is morally impossible they should be under such happy and beneficial circumstances in this kind as Atticus was and therefore cannot expect the like success therein as he sound Indeed if the Senate and People of Rome that made these Decrees in favour of those that got into the Saddle had been but Usurpers of the supreme Authority or had it not been really and legally fixed in them or had they been a pack of men that had but pretended the supreme Authority and the state-State-power of making Laws or politick Edicts Proscriptions and Declarations of this nature without any legal and true power so to do It had not only been an act of nobleness and generosity but possibly of duty to have ministred relief and supply to those that were oppressed by them But the Case was otherwise the true supreme Authority of the Roman State was engaged in those Edicts and Proscriptions though drawn thereunto by the power of a prevailing Party And therefore the adventure of Atticus was great in ministring supplies to those that fell under those Sentences and Decrees though his great Wisdom in managing thereof the great and publick veneration of his goodness and the junctures of the affairs of the Roman State rendred him safe and secure from danger under that adventure And whosoever shall adventure in like manner had need be sure his Circumstances be the same with those of Atticus and that he hath as good a Judgment yea and Fortune also to discern and weather Difficulties as he had otherwise in such Adventures he cannot be without great danger And as I have added this Caution touching the practice of Atticus in his Life so there is another Caution to be added touching his Deportment near his Death It seems to me that his obstinate resolution not to take any nourishment to preserve his Life because it would prolong his pain together with his Life was not at all commendable but as it savoured too much of impatience unbecoming a Philosopher so it was an act of much wilful imprudence for the receiving of convenient nourishment might prolong his Life and possibly abate his pain But the wilful refusal of it must necessarily be as it was an immediate cause of his Death which he thereby hastened and although self-Murder was grown too much in fashion among some of the Grandees of Rome as appears by the instance of Cato and others yet certainly it was a practice not only of Inhumanity but of much Pusillanimity and Impotence of Mind and a miserably mistaken choice to choose Death the worst of Evils rather than endure Pain or Disgrace in the world which a little Philosophy would have taught them to bear with patience rather than to avoid by destroying their own Lives FINIS ERRATA PAg. 9. 1. 23. r. Province P. 17. 1. 19. for note r. not P. 36. 1. 15. r. 11th year P. 41. r. 4628. P. 45. 1. 5. r. fermented P. 57. 1. 6. r. Gentlest Animadversions P. 59. 1. 24. r. aided P. 69. 1. 9. r. evil Engine P. 73. 1. 6. r. Gilded all their 1. 21. r. Protections of P. 82. 1. 7. dele rather 1. 14. r. Consulate of Marius P. 87. 1. 2. r. in or against P. 93. 1. 21. for strange and foreign r. strong and firm P. 98. 1. 4. r. or like means P. 99. 1. 16. r. for the state his stake P. 104. 1. 4. r. who will P. 114. 1. 1. r. opposed them P. 118. 1. 20. r. Air but. P. 134. 1. 22 23. r. for the later both will come P. 153. 1. 27. r. they put P. 158. 1. 18. r. were obvious to P. 161. 1. 9. r. Great men especially if inclinable to any Faction P. 165. 1. 8. r. CHAP. IX and so for all the rest of the Chapters to the end of the Book on forward P. 174. 1. 22. r. No publick 1. 25. r. Injudicial 1. 26. r. Employment be must P. 190. 1. 15. r. His declamations P. 199. 1. 23. r. constantly avoid P. 225. 1. 5. r. others would commend P. 230. 1. 1. r. extorted from ADDENDA Pag. 92. Between Line 12 and 13 insert as followeth IT is true that the lawful Governors of a Kingdom or State must necessarily sometimes use great severities upon Rebels and Disturbers of the Government and this is necessary as well by way of just retribution of great demerits but principally for example and so prevent others from the like Exorbitances Ut Poena ad paucos Metus ad omnes Rewards and Punishments being as well the two great Pillars that support Government as the two great Wheels that keep it in a regular and orderly Motion But yet there is great Prudence and Moderation to be used therein as well in reference to the kinds and degrees of the punishments as in the extent of them for if they be too inhumane and barbarous or be extended to all the persons that are Offenders when the number of them possibly is very great it may prove like Physick that is too strong for the Bodies and brings many times greater danger than the Disease it designs to cure But the Case of those Factions in Rome was not like that of the Civil Magistrate in punishing Malefactors in a State but it was the Passions and Animosities of one Faction or Party against another and therefore such horrid and extensive severities that they used one against another rendred their severities and the extent of them as unexcusable so in the event dangerous and unsuccessful to those that used them the reason above given Pag. 144. Between Line 7 and 8 add It is true that he relieved Brutus after his Exile but so he also relieved Anthony after his Exile though both were extream Enemies each to other but still it was for their private relief not to support their Factions Brutus used him as his great Councellor as we are told in his Life But it was not upon the account of Brutus his publick undertakings but only touching his private Concerns which appears beyond all question in that in their highest Familiarity and Friendship he refused not only to subseribe for the Treasure designed for Brutus but would not so much as meet about it
them sometimes by the occurrence of some foreign war these differences were often allay'd or diverted without any great detriment to the Publick But Marius being a rough fierce and bold person a man of Wit and Courage a good Souldier successful ambitious and that could not endure any Opponent or Rival began that Fire in the Commonwealth of Rome that scarce ever left burning till the Commonwealth of Rome was at last necessarily resolved into the Monarchy of Augustus And all those Civil Discords and Wars all those Rapines and Violences those Murders and Banishments that in the space of about fifty years after the sixth Consulate of Marius filled the City and Empire of Rome were the success of that Faction that he began and of that Breach that he first made in the Texture and Contiguation of that goodly structure of the Common-wealth of Rome and the Praeludia to the Monarchy of Augustus as the only Cure thereof Now in as much as the frame of the Roman Commonwealth consisted of the Consuls the Senate and the Tribunes and had so stood for many years and though in all that time there had been men of Spirit and ambitious enough to trouble a State and there wanted not frequent brawls between the Nobility and Commonalty of Rome in all this time which might have as well given opportunity to troublesome Spirits and to have given fire to the Ambition and Discontents of persons and thereby have raised Civil Wars and put the State of Rome into blood It will be seasonable for us to enquire what the reason might be why that Common-wealth was no sooner engaged in Civil Wars or if at any time some such thing happened as some such there sometimes were though not so great or dangerous they were soon extinguished and things quickly reduced into a peaceable state and yet in the time of Marius such a Civil War begun as never left the Common wealth of Rome till it had in a great measure changed its Government And how it came to pass that the Factions in Rome were so deeply radicated that the Commonwealth could not be cured of it till it grew into an Empire under the Government of Augustus Caesar But before I come to the discussion of that enquiry it will be convenient for the application of what follows in this Discourse to premise something touching Factions in general what they are and what are so truly denominated And I must premise that the established Government of Kingdoms States or Commonwealths are of various frames and constitutions and those things may be lawful according to the constitution of one State which are neither lawful or tolerable according to the constitution of another State And therefore what I am about to say concerning Factions in a State must be understood with relation to that or the like State or Government whereof I write viz. the State of Rome as it stood in those times when these troubles broke out And this I mention to prevent misapplication and miss-interpretation of what I am writing By a Faction in a Commonwealth I do not mean that Government which is by Law or custom setled and therefore where the setled Government is Monarchical I do not take the adhering to the King a Faction or where the Government is Aristocratical or by a Senate as it was sometimes in Rome or mixt partly Aristocratical and partly popular as it was after the setling of the Tribunitia Potestas that established Government or the adherence to it was no Faction but it is so far from it that the adherence to the Government legally established whether it be Monarchical Aristocratical Democratical or mixed is the duty of every good Subject and Citizen But that which I call a Faction in a State is one of these ensuing kinds 1. When a party of men shall conspire and unite themselves against the established Government to subvert or alter it and this is the greatest Faction Crimen lesae Majestatis 2. When a party of men shall unite and confederate themselves together to gain either something to themselves or to others by force or fraud against the will and consent of that Power that by Laws is intrusted with the concession or denial thereof 3. When any person entrusted by the Sovereign power with a particular Power or Authority shall endeavour by force or fraud to extend that power wherewith he is entrusted beyond the bounds of it as if in the State of Rome the Tribunes should by stirring up the People or by force or secret confederacy encroach upon the power of the Senate or Consuls or è converso For though by the constitution of the Government they were invested with a just and real power yet when by violence or fraud they accroach a larger power this acoroachment is an act done by them as private persons and without the bounds and limits of their Authority and therefore in such an Enterprize they are no more excused from a Faction by their Authority that they had than if they were without any such Authority because they herein act beyond the bounds and without the warrant of that Authority and consequently as private persons 4. When two or more great and ominent persons or parties and it may be of a considerable interest in a State or Government engage one against another at first it may be privately and as opportunity grows it may be more openly and visibly crossing each other accusing publickly each other each party soliciting others to be of their party At length using discriminations of denominations or habits or signs and possibly in a little time publick affronts and rencounters And at last it may be open hostility and all this while the true real Governors of that State whether Monarch or Senate sit still and look on it may be out of fear of being oppressed by the power of both or either party it may be out of respect to some of the heads of either party it may be out of policy to suffer either party to worry and weaken and ruine one another hoping thereby to preserve the Government or it may be one of a weak and same and inconsiderate opinion contenting themselves with the name or external face tile and ensigns of Government and the professed respects of either party but not daring to interpose any acts of real authority to suppress or remedy those growing mischiefs fearing they should not be able to carry it through in respect of the potency of parties and so the true Governors stand by and look on contenting themselves with the complements and profession of subjection by both parties till at last one party getting the better of the other layes by the disguise of pretended Subjection and gives the Law to his lawful Governors and makes them do what he pleases or suffer what it inflicts And this commonly is the mischief that attends a Government that out of any the beforementioned respects suffer Factions to grow so great that at last
they become Masterless and either by conjunction of both parties or prevalence of one give the Law to their lawful Governors 5. When some particular persons that are or are not in any authority in a State or Commonwealth design some matter either for themselves or against any other and to effect that design do by secret means or power or fraud or otherwise draw over the power of that State wherein they live to be their Engines and Instruments under the countenance and signature of their authority to effect their Design For though the authority of the State is engaged therein yet that being obtained by the force fraud or other Engine and to serve the particular interest or end of a party and not acting according to the true and native freedom and integrity of their Institution excuseth not this from being really a Faction though sometimes it be speciously guilded over with the countenance of publick authority For instance Suppose Marius and Sylla two great leading men in Rome had a jealousie and animosity one against the other and Marius desires that Sylla be deprived of the Province allotted to him and that it be conferred on him On the other side perchance Sylla hath the like design against Marius Marius solicits by Bribes or Menaces as many of the Senate as he can prevail with to take his part and Sylla doth the like for his part The Senate is near divided Sylla procures some of the Senators of Marius's part to be sent away about some other employments and thereby Marius is over-voted and deprived of his Province then Marius makes in with the Tribunes solicits the people to be of his party and a tumult is thereby raised in the behalf of Marius and thereby and by those Friends of Marius that are of the Senate the former Decree is repealed and then Marius is restored to his own Province and also obtains Sylla's Province The next day Sylla who is potent in the Army complains of the wrong done him and engageth the Army for him whereby again both Tribunes and Senate are over-powered and the Senators of Marius's part withdraw themselves for fear of the Army and now Sylla carries it both with the Tribunes and Senate and re-obtains his own and Marius's province and perchance Marius sent into exile though here be the concurrence of the Governors in these vicissitudes Yet these are nevertheless but several Factions And this was most commonly the Discipline of the several Factions of Rome or if they that could get to have more interest or power with the people or with the Army or could make the more bold and daring part of the Senate though less in number to over-rule the greater part or if they were excessively loved or excessively feared or were subtle and crafty to fit either the People or the Senate to their Designs these were sure to have a countenance of Authority quickly for what they did so that in the vicissitudes of Factions and of their prevalence they never wanted a Senatusconsultum or a Plebiscitum to warrant what soever they did And in the mean time the favourers of the adverse party for fear or by-ends withdrawing themselves from the Senate or Assemblies and then the others did what they pleased in favour of their own Party And when it came to the turn of the other party to be uppermost the same method was commonly held the friends of the depressed with drawing themselves or sitting silent or changing their Suffrages and then all went smoothly the other way Whereby it came to pass that as Sylla at his return wanted not the Decree of the Senate to justifie all his Murders and Proscriptions so Marius at his return wanted not the like for his Murders and Proscriptions of the party of Sylla and the same vicissitudes obtained between Caesar and Pompey Brutus and Antonius Antonius and Octavius and for the most part the Factions of Rome whereof I have written were of this latter kind and managed under the shadow and umbrage of the Civil Authority though in their original they arose from the pride and ambition envy and emulations jealousies and designs disgusts and animosities of particular persons who could not brook any whom they suspected might be Rivals of their Greatness Honour or Power And these prevailing bore down the Magistracy of Rome before them and yet sooner or later grounded all their exorbitances under the stamp signature and countenance of the Authority of the established Governors Now though it may be true that these Decrees of the Authority established by Law though by this means obtained are binding while they stand in force yet the manner of obtaining such Decrees by these and the like means are unjust and factious and in true intrinsick justice do not excuse or justifie the obtainers thereof from oppression and injustice though they may possibly for the time be temporary projections of them when they continue unrepeated or unavoided Now a few words touching the second namely the Reasons why these Civil Wars broke out more abundantly and violently at this time than formerly It is true that the very Constitution and Make of such a Government as Rome had being partly Aristocratical and partly Popular and with some shadow of Monarchical Power in the Consuls renders such a State very powerful in relation to foreign Undertakings and Wars for foreign Engagements do concenter and unite a people and the Fabrick of such a State renders their power united against a foreign power and consequently more forcible formidable and for the most part successful the weight of the whole Body moving together in such foreign Enterprizes But on the other side these Forms of Governments have this Disease natural to them that they are unquiet and full of Factions among themselves especially when they have no foreign diversions Great Bodies they move slowly yet move they must and if the Mill have not Corn to grind the upper and nether Milstone will grind each other If we should suppose the supream Government had been only Aristocratical by a Senate consisting of three hundred persons Reason and Experience shews that Factions are apt to rise even in such a Council Much more when the common people were sharers also in the Government For first Commonly in such great Assemblies some particular persons are the leading men who think themselves intitled by their parts or reputation or interest to govern the Councils and that raiseth envy and emulalations in others who think they have as much reason to sway in supream Councils as others which presently engageth that Council in parties and Factions Again 2. It is commonly seen in such numerous Councils where they are supream and absolute some there are that drive on their particular interests offices and advancement of their Families and Relations and because others among them have the same designs for themselves which must needs cross and disappoint one another every one gathers and engageth as many as they can to carry
his lowest condition declared an Enemy to the State Brutus and Cassius in the vogue and esteem in Rome and seemed to ride upon the strength of the Common breath of popular applause and yet in this condition of Affairs Atticus assisted and protected the Family of Anthony with his Money and Interest in their lowest and deplorable condition And when the great men of the time began to look sowr upon him and complained quod parum odisse malos Cives Videretur That he was too favourable to the publick Enemies of the State yet he continued constant in his way and as our Author tells us rather thought it his honour for him to practice what was fit for him to do than what others would command And certainly this Constancy of Atticus to his Friends to Himself to his Principles was not only his Honour but his Safety all the World looking upon him as a common Benefactor to Humane Nature not changed nor shaken from his Goodness by any variety of Fortune A man that is unstable or tottering is loved by no man because he is not fit to be trusted but a man constant to worthy and generous Principles retains the like constancy of Esteem and Veneration from all men and together with his honour and esteem and worth commonly retains his safety and security in publick concussions And thus I have gathered out of the History of the Life of Atticus such things as seemed to me the great means of his unexampled peace safety honour tranquillity and happiness in a continued series of incomparable and matchless concussions and storms in the Roman State I shall conclude with these few general Observations upon his Life and with some Cautions touching it The Observations are these 1. That most certainly Virtue Goodness and Integrity is the best Policy and greatest means of Safety in the most dangerous times and places 2. That most certainly Virtue and Goodness and Integrity is the truest way for any man to gain true honour veneration and esteem among men it is more conducible than Riches and Armies and Triumphs and Victories 3. That as it is the truest way to get Honour so it is the best means to keep it because such an Honour hath not its dependence upon any thing without a man his Fortune Wealth Power or Success these are changeable and variable but a good wise and virtuous man carries the root and spring of his Honour in himself he shall never cease to be honoured till he cease to be good 4. That there is a secret veneration of Goodness and Virtue in all men even in the worst and vilest a man cannot so far put off Humanity but that Goodness Wisdom and Virtue will have so much of party and interest in his nature that he cannot choose but pay a secret approbation veneration and esteem to those that have it 5. That consequently Wisdom Beneficence Virtue and Goodness have a great connaturality to Humane Nature and are the true genuine Spirit or Genius of it and that it is so is evident 1. By the great good it procures to Humane Nature Honour and Safety and 2. By the great esteem that Mankind hath of it and the common interest it obtains in the common Nature of Mankind CHAP. XIV Touching certain Cautions to be used in the Observation and Imitation of the Life of Atticus in publick collisions of Factions WE have seen in the former Discourse not only the singular Virtue and Goodness of Atticus but also his admirable Safety in times of publick Factions and Commotions in the State of Rome And yet we may observe in his Life some things practised by him with great success and security which yet were things of great danger and hazard and possibly such as may not be undertaken or adventured upon by others and exceed the limits of common Example When a person is by the lawful supreme Authority of a State or Country declared a publick Enemy or a Traytor proscribed or banished ordinarily common humanity of all States allows of relief and support to his Wife Children Family Servants and dependents but for the most part if not always forbids supplies to be sent to the person thus proscribed or declared an Enemy or any communication or converse with him because though possibly it may be all done upon a personal account and intuitu personae without respect to his condition in relation to the Publick yet it cannot choose but be a support to him and a countenance of him whereby he may be enabled to gather new supplies or at least courage or encouragement for farther attemps to the promoting of his Faction Party or Designs And although in the Roman State those declarations of Enemies whether Marcus or Sylla or Brutus or Anthony or Pompey or Caesar were obtained by the prevalence and sollicitation of the adverse Party or Faction and were in a manner extracted from the Senate and People yet it is plain that according to the Constitution of the Roman Republick the supreme Authority was lodged in the Senate or Senate and People and therefore the publick Acts Decrees or Laws made by them were in force till repealed by the like Solemnity or Authority though perchance at first unduly obtained For such veneration is necessarily due to Laws or Constitutions enacted by the full supreme legislative legal power according to the true Constitution of the Civil Government that they are not to be rescinded by private persons upon their pretence of being unduly obtained till they are regularly avoided by the like legal power by which they were enacted or instituted And therefore a private person such as Atticus was or any other might be that should go about to relieve and supply Marius or Sylla Pompey or Julius Caesar Brutus or Anthony Octavius or Lepidus while they were under these publick Declarations or Proscriptions by the Civil Power of the Roman State according to the settled Laws of that State must needs be under a violation of the Law and subjected to the danger and inconvenience that ariseth from violations of publick Laws Besides it may seem this liberty taken by Atticus of relieving persons thus declared Enemies to the Commonwealth and holding such intimate correspondence with them neither became a good Citizen nor a good Man which according to the old standard of the Roman Morals was Qui consult a patrum qui leges juráque servat And therefore though the general Scheme of the Life of Atticus afford a prudent and good Example of Imitation especially in the like state of Affairs yet it were hard to make him a pattern of imitation in this particular of his supplies of Enemies so publickly declared by the true supreme power of the Roman State I say the true supreme power of the Roman State nor in his correspondence with them For it is so far from proving a man's safety that according to the usual Methods and Laws of Government it exposeth a man to the greatest danger and that
But Antony though he was carried with so great hatred against Cicero that he was not only an enemy to him but also to all his Friends and would banish them all yet many reminding him he remembred the good offices of Atticus and when one had enquired where he was he wrote to him with his own hand that he should not fear and that he should presently come to him that he had exempted him and Gellius Canius from the number of the banished And lest he should fall into any danger because it was night he sent him a Guard Thus Atticus in his greatest fear was a safeguard not only to himself but also to him whom he held most dear For he sought not only for his own safety but joyntly for others that it might appear that he would no Fortune of his should be disjoynted from his Friend Therefore if a Pilot deserves great praise that saves his Ship from the Storm and Rockie Sea why should not his singular prudence be valued which out of so many and so great Civil Storms came to safety And to discharge himself from these evils he did nothing else than to become an assistance to the most in what he could When the common people by the rewards of the Conqueror redeemed some of those that were banished none of the Banished came into Epirus to whom any thing was wanting and all that came thither had liberty of remaining there But also after the Battel at Philippi and the death of Cassius and Brutus He purposed to protect L. Julius Merilla the Pretor and his Son Aulus Torquatus and the rest that were stricken with the like Fortune and took order that to them all things necessary should be privately conveyed from Epirus to Samothracia It is difficult to reckon up all things he did and note such as are necessary to be remembred This one thing we would to be understood that his Liberality was neither temporary nor crafty That may be iudged by the things and times themselves that he commended not himself to those that were prosperous but always helped those that were in distress Who therefore respected Servilia the Mother of Brutus no less after his death than while he flourished Thus managing his Liberality he maintained no enmity because he neither injur'd any neither if he received any injury had he rather revenge than forget it With a never dying Memory he retained Benefits received but those which he did he only remembred so long as he continued grateful that had received them He did therefore so that it seems truly said Every man's Manners fashion to every man his own Fortune And yet he first fashioned himself before his Fortune who took care that in nothing he might be justly punished By these things he brought to pass that M. Vipsanius Agrippa one joyned to young Caesar in intimate familiarity who by reason of his own Favour and Caesar's Authority had a power upon persons of every condition did chiefly desire the affinity of Atticus and sued to have the Noble Daughter of this Roman Knight in Marriage and the maker of this Match was M. Antony the Triumvir of the Common-wealth by whose Favour when he might have increased his Possessions he was so far from the desire of Money that he used it in no other thing than in deprecating either the dangers or inconveniences of his Friends Which was eminent even under the very Proscription it self For whereas the Triumviri according to the custom whereby things were then managed sold the Goods of L. Sanfeus a Roman Knight his Equal who lived many years at Athens being thereunto led by the desire of Philosophy and had fair possessions in Italy By the Labour and Industry of Atticus it was brought to pass that by the same Messenger Sanfeus was informed that he had lost his Patrimony and re-obtained it again The same Atticus delivered Julius Claudius the most elegant Poet of this Age next after the Death of Lucretius and Catullus and a very good man well instructed in the best Arts who after the Proscription of the Roman Knights was for his large possessions in Africa brought into the List of the banished in his absence by P. Volumnius General of the Workmen of Antony which at present it is difficult to judge whether it was more painful or glorious for him to effect because it was known that Atticus had a care for his Friends in their dangers whether absent or present And this man Atticus was esteemed no less a good Father of a Family than a good Citizen for whereas he was full of money no man was less a Buyer or less a Builder And yet he dwelt very well and enjoyed all things of the best For he had a House in the Quirinal Hill left to him hereditarily by his Unkle whose pleasantness was not so much in the building as in the Groves adjoyning For his House being an ancient built House had more of Decency than of Cost wherein he changed nothing but what he was compelled to by its decay He had a Family that if we may judge by its profitableness was the best if by the form of it not mean for in it were most learned Youths excellent Clerks and many well read in Books that there was scarce a Foot-boy but could well do any of these businesses in like manner other Artificers requisite for houshold Affairs singular good And yet he had none of these but such as were born and taught in his House which is a sign not only of Continence but of Diligence For not intemperately to desire that which thou feest desired of many ought to be esteemed the sign of a continent person And to procure rather by diligence than purchase it of no small Industry He was neat not stately handsom not sumptuous he affected with all diligence a cleanliness without superfluity His Houshold-stuff moderate not much so that in it neither Extream appeared Neither shall I pass by this although I guess it may seem light to some Whereas he was a chief Roman Knight and did very liberally invite men of all Ranks to his House yet we know that he spent not monthly more than 3000 Aerii about 10 l. sterling and this we speak not by hear-say but of our own knowledge for by reason of our familiarity with him we were often present at his domestick Affairs No man in his Feasts heard any other Acroama than a Philosophical Lecture which we esteemed most pleasant neither did he ever sup without some philosophical Lecture that his guests might be delighted as well in their minds as in their appetites for he invited those whose manners agreed with his When so great an accession of Money happened to him he changed nothing in his daily deportment nothing in the custom of his Life And he used so great moderation that neither under the 200000 Sesterces or 6000 Crowns he had from his Father he carried himself less splendidly nor under the 100000 Sesterces or 30000