their consent and advice of the Lords shall deeme to be just and fit And this power or rather trust they derive from the people their Electors yet not without dependance on the King The Knights are sent by the County but the County had power and command by the Kings Writ to send them And as for the Burgesses their trust or power call it what you will doth more especially referre unto the King as the author thereof for whence had the elected Burgesses their power but from the Borough that sent them whence had the Borough power to send but from the King who by his Letters Patents incorporated them into a Borough and gave them power to send Burgesses to the Parliament which otherwise they had no more right to doe then any other vile whatsoever And this is the ground of that power which the house of Commons have as concerning the generalty of the Kingdome And besides this the house of Commons although a great and honourable Assembly yet of themselves as I think they are no Court either of Record or of ordiâ—ary Iustice unlesse it bee with respect to their owne Members which is rather a necessary priviledge then any power They can neither administer an Oath nor give any judgement twixt party and party nor have they power to controll or reverse a judgement given in the meanest pipowder Court I speak not this with a minde to derogate from the due honour of that Assembly but to occasion some friendly brother if I am in errour to instrâ—ct me how the imposing of the Protestation by order of the Commons only upon all the subjects in generall under a penalty of being branded with malignancy and adjudged unfit to beare any publike office may be defended How that order for levelling Chancels and making other alterations in the Church which issued from the Commons without the King and in opposition to the Lords may be justified either by reason or president How that Remonstrance a chiefe meanes of all our succeding dissentions that was voted with so much opposition in their owne house and was after published I will not say to disaffect the people from his Majesties government may be defended and justified In briefe may I be instructed with some grounds by which these and many other their actions and Votes may be warranted I shall thenceforth acknowledge them whom now perhaps by mistake I think to be no Court at all to be the most supreme Iudicatory both for Law and State In the meane while I am ignorant of any trust they have other then a trust from the people to consult and assent to the King and Lords in the making of Lawes which without the consent of the Lords and his Majesties concurrence is altogether uselesse and of no vertue And in them apart I know no Iurisdiction but with respect to their owne Members and surely that such as it is they have from the Crowne the fountaine of all Iustice and the spring head of all Iurisdiction The house of Peeres considered simply have power by assent or disassent to enable or disable the making or repealing of any Lawes and generall Ordinances but without the concurrence of King and Commons this of it self is of no use They are likewise an high Court of Iudicatory in respect of particular causes orderly brought before them having Iurisdiction in many though not in all Cases In criminall causes concerning life and member I think they have not Iurisdiction without the Kings speciall Commission and therefore they cannot attaint any man for treason murder or felony They are not only a Court of Iustice but of Record they may take a recognizance and by the Kings Writ or Commission may reverse for errour the Iudgements given in any of the ordinary Courts But all these powers as likewise their Baronies by reason of which they have place and vote in Parliament are immediately and meerely derived from the Crowne the fountaine of all honour and jurisdiction and they doe so necessarily depend upon the King in matters of Iudicatory as that in iudgement of law they speak ove bouch le Roy mesme Thus much concerning the Lords and Commons apart from the King The King alone he is Capitalis Angliae Iusticiarius the fountaine of all Iurisdiction and above all other Iurisdictions Britton speaking in the person of King E. 1. nous volousque nostre jurisdiction soit sur touts jurisdictions in nostre royalme By the law of Nations and by the very end of Regall power the King is to iudge the people 1 Sam. cap. 8. Give us a King to judge us vers. 20. We will have a King over us that we also may be as the Nations and that our King may judge us Bracton tels us That the King alone if he could suffice ought to judge the people and that by his Oath he is bound thereunto And as the ordinary iuridicall power is supreme and originally in the King so likewise is the legislative it being a principall end of Regall authority dare jus populo which power was in Kings by the law of nature while they governed the people by naturall Equity long before either municipall lawes or Parliaments had a being Before Moses there were no standing municipall lawes or at least not before Pharoneus long before which there were Kings of Sâ—itâ—â—â— Assyria Egypt c. who according to naturall Equity gave law unto their people Rhemo cum fratre Quirinuâ— jura dabat Hoc Priami gâ—stamen erat â—um jura vocatiâ— Mâ—râ— dâ—ret populâ—â— But their lawes they so gave ought to bee agreeable to naturall Equity aiming no lesse at the good of the people then of themselves Such conditions and limitations as are agreeable to naturall Equity Kings by the divine institution were bound to observe and some by their voluntary Oaths for themselves and their successours many times bound themselves to more strict limits then were absolutely requisite yet being agreeable to Equity and consistent with Royalty ought to be observed And thenâ—e it is according to the severall degrees that the latitude of naturall Equity doth admit in giving lawes that some Kings are more strictly limiâ—ed then others and according to the oaths and promises made by the King of this Realme they can neither give nor repeale any law but â—ith the assent of the Peeres and people The Observaâ—or doth not deny the Legislative power to bee in the King but saith he partly in the King partly in the Kingdom which I shall admit to be true in this sence viz. that the Legislative power is not so in the King onely as that he being sole can either in ordinary or extraordinary cases make or alter any Law for thereunto is necessarily required the assent both of Lords and Commons But yet to speak properly the Legislative power is solely in the King although not in the King being sole Rex solus legislator non si solus the assent of
Peeres and Commons gives weight and testimony unto the Law but the King only gives it force and authority And it will be thus proved the Legislative is the most soveraign power jus dare is somewhat more then jus dicere If then this most supreame power were formalitèr subjectivè aswell in the Lords and Commons as in the King the Government of this kingdome during Parliament would be Democraticall or Aristocraticall not Monarchichall or Regall Nor would it be a kingdome or Realme but a Republique For what else is Aristocracy but the supreme power seated in divers of the Nobilitie or what Democracy but a like power in the people The Legislative power is then solely in the King ut in subjecto and the consent of Lords and Commons is no parting or sharing in that power but onely a condition requisite to the use of that power in the King And this I conceive is evidently proved by the Oath of Supremacy whereby the King is acknowledged the onely Supreame Governour and likewise by the forme of all our ancient Statutos in which the King only speaks as the Law-maker some Statutes are in forme of a Writ in the Kings name only directed to the severall Sheriffs some in form of a Charter made by the King sometimes it runs the King wills the King ordained or the King in Parliament or the King with the assent of the Lords and Commons c. And never did any Act runne thus The Lords and Commons with the assent of the King or the Lords and Commons in Parliament ordaine or order c. And in the passing Bills to this day the imperative is only by the King Soit fait come est desire or Le Roy voet 22. E. 3. 3. Pl. 25. Le roy fist les leyes per assâ—nt des Peeres de la comune non pas lâ—s Peeres le comune In a learned argument made in Parliament against impositions and printed by command of a Committee this Parliament that Champion for liberty examining where the soveraigne power is in this kingdom The soveraigne power saith he Is agreed to be in the King but in the King is a twofold power the one in Parliament the other cut of Parliament the correcting of the errors of the ordinary Courts is by him Acts of Parliament be they Lawes grounds or whatsoever the Act and power is the Kings but with the assent of the Lords and Commons which maketh it the most supreame power not controlable by any but controling the regall power out of Parliament so he Now by all that hath been said 't is apparant That in the Lords and Commons severed from the King there is onely power in particular cases as is before expressed but that power that may oblige the subject in generall by Lawes Ordinances or such like Acts or Orders is solely in the King In the name of goodnesse then what is that which the people speak of when they talke of the power of the Parliament in such generall cases without and in opposition to the King How can they without the King the power being only in the King make Lawes and Ordinances and with binding authority declare the Law Is the Legislative power solely in the King and yet hath he not a free assent but must of necessity follow the major Vote The Royall assent was that which onely did give power and force unto the Law and it is now turned to an empty piece of formality a matter of course that without any Election must follow which way the Vote shall lead it Or if the Royall assent bee not added yet if the major part at any time shall deeme it necessary that their Votes stand for Lawes without it they are as compleatly and firmely binding as if they were added I wish some man would first sadly consider and then give me satisfaction if by these very Votes the Government be not already altered and Monarchy regulated by Law turned into an arbitrary boundlesse Cligarchy altered I say as farre forth as meere Votes are abâ—e to prevaile which yet I hope will never be actually effected This and many other Observations that may be made out of the premisses I shall remit unto the ingenious reader I shall only make application of what hath been said against the Observator pag. 9. It is alleadged saith he in derogation of Parliament that whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble and treat in all cases of a publike nature yet without the Kings concurrence or consent they are livelesse conventions without all vertue and power the very name of Parliament not due to them This Allegation saith he at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will as any Nation under heaven ever suffered under Patience good Observavator The very name surely is not due but to the very thing In conjunction with the King I can say the King and Parliament nâ—ming the King specially propter excellentiam but I cannot rightly say the King or Parliament or the King against the Parliament can you shew me where the Lords and Commons opposed to the King are termed a Parliament Did ever any man describe a Parliament to be a body consisting of Lords and Commons only with some difficulty I could find where it is said to be a body consisting of King Lords and Commons I would not strive about words but that I see the very name of Parliament misapplyed to the two Houses doth somewhat abuse the people As for Parliamentary power itselfe I have proved it to be formally and immoveably in the King only ut in subjecto and that the consent of Lords and Commons is but a requisite condition to compleat that power as to the doing of some Acts to which it cannot other wise extend If then there bee no concurrence of the King in whom only the power is what are they but a livelesse Convention without all value and power What 's a confirmation of the Deane and Chapter without a grant of the Bishop to be confirmed An assent oâ— Lords and Commons without an Act to be assented to is somwhat like two cyphers without any figure which yet if added to a figure make it centuple If this Allegation against which the Observator doth exclaime with so much vehemency be any new doctrine I am content to bee discarded but if it shall appear to be a most known truth and such as doth not more support the Royall Prerogative then the liberty of the subject then I trust men will be satisfied upon what grounds that odious scandall is raised against his Majesty of intention to bring in an Arbitrary Government such as the French are subiect to A calumny not a little practised to beat off the subiects from their due Allegiance The truth then of this position that the Houses without the King as to the making of any publike Acts Orders or Ordinances are livelesse
â—yranizing over his Subjects If the Prince saith Bodin be an absolute Soveraigne as are the true Monarches of Spaine England c. where the Kings themselves have the Soveraignty without all doubt or question not divided with their Subjects in this case it is not lawfull for any one of the Subjects in particular nor all of them in generall to attempt anything either by way of fact or of justice against the honour life or dignity of the Soveraigne albeit that hee had committed all the wickednesse â—mpiety and cruelty that could be spoken for as to proceede against him by way of justice the Subjest hath uo such jurisdiction over his Soveraigne Prince of whom dependeth all power and authority to command Now if it be not lawfull for the Subject by way of justice to proceede against his Prince how should it then be lawfull to proceede against him by way of fact or force for question is not here what men are able to doe by strength and force but what they ought of right to doe the subject is not onely guilty of Treason in the highest degree who hath slaine his Soveraigne Prince but he also which hath appempted the same who hath given Counsell or consent thereto And then he goes on to prove the same by sundry examples taken out of Scripture and then saith he to answer vain objectiâ—ns were but idely to abuse both time and learning But as he which doubteth whether there be a God or noe is not with arguments to be refuted but with severe punishments so are they which call into question a thing so cleare and that by Bookâ—s publiquely imprinted that the Subjects may take up armes against their Prince being a Terant Howbeit the most learned Divines are cleare of opinion that it is not lawfull without especiall command from God And as for that which Calvin faith if there were at this time Magistrates appointed for the defence of thee people and to restraine the insolency of Kings as were the Ephori in Lacedemonia the Tribunes in Rome and the Demarches in Athens that they ought to resist and impeach their licentiousnesse and cruelty He sheweth sufficiently that it was never lawfull in a right Monarchy for he speaketh but of the popular and Arâ—stocratique States of Common-weales We read also that the Protestant Princes of Germany before they entred into armes against Charles the Emperour demanded of Martin Luther if it were lawfull who frankly told them that it was not lawfull whatsoever Tiranny or impiety were pretended yet was he not therein of them beleeved So thereof ensued a most deadly and lamentable Warre the â—â—d whereof was most miserable drawing with it the rume and destruction of many great and noble houses of Germany with exceeding slaughter of the Subjeâ—ts The Prince we may justly call the Father of the Countrey and ought to bee more deare unto every one then any Father Et nulla tanta impretas nullum tantum scelus est quod sit parricidio vindicandum I say therefore that the Subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against his soveraigne Prince how naughty and cruell soever he be Lawfull it is not to obey him in all things contrary unto the Lawes of God and nature to fly and hide our selves from him but yet to suffer stripes yea and death also rather then to attempt any thing against his life or honour This is the substance of that learned Protestants discourse which is worth your reading at large But alas all this discourse is besides the present businesse nothing is attempted against the life or honour of the Prince the taking up of Armes and shooting bullets at him is in defence of his Majesties person there are no expressions in this observatour nor yet in him that hath made observations upon a speech of King James with eight and twenty Queres nor in any other Pamphlets that licenciously slye about that doe at all touch the honour of the Kings Subjects may not resist saith Bodin and our best Divines without speciall command but ouâ— Brethren now have speciall instruction from the Spirit to doe what they doe or if they have not the Spirit assuring them that they may take armes against their Prince yet Master Cal. hath well distinguished that it is one thing to sight against a King another thing to fight against the lusts of a King Against the lusts of a King my beloved Brethren we may fight nay we ought to fight against them And our Observatour stands in defence of that distinction That levying Forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanied with his presence is not levying warre against the King but warre against his authory though not person is warre against the King But in truth are not all these shifting distinctions like a Shipmans hose that will fit an Jrish Rebell as well as an English I dare not speake my minde of that distinction the Observator maintaines but you shall heare what an honourable Chancellour of England hath long since said of it This is a dangerous distinction betweene the King and the Crowne and betweene the King and the Kingdome it reacheth too farre I wish every good Subject to beware of it It was never taught but either by traytours as in Spencers Bill in Edward the seconds time or by treasonable Papists as Harding in his confutation of the Apologie maintaineth that Kings have their authority by the positive Law of Nations and have no more power then the people have of whom they take their temporall jurisdiction and so Ficlerus Simanca and others of that crew by seditious sectaries and puritans as Buchanan de Jure Regni apud Scotus Penry Knox and such like in Calvins case it is reported that in the reigne of Ed. 2. the Spencers to cover the treason hatched in their hearâ—s invented this damnable and damned opinion that homage and oath of ligeance was more by reason of the Kings Crowne that is of his politique capacity then by reason of the person of the King upon which opinion they inferred execrable and detestable consequence 1. If the King doe not demean himself by reason in the right of his Crown his leiges are bound by oath to remove the King 2. Seeing the King could not be removed by suit of Law that ought to be done per aspertee 3. That his leiges be bound to govern in aid of him and in default of him All which were condemned by two Parliaments I will not say that this concernes the Observator or any body else let others judge I only say I am unsatisfied how we may lawfully use active resistance with our swords in our hands against a lawfull soveraign Prince though tyrannizing or if it might be done yet certainly not till after much sufferance and that destruction shall open its jawes ready to swallow us up and not upon imagenary feares and jealousies such as we have had now at lest twelve moneths past
universalitie or body collected As he is head so is he in place power and dignitie above the body politique or universalitie and not otherwise the head of any particular but as he is a part of that universalitie As out of the Embrion saith Fortescue ariseth a body naturall ruled by one head even so of a multitude of people ariseth a kingdome which is a body mysticall governed by one man as by its head As then in the naturall body the head is improperly said to be the head of the arme or of the leg but the head of the body so in truth must the King be made the head of the misticall body not of the particular members The King is but one head and therefore but of one body not then of the particulars which are many bodyes but of the universall one body There is a politique body wich is the Vniversalitas Angliâ— hath this body politique no head or is the head inferiour to its body and yet no Monster The Observator will object that the politicall head must be sâ—bservient to its body for that it received its first being and subsistence from the body we shall hereafter prove that the Regal power hath alwayes its being from God though it be sometimes with the peoples approbation And as the politicall head hath its subsistence with the body and must be destroyed by its dissolution so if you destroy the head or kingly power you destroy the kingdome and dissolve it into a Chaos and confused multitude Nec populus Acephatus saith Fortescue corpus vocari meretur quiaut in naturalibus capite detruâ—cato residuum non corpus sed truncum appellamus Sic in politicis sine capite communit as nullatenus corporatur But admitting that in the body politique the head hath its power authority derived meerly and solely out of the politique provision that radically and habitually was in the people to provide for its own safety and weale yet I cannot see how it will follow that therefore the Regall power must be subservient and subject unto the people for as in the naturall body the heart being primum vivens distributeth blood and spirit unto all the members and giveth life and vertue unto the head it selfe yet must that and the whole body be subject unto the head which as Supreame governeth and directeth the whole man A second kingly Attribute is this that he is Sponsâ—s regni and at his Coronation wedded with a Ring unto the kingdom The Observator saith this must be applyed to subjects taken devisim not conjunctim Otherwise as the wife is inferiour to the husband so would the people be in politiques to the King But in sadnesse is the King wedded to the particular men and women within this kingdome with beards and without I pray how many wives will he so have The Observator foresaw the Arguments which might be drawne from these and other attributes whereby Princes are 〈◊〉 Gods Lords Fathers c. and that therefore subjects must stand by the same relation as Creatures Servants Children c. all Which he would shift off by his misapplyed distinction of Kings are such singulis but not universis But indeed a King is said to be a Father or Pater patriae that is of the universalitie not of particular persons And elsewhere the King is termed an Oeconomus or Paâ—eâ—familuis which with no congruity can be said in respect of particulars Nor can the Observator satisfie any man considering that Domesticall government is the very Image and modell of Soveraignty in a Common-weale why children and servants might not as wel use this distinction against their Parents and Masters as subjects against their Soveraign for may it not be objected though the Father in relation to his Children or a Master of a Family in relation to his servants be singulis major yet Vniversis minor and therefore if all the sons or servants hold together they may command their Father or Master or turn him out of doores which was wisely foreseen by Agesilaus when he returned this answer to a Citizen of Sparta that desired an alteration of the Government That kind of Rule which a man would disdain in his own house were very unfit to governe great Regions by But the Observator will object that the relation holds not alike betwixt King and Subjects as between Master and servants For that the Master saith he is more worthy then his servants and above them all but this holds not in relation betwixt a King and his Subjects Why that 's the question For proofe whereof although he neither doth or can alleadge any one authority yet to prove the contrary that the people neither conjunctim nor divisim and much lesse then representatives are more worthy or above the King amongst many peruse these few Bracton l. 1. cap. 8. Omnis quidem sub eo rege ipse sub nullo nisi tantum sub Deo parem non habet in regno suo quia sic amitteret praeceptum nam par in parem non habet imperium item nec multò fortiùs superiorem nec potentiorem habere debet quia sic esset inferior sibi subditis If he be tantum sub deo then not under the people or their representatives 19. E. 4. 6. If all the people in England would make a warre yet if the King will not assent it cannot be said a warre but the King alone may make a warre or league Is not the King in this above all the people in England 24. H. 8. cap. 12. Where by divers sundry old authentique histories and Chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed that this Realme of England is an Empire and so hath been accepted in the world governed by one Supreame head and King having the Dignity and royall estate of the Imperiall Crowne of the same unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people been bounden and owen to beare next to God a naturall and humble obedience c. Note the King the supreame head true saith the Observator singulis not universis unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts been bounden and owen next to God Then no mediate underived Majestie 'twixt God and him a naturall obedience that is due by the law of nature or the Divine Law not onely by the pactions and agreement of politique Nations 25. â—â— 8. 25. H. 8. This your Graces Realme recognizing no Superiour under God but only your Grace By Realme is meant either Subjects divisim or conjunctiâ— If divisim then no particular is subject to Judges and Justice nor to the Lords and Commons in Parliament but onely to the King which is absurd If conjunctim then is the King in the act recognized Major universis Camb. Eliz. pag. 39. The Queene explaines the Oath of Supremacie that she claymes nothing thereby Quam quod ad coronam Angliae jam olim jure spectavit scilicet se sub Deo
Houses without the King represent the Universall Realm shall be considered anon passing that by I conceive that the Parliament truely so called is above the King taken solely for that it doth involve the King without whom they are not truely a Parliament The Parliament then thus considered is a whole compared with some part and the King but a part though the most excellent part of the whole Now every whole is greater then any part the Head though more excellent then all the other Members yet not more excellent then the whole Man whereof the Head is but a part But the King solely compared with the Parliament or rather the Houses of Parliament excluding or not involving the King is superiour and above them whether you consider them scorsim or conjunctim for taken conjunctim they make but a Body which though it be greater then then the Head in Bulk yet doth the Head excell in Vertue Excellence and Authority And although by vertue of representation they are the Body of the whole Kingdom yet is the King the Head of that Body and the Representative of God himself who I am sure is above the Body they represent It is a Principall undeniable Pax in parem non habet imperium multo minus in superiorâ—â—â— If then the Houses be above nay if but equall with the King He can have no Command over them But it is evident He hath Command over them He calls and commands them to assemble being assembled or united together He may command them to prorogue or adjourn for time or place upon which Command it is then their Duty to rise and remove and again at His pleasure He can dissolve them Although for this time His Majesty hath been graciously pleased to restrain Himself from the exercise of that Power yet the Power it self is still in Him as an Inheritance inseparable from His Crown The Representatives of the Kingdom either are Subjects or not That they are not Subjects by reason that they are assembled is absurd and so would not the Kings Protection due unto Subjects belong unto them If they are Subjects then doth the King remain their Soveraign and Superiour And indeed so far is their uniting and assembling in Parliament from diminishing the Kingly Soveraignty to which they were before all and every one Subject as that the Regall Majesty is thereby much more encreased and augmented Cromp. Jurisâ— 10. We are informed by Our Judges saith King H. 8. to His Parliament That We at no time stand so highly in Our Estate Royall as in the time of Parliament wherein We as Head and you as Members are conâ—oyned and knit together in one Body Politique If the Houses as representing the Universall Realm are above the King then they may judge Him punish or depose Him But they cannot judge Him 22 Edw. 3. 3. Le Roy per cux ne doit estre ajuge 3 Edw. 3. 19. Scrope Those which are Judges of Parliament are Judges of their Pâ—â—rs but the King hath no Peer within His Own Kingdom and therefore ought not to be judgedly them And for deposing a King or depriving Him of His Right and Authority or any necessary part thereof no Act of Parliament can prevail much lesse the Lords and Commons An Attainder by Parliament could not barre the title to the Crowne from descending on King H. 7. nor was an act of Parliament disabling King H. 6. to reassume the Government of his people of any force but without any repeale in it selfe frustrate and voyd 7. Rep. 14. Calvins case an act of Parliament cannot take away the Kings protection or the Subjects service which is due by the Law of nature 11. Rep. Sur de la wares Case William de la ware although disabled by act of Parliament was neverthelesse called by Q. Eliz. to sit as a Peere in Parliament for that it seemes the Queene could not be barred of the service and Counsell of any of her Subjects 2. H. 7. 6. A statute that the King by no non obstante shall dispence with it is void because it would take a necessary part of Governement out of the King If then no act of Parliament be of force to take away the government or any necessary part thereof from the King then surely is not any Ordinance of the Lord and Commons of force to doe it And consequently the Lords and Commons as representing the vniversall Realme cannot be above the King but inferior to him Before the King commanded them to assemble each particular and all of them were his Subjects and inferior to him If by assembling into one body and the vertue of representation they cease to be his Subjects and inferiors why doe they then in all their petitions and declarations or Answers proceeding from them not as particular men but as houses of Parliament united stile him Their gracious Soveraigne and themselves His Majesties most humble Subjects the Lords and Commons in Parliament Let our Observator judge whether these representatives have not ill discharged their duty to the Kingdome by debasing thus the underived Majestie so he calls it of the people by petitioning in so low and humble a forme him that is but their creature and in whom there is no Majestie but what is from them derived downe unto him for so the Obseruator conceives it But now to answer the Observators Argument which is thus There is nothing saith he more known or assented to then this that although the King be singulis major yet universis minor being below the people then in universali he must likewise be below the representatives of that universalitie I will not stand to question what necessary connexion these propositions have The people are above the King therefore their representatives are so The King of England is above the King of Spain doth the English Embassadour therefore take place of the King of Spain But admitting a necessary Connexion The people are above the King ergo the houses representing them Why then è converso The houses representing are not above the King ergo the people represented are not and so having proved the houses below the King I have already proved the King above the people yet a word more 'T is true as the Observator saith nothing is more known or assented to then this that the King solely is Minor universis the universalitie including the King For no part be it the head can exceed or be greater then the whole But againe if the King and universalitie bee contradistinguished nothing is more known or assented to then this That the King I speake of the King of England a Soveraign King not a Duke of Venice is not onely singulis major but major universis Nay most properly is the King above the people considered as an entire Congregation For chiefly as he is King he is above all others Now King relates to kingdome Rex to Regnum and Kingdome or Regnum denotes an
Electors throughout the whole Kingdome may according to this doctrine revoke the trust and authority that all the Members have If so how can my obedience be required to their Votes when as it is doubtful whether the major part of the Free-holders do not disavow their proceedings Most certain it is whether the people were the authors of Regall power or not there neither is nor can be any power remayning in the people above that which is in a Monarch or King for if the supream power remayn in the people it must be a popular State such as Rome sometimes was The Lacedemonians had a King in name but their Estate was truly a popular Estate the supream power being in those 5 worthy Members called the Ephori who figuring patronizing the people had power to controll the doings of their King and their custome was as Plutarch relates every ninth yeere upon some cleer night to gaze upon the Firmament and if they observed the Moon to twincle or any Star to sparkle or shoot they thereupon would commit their King to prison who might not thence be delivered untill the Oracle of Apollo had so declared A happy Government I assure you both for King and people But if you will allow of a true King in power as well as in name the sovereigne power next under God must be in him not controllable with the breath of the fickle multitude Princeps Nec ponit aut sumit secures Arbitrio popularis aurae The Roman Emperour was anciently chosen by the Souldiers but did there remayne in them a power over the Emperour so elected T is recorded that the Souldiers having chosen Valentinian the elder would have added ao lleague unto him in the Imperiall government but the Emperour answered them me ad imperium eligere penes vos erat sed cum jam à vobis electus sim consortem imperii quem postulastis non amplius in vectra sed in mea potestate eligere situm est and with this answer were the Souldiers well contented whereby it appeares there remained no superour power in them Did there remaine a superintendent power in the people over the King it would then be lawfull to appeale from the Kâ—ng to the people as to the more supreame power but such appeales were never heard of at least not till of late nor are they consistant with Monarchy or any government but necessarily tend to Anarchy and destruction Omnis honestae rei malus judex est vulgus there is no Common-wealth wherein there are not more evill then good more simple then wise if then the majority of the people shall determine upon the last Appeale what judgement shall we be ruled by You see whereunto the Observators principles do lead and if you desire to know the fountaine from whence he drew these goodly doctrines that little Treatise entituled Puritano-Iesuitismus will point it out unto you I shall forbeare to consider any further by what authority Kings doe reigne And I heartily wish that this Anti-monarchist had spent his time in praising God for giving us that forme of government which experience teacheth and all the learned in the world do acknowledge to be the best and most convenient rather than by presumptuous enquiry after the cause and origen thereof to have endeavoured to shake and unsettle the same As concerning the finall cause of Regall Authority it must be acknowledged the generall end thereof is no other then the conservation and good of the people and true it is that the King is bound not only by his Oath but also by the very end of his Regall Office to protect us and to endeavour our promotion to all kinde of politicall happinesse even as much as he intends his owne honour and right But I cannot swallow that ingratefull inference the Observator makes from thence daring to tell his King That hee cannot merit of the State that whatsoever hee doth for them is meâ—re duty May not the same act be of duty and yet meritorious or deserving Is it not the duty of a Father to take care for his children and yet your selfe acknowledge the Father doth all his offices meritoriously You suppose though falsly Kingly authority commenceth by pact and agreement with the people is not honour and obedience even by that very pact to be paid him as a due reward and doth not reward presuppose desert although after such pact made his care and protection be of duty yet being free to oblige himselfe by that pact to preserve nourish and defend his people was an act meritorious Omnium domos illius vigilia defendit omnium otium illius labor omnium delitias illius industria omnium vacationem illius occupatio For which the Law doth attribute unto him all Honour Dignity and P cheminence and yet you say he deserveth nay he can deserve nothing The word Grace you tell him sounds not well in his mouth yet surely former Kings have used the word without being checkt for it 28. â— 1. cap. 1. The King â—f his speciall grace for redresse of the grievances of his people sustained by his warres and for the amendment of their estate and to the intent that they may be the more ready to doe him service the more willing to assist and â—yde him in time of need grants c. You see that King tearms it of speciall Grace though for amendment of their estate and for those Articles hee granted them hee expected in retribution that his subjects should bee the more willing to assist and ayde him in time of need And so I hope will all good subjects bee at this time the more willing to ayd his Majesty for those many Acts of greater grace he hath pleased to passe unto us You may see sundry other Acts wherein the King himselfe speaking pronounceth them to be of his speciall grace W. 2. cap. 10 cap. 29. 18. E. 1. Stat. de quo warranto c Statutum de gratia regia diâ—itur quando Rex dignatur cedere de jure suo regio pro quiete comodo populi sui Prâ—m Regall the Observator passeth on to consider Parliamentary power pag. 5. Parliaments have the same efficient cause as Monarchies if not higher for in truth the whole Kingdome is not so properly the author as the essence it selfe of Parliaments and Parliaments have also the same shall cause as Monarchies Well 't is agreed that the good of the Kingdome is the end whereto Parliamentary power should direct it selfe but then as concerning the power of Parliaments and the efficient cause of that power it will be requisite to consider the parts distinctly and then the power of all together The Parliament is a Body consisting of three distinct Estates the King the Lords and the Commons Unto the Commons considered alone it most properly appertaines to present the grievances of the people and in humble manner to pray such redresse as the King with
list to unsettle principles power being you say nothing else but that might and vigour which a society of men containes in it selfe why should the might and vigour of these being farre the major part be over mastred and concluded by the Votes of those that are deputed by a miner number of the people or why should halfe the Kingdome in which there are but few Burroughes be equalled and overborne in Voting by two Counties out of which many Burgesses are chosen Old Sarum shal have as many Votes in Parliament as the Citty of London or County of Wiltes By which it seemes the Commons are not sent with equallity from all parts nor sent by all how doe they then represent all what reason is there that all the Kingdome should sit downe with their Votes the truth is the King Lords and Commons in conjunction are vertually the whole Kingdome for that all the people did at first submit themselves to their determination 25 H. 8. 21. your royall Majestie and your Lords and Commons representing the whole Realme in this your most high Court of Parliament have power c. So that in the King principally but yet in conjunction with the Lords and Commons is the vertue and power of the whole Kingdome contained But if we shall admit that the vertue and power of the whole Realme is by representation in the Commons alone or at least in the Lords and Commons what will thence follow the Kingdome you will say are the efficient cause of Kingly power and consequently above it they being above it have power over it may reassume it or dispose of it to such persons as they can confide in and this power the Kingdom may confer upon such as they shall choose for that purpose The Observator hath met with a free Gamster though his principles have beene particularly disproved and are distructive not onely to Monarchy but unto all government yet at present let him take all for granted First that the people have such power and secondly that they may transmit it unto such as they shall choose for that purpose But the question is whether they have done it whether they have chosen the new members for that purpose or for some other The King did not create the Lords I beleeve for that end nor create Borroughes with power to send Burgesses for that end nor command the Counties to elect Knights for that purpose nor did the Borroughes and Counties when they did elect give any such power upon the receipt of the Kings Writ by the Sheriffe and warning or notice given to the Freeholders they meet and cry up some mans name this in it selfe imports nothing but with reference to the Writ so that the people intrust them to doe onely what the Writ requires and thereupon the Sheriffe returnes Elegi feci duos milites who have power from the County ad faciendum what I pray quod breve in se exegit in that they have no avthority without the King to judge of dangers and oblige the King and people to goe their way for repelling the â—ame and yet doth the Writ continue as large as ever it hath been seeing neither the Kings writ nor the peoples election made thereupon doe give it I demand whence have the Lords and Commons excluding the King this soveraign power to judge of dangerâ—â— and thereupon if they so cause to take from the King the power of the Kingdome and according to their pleasures to dispose thereof unto certaine confiding persons unto which disposition the King and people are all required to conform and give consent We have beene often told that it is by the fundamentall Law of the Land a foundation so deepe that like the River Nilus it hides its head from all that seeke it never yet could any the most learned instruct us where to finde out this fundamentall Law which hath layen buried so long that no Law-booke Record or Chronicle makes any the least mention thereof But yet at length a certaine Pamphleter defending the Observatour hath hapt upon it but not amongst the Lawes of this Land he was nessitated to dig a little deep for it but amongst natures principles It is radically couched in nature it selfe and irrepealably enacted in her Magna Charta to which all positive Lawes must in equity vaile that the State may lawfully of its selfe provide for its preservation espectally if the King either see not the danger or seing it will not provide for it in such mâ—nner as may give best security to himselfe and the Common-wealth Certaine it is there is no state but is endued with ability and meanes to preserve it selfe instinct of nature will force all men preserve themselves from present destructior and providence teacheth all to provide against future emergent dangers and this surely the State of England hath done in submitting it selfe to the care and protection of a King on whose good foresight and wisdome next under God the welfare of the whole Realme dependeth he sits as on a watch Tower survaying his owne dominions and by the vigilancy of his Councell at home and Embassadours abroad hath timely intelligence of any approaching evill against which if he shall need any extraordinary advise or aide of his Subjects he hath power by his writ to assemble them in Parliament and with their assent to raise mony and other necessary provision for their defence and safeguard And this I say is that meanes of safety wherewith the State of England hath provided it selfe by putting themselves for better for worse under the protection of a King against all dangers And certainly he that ought to protect them against dangers to him it appertaines to judge of danger and so much was admitted by those who argued for the Subject in case of Ship-mony that the King was sole Judge of the dangers but that he could not therupon tax the Subject but by assent in Parliament But what you will object if the King will not see the danger or seeing it will neverthelesse suffer the Kingdome to fâ—eat at all hazzards or what if being carried away with Malignant Counsell he himselfe shall steere it towards rocks and shelves May not the Kingdome in such case save themselves from ruine and oppose the King There can be no Generalissime so uncircumscribed but that if he shall turne his Cannons upon his owne Souldiers they are ipso facto absolved of all obedience of all Oathes and tyes of Allegiance whatsoever for the time and bound by higher duety to seeke their owne preservation by resistance and defence For my part I cannot but thinke that a state after much sufferance seeing utter destruction to be at hand ready to swallow them up may use any good and lawfull meanes as flight and avoydance to preserve themselves from ruine by the hand of a tyranizing Lord yet I dare not approve of active resistance by taking up armes against a lawful Soveraign Prince though
from Papists training under ground and conspiracies against the State discovered by a traytor lying in a diteh and which have bin wrought in us by weekly relations of horrible terrible strange newes from Denmarke France Spaine and from all places in Christendome excepting Amsterdam from thence no danger at all to be feared But what if a kingdome may not resist shall they not therefore have meanes to save themselves if a seduced King shall indeavour to lead them backe to popery or to bring them under an arbitrary rule may they not in good time foreseeing the danger arme themselves for defence and not suffer themselves to be led on to the ruine of their lives fortunes and religion For Religion surely no Subjects ought to depart from it at the pleasure or command of any Prince or Potentate how great or absolute soever his power be and for their lives and fortunes no Common-wealth may want a meanes of preservation Salus populi supremalex But I thinke the best way to preserve a Kingdome or people is not to allow them a power upon such suppositions to rise against the pleasure and command of their King or Governour Caligula in a suddaine fit of cruelty might wish that all his Subjects heads grew upon one mans shoulders that so at one blow he might cut them off But is it possible that after deliberation such an unnaturall wish should settle in the minde of any Tirant certainly t is neer bordering on impossibility that a King should seriously desire to destroy the lives and fortunes of all his Subjects with which his own Soveraignty will necessarily be destroyed or if he should endeavor to make them slaves and vassals to his arbitrary power what doth he else but change the good title of a King to that of a Tirant which before a lawfull Prince will ever doe he must be extreamly blinded with ambition and cruelty And if a King of England should affect it yet hath the Law disabled him to effect it his commands must all run in the right Channels of Justice and equity or by no particular officer ought to be obayed Nihil aliud potest Rex in terris cum sit Minister Dei et ejus Vicarius quam quod de jure potest it is then a very remote danger and almost impossible that can this way befall the Subject and yet seeing it is not altogether impossible a mischiefe I must acknowledge it is to be under such a possibility But on the other side if you gâ—ve way to the inconstant multitude upon pretence of saving themselves and the kingdome to rise against authority we shall every day have the government hazarded if not destroyed and in such case doth not even naturall prudence instruct us to live under a possible mischief then under a daily inconvenience this Doctrine of the peoples power to judge of danger against the commands of their Soveraigne and upon that to take up defensive armes if it should be admitted will be more pernicious to Kingly government out of Parliament then it will be to Parliaments themselves for as the people may preserve themselves against a wilfull seduced Prince that would destroy them so may they against an Ordinance of the Lords and Commons if they shall judge it to tend to the destruction of the Kingdome or subversion of Government the Charter of nature by its supreame Law intitles all to seeke their salety and against this it will be of little purpose for you to tell the people that next to renouncing God nothing is more pernitious then to forsake thier representatives when they shall judge their representatives forsake their trust and would leade them on to Anabaptisme or any other way to destruction The King is Judge of danger at least out of Parliament but if he will not see dangers or if he himselfe shall become a danger to the Kingdome the Kingdome may save it selfe In Parliament we will suppose the Lords and Commons are Judges of danger but if some driven away by force and the rest seduced by a Malignant party will not see dangers from Anabaptists Brownists c. or shall themselves become a danger to the State and setled government the people may save themselves from ruine t is so written in Natures Magna Charta cap. 1. Will not this cloak sit exceeding well upon the backe of Irish Rebels they judge their Religion restrained and ready to be destroyed by a Prince seduced by the advise of English Protestants and defence and maintainance of their Religion they take up armes let 's first lay this ground in England and then let a Doctor in Divinity or some seditious IMP walke up and downe under hand like the pestilence in the darke to infect the minds of silly men and make up a faction whether against King or Parliament thereupon what thinke you will become of Regall and Parliamentary power will not they both be made subject to the designes of such seditious Protestants as at any time shal be able with the glorious names of Liberty and selfe preservation to abuse and intoxicate the minds of the wavering multitude If the King being led away with an old error of Protestancy shall endeavour to extirpate the beleeving Brownist or orthodox Anabaptist may not the Brownists or Anabaptists judging their Religion to be true save themselves nay ought they not to catch at all advantages whereby they may deliver their blinded King and Kingdome from following after their owne destruction in an Antichrist way of Protestancy It was long siince suspected by the King and by many of his good Subjects that the ordinance of the Militia would be used to the overthrow of Government and destruction of the Realme and since that hath raised unto the Authors of it a sufficient strength to over master all opposition we see they have already adventured to root out Episcopacy together with Deanes and Chapters Archdeacons Chancelours and the ancient and honourable profession of Eclesiasticall and Imperiall Law besides a good part of the common Law overturned and in likelyhood the rest will not stay long by us And how farre this willfull rejection I say wilfull rejection not barely the want of Episcopacy is destructive to the very essence of a Church is much to be doubted After so good eâ—rnest given of their intentions I suppose a major part of the Realm are well satisfied that their Militia and the ordinances send to the destruction of the Realm if so then by this ground they may lawfully save themselves and oppose their destruction Admit this or forsake your principle And yet if it will do you any service I am content at present you take advantage of it I will admit the Kingdom if they see the King would destroy them may preserve themselves you will say â—f the people have power to preserve themselves against the danger a seduced K. would bring upon them then must they have power to judge of that danger when it is and
our superfine Reformers the Reformers being farre the minor part ought to sit downe and acquiesse otherwise bloud will be shed and the major part in probabilitie prevaile you to lay a Calumny on the King will say they speake all one language and conspire in one end which although no sober man will credit yet this is certaine that they all concurre in some things against new Confounders I should say Reformers In these things then by your owne rule the minor part ought to yeeld and acquiesse If the major part present of Lords and Commons shall desire it the King you will say is bound to passe an Act that no marriage for any of his Children shall be concluded not treated on without the Parliaments assent By the same reason that he is bound to passe this Law to the English hee will bee bound to passe the like to the Irish and againe the like to the kingdome of Scotland because the Lords and Commons in the severall Parliaments desire it and the kingdomes have a like interest and right to warrant that desire If these Lawes bee passed what will become of the Royall line Besides a match may bee mentioned or treated on a Parliament for that 〈◊〉 purpose must bee called in each kingdome and being called is it probable three Nations so different in their constitutions should agree in one The Scots â—â—y approves marriage desired with the French The Irish will rather desire the alliancs of Spaine The English of Denmarke In this case to observe one Law is to breake two yet such a Law being Voted or any thing else the King you say is bound to passe it and you seeme to prove it thus T is acknowledged the King is bound by Oath and Office to passe all just Lawes that are either for preservation or good of the Subjects to grant this say you that hee is bound to passe just â—awes and yet to leave him to his owne free Iudgement what is a just and good Law is to give us a dry right without a remedy So againe you obiect If the King will not call the Parliament For making Lawes when it is expedient that must not conclude the people for theâ— they would have a dry right to Parliaments without a remedy And upon this ground and for that the King hath his power given him as you suppose by the people and that upon trust you will have him accomptable to the Lords and Commons the representatives of the people how he hath discharged his trust and if he shall be found neglectfull or faulty there must bee you say a meanes to inforce otherwise wee are subject to the boundlesse will of the Prince and a gappe is opened to as past and arbitrary power as ever the Grand Seignior had If the King may so assume a share in the Legislative power as that without his concurrence the Lords and Commons may not Judge of dangers and by temporary Ordinances put the kingdome into a posture of defence God hath not then left humane nature any meanes of sufficient preservation Thus the Observator Although he mention God yet I doubt his Argument is grounded in Atheisme because forsooth we have not the remedy in our own hands therefore are we without remedy exposâ—â— to the will of any tirannous Prince that may bee either then hee thinkes there is no God or with Epicurus that hee is otâ—osum inexerâ—itum et neminem iâ—t humanis rebus ad â—â—li cardines oâ—â—â—b lat nulla tangitur mortalium cura For if there be a God with providence why should we be affraid to trust our remedy with him There is a bridle to restraine the licencious will of ambitious Princes and that 's the Law but the reynes must not be layd in the hands of subjects The Heart of the King must be in the hands of the Lord he will direct it towards the subjects good or if a Prince shall incline to Tyranny he will in good time remove him unlesse it be his pleasure by him to chastice the sinns of that people or to try and improve their patience in which case there is a blessing for them that can content themselves with a fiat voluntas Domini God only I have proved is the Author and efficient cause of Kingly power Kings are his annoynted his vicegerents and therefore properly occomptable to him alone Where the word of a King is there is power and who may say unto him what doest then Non potest ei Regi necessitatem aliquis imponere quod injurianâ— sâ—â—m corrigat et emendat nisi velit cum superiorem non habeat nisi Deum et satis erit â—i ad paeâ—â—â— quod dominum expectat ultorem Punishment enough indeed if you consider how much more severe God is in taking an Account of Kings then of other men subject to temporall punishments which you may see sett downe by a King himselfe Heare therefore O ye Kings and understand learne ye that be Iudges of the end of the Earth Give â—are you that rule the people and glory in the multitude of Nations for power is given you of the Lord and sovereignty from the highest who shall try your workes and search out your Councels because being Ministers of his kingdome you have not judged aright nor kept the law nor walked after the councell of God horribly and speedily shall he come upon you for a sharpe Iudgement shall be to them that be in high places for mercy will soone pardon the meanest but mighty men shall be mightily tormented Were there not a God to take this severe accompt from Kings and to straine their ambitious desire from tyrannizing over their subjects yet by what hath been formerly said it will appeare to be more safe for a people to live subject to the inconvenience then to give power to the people upon pretence of saving themselves to riâ—e against Sovereigne authority A supreme indisputable power must be somewhere this the observator acknowledgeth and al must acknowledg that are not in love with Anarchy the question then is only this wheâ— is its most safe resting In the Parliament saith the observator â— agree with him in the King in Parliament is the most safe resting of the supreame indisputable power But the mischeife is the observator by Parliament meanes only the Lords Commons distinguished from the King Now whether it be more safe resting in them or in the King with them thâ—â— is the question which in effect is all one with this whether Democracy be a better forme of Government alwayes followes the disposition of the Sovereigne power If therefore the Sovâ—reigne power rest incontrollably in one alone then is the Government simply Monarchicall If it rest in the cheife Peeres then it is an Optimacy If in the people Democracy If it râ—â—t in one alone and yet to the use of it in the most weighty matters a consent of Peers and people is to be had then it is