A REPLY TO THE ANSWER Printed by his Majesties Command at OXFORD to a Printed Booke Intituled OBSERVATIONS upon some of his MAIESTIES late Answers and Expresses By J. M. LONDON Printed for Matthew Walbancke Anno Dom. 1642. A reply to the Answer printed by his Majesties Command at Oxford to a printed booke intituled Observations upon some of his Maiesties late Answers and expresses THe Authour of the Answer to the Observator which was pâ—…inted aâ—…Oxford no place more fit to entertaine such cavils by his 〈◊〉 Command too good a Patron to be thus abused Begins his disâ—…urse by way of Preface and there would tell us the Originall of Regall Authority were it not a losse of time he has been to profuse prodigall of it in his Book he doth well to spare it in the Preface for that he sees t is granted to be at 〈◊〉 least mediately from God I shall not dispute whether God be the immediate donor of Royalty or no For I take it to be very cleare and evident that the Kings of Israel were of Divine instiâ—…tion But that Royall Authority should bee unto us or the sâ—…cceeding ages more of Divine right or Institution then Aristocraticall or Democraticall power that I deny 〈◊〉 were they of Divine institution it must of necessity be that all States must be fwayed and ruled by Kings and the execution of other power were sinne and that I hope 〈◊〉 man will dare to aâ—…rt Againe were they of Divine right they ought to have equall power and Dominion in all places and that they have not for as it is well known in some Kingdomes they have greater Authority in some lesse And all vary according to the severall Lawes and Constitutions of their Countries Why then if they bee of humane institution it must be agreed that no King hath at thiâ—… day any speciall Ordinance from Heaven by which to intitle himselfe to his Crowne and Regall authority And hence the consequence is just that Kings are bound by thâ—…se qualifications of compact and condition that were made with them by the people and ought to discharge and execute their Royall functions answerable thereunto But then he goes on anâ—… tels us that power or governement was oâ—…yned of God for the good of mankind which was not to bee obtained without preservation of order and therefore he hath commanded all to be subject to the Lawes of society not onely for wrath but for conscience sake With this limitation the Author saith true we must submitt to the Laweâ—… of society where they doe not oppose the Law of God otherwise not for how can a man obey for conscience against conscience And he saâ—…es we must submit not onely whilst we enjoy the benefit of Governors but 〈◊〉 whilst we dâ—…e suffer under some accidentall abuses I but what if those abusâ—… provâ—…â—…o be wilfull I know that is the Authors meaning though he will not expresse it for if his opinion miâ—…ht passe as Orthodox the cases would be all one I and what if thâ—…se abuses strike at our Religion at our lives libeâ—…ies and estates at all that God hath entrusted us with and made us happy in must wee here submitt and quietly surrender up all our happinesse at once a most strange Doctrine Well let him Preach it at Oxford to those whom a foolish zeale hath besotted with an unwarrantable devotion to their Soveraign But let us know that good subjects may preserve these yet not be the lesse but the more dutifull to their King Is it any breach of duty to deny that which the Law of God and my conscience tels mee that I ought not to grant or can that have the impuration of disloyalty to my Soveraigne which styles mee just before God well to passe this because I shall have occasion to speake more fully to it after those that maintaine this error misery will bee this portion here and a just judgement hereafter But he tels us that we cannot reape the constant fruits of an establâ—…shed policy unlesse by compâ—…ct we submit our selves to some possible inconveniences The Author would have done well to have explained 〈◊〉 what he meanes by those inconveniences bâ—…t 〈◊〉 this is his meaning for the whole sâ—…ope of his Booke speakes as mâ—…ch that it is possible a King may degenerate into a Tyâ—…ant and make his boundlesse Arbitrary will to be Law and if this fall out as too commonly it doth yet wee must patiently doe or sâ—…ffer what ever though never so unjustly and contrary to good conscience is imposed upon us and which is more wee must by solemne contract binde our selves beforehand this to doe and why so for that otherwise there can be no constant benefit of an established policy A most strange and unnaturall assertâ—…on was it ever heard or can it bee imagined that a people should contract to their owne ruine there is a mutuall compact betwixt King and People the King is to governe by a rule if he would have his people to obey and if he swerve from that this dissolâ—…es the contract and gives the people pâ—…wer to 〈◊〉 and preserve themselves And if this were not Law what benefit could we expect to reape of such an established destructive policy He hath made bad premiâ—…es and worse conclusion for marke what he has dâ—…uced from thence Hence saith he it followes after a people hath by 〈◊〉 contraâ—… divested it selfe of that power which was primarily in them they cannot upon what pretâ—…ce soever withoâ—…t manifâ—…st breach of Divine Ordinance and violation of publique saâ—…th resume that authority which they have placed in another This by the way power according to the Authors owne 〈◊〉 was primarily in the people a truth ingeniously acknowledged but the mischiefe 〈◊〉 they have by contract divestâ—…d themselves of that power how is that made good why thus they chose one to be King over them and contracted to obey him what in omnibus 〈◊〉 in all his commissions nothing lesse for that might be to disodey God and whether it bee lawfull to obey God or man judge you I but they have given him an absolute Authority and made him supreme and therefore not to be qâ—…stioned by â—…ny inferiour pâ—…wer and if this were true his Majesties counsell who too 〈◊〉 malâ—…ne â—…he haâ—…pinesse of King and peopâ—… and would worke oâ—… their owne 〈◊〉 desâ—…gnes by the ruine of boâ—…h wâ—…ld never have advised hâ—…s Majâ—…sty to have inserted this into many of his Declaratâ—…ons that his Royal power was committed unto him by God and the Law in trust for the well governâ—…ng and 〈◊〉 of his people committâ—…d to his charge And as a trust is for the benefit and behoofe of him for whose sake the convâ—…yance in trâ—…st was made nâ—…t of him who is the party intrusted So likewâ—…se every trust doth implâ—… a conditâ—…on that the party doe dâ—…ly perfâ—…rme and discharge thâ—… tâ—…st or if hâ—…e doe not that he bee 〈◊〉 so to doe Thâ—…s
hath a right of dissenting Confest out Author thinks hee hath here got a great advantage of us out of our owne confession why was it ever denyed that the Kings consent wâ—…s not necessary to the making of new lawes or to the altering or 〈◊〉 of the old Nay hath it not beâ—…ne agreed that his assent is so essentially necessary in such cases that if he will dissent as hee may nothing can be donâ—… without him why then a fortiori he shall have a nâ—…gative power where the alteration of thâ—… forme of Government is propoundâ—…d But he must understand that this doth no-way derogate or detract from the right of the Parliament in declaring the common law of the land in certaine cases before them without his Majesties consent for that that is a power incident to this great Court as well as others inferiour and in such case the King hath no negative voyce â—…xcept both King and people Heâ—…e saith hee a power is given to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and King If ever he make good this collection out of the Observators words I le râ—…nounce my understanding All that he 〈◊〉 to intimate unto us is but this that the changing of the auncient established forme of our Government is Casus omissus out of their Commission and therefore not to be accompliâ—…ed by them without the consent of both King and people 〈◊〉 doth not say that the Collective body may doe it without the consent of the 〈◊〉 Lords and Commons This happily might be a predominant power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consent is necessary for the introducting of a new frame of Government Now how this should be a transferring of a power to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and king I must confesse I apprehend not therefore the construction is either very forraigne or my capacitie extreame dull If the King be an affecter of true liberty he hath in Parliament a power as â—…xtensive as ever the Roman Dictators was for the preventing of publike dâ—…resses He saith that though the Romanes could not indure a King yet in effect they had the same thing for in any immiâ—…nt dangers necessitie of State forced them to chuse a Dictator which as he sayes had absolute power over them and to submit to his Authority which relieved them in their greatest extremities Hence he saith we may make the truest judgement what forme of Government the wisest Romanes esteemed most convenient And concludes that since they preferred the unbounded power of one to a popular sway we have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this Government c. May all the blessings of Heaven and Earth-inrich and incompasse his Royall Scepter May he for ever enjoy the utmost limit of his just and legall power And may this happy glo rious succesefull and never sufficiently to be encomiasted Government continue without the least interruption amongst us untill time hath spent its last period and brought a dissolution and finall conclusion on all things And I take him to be no true and faithfull member of the Common Wealth that will not say Amen If the Counsell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation If the Councell of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation That the Parliament and Court should be at varience t is no news there hath beene alwayes a secret enmity and antipathy bâ—…twixt them The Court never well digesting the happinesse and freedome os 〈◊〉 people nor they the oppression and publique disservice of the Court the one still contending for an absolutenesse of 〈◊〉 the other for the maintenance and desending of their liberty But I nâ—…ver heard before that the Counsell or advise of the Court was opposed to that of the Parliament or could any way ballance with that doubâ—…lesse they are not equâ—…ll competitors the Parliament represâ—…nt the publique and those counsellors themselves onely the one studies to augment the Common wealth the other their owne wherefore he is perfidious to himselfe and treacherous to hâ—…s countrey that can be so transported with words as to renounce the Parliament for my part I shall lay it down as one of the Articles of my beleife that the Counsell of â—…he Court is directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament evidently consonant thereunto good cause then of contestation in defence of 〈◊〉 publike The Observator having laid it downe as a ground that 〈◊〉 câ—…nnot reasonably be supposed the greatest counsell of the Kingdome should not giâ—… the most faithfull advise adds thereâ—…ore Princes if they may not be lead by their owne opinions rather than by the sacred and awefull counsells of whole Nations unreasonably complaine they are denied liberty of conscience and 〈◊〉 out of their owne undeâ—…standings I appeale to any mans judgment whether any thing can be â—…ged for the authority of a Lay councell that it 〈◊〉 to inâ—…orce a submission of judgment and a performance of duties arising from trust agreable thereâ—…o which may not with at least equall advantages be pressed for the same binding power in councels Eccleciasticall And yet theâ—…e he saith it would go hard but a man would find some answer as easily he mighâ—… wherby to iustifie his liberty of dissenting in some things which he saies we may with very little alâ—…eraton apply to civill counsells I confeâ—…e this is a point more 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 by a Divine than a Lawyer but t is 〈◊〉 frequent with me to trespasse upon another mans profession 〈◊〉 give me â—…ave a little that our Author may not passe uâ—…nswered to speake my 〈◊〉 in this perticular Now with the favour of the Author if my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 me not there is a wide 〈◊〉 as to our case betweâ—…ne lay and 〈◊〉 Counsells For I take this for a â—…rtaine and cleare truth in dâ—…vinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 counsell whatsoever be it of never so great ability or eminency 〈◊〉 oblige the conscience of a man by their dicisions or determinations for thâ—…t the conscience of a man is if I may so speake out of their jurisdiction t is God alone that hath power over that Besides he that opposes the dictates of conscience sins against God The Apostle in the 14. to the Rom. Shewing how men ought not to contemn or condemn one another for things indifferent sayes in the 5. verse one man esteemeth one day above another another estâ—…emeth every day alike let every man be fully perswaded in his owne minde By this t is manifest I ought not to be guided by the conscience of other men Againe ver. 14 there is nothing saith he uncleane of it selfe but â—…o 〈◊〉 that
as now or an unexpected interposing providence as in case of the Gunpowder ploâ—… may prevent the blow shall we therefore conclude it was never oflâ—…red It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had beene frighted with secret plots and 〈◊〉 designes Douâ—…tlesse those whome apparent and visible dangers will not frighten secret and concealed cannot The King might have prevented the same repulse by sendâ—…ng of a messenger before hand That is if he had not come to gâ—…t in he had not bâ—…ene shut out if he would have stayed away he would not have denyed hâ—…m entrance A very apt conclusion and it had bâ—…ene happy his Majestie had found so good advise as to have saved hiâ—… labour Or by comming without any such considerable forces Let his forces be great he was not to give law to his Prince No nor any privie Counsell to the Parliamâ—…nt Bâ—…t nâ—…ither is it likely â—…ee would have â—…ave admitted him then for you 〈◊〉 a litâ—…le above 〈◊〉 offered to enter with twenâ—…y Horse only unarmed Whether his Maâ—…esty mâ—…de any such profer or no I know not nor is iâ—… materiall for t was not the paucitie of number th t could excuse his breach of trust The Scots in England tooke Newcastle but by private authority yet there wâ—…re other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The king and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an act of Oâ—…livion T is no wrong either to King or Parliament for a man to say that is no treason which they have adjudged not to be so Neither is that act of theirs so to be buriâ—…d in utter silence as not to acquit and discharge us if we can plead the same innocency Then the Observator instances at large in the example of â—…dward the second misted by 〈◊〉 It doth not â—…llow because one king hath hearkned to evill Counsâ—…ll therefore all must be denyed the liberty to hearken to good That is true but it doth clearely demonstrate thus much that oâ—…hers may be misled as well as he and when a Parliament shall declare as now that the King is misled by evill Counsell t is not your bâ—…re 〈◊〉 that can make good the contrary 〈◊〉 pâ—…tie was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the scales and ballancing their râ—…putations What odds may be gained in point of estate I know not though I am 〈◊〉 there will be nothing lost But without controversie their reputations cannot be very good whose cause and counsell is so bad An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withâ—…ut some meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted than not to perceive what is so obvious deny the King a negative and the thing is done Had the Parliament as in truth they never did denyed the King a negative yet the Author who pretends to be so quick sighted would find it a matter of greater weight and difficulty than to be so easie compassed and effected The power of the Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tyranny a mongst us is not disceâ—…able It is not thought this was the intent of those that intrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs for though their power depend upon a publike consent in the election yet not so after they are met together If the power of Parliament be meerely derivative as it cannot bee denyed and that not absolute and illimitâ—…d but qualified and circumscribed as it must bee agreed why then the consequence is very just that where they doe exceed that power this doth not â—…gage the consent and obedience of the people why then without â—…e shall allow that the peoples vote and consent may be had which is so far from improbable that it is almost impossible we may here judge what an idle fancie and vaine dreame this is of their labouring to introduct an Aristocracy He sayes that He believes they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdome Our Author must vent his contumacious and opprobrious conceipts against the Parliament though they be a contradiction to his owne reason What are their severall relations compared with the publike or what advantage can thâ—…r power of preferment yeeld them since but few can attaine to that in the ingaging of a whole Kingdome to erect so unlawfull and oidous a tyranny His Majesty expresses his indignation that they should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him To which the Observator answers This cannot bee collected from these words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modestie and duty because sayes he it may justly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the deposing of any king of England What was there asfirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of free in it What though it had not any candid and ingenious reader would supply it by a faire intendment we ought not to stand upon our captions with the Parliament whose words and actions ought if we will be guided by the rule of law to receive the most honourable and favourable construction of us Whâ—…refore we ought not so critically and unjustly to imagine when they doe generally mention the highest presidents of other Parliaments that they doe include forced parliaments because as they well know these are not presidents for free Parliaments to bee guided by And doe they not by their Declaration dated the second of November 1642. which I make no question the Author had a view of before the publishing of his booke say that in that Declaration to which this objection refers they delivered that they did never so much as suffer this to enter into their thoughts And further that some presidents were such as that they ought not to be rules for them to follow which very reasonably and probably might intend those of deposing Kings How dare then the Author though not expresly yet tacitly accuse the Parliament of being guilty of the maintaining that position contrary to their owne publike profession and vindication But I passe itover and leave him to his just censure He sayes that the King is offended
good an innocents oppugning of the sword of Justice to rescue his owne life I dare confidently asfirme not the least title to this purpose No a man ought to discharge his Covenant though it be to his disadvantage And ruat Coelum fiat 〈◊〉 though heaven itselfe if it were possible should be destroyed yet let justice â—…ourish That were a way to open a gap for all disorder and breach of rule and society without which no common wealth can be of long subsistance If thou suffer unjustly God will abundantly remunerate thy sufferings and repay it upon the head of thine enemies wherefore much better it is for thee to submit to thy censure by patience than to incurr the breach of all society by dâ—…sobedience I but saith the Author If reason will not satisfie perhaps 〈◊〉 may Qâ—…i 〈◊〉 potestati ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt to resist the Magistrate 〈◊〉 And he saith that answer with which too many are deceived cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion this 〈◊〉 obliges private men but not Magistrates Since inferiour Magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as pirvate men and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to 〈◊〉 T is not usuall with mee to intrenâ—…h upon another mans profession but seeing I am here inforced to it give me leave a little to sayle out of my way to answer the Author First for the taking up of Armes or the waging of a warre in generall I never heard any man oppose the legâ—…timation of that warre that had these three requisites or ingredients A lawfull authotity commanding 〈◊〉 as the â—…agistrate A just and lawfâ—…ll end or cause occasioning it as the defence of our Religion liberties and the like And a good affection in following of it as not with rashnesse or temeritie but after all other meanes sirst endeavoured And now I appeale to any indifferent man whom neither feare nor affection hath ingaged to the contrary whether all these are not exactly made good in this great â—…taking of the Parliament I but saith the Author how doth this anâ—…wer the taking up of armes against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King for 〈◊〉 all o her 〈◊〉 are but as private men compared with him To this I â—…nswer 〈◊〉 under he Aâ—…ors favour â—…he suprâ—…am power as I have made it good before is the people represented by a Parliaâ—…ent and then no doubt that precept of the Apostle comprehending the King aswell as other persons doâ—…h according to his owne Argument justifie he Parliament in their proceedâ—…s and make good â—…heir taking up of Armes in their owne just defence I but hen the Author 〈◊〉 hat of the Apostle that the Magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum Gods minister to thee 〈◊〉 thy good and though thou suffer by him unjusty yet there he is 〈◊〉 in bonum for that by thy patient suffering thou shalt thereby gaine an eternall reward Cerâ—…inly God never made Magistrates on purpose to aâ—…ict and 〈◊〉 over their pâ—…ople thâ—…t they by patient 〈◊〉 might enjoy the greâ—…ter happinâ—… hereafter No that they provâ—… corrupt issues from hemselves not from any divine determination and therefore if the Mâ—…gistrate doe prove to be Minister nobis in malum a Minister to thee â—…or thy ill he is not then 〈◊〉 minister Gods Minister for that he doth transgresse and goe beyond his commission and in such case under the favour of M. Doctor Ferne conscience doâ—…h not only deny obedience but command and justifie 〈◊〉 But in all this conceive me 〈◊〉 t is the magistrates not any 〈◊〉 opposition that I justifie and this being undertaken with the due circumstance is not a meanes to destroy order and societie but maintaine them But yet I hope our Auâ—…hor will be here informed that this is not our case For doe we take up armes against our Soveraign may he perish who in his thoughts intends him the least ill No t is as the Parliament have often declared against his Malignant Councellors such who endeavour whatever their 〈◊〉 may be to his Majesty the subversion of our Religion and the destruction of the publike And I hope there is nothing in the word of God that opposeth this O yes in opposing hâ—…s authority you fight against him Strange if it should be so when neither the law of God nor man do oblige obedience to commands unlawfull He that obeyes the magistrate upon such termes doth it at his owne perill and I hope t is lawfull for the Parliament to depresse any civill or private combustion I but what if that authority have the Kings person accompanying it may you in such case make resistance No question we may for t is not the person of the King that can legitimate an action that is in it selfe unlawfull nor adde any greater force or vigour to their Commission that obey Besides the personall presence of the King doth or doth not countermand his authority if it do countermand his authority then they have no power to warrant their actâ—…on if it do not yet the act is 〈◊〉 So then let them take their choise they see their termes Unhappy people who having committed themselves to the government of one King onely might not oppose the unlawfull and tyrannicall regiment of so many It being in effect objected as appeares befoâ—…e That a â—…emporall power meaning the Parliament cannot bee greater than that which is lasting and unalterable intending the King Is this were so saith the Observator the Romanes have done impolitickly in creating Dictators when any great extremity assayled them and yet we know it was very prosperous to them sometimes to change the â—…orme of government Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger to trust to a Monarchy not 〈◊〉 Aristocâ—…y and much lesse to a Democracy What have we to do with Aristocracy or Democracy God be blessed we nor know nor desire any other government than that of Monarchy and we shall with all hâ—…mility cast our selvs upon his Majesties care and providence guided by his Parliament But if sedâ—…ced by malignant and destructive Counsell we are not bound to yeeld our selves as a prâ—…y to the ranâ—… and malice of his and our enemies The King objects if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than Councellors wee make them Comptrollers and this is not â—…ble to Royalty To which the Observator answers 〈◊〉 say saith he that to coâ—…t is more than to counsell 〈◊〉 yet not aâ—…es so much as to command and comptroll True saith the Author not alwayes but then it is when their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impose a necessity upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 the like Doth their consent impose a greater necessity or ingagement upon the King than the consent or declaration of law in cases of publike conâ—…nt by former Parliaments hath done or than the judgement of his Judges in inferiour Courts doâ—…h do who are so Counsellours for the King as that the King may
his Majesty for the ordering of the Militia according to their advise â—…or the better security of his people and His Majestiâ—…s negative returne unto them before they according to their duty undertooke in his Majestiâ—…s and his people behalâ—…e the trust and maâ—…age of the same And now it must be in their power to command men 〈◊〉 horses seise on all the Ammunition send for what supples of money they thinke necessary for the repelling those dangers This is but a consequence of the other it were but in vaine to lay a foundation if they had not power â—…o raise the Structure I but here wee are fallen backe againe into what we so much complained of Arbitrary poweâ—… 'T is much that one who pretends to be Mâ—…ster of his reason should be thus mistaken Then belike all proceedings in cases according to equity and necessity which justice requireth should not be regulated by the strickt rule and severity of law as not being within the intention of it for that such constructive might prove destinction to the rule is a prosecution of an arbitrary power The manage of a businesse in case of necessity neede not keepe correspondence and agreement with the rule neithâ—…r that to be stileâ—… Arbitrary which necessitâ—… makes lawsull Was not this the very case of Ship-money there likewise was a pretence of danger and necessity and none so compelent a judge of this as the King and therefore for the securing of the people money must be immediatly raised without the Subjects consent With the Authors favour these cases do no way runne parallel for will it therefore follow that because the King cannot upon no pretence whatsoever take away the Subjects propâ—…rty without their consent that the Parliamâ—…ent may not take it with their conâ—…ent Most inconsequent The Parliament represent the people which the King doth not And therefore their conclusions do 〈◊〉 â—…he people whâ—…ch the Kings cannot But then he presles an Argument that was made against the ship-money which he saith will hold in our case It was then laid downe as a sure 〈◊〉 of reason that it was better for the Kingdome though it were in reall danger in arena 〈◊〉 capere to 〈◊〉 for it selfe as well as it wâ—…s able by a suddaine defence than that the King should prâ—…vide such a remedy which would be so easily so â—…quently abused upon every preâ—…ence of dâ—…nger to pâ—…event such an evill which could extremly seldome oâ—… almost never hapâ—…en for an Army and Navy could not be so 〈◊〉 provided but that we must have some intelligence of it So 〈◊〉 â—…aith in case of the Militia better suffer it in the old waâ—… and the Kingdome 〈◊〉 for it selfe in case of 〈◊〉 than to 〈◊〉 the hazzard of the 〈◊〉 abuse of it to the putting of the Kingdom into a combustion upon I know not what vaine pretences I beleive the Author preached a quite contrary Doctrine before the Parliâ—…ment O the power and vertue of this great Assembly that can so Metamorphize men as to makâ—… thâ—…m spâ—…ak accoâ—…ding to the dictate of reasâ—…n not affâ—…ction But for his Argument the ground of the obâ—…ection that was laid down against the Ship-money was the possible frequent abuse that might be of such a remedy upon eveâ—…y pretence of danger which without controversie carries a great deale of wait with it And when our Aâ—…thor can make it good as he hâ—…th strongly 〈◊〉 but much failed in it that a Communitâ—… maâ—… have those many private ends to mislead it that a King may then shâ—…ll we agree that the cases do in reason parrallel untill then we must â—…ell him thâ—…t there is â—…oure hundrâ—…d to one against him I 〈◊〉 the world judge whether the 〈◊〉 Sir Iâ—…hn Ho hams act Treason be not contrary to the cleareâ—…t 〈◊〉 of humane reason and the â—…trongest inclinations of nature for every private man may defind himselfe by force if 〈◊〉 though by the force of his Majestrate or his owne 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be not without all confidence by flâ—…ght Sir Iohn Hothams seising upon the Kings Towne and Ammunition was it seemes in his own defence who assaulted him Did his Majesty drive him into Hull No But his Mejesty would have driven him out he being possessed of it by the Authority of Parliament for the securing of him and his people And though it be not lawfull for a Subject to seise a towne in his owne defence yet having got it by a lawfull authority he may defend himselfe and it against any assault by the same power Neither can any other extrajudiciall power or command discharge him of that trust which was committed to him in a legall and judiciall way by another What can he thinke of the Gunpowder Traytors was their resistance a just defence Then certainely every rebellion is a just warre His conclusion is very just For questionles there can be no warre unlawfull if their resistance were a warrantable defence But I hope the Author will give us leave to tell him that the cases are more different then a Papist and a Protâ—…stant they agree in somewhat the cases in nothing for they had neither lawfull cause nor sufficient authority on their side to maintaine resistance as Sir Iohn Hotham had Againe they were Traytours before by their horrid unnaturall and cruell attempt But I hope Sir Iohn Hothams bare seising of the Towne could not proclaime him Traytor But enough of this in a case so manifest He may as soone convince a man of common sense that black and white are the same colour as that these cases runne parallel Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard being uncapable of flight must yeeld their throats and submit to Assassinates if their King will not allow them defence There is a great difference betwixt a Subjects defending of himselfe and offending his King His feaâ—…es are over witty if they will not permit him to thinke himselfe safe except he get into one of the Kings Forts for his better security Without question he that may defend may offend for how is it possible that I should defend my selfe if I may not offend my enemy What a sensles thing and void of reason is it to mainetaine that Subjects may take up Armes to defend themselves against the unlawfull Tyranny of their Prince but yet upon his approach they must not use any hostile act but stand like so many stocks immoveable what is this but opposiâ—…um in objecto a flâ—…t contradiction or a taking up of Armes in iest to make me capable of losing my life in earnest If this were all we could doe the most facile way for wicked Princes to accomplish their ends would be â—…his by Tyranny and oppression to ingage the people in this imaginary defensive warre thereby to disarme them and force obedience to their unjust desires or slay them with their owne weapons But to passe this If a King shall take up armes
to dâ—…stroy his people no question law reason and pollicy will warrant their seising of â—…ny fort or publique place of defence for their owne better security See if we are not left as a Prey to the same bloody hands as have done such diabolicall exploits in Ireland c. If we may not take up armes for our owne safety or if it be possible for us to take up armes without sâ—…me â—…otes or Ordinances to regulate the Militia Subjects upon invasiâ—…n would not have wanted Commission to take up armes But upon a civill combustion they might Hee that will give me power to fight against his enemy will not give me authority to oppose himself but doubtlesse this is no rule in the Politiqâ—…es for a man first to receive one blow and then to stand upon his guard to keepe off the second better by a vigilant providence to prevent both or to expect an invasion and then be to â—…eke our Commission enemies are more easie kept out than thâ—…y can be repelled when they are once in I but he saith this would be of ill consequence to subjects if they might have power to take up armes as often as ambitious cholerick men for their own ends shall perswade thâ—…m they are in danger For by this meanes being easily deceived whilest they endeavour to avoyd false they would run them selves beadlong upon true perils Thâ—…se ambitious men which he himselfe knowes not and these pretended dangers because he himselfe feares not have a strong influence upon the Authors whole booke T is very much that the reason and senses of a whole Nation should be so easily captivated But t is his onely plea and therefore you must give him leave to make use of hiâ—… prâ—…tences or you bid him silence Well to tell our Author once for all as no man can or will justifie a pretended cause of feare so no man can condemne a reall And without he will say that there can be no cause of feare without he be privy to it this aspersion is by no meanes to be suffered for by this we shall never know how to beleeve that we are in danger for that true feares may be blasted with the ignominie of feined and pretended carry the visage of true The King sayes the Parliament denyes c. to whether now in this uncertainty 〈◊〉 the subjeâ—â— bounded to adhere Wee may consider whether the Houses doe not barely say and whether his Majesty doth not descend so farre as to give reasons for what â—…e doth and to shew the Kingdome the ground of his actions by perticular citation of the Lawes which justifie them What the two Houses of Parliament barely say then belike if his suffrage be of any account they prove or make good nothing Was ever age guilty of so great irreverence or of offering so greaâ—… an afforoâ—…t anâ—… in â—…ignity to this great Assembly Of whom as the law saith we ought not to imagine a dishonourable thing much lesse to speake it I am confident that all Historiâ—…s that ever were cannot give you one example of so high disdaine and presumption What the two Hoâ—…ses barely say He hath a great measure of confidence that dare say it for my part I dare not returne the contrary but I leave it to the whole woâ—…ld to judge whether that they do not exactly prove and maintaine their owne assertion and utterly disprove and destroy the contrary objections and conclusions I but saith the Author we ought to agree whether swerâ—…ing from law be to be judged by the actions or by the auâ—…hors that is if the King should â—…ave done what ever they did and the Houses what ever he did whether all would not thâ—…n have beâ—…n lâ—…gall because don by them Certainly t is no good way of iudging to conclude the legality or illegality of an action from the Author or Actor t is the applying of the rule to the action that denominates it eithergood or bad However we ought not totally to reject these circumstâ—…nces of place and persons for no doubt that in some cases may be lawfull for one that will not be lawfâ—…ll for another And it is more than probable that the Parliament may in many cases have a more extensive powâ—…r than the King However certaine I am that it is but charity in our Author to grant them his beleife that they will not approve or maintaine that in themselves which they condemne as illegall in his Majesty The King doth not desire to captivate any mans understanding to his authority but is willing to make all the world the judge of his actions And have the Parliament withheld any thing that might give satisfaction to the people Neither â—…s a blind ob diencâ—… a part of any mans duty to the Houses Hee who after so great lâ—…ght and evidence of the integrity and justice of the Parliaments proceedings shall say he obeyes he knowes not upon what grounds may justly be concludâ—…d to be Non compos mentis robbed of his senses Some things he saith are matter of fact here we may be guided by senseâ—… and judge as wee see With the Authors favour this to an ordinary capacity may be a dangerous way of determining for though wee must alwayes judge according to the outward sâ—…nse in matter of fact yet wee must have this caution that we gâ—…e no further as for instance If I see one enter and seisea Castle or fort of the Kings put the case Hull that he did enter that my sense directs mee to discerne but whether he keepe the possession for or against the King that is examinable upon other circumstances and is matter of law depending upon reason and judgement and this every ordinary capacity cannot judge of But saith he this every one may â—…udge of whether the King hath seised on any thing wherein the subject hath a property That 〈◊〉 thupon the â—…ower and priviledges of Parliament the best evidence to maintaine the title that we have to â—…ll that ever we enjoy Or whether that the Subject hath not seized on something wherein the King hath a property That we must yeeld affirmative to that the Subject hath not seized on the Kings property but it is to his use and behoofe for the securing of him and his people So that the King looseth nothing but both gaine protection and safety thereby Whether the King hath raised warre against the Parliament that is whether his guard was an Army A very strang and unusuall guard of 15000. or 20000. And whether Hull is now London Very manifect it is not but the forces that â—…ound no bâ—…tter successe approaching London may for ought I know make a speedy retreat to Yorke againe Wee had a Maxime and it was grounded upon nature and never till this Parliament withstood tâ—…at a community can have no private ends to mislead it and make it injurious to it selfe True in a staâ—…e where a collective bodâ—… 〈◊〉 and
esteemeth any thing to be uncleane to him it is uncleane by this likewise it is cleare that what my conscience perswâ—…des mee is unlawfâ—…ll be the judgement of other men what it will ought not to be inforced upon mee Againe the last verse He that doubteth is damned if he eate because he eateth not of faith for whatsoever is not of faith is finne So that for my part I take it as an unquestionable â—…ruth that no Ecclesiasticall authority whatsoever hath power over a mans conscience though it be but in things indifferent But now on the other side I take it to be as evident and as 〈◊〉 an assertion that any Lay counsell may in 〈◊〉 meerely civill or morall no way reflecting upon the word of God oblige the conscience which indeed is but the bare opinion and judgement of a man by their conclusions and determinations and in such ease t is no sin for a man to oppose his owne reason by submission to the judgement of oâ—…hers And if this were not a truth Justice would be but slow payed and the law as various as the severall dispositions of men and every man would have power to infringe the law upon every 〈◊〉 of opposition to conscience 〈◊〉 but the Author goes on and tells us that though amongst probable Aâ—…guments that drawne 〈◊〉 the Authority of wise men carry with it greatest weight yet it must give place to a greater reasoâ—… T is â—…rue where the greater or better reason is evident but 〈◊〉 are not bound to renounce our owne understanding and to believe that to be the better reason which you affirme to be so The Parliament must in strength of probability give the better reason and when you can prove the contrary which as yet you fall much short of then shall we be of your beliefe untill then you must give us leave to retaine our owne Now to every man belongs a judgement of 〈◊〉 which must decide for what concernes his perticular duty T is true where he is sole Arbiter and where it coâ—…cernes his owne particular onely but where the publique is interested there it is otherwise So hee â—…aith in the Kings case The Votes which carry in them the authority of of both Houses shall beare great sway and is it be in things extreamely dubious they may turne the Scales of the other â—…ide This truth if firmely stood to as it ought would suddainely perâ—…d this sad contestation But alas how quickly t is broken For he saith if greater reason seeme to contradict them his Majesty will not hoodwinke his understanding and blindly â—…ollow whether they please to lead him he will walke by the greater light greater reason very much that the reason of the Court should preponderate that of the Parliament For example he saâ—…h 〈◊〉 Majestie perceiving how much his people may suster under arâ—… power is resolved never to make use of it and thâ—…nks it lesse fitting any other should I would to God hâ—…s Majestic had never been wrought upon by his evill Counsell to break his resolution Is it not an arbitrary way of rule for to takâ—… away mens property without their consâ—…nt And is iâ—… not arbitrary for the King to preâ—…e his owne single exâ—…udiciall judgement before that of his Parliaments But it is told him now the use of it will bee for their good by reason of appâ—…ent imminent dangers Hath the Author thus informed his Majestie certainly never any one else did it were happy both for King and people that it were no more practised by tâ—…e Court than it is by the Parliamenâ—… Concerning the Action at Hull the Observator agreeth to take possâ—…ssion of the Kings Towne and shuâ—… the gates against hâ—…m is treason if circumstances doe not vary the nature of the act as in this case he sayes thâ—…y doe for the first thing to be lookt on is that the King was meerely dâ—…ed enâ—…ance for that time his generall right was not denyed If then a subject take up 〈◊〉 against his Soveraigne in a tâ—…mporall warre it must not come 〈◊〉 the compasse of 〈◊〉 No whether it be temporary or coâ—…nuing so he hath the same Commission to justifie his action And he may legâ—…lly possesse 〈◊〉 of the Kings 〈◊〉 and maintaine them against him so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath no 〈◊〉 in them T is not his confessing that he hath no right for that all thâ—… world can judge of but his doing no wrong that excuses him No deâ—…ing language was given If a man take away my puâ—…se shall he be acquitted from â—…elony because he did not give mee ill language too Inventio tua nomen imponit operi 〈◊〉 t is the invention as we say in law that denominates the action And therefore though I cannot acquit him of felony that shall take away your purse and in exchange give you only good words yet if he shall rescue your purse out of the hands of Robbers or take it from your ownâ—… person being in danger for its better security and shall againe faithfully â—…ore it when you have liberty to enjoy your owne if he be felon 〈◊〉 dye for him No act of violence was used This he may say who hath picked anothers pocket but it is no sufficient plea against the Law Yes if he can shew a lawfull commission for it 〈◊〉 he used no violence though the King for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 together did stand within Musket sâ—…t c. It is no argument of innocence that he had 〈◊〉 to be more highly guilty and abstained T is true had he beene guilty at all The King used termes of desyance c. and this makes the Act mâ—…ely desensive or rather passive If this were true there was never any warre but defensive For those who by some great injustice oâ—…ed provoke a nation to right it sâ—…e fight aswell to maintaine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as what they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that offer any injustice or wrong though they take up aâ—…mes to secure themselves 〈◊〉 on the offensive pâ—…t nâ—…t the defensive But this rests to prove in our case How 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 to the King any grounds to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yorke many men wonâ—… or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seeme the same 〈◊〉 to the King as if he had beene pursued to the gates 〈◊〉 â—…ke Certainly it was a 〈◊〉 ground not only to raise a guard for his safety but an Armie to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aâ—…d to right his 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 for his safety why Sir 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not advance towards York nor ever〈◊〉 â—…sed it An army to punish thâ—…t hâ—…gh indignity Very just it should be sâ—… had there beene 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to right his 〈◊〉 veâ—…y reasonable had his Maâ—…esty been any way dishonoured 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Townesmen out of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 who acts only by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
Paramount in every mans private property and so if occasion require may call for a part for the preservation of the whole and upon such termes he is unwise that will not freely disburse it yet it doth not therfore follow that this is seized by the same right that the Forts Castles are which are meerely for the publike defence and security For the Kingdom hath a peculiar proper interest in the one which it hath not in the other And though necessity may justly demand both for the Publique safety yet it is the proper worke and office of the one not soof the other That there is an Arbitrary power in every state somewhere t is true t is necessary no inconveniencefollows upon it If he mean by arbitrary a lagistative power this is granted yet not to part but the wholebody But what if one part do desert the other and refuse to concurre with hâ—…m must that 〈◊〉 still and do nothing But hee sayes this speakes not to the case for still they give us a certaine rule to live by And do not the Parliament do the same No law can be all equity nor all equity Law for so the one would confound and destroy the other but there must be a certaine rule upon which to make this equitable construction Why now I appeale to any one that knowâ—… any thing of the justice of their proceedings whether that they have not often laid downe this as an unquâ—…ionable position that the King by his Prerogative hath the sole ordering of the 〈◊〉 of the Forts Castles and Magazine throughout the Kingdome why then hâ—…re is your certaine rule to live by onely they make this equitable qualification of it and I must say that it were no just law if it would not admit of this construction that in case where 〈◊〉 Kingdome is in imminent danger of for reigne invasion or civill combustion and that the King seduced by evill and Malignant Counsellours will not receive their advise and Counsell for the securing of the same in such caâ—… they who are intrusted with the publike may seize the Forts and Magazine and 〈◊〉 the Militia for his Maâ—…esties and his peoples safety and preservation And doth this any whit destroy the rule Nay rather doth it not mainetaine and support it I but he saith that he is to justifie there is such a Paramount Law which shall make other lawes truely Oracles that is capable of contrary meanings so that now a man may be justly punished for doing such a thiâ—…g because he hath disobeyed the letter of the law a weeke after he shall be justly punished too for noâ—… doing of the same thing because he hath disobeyed the equity of the law This I shall justifie and yet let me tell the Author that this is no forcing or stâ—…ayning the lawes to contrary meaning but onely a Declaration of the true intention of them The Statuâ—…e de frangentibus prisenam doth enaâ—…t that it shall be felony for a prisoner to breake prison the prison by accident is set on fire tâ—…e prisoners may in such case break prison for the salvation of their lives and are no felons and yet this is against the expresse letter of the Statute and shall wee in such case say that this is a contrary meaning to the law No wee may not t is cleerely agreeable with the intention of it Agaâ—…ne the sole power of ordering of the Militia doth by the law reside in the King and if in time of peace and securâ—…ty the King duely discharging of his trust any one shall dare to execute any other Commission and by vertue of that shall traine muster or discipline any 〈◊〉 his Majesties subâ—…ects without his authority there hee is justly punishable as offending against the letter of the law But now on the other side if in time of publique distraction and feare of invasion from abroad or of civill and intestine combustion within the King shall refuse to hearken to the Counsell of his Parliament and shall listen to such advise as being followed mâ—…y prove the utter ruine and destruction of the Common-wealth In such case if they shall take upon them for to order the Militia for the securing of his Majesty and people and shall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commissions to that purpose those that in sâ—…ch case shall disobey may be punished for not submitting to the equity of the law And yet still this is no contradiction or contrary â—…eaning to the law but an eqâ—…itable just â—…planation according to the intâ—…ntion of it And if this will not give the Author satifaction for my part I thinke nothing will I but then he cites us Aristotle which saith Those lawes are with greatest prudence 〈◊〉 shed which dâ—…fine most cases and which leave nothing which possibly may be determined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 breast of the judge And the Author gives the reason of it for that to leave an ample and large construction according to equity unto Iudges may be a meanes to satisfie corrupt ends T was a wise saying of Aristotle and no doubt t is a very admirable rule and direction for all legistative powers to make such lawes that might be their owne exposâ—…ours and that might if it were possible extend to all cases â—…hat so the selfe respect or corrupted judgement of their interpreters might not through the dubious ample or various sense of them be satisfied But since it is impossible for them so 〈◊〉 sorsee and inlarge the law but they must of necessity lâ—…ave some câ—…ses unprovided for and some incertaine which must râ—…st upon the judgement of the Iudges of it How doth it any way oppose law or reason where there is not for all cases an exact provision to allow a favourable and 〈◊〉 construction But then covertly 〈◊〉 to the condition of our times he tells us a large Story of the 〈◊〉 in Germany and of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens what a 〈◊〉 and large power they had got into their hands 〈◊〉 by insinuating themselves into the hearts of the people and how they did abuse that power by injustice and oppression and so concludes that upon proportionable grounds and principles such mischeifâ—…s being then may be againe Could the Author have made a worse compâ—…rison 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 would was ever greatâ—…r dishonour or indignity cast upon a Parliament upon such 〈◊〉 such groundlesse and inconsequent reasons and arguments The Anabaptists they abused Germany the thirty Tyrants Athens and therefore thâ—… Parliament do England the rest of His booke shewes this to be his meaning though hee conclude with a may be though he had not regarded his own credit and reputatiâ—…n yet hâ—…e should have had some respect to the honour and fame of his Countrâ—…y and have studied a better resemblance though he had not raised a better conclusion The bad actions or impostures of some are not infallible presidents for others to be judged by But to advertise the Author that he do not for the
〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 it and are to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 as the whole body of the 〈◊〉 To 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath granted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in reason be d si ed. is not to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but then by the rule of contraries to dissent 〈◊〉 he hath granted whatever might in reason be 〈◊〉 is a 〈◊〉 of the Houses and this you do 〈◊〉 allow Why now the onely judge in this case of reasonable or 〈◊〉 demands is the Parliament and they have adjudged their request 〈◊〉 wherefore it is your duty and mine 〈◊〉 wee will oppose our judgements to theirs which will be extreame arrogancy to believe they are so however what their awefull authority will not do their reason ought But he sayes upon pretence of distresse to takâ—… illegall courses is as if thâ—…y should perswade us we are not in 〈◊〉 and therefore they must break 〈◊〉 beads to forward our recovery Right but in case of apparent and imminent danger as now if the great Physitian of the common-wealth shall neglect his patient it may by all lawfâ—…ll and legall courses as it doth now indeavour its owne preservation Thâ—…y represent the people to some purposes not the King to any and therefore are but a part of the State Very true if the King do not desert them but if he do then they represent the whole State 4. That no member of Parliament ought to be troubled for treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicions onely and when leave cannot sâ—…asonably be â—…ad and when Competent accuse appeare not â—…n the impeachment If by suspitions be meant onely a bare not confiding in this injustce cannot be sufficient ground No nor if by suspitions is meant a labouring for an Arbitrary power for which there is no ground and of which the whole Parliament must needs be equally guilty this is as insufficient â—… cause of impeachment as the other But upon Articles drawne and proofes in readinesse which it is not fit to produce while the accused parties are at liberty they may be meddled with True if competent 〈◊〉 appeare in the impeachment then they may be arrested and deteined to appeare before the Parliament but there ought to be no other prosâ—…cution in any other Court or way than in Parliament whereby they may be deprived of a member without their consent I but sayes hee if the Houses being adjourned were not able to give consent or upon too much confidence shoâ—…ld not be willing hath not the law provided in such a case for tryall of treason For the first no doubt where they are not able to give consent there they have not power to dissent And for the latter if upon hearing of the cause the accusers appeare to be competent and the cause of impeachment legall and just t were to much presumption and confidence in us for to believe them so confident as not to be willing to give way for a legall tryall 5. That the Soveâ—…aigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no Negative voyce This power is not claymed as ordinary nor to any purpose but to save the Kingdome from ruine in case where the King is so seduced and that he preserres dangerous men and prosecuâ—…s his loyall Subjects Not as ordinary that is they will only be Kings as long as they please and when they are weary of 〈◊〉 the kingdome shall be out of danger and then it shall be his turne to command againe The Author might have spoken truth in better and more honourable language both to King and Parliament if he had pleased That is they will as of right they ought represent the whole State the King deserting of them so that they may be enabled to preserve the kingdome from ruine and when that shall be out of danger then shall his Majestie freely enjoy his negative according to law and right To save it from ruine the law hath better provided for the peoples safety by prohibitâ—…ng all illegall executions of power grounded upon what specious pretences soever 〈◊〉 As illegall executions of power such as the Commission of Array are not to be justified So legall such as the Militia are not to be condenmed And in case where the King is seduced that is when â—…e is not so wise as he should be because he doth not thinke as they do and refuses to satisfie the humors and interests of some I dare not say that the King is not so wise as he should be No such irreverend dialects I leave to the Author But this I may say had not his Majesty waived the faâ—…full advise of his Parliament who seek nothing but the peace and happinesse of him and his people and satisfied the humours and interests of others who ayme at nothing more than the ruine of both these sâ—…d disasters had not fallen upon us And preferres this seemes to be the cause of all preferments do noâ—… goe the right way true for none but Commissioners of Array do now happe preferments dangerous men that is such as desire he should governe according to the known lawes of the land were we before the Parliament governed according to the known lawes of the land they are the same men that still labour to defend the same rule and power And prosecuâ—…es his loyallâ—… Subjects that is is driven from London to Yorke where be long time patiently expected the undeceiving of the people No he paâ—…ed from London or if you please that I may speake truth was seduced by malignant Counsell to make so unhappy a change And I wish from my very soule that his sacred person were not more deceived by such than his people are by the Parliament 6. That leavying of forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanyed with his presence is not levying war against the King but war against his authority though not person is war against the King If this were noâ—… so the Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining himselfe and the Kingdome could not save both but must stand and looke on It is against common sense to sancy a King ruining himselfe and kingdome he can neither be willing not able T is not to be presumed that a King rightly informed will but a King seduced may and uponRep. â—…reacherous and unworthy advise for raigne aid will not be wanting to do that which domâ—…stick cannot 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings T is denyed that any King was deposed by a free Parliament 〈◊〉 elected This is mâ—…st 〈◊〉 but takes not off those words upon which this proposition is grounded But it doth with any faire and candid reading and interpretation For when the Parliament saith that all Presidents ought not to be rules for them to be regulated by this position must necessarily intend those of deposing Kings for that the presidents of forced Parliaments ought not to be followed These might well have beene omitted as being more fully handled in the booke But least hee should complaine any thing was past over I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer FINIS Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 1 King 12. Verse 8. Verse 7. Verse 8. 9. Verse 10. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 Râ—…p Obser. Aâ—…s 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. â—…ep Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aâ—…s 〈◊〉 Obs. Aâ—…s Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Ans. Rep. Rom. 13 â—… Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Aâ—…s Râ—…p Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. 〈◊〉 Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 5 〈◊〉 14. 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. Obser. Aâ—…s Râ—… Obser. Ans. Rep. That was a Pâ—…pular 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Dr. Ferne Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Olâ—… Ans. Rep. Obsâ—…r Ans. Mâ—…t 27. 19 Rep. 〈◊〉 18. Obsor Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Obs. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obâ—… Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep. Oâ—… Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Aâ—… Rep. Obâ—… Aâ—… Rep Oâ—…s Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep. Obs. Aâ—…s Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Oâ—…s Aâ—…s Rep. Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obseâ—… Ans. Rep. Obs. 〈◊〉 Obs Ans. Rep. Olâ—… Ans. Obs. Ans. Rep.