses of the people from morning till night he told him plainly ultra vâ—res sâ—as negotium esse that the burthen was too heavy for him vers 18. and therefore that he should choose some Under-officers and place them over Thousands over Hundreds and ever Fifties and over Tens Vers 21. Leviusque sit tibi partito in alios onere that so it might be the easier for him those officers bearing some part of the burthen with him Yet so that these inferior Officers should only judge in matters of inferior nature the greater matters being still reserved to his own Tribunal Which counsel as it was very well approved by Moses so was it given by Jethro and approved by Moses with reference to the
been employed in the like affairs under the Gospel of Christ and that too in the best and happiest times of the Christian Church In search whereof it is not to be looked for by the ingenuous Reader that we should aim fo high as the first 300 years after Christs Nativitie The Prelates of the Church were suspected then to have their different aims and interesses from those who had the government of the Civil State and therefore thought uncapable of trust and imployment in it But after that according to that memorable maxime of Optatus Ecclesia erat in Republicâ i Deschismat Denâ—â—â—st l 3. the Church became a part of the Commonâ—wealth and had their ends and aims united there followed these two things upon it first that the Supreme Government of the Church depended much upon the will and pleasure of the Supreme Magistrate insomuch as Socrates observeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 k Socrat. Eccl. hist lib. 5. c. 1. that the greatest Councels have been called by their authoritie and appointment And 2 ly that the Governours and Rulers of the Church of God came to have place and power in disposing matters that appertained to the well ordering of the Civil State And this they did not out of any busie or pragmatical desire to draw the cognizance of secular causes into their own hands or to increase their power and reputation with the common people but meerly for the ease and benefit of those who did repair unto them for their help and counsel and to comply with the command of the Apostle who imposed it on them S. Austin tells us of S. Ambrose with how great difficultie he obtained an opportunitie of conversing with him privately and at large as his case required Secludentibus â—um ab ejus aure atque ore catervis negociosorum hominum the multitude of those who had business to him l August Confes l. 6. c. 3. and suits to be determined by him debarring him from all advantages of access and conference Which took up so much of his time that he had little leasure to refresh his body with necessary food or his minde with the reading of good Authors And Posidonius telâ—s us of S. Austin causas audisse diligenter piè that he diligently and religiously attended such businesses as were brought before him not only spending all the morning in that troublesome exercise m Posidon in vita August c. 19. but sometimes fasting all day long the better to content the suitor and dispatch the business The like S. Austin tells us of himself and his fellow Prelates first that the Christians of those times pro secularibus causis suis nos non raro quaererent n August in Psalm 1 8. serm 74 Epist 147. did ordinarily apply themselves unto them for the determing of secular causes and cheerfully submitted unto their decisions next that the Prelates did comply with their earnest solicitations and desires therein Tu multuosissimas causarum alienarum perplexitates patiendo o Id. de opeâ—e Monach c. 29. by intermitting their own studies to ingage themselves in the determining of such secular causes as were brought before them for the contentation of the people and the discharge of their own duty both to God and man And this is that which both S. Ambrose and S. Augustine tell us in their several writings viz. that they did undergoe this trouble for no other reason then out of a conformitie and obedience to the words and intimation of S. Paul 1 Cor. cap. 6. touching the ending of such suits and differences as did arise amongst the Faithful S. Austin saying Constituisse Apostolum talibus causis Ecclesiasticos cognitores p Id. in Psal 118. serm 174. and iisdem molestiis eos affixisse Apostolos q Id. de opere Monach. 29. S. Ambrose that he had undertook the businesses which were brought before him Secundum sacrae formam praeceptionis qua eum Apostolus induebat r Amb. Epist 24. which did impose such a necessitie upon him that he was not able to decline it Both of them doe agree in this and Posidonius doth agree with both in the same particular s Posidon in vita August c. 19. that they were not only warranted but obliged by S. Pauls injunction to undertake the cognizance of such secular causes as were from time to time committed to their care and trust and that they had not done their dutie had they made any scruple of the undertaking But these being only private matters let us next see whether their service was not used in affairs of State and we shall finde that Constantine did always take some Bishops with him when he went to war not only for their ghostly counsel in spiritual matters but for advise in matters which concerned the occasion t Euseb in vita Constant l. 4. c. 54. the prosecution of the war which was then in hand that Ambrose was twice sent Ambassadour from Valentinian the younger to the Tyrant Maximus which he performed to the great contentment of his Prince and the preservation of the Empire u Amb. Epist 27. lib. 5. whereof he gives us an accompt in an express unto the Emperour that when Firmus had rebelled in Africk and saw himself too weak to resist the Forces which were raised against him under Theodosius Antistites ritus Christiani pacem oraturos misit x Ammian Marcel hist l. 29. he sent the African Prelates his Ambassadours to treat of peace that Marutha Bishop of Mesopotamia was in like nature sent to the Court of Persia y Socrat. Eccles hist l. 7. c. 8. in the time of the Emperour Honorius I. as after that Epiphanius Bishop of Ticinum which we now call Pavie employed from the Ligurians to Athalaricus King of the Gothes in Italy from him unto the Court of Burgundie as Cassiodorus and Ennodius doe describe at large that James the godly Bishop of Nisibis a frontier Town against the Persians was also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both Governour of the place and Captain of the Souldiers which were there in Garrison z Theodoret. hist Eccl. l. 2. c. 30. and did most manfully defend it against all the force and fury of the Persian Armies An. 338. or thereabouts and finally which was an argument of great power and trust that the Bishops in Justinians time were by him appointed to oversee the Civil Magistrates and to give notice to the Emperour if they failed in any thing which did concern the Government oâ— the Estate in their several places of which the very Edicts are still extant in the Book of Novels a Novel 56. in Append. ad Novel 8. 5 The Prelates being grown into this esteem for their integritie and wisdom with the Roman Emperours it is no wonder if they were imployed in the greatest Offices of trust and counsel after the Empire was dismembred and shared betwixt such several Princes as grew