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A52522 Wonderful predictions of Nostredamus, Grebner, David Pareus, and Antonius Torquatus wherein the grandeur of Their present Majesties, the happiness of England, and downfall of France and Rome, are plainly delineated : with a large preface, shewing, that the crown of England has been not obscurely foretold to Their Majesties William III and Mary, late Prince and Princess of Orange, and that the people of this ancient monarchy have duly contributed thereunto, in the present assembly of Lords and Commons, notwithstanding the objections of men and different extremes. Atwood, William, d. 1705?; Grebner, Ezekiel.; Nostradamus, 1503-1566.; Pareus, David, 1548-1622.; Torquato, Antonio, 15th cent. 1689 (1689) Wing N1401; ESTC R261 72,982 73

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Judges in B. R. in the time of Q. Eliz. on my side King R. 3. had granted certain Priviledges to the Burgesses of Glocester with a Saving to himself and his Heirs and it was agreed by all the Justices That altho' the Words are Saving to himself and his Heirs it shall be taken for a perpetual Saving which shall go to his Successors This therefore they adjudg'd to reach the Queen who 't is well known was not Heir to R. 3. The great Objection is That in the Contests for the Crown between the Families of York and Lancaster each Side pretended Title by Proximity of Blood and as either prevail'd their Right was acknowledg'd to be according to God's Law Man's Law and the Law of Nature To which I answer As appears in the very Objection this was apply'd to those who had no such Right of Proximity as well as those who had and thus 't was to R. 3. as well as to E. 4. And even the Election of H. 4. after the Deposing and Relinquishing of R. 2. with his own express Consent is by the same Parliament that says so much of the Title of E. 4. called an Usurpation upon R. 2. Wherefore if this Record be any way leading to our Judgments no Deposing or Resignation whatever be the Inducement can be of any force Whence 't is plain that all these are but Complements to the longest Sword however they neither set aside former Authorities nor establish any Right for the future at least not more for the Heirs of E. 4. than the Parliament of R. 3. did for his Heirs Yet whoever comes next by Right of Proximity according to any Settlement in being I will not deny that they enjoy the Crown according to God's Law Man's Law and the Law of Nature for as the Great Fortescue has it All Laws publish'd by Men have their Authority from God and upon which the Author of Jovian argues and supposes all Laws of Men to be the Laws and Ordinances of God Yet who can say but these Humane Creatures or Ordinances of Men may be altered as they were made And tho' it may seem strange to some yet I may with great Authority affirm That when the People had determin'd the Right on the Side of R. 3. he was King as much according to God's Law as E. 4. For Pufendorf holds That where the Question is what Degree or what Line is best the declared Will of the People determines the Controversie since every one is presum'd to understand his own Intention and the People that is now is to be thought the same with that by which the Order of Succession was constituted But let Men argue as nicely as they please for a Right or Sovereignty inseparable from the Person of the next in Blood to the last lawful King let this fall upon J. 2. the reputed Prince of Wales or any other Person of unclouded Birth and Fame and let them argue upon the Declaration 1 E. 4. That Allegiance is there due by God's Law Man's Law and the Law of Nature Certain it is that the Statute 11 H. 7. above-mention'd was not only made in an Age of greater Light but being a subsequent Law derogates from whatever is contrary in the former By this last it is declared to be against all Laws That Subjects should suffer for doing true Duty and Service of Allegiance to the King de facto which is as much as if 't were exprest to be against God's Law Man's Law and the Law of Nature By the necessary Consequence of which Allegiance is due to a King de facto according to all these Laws Wherefore whoever denies Allegiance to King William and Queen Mary or maintains a contrary one to J. 2. offends against God's Law Man's Law and the Law of Nature Nor whatever some imagine can the Proviso at the end of this Statute in the least impair its Force as to what I use it for The Proviso runs thus Provided always That no Person or Persons shall take any Benefit or Advantage by this Act which shall hereafter decline from his or their said Allegiance Where said Allegiance shews it to be meant of Allegiance to the King de facto whose Service is called true Duty and no Man surely can think the meaning to be that if after such Service they turn to the other Side or become Traytors to the present Power they shall suffer for the former Service as Traytors against him that had the Right either during the Reign of the King in being which would be an unlikely owning the ejected Power or hereafter if that should come to be restor'd which would be far from answering the apparent End of that Clause which is to keep Men in Obedience to him who has the Power of punishing the Disobedient Wherefore the plain meaning must be that no Man who departs from his Duty of Allegiance to the present King shall save himself by pleading that he had been in Arms or had done him any signal Service In short this was to be no Corban to answer for any following Departure from Duty 4. I think I have with due regard to all colourable Objections made it appear That Allegiance may in some Cases be withdrawn from one who had been King till the occasion of such Withdrawing or Judgment upon it And this I have done not only from the Equity and reserved Cases necessarily implied but from the express Original and continuing Contract between Prince and People which with the Legal Judicature impowred to determine concerning it I have likewise shewn and exemplified by the Custom of the Kingdom both before the reputed Conquest and since And have occasionally proved That tho' Oaths of Allegiance may reach to Heirs according to special Limitations as was 26 Hen. 8. yet in common intendment by Heirs of a King or Crown no more is meant than such as succeed to it according to the Law positive or implied And that whoever comes to the Crown upon either Allegiance is as much due to him by the Law of God and Nature as it was to the nighest in Blood Or to use the Words of Bishop Sanderson Dignity varies not with the change of Persons Whence if any Subject or Soldier swear Fidelity to his King or General the Oath is to be meant to be made unto them also who succeed to that Dignity And when the Crown continues in the Blood this especially by what I have above shewn puts the Obligation of Allegiance to the King in being out of controversie unless it can be made appear that the Right of the former King remains or that there is some Settlement of the Crown yet in force which ties it strictly to the next I come now to prove That the People of England are actually discharged from their Oaths of Allegiance to J. 2. and were lately restored to that Latitude of Choice which I have shewn to be their Original
of a King than they would have of coming to Parliament without his Writ Yet since the Right of the People in Person or Representation is indubitable in such a Case what hinders the Validity of the late Choice considering how many Elections of Kings we have had and that never by the People diffusively since the first Institution of the Government And the Representations agreed on tho' I take them to be earlier settled for Cities and Burrough than for the Freeholders in the Counties yet have ever since their respective Settlements been in the same manner as now at least none have since the first Institution ever come in their own Persons or been Electors but what are present personally or representatively and their own Consent takes away all pretence of Error If it be said That they ought to have been summon'd Forty days before the Assembly held That is only a Privilege from the King which they may wave and have more than once consented to be represented upon less than Forty days Summons Mr. Prynne gives several Instances as 49 H. 3. 4 E. 3. 1 H. 4. 28 Eliz. and says he omits other Precedents of Parliaments summon'd within Forty days after the Writs of Summons bear date upon extraordinary Occasions of Publick Safety and Concernment which could not conveniently admit so long delay And Sir Robert Cotton being a strict Adherer to Form upon an Emergency advis'd That the Writs should be antedated which Trick could make no real difference To say however there ought to have been a Summons from or in the Name of a King in being is absurd it being for the Exercise of a Lawful Power which unless my Authorities fail the People had without a King or even against the Consent of one in being Besides it appears That such Summons have not been essential to the Great Councils of the Nation Tacitus shews That the Germans from whom we descend had theirs at certain Days unless when some extraordinary Matter hapned And by the Confessor's Laws receiv'd by W. 1. and continu'd downwards by the Coronation-Oaths requir'd to this very day the general Folcmot ought to be held annually without any formal Summons upon May-day And the Statute 16 Car. 1. which our rigid Formallists must own to be in force has wholly taken away the necessity of Writs of Summons from a King. The Assembly of Lords and Commons held Anno 1660. was summon'd by the Keepers of the Liberties of England not by the King's Writs yet when they came to act in conjunction with the King they declare enact and adjudge where the Statute is manifestly declaratory of what was Law before That the Lords and Commons then sitting are and shall be the Two Houses of Parliament notwithstanding any want of the King 's Writ or Writs of Summons or any defect or alteration of or in any Writ of Summons c. Tho' this seems parallel to the present Case yet in truth ours is the strongest For the King then having been only King de jure no Authority could be receiv'd from him nor could any Act of his be regarded in Law thro' defect either of Jurisdiction or Proof if not both Accordingly as not only the Reason of the thing but the Lord Coke shews a Pardon from one barely King de jure is of no force Besides the Keepers were an upstart Power imposing themselves upon the People without any formal Consent at least not so fully receiv'd to the publick Administration as our present King was who at the Request of a very large Representative of the People pursu'd the late Method of calling a more Solemn Assembly If that Anno 1660. had Power acting with the King to declare it self a Parliament why had not this in defect of a King to declare or chuse one Sure I am prudent Antiquity regarded not so much the Person calling or the End for which a General Council was call'd as who were present that Notice which they comply'd with being always sufficiently formal Wherefore a General Ecclesiastical Council being summon'd in the Reign of H. 1. by William Archb. of Canterb. thither according to the known Law of those Times the Laity came I cannot say they sate there for the Numbers were so great as they commonly were at such Assemblies before the Free-holders agreed to Representations that happy was the Man whatever his Quality who could have a convenient Standing After the Ecclesiastical Matters were over in the Council I now speak of they fell upon Secular Some they determin'd some they adjourn'd some the Judges of the Poll or Voices could make nothing of by reason of the great Crowd and Din. And when the King heard their Determinations and confirm'd them they had full Legal Force But had there been no Warrant from former Times for the late manner of Proceeding the People of Legal Interests in the Government having been restor'd to their Original Right who can doubt but they had an absolute Power over Forms That they were not call'd to a Parliament I hope will not be an Objection since the Word is much less ancient than such Assemblies And since the Cives the Common Subject of the National Power have made their Determination this according to that Positive Law which I have shewn above ought to quiet the Debate and command a Submission And yet were there not positive Law on their side the equitable Reservations before observ'd might be sufficient Warrant Nor is the Civil Law wanting to enforce this Matter One Barbarius a run-away Servant not known to be so got in favour with Anthony at the time of the Triumvirate and by his means came to be Praetor upon this a great Question arose Whether what he did or was done before him during his Praetorship were valid Vlpian decides in the affirmative and Hottoman upon that Question says The Suffrages of the People have the force of a Law. The Reasons given for the Resolution as they are in Gotofred who best reconciles the various Readings will greatly strengthen our Case He tells us That tho' the Question there is only concerning a Servant the Reason of it reaches to Emperors and all Secular and Ecclesiastical Dignities The Reasons why Vlpian holds the Acts of such good are 1. In regard of Common Utility and the Inconvenience it would be to those who had business before him if it were otherwise 2. From the Power of the People to give a Servant this Honour Gotofred thinks If this may be done with certain knowledge that he was a Servant much more if thro' mistake for if the People who have the Supreme Power may with certain knowledge for the sake of the Publick Good not only design a Servant for Praetor but in this Case by a just Election take a Servant away from his Master how much more may it be done as in the Case propounded not to make a Servant wholly a true Praetor not to take
Lords took upon him the Charge of the Kingdom as forfeited to him by breach of the Covenant establish'd in Parliament Yet this gave him no sure Settlement for the Popularity of the Earl of Warwick drove him out of the Kingdom without striking a Stroke for it Upon which H. 6. was again restor'd to his Kingly Power and Edward was in Parliament declared a Traytor to the Country and an Vsurper of the Realm the Settlement upon R. and his Heirs revok'd and the Crown entail'd upon H. 6. and his Heirs Males with Remainders over to secure against Edward's coming to the Crown Yet the Death of the Earl of Warwick having in effect put an end to King Henry's Power he was soon taken Prisoner and put to death as his Son had been before and then Edward procures a Confirmation in Parliament of the Settlement under which he enjoy'd the Crown Thus as the Power of the People or Great ones of Interest with them turn'd the Scales from time to time so 't was their Consent which fixt them at last during the the Life of E. 4. It may be said That whatever the Law or Practice has been anciently neither can now be of any moment by reason of the Oath requir'd by several Statutes declaring it not lawful upon any Pretence whatsoever to take Arms against the King and abhorring the Traiterous Position of taking Arms by his Authority against his Person And 2. The Clause in the Statute 12 Car. 2. whereby it is declar'd That by the undoubted and fundamental Laws of this Kingdom neither the Peers of this Realm nor the Commons nor both together in Parliament or out of Parliament nor the People Collectively or Representatively nor any other Persons whatsoever had have hath or ought to have any Coercive Power over the Persons of the Kings of this Realm I shall not here insist in answer to the first on the necessity of a Commission and a King continuing Legal in the Exercise as well as Possession of Power nor the difference between the Traiterous Acts of single Persons and the Revolt of a Nation nor yet upon the Authority of the Common Law whereby a Constable or other Officer chose by the People may act without any Authority from the King. And for the latter as Coertion is restrain'd to the Person of the King the declaring against that is not contrary to the Authorities for discharging Allegiance by a Judicial Sentence or otherwise by vertue of equitable and supposed Reservations provided a tender Regard to the Person be still observ'd But if Proceedings to free our selves from his Authority fall under this Coertion then I shall offer something which may remove both this and the other from being Objections to what I have above shewn To keep to what may equally reach to both Authorities I shall not urge here That these Statutes being barely Declaratory and enacting no Law for the future introduce none so that if the Fundamental Laws shall appear to be otherwise the Declarations do not supplant them Nor yet to insist upon a Rule in the Civil Law That the Commonwealth is always a Minor and at liberty to renounce the Obligations which it has entred into against its Benefit which is the Supreme Law. But I shall stop their Mouths who object these Statutes and maintain That according to what themselves receive for Law the Parliaments which enacted these Declarations had no power so to do and then the Law must stand as it did For this let us first hear Mr. Sheringham whose Authority few of these Men dispute They that lay the first Foundation of a Commonwealth have Authority to make Laws that cannot be alter'd by Posterity in Matters that concern the Rights both of King and People For Foundations cannot be remov'd without the Ruine and Subversion of the whole Building Wherefore admit the Acts had been duly made according to him they would be void if the Fundamental Law were as I have shewn However I am sure I can irrefragably prove to them who will not have a Nation sav'd without strict Form of Law That the Parliament which made those Acts had no Power at the time of making them being by the express Words of a former Statute repeal'd The Triennial Act 16 Car. 1. provides in a way not easily to be defeated not only for holding a Parliament once within Three Years at least but that all Parliaments which shall be Prorogu'd or Adjourn'd or so continued by Prorogation or Adjournment until the Tenth of September which shall be in the third Year next after the last Day of the last Meeting and Sitting of the foregoing Parliament shall be thenceforth clearly and absolutely dissolv'd Now say I that Parliament which enacted these Laws had sat beyond that Time Ergo c. These were made in the Parliament next after the Convention which brought in the King which they I am sure will not call a Parliament Wherefore we must go back to the first Long Parliament which upon their own Rule Rex est caput finis Parliamenti was dissolv'd by the Death of C. 1. Anno 1648. notwithstanding the Act for making it Perpetual which indeed by the Words of it seems only to provide against any Act of the King to the contrary without their Consent But by the Death of the King that Parliament lost the Being which before it had as it was under him when it was Parliamentum nostrum the Parliament of Charles the First and so expired An. 1648. by Act in Law. And perhaps it s own breaking up in Confusion before was in Law an Adjournment sine die working a Dissolution by either of which that Parliament was dissolv'd more than three Years before the Parliament which made the Statute in question which Parliament assembled An. 1661. and was ipso facto dissolv'd when it attempted to make those Statutes it having been continued by Prorogation or Adjournment beyond the Tenth of September in the Third Year after the Dissolution of the last Parliament of Charles the First which was the next foregoing Legal Parliament according to strict Form for the Parliament which brought in C. 2. Anno 1660. was not summon'd by the King's Writs consequently the Parliament 1661. having no Power after it had continued as above whatever was the Ancient Law in this Matter remains as it did before those Laws If it be Objected That the Necessity of the Times had dispens'd with the Letter of the Triennial Act as to this Particular 1. They who would plead these Statutes cannot urge it since they will not allow of greater Necessity to authorize the Maintaining and Restoring the Constitution But surely however Necessity might support other Laws it shall not such as alter the Constitution but every Legal Advantage shall be taken for restoring it 2. The Necessity was not absolute for the First Parliament of Charles the Second might continue together as long
as they could sit without Prorogation or Adjournment and be good for a day at least time enough to have repealed the former Statute as to that part and to qualifie themselves for a longer Continuance In short They with whom our Dispute is are either for the Unalterableness of Fundamentals according to which what I have shewn remains notwithstanding all Efforts to the contrary or else all of a sudden they have a mighty Zeal for the strict Letter of the Law by which that Parliament which endeavour'd to alter the Fundamental Contract was ipso facto dissolv'd before such Attempt However since the Question is not about a Coercive Power over Kings but barely concerning Allegiance to them whenever he who was King ceases to be so either by the Act of God or the Law the Obligation of Allegiance necessarily determines as the subject Matter of it fails But lest the Liberty allow'd in extraordinary Cases be us'd as a cloak for maliciousness I shall restrain it with the Authority of the Learned Pufendorf In Contracts by which one is made subject to another this has the Right of Judging what the Subject is to perform and has also a Power conferr'd of compelling him to the Performance if he refuses which Coercive Power is by no means reciprocal Wherefore he who rules cannot be called in question for breaking his Contract unless he either wholly abdicate the Care of the Government or become of an hostile mind towards his People or manifestly with evil Intention depart from those Rules of Governing upon the Observance of which as upon a Condition the Subjects have suspended their Allegiance Which is very easie for any one who Governs always to shun if he will but consider that the Highest of Mortals are not free from the Laws of Humane Chance But that the Judicial Power of the People so qualified as above is not peculiar to England might appear by the Customs of most neighbouring Nations For Denmark Swedeland and Norway which had anciently three distinct Negatives in the Choice of a King I shall refer to Krantius particularly in the remarkable Story of their King Erick who was adopted Son of the Three Kingdoms Anno 1411. he having provok'd his People by the Outrages of his Officers and Soldiers he was oppos'd with Force by one Engelbert a Danish Nobleman transmitted down to Posterity with the fair Character of engaging in the Publick Cause neither out of love of Rule nor greediness of Gain but meer compassion to an opprest People This so generous an Undertaking was so justly Popular that Eric not able to stem the Tide withdrew from Denmark the Place of his usual Residence to Swedeland But Engelbert's Noble Cause found so few Opposers there also that the King as a Pattern to J. 2. privately ran away and recommended his Nephew in his stead but they told him plainly he was made King by Adoption and had no Right to surrogate another Him there not being the inconsistency of a different Religion between the Head and Members of the same Body they would have receiv'd again upon Terms but he refusing the Three Kingdoms unanimously chose one of another Family For the Authority of the People even in France no longer since than the time of Lewis 11. Hottoman's Francogallia gives a large Proof Nor is the Emperor of Germany more exempt for the Golden Bull of C. 4. provides who shall sit as Judge or High-Steward when he comes to be Impeach'd And by that the Palatine of the Rhine has the like Power with that which Matthew Paris says the Earl of Chester had here as Count Palatine Nor is this in the Empire founded meerly upon that Bull for the Bull it self says Sicut ex consuetudine introductum dicitur As 't is said to have been introduc'd by Custom And Freherus gives an Instance of this before that Bull in the Case of King Albert whom they threatned to depose for killing his Leige-lord Adolphus With Freherus agrees Gunterus in his Octoviratus who says That the Palatine of the Rhine Major Domo to the Emperor is by Custom Judge of the Emperor himself or rather in the highest Matters declares the Sentence of the Electoral College And he cites several Authors to prove the like Office or Power to have been in divers Kingdoms and Principalities and names France England Arragon Spain Denmark Poland Bohemia c. And for France Loyseau in effect shews this Power to have belong'd to their Maior du Palais for he owns the Power to have been greater than the Roman Praefect of the Palace had and yet he cites the Words of the Emperor Trajan giving his Praefect a naked Sword which he enjoyn'd him to use against him if he misgoverned And Loyseau says That this dangerous Office was put down by the Kings of the Third Line that they might perpetuate the Crown in their Family This Office he supposes to have been split into the Conestable's Chancellor's Treasurer's and the Grand Maistre's du France or Count du Palais which he seems to resemble to an High Steward with us And I meet with an old English Author who affirms almost such a Power as is above-mention'd to have belonged to the High-Conestable of England His Words are these As God hath ordained Magistrates to hear and determine private Matters and to punish their Vices so also will he that the Magistrates Doings be call'd to account and reck'ning and their Vices corrected and punished by the Body of the whole Congregation or Common-wealth As it is manifest by the Memory of the ancient Office of High-Constable of England unto whose Authority it pertained not only to summon the King personally before the Parliament or other Courts of Justice to answer and receive according to Justice but also upon just occasion to commit him to Ward 3. There has been no Hereditary Right to the Crown of England by Proximity of Blood from the Fundamental Contract but the People have had a Latitude for the setting up whom of the Blood they pleas'd upon the determination of the Interest of any particular Person except where there has been a Settlement of the Crown in force The Kingdom I own is founded in Monarchy and so is Poland which yet is absolutely Elective Nor is there any Consequence that the Dissolution of the Contract between the immediate Prince and People destroys the Form of Government for that depends upon a prior Contract which the People entred into among themselves And that by vertue of this to avoid endless Emulations Kings have generally from the first Erection of the English Monarchy been chosen out of the same Family appears beyond contradiction I know some talk of a Birthright and Inheritance in the Crown which is not founded in the Statutes but on the Original Custom and Constitution of the English Government which is an Hereditary Monarchy according to proximity of Blood. But I would
Right The Lords and Commons having a Judicial Power in this Matter as hath been prov'd at large their Exercise of this Power in the nature of the thing determines the Right unless an Appeal lies from them to some higher Court in this Nation But that no Power can legally question them or any of them in this Matter appears more particularly in that there is no Statute now in force nor was since the Death of Car. 2. which makes it Treason to conspire to Depose a King or actually to Depose him But this is of the Nature of those Common-Law Treasons which are left to the Judgment of Parliament And they who are the only Judges of their own Actions have a pretty large Liberty in them especially according to them who would infer the Absolute Power of Princes from the Supposition of no constituted Judges of their Actions Wherefore the Defence of their Proceedings might justly seem to be superseded were it not for an ungovernable sort of Men who either cannot or will not judge according to the Rules of right Reasoning but as they will hardly admit of any Doctrine as true for which they have not the Decision of some Father or Council will believe no Action not proceeding from their imperious Dictates justifiable even in Cases of the utmost necessity for the Preservation of the true Religion and just Laws for which they have no Warrant from the Examples of their Forefathers or Opinions of Men whose Books have past with their Allowance Which often drives me to the seeming Pedantry of Quotations to confirm the most obvious Considerations to which my own Thoughts led me The either open or more covert Matters of Fact inducing the Declaration of Lords and Commons That J. 2. has broken the Original Contract I need not now enquire into All People must own that 〈◊〉 if they in the least attend to the Constitution of our Governme●● and how apparently he by his general Dispensations usurp'd a Legislative Power for the Destruction of the Protestant Religion and Civil Rights which we were in a fair way of being Dragoon'd out of by a Standing Army by degrees to have been wholly under Popish or Complying Officers Yet if there were no more than his leaving the Kingdom without making any Provision for keeping up the Justice of it and going into France a Country from whence all Mischiefs have of late Years flow'd upon us and our Religion Who can deny but this alone would have been enough to set him aside The going out of the Realm without appointing a Custos was anciently in our Law a Discontinuance of Justice And the Lord Hobart gives it as a Maxim Cessa regnare si non vis judicare Cease to Reign if you will not Judge or maintain the Course of Justice Many I know upon these Questions rather regard the Civil Law and that I am sure gives a home-thrust in the Case of deserting one's Country and going into such an one as France is to our Nation tho' it has been in too strict Alliance with our Kings The Digests say A Deserter has no Right of being restor'd to his Country For he who left his Country with an evil and treacherous Mind is to be held as an Enemy c. But we are to take not only him for a Deserter who runs over to Enemies in time of War but also during a Truce Or who runs over to them with whom there is no Amity either after undertaking to be faithful to his Country or else undertaking to be faithful to the other Either of which Senses the Words will bear 'T is likely to be said That this out of the Civil Law is improperly applied to the Prince who according to that is exempt from all Laws But I would desire such to read the Rescript or Law of Theodosius and Valentinian wherein they thus declare 'T is an Expression suitatable to the Dignity of one that Reigns to profess himself bound by the Laws Our own Authority does so depend upon the Authority of Law. And in truth for the Governing Power to submit to Law is greater than Empire And by the Promulgation of this present Edict we make known to others what we will not allow to our selves That J. 2. had before his Departure broken the Fundamental Laws and that now he not only ceases to Protect but is in a Kingdom which foments and strengthens a Rebellion in Ireland part of the Dominions belonging to the English Crown I think no body will deny Nor till they can answer what I have shewn of the mutual Contract continued down from the first Erection of the Monarchy here ought they to deny that he has thereby broken the Original Contract which bound the People to him and him to them What results from this Breach is now more particularly to be considered That it is a Discharge from all Allegiance to him requir'd by any Law and confirm'd by any Oaths is evident not only from the former Authorities but from the Condition going along with such a mutual Contract as I have prov'd to be with us between Prince and People Or rather to use the Words of the Learned Pufendorf The Obligation is not so much dissolv'd as broken off by the Perfidiousness of either Party For when one does not perform that which was agreed on neither is the other bound to performance For the prior Heads of things to be perform'd in Contracts are in the Subsequent by way of Condition As if it should be said I will perform if you perform first This he more fully explains in another Book where he distinguishes between an Obligation imperfectly mutual as he supposes it to be between an Absolute Prince and his Subjects and one perfectly mutual as he takes it to be where the People have conferr'd a Power on any Terms Of such Obligations he says These since they have a mutual respect to the things agreed on and suppose mutual Faith it is evident that if one Party violate the Faith which he plighted the other is no more bound And therefore he is not perfidious who stands not to those Contracts which the other has broken For all the Heads of one and the same Contract run into each other by way of Condition c. And in that Book of his which is counted the Standard of the Law of Nations he asserts it to be lawful for Subjects to oppose their Prince by Force which is a sufficient departure from Allegiance if he goes about modum habendi potestatem immutare i. e. to change that Manner in which he by the Contract enjoys the Power from less to more Absolute And in his Tract de Interregnis cited above he allows of this If the King abdicate all Care of the Commonwealth becomes of an hostile Mind towards his Subjects or manifestly departs from those Rules of Governing upon the Observance of which as upon a Condition the
Subjects have suspended their Obedience Nor is the German Author Knichen less plain whose Words are If the Magistrate have absolute and full Majesty due Subjection ought by no means to be denied him tho' he be impious Nor may another be substituted in his room upon his being cast out Much less can a new Form of Government be introduc'd But if he were constituted by the People under certain Pacts and Promises sworn to him by the People and therefore is bound to certain Rules of Laws and either to do or avoid things contain'd in those Contracts whether Fundamental Laws or things particularly concerted as for Example the Emperor in our Empire They not being observ'd but studiously enormously and obstinately violated the Hopes of Amendment after many of the Subjects Prayers and Admonitions plainly vanishing he may rightfully be remov'd by the States and People c. The Reason is Because he was promoted to the Government by such Agreement and that sworn to according to the Laws of the Agreement or Contract The Nature of which consists in this That if that Party for whose Sake or Cause they are Constituted violate them the other Party of very Right is freed from the Observance of those things which are granted by such Laws Nor does Philip Pareus come short of this in his Defence of his Father David where he speaks very particularly of the Effect of the mutual Compact But notwithstanding the Discharge from Allegiance to J. 2. some will urge That it continues to the Person that stands next in Blood. Against which I doubt not but I shall offer full Evidence For 1. If as I have shewn the Promise to the King himself be Conditional and his Interest determines by his Breach of the Condition be the Condition precedent in which Case no Interest is vested till Performance or subsequent in which the Breach divests what before was settled What Interest can the Heir have in a Conditional Estate determined by Breach of the Condition And since it has been made appear That the Heirs of a King with us take not as Purchasers by an O●●ginal Contract upon which there might be some Pretence of an Interest vested in them independent on their Father's Title but they who can be said to have succeeded without an immediate Choice did it by vertue of subsequent Settlements entirely depending upon the Original Contract continuing down to their immediate Ancestors respectively If that Contract be dissolv'd what can support the Settlement Can the Agreement for the Benefit of a King and his Posterity be suppos'd to be other than that if he govern them as King performing the Essentials of the Contract on his part he and his Descendents shall enjoy the Crown Can it be imagin'd that this was made for the separate Benefit of the Heir without regard to the Ancestor's Performance Or is it to be supposed in the nature of the thing that the People would have made such a Contract whereby after being justly discharged from their Allegiance to a King and having acted pursuant thereto they shall enable a Successor to revenge his Ancestor's Quarrel This were such a Contract as that which the Lord Clarendon assures us if never so real can never be suppos'd to be with the intention of the Contracter And Grotius argues against a King's Power of aliening his Kingdom from hence that this is not to be prsum'd to have been the Will of the People in conferring the Power And in another place he says Right is to be measur'd according to the Will of him from whom the Right arises 2. The Power of the King being as Fortescue has it and the Authorities above plainly evince a Populo effluxa deriv'd from the People and the Interest of J. 2. being determined he yet living so that there can be no Heir to him or of his Body What hinders the Operation of the known Rule in Law That where there is no Remainder to take effect at the Determination of the particular Estate it shall revert to the Donor Which in this Case is manifestly the People If it be said That this Rule shall not extend to the Descent of the Crown which differs from Common Inheritances I dare say No Man can shew any Difference but what is more strong for the People's Choice For whereas Common Estates are for the Benefit of them who have the present Interest the Crown is a Trust for the Benefit of the People 3. The Ancient Statute above-mentioned of which the Lords and Commons mind R. 2. upon his Male-administration says That upon putting the King from his Throne with the Common Assent and Consent of the Nation for the Causes there exprest they may set upon the Throne in his stead propinquiorem aliquem de stirpe Regia some body of Kin to the King of the Royal Stock If they were tied to the next it certainly would have been proximum Besides the word aliquem shews a Latitude And according to this upon R. the Second's being Deposed H. 4. claimed the Crown Al 's descendit be ryght Lyne of the Blode comeynge fro the gude Lord Henry Therde But because this without consideration of his Merits in rescuing them from R. 2. entitled him to the Crown no more than another of the Blood therefore the Lords and Commons drew up an Instrument purporting their Election 4. But admit none of the foregoing Arguments were enough to shew That upon James the Second's Abdication or at least losing his Interest in the Government the People of England were restor'd to that Liberty which they had before the Settlement of the Crown which was in force till the Original Contract was broken by him yet I conceive the particular Consideration of the State of the Settlement might afford sufficient Argument Henry the Fourth Fifth and Sixth if we believe Dr. Brady held the Crown by Usurpation Yet the earliest Settlement of the Crown farther than the first Son was in the time of H. 4. Nor as I shall shew was the Crown enjoy'd by J. 2. under better Title than they had H. 5. and 6. came in under an Entail of the Crown 7 H. 4. confirmed 8. The Misgovernment of H. 6. having given occasion to Richard Duke of York of the Blood-Royal and Elder House to assert the Peoples Rights not his own Henry and the Duke with the Consent of the Lords and Commons came to an Agreement in Parliament That Richard and his Heirs should enjoy the Crown after the Death of Henry And tho' here the word Heirs is mention'd without restraint yet considering that it is the first time that ever the Crown was settled so far I know not whether it is not to be taken with Gomezius his Restriction of an Usufructuary or Emphyteutical Estate of the last of which much of the same nature with the other he says If it did not use to be granted to more than the