Law-principles in point of suit may be reduced as is known to all skilful Lawyers Posit 2. Intail is a corrupt title of Claim For it hath no ground either in Nature or in Reason but only in the circuit of a prodigal humour for perpetuating a Name which is but grasse and the glory thereof as the flower that fadeth Thus the perpetuating of the Line in the person of the eldest son by vouchsafing the whole substance on him is no lesse unjust then prodigal Posit 3. Jure divino upon the accompt of Divine Right all Pleas ought to be composed according to Conscience and Reason without all respect to any Platform of humane Law So it was in the Primitive Institution of the Jewish Common-wealth 1 Special care was had to establish such Judges in it as were men of Conscience and Religion Exod. 18.22 25. Deut. 1.13 15. Who were to judge the People as did Moses making them know the Statutes of GOD and his Laws in judging Pleas between one and another Ex. 18.16 2 Because as they were to judge no other Judgment but what was GOD's Deut. 1.17 so they were to judge only for the Lord 2 Chron. 19.6 Posit 4. The Rigour of the Law is great injustice although the Process be secundum allegata probata For Nimium jus nimia injuria I might instance a hundred cases in which the peremptoriness of the Law is either too intense or too remisse Posit 5. Though the Law were never so just in it self it can never be justly executed a Platform being observed men not being left to their own freedom in judging Because a Platform can never be pleaded without Interpreters Who I pray shall interpret Not the Judges for they cannot both judge and plead Hoc opus hic labor est Not the ignorant Pursuers and Defenders for ignoti nulla cupido far less intellectio Therefore it only remaineth that skilful Lawyers be employed And then be sure of heavie burdens which they themselves will not touch with one of their fingers And thus a Platform's abrogation is the Law 's reformation Otherwise it is but verberatio aëris Posit 6. To day the only best way of easing the People of their burdens in point of Suit is To remit all Pleas to the Arbitration of Neighbours The truth of this doth appear thus All determination of Pleas of necessity is either upon a judicial or as I may so say arbitral accompt If upon a judicial accompt then either according to the dictates of Conscience and pure Reason or the principles of a Platform The former cannot be to day Oh! how selfish are the best of men at this time Though there be both godly and able men to day yet cannot all places of trust be filled with such as answer the Scripture qualifications of Rulers Not til the time Our Officers be peace and Exactors righteousness the Judges being restored as at the first and Counsellours as at the beginning And as the former is impossible so the other is hurtful for as Judges qualified as said is are rare and many of them to fil al places of trust cannot be found so a Platform being established swarms of Lawyers the main face-grinders do abound It therefore remaineth that Pleas be determined by way of Arbitration among friends And then be sure not one of a hundred otherwaies of little expence great moderation and great dispatch Because of the untowardness of People I must needs adde some Cautions Caut. 1. The Pursuer refusing without all reason friendly to compound by way of Arbitration it will do well if by an Act be forfeited toties quoties so much of his suit as may daunt him viz. either one half or a third part thereof as may be judged convenient Caut. 2. The Defender upon no good grounds refusing to compound by way of friendly Arbitration it will do well if an Act bind him toties quoties to forfeit an half or a third part more and above what is sued of him Caut. 3. It will do well if some of the godliest and ablest men be appointed and authorized to that end to attend a ◠Pleas which either cannot or stubborn persons refuse to be composed by way of Arbitration all due execution passing upon their Determination whether as to the deciding of the Plea or fining of the stubborn and refractory person All which as I conceive do stand with Reason for as the end of War is Peace so the end of Law is Arbitration Were all men beaten with the Law abroad be sure they would friendly agree at home And many are forced to do so when they have spent their time wits and estates upon it So old Clients can though wantons be ignorant thereof I shall not multiply words on this subject at present but willingly rest satisfied with what is spoken already though I might enlarge my self theron to which I shall be most ready whensoever called thereto being nothing but the abridgment of my thoughts in the matter and hoping the poor man's counsel may deliver the City supposing these words to be spoken in season the exigent of time calling for the like I have no more to adde at present but that I am Your Honours obedient and humble servant PET. ENGLISH To the READER THough my broken speech can adde nothing to the worth of this Treatise yet I judge it my duty to utter some few words concerning it I know Truth in all ages hath had many enemies some men asking what it is and some contradicting and apposing And surely that truth which crosseth most the vanity glory and pride of this world is most opposed by the men of this world in whom the Prince of the power of the a◠worketh Yea and any truth which in former ages hath not appeared unto the sons of light but hath been under a cloud the Sun of Righteousness in whose sight Saints see light being pleased not to make the cloud flee away is seen and scarce clearly seen but by few who are of the day and not of the night Hence is it that many who are light even oppose such a truth No wonder then though the truth spoken of here be so much opposed seing it not only crosseth the vanity of a vain-glorious age but also hath been so long over-clouded Howsoever it is very necessary to be known Doubtest thou whether it be lawful for thee to submit to the present Government the Power of the King being in thy apprehension absolute without the bounds of Law or the Kingly Government being the choicest and best and so not be altered far better then a Commonwealth or it being unlawful to resist the King and decline his Authority Thou shalt find these things fully and largely cleared from arguments of all sorts To the Law and to the Testimony of the Spirit of Truth that compleat rule they are brought In the balance of Reason they are weighed But if that shall not suffice thee who eyest much the examples
lawfully be declined that one better may be set-up 180 SECT V. We are tied by League and Covenant to maintain and espouse Christ's interest absolutely notwithstanding any thing may ensue thereupon Ibid. By no Oath or Covenant can we be absolutely tied to espouse the King's interest and preserve Monarchy involably Ibid. A SURVEY of POLICY OR A Free VANDICATION of the COMMON-VVEALTH of ENGLAND PROEME COURTEOUS READER I Beseech thee judge of me impartially Do not imagine I speak my mind more freely then is pertinent Let me tell thee my freedom is upon a good accompt I may hold my face toward Heaven and say what I speak it is from the simplicity of my spirit My record is from on high I do not speak from a by-assed principle and if I do so shall not my Lord try it out Why I pray thee wilt thou stumble at my freedome in expressing my mind against Kingly Government in behalf of that which is popular Verily I desire thee not to cleave to my judgment implicitly Yet would I have thee duly examining without prejudice what I speak and embrace that which is good wilt thou learn so much of that which the world cals Scepticisme as to suspend thy judgment a little and not sentence against me at the first Be not wedded to thine own opinion but try all things and hold that which is good Do thou kindly embrace any thing which is of GOD in this Book I do ingenuously profess I shal forthwith be of thy judgment if thou shew me better grounds inforcing the contrary of what I maintain Well the main subject in hand resolveth upon this Question Whether or not is the Commonwealth of ENGLAND an usurped power These Questions being put aside that follow it is easily answered 1. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute 2. Whether or not is Royall Government the choicest of Governments 3. Whether or not is a Commonwealth the best of Governments 4. Whether or not is it lawfull to resist the Royall Person and decline the Royall Authority 5. Whether or not doth the Covenant tye us to preserve Monarchy inviolably Of these as followeth SECT I. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute THe Court-Parasits and Nation of Royalists do plead much for an arbitrary and illimited power to the Royall Person But in this matter we do freely offer our judgment ASSERT I. The power of the King as it commandeth just and lawful things is absolute and in such a notion cannot be lawfully contraveened It is made good firstly from that which Solomon saith for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him Where the word of a King is there is power and who may say unto him what dost thou Eccl. 8. These words by Writers are diversly expounded 1. Some expound them concerning the absolutenes of the Kings power whether in things lawfull or unlawfull good or bad And in this we find none more willing then Salmasius the Humanist Defens Reg. cap. 2. 2. Others again who are no friends to absolute and unlimited Monarchy do interpret the words not de jure but de facto Regis i.e. they opinionat that Solomon doth not speak here of the power of Kings which according to Law and Reason doth belong to them but concerning the absolute way of governing which one way or other is conferred upon Kings whether by usurpation or tyranny or by a voluntary and free subjection of the people to an absolute and arbitrary power in the Kingly Person Yet 3. I do choose a way distinct from either of these And I expound the words concerning an absolute power in the King in things lawfull and honest This I make good from the Contexts 1. The Preacher saith I counsell thee to keep the Kings commandment and that in regard of the oath of GOD. Now what power the Holy Ghost here giveth to Kings is such a power whose ordinances he exhorteth to obey and that under an obligation being tyed to obey it by a lawfull oath the oath of GOD. But we cannot obey the unjust Acts and Ordinances of an arbitrary and illimited power Unless you will say that it is lawfull for us to sin against the LORD and to do the will of man rather then the will of GOD which is contrary to that which is spoken Act. 4. and 5. Yea as afterward is shewed arbitrary Monarchy invested with a boundlesse power to do both good evill is sinful and unlawfull And therefore we cannot tye our selves by the oath of GOD to maintain it Sure we are we can not lawfully swear to maintain and obey a sinfull and unlawfull power Unlesse you may also say that we may lawfully engage our selves by oath and Covenant to maintain and obey the ordinance of Satan 2. He speaketh of such a power which is not for maintaining vice and allowing that which is evill but for correcting and punishing of evill-doers Be not hastie to go out of his sight to do knaves who hate the light stand not in an evil thing Why for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him c. Would the Holy Ghost say ye must not dare to do evill and with draw your selves preposterously from the Kings presence for he hath a power conferred on him that cannot be contraveened in executing justice on malefactors And therefore if ye transgresse be sure the King will punish you So then this manifestly holdeth out to us that the Holy Ghost speaketh in this place of such a power in Kings which exerciseth good and performeth that which according to the Law of GOD is incumbent to the Kingly power to do But sure I am illimited Monarchy whose power is also to do evill can spare the malefactour and punish the righteous The Holy Ghost speaketh of a Kingly power that produceth contrary effects 3. The Holy Ghost subjoyneth Whose keepeth the commandment shal feel no evil thing Then this must be a just and lawfull commandment otherwise obedience to it would bring forth death Rom. 6. But sure we are this cannot be spoken concerning a boundlesse and arbitrary Regall power for as Solomon here speaketh of the Regall power so he speaketh of the effects thereof and of our obedience thereto And as we find he speaketh onely of good effects so he onely speaketh of an obedience and subjection thereto which according to the oath of GOD and in conscience we are tyed to perform But as we cannot lawfully give up our oath of Allegiance to boundless and arbitrary Regall power so there is a vast dis-proportion between it and the effects of that power which Solomon speaketh of here Solomon speaketh of a power which only produceth good effects But arbitrary Monarchy is in a capacity of producing both good and bad effects Secondly we establish the point from reason it self the Kingly power as it produceth good effects not onely in it self is the Ordinance of GOD but also it executeth the purpose of GOD both on good and bad But as the Ordinance of GOD
cannot be contraveened so it is laid on us as a necessary duty to subject our selves for conscience sake to him who executeth the purpose of GOD according to the prescript of GOD'S wil Rom. 13. So then in such cases as GOD can not be contraveened no more can the Kingly power be withstood but what it enacteth according to equity reason should absolutely be obeyed In this sense the Holy Ghost commandeth obedience and subjection not onely to Kings but also to all other Rulers Tit. 3.1 Per. 2. Kings and all Magistrats in this sense are called Gods GOD'S Deputies and Lieutenants upon Earth Ex. 4. and 22. Ps 82. feeders of the LORD'S people Ps 78. the shields of the Earth Ps 47. nursing Fathers of the Church Is 49 Captains over the LORD'S people 1. Sam. 9. Their Throne is the Throne of GOD 1. Chr. 19 their judgment is the judgment of the LORD 2. Chr. 19. The Land lyeth under great judgment when it wanteth them Is 3. Who then dare adventure in such respects any way to contraveen the Kingly power and to decline his authority for so there is a divine sentence in his lips his mouth transgresseth not in judgment his Throne is established by righteousnesse righteous lips are his delight and he loveth him that speaketh right his wrath is as messengers of death but in the light of his countenance is life and his favour is as a cloud of the latter rain Prov. 16. In such cases his wrath is as the roaring of a Lion but his favour is as dew upon the grasse he sitteth in the Throne of judgment scattering away all evill with his eyes scattering the wicked and bringing the wheel over them So mercy and truth preserve him and his Throne is upholden by mercy Yea his fear is as the roaring of a Lyon so that he who provoketh him to anger sineth against his own soul Prov. 19 and 20. Upon these grounds and in these respects Solomon exhorteth us to honour the King Proverb 24. and not to strike Princes for equity Prov. 17. Therefore the Kingly power as it is in it self and as it executeth the purpose of the just LORD of Heaven and Earth according to the LORD' 's good will and pleasure neither his power nor the just Acts thereof can be any more contraveened then the power of GOD and that which he commandeth to be performed for so the King's power is GOD'S power and what he doth is according to divine authority And in these notions we hold the Kingly power to be absolute for so as his power in such respects can not be contraveened in like manner he may lawfully execute every thing that is good and expedient with a full and vast power according to Law and reason So the power of the King of kings is vast and absolute not because he may do both justly and unjustly according to his pleasure but because he may do every thing that seemeth good in his eyes according to justice In this sense I confess Salustius his Author saith very well Impune quidvis facere id est Regem esse Indeed the King may do every thing that is just and equitable according to Law and Reason and deserveth not to be punished therfore This is the same which Solomon saith Eccl. 8. v. 3. and 4. compared with Prov. 17.26 Albeit we may put such a favorable construction upon these words yet do we doubt much if Salustius his Author's meaning be such Indeed I take him to be of Aristotle's opinion who saith concerning the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pol. 1. 3. c. 12. The Law also saith concerning the King Tanta est ejus celsitudo ut non posset ei imponi Lex in Regne suo Curt. in consol 65. col 6. ad F. Petr. Rebuf notab 3. repet L. un c. Omnia sunt possibilia Regi Imperator omnia potest Bald. in Sect. F. de no. for fid in F. in 1 Constit C. col 2. Chass catal glor mun part 5. consid 24. All these go no other wayes saith our learned Country-man but thus The King can do all things which by Law he can do and that holdeth in him Id possumus quod jure possumus Lex Rex 9.26 ass 3. This is a very quick and noble glosse But for my self as I judge their meaning to be nothing such so I am indifferent whether it be so or not No question there be many who do plead for absolute and arbitrary Monarchy beside the Nation of Royallists And those to whose temper absolute Monarchy doth most relish we find to be attended with these qualifications 1 They are meerly heroick and ambitious So were the Giants before the Flood Gen. 6. Beros Antiq. l. 1. Nimrod after the Flood Gen. 10. Bern. Antiq. l. 4. and all the rest of the great Heroes Arist pol. 3. c. 10. 2 They are meerly tyrannous and cruel So we find that Pharaoh had an arbitrary power over the People of Israel Exod. 1 and 5. Nebuchad-nezzar had the like power over his Kingdoms Dan. 2. and 3. By vertue of Ahasuerus absolute power Haman was licenced to exercise tyranny on the People of the Jews Est 3. We might alledge many examples to this purpose But the point is most clear in it self for those who are of a tyrannous disposition can endure no Law but their will Otherwise they could never get their tyranny exercised 3 Those whom we find chief pleaders for absolute Monarchy are either concerned therein themselves as Alexander M. and M. Aurelius and such like or else Flatterers and Court-Parasites as Lyricus Rom. Virgil and such like And of this sort we find none more violent in this matter than Dr. Fern Hugo Grotius Arnisaeus Spalato c. whose foot-steps with his ful-speed Salmasius doth trace But although men by way of flattery and by-respect may act and plead for arbitrary Monarchy yet let me tell you I do not imagin but they may act and plead for it through simple error and delusion And so I conclude that Aristotle Xiphilin Salust and the foresaid Lawyers do much run this way though they be more moderate in the matter then the rest And as afterward is shewed we find the Talmudick and Rabbinick Writers this way somewhat inclining to the lawless and arbitrary power of absolute Monarchy Assert 2. The King hath not a power above Law and a Prerogative Royal to dispose upon things according to his pleasure whether with or against Law and Reason Firstly Such an arbitrary and vast power is repugnant to the first Institution and Scripture-mould of Kings According to the Holy Ghost's way of moulding the King he is thus qualified 1 He is an Elective King chosen by the People in subordination to God Thou shalt in any wayes set him King over thee whom the LORD thy God shall choose Deut. 17. 2 A Brother-King and not a stranger-King One from amongst thy Brethren shalt thou set King over thee thou mayest not set
a stranger over thee who is not thy Brother Ibid. 3 He must not tyrannize over the People by Leavying Forces and by strength of hand drawing them into Egyptian slavery He shall not multiply horses to himself nor cause the People to return to Egypt to the end that he should multiply horses forasmuch as the LORD hath said unto you Ye shall henceforth return no more that way Ibid. These words properly and in their emphatick sense can import nothing else but a discharging of the King by Forces and Armies to tyrannize over his People that bringing them into bondage and upon their ruines he may not strengthen himself and multiply his Forces So the King of Egypt did with the People of Israel whileas they were in Egypt under his tyrannous yoke 4 Not a Leacherous King given to women for drawing him on into temptation Neither shall he multiply wives to himself that his heart turn not away Ibid. 5 Nor Covetous given to enrich himself and to build-up his own estate upon the ruins of his People Nether shall he greatly multiply to himself Silver and Gold Ibid. 6 But he must be a King acquiring the Scriptures of GOD meditating on them his whole life-time thereby learning to fear the LORD to observe his Commandments and to practise them that he may be humble and lowly not turning aside either to the right-hand or to the left And it shall be when he sitteth upon the Throne of his Kingdom that he shall write him a Copy of this Law in a Book out of that which is before the Priests the Levits And it shall be with him and he shall reade therein all the dayes of his life that he may learn to fear the LORD his God to keep all the words of this Law and these Statutes to do them That his heart be not lifted up above his Brethren and that he turn not aside from the Commandment to the right-hand or to the left Ibid. Herefrom we draw this Argument The power of him is not Arbitrary and beyond the bounds of Law whose power according to the Law and Word of GOD is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law But the power of the King according to the Law and Word of God is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law Ergo the Power of the King is not Arbitrary and beyond the bonnds of Law The Major cannot be denyed unlesse men will be so bold as to deny a Regulating and squaring of their Acts and Institutions according to the Word and Law of God Sure I am none will deny it but such as will contradict Scripture it self and decline it as the rule and pattern of their Actions The Minor is manifest from the Text above Cited Barclay the Royallist distinguisheth between the Office and power of the King and so the man endeavoureth to elude our Argument thus The Office of the King quoth he is set down Deut. 17. and the King's power is spoken of 1 Sam. 8 where saith he an Arbitrary power is conferred upon the King and laid upon his shoulders But this distinction serveth not for his purpose For either the power of the King is according to the Word and Law of God or not If it be then as the Office of the King is regulated in like manner his power also is kept within the compasse of Law For his Office spoken of Deut. 17. admitteth bounds and is kept within marches That which is spoken concerning the King Dent. 17. in terminis doth subject the King to Law and taketh-away Arbitrarines in his Government So then that which is spoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. doth either contradict that which is spoken Deut. 17. or else it giveth him no power and liberty of governing above Law at random If it be not then it is not a Divine but a diabolick power Moreover what the King doth according to his power either he doth it by vertue of his Office or contrary to it If by vertue of his Office Ergo the Kingly power cannot be absolute unlesse his Office be also absolute for so the exercise of his power dependeth from his Office In such a case he can do nothing according to his power but what he hath Authority for from his Office But his Office Deut. 17 is not absolute but Regulated according to Law If contrary to it Ergo it is not the Kings Office to exercise an absolute power and consequently the Kings Authority is not absolute Furthermore either the King as King is absolute or not If he be absolute as King Ergo the Royall Office is absolute For the King is formally King by vertue of his Royall Office If not absolute as King then we gain the point For so it followeth that the Kingly Government in it-self is not absolute and illimited and if the Kingly Government in it-self be not of a vast and absolute extent we Demand in what notion the Authority of the King is Arbitrary and illimited Either ab intrinscco i.e. As it is essentially a Kingly Authority or ab extrinseco i.e. according to some cadent and accident of the Regall Office If the former ergo the Office of the King it-self is absolute which is not onely repugnant to that Deut. 17. but also to that which Barclay confesseth himself If the latter ergo the King as King and according to his Office is not absolute for quod convenit rei accidentaliter ei non convenit formaliter Then we demand if the King as King be not absolute whether or not he be absolute as he is a Judge or as he is a Man If as he is a Judge ergo all Judges no lesse then Kings are of an absolute and Arbitrary power which Royallists themselves do altogether deny yea they make the King essentially different from other Judges under this notion because the Kings power is absolute and their's is not And consequently seing according to the Doctrine of Royallists the King is essentially differenced from other Judges as he is absolute then nolint velint the King as King is absolute Thus the Gentlemen do contradict themselves If as he is a Man ergo all men let-be Kings are of an Arbitrary and boundlesie power but sure I am no Royallist will say so Next to Barclay in-steppeth Salmasius on the floor as one minding to cut the knot if he cannot loose it This Gentleman labourreth though in vain to reconcile that of Deut. 17. with that which is spoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. The Israelites saith he did not seek from God one King onely but a change of the government by Judges and in stead of that they required a Regall Government But quoth he the Prophet to disswade them therefrom propounded to them these incommodities which ensue upon the Kingly government this the Prophet calleth jus Regum which I quoth he call the Arbitrary licence which is granted as a lawfull power to these who govern after a Kingly manner This jus Regum saith
he the Grecians translate it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whereby is understood a just and reasonable way of carry-on matters And the Jews in this place call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifieth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the Septuagints translate this Hebrew word sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now this pertaineth to the office of some man and albeit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth differ from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet some smal difference being between them the one is taken for the other Defens Reg. cap. 2. Ans This Gentleman is so far from loosing the knot of the difficulty as that he tieth it a great deal faster then it was before And he must give me leave to say that he mistaketh the state of the question in hand The Question is whether or not that which is spoken 1 Sam. 8. is repugnant to that which is spoken concerning the King Deut. 17. This Royallist denyeth the one place to contradict the other and he rendereth no other reason for it but because the Prophet 1 Sam. 8. calleth absolutenesse and Arbitrary licence in the Royall Person jus Regum Now the man espyeth not the lightnesse of his own inference which is this The Prophet 1 Sam. 8. calleth Arbitrary power jus Regum Ergo that which is spoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. is not repugnant to that which is spoken of him Deut. 17. Whereas this man should prove the consequence he doth nothing but playeth upon the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Well I desire him to learn this much in his probation of the Antecedent he standeth by that which maketh the contradiction between these places the more apparent We have shewed already and he himself doth not deny it That the holy Ghost Deut. 17. subjecteth the King to Law and disclaimeth Arbitrary Power in him And yet this Gentleman will have the holy Ghost to allow and cry-up 1 Sam. 8. absolute power in the King This he not only saith but he also endeavoureth to prove from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is translated and taken by some both in Greek and Latine But I pray you Friend what is this but to prove a contradiction upon your self let it be so that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is so taken as you will have it the contrary whereof we shal demonstrate yet shall you never reconcile these two places together but thereby you enforce the more a contradiction between them and consequently according to your way the consequence is so far from being deducible from the Antecedent that contrariwise it is directly repugnant to it So then my Friend albeit I should grant you all that you would have yet you have this to prove That though the holy Ghost Deut. 17. crieth down Arbitrary Government in the King and 1 Sam. 8. proclaimeth it and alloweth the same in the King yet notwithstanding the holy Ghost doth not contradict Himself and neither of the places is repugnant one to another Prove this Et eris mihi magnus Apollo And whereas you only prove the Antecedent you do nothing but beat the air and proceed ab ignorantia elenchi Secondly It is repugnant to the power which the holy Ghost in Scripture hath conferâ—ed upon inferiour Judges It is clear from the Book of God that the Lord investeth inferiour Judges with power to execute judgment on all without respect of persons and commandeth them to do so And consequently they are invested with power to execute judgment on Kings themselves But if the power of the King were absolute and above Law then that power which the holy Ghost in Scripture conferreth on inferiour Judges is altogether unlawful and in vain Royallists start much at this Argument They talk much against it and I wot not what Because Salmasius speaketh most against it we shall firstly begin with him This man plainly denieth inferiour Judges to have any Authoritative power over Kings But because he is very large upon this matter and for preventing tediousness to the Reader we shall therefore handle the whole substance of that which he replieth and objecteth against this Argument in a following Sub-section SUBSECT 1. Salmasius his Opinion concerning the Power of Inferiour Judges examined and refuted THat we may in a methodick and square way handle his opinion and conveniently meet with these things which he replieth against our second Argument we shall lay down his mind in these Propositions Propos 1. The Jewish Sanhedrin had no power over the Kings of Israel and Judah That he may establish this Proposition he taketh this way to prove it Firstly The people of Israel saith he did seek a King to reign over them after the manner of the Nations But all the Kings of the Nations in these times were absolute and not subject to Law Ergo. The Proposition he proveth from 1. Sam. 8. The Assumption he taketh for granted saying that the Assyrians whose Monarchy was at that time when the Israelites sought a King to reign over them did not restrict their Kings within the bounds of Law Therefore Artabanus Persa much commendeth that Law whereby the Persians enacted that the King should be honoured as the image of GOD. Plut â—n vit Themist And Claudianus saith that they gave alike obedience to cruell and tyrannous Kings Yea Otades calleth Monarchy that to which every thing is lawful unpunishably Herodot lib. 3. Then seing the Persians succeeded to the Medes and the Medes to the Assyrians who reigned at that time when the Israelites did seek a King to reign over them it appeareth that as the Persian Monarchy so likewise the Assyrian and Median Monarchies were of an absolute and arbitrary power And Homer who lived as some imagine about that time when the Israelites sought a King from Samuel to reign over them saith that Kings are from Jupiter and those do reign who get authority from the son of Saturn Whom he also calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 divine Kings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 trained up by Jupiter Therefore Kings in Homer's time were not subject to Law Defens Reg. cap. 2. and 5. Ans Both the Propositions of this Gentlemans Argument seem very strange to us As for the first Proposition we do not deny it for the people of Israel said to Samuel Now make us a King to judge us like all the Nations 1. Sam. 8. But it doth not follow Ergo make us an absolute King as the Nations about us have 1. Because Moses Deut. 17. by the Spirit of prophecie foretelleth their seeking of a King after the manner of the Nations But it is evident that Moses there doth onely prophesie of their seeking a King after the manner of the Nations i.e. that as the Nations about had Kings over them so they might have a King over them in like manner for both Deut. 17. and 1. Sam. 8. the words are general In neither of these it is said Make us an absolute king after the maner of the
Publick and legall way Extraordinary The Prophets rebuked the Kings of Israel and Judah for their faults and transgressions And what is rebuke but a degree of punishment And so Kings not having immunity from the lesser degree of punishment why are they not also lyable to the greater according to their delinquency Magis minus non variant speciem Yea Jehu executing the purpose of the Lord on the house of Ahab slew both the King of Israel and the King of Judah 2 King 9. and withall he caused cut-off all the sons of Ahab 2 King 10. O but you will say These practises of the Prophets and of Jehu were extraordinary And then It is a very bad Argument The Apostles preached by the extraordinary instinct of the Spirit Ergo Ministers who have nothing but an ordinary spirit should not preach So it doth not follow The Prophets and Jehu acted against delinquent kings through an extraordinary call thereto Ergo those who have nothing but an ordinary call thereto should not do so It may be you will say The People can have no ordinary call to act against their kings Be not mistaken 1 Extraordinary things supply the room of ordinary things whileas they are wanting So Samuel killed Agag because Saul the ordinary Judge was wanting in his duty 1 Sam. 15. 2 At least it followeth that the same thing which is done extraordinarily may also be done lawfully in an ordinary way Otherwise many absurdities and blasphemies should follow 3 Datounâ— oppositorum datur alterum And consequently seing there is an extraordinary call for punishing Kings there is also an ordinary call for doing it The reason of this is because esse extraordinarioe vocationis is so called and is so in it-self because it standeth in opposition to esse ordinaria vocationis as we have shewed at length curs Philosophico-theolog disp 4. Sect. 6. And therefore there can be no extraordinary call for punishing Delinquent Kings unlesse there be also an ordinary call for doing so 4 Punishing of delinquent Kings either in it-self is sinfull and unlawfull or not If sinfull and unlawfull then neither ordinarily nor extraordinarily may Kings lawfully be punished for no sin can be committed by an extraordinary Divine providence Otherwise God should extraordinarily sin But we have shewed already that Kings may be punished by vertue of an extraordinary call And consequently it is not a sin in it-self to punish delinquent Kings If lawfull and unsinfull I see no reason why a thing which is in it-self lawfull and honest may not lawfully be done by ordinary as well as by extraordinary midses for either the exercise of ordinary midses is in it self lawfull or not None I am sure will say that the exercise of ordinary midses is unlawfull Otherwise every thing that is done ordinarily is done sinfully Which to say is absurd And if you say that the exercise of them in it self is lawfull then it is lawfull in it self by vertue of an ordinary call to punish delinquent Kings But if there be any fault and escape in the way and manner of imploying that cal that no whit hindereth but the call in it self is lawfull and commendable for such things are meerly extrinsecall to the nature of the call it-self And ab extrinseco ad intrinsecum non est sequela 5 Jehu and the Prophets had no other reasons for them in speaking and acting by vertue of an extraordinary call against delinquent Kings but what those may have in proceeding against them by vertue of an ordinary call They no otherwise proceeded against them by vertue of their extraordinary call but as it was for the good of the LORD's People and for executing Justice on their delinquency that others might learn not to offend But sure we are such grounds are competent to an ordinary call foâ— proceeding against delinquent Kings And 't is an undoubted maxim Idem est jus ubi eadem est ratio juris Iâ—st That example concerning Athaliah saith Salmasius deserveth not an answer for saith he she usurped the kingdom and killed the whole Royall Family And so there was lesse executed against her then she deserved And with all according to the Jewish Lawes it was not permitted to women to sway the Scepter and sit on the Throne for it is not said Deut. 17. Thou shalt set a Queen over thee but a King over thee Def. Reg. cap. 4. Ans That the example concerning Athaliah very much concludeth our purpose we argue thus Either Athaliah had the right and authority of a King or not If the had the right and authority of a King ergo if the King be of an absolute power and not subject to Law then Athaliah was no more subject to Law then any other King for as Salmasius and all Royallists will have it the King is of an absolute power and not subject to Law And consequently Athaliah being invested with the right of a Kingly power and authority she was no more subject to Law then any other of the Kings of Judah Therefore if you say that Athaliah was invested with the right and authority of a King you must either commend the practice of Jehojadah and the people in killing her or else you must charge your opinion and not imagine Kings to be absolute and not subject to Law If she had not the right and authority of a King then either because she usurped the Kingdom and intruded her-self upon it contrary to the consent of the People or because she did cut-off the righteous heirs of the Kingdom and set up her-self in the Kingdom or else because according to the Law women ought not to govern Not the first because according to the Doctrine of Royallists conquest is a lawfull title to the Crown But Athaliah conquered the Crown of Judah to her-self What more I pray you did she in intruding her-self upon the Kingdom of Judah then unjust Conquerers do in thrusting themselves in upon the kingdoms which they subdue As she intruded her-self without the free consent and election of the People so do they And yet Salmasius with the rest of his Brethren will have such Conquerers lawful heirs and absolute kings over these kingdoms which they subdue Nor can you say the second because conquerers who subdue other men's kingdoms cut-off all those who by pretended blood-right claim a title to the Crown And yet Royallists will have such lawfull heirs and absolute kings over these kingdoms to which they have no title but the sword Nor can you say the third because all Royallists admit Royal birth a just and absolute title to the Crown But women no less then men may be and are of the Royall Off-spring And consequently if the doctrine of Royallists be true and unless Salmasius will contradict himself women may as lawfully govern as men Therefore it doth not follow that because Athaliah was a woman she had not right to govern the People of the Jews and reign over them I confesse
by Royall birth she had no title to the Crown But she conquered the Crown to her-self and did reign six years with the consent of the People But sure I am Salmasius and all the Royallists as they hold the consent of the People as a necessary ingredient to make-up the lawfulness of the title to the Crown so they maintain conquest without all exception to be a just and lawful title thereto But what need I thus to stand do not I know that Salmasius and the whole nation of Royalists will have the formall and essentiall being of the King to consist in an absolute and illimited power But any person whether man or woman usurper or non-usurper is capable of such a power and may be invested therewith And consequently though Athaliah was but a woman and an usurper it doth not follow that because she was such therefore she was not of an absolute and arbitrary power The greatest of Tyrants and the worst of women is capable of such a power And the power is not changed because of the change of the person and of such and such qualifications in him Such things are meerly extrinsecal to the nature of the power it-self So then if the King be formally a King because he is of an illimited and arbitrary power I see no reason why Athaliah did not reign as a King for she was capable of such a power wherein according to the doctrine of Royallists the essentiall frame of a King doth consist And consequently seing she did reign in stead of the King of Judah and exercised his authority there is no reason why she was not absolute and unsubject to Law as well as he Therefore Salmasius must either leave-off his opinion and not imagine that the Kings of Judah were absolute and not subject to Law or else he must cry-down the laudable practice of Jehojadah and of the People in killing Athaliah For shame he will not do this Propos 2. Except the Lacoedemonian kingdom there was no kingdom in old wherein absolute and uncircumscribed Monarchy was not erected though in some more remiss and in others more intense For proof of this Salmasius sheweth what was the condition of Monarchy in the Assyrian Egyptian Jewish Median Persian Grecian and Roman kingdoms Of the Jewish kingdom we have spoken already and more of it afterward in a more convenient place As for the Assyrian kingdom together with the Median he proveth that kings in them were absolute and un-subject to Law because such was the condition of the kings of Persia This he maketh good from Ottanes the Persian 〈…〉 Monarchy to be that to which every thing is lawful unpunishably Herod lib. 3. Yea Artabanus averreth That no Law amongst the Persians was more commendable then that whereby they enacted that the King should be honoured as the Image of God Plut. in vit Themist And Claudian saith That they gave a like obedience to cruel and tyrannous Kings Therefore saith Salmasius seeing the Medians succeeded to the Assyrians and the Persians to the Medians it appeareth that as the Kings of Persia so the Kings of Assyria and Media were absolute and not subject to Law And though the Egyptian Kings before they were subdued by the Persians were hemmed-in by the bonds of Law in every thing that they did yet notwithstanding we never reade that at any time they brought any of their Kings upon the stage and caused them to suffer for their Delinquencie They did bear the yoke of two cruel tyrants Busiris and Cambyses most patiently without reluctancie Which Cambyses because of his cruelty the Jews called Nebuchodonozor He desired in marriage his german sister and so calling a Councel be demanded at his Counsellors if there was any Law in Persia which did permit such a marriage They desirous to gratifie their King told him That they found a Law whereby the King of Persia was permitted to do any thing be pleased Herod lib. 3. As for the Grecian Empire it is known saith Salmasius that Agamemnon had an absolute power over that Army which be led on against the Trojans And therefore he is called Rex Regum And Aeschylus calleth the King of the Argives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an uncensurable Governour So Homer calleth the Grecian Kings Kings made by Jupiter reigning by and holding their Crown of him He calleth them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 divine Kings trained-up by Jupiter Philip saith that the King hath equal power with GOD Diogenes in lib. de Reg. writeth that the King is just so in respect of the Commonwealth as GOD is in respect of the Universe And so as GOD hath power over the whole world in like manner the King hath power on earth In like manner Ecphantas calleth it a thing proper to the King to govern himself and to be governed by none Lastly he stepeth-in to shew how that the Roman Kings of old were of a vast and arbitrary power Romulus saith Tacitus governed the Romans as he pleased Pomponius writeth that Kings at the begining of Rome had all poâ—er Dio saith they are unsubject to any Law Plutarch and Justinian will have the Laws subjected to them Which maketh Severus and Attoninus to say Licet legibus soluti simus attamen legibus vivimus Instit lib. 2. tit 17. Plinius in his Panegyricks saith to Trojanus that he subjecteth himself to the Laws And yet as Dio saith he had power to do every thing by himself to command both himself and the Laws to do every thing that he would and not do what he would not And Salust saith that to do every thing unpunishably that is to be a King Def. Reg. cap. 5. Answ I suppose there is not plena enumeratio partium here There were moe Kingdoms then what Salmasius hath reckoned-up Howsoever I shall do my endeavour to find him out And that I may take away the strength of all that he objecteth and leave not so much as the ground-stone thereof I lay down these following Conclusions Conclus 1. Because of extraordinary heroicisme and gallantry of old some were of a simply vast and absolute power and in nothing subject to Law This we make good from the condition of some Kings both before and after the Flood Before the Flood the point is clear About the 500 year of Noah's age which was in the 1556. year of the world Policy began to have some footing for then men began to follow after their own inventions hearts desires and so men then a-dayes being of huge strength and undaunted courage given to pleasure and renown those amongst them who by strength of hand could carry the pre-eminence and precedency over others no less performed it then endeavoured it And Noah was five hundred years old Gen. 5. There were Giants in the earth in those dayes and also after that when the sons of God came-in unto the daughters of men and they bear children unto them the same became mighty men who were of old men of
amongst the Cretians He was the first Law-giver amongst them whose Laws they retained until after-ages as is said already As amongst the Egyptians and Grecians we find Monarchy in the dayes of the Heroes in like manner we find it to have been regulated also in other Kingdoms The Ethiopian Kings were so much restricted to Law that it can hardly be determined whether they or the Egyptian Kings were most subjected thereto As Diodore telleth us of the subjection of the one to Law so doth he story of the subjection of the other thereto In expresse termes he faith That the Ethiopian King according to statute and ordination leadeth his life according to the Laws doing every thing according to the Country-fashion neither rewarding nor punishing any but according to the Law of his Ancestors And which is more to be wondered at the Priests have such power over the King that at their command and pleasure he suffereth death And for this they alledge it to have been an old custom amongst all their Kings from the beginning to undergo death at the desire of the Priests Rer. ant lib. 4. cap. 1. I shall not stand here to dispute whether or not Monarchy amongst the Indians in the dayes of the Heroes was regulated and subjected to Law Albeit there be some probability for the non-absoluteness thereof yet we think it good to leap it over because the matter is not clear enough And we shall begin with the Indian Kingdom to shew that in after-times in it Kings were of a non-arbitrary and regulated power It is reported that the Indians established those Laws which they received from their ancient Philosophers the Gymnosophists Who taught that all were free and none were servants This they established by Law And so the Indians like the Lacodemonians had their Ephori and overseers chosen-out from amongst the common people and beside them there were some few chosen who in nobility and prudence exceeded all the rest who were interested in governing and ordering all the great affairs both of King and Kingdom Diod. rer an t lib. 3. cap. 10. In like manner the Egyptians as in the heroick times so in after-times they most precisely subjected their Kings to Law Diod. ant lib. 2. cap. 3. For as in old both the King and the Kingdom were governed and regulated by Pretors so afterward out of their chiefest Cities Heliopolis Memphis and Thebes the best men were chosen to sit in Judgment and to over-rule all not inferiour to the Athenian Areopagites nor to the Lacedemonian Senatours Amongst the Grecians there were severall Kingdoms wherein the Regall power was hemmed-in by the hedges of Law in after-times after the dayes of the Heroes Which maketh Aristotle say that in after-times the power of Kings was weakned and subjected to the People partly by the peopl's detracting from their power and partly by the King 's own voluntary dimission Polit. 3. cap. 10. We have examples of these not only amongst the Grecians but also among other nations The Athenians diminished the power of their Kings after the Codrids had become lecherous soft and effeminate At that time they changed their Kings into Princes whom they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Heracl de Pol. Ath. But it seemeth very probable that then they rather changed the name then the power of their Kings for long before the race of Codrus was extirpated Theseus had restored liberty to the Athenians and as is said already had erected a Commonwealth amongst them Which appeareth to have lasted during both the time of the Kings and likewise of the Princes And consequently seeing there was a Common-wealth in both their times there could be no difference in their power But that we may give an exact and punctuall answer to this pre-occupation you shall take notice of the different condition of the Athenian Commonwealth and of the changes thereof First before Theseus reign we do not imagine otherwise but that the Athenians were governed not onely by a Kingly government Ber. art lib. 5. Maneth de reg Egypt lib. Heracl de Pol. Ath. but also their Kings then were of a vaste and absolute power according as the power of the Kings used to be in the dayes of the Heroes Arist Pol. 3. cap. 10. and 11. Secondly under Theseus reign the power of the Kingly government was much impaired Then the people were restored to liberty and got power in their hand as is said already Therefore Euripides faith that the Athenians under Theseus did not come under the yoke of one man but the people as free men governed like a King by course In Thes Yet we must not imagine that then there was a perfect and entire Commonwealth erected No verily for Theseus remained notwithstanding as their Prince and as one having greater authority then any Patriot and Commonwealth's-man I will not say that Theseus retained a power in his hand equall to the power of the People and their Representative That is expresly against what Euripides and others above-cited do report But this much I may say that he retained as much power in his own hand as made him superior and of greater authority then any one at-least whether of the Councel or of the People And that he was the first man in dignity and authority in the Commonwealth is clear 1. Because as both Aristotle and Plutarch report he remained notwithstanding the Prince of the Commonwealth Therefore even unto this day he is reckoned-up in the Catalogue of the Athenian Kings 2. Because he differenced between the Patricians whom we call gentle-men tillers of the ground and Crafts-men giving to them power according to their ranks and stations investing some of them with greater and some of them with lester power and consequently seing he differenced one kinde of persons from another in the Commonwealth making some of them in authority Superiour to others much more hath he retained a power in his own hand whereby he was differenced from any amongst all the rest 3. Because the Codrids and those who succeeded him were properly called Kings and therein they are contra-distinguished from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Princes and diametrally opposed to them But I conceive that there was greater reason why Theseus was a King then they were He was heroick and not so were they Yea Heraclid in plain terms faith that Kings were not abrogated from amongst the Athenians till the posterity of Codrus became effeminate and lecherous At which time faith he they were taken-away and Princes put in their room Observe therefore that from Theseus untill the last of the Codrids the Athenian Monarchy was regulated We establish the point thus 1. Because Theseus himself as is proved already was regulated Ergo far more Codrus and his posterity were regulated Theseus was of an heroick temper such as were not the Codrids And so by nature he was more disposed for an absolute way of governing then they He lived in an heroick time wherein Monarchy was most in request
Athenian Kings were differenced from the Athenian Princes so it is most probable that after such a manner these three foresaid kindes of Athenian Princes were differenced each-one from another and therefore it is alledged that a Commonwealth was not erected amongst the Athenians till annuall Princes were set over them Which maketh the Princes of the first and second kinde though not of the third to be reckoned up as Kings Yet they must give me leave to say that though the Athenian Common-wealth was not fully and compleatly established till the up-setting of annuall and yearly Princes notwithstanding in some degree or other there was ever a Commonwealth amongst them from the dayes of Theseus untill some of their annuall Princes began to usurp and brought them under bondage for not onely as is said already their Princes of the third kinde but also their Kings and Princes of the first and second fort were subjected to Law and the people had a ruling power over them And so all of them had the like power according to the effentiall frame of a regulated and non-absolute power though the Kings had a more vaste authority and might extend their power further according to Law then the Princes and those of the first kinde then the Princes of the second or at least of the third kinde Even-as Majors v. g. have greater power then Alder-men and Alder-men then Counsellours Howsoever we find that the Princes of the third kinde are also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as well as the rest They are said to have had the power of the battell and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the sacrifices He who had this power is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King Thus we finde that he had that same power which the Lacedemonian Kings had But it is afterward shewed that such were proper though not absolute Kings Well I regard not though you esteem not such as Kings properly so called I lose nothing by this If we argue from examples of former and ancient Commonwealths then have we the Athenian and Lacedemonian Republicks as presidents of a popular government and Common-wealth Friend this is the mark we drive most at in the matter in hand Those Princes who governed as Kings did usurp a greater power then what according to the fundamentall government of the Kingdome and the institution of Theseus did belong to them So Cylon endeavoured but his attempt was choked in the bud Herod lib. 5. Thucid. lib. 1. Herac. de Pol. Ath. Cic. de leg Phutar de Sol. But what he intended Pisistratus acted as is storied by the same authors together with Diogenes Laertius Valerius maximus and Diodore And that usurpation continued untill Thrasybilus and Rhinon's dayes These did vindicate the liberty of the Athenians against those tyrants who did keep them under bondage Herac. de Pol. Ath. Val. max. lib. 4. cap. 1. lib. 5. cap. 6. Aemil. Prob. de Thras And so their government turned meerly popular and became an even-down Commonwealth Alex. ab Alex. lib. 4. cap. 23. And as for these Princes we deny not nor can we say otherwise but they had not onely as great but also greater power then any of the Athenian Kings whether Theseus or any King that succeeded him And that they were of equall power at-least is evident for they did reign not as Princes but as Kings Her de Polit. Ath. And Pisistratus one of these usurping Kings in his Epistle to Solon saith plainly that he walked according to Solon's Lawes differing in nothing from the people but in honour and dignity But he addeth that he took upon him that power which the Athenians conferred upon Codrus and his posterity And in this he acknowledgeth that he sailed and had such a power not by the Law of the Kingdom but by a Law of his own making Whence it is evident that Pisistratus by usurpation took upon him as great power as did Codrus or any of his race Yea and that they had greater power is also clear for Justine storieth That after Codrus while-as the Administration of the Republick vvas given over into the hands of yearly Magistrates the King's lust became the People's law Thus he telleth us that in the times of defection and vvhile-as corruption entered the State of Athens Kings became absolute and vvere of an arbitrary povver Post Codrum administratio Reipublicae annuis Magistratibus permissacst Sed Civitatinnullae Leges tune erant quia libido Regum pro legibus habebatur And aftervvard he speaketh how they vvere reformed by Solon and hovv Pisistratus and others vvho succeeded him did tyrannize over them Lib. 2. Solon looked upon the Athenians under Pisistratus reign albeit he governed according to Solon's Lavvs as under the yoke of bondage 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. And it is reported that Cleon and those who followed him destroyed the Commonwealth Great tyranny there indeed and arbitrariness of power Her de Pol. Ath. Thus we see clearly how that not onely Kings in after-times were regulated and in all things subjected to Law but also as some of the Athenian Princes were inferiour so some of them were superiour to the Athenian Kings In Corinth the Kingly Government was also regulated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Herac. de Pol. Corinth i.e. Periander first changed the Commonwealth taking to himself a guard and at last appointing to himself a Senate Now you must not think that this Senate had not power over Periander 1. Because that Senate cannot properly be called a Senat wherein the King hath a negative voice It is but at the most a cypher far from the nature of Senates that were in old amongst the Athenians Carthaginians c. 2. Because Periander in his Epistle to Solon advised at him what he should do in securing himself from those who went about to kill him And Solon in his Epistle to him advised him to lay-down his lording power It is very easie to know what hath been the cause why his own subjects endeavoured to cut him off for it is reported of him that he was the first King who went conveyed with a guard of Souldiers Whereupon he suffered none to live in the City This could not but irritate his subjects against him and make them conspire against his life See Herod lib. 5. Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. Periand Herac. de Pol. Corin. Thra. sibulus counsel was just contrary to Solon's He desired him to spare none whether friend or foe but cut all off Which he did indeed as Herodot reporteth But we must think that he advised with Solon after he had put in execution Thrasibulus counsel for Solon in his Epistle to him telleth him That the way to secure himself in his Kingdom was not to cut-off any but to lay-down his lording power over them This infinuateth that he had followed Thrasibulus counsel and had cut-off his subjects before either Solon wrote to him or he had
lording and tyrannick power to be given to the King nor did he put such power in the people's hand as to beget jealousie and envie against the kingly power And Aristotle saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 10. i.e. The Kingly Power in the Laconick Commonwealth is most restricted to Law for it hath not a vaste and arbitrary power This maketh him say Pol. 2. cap. 7 9. That the Kingly Power was subjected to the People and the Ephori had the greatest power in the Commonwealth Which commeth just to that which Heraclid saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 De Pol. Laced i.e. The Lacedemonian Ephori had the greatest power in the Commonwealth Xenophon likewise faith That the King did swear monethly to the People to govern according to Law De Rep. Lac. lib. And Nicolaus Damascenus That he did swear to govern according to Law before he got the Crown 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 De Mor. Gent. Laced And how great the power of the Ephori the Representative of the People was over all the rest of the Magistrates in the Commonwealth you may learn it from Plat. de Leg. lib. 4. Isoc Pan. Plut. de Civil Instit Whereupon faith Xenophon they had power of deposing imprisoning and judging even to the sentence of death the rest of the Magistrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 De rep Laced lib. And because of the vastness of their power over the rest of the Magistrates they did at their own hand imprison and condemn Agis their King Plut. in Ag. In this they went against the Law of the Nation because according to it they had only power to judge and sentence their King while-as the King of the other family did sit upon the Bench with them Pausan Lacon But they without the concurrence of any at their own hand did imprison and sentence Agis The power of the Lacedemonian King is taken-up in these notions 1. At home he had charge of the sacrifices Arist Pol. 3. cap. 10. Herod lib. 6. Xenoph. de rep Lac. lib. of ordaining Magistrates and Priests and of dismissing Messages whether friendly or hostile See Herod Xenoph. ibid. But Xenophon faith That at home he had but the honour of a private man 2. From home and in the battel he was first and had the chief hand in managing the matters of the war So say the forecited Authours Inst 1. The Lacedemonian Monarchy saith Salmasius was peculiar All other Monarchies beside were absolute and of an uncircumscribed power though some were more intense and some more remisse And saith he the Lacedemonian Kings were rather General Captains then Kings Therefore Aristotle defineth their power to be a power of commanding the battel from a perpetual title of birth-right Pol. 3. cap. 10.14 Yea and though the Lacedemonian Ephori did cut-off Agis yet not withstanding the people did abominate and detest that fact Def. Reg. cap. 8. Wherefore the man doth esteem the annual Carthaginian Kings properly not to have been Kings Otherwise saith he the Judges of Israel may also properly be called Kings for they had that same power which the Carthaginian Kings had The one were called Sophetim and the other Sufetes Both which come to one purpose And yet saith he the Scripture calleth the Judges of Israel Kings Judg. 18. But this must be taken in an improper sense And so he concludeth that Probus doth call the Carthaginian Sufetes Kings improperly Def. Reg. cap. 7. Ans We do much wonder at the man who is not ashamed to say that all Monarchies besides the Lacedemonian were absolute and unsubjected to Law We have evinced the contrary of that already having shewed from the examples of many Commonwealths that Kings were no lesse subjected to Law then any of the people And in this the manner of Royall Power amongst the Romans is not wanting The power of the King was subjected to the Senate Rex ad Senatum referebat Pomp. Let. de mag Rom. i.e. The King had his referres to the Senate Penes hoc quidens senateres adeo semper totius Reipublicae summa innixaest ut ne Reges quidem Consules aut Dictatores aut alius quispiam magistratus inconsulto Senatu quippiam moliretur Fenest de mag Rom. i.e. The sum and head of the whole Commonwealth did ever so depend from these senatours that even Kings Consuls or Dictators or any other Magistrate did not enterprise any thing without consulting the Senat. Senatores velutipresides Reipublica custodes tanta authoritatisfuere ut si populus Regem aut magistratum quempiam jussisset id sic ratum foret si Senatus author fieret Alex. ab Al. lib. 4. cap. 11. i.e. The Senatours as Praesidents and keepers of the Republick were of so great authority that if the people had commanded the King or any Magistrate that accordingly should be ratified if the Senat authorized it See also Liv. lib. 1. Dionys lib. 2. Digest lib. 1. tit 9. Luci. Ann. lib. 1. cap. 1. Plut. in Romul Aye which is more Dictatours whereof Julius Caesar was one who amongst the Romans were of greater power then Kings were subjected to the Tribunes for it is reported that M. Fabius appealing from L. Papyrius Dictatour to the Tribunes by their authority exempted his son 2. Fabius from pun shment Alex. de Alex. lib. 1. Well we shall not alledge that the Tribunes the Representative of the people had greater authority positively in exercising acts of Law then the Dictatours for not onely Alexander ab Alex. lib. 1. Geni di cap. 3. lib. 4. cap. 23. lib. 5. cap. 2. but also Pomponius Let. de magist Rom. and Fenestella de mag Rem lib. alt do plainly say that in respect of positive authority the Dictatours were above the Tribunes and there was no appellation from them Yet all of them say that in respect of negative authority the Tribunes were above Dictatours Consuls and all the rest of the Roman Magistrates because they had power of interdicting and discharging all the rest of the Magistrates Dictatours or any other from undertaking any thing as they judged sit and expedient should neither be acted-for nor against And so having this power de jure as is condescended upon by Alexander himself and all others I admire why Alexander maketh any question concerning M. Fabius appellation from the Dictatour to the Tribunes for so he did not appeal to them as to judges of greater authority then the Dictatour but as to propugnatours and defenders having a power of inhibiting what was done as they judged amisse by the rest of the Magistrates Albeit they had not a main voice in judging wherein the power of the Dictatour was above their's and in descerning yet had they a main voice in defending approving and disapproving And whereas this man alledgeth that Aristotle is of his judgement he is close mistaken For Aristotle doth not define the Laconick Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the power of the battell according to a
relative to the Carthaginian annuall Kings Yet I must needs say that as it is taken strictly and by way of limitation with very good reason it may be referred to the Roman consuls for they had that same power which the Carthaginian Kings had and both of them were yearly Magistrates Having thus discussed the grammary of the word you may observe that in it's first acceptation it is not onely relative to those who in old were above Kings but also to those who were inseriour to them And in the second acceptation it is relative to such who amongst the Carthaginians were both re and nomine Kings and amongst the Romans to such who were Kings not nomine but re But if we take sufetes precisely for sophetim unlesse you take sophetim in a larger sense then it is taken in the book of the Judges you must needs say that it is onely relative to such who were Kings neither re nor nomine for afterward I shall make it appear that the Judges of Israel were so far from being of a Kingly power that contrariwise they were but of equall authority with any of the Sanhedrin At least it is easy to prove that they were not of a Kingly power or of such power as had the Roman consuls and the Carthaginian sufetes albeit we should say that they were the first of the Sanhedrin having greater power then any of the rest for the Athenian annuall Princes had more power then any member of the Athenian councel and yet they were not properly Kings We may say the like also concerning the decennal Princes and those Princes who amongst the Athenians did govern for their life-time I deny not but these may be yea and were called Kings who were not so indeed as the Judges of Israel Judg. 18 And we deny not as Salmasius will have it Def. reg cap. 8. but many both of old and new also were and are not called Kings who were and are of greater honour authority then they What then This will never conclude that the Carthaginian sufetes were not of a Kingly power Though the word sufetes may be taken for sophetim yet shall we never conclude therefrom that the Carthaginian sufetes had no more Power then the Judges of Israel At the most it concludeth that they had not a kingly power in a full and intense measure And therefore the word in its most native signification is all one with Consules who had a kingly power though not in the highest degree And for my-self I can find no essential difference between the Carthaginian Sufetes and the Lacedemonian Kings Whereupon I am made to conclude That as the one so the other also were of a kingly power This man looketh upon the off-cutting of Kings as a thing of another world even as if such a thing had never been practised before since the world began He telleth us of Agis how that amongst all the Lacedemonian Kings none was cut-off but he But in the interim he shall observe that though in the examples which we shall alledge to this purpose there be some of them which speak nothing of the off-cutting of Kings Yet all of them do speak of the punishment of Kings either one way or other And know likewise that in old Kingdoms in punishing of capital faults used diverse wayes of punishment Amongst the Indians the delinquent though guilty of the greatest crime got no more for his punishment but to be shaved at the King's command This was thought amongst them a capital punishment Nicol. Damasc de Mor. gent. Ind. Some Nations who dwelt about Cancasus on capital transgressours did execute banishment as a capital punishment They executed it instead of death It is reported That the Trallians thought it punishment enough to inflict upon a murderer if he did give a bushel or measure of Pulse to the friends of the defunct The Druids and Cercets for the greatest faults did no more but interdicted the delinquent from being accessory to the sacrifice The like punishment was also executed upon sacrilegious persons in Elephantine Ethiopia Alex. ab Al. gen di lib. 3. cap. 5. Where if the Reader shall be pleased a little to trouble his eyes he shall see how that some Nations in old according to the Laws of the kingdom in their punishments were most severe though against the smallest faults and some were not so but were most remisse in their punishment though against the greatest crimes Therefore Salmasius shall not think that those who did not punish their Kings with death were any more favourable to them then those who did bring them to the scaffold and cut-off their heads for he may see that amongst some Nations even a small punishment was thought capital We shall therfore think that the Egyptians of old in with-holding stately and glorious burials from their delinquent Kings did esteem that as great if not a greater punishment then if they should have brought them forth and caused cut-off their head Diod. rcr an t lib. 2. cap. 3. In Meros they withdrew themselves from the society of their delinquent Kings till through want of company they consumed away in languish This they esteemed a greater punishment and indeed so it was then if they should have brought him to the scaffold Alex. ab Alex. lib. 3. cap. 5. And how the Egyptians plagued Amasis their King is storied already Prop. 1. Ans The Senate amongst the Cumâ—ans which they called Phylactus holding their Kings by the hand still detained them till they either rewarded them or punished them according to their deserts Alex. ab Alex. ib. The heroick Theseus was banished by the Athenians Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Diod. Sic. rev an t lib. 5. cap. 5. Plut. in Thes Sardanapalus because of his beastliness and sensuality was dethroned by his subjects Arist Po. lit lib. 5. cap. 10. Metasth an Pers lib. Just lib. 1. Diod. Sic. ant lib. 3. cap. 7. And as Herodotus lib. 1. storieth after Sardinapalus was put out of the way both the Assyrians and Medes for a long time were governed without Kings by Popular government The Athenians did cut-off Cylon together with his complices who intruded himself upon the Kingdom or at least endeavoured to do so So did they cut-off Hipparchus son to Pisistratus and also endeavoured the off-cutting of Thessalus another of his sons who succeeded to him in the Kingdom They did also cut-off Cleon together with 1500 with him who had destroyed the Commonwealth Herac. de Pol. Ath. They caused Miltiades to die in ptison although he was King of Chersonesus Hered lib. 6. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Aemil. Prob. in vit Miltiad Plut. in vit Cim And you will find Aristotle tell you in the general concerning Pisistratus and his posterity who were Kings in Athens how they were punished and shut from their Kingdom Pol. 5. cap. 10. Leonidas King of Lacedemonia was banished So was Cleombrotus And Agis was imprisoned and cut-off in
And why shall we think other wayes of it seing the Conquerour came not to the Crown of England by blood-right but by meer Conquest having the whole Kingdom of England against him And Polydore saith Hinc colligere licet vel Edovardum non servasse sidem Gulielmo quam à principio de hereditate regni non satis considerate dedisset vel nullum qnod verisimilius est fecisse promissum Angl. hist lib. 8. This he gathereth from that which Edward spake to Haraldus whileas he prayed GOD that either he would avert the comming of England into the Conquerours hand or else that he would keep him back from it so long as he lived Therefore to me it is more then apparent that the Confessour did not in his Testament assigne the Conquerour to the Crown albeit Salmasius alledgeth the contrary Def. Reg. cap. 8. What Doth not Polydore tell us that because Edgarus was of young and tender years he was not admitted by the people to reigne And fearing lest the Conquerour should succeed to the Crown they rejoyced greatly that Harald took upon him to reigne in Edward's room Whereat as may be learned from Polydore Edward was not displeased himself but very well satisfied that Harald should succeed to him Whereupon we fear not to say that not onely the power of enkinging was in the people's hands but also that the Confessour did not promise the Kingdom to the Conquerour after him although the contrary be alledged And is it likely that the people would have so much declined and withstood the Conquerour if Edward had assigned him to the Crown as his heir No verily for they adored him as their Law-giver It is known that Rufus was but third son to the Conquerour and yet he was created King Him the people preferred before Robert his eldest brother What Would they have done so if blood-right by the Law of the Kingdom had been the title to the Crown No verily It is remarkable that Rufus was ordained King and it was not so much as objected that Robert was elder then he he being but the third son to the Conquerour and Robert being the eldest Yea Rufus dying without children they appointed Henry the Conquerours fourth son King as yet passing-by Robert the eldest And which is more though Henry 1. had left in his Testament his daughter Mathildis together with her sons as heirs of the Kingdom yet not withstanding the people created Steven Nephew to Henry 1. By the authority of Parliament it was ordained that Steven so long as he lived should enjoy the Kingdom of England and that Henry 2. son to Marthilais daughter to Henry 1. should succeed to Steven in the Kingdom of England passing by any that was begotten by Steven Likewayes the people created John King although K. Richard dying without heirs had lest Arthure son to Gaufredus who was elder then John heir to the Crown I might speak more for clearing this putpose but I forbear judging this sufficient Whence it is more then evident that the Crown of England since the dayes of Edward the Confessour by no Law of the Kingdom is hereditary I confesse since that time now and then the Kings eldest son did succeed and was holden as Heir of the Kingdom But this was onely by custome through favour of the Race in which according to the manner of Nations which I must needs call an abuse very ordinarily the first-born is preferred as the onely lawfull Heir of the Crown Therefore seing the Crown of England since that time hath not been at least precisely hereditary to me it seemeth very probable that for that time it hath not been absolute and arbitrary for so the original and fountain-power of enkinging is in the People's hands And consequently in this respect the People are simply above the King as the cause is simply above its effect Philosophers say That can a est nâ—bi◠〈◊〉 effect 〈◊〉 And so seing the King of England dependeth from the People no question they have simply a power over him and not he an absolute power over them Secondly Because according to these Laws the liberty of the subject is vindicated and the Prince is subjected to Law Because in Henry 1. his time a Parliament was holden At which time Parliamentary Power by the Law of the Kingdom was declared the Supream and highest Authority for any thing of weight was referred to it So that whatsoever was done either by the command of the King or of the People it was holden null unlesse it had been ratified by the Parliament In it every one whether King or other Members thereof have alike and equal power of speaking And withall nothing spoken in it is of validity and force unlesse it be concluded on by the major part together with the approbation of the King Polyd. Ang. hist lib. 11. It is observable That by the authority of the Parliament it was ordained That Steven so long as he lived should remain King of England and that Henry 2. afterward should succeed him By whose mediation and authority the debate between Henry and Steven touching the Crown was decided And I pray you how could these things have been unlesse the Parliament had been above the King Inst 4. But saith Salmasius the power of convocating and dissolving the Parliament belongeth to the King of England The power of the Parliament is extraordinary and pro-tune But the power of the King is ordinary and perpetual And likewise the King of England in Parliament hath a negative voice And therefore in many Acts of Parliament he is called the King and Lord of the Parliament and what is ordained is enacted in his Name And so saith he though the King of England doth act according to the Laws of the Kingdom and concurrence of his Parliament yet notwithstanding he is an absolute King Otherwise the Kings of the Jews had not been absolute who had power to do nothing without the consent of the Sanhedrin And Artaxerxes had not been absolute who could not be reconciled to Vasthi because the Law discharged it Yea if Kings were not absolute because they act according to the Law and the advice of their Parliament then Cambyses had not been absolute who conveened a Councel whileas he intended to marry his german sister and demanded of them if there was any such law for allowing such a marriage Def. Reg. cap. 8. 9. Answ Salmasius shall do well to consider these few things 1. What the power of the English Parliament is Which is defined by Camdenus to be made-up of three Estates having the highest and most sovereign power in making Laws confirming Laws annulling Laws interpreting Laws and in doing every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is concerned Brit. chorog de Tribun Ang. This is far from Salmasius mind who Def. Reg. cap. 9. opinionateth that the Parliament hath not power over every thing in the Kingdom But Polydore summeth-up the power of the Parliament under these notions First
Charta and de Foresta subject the King to Law And because that Henry 3. did not stand to the maintenance thereof after he had given his Oath at a Parliament at Oxford to maintain them inviolable therefore the People took up Arms against him till after many debates between them they caused him often to promise that they should be inviolably observed as well by him as by all other Thus they tied not only him but also his heirs to govern according to the ancient Laws of the Kingdom And because Edward 2. did act against these Laws following the counsel of Peter Gaveston and the two Spensers therefore he was imprisoned and dethroned after several conslicts between him and the People 'T is remarkable that the People refused to crown him till firstly he did put P. Gaveston from him And likewise Edward 5. was deposed after he had reigned two moneths and eleven dayes and was obscurely buried in the Tower of London Where then I pray you is the absoluteness of the King of England Inst 6. Under Edward 4. saith Salmasius it was enacted That the King might erect a publick Judgment-seat by his Letters patent in any part of the kingdom he would Under Henry 7. it was enacted and declared That the King had a full power in all Causes in administring Justice to every one In the first year of Edward 6. a Statute was made declaring all authority both Spiritual and Temporal to be derived from the King Def. Reg. cap. 9. Answ I must needs say This hath more colour of probation then any thing the man as yet hath objected But not withstanding this he will do well to observe this distinction 1. What is given to the King by way of complement and Court-expression 2. What is giving to him in reality and by way of action The truth is in the first notion there is as much ascribed to the King of England as if he had been indeed an absolute Prince On him you have these Court-Epithets The King of the Parliament The sovereign Lord of the Parliament Yea and the Parliament is called The Parliament of the King He is called The Original both of Spirituall and Temporal power having full power over all causes and persons and to crect Judicatories in any part of the kingdom where he pleaseth This is spoken But what then Examine the matter aright and you will find it but spoken What cannot Court-Parasites and flattering Councellors passe a fair compellation upon their Prince 'T is the least thing they can do to bring themselves in credit with him Read the Parliamentary Acts of Scotland and you will find just as much spoken if not more of the King of Scotland In Parl. 18. Jam. 6. Act. 1. 2. James 6. is called Sovereign Monarch absolute Prince Judge and Governour over all Estates Persons and Caâ—ses And yet who dare say but the King of Scotland according to the Law of the kingdom is a regulated and non-absolute Prince But according to the second notion let us examine the strength of these Epithets And so in the first place we fall a-discussing particularly these three Sanctions of which Salmasius speaketh The first faith That the King by his Letters patent may erect Court-Judicatories in any part of the Kingdom where he pleaseth This will never conclude that the King of England hath an absolute power This Act only speaketh of his power of calling inferiour Judicatories What is that to the purpose The King of England had power to call and dissolve the Parliament the highest Judicatory of the Land Yea Henry 1. did ordain and constitute the Parliament Yet notwithstanding that as is shewed already the King of England cannot be called absolute The King of Scotland hath power of giving-out Letters of Caption Parl. Jam. 2. chap. 12. Courts of Regalities are justified by the King's Justice chap. 26. And the Parliament petitioned the King to cause execute the Act anent the Establishment of Sessions for executing Justice chap. 65. The power of the Colledge of Justice is ratified and approved by the King Jam. 5. Parl. Edinb Mar. 17.1532 But who will therefore call the King of Scotland an absolute King The second Sanction giveth the King full power over all persons and all causes But I pray you doth this give the King power over the Parliament and Laws No verily It only giveth the King power over all persons and estates separatim but not conjunctim as conveened in parliament Which cometh just to that which Aristotle faith alledging that the King hath power over all seorsim but not conjunctim Polit. 3. cap. 11. And he is said to have a full power not because his power is absolute and boundlesse Verily it must not be taken in a simple and absolute notion but in a relative and comparative sense It doth not imply the exemption and immunity of the King from Civill and Politick subjection to Law But at the most it pleadeth for exemption to him from forraine power and subjection to forrain laws This is evident by comparing this sanction under Henry 7. with stat 18. Rich. 2. ch 5. Where it is declared that the Crown of England is free without subjection to any other Crown but is onely subject immediatly to GOD in every thing which relateth to the managing of it's Affairs The like is spoken Henry 8. Par. 24. So we find the like fulnesse of power pleaded-for to the King of Scotland ITEM It is thought expedient that since our Soveraign Lord hath full jurisdiction and free empire within his Realm that his Highnesse may make Notares and in time to-come that no Notare made nor to be made by the Emperour's authority have faith in Contracts Civill unlesse he beapproved by the King's highnesse Jam. 3. parl ch 38. This exemption is pleaded for to the King of Scots from subjection to the Imperiall Lawes But who I pray you for this will conclude the King of Scots to be an absolute Prince having immunity and freedome from all Lawes whether muncipall and Country-Lawes or sorensick and forrain And as for the third sanction the words whereof be these Omnem authoritatem spiritualem temporalem derivari a Rege you shall be pleased concerning it to observe this distinction There be two termes in the act it-self one concerning temporall and another concerning spirituall power We begin at temporall power The King may be called the originall of it two wayes 1. Formally i.e. as if all temporall power were therefore authoritative and juridicall because of the Kingly power it being only in it-self effentially authoritative and commanding This we deny to be the sense of the sanction in respect of temporall power It is not onely repugnant to Magnacharta the ancient Lawes of the Kingdom the nature of Parliaments appointed and ordained in Henry 1. his time to the oaths and promises of Rufus Henry 1. their successoursto act and govern according to Law but also to the ordinary practices of the
Estates who in maintenance of their Liberties and the ancient Laws of the Kingdom did rise in armes against their Kings and caused them nilled they willed they to subject their necks to the yokes of Law Amongst other of their practices this is very remarkable that albeit they had saluted Ludovick as their King and put him in the room of John yet notwithstanding in the end they declined him and in his stead crowned Henry 3. John's son This speaketh much of the States power above the King 2. Virtually It cannot be denied but in this notion all temporall power dependeth from the King And that two wayes effectively and vindicatively Effectively because the King of England had not onely power of conveening dissolving the Parliament of ordaining inferior Judicatories but also by him the Parliament of England was firstly instituted and ordained Vindicatively because it was his part to patronize and execute the acts of Parliament at least as the main and prime man of maintaining and defending them The like power the Kings of Scotlana had also as is clear from their Acts of Parliament But as for the spirituall power of the King of England I stand not much to confesse that he had a formall and Ecclefiastick power in Church-matters and that what power the Church so called had was derived from him It cannot be denied but before the conquest there were Ecclesiasticall Laws made by many Kings of England as Inas Alfred Edward the elder Gythrum Ethelstane Edmund Edgar Aetheldred Canutus and others In the interim this Gentleman shall do well to observe that the King of England had not alwayes this power It cannot be denied but Lanfrancus Anselmus and Berket going to complain on their Kings and Governours firstly brought the Pope's judiciall authority from Rome into England both over King and people Which supremacy of the Pope over the Church of England untill in and about Henry 8. his dayes who did shake-off the Pope's yoke did continue And so Edward 6. succeeding to him to me it is more then probable that by the scresaid sanction made in his time the ancient power of the Kings of England in Church-matters was taken out of the Pope's hands and put upon the King And it cannot be denied but according to Edward the Confessour's Lawes the King of England had a primary formall and Ecclesiastick power in Church-matters I stand not to grant that But what though I should say that according to this statute made in Edward 6. his time the King of England had a primary and originall power and that formally both in respect of spirituall and temporall jurisdiction yet will it onely conclude an absolutenesse of the King according to Law but not against it It no wayes denudeth the people of a fountain-power to desend themselves against the unjust decrees and actings of the King The Roman dictatour had an absolute power in judging and yet it was lawfull for the people to repeal his acts in their own just defence Many times have the People of England defended themselves from their King and stood by their own liberties notwithstanding the King 's acting against them What I pray you is it for me to say that the King of England by this act is called the originall both of spirituall and temporall power under a formall notion Is he not called also the King and Sovereign Ford of the Parliament Is not the Parliament called his Parliament Is not every thing ordinarily acted and emitted under his name Is it not ordinarily said It is ordained by the King With the eonsent or at the desire of the three Estates It is very seldome said It is ordained by the King and Parliament But I pray you what be these but Court-complements They are words and nothing but words Go conser them with the practice of the Parliament and you shall finde the one just contrary to the other No wonder forsooth because the King getteth more honour then he hath power Trie this and you will find it an ordinary practice Aye which is more cannot a corrupt Parliament through the defection of the times give the King more then what is due to him either by the Law of GOD or by the law of the Nation Know we not that Parl. 18. K. Jam. 6. through the backsliding of the times did advance him to greater priviledges then the King of Scotland by the Law of the Kingdome had or can be warranted by the Law of GOD Indeed I will not say so of Henry 8. for it is known that in his young years he did put the managing of the Kingdom into the hands of the Princes as did others of his predecessors before him And as for Edward 6. I must needs say his times were better then any times of his predecessors But it appeareth to me that as both Henry and he have encroached very far upon the liberties of the Church so called so did they encroach too far upon the liberties of the State But leaving Henry of whose power I find not so much spoken as of Edward I must tell you one thing concerning Edward and it is this Those who write of him and namely Foxe do crie him up beyond all the Kings of England for piety wisdom and learning And Foxe runneth so far out in his commendation that he esteemeth him inferiour to no King though worthy to be preferred to many Whereupon he feareth not to match him with Josiah and put the qualifications of both in one ballance Which maketh me imagine that the foresaid act emitted in Parliament under Edward's reign did passe in his behalfe because of his personall endowments The like act upon that same ground though in respect of him it was meerly pretended without any reality in his person did passe Parl. 18. upon K. Iam. 6. Thus the case is extraordinary We denâ—e not but because of personall endowments Kings may be and have been advanced to greatest power What will this conclude an ordinary president thereof and a standing law therefore No verily There is no consequence from extraordinaties to ordinaties The standing ancient lawes both of England and Scotland are against absolute Princes Of scotland and of England we have spoken already at length Verily the example of Edward 1. though there were no more may serve to clear oâ—r purpose He to repair what was done amisse by his father Henry 3. who was at variance with the people touching the liberties of Magna charta and de foresta did much gratifie the people restoring them to great liberty and abrogating all lawes which did make for the bondage and slavery of the people Howsoever the matter be five sic five non these sanctions above-cited by Salmasius do conclude the Parliament to have power above the King The reason is because if we look precisely on these acts what power the King hath is from them They not onely declare but also they enact and ratifie his power to be such such And so the
which he citeth out of hist de monast Steph. Cadom in Norm i. e. I have acquired the Royall Crown which none of my ancestours did bear which the grace of GOD alone and not hereditary right bestowed upon me I constitute no heir of the English Kingdom but I recommend it to the eternall Creator whose I am and in whose hands are all things for I did not enjoy such a honour by hereditary right but by dire conflicts and great effusion of mans blood I took it from the perjured King Harald and subjected it to my dominion having killed or put to flight his favourers Thus Salmasius may see that he buildeth hereditary right to the Kingdom of England upon a sandy foundation in pleading for the undoubtednes thereof from what right the Conquerour had over it Let it be so the Conquerour himself had right to it by the sword yet in his fore-going latter-wil he shaketh all his succestors loose of any right to it by succession and casteth the disposition thereof wholly over upon GOD and the people Whence was it that as is said already the people did create Rufus king in his room and passed-by Robert his eldest son 'T is remarkable that no where it can be read that the Conquerour did tie the Crown of England to his posterity Salmasius cap. 8. maketh a fashion of proving it out of Malmsburiensis Hundingtonionsis and other English histortans who say nothing but that the Conquerour subdued England and caused the people swear allegeance and sidelity to himself No other thing can be read in them And no-where can salmasius find it that ever he did tie the people of England by bath both to himself and his posterity Neither dar Salmasies conclude any thing from these Historians directly He concludeth that but by the way because of the Conquerour's full and absolute subjecting of England to himself as indeed these Historians do report Yet friend this is but a stollen dint You lose more then you gain by it As for Camden he cannot be of Salmasius judgement unlesse he contradict himself From him we have said already that the power of the Parliament is above the King Therefore whileas he faith that the King of England hath supremam potestatem merum imperium it cannot be understood of the kingdom taken in a collective body And it is true indeed taking the people sigillatim one by one the King of England is above them all and interiour to none but to GOD. And in this sense he speaketh well nec praeter Deum superiorem agnoscit In this sense the latter part of Cokius words is to purpose Because of this superiority the 24. Parl. Henr. 8. passeth a fair complement upon him saying that the kingdom of England doth acknowledge none superiour to it under GOD but his majesty and that it is governed by no Laws but what were made within it-self by the tolerance of him and his progenitors Per tolerantiam tuce gratiae tuorum progenitorum Misalmasi it had been more for thy purpose if they had said Per authoritatom tuae gratiae tuorum progenitorum This soundeth no ordinative and effective but permissive and approbative power in the King Well let this passe the former part of Coktus words doth not speak of the absoluteneste of the King but of the kingdom of England Juxa tgitur lages bajus regni antiquas saith he hoc Angliae regnum absolutum est imperium De jur Reg. eccles He saith not Angliae Rex absolutus est imperiator There is a difference indeed between the King's power and the kingdom's power So much of England We come now in the next room to demonstrate the King of Scotland according to the Law of the Nation to be a regulated and non-absolute Prince This is so clear that we need not to speak any thing of it And it is so abundantly proved by our godly 81 dear Country-man Lex Rex quaest 43. that no man in it can go beyond him Therefore we shall only glance at it by comparing in some few particulars the Lacedemonian kingdome with the Scotish in subjecting their Kings to Law 1. As the Lacedemonian King did every thing according to Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 10 so the King of Scotland hath power to do no other wayes In the Parliament an 1560. the Nobility saith frequently to Q. Regent Regum Scotorum limitatum esse imperium nee unquam ad untus libiâ—inem sed ad legum praescriptum nobilitatis consensum regi solitum So it is declared Parl. at Sterl 1567. and 1578. concerning Q. Mary This was practised by Mogaldus who did all by the Parliament as the ancient custome was Whence the kings of Scotland had no power to do any thing without the advice and counsel of the Estates They had no power to establish or abrogate laws according to their pleasure This my dear Country-man proveth at length in the place above-cited In the interim take-alongst with you that decree made in Finnanâ—s Rex 10. his time viz That the king should enjoyn nothing of concernments but by the authority of Parliament and that they should not administer the Republick by private and domestick councell nor the businesses of the king and publick should be managed without advice of the fathers and that kings by themselves without the ordors of the fathers shires and governours should not make or break war peace or leagues 2. As the Lacedemonian king did bind himself by oath to govern according to the I awes of the kingdom Xenoph. de Repub. Laced N. Damasc de mor. gent. Laced so the king of Scots by Oath and Covenant is tied to do the like The plat-form of the king's coronation-oath is set-down K. James 6. Parl. 1. Whereby he is obliged to maintain the true Kirk of GOD and Religion now presently professed in purity and to rule the people according to the laws and constitutions received in the Realm causing justice and equity to be ministred without partiality This did both James 6. and Charles swear And that this is no new custome amongst the kings of Scotland you will find it more then abundantly proved by our learned Country-man in the place above-quoted 3. The Lacedemonian kings were subjected to the stroke of justice Which maketh Pausanias so to write of them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. Concerning the Lacedemonian King judgment was so ordered Twenty eight in number who were called Senatours were appointed to judge And with them did sit the Ephorick magistracy together with the King of the other family So the king of Scots was censured by the Parliament made up of three Estates His neck was brought under their yoke as my learned Country-man maketh good in the place fore-quoted And so as the Lacedemonians did cut-off and turn-out many kings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pol. 5. cap. 10. so the Scots in old did the like as is made good already See Lex Rex loc cit
according to or against Law That doth militate against the ground and motive of their call They are no otherwise called to govern according to their pleasure but as people expect their will shal bring forth the choicest Laws Whence precisely and formally their power both according to the subject and object thereof is restricted and kept within the bounds of Law But we cannot say so of absolute Monarchy acquired and conferred by extraordinary heroicism and such like And consequently we may very justly say that Aristotle referreth absolute Monarchy obtained because of personal endowments to the third species of Regal government and doth not refer absolute Monarchy because of extraordinary heroicism and such like to any species or kind of Monarchy he speaketh of The reason we say is this because any kind of Monarchy he speaketh of doth not exceed the bounds of Law But illimited Royal power conferred because of extraordinary qualifications precisely and formally doth not exceed the bounds of Law Whereas being conferred upon grounds of extraordinary heroicism purchase and such like precisely and formally the power thereof out-reacheth all Laws Thus we judge Aristotle's mind to be cleared concerning all the species and sorts of Monarchy summed-up by him I confesse Salmasius imagineth that Aristotle by Pambasilick or all-governing Monarchy doth mean arbitrary Monarchy having power to govern at random either according to or against Law But the Gentleman in this is a little mistaken for otherwise in the moulding of the King he had not required such conditions and limitations as he doth Which be these 1. That he should descend of such a race which in vertue and goodnesse should exceed all others Pol. 3. cap. 1 2. Whence is it that both there and Polit. 1. cap 3. he saith that the best according to nature over-ruleth that which is worse and lesse good 2. That the King himself should exceed the rest in vertue and goodnesse Yea but for a King to govern according to his own hearts lust even against Law and Reason there is no necessity of vertue and goodnesse seing illegality and injustice flow from a vicious and corrupt principle Therefore Aristotle in opposing Monarchy or Government laid upon one to Government carried-on and managed according to Law doth not insinuate an arbitrary power in the King having immunity and freedom from Law but in so doing he only opposeth the power of Government laid upon one to its power being laid upon many implying that as in this respect the Governour is subject to the rest and cannot act any thing of Law without their consent and assistance so in the other respect the Governour in carrying on things according to Law hath immunity from subjection to any other beside and in doing things legally may perform them without the interposition of any other man's authority Whence we see that Aristotle alloweth an absolute power in the king to act according to Law but not to act either according to Law or against it And therefore in so far he taketh these by the hand who deny Monarchy to be according to nature in as far as they contend that to be against Nature which is against Law Which maketh him conclude Tyranny to be against Nature it being against Law and Reason And consequently he doth not allow arbitrary power in the king to do either good or bad according to his pleasure He only pleadeth for power to the King which is according to Nature Justice and Utility He will have him a man excelling others in vertue and governing according to Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 12. Moreover it is contrary to the nature of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Aristotle expresseth cap. 11. to render it an arbitrary power There is a very great difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Howsoover he expoundeth it himself cap. 10. and defineth it to be a power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to govern the city and all the publick matters whether at home or abroad thus the man speaketh of a governing power but arbitrary power is a misgoverning power he speaketh of a power ordering and doing all things but arbitrary power is a power of misordering and undoing all things it doth not follow that because kings of old had power over all things Ergo they had power to dispose on them according to their pleasure Quasibero there were not an all-commanding power according to Law This consequence doth not immediately follow from the Antecedent It is a fallacy ab homonymia for there is a twofold all-commanding power one according to and another above Law 'T is therefore a poor shift to conclude an arbitrary power from an all-commanding power The original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth bear an arbitrary power only by way of analogy and it is known that the Roman Dictator had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power though not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing power Well let it be so that Aristotle saith That kings in ancient times had an arbitrary power a power above Law But I pray you what kings then doth he understand Either they are the Founders of the primary Colonies or the after-Heroes and Founders of the secondary Colonies If of the first kind ergo you gain just nothing We have granted that already Concl. 2. Their power was extraordinary If of the second kind we might also therein take you by the hand Howsoever with some distinction or other you have our mind cleared in this ibid. Therfore howsoever you understand the latter part of the fourth Species I lose nothing If you say that Aristotle only meaneth in it an all-commanding power according to Law then do I gain my purpose And if you suppose his meaning to be otherwise you learn from what foregoeth that I lose nothing Thus the case is extraordinary And I deny not but Royal power that way hath been arbitrary Yet you cannot deny but the first second third and fourth or the former part thereof Species of Monarchy do not speak a word of Royal power above Law Although Aristotle's words may bear this construction yet do we judge it were corresponding to his sense and meaning to put this sense upon them In the former part of the fourth Species he contradistinguisheth the times of the Heroes from the ancient times which he expresseth in the latter part thereof But the one being opposed to the other if we speak rigorously and properly by the ancient times can be nothing understood but the golden age which after the flood Ethnick Writers know no time before the flood lasted as some say 250 years and as others say with better warrant 131 years All which time if we speak properly and rigorously there was no kingly government at all for as is shewed already Concl. 3. there was no government then but natural and oeconomick In qua nullo ferente legem natura ipsa vivebatur Mnes Phoen. Damasc lib. 97. bist
tyrannous and usurping kings delight in cruelty They seek nothing but their own ease and if they act any thing according to Law it is only for the fashion as the tyrant Cambyses did in seeking his german sister in marriage What Such hold will for Law They know nothing but Hoc volo sic jubeo sit pro ratione voluntas Juv. Satyr 6. Such Kings do not judge according to the Law of the Kingdom Neither is there power according to the Law of the Kindom laid upon such What they do is done by themselves unanswerable to any They act will-way and not Law-way They were not judged because they did take power to themselves above all Law It cannot be denied but Salmasius concludeth well from 1 Son 8. and 2 Sam. 8. that the King of Israel judged Def. Reg. cap. 2. But he will do well to advert that though this be true Rex judicat concerning the King of Israel according to God's institution the Law of the Nation and the practice of some of their Kings yet this is as true Rex non judicat concerning the ordinary practice of their Kings And it is very observable that Jannoeus whom they called Alexander all the while he did reign over the people of the Jews acted nothing according to Law but tyrannized over them fos an t Jud. lib. 13. cap. 21.22 But in Gem. tract de Syned cap. 11. it is said that because of Jannoeus it was enacted that the king should neither judge nor be judged And if it be true that it was enacted then then do I not think that it was upon that fabalous ground which doth not so much as relish to Salmasius of which the Rabbinick writers speak but because of the tyranny and cruelty of the man who did not govern law-way but will-way And as Alexander so the tyrant Herod had an arbitrary power though we suppose it did depend much from the concession of Antonius Jos Ant. lib. 15. cap. 4. Conclus 3. The good Kings of the Jews because of personall endowments had exemption and immunity from Law This is manifest in the examples of David and Solomon There were two things chiefly in David which were against the Law 1. Multrplication of wives Whereof David had very many 1 Chr. 3. and 14.2 Murder upon the back of adultery 2 Sam. 11. And Solomon did many things contrary to the Law 1. He multiplied gold and silver 2. Horses and Charets 1 Kin. 10.2 Chron. 9.3 Wives And 4 he fell into adultery 1 Kin. 11. And yet we read no that either David or Solomon were judged therefore by the 〈◊〉 And what I pray you could be the reason of this Not because the king de jure hathimmunity from Law Nor because they over-awed the Sanhedrin by force of armes We read nothing of that And you shall not make me believe that the Sanhedrin durst not attempt the executing of justice upon them 1. You thereby put a great note of reproach upon David and Solomon You do no lesse then insinuate a disposition in them for rebellion if you alleadge that the Sanhedrin which de jure as both already and afterward doth appear had power over them durst not for fear of their resistance execute judgment on them That had been a disposition to resist the higer powers Which the Holy Ghost condemneth Rom. 13. And I will not think that such men had the Spirit of rebellion to repine against the execution of justice 2. We find that the Sanhedrin did execute justice on Amaziah And the people did so against Athaliah 2 Kin. 11.2 Chr. 23. Which maketh me think that it was not for want of power that David and Solomon were spared Other Kings of Judah were punished for their faults The Sanhedrin and people had power to execute justice on them And why not also on David and Solomon They were all Kings alike And it is very remarkable that after Solomon's death ten tribes declined the house of David because of Solomon's heavy exactions and tributes he laid upon the people 1 Kin. 12.2 Chr. 10. I believe they were as powerfull to revolt from Solomon as from Rehoboam And seing the people took so heavily with Solomon's yoke that therefore they did revolt from his son it maketh me think that the Sanhedrin did not spare him for fear of his power Verily both they and the people have born patiently with his slips and heavy impositions because of his rare and singular qualifications Otherwise I can see nothing for it why the people did not make a mutiny against and revolt from Solomon as against and from Rehoboam 3. Because as both already and afterward doth appear the Sanhedrin both according to GOD's institution and the Law of the nation had authority and jurisdiction above the king But sure I am it had been a very uselesse power if they durst not have exercised it It had been all one to have wanted that authority with wanting power to have put it in execution as occasion served And this had been a having and a non-having power Which is ridiculous and repugnant Neither can you alleadge that they were spared because then judicatories were altogether turned corrupt and knew not what it was to exerctse justice for that doth directly militate against the eminent Reformation both of Church and State that was under the reign of both these Kings Therefore seing David and Solomon were spared not because they were absolute nor because the people durst not execute judgement on them nor because the people and judicatories under their reign were altogether dissolute not knowing the way of exercising justice to me it is more then manifest that their delinquency was past-by because of their personall endowments The shining vertues and eminent graces that did appear in them no question have kept back the Sanhedrin from putting hand on them O! what a temptation would it be to me to voice for a David's off-cutting O! how much would my soul be grieved to sentence against a Solomon And shall not I think but those of the Sanhedrin were much taken up with the qualifications of these men as well as I could be with the vertues of such-like I cannot think that I am singular in this In the interim observe that my meaning is not that they had such a vast power as Salmasius dreameth of I do not think that ever the Sanhedrin would have spared them unlesse they could not have done otherwayes if they had turned positive and even-down tyrants and destroyers of the Commonwealth But onely my meaning is that because of their eminent qualifications they had immunity from Law in some notes of delinquency Neither do I speak that they had this priviledge de jure but de facto Thus you see that this is no argument for Royallists who object the Sanhedrin's sparing of David and Solomon as a ground of the King 's arbitrary power And in this none is more ready then Salmasius Def. Reg. cap. 5. But they shall
by the State for committing adultery with a privat woman and committing murder against a privat man And what if I should hold the negative of the Question as indeed I make it a great case and do spare to determine upon either of the parts at this time yet would Royallists gain just nothing The Question between them and us is this Whether or not the King is unpunishable by man though turned a positive tyrant and forthwith a destroyer of the Commonwealth Friends shew me the like practice in David and the Sanhedrin's sparing him notwithstanding and I shall yeeld to you Ye are so far from being able to do so that weighing David's murder in a square ballance you will find it lighter then is supposed for neither he nor his had formally but virtually a hand in the murder of Uriah This is far from a destroving of the People 'T is not like Nero's wish that all Rome had but one Neck that he might cut it off Now Royallists must object from the Sanhedrin's sparing a Nero. Otherwise they beat the air and change the state of the Question Conclus 4. The Kings of the Jews de jure had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power This we make good firstly from divine institution and God's moulding of the King Deut. 17. from which is already proved Subsect 1. Assert 2. That the power of the Jewiâ—h king is hedged-in by Law And Josephus on the place saith That he should do nothing without the consent and advice of the Priest and Sanhedrin Antiq. Jud. lib. 14. cap. 8. 'T is but vanity in Salmasius to clude Josephus speech saying That his meaning is only concerning the Kings of the Jews after the captivity Def. Reg. cap. 2. Is he not blind that seeth not this man's deceit Sure I am that which is spoken of the King Deut. 17. was spoken long before the Kings of the Jews after the captivity yea long before there was any King in Israel 'T is the very positive rule and pattern of all Kings And Josephus in the place above cited as it were commenting on Moses words giveth the meaning of them Nay but you shall further observe the fallacy of this Gentleman He studieth to put his own construction as most beseemeth his honour upon Josephus words And yet notwithstanding he refelleth Josephus and cannot rest satisfied with his own construction Yea which is more he sleeth cap. 9. to what Josephus saith as to a main ruth in respect of all the Kings of Israel both before and after the Captivity Then tell me what manner of man can he be who cap. 2. declineth from and cap. 9. enclineth to Josephus In the one place he plainly denieth That the Kings of the Jews whether before or after the Captivity were tied to do nothing without the consent of the high-Priest and Sanhedrin And yet in the other place he affirmeth the contrary But he loseth all his labour whether to deny what Josephus saith or to glosse it according to his own humour for as afterward is shewed Josephus was no friend to Monarchy And which is more what Josephus faith is the common judgment of Jewish Writers Rex obediat curioe senatus majoris i. e. The King let him be obedient to the authority of the higher Sanhedrin Deut. 17. Senatus major intersiciendi gladio jus habeat i.e. Let the higher Sanhedrin have the right and power of killing by the sword Exod. 21. Nemo sese opponat decretts sanctioris Senatus i.e. Let none withstand and resist the Statutes of the greater Sandedrin Deut. 17. R. Mos Egypt proec aff 176. and 225. proec neg 316. It cannot be denied but the Jewish King was regulated seing not only he was oblidged to give obedience to the higher Sanhedrin but also every one without exception was tied not to contraveen the Acts and Sentence thereof He had not so much as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 much lesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The power of the sword was not in his hand but in the Sanhedrin's Thus his power was restricted as was the authority of the Lacedemonian king and the power of other Kings as is spoken-of already at length Yea Maimonides faith Qui ex familia Davidis sunc judicant judicantur And so in expounding that Rexneque judicat neque judicatur cod San. cap. 11. he saith That it is true in respect of the Kings of Israel but not in respect of the Kings of Judah And in what sense it is true concerning the Kings of Israel is already explicated by us The Gematick Writers from these words Ob house of David execute judgment in the morning and deliver him that is spoiled out of the band of the oppressour Jerem. 21. move this Question Nisi in jus vocari póssent quomodo judicarent i. e. How could the house of David judge unlesse they were judged This they prove because in Scripture we are commanded to search and try our wayes i.e. as they say Corrige te ipsum deinde alios corrige Salmasius rageth at this and he denieth what they infer I shall not take it upon me to make good their consequences Let Salmasius impugn them as much as he will My purpose is only to shew That they are not of his opinion They are contented not only to say That the king of the Jews at-least of Judah as Salmasius himself out of Sichardus R. Lakises hath was subjected to Law but also they dispute for that and endeavour to enforce it by Arguments Secondly from their acting with the concurrence of their Princes And David consulted with the Captains of thousands and hundreds and with every leader And David said uuto all the Congregation of Israel If it seem good unto you let us send abroad unto our brethren that they may gather themselves unto us 1 Chron. 13. There is much in this If it seem good unto you This insinuateth that as David would not act without the advice and counsel of his people so his acting depended from their determination For the King had taken counsel and his Priests and all the Congregation in Jerusalem to keep the Pass-over in the second moneth He doth it not of his own head without advice And the thing pleased the King and all the Congregation It is a thing done by common consent So they established a decree Mark it is not said So the King established a decree But the Authority both of King and Princes is interposed The decree floweth from the joynt-joynt-authority of both Therefore it is added So the posts went with Letters from the King and the Princes 2 Chron. 30. They go not forth as commissioned only from the King but also from the Princes And it is most remarkable that which Zedekiah said unto the Princes The King is not he that can do any thing against you Jerem. 38. Ergo if the King could do nothing against the will of the Princes he had not an arbitrary power to dispose upon matters as he pleased Inst The
Jesephus ant Jud. lib. 6. cap. 40. is close of our judgment And Cl. Alexandrinus in plain termes saith That the Lord doth not promise them a King but threatneth them with a Tyrant And Salmasius though he leaneth to humane authority yet he standeth not to say That Clement and all who expound the words contrary to his mind do erre Def. Reg. cap. 5. I suppose the man is for nothing but what is for him Ex ungue Leonem But we have many moe Interpreters and Writers of our judgment Beda lib. 2. in expos Sam. Glos interl Hug. Card. Lvr. Cajet Serar Corn a lap Mend 〈◊〉 Tust Abul in 1 Reg. cap. 3. quest 17. Rebuf tract de incong Calv. in loc P. Mart. in Loc. Jun. Trem. Riv. Diod. Piscs Brent in loc So faith Buehanan de jur reg ap Scot. I confesse the Septuagints render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And this Salmasius runneth-to as to a strong tower withall further alleadging that sometime they translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Def. Reg. cap. 2. But he buildeth upon a sandy foundation We make not reckoning how the Septuagints elsewhere transsate it They do also in some places render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The word in it-self hath diverse significations But to our purpose we coutend that here it signifieth nothing but manner or custome And though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath it's arisal properly signifieth jus justitia and fas yet improperly it is called ritus mos and consuetudo It is said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hom. Odys And likewise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist de mun According to this latter sense we understand the meaning of the Seventy Thirdly we clear it evidently from the text it-self And that according to these reasons 1. Because the LORD commanded Samuel to describe to them the State and condition of the King to use it as a motive for disswading them from following-out such a desire Howbeit yet protest solemnly unto them and shew them the manner of the King that shall reign over them i. e. before thou shalt set a King over them thou shalt protest solemnly against it And in so doing thou shalt draw arguments and motives of disswading them from their purpose from the very condition and nature of the King that shall reign over them And R. Judas speaking on the place saith that what the LORD commanded Samuel to speak did serve to strike a terrour in the hearts of the people Salmasius vainly shisteth this as subtilly he expoundeth that of R. Jose Quicquid dicitur in capite de Rege eum Regum jus habere to relate to 1 Sam. 8. and not to Deut. 7. Def. reg cap. 2. Howsoever see what Josephus faith Now I command thee to make them a King Whom I shall design But before thou shalt do so forewarn them of the great evils that shall ensue thereupm and protest that in so doing they cast themselves loose of a good estate into a worse Ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. To this same purpose Brent speaketh more plainly and largely Hom. 26. in 1 Sam. cap. 8. Now tell me if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were to be understood concerning the office and right of the king how could Samuel have objected it as a disswading argument to alienate the people's minde from seeking after Kingly government Either he here speaketh of lawfull or unlawfull power If of lawfull power either he describeth to the people the good or the bad of it If the good ergo he did not protest against the power but whereas he should have disswaded the the people from seeking after it he tacitely perswadeth them thereto for how much more the excellency and goodnesse of a thing is pointed-out so much more it is desired-after And to say that Samuel did not disswade them therefrom but perswaded them thereto is to avouch that either he did argue against himself and militate against his own purpose or else that he acted contrary to his Commission from GOD. The LORD commanded him solemnly to protest and disswade them from their purpose He would have him to lay-out before their eyes the dangerousnesse of Kingly power to strike terrour in their hearts that they might forbear longer to desire it If you come to my hand and say that the Prophet in this place onely speaketh of unlawfull power or of the bad of a lawful power I obtain my desire I seek no more then that you say he speaketh here of the abuse and not the use of Kingly power And I trow the abuse of Kingly power is not the right but the wrong of it 2. Because the Prophet in describing the manner of the King setteth down acts of tyranny not of lawfull authority We take up the description it-self under a general and particular notion The generall Ye shall be his servants He shall beslave you and make you serve him according to this pleasure Which made Josephus say And that I way speak it in a word ye together with all yours shall serve the King no otherwaives then his own domestick servants Ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. See plain language in Brent to this purpose hom 27. in 1 Sam 8. The particular notion hath several parts in it Firstly in order to the King 's tyrannizing over the sons of the people He will take your sons c. As if he had said your King shall make you sonlesse He shall bâ—slave them to his service imploying some in one office and some in another And in all these employments whether base or not neither ye nor your sons shall be holden as frec-men but all the fruits of your labours shall turn-over into the King's privat advantage Whereupon Josephus himself bringeth-in Samuel speaking that he would declare to them who should be their king but adding that he would first shew them what things they would suffer under a king and with how great disadvantages they would live under him Therefore ye shall firstly know that he will take from you your children and he shall make some of them drivers of Chariots c. So that there shall be nothing which be shall not constrain them to do after the manner of bought slaves Ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. In this Josephus much agreeth with these words in the original text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in their proper rigorous signification are rendered he will quite take-away your sons But we judge it not to be an Act of Regal power but of meer tyranny to denude the parent altogether of his child and the King to dispose of him at his pleasure For this Brent gallantly speaketh loc cit Secondly In order to the King 's away-taking of the daughters of the people He will take your daughters to be confectionaries and to be cooks and to be bakers As if he had said He shall not only make you sonlesse but daughterlesse also And as he will make slaves of the one so
conducted them thorow the Red Sea he was as the mouth of God to them and by his favour with the Lord he furnished them with all necessaires in the wildernesse And it is known that the man was most eminently endowed matchlesse in his time Thus what Kingly power Moses had was not only accidentall but extraordinary Therefore it can be no ground to Royallists to build upon Conclus 2. After the institution of the seventy elders and the accomplishment of Jethro's counsell neither Moses nor any other of the Judges had a Kingly power Firstly The people desired Gideon to reign over them and offered to devolve the Kingdom over into the hands of his posterity And Gideon refused to do so and embraced not their offer Judg. 8. And he addeth this as the reason of his deniall The LORD shall rule over you As if he had said Neither I nor any of my posterity can take upon us to reign over you as your Kings Ye are the LORD' 's peculiar people Of whom the LORD hath a most special care Any that rule over you must be deputed by God in an extraordinary way They must take the word at his mouth ruling over you by an immediat dependency from him Now tell me whether or not was Gideon King at this time If he was King ergo he refused to embrace the power which he had And that is ridiculous If he was not King I obtain the point Again either they offered to Gideon a Kingly power or not If a Kingly power ergo either Gideon was not King or else by way of gratification they offered him the power which he had already And that had been in them greater impertinency then courtesie Yea they had dealt altogether ridiculously And sure I am Gideon had never answered them so as he did if he had had such power He had positively denied to enjoy that which really he did enjoy And that they did offer him a Kingly power is manifest 1 Because the word in the Originall text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth to lorde and govern in a kingly way Gon 4 37. Dan. 11. Mic. 5. and in many other places It hath affinity with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the Graecians changing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signisieth to reign in a kingly way 2 It could be no other then kingly power because Gideon wanted no power but that He judged them led forth their Armies and commanded in chief And consequently either he was not King or else the people offered no other power to him then what formerly he had And I cannot imagine that ever they would have been so impertinent to gratifie his labours with the offer of just nothing If they had done so they had forth with befooled themselves And if Gideon had not kingly power neither had any other of the Judges He had that same power and no losse which they had They were all Judges alike Secondly Abimelcch had different power from the Judges What power he had was kingly This is evident 1. From the question he putteth-up unto his mother's brethren whereby he pleadeth to reign over the people of Israel He useth there the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the people used in offering to Gideon and his posterity power to reign over them And as is said already it implieth a kingly-ruling power 2. From Jotham's parable wherein the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used and this under a parabolick notion he alludeth to Abimelech And it cannot be denied but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is seldome or never used under any other signification then King Precisely and ordinarily it is onely attributed to one of a kingly power You will finde it so in innumerable places of Scripture 3. From Jotham's application of the paâ—able to Abimelech In it is used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence is deâ—ived 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both of them ordinarily are onely applied to persons of kingly authority See Judg. 9. This is according as it is written in Chron Alex. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i.e. this is Abimelech who made himself King in the Kingdom or who tyrannously made himself King I pray you why doth the Holy Ghost call the Judges 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Judges and Abimelech 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King if he had not been of a Kingly and different power from them I confesse Judg. 17 18 19 and 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is spoken concerning the judge yet not properly but metaphorically it is spoken so moeroris gratia to expresse the dolefulness of the want of Authority or of persons in Authority And I must needs say that authoritativeness 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is competent whether to the kingly person or to the kingly power therefore the holy ghost in these places expresseth his purpose by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and this he doth not apply to one particular judge as to Abimelech but to the whole incorporation of Judges Then hear Either Abimelech had different power from the Judges or not If different ergo the Judges were not Kings and had not Kingly power The greatest power Abimelech had was Kingly And therein he was differenced from the Judges You cannot say that his power was not different from theirs as is shewed already And consequently his power at the most being kingly and notwithstanding different from the authority of the Judges it necessarily followeth that the Judges had not kingly power Thirdly If the Judges had had kingly power then there had been no change in the Government after Saul was ordained King Thus there had been change nomine but not re And so the people in vain had sought a King and Samuel in vain had denied them a King Thus they sought nothing and he denied nothing but what they had before Bellarmine de Rom. pont lib. 1. cap. 2. though to no purpose laboureth to elude this distinguishing between Rex Prorex Indeed we cannot but much commend him because he saith That God in the time of the Judges was the proper and peculiar King of the Jews This is shewed already And so implieth Gideon's answer Judg. 8. And this cutteth the back of what Bellarmine saith for so they being but Viceroys and God the only King then had they not properly kingly power This is what I crave Yet in the interim I demand whether or not they could extend their power as the Kings And that they could not is manifest Because they had no more power then any of the Seventy and higher Sanhedrin The Seventy were chosen to bear equal burden with Moses and the Judge in all the weightiest and most publick matters Num. 11. Now either conjunctively or disjunctively they had equal power with Moses and the Judge If but conjunctively these two absurdities will follow Firstly that the Judge was not subject to the Sanhedrin for the equal is not subject
confesse the People of God even in the matter of Religion may be brought to this But deceive not thy self The People of God cannot swear absolutely by force and might not only to endeavour but also to act for Religion That is also a vain Oath and a swearing to impossibilities How many times have the People of God been brought so low that their power hath been wholly eclipsed They can absolutely swear no more but to employ all power God shall put in their hands in the defence and preservation of Religion and never alter nor change their faith notwithstanding they run the hazard of perishing goods lives and fortunes Tell me wilt thou say thou art obliged to swear so instanding by Monarchy Dost thou imagine thou art necessarily tied to stand by Monarchy as by Religion Thou canst not change thy faith nor decline it if it be true whether before or after thou hast sworn to maintain it unlesse thou run the hazard both of sin and condemnation Thou canst not embrace the contrary faith and Religion without sin Which draweth-on as its inevitable consequent if persevered therein the wrath and eternal displeasure of the Almighty But I pray thee thinkest thou it damnable to subject thy neck to the yoke of any other Government beside Monarchy Are not other Governments lawful as well as it Are not they consubsistent with Religion and the matter of salvation no lesse then it How darest thou absolutely tie thy self by Oath and Covenant to stand by one only kind of Government when as thou mayest lawfully submit thy neck and give-up thy allegeance to any kind thereof Thus thou not only overchargest thy conscience but also exposest thy self needlesly to hazard And so much the rather of this because of all Governments Monarchy is most dangerous and least to be wished Art thou not of all fools the greatest to swear absolutely to maintain that Government which is least good though thou mayest obtain that which of all Governments is the sweetest The Authour of Exerc. con usurp pow cap. 3. mistaketh the matter very far whileas he saith We are equally and that same way obliged by League and Covenant to maintain the King's Person and Authority as by it we are tied to maintain Religion The contrary of this is already cleared Lastly I deny not but not only Monarchy in it-self is consistent with Religion but also secundum quid it is the best of all Governments Yet if we speak simpliciter and of the ordinary fruits and Consequences of Kingly Government the King's interest alwaies cometh in competition with Christ's interest So is proved invincibly as we suppose already Now wilt thou swear absolutely to maintain that which absolutely and ordinarily standeth in opposition to Christ and his interest Thus thou swearest to maintain that which setweth to over-turn both Church and Common-wealth And hereby thou preserrest man's interest to God's interest for so thou exposest both Church and Commonwealth to ordinary and inevitable danger and hazard in maintaining Kingly Government inviolable The foresaid Authour in the place above-cited endeavoureth to justle us out of this He taketh much upon trust but he proveth nothing He would have us to take it upon his word that Monarchy is most consubsistent with Religion and the good of the People We cannot take him in this as an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We have already upon this concluded more by force of argument then he either may or doth speak by word What is it any wonder though he saith so He is not ashamed to aver against Heaven and experience it-self That Religion was consubsistent with the preservation and defence of the last King's Person Let God judge this O my soul come not thou into his secret unto the Assembly of such mine honour be not thou united COROLLARY HAving through the Lord's more then ordinary assistance discussed these five Questions above-written it now remaineth to try what strength is in them to conclude the Commonwealth of England to be a lawful Government and not usurped power And we make it good thus If the Comonwealth of England be an unlawful usurped power then either because the power of the King of England not only according to the Law of the Kingdom but also of God is absolute And so without usurpation he can neither be judged nor his Kingdom taken from him by any but by God Or because Monarchy is of all Governments the choicest And so cannot be altered nor exchanged with any other Government unlesse we go from the better to the worse And it is rash madnesse or sinful rashnesse to exchange the best with the worst Or because Popular Government is least to be desired Or because it is unlawful to resist the Royal Person and decline the Royal Authority Or lastly because we are tied not only by the Oath of Alleageance but also by solemn League and Covenant to maintain and preserve Monarchy inviolably But none of all these you can alleadge to bind usurpation upon the Commonwealth of England as is shewed already Ergo it is a lawful and not usurped power FINIS Errors to be corrected thus REad Page 6. line 8. Beros P. 9. l. ult carrying-on P. 10 l. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 12. l. 10. tanes P. 20. l. 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 30 l. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 35. l. 4. satrapie P. 60 l. 24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 64. l. 33. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 65. l. ult hos P. 67. l. 25. naught P. 74. l. 17. Gorbomannus l. ult censured P. 75. l. 2. excommunicared and to be punished l. 3. Eugenius l. 10 for Duncanus read Again usurping he P. 76. l. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 79. l. 20. after Steven r. King P 85. l. ult after Inst r. 5. P. 95. l. 17. Imperator P. 9◠l. 24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 123. l. 30. exciusive P. 1◠l. 32. sect 1. P. 129 l. 32. subsect◠P. 132. l. 20. subsection P. 134 l. 21. before Concl 6. r. subsect 1. P. 136. l. 21. subsect 1. P. 144. l. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 1◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 14◠l 22. hath P. 163. l. 40. P. 171. l. 35. subsect 1. P. 174 l. 19. hurled P. 175. l. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 P. 175. l. 37. doe APPENDIX In which the seven Angels sounding are compared with the seven Angels plaguing in overturning all Powers and Potentates READER I Have thought it expedient to annex to the fore-going Treatise concerning the Commonwealth of England a small addition concerning the sounding and plaguing by seven Angels And that because they do relate to the overthrowing of all Kings and Kingly Powers whatsoever Whence my purpose in the fore-going Treatise is abundantly enforced and established That I may the more conveniently give thee my thoughts in order to these Angels I would have thee in the first place with me to remark that the Angels sounding are
this is rather said then proved But afterward nolis velis we shall evidence That Samuel thought no such thing Thirdly If Kings had been subjected to the Sanhedrin and ought to have been arraigned before it either to have been accused or condemned then had there been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of the Jewes But the latter is false Ergo. This is Salmasius his great gun And for proof of the Major he faith The Judges of the people of Israel did judge led forth their Armies made Lawes executed judgement and did exercise all other such-like functions which are exercised by Kings Therefore unlesse the Kings of the Jewes had been unliable to the Sanhedrin there had been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of Israel The Assumption he maketh it good thus It had been altogether in vain saith he to have changed the government of the Judges into the government of Kings if they had been both one Thus the difference had onely been in name and not in reality Def. Reg. cap. 5. But the man cap. 2. proveth the Assumption more largely and most pertinently There saith he the Judges amongst the people of the Jews were subject to the Sanhedrin And so he saith the Judges amongst the Jews were called in the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophetim Whence the Paenans derive the word Sufetes Now the Judges in the Senat of Carthage were called Sufetes And Festus observeth that Sufetes in the Punick language signifieth and denotateth a Consul And out of Caelidus he citeth these words Senatus censuit referentibus Sufetis So the Roman Consuls referred to the Senat and the Senat judged of their refer Therefore seing the Judges of Israel were but like Consuls who were subject to the Senat as the case was amongst the Carthaginians and Romans they were not of a kingly power but subject to the Sanhedrin though they retained the government so long as they lived whereas the Roman Consuls and Carthaginian Sufetes were only but yearly Magistrates And this is further cleared from the Holy Ghost's contradistinguishing Judg. 9. the government of Abimelech who took upon him a kingly government from the government of the rest of the Judges Yea the Israelites Judg. 8. offered to Gideon that same power over them which his son Abimelech usurped This was a kingly government that they offered to him Which Gideon refused And yet neverthelesse he was a Judge And consequently if both Judges and Kings amongst the people of Israel had one and the same power not onely the people of Israel had offered to Gideon no new power but what he had before but also Gideon had refused to enjoy that power which actually he did enjoy Ans We heartily subscribe to the Minor and do much cry-up Salmasius in the probation thereof I wish the man were as solid and pertinent in all the rest as in that Yet I crave his leave to deny the Major And I think I have good reason to do so for he only differenceth absolute Kings from Judges imagining that none properly can be a King essenitally distinct from a judge but he who is absolute and unlyable to the Law He far mistaketh the point It is one thing to be an absolute King not subject to the Sanhedrin and Senat and another thing to be a non-absolute King and subject to Law And yet both are properly and univocally Kinge The non-absolute King is essentially differenced from the Sophet or Sufet the Judge because he is major singulis but minor universis in syuedrie But the Judge is but of equal authority with the rest of his collegues in the Senat though because of his eminencie and personall endowments he may praeside and be as a leading man amongst the rest Such was the case of the kings and Judges amongst the Jewes as after ward shall be shewed There are some accidentall differences also between the Judges amongst the people of the Jewes and their kings as namely 1. The Judges were in a most speciall immediat and extraordinary manner designed and appointed by GOD himself to govern his people Kings were not so if we look to them in an ordinary way and for the most part 2. The Judges of Israel had no hereditary power and government over them Such had their kings 3. The kings of Israel both in their ordination and afterward were attended with prodigall sumptuous and Royall Dignities which were denied to their Judges And whereas Salmasius essentially distinguisheth Melech a king from Sophet a Judge because the one is of an absolute power and the other is not he shal do well to advert that he lose not more this way then he gaineth for so he putteth the essentiall frame of the king in an absolute and uncircumscribed power But in our first argument against this we have shewed the incongruity and absurdity thereof Which afterward shall more appear from what is spoken as followeth Fourthly There can be no example alledged in the Book of God whereby is pointed-out the subjection of Kings to Law We read not that ever the Sanhedrin or the people of the Jews did punish Kings for their faults And yet many of their Kings were most guilty of many great and criminall faults as namely David and Solomon Def. Reg. cap. 5. Ans This argument is like the first Both of them speak much de facto but nothing de jure This is a very bad consequence The people of Israel sought an absolute King to reign over them and did set-up such a King over them Ergo the power of an absolute King is lawfull and Kings de jure are not subject to Law Friend you break-off too soon Though I should grant you the Antecedent yet before I can approve the validity of the consequence you must prove the validity of their practice You count your reckoning too soon whileas you thus conclude There is no practice in Scripture holding-out to us that the Jewish Sanhedrin did ever execute judgement on any of their Kings who transgressed the Law and did violate it Ergo Kings are not subject to Law What if I should grant the Antecedent You have notwithstanding to prove the lawfulnesse of their non-executing judgement on their kings who transgressed before I can at any time subscribe to the consequence Philosophs know though many Humanists do not that à facto adjus non statim valet consequentia Aye they can tell you that argumentum negativum nihil concludit Well as I deny your consequence so I do not admit your Antecedent I illustrate the vanity of it from examples in Scripture both ordinary and extraordinary Ordinary Jehojadah in the face of the Assembly commanded to fall upon Athaliah and kill her 2 Kings 11.2 Chron. 23. And though you shall deny this practice as concluding any thing against your purpose yet I pray you what can you say of that practice in killing Amasiah We have shewed elsewhere that such a thing was done in a
perpetuall title from blood-right because he opinionateth that the Lacedemonian Kings were not properly Kings but because the greatest authority the Lacedemonian Kings had was in leading-forth the Army There indeed they were primi above the Senat and Ephorie Whereupon he also calleth the Laconick Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power of leading forth the Army by it's own power He is so far from being of Salmasius opinion that contrariwise he reckoneth up the Laconick Monarchy amongst the proper species and and kindes of royall power Polit. 3. cap. 10. and 11. And whileas he speaketh of the Lacedemonian Kings he doth so call them Pol. 2. cap. 7. and 9. Inst 2. Aristotle doth so faith Salmasius 1. Because the power of the battell was hereditary to the Lacedemonian Kings 2. Because the Lacedemonian Kings in battell had a full free and Kingly power Aye faith he they had also a power in those things which related to the ceremonies wherewith Kings in old were solemnly entrusted Def. Reg. cap. 8. Ans The first reason is forthwith nought 'T is a bad consequence The Laceà emonian Kings were hereditary Commanders of the Army in chief Ergo Aristotle because of that calleth them Kings Zuasi vero he had had no such reason for him to call them Kings if they had onely been entrusted with the power of the battell by election Friend you are a-little mistaken in this 1. Because Aristotle divideth the power of the battell into hereditary and elective power Pol. 3. cap. 10. Thus he contra-distinguisheth the one from the other as two different species properly and specifically differencing the power of the battell in generall 2. Because a Kingly power is not therefore Kingly because it is hereditary Yea which is more a Kingly power cater is requisitis is properly and formally elective And therefore Aristotle should have had more reason to have called them Kings if their power had been by election and not by succession So the man himself judgeth whileas he faith that the Carthaginian and Cretian kings were better ordained then the Laconick Because faith he the Laconick kings are ordained by succession and they by election And he addeth a reason to this because faith he by election the best are choosed whereas by blood-right the like cannot be had Whereupon faith he the heriditary title of Kings amongst the Lacedemonians hath brought great hurt and detriment unto the Commonwealth Polit. 2. cap. 9. And as for his second reason it plainly contradicteth himself for so he confesseth that in the battell they had a Kingly power And he hath little reason to say that Aristotle called them Kings because they had a power of over-seeing the sacrifices So had the Athenian annuall Princes whom properly he will not admit to be called Kings Howsoever it cannot be denied but properly they were Kings albeit they were subjected to Law 1. Because it doth not follow that a King properly is not a King because he is a regulated King We have shewed already that GOD no otherwise mouldeth the King but as he subjecteth him to Law Assert 2. And afterward we shall shew how that the Kings of the Jews were regulated Kings And yet who will deny but they were proper Kings 2. The King is not properly King unlesse he be a regulated King and subjected to Law as both already and afterward is shewed And therefore the Lacedemonian Kings were Kings properly the rather because they were regulated 3. Because Salmasius himself confesseth that in the battell the Lacedemonian Kings had a full and Kingly power And yet then their power was not absolute and arbitrary They had not then a full power to act against Law but according to Law as you may learn from Conclus 6. in comparing their power with Agamemnon's power Therefore either Salmasius will contradict himself or else he must needs say that Kings are properly Kings though they be regulated 4. Because all that write of the Lacedemonian Commonwealth of whom we have cited many already do call the Captain-Generals of their Armies Kings And 't is remarkable that Lylander in an oration which was found after his death perswaded the Lacedemonians to shake-off the Kingly government and elect a Captain-Generall for governing the battell Plut. Aemyl prob in Lyâ— This he speaketh of the Lacedemonian Kings as contradistinguished from Captain-Generalls of Armies O but faith Salmasius Lysander onely deherted the people from setting over their Armies Captain-Generalls by succession and perswaded them to take from them the name of Kings Def. reg cap. 8. See how the man bewrayeth himself for Lysander was Captain-Generall of the Lacedemonian Army And yet he was not their King Therefore amongst the Lacedemonians it was one thing to be King and another thing to be Captain Generall of the Army I confesse their King had also the power of the Army But he had not onely other power beside but also he had power of the battell in a more intense way then any deputed and substituted Captain amongst the people Otherwise there had been no difference between Lysander and the King who was but onely Captain of the Army Yea which is more Lysander doth not speak of shaking-off regium nomen but regiam potestatem as is clear out of Probus But sure I am regia potestas is not nomen regis but res regis Salmasius shall have no need to deny that the Carthaginian annuall Kings were Kings properly so called But in the interim he shall give us leave to consider and take a light view of the nature of the word susetes Which is taken in a twofold sense 1. Largely And so the word may be derived from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sapha Whence sufes is all one with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophe speculator inspector episcopus or ephorus Thus sufetes may be referred to judges of any sort And in this sense Alexander ab Alexandro referreth it to the Graecian â—symnetâ— the Egyptian dioecetes the Persian megistanes the Oscian medix c. Geni di lib. 4. cap. 23. Him Julius Scaliger followeth whileas he faith Porro qui Hebraïce sciunt non ignorant Poenos Tyrorum colonos esse concedent mihi Sufes idem esse quod 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And so the man supplying Festus words saith Sufes dictus est Pocnerum lingua summus magistratus ut Oscorum medix c. 2. Strictly and by limitation And so it is derived from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saphat Whence sufes is all one with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophet Which in the Greek is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a judge In this sense it is applyed to the Carthaginian yearly Kings and Roman Consuls Alex. ab Al. gen di lib. 3. cap. 3. The word sufes by Festus and T. Livius is rendered consul So it is by Sabellicus Aen. 5. lib. 5. It cannot be denâ—ed but as sufetes is a Puâ—ick Word so in it 's most strict and rigorous acceptation it is only
Every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is interested is referred to it Secondly Whatsoever is done at the command whether of King or People is of none effect unless it be authorized by the Parliament Thirdly It establisheth and taketh away Laws as it judgeth fit Fourthly Every Member of it hath a-like power and freedom in voicing And what is decreed and enacted by Parliament he calleth it the proper and municipal Law of the Kingdom Seing then the Parliament is the most sovereign and supream power in the Kingdom of England according as it was in old how can it be said That the King of England hath power over it If it be so then you admit two Supream powers and a power above a Supream power which is contradicent The Lacedemonian Ephori were no otherwise above their Kings but because they were invested with the highest and supream power All things were referred to the Parliament even as the Roman Consuls as Festus out of Coelidus saith did refer every thing to the Senate Now because of this the Senate had the highest power and was above the Consuls Ergo seing all matters of the Commonwealth in old in the Kingdom of England were referred to the Parliament no question it had power above the King The Roman Senate is therefore said to have been of the supreamest power Fenest de Magistrat Rom. cap. 1. because neither Kings nor Consuls nor Dictators nor any other Magistrate could do any thing without their advice and counsel Ergo seing whatsoever the King of England or any other of that Kingdom did in old was to no purpose without the authority and approbation of Parliament without all controversie the King of England was subjected to the Parliament Salmasius concludeth the King to be above the Parliament because he alledgeth the Parliament can do nothing without the King Why may not I then conclude the Parliament to be above the King because re ipsa and according to the Law of the Kingdom the King can do nothing without the authority and consent of the Parliament Where then I pray you is the King 's negative voice There is not a Member in Parliament cui oequa loquendi potesias non competit So saith Polyd. Angl. hist lib. 11. What Do you imagine that ever the Parliament could by their authority have drawen-up the foresaid agreement between Steven and Henry 2. unlesse they had had power above the King What they did therein was a direct acting both over Steven their present King and Henry 2. their future King But will you tell me whileas the States of England did seek of K. John to be governed by the ancient Lawes made by Edward the Confessour whether or not were these Lawes Acts of meet pleasure giving the King a liberty to do as he would either to tyrannize over the people or not You can not hold the affirmative because what they demanded of the King was to be restored to liberty to be freed of tyranny Polyd. Vir. Angl. hist lib. 15. And if you hold the negative part then do the ancient Laws of England pull absolutenesse out of the king's hands and subject him to Law Magna charta saith The King can do nothing but by Lawes and no obedience is due to him but by Law And the States of England were so far from permitting John to rule at randome and not according to the ancient Lawes of the kingdom that contrarywise they combined against him entering in oath together to pursue him still on till he should govern according to Law and establish the ancient Lawes of the kingdom Yea albeit that Pope Innocent commanded them to lay-down arms and though upon their deniall thereof they were declared enemies by the Pope they notwithstanding followed-on their purpose and cryed-out that they would be avenged by fire and sword on such a wicked tyrant who did so much slight the people Aye which is more they sent into France and from thence brought Ludovick the French king's son and created him king notwithstanding any thing either John or the Pope could do in the contrary Thus they never rested till in sorrow they brought John's head into the grave Where I pray you is the absolutenesse of the king of England whenas the States would not suffer him to govern but according to Law and in denying to do so pursued him in arms unkinging him enkinging another in his room and bringing himself in sorrow to the grave This is far from the arbitrary and infinite power of kings Salmasius speaketh of And whereas he saith the parliament is but extraordinary and pro tunc this is either because Kings were long before Parliaments or because the Parliament hath not power to intermeddle in every businesse of the Common-wealth but is conveened pro re nata for ordering the weightiest Affairs of the kingdom If you say the former we do not deny it We heartily confesse that of all Governments Monarchy was first established And Aristotle giveth the reason of it because saith he in the beginning it was hard to find-out many men fit and able to govern And therefore necessity moved them to lay the government on one for though in the beginning it was hard to finde-out many yet was it easie to finde-out one endowed with qualities and gifts for governing Polit. 3. cap. 11. lib. 4. cap. 13. But though this be granted yet doth it not follow but Senats or Parliaments being established they have even according to the custome of the Nations more power then kings as is shewed already And therefore Aristotle saith in the places fore-cited that by processe of time the number of Common-wealth's-men increasing kings at last went close out of request and were denuded of all power And Pol. 3. cap. 10. he saith that in after-times the power of kings was extremely lessened partly because of their own voluntary demitting and partly because of the people's detracting from their greatnesse Nay any king Aristotle alloweth he alloweth no more power and greatnesse to him but to be greater and more powerful then every one separatim and many conjunctim but to be of lesse power and greatnesse then the peoople Pol. 3. cap. 11. But I pray you what is the Parliament but the Representative of the people If you say the other we deny it as is shewed already And it seemeth very strange to me that the Parliament hath not power in small matters and yet hath power to manage and go about matters of highest concernment If Salmasius will ask Philosophs they can tell him Qui potest majus potest minus He imagineth that he gaineth the point because the King of England had power to conveen and dissolve the Parliament as he judged fit This is but a singing of the triumph before the victory for the Roman Consuls had the same power over the Senat. Alex. ab Alex. gen di lib. 3. cap. 3. But who will say that they had an absolute power over the Senat
to this purpose Priamus was not only withstood by his own subjects who did steal Helena but also what he did therein either firstly or lastly was according to the advice and counsel of the Senatours Dict Cret de bel Tro. lib. 1. 5. Dar. Phr. ae excid Tro. lib. And though Dares Phrygius reporteth that Priamus determined and voiced otherwise then they who followed Antenor and Aeneas who appear to us to have been the major part of the Senat for we gather from both these Historians that not only the greatest part of the Senate but also the whole body of the People were for the concluding and drawing up peace with the Grecians I confesse Dares Phrygius in plain terms faith that Priamus voiced against peace and truce taking-up with the Grecians and what he voiced was established and holden as a thing concluded-on by all Indeed he carried it contrary to all who opposed him as Dares will have it Yet Dictys storieth the just contrary and saith that Priamus followed the advice and determination of the Senat. And indeed Q. Calaber lib. 12. and Tryphiodor de Il. exc insinuate no lesse for they observe Dictys way which he hath in storying the Grecian stratagem which ensued upon terms of peace concluded on between the Trojans and Grecians Howsoever albeit I think my-self rather oblidged to encline to Dares relation yet lose I nothing thereby if I do so I am not of that opinion to think that Priamus was so hemmed-in by Law as the Lacedemonian Kings Let it be so he had a negative voice in Senate as Dares in sinuateth yet sure I am none will say that the Senate was a cypher having no authority at all You will learn from these fore-cited historians the contrary of that And in so far as Priamus did act according to the advice counsel of the Senat in as far he did act according to Law Thus he did not simply act according to pleasure and in an arbitrary way No verily In this his power was somewhat limited And this is all that both Aristotle and we do crave And so we must not think but Alcinous was some way or other regulated by his Princes and Rulers as you may read Hom odys 8. And how much Agamemnon was subjected to Law is shewed already Of him is made good that which Aristotle speaketh of the tying of the King to the People by the elevation of the Scepter as by Oath and Covenant Hom. Il. 2. Alex. ab Alex. lib. 5. cap. 10. We need not think it strange to say that in the dayes of the Heroes Kings were some what subjected to Law for not only Agamemnon but also Theseus were no leste subjected to Law as is shewed already then the Lacedemonian kings 'T is observable that Orestes son to Agamemnon and King of Mycenae was judged and absolved by the Councel of Areopagus Him Mnestheus son to Theseus and King of Athens could not get set free till firstly he was examined by the Areopagites whom Dictys calleth most strict Justiciaries de bel Tro. lib. 6. Mark that the Mycenan King was judged by the Athenian Judicatory Then tell me seing a King of another Kingdom in the dayes of the Heroes was subjected to the Law and Judicatory of Athens shall we not think that Kings in those dayes in some things at least were restricted and subjected to Law Verily this is an argument from the greater to the lesser But hear what Alexander ab Alexandro faith Tantique Areopagus fuit ut Heroas semideos illuc in judicium advocatos dicerent Pisistratus in eo judicium subire non dubita it lib. 3. cap. 5. i. e. And Areopagus was of such power that they cited into judgment the Heroes and Semidei and Pisiâ—atus doubted not to undergo judgment there And I would have Royallists to observe that in this matter I give them more of their will then Aristotle doth for according to this last sense and exposition his words insinuate That all Kings in the dayes of the Heroes in some things were restricted Yet we say that many of them had a vast and arbitrary power Yeâ— in the latter part of the fourth species he saith That Kings in ancient time had but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-governing power But we go further-on with the Malignant and say That they had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing power Yet preciâ—ely and properly their power was but Pambasilick an all-governing and not arbitrary and illimited We shall stand here a while to speak of the Kingdom of England for it is not only the chief subject of our discourse in order to which we drive all that we speak but also it falleth-in here by a string-line Already we have spoken of it at length from the dayes of the Conquerour or a little before until now It therefore remaineth we speak of it as it was from its beginning unto the reign of the Normans And so we consider it under these notions 1. As it was in its first beginning and original And though I will not say that Britain was inhabited so soon as other Kingdoms which lie in and about the middle and chief part of the Earth No question such parts were firstly inhabited as both history and reason doth teach Yet I may very conveniently say that the chiefest Kingdoms and those which he next Armenia being planted after people were extreamly multiplied on the earth they did seek out to inhabit the uttermost Isles of the world There was a physical necessity for this People daily multiplying could not dwell all in one part but of necessity they behoved to depart one from another for residence sake Yea there was a moral reason for it also No question desire of great lands and possessions so soon as people were greatly multiplied on the earth after the flood could not but set them a work to seek-out the remotest parts This is confirmed by what the holy Ghost faith The sons of Japhet Gomer by these were the Isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands every one after his tongue after their families in their nations Gen. 10. I pray you tell me whileas the holy Ghost speaketh there indefinitely of the Isles of the Nations if he doth exclude the Isle of Britain What more reason is there to exclude it then any other And for my self I think there is more reason to include it then any of the rest Firstly because it is the chiefest Isle in the world And therefore in it self the more delectable and the more to be sought after Secondly because Gomer whom Berosus calleth Comerus Gallus did come into Italy and erected Colonies there Ant. lib. 5. Now tell me is it not most probable that Gomer did translate Colonies from Italy into France and from thence into Britain every-one of them lying contiguously one with another We find as much in his name as pointeth-out this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gomer signifieth to end And is not Britain
That Jeroboam was a vile idolater and was not worthy to be a King 2. That the people justly defired Rehoboam to dimit of the power which his father had and that the old men did arightly counsel Rehoboam to do so Neither of these doth Salmasius deny And so I gain the point as is already proved Fourthly from the People of the Jews processing their Kings So did they against Athaliah 2 King 11.2 Chron. 23. and Amaziah 2 King 14.2 Chron. 25. See subsect 2. prop. 1. And as they processed their Kings so did they resist them as afterward is shewed But I pray you could they have done such things lawfully if their Kings had had an arbitrary power over them And that they did such things according to Law and Reason is proved by us Fifthly If Ahab had had an absolute power I see no reason how he could have been refused of Naboth's Vineyard 1 King 21. Sure I am if he had had a prerogative above Law and a power to dispose according to his pleasure either upon the goods or the person of the subject he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard at his own hand without so much as demanding it with Naboth's leave And yet the text saith That Naboth having refused to give it him he went home much dismaid and refused to eat bread because Naboth had denied it to him And which is more he could not get it till a false processe was led against Naboth by the crast of Jezebel But is it imaginable that ever such things would have been done if Ahab's power had been arbitrary and uncircumscribed No verily No question if his power had been boundlesse by vertue of a Royal Act he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard either without grieving himself or without leading a false processe against Naboth And therefore Mr. Withers 〈◊〉 Tom Plain-man saith notably Why I pray Did Ahab grieve that Naboth said him nay Why made he not this auswer thereunto If what the Prophet said some Kings would do Were justly to be done Thy Vineyana's mine And at my pleasure Naboth all that 's thine Assume I may Why like a Turkey-chick Did he so foolishly gro◠sullen sick And get possession by a wicked fact Of what might have been his by Royal Act If such Divinity as this were true The Queen should not have needed to pursue Poor Naboth as she did or so contrive His death since by the King's Prerogative She might have got his Vineyard nor would God Have scourge that murder with so keen a kod On Ahah had be asked but his due For he did neither plot nor yet pursue The murder nor for ought that we can tell Had knowledge of the dead of Jezebel Till God 〈◊〉 it by the Prophet to him Nor is it said that Naboth wrong did do him Or disrespect in that he did not yeeld To sell or give or to exchange his field Brit. Remembr Cant. 8 Now hereby is made to appear That the Kings of the Jews were not absolute whether according to the Law of God or the Law of the Kingdom And why then do Royallists plead so much for the King 's arbitrary power seing the Jewish Kings de jure had it not Which maketh me think other Kings far lesse should have it for the ordination of the Jewish Kings did depend from God in a most special way and God there in was most intimatly concerned We must not think that the Kings of Judah after the captivity de jure had any priviledge above Law more then those who preceded them According to the Law of God they had no such priviledge as is shewed already And that according to the Law of the Nation they had it not is also evident 1. Because after the captivity the store of the Government was changed And they had not so much as Kingly Government much lesse absolute Monarchy till Aristobulus firstly usurped the Crown Jos an t Jud. lib. 13. cap. 19. 2. Because the people did withstand the tyrant Alexander And whileas he was dying he was necessitate to exhort his wife who succeeded to him to dimit of his power and to promise to govern according to the advice and counsel of the Senatouis and Pharisees Ant. Jud. lib. 12. cap. 22. 23. Which she did accordingly cap. 21. And at her death she desired the Sanhedrin to dispose upon the Kingdom as they pleased even while her son Aristobulus was in arms for bringing the Kingdom to himself Yea the Sanhedrin not onely accused Antipater but also arraigned Herod before them who for fear of them was constrained to slee Ant. Jud. lib. 12. cap. 17. And what arbitrary power Herod had was by 〈◊〉 concession whom Herod blinded and deluded with gifts Ant. Jud. lib. 15. cap. 4. I confesse whileas Herod was cited before the Sanhedrin he was not King but Governour of Galilee But what then I hope Salmasius will not deny which indeed he confesses that his father Antipater did reign as King And yet the Elders of the People did accuse him before Hyrcanus But neither Hyrcanus who indeed was King of the Jews nor Antipater who was Procurator and managed the matters of the Kingdom because of his weakness were able to absolve Herod notwithstanding Caesar the President of Syria wrote some Letters to Hyrcanus threatning him if he did not absolve him The Sanhedrin went-on so precisely against Herod that they went about to condemn him to death So that Hyrcanus was necessitate in satisfying Caesar's desire to cause Herod flee quietly away Now I would fain know of Salmasius if either Hyrcanus or Antipater had had an absolute and arbitrary power might they not have absolved Herod at their pleasure the Sannedrin nilling or willing and not basely for fear of the Sanhedrin have dismissed Herod secretly Therefore Salmasius must give me leave to say though he imagineth the contrary that Sichardus very pertinently urgeth this example to prove that the power of the Sanhedrin was above the King And Salmasius himself denieth not Def. Reg. cap 2. 5. but the strain and current of Rabbinick Writers doth run this way Inst Nay but saith he in the Jewish Talmud it is spoken otherwise And therefore it is said Rex neque judicat neque judicatur non drest testimonium nec in ipsum dicitur in Cod. San. cap. 11. Def. Reg. cap. 2. Answ Verily this Gentleman needeth not brag much of this for the Jewish Writers pull this out of his hands by a distinction Some of them understand it concerning the Kings of Israel and some of them refer it to the Samaritan Kings But they deny it to have place in the Kings of Judah and those who came of David I admire much that he should cite the authority of Jewish writ for him He doth not deny but the Jewish Writers are no friends to Kingly Government And they positively say which he denieth not himself that the King of the Jews was subjected to Law And which is more they particularity
to uâ— that there is greater danger and hazard to be expected and looked for at the hands of Kings then good So it fared with the people of the Jeâ—s at the hands of their Kings Amongst them all there were but six good all the rest wicked Of whom it is said That they walked in the wayes of Jerâ—boam who made Israel to sin And it is not for nought that such a causal epithet is most often registred in Scripture and anncxed to the wicked Kings of the Jews 1 King 15.16 22.2 King 3.10.13.14 15. Now let the indifferent Reader judge whether or not that causal epither be so often ascribed and given to them in vain There is a great emphasis in that who made Israel to sin If we plumb the bottom of it arightly we shall find it coucheth as much as that Kingly Government is most dangerous and produceth badest effects And it is the more evident by comparing the state of the Jeâ—ish Commonâ—ealth under Kings with the state of it as it were under Judges Peter Martyr from severall pregnant reasons proveth That the condition of the Jews was far better under the Judges then under the Kings Com. in Judic cap. 1. His Reasons we digest thus 1. The Judges did alwaies deliver them from misery and bondage Judg. 2.3.4.5.6.7.1.1.13.14.15.16 20. Whereupon it island Nevertheless the 〈◊〉 raised up Juriges who delivered them out of the hand of those that 〈◊〉 them Judg 2. But the King did not alwaies so 1 Sam. 28. 29 1 Kin. 24.2 Km. 6.7.12.13.16 17 2 Chr. 12.8.21 8. They oftentimes destroyed them 1 Sam. 22.2 Sam. 21.1 Kin. 18. 22.2 Kin. 16. 21.2 Chr. 24. They compelled them to slavery to 〈◊〉 and idolatry 2. The people of the Jews were not led into captivity under the Judge as they were under the Kings 2 Kin. 18 2 2 Chr. 3b Yea under Judges as is clear from the places above quoted touching them the people were never brought into any misery and affliction because of them They were not only ordained by God to deliver and did deliver the Jews out of all their calamities but also they laboured to keep them back from sinning which was the cause of all their sorrows Judg. 2. But the wicked Kings who did reign over them not only did not disswade them from committing iniquity but also did draw them-on unto the perpetrating of manifold and most greivous abominations whence it was many sad and sore Judgments were 〈◊〉 upon them 3. There were very few good Kings But we read 〈◊〉 of any evil Judges save Abinelech and Samue's sons And it is very observable that because Abimelech perverted judgment and usurping the authority did reign as King God judicially plagued him 〈◊〉 9. Yea for the bribery of Samuel's sons he rented the Kingdom from them And it was 〈◊〉 wonthough the most part of the Judges were good and few of them wicked 1 Because as Peter Martyr saith in electing them they had no regard to their riches but to their vertue and godlinesse Exod. 18 and Deut. 1. 2 Because as the same author saith they were not declared by the voices of men but by the ordinance and inspiration of God Posterity or succession was here of no force Judg 2. And 'c is remarkable these two conditions being slighted the Judges were corrupt and dissolute But they being observed they were ever found holy and much so the good of the people Then tell me is it any wonder though the Jews were in a far better condition under Judges then under Kings The Judges for the most part were holy They alwaies dehoried the people from prophanity alwaies delivered them from slivery at no time brought evil upon them But the Kings for the most part were wicked the contrary effects were produced by them This as a speaking commentary intimateth to us That the condition of the people is most desperat and hazardous under Kings We cannot passe-by the condition of the Jews after the captivity as it was under Captains or Judges and as as it was under Kings All the while they lived under Captains their condition was most happy and blessed Albeit at that time now and then they were crossed with the bondage of strangers yet were they free from intestine jats Their Captains did not rise against them and bring them under slavery as did their Kings Their zeal and forwardnesse in acting for the weal both of Church and Common wealth are fully regestred in the books of Ezra and Nebemiah Mace 1. and 2. Jos an t Jud. lib. 12. and 13. And how much the Jews under the reign of Kings after the captivity suffered is storied at length by Josephus ant Jud. lib. 13.14 15. In a word the case of the Jews under Kings being most desperat far unlike the tweetnesse of their condition under Judges it speaketh to us That Kingly Government of all Governments is the most hazardous What better fruits I pray you needeth any kingdom to expect at the hands of Kings then the people of the Jews were served with at their hands Verily I suppose we may expect rather worse then better fruits then the people of the Jews were made to tast of under the reign of Kings Secondly from the Lord's unwillingnesse to set-up Kingly Government amongst the people of the Jews in remonstrating to them the extream hazard and tyranny they should lie under if they subjected their necks thereto This is seen 1 Sam. 8. And for making good our purpose therefrom we move the question Whether or not doth Samuel 〈◊〉 describe the office or rather the tyranny of the King Royallists do proudly aver That in it is understood the Office and Law of the King And none herein is more forward then Salmasius Def. Reg. cap. 2. 5. But that we may dispatch the businesse between us we shall firstly try the sense of v. 11. what may be imported in the original text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And he sard This shall be the manner of that King who shall reign over you But Salmasius starteth very much at this translation And for manner he placeth law or right So the man will have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to signisie yea but he is far mistaken firstly because in many places of scripture we find the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 taken for manner consuetude or custom Gen. 40. Exod. 21. Numb 29. Josh 6. Sam. 2. Sam. 7 1 King 18. But a place or two we expresse for further clearing this purpole 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And they are doing into this very day after their former manners 2 Kin. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And their customs keep not Ezek. 20. Secondly because it is the ordinary and common translation So the Chaldee Paraphrast translateth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is one and the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and it is to be rendered manner
likewise of the other Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text and it proporteth a ravenous and cruel away-taking but hear Josephus Kings will make confectionaries of your daughters for their own use kitchen-women dressers of cloath and they shall compel them to do any other service which dainsels for fear of strokes do perform Lec cit Nay but Brent loc cit is more full and plain Thirdly in order to the King 's a way-taking of their poslessions And be will take your fields c. It may be you think that your sons and your daughters will be well taken-off your hands and though he should wrong them he will not wrong your selves Peradventure you imagine his tyranny will take a stand there Nay but I 'll tell you if he take-away your sons and daughters he will also takeaway your substance And well know I if you get any courtesie at his hand ye'll have little reason to boast of it He will take the tenth from you Sure I am he will have so little respect to you to your children that serve him and to your pains in gathering riches together that what ye gain through the sweat of your brows he willet it out to any base fellow in his Court and ye dare not say it is evil done If this be not an act of tyranny saith Piscator then had not God punished Abâ—b for taking-away Naboth's vinevard Abab according to Law should have possessed it Schol in 1 Sam. 8. See Josephus Brent lcc cit Fourthly In order to his away-taking of the people's servants And he will take you men-servants and your maid-servants and your goodliest young-men and put them to his work 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text his tyranny shall not end at your sons and daughters and at your possessions but he shall violently rob you of your servants and if he take not all of them be sure he will take the chiefest of them sce plain Brent thid Fifthly In relation to his away-taking of their theep He will take away the tâ—nth of your sheep He will not leave you so much as a sheep's tail At least he will take the tenth of them 3. The consequent and event both of the general and particular part of the description is the effect of tyranny not of lawful authority Ye shall cry-out in that day because of your King whom ye shall have 〈◊〉 you We are sure that the people would never cry-out for exercising the just and lawful Acts of Regal Authority Thereby justice is promoted and vice is punished Which is a blessing and not a bondage for people to make them cry out in bitternâ— of spirit Thus it is abundantly made good that Samuel here doth not describe the power but the tyranny of the King Now in-starceth another question Whether or not doth the Prophet in this place 〈◊〉 Jews from secking a King as a King To which we answer affirmatively and prove it thus If the Prophet doth not disswade the people from seeking a King under the notion of a King then either because he only taxeth carnal confidence in them or arogancy and pride or precipitation only or else because they sought a King after the manner of the Nations But none of these Reasons whether conjunctly or severally are the aâ—aequat object of the Prophet's disswasion Firstly Because it is said That Samuel was displeased because they sought a King The text is not But the thing displeased Samuel when they said We will have confidence in a King c. But it is The thing displeased Samuel when they said Give us a King 'T is wrong Logick to take to King in esse accidentali At least 'c is very far setch'd Philosophy to take it under some extrinsecal and adjunctive notion or other Sce Josephus loc cit Brent hom 27. in 1 Sam. 8. Secondly Because God expresly commandeth Samuel solemnly to protest against the election of a King But if the Prophet should only have taxed them for incredulity arrogancy c. then should the Lord only have given Sa nuel orders to disswade them from these evils in laying out before them the wickednes thereof But the Prophet only layeth out before them the danger of Monarchy expresly disswadeth them therefrom Who can imagin if his main only purpose had been for disswading them from these evils and not from setting-up Royal Government amongst them but he would rather have turned his Royal Government amongst them but he would rather have turned his face against these evils in spreading-out the dangers thereof before their face then in pointing-out to them the evil of Monarchy Verily were it so he had harped upon the wrong string Thirdly the people's answer is in reference to Samuel's reasoning Nay but say they we will have a king over us This had been a very uncategorick answer yea plain non-sense if Samuel had been only taxing them for carnal confidence arrogancy sc. and dehorting them therefrom Fourthly Because we have shewed already That Samuel according to God's Commandment draweth motives from acts of tyranny that the King would exercise to disswade the people from seeking after him Would he say Ye think your King will ' fight your battels and save you from forrain invasion Well let it be so But I 'll tell you the King himself will tyrannize over you Get him when you will I warrant ye shall not be free of intestine trouble Nothing is so evil as that It is worse then sorrain war Therefore ye will do well to keep your selves free of him so long as ye want him Fifthly Whileas the Lord tacitly rebuketh them of carnal confidence in these words They have rejected Me that I should not reign over them he likewise in them insinuateth a reproof in order to their shaking-off the Government which he had instituted amongst them I was God's Ordinance yea the chiefest of its own kind But whosoever shaketh-off though the least of God's Ordinances doth shake-off God Himself Rom 13. I mean in a preposterous and carnal way delighting in change and going from the better to the worse So did the people of the Jews at this time Therfore God reproving them as rejecters of Democracy by way of consequence he checketh them as suiters of Monarchy for he could no waies have rebuked them for rejecting the one if he had not altogether allowed them in seeking after the other Sixthly They are reprehended and taxed expresly for seeking after a King I wil ' call unto the LORD that ye may perceive and see that your wickedness is great which ye have done in the fight of the LORD in asking you a King And all the people said unto Samuel Pray for thy servants unto the LORD thy God that we die not for we have added to all our sins this evil to ask us a king Ye have done al this wickedness 1 Sam. 12. Let the indifferent Reader
striketh a midst betwixt all Governments Polit. 4. cap. 11. Thirdly Of the chiefest Historians and Orators Berosus imputeth it as a great fault to Nimrod because he erected Kingly Government contrary to what Janus i.e. Noah gave commandment and precept for Ant. lib. 4 I confess what Government was before that time was not purely politick Yet it drew very near the borders of Democracy for then they knew not what it was to be governed by one or by some few because of riches honour and such like No verily they admitted no precedency but purely natural and moral Purely natural because speaking rigorously they lived then as under fatherly and oeconomical Government Purely moral because those did govern who were eminent in godlinesse and vertue It is called the golden age because then men were free of deceit each one living in a brotherly conscionable way with another They knew not what Law-quircks and Politick quiddities meant then All lived as under one common father governed according to the Laws of pure Nature and Justice Subsect 2. Concl. 3. Thus then none were holden-back to govern to whom Nature and Vertue had given the precedency And this I find only to be the difference between Popular Government and what Government was then The one was natural and the other is political Persons then did govern not only because of vertue and godlinesse but also because of natural priority No wonder because then they lived under Governours as under natural fathers Government then was rather oeconomical then political But Popular Government though it giveth place to Physical and natural precedency yet not in the matter of Government It admitteth natural precedency in natural things But in policy only vertue and godlinesse have the first place Yet there is no repugnancy but per accidens in politick things both may consubsist Natural precedency in it self is not repugnantly capable of that which giveth political preferment Herodot seemeth to commend Ottanes who against Darius pleaded for the up-setting of Popular Government among the Persims He saith that Ottanes took the middle way Lib. 3. But in medio stat virtus No wonder though he enclineth to Ottanes judgment rather then to the opinion of Darius who pleaded for Monarchy The man as is said already approveth Pindarus in saying Law is King But amongst the Persians Monarchy was ever above Law Josephus calleth the Government firstly instituted amongst the Jews the best of Governments Ant. Jud. lib. 4. cap. 8. lib. 6. cap. 4. Howsoever he taketh-up the plat-form of that Government is not material But I may determinately say it was democratick and popular This we take to be the judgment of Salust He opposeth liberty to Regal Government a free City to Monarchy Yea he inveigheth against the Grectans as base free of vertue and painsulnesse because saith he libertâ—em per intertiam amiserint And he speaketh of Noble-men as unprositable members in quibus sicus in statua nihil est additamenti Yea he calleth them socordes tgnavi adding per superbiam cuncta gentibus moderantur Moreover he laieth down this as a maxim Libertas juxta bonis malis strenuis ignavis optabilis est Liberty is to be desired by all good and bad stout and cowardly In fragm Cicero was fully of Pompey's way He greatly commended his cause and did much exhort others thereto This you may see in many of his Epistles lib. 2. ep 18. lib. 4. ep 44. lib. 5. ep 62.64 74. See Plutarch in Cicer. Now Pompey was clearly for the defence and preservation of the Roman Commonwealth at it was established before Caesar's usurpation It is beyond all controversie at that time it was in part popular Then the Romans were governed by Tribunes of the people who had power to defend against any Magistrate whether Dictator Consul or any other of the people Sure I am none will say but Demosthenes was all the way for Democracy Orat. cont Theocr. He pleaded still for the Liberties of the Athenian Commonwealth in many Orations whereby he exhorted the Athenians to withstand Philip for preserving amongst them Popular Government inviolable Plutarch reporteth he incited all Greece both against Philip and Alexander In Demost Fourthly Of notable Kings and warriours Minos who by Homer Hesiod Plato and others is called the chiefest of Kings amongst the Cretians created Cosmi Popular Governours So Theseus whom Isoerates crieth-up above Hercules did institute Popular Government amongst the Athenians Theompompus Lycurgus and Agesilaus most noble Kings and most notable patrons of Popular Government And shall we not think but Miltiades Themistocles Aristides Cimon Hannibal and many other notable warriours who did live under the yoke of Popular Government esteemed it the choicest of Governments They acted much both gallantly and cheerfully for the preservation thereof Men's practice is a more evident testimony of their judgement then their profession 'T is known that Lysander an eminent warriour in an oration to the Lacedemonians perswaded them to shake-off Kingly Government altogether Plut. Prob. in Lys Had that been I suppose the Ephorick Magistracy should have governed all Though Dion a matchlesse warriour was against the popular multitude which inevitably begetteth confusion yet was he for Plato's Aristocracy which is reformed Democracy Fifthly From the example of the chiefest and most reformed Common-wealths whereof some were purely popular and some mixed v. g. dthenian Cyrenian Cumaean Pyrean Horean Syracusian Tarentinian Theban Roman c. Diodore out of Herodot reporteth That the Assyrian Kingdom being overturned by the Medes for a long time after the Cities were governed without Kings by Popular Government The point being thus established both by divine and human authority it nextly falleth into our way to make it good from Reason it-self And for this we shall shortly give you the abridgement of the Arguments of some ancient Philosophers which Aristotle alleadgeth Polit. 3. cap. 11. and 12. As they do plead for Popular Government so they do directly militat against Monarchy The first is taken from the parity and equality of the Members of the Republick the second from the necessity of Magistracy the third from the equity and infallibility of Law the fourth from the inconveniency of setting man above Law the fifth and sixth from example Sparing to repeat their arguments at length we content our self with an argument of our own framing And it is this That Government is simply best which restoreth us nearest beyond all Governments to our condition and liberties in the state of perfection and pure naturals But Democracy restoreth us nearest beyond all Governments to our condition and liberties in the state of perfection and pure naturals Ergo Democracy simply is the best Government The Proposition is undeniable because the state of perfection and integrity is simply the best It is without either spot or wrinkle And consequently the nearer we draw to that condition our case is so much more excellent and good And so whatsoever Government
restoreth us nearest thereto without all controversie is simply best In making good the Assumption we lay-down these two Conclusions Conclus 1. No man by nature in a formal and antecedent way is born subject to Government Firstly If Nature tied man formally and in an antecedent way to Politick subjection we demand Whether or not in such respect it layeth bonds of subjection upon all men If it doth then Kings no lesâ—e then subjects are tied by Nature to jurisdiction 1. Because that which agreeth to a thing formally and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also competent to it universally and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. If Kings were not also subjected to Authority by nature it would inevitably follow all men and not all men were subjected to it Which is implicatory If not then it followeth That some men by nature formally are born subject to Authority and some not Both which are repugnant for if Nature as Nature subjecteth man to Authority it giveth exemption to none more then to another Otherwise you shall either admit a simple contradiction or else you shall deny all men to be natural Therefore of neccssity the Royallist must either admit all men according to Nature to be born free or else both King and People by Nature to be born subject to Government He must either admit the one or deny the other also Which he proudly affirmeth See what Philosophy this is Man by nature is formally born subject to Government So will the Royallists have it This will be the Conclusion Ergo man by nature is not formally born subject to Government A plain contradiction indeed The reason is If nature subject man formally to Government then it subjecteth all men thereto And if all men I demand Whether or not doth nature subject one to another If it doth ergo either committitur circulus or else one by nature is not subjected to another Otherwise all according to nature are not subjected thereto as is shewed to be If not ergo none by Nature are borne subjects for so by Nature there is none to whom they are subjected Non. entus nulla sunt accidentia Therefore it inevitably followeth either all to be born free or else all to be born subjected to Government and not to be born subjected thereto Secondly If Nature laid formal bonds of subjection upon Man to Politick Authority we judge it very strange how there have been and may be many families and societies of men void and free of such subjection We can scarcely think that the interveening of any accidental cause could obstruct the current of such a formal stream of Nature from issuing and streaming forth its formal effect We can hardly digest it how Nature formally bending its strength to produce Politick subjection doth not also erect Government amongst Beasts and subject one of them to another See we not by experience how natural predominants do alwaies produce effects suitable to their temper Why may we not then with as good reason alleadge that Nature producing Government and subjection to Policy would have also through its natural sourse drawn all natural creatures to the erecting of Government and Policy amongst them How cometh it to passe I pray you there is not King-Lion King-Eagle King-Elephant c. Thirdly If Nature formally tied some men to subjection and formally derived power of governing and reigning to others then the constitution of Judges and Governours would be a formal and natural act Physically and formally flowing from Nature's principles not contingently but necessarily Which taketh away the freedom of God Deut. 17.1 Sam. 12. Ps 75. and Dan. 4. in setting-up Governours and Rulers according to his pleasure excluding all formal and physical necessity from Nature And not only so but also it solloweth that both Rulers and ruled are eternal and unchangeable Which is repugnant both to Experience and Reason The Gymnosophists and Indian Philosophs did enact it by Law That all by Nature were free-born and none were servants but to be of equal authority and alike dignity Diod. Ant. lib. 3. cap. 10. Dionysius Halicarnassius saith In all men the desire of liberty is innate Lib. 5. 6. Julius Caesar averreth All men study to liberty Lib. 2. 3. de bel Gal. And Gregory affirmeth All men by Nature to be free whom Nations have subjected to bondage 12. quaest 2. The Law speaketh much for us in this and in positive terms saith what we affirm L. manumiss F. de just jur Lib. 1. digest tit 1. lib. 1. Inst tit 5. Ulpian Justian distinguish between the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations The one is particular only relating to man the other is general relative both to man and beast Ulp. lib. 1. sect ult Just dig lib. 1. tit 1. Inst lib. 1. tit 2. But I pray you Wherein can the Law of Nature be common both to man and beast if you affirm Nature to have laid strait bonds of subjection upon one to another We find by experience that Lions are not subject to King-Lion Boars to King-Boar Eagles to King-Eagle And so you annul this community of the Law of Nature to Man and Beast if you understand subjective authority formally to flow from Nature They do as yet more clearly difference these Laws calling the one slavery and the other liberty Ulp. lib. man D. Just dig lib. 1. Hence Ulpian Inst lib. 1. and Justinian Dig. lib. 1. say That all by Nature being free-born Manumission to Nature is unknown It is the consequent of servitude according to the Law of Nations See also Just Inst lib. 1. tit 5. Whence is it out of Florentine he defineth liberty from Nature and servitude from the custom of Nations Dig. lib. 1. tit 5. Where liberty is expresly opposed to Government and Authority The one is called humane constitution and the other Nature's birth But the Lawyer Prate would make us beleeve by the Law of Nations Ulpian and Justinian do understand a humane universal Law and Sanction and by servitude praedure and tyrannous form of Government And so faith he the Law of Nations must not alwaies be opposed to the Law of Nature as Livius saith Neither must we think faith he that all Civil Constitution is contrary to Nature but such as draweth the subjected into slavery The Lawyer Baldwin seemeth to take him by the hand whileas he calleth the Law of Nations the particular Law of Nature But the man com in Justit Inst lib. 1. 2. seemeth neither to be much for it nor much against it Nay but Mr. Prate wresteth Ulpian and Justinian their meaning for if the Law of Nature were taken by them for any humane Law then should humane Law be common both to man and beast Do not they say the Law of Nature is common to both Therefore you shall either conclude beasts to be men and affected with humane faculties or else you shall restrict your universal within the bounds of a particular But if you shall say
others do render it 'T is a vain thing in Royallists to imagine Elishah and the Elders with him did not resist the King but his messenger 1. The text maketh clear against this 1s not the found of his masters feet behind him Thus Elishah commandeth the door to be shut upon the messenger because the King was backing him and coming-in immediatly after the cut-throat This intimateth to us the shutting of the door and the out-keeping of the house was mainly against Jehoram himself His immediate approaching upon the back of the messenger is the ground of shutting the door and keeping-out the house They alleadge also this to be an extraordinary act Quasi vero self-defence were not a thing most natural and ordinary Away with this elusion 2. Because what the King's emissary doth in the King's name is done by him as in the King's person and authority And so virtualiter at least it is all one to resist the King's emissary and to resist the King himself Salmasius would loose the knot another way And faith he the impure Puritans can conclude nothing from thus for cutting-off the head of Charles 1. The Prophet did not take it on him to cut-off Jehoram That was done by Jehu whom God extraordinarily stirred-up thereto Def. Reg. cap. 4. Who ever saw such a man as this He only raileth and shifteth the Question The Question between us now is not concerning the off-cutting but the simple act of resisting Kings And though Elishah did not cut-off Jehoram yet he cannot deny but he withstood him and defended himself against his violence This is all for the present we crave Neither can he deny but Elishah gave orders to one of the children of the Prophets to anoint Jehu King Whereupon he went forth and did cut-off Jehoram executing the purpose of God on the house of Ahab From which example is shewed already to be lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings It is the Magistrat's part and not the Prophet's unlesse it be by extraordinary impulsion to cut-off the delinquent And so as from the example of Elishah it is lawful to resist so from the example of Jehu whom Elishah caused to be anointed for cutting-off the house of Ahab it is lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings 4. Libnah made defection from Jehoram and revolted from him 2 Kin. 8.2 Chr. 21. Salmasius studieth to elude this yet he faith nothing against it but what others of his own tribe said before him And faith he Libnah's revolt in respect of God the Judge of all the earth was a just punishment of Jehoram 's sins But in respect of the revolters it is no where justified in all the text Def. Reg. cap. 4. But with his leave the text insinuateth the contrary This you may learn from comparing the revolt of Libnah with the revolt of the Edomites So the Edomites revolted from under the hand of Judah unto this day There is nothing added to that The same time also did Libnah revolt from under his hand This is added as a reason because be had for saken the Lord God of his fathers Thus is abundantly holden-one unto us that Edom and Libnah revolted from Jeboram in a different way No question in respect of God the cause and ground of the revolt of both is one God caused both to revolt to punish the sins and transgressions of Jehoram But in respect of the Revolters there are different causes The Edomites revolted because they disdained to live under the yoke of the King of Judah The text faith they chose a King of their own And from that which is added as a ground of Libnah's revolt it is more then apparent to us it revolted from a principle of Religion And these who comment upon the text say Libnah revolted because Jehoram pressed the people of the Land to Idolatry I suppose upon good reason Libnah's revolt is far more justifiable then the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam The one revolted upon a natural and the other upon a spiritual accompt And yet as is shewed already the ten Tribes revolted allowably 5. Uzziah was withstood by Azariah accompanied with fourscore valiant Priests of the Lord. And in this contrary to the doctrine of Royallists we shall make good these three things 1. That they resisted him violently 2. allowably 3. that they dethroned him The first is evident from the text Firstly because it is said they withstood him They withstood Uzziah the King 2 Chron. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they are words of violent resistance signifying to stand against And for this cause the fourscore Priests are called men of valour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sons of strength So the Seventy and Arius Montanus translate them It maketh us imagine they were purposely selected from amongst the rest of the Priests because of their valour and strength to withstand Uzziah in facrificing Secondly because they did thrust Uzziah violently out of the Temple Azariah the chief Priest and all the Priests thrust him out from thence Ibil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signisieth to thrust out with violence They hurried him out of the Temple as the word importech The second is also manifest because the Lord attended the undertaking of the Priests with miraculous and extraordinary succesfulnesse They no sooner laid hands on the King but beyond all expectation the Lord did put hand in him also He did back them notably They no sooner did resist the King but assoon the Lord from Heaven did strike him with Leprosie And is it imaginable but the Lord one way or other had plagued them also if they had failed in their-duty to the King I can see no reason why he should have spared them in failing in their duty more then he did not spare Uzziah in failing in his duty And which is more the Priests do not groundlesly withstand him They argue from the King's duty and from their duty They tell him in plain terms It did not become the King to sacrisice Num. 18. but the Priests Ex. 30. Upon these grounds they set-to to withstand him and keep him back from burning incense Which insinuat that their act of resisting him was in no part of his duty and that which was proper to his kingly charge but only in maintaining their own liberties and what according to God's Law was due to them Would they say We will withstand thee O King and have reason to do so because as thou dost that which is not incumbent to thee so thou encroachest upon the peculiar liberties of our charge The third is beyond controversie though Royallists start much at it 1. Because he was cut-off from the house of the Lord. This was because of his Leprosy for according to the Law the Leper was cut-off from the Congregation Thus the Priests spare not to execute the Law upon the King though Royallists estecm him to have exemption and immunity therefrom And Uzziah the King was a leper unto the day of his death and dwelt in