A REPLY TO THE ANSWER Printed by his Majesties Command at OXFORD to a Printed Booke Intituled OBSERVATIONS upon some of his MAIESTIES late Answers and Expresses By J. M. LONDON Printed for Matthew Walbancke Anno Dom. 1642. A reply to the Answer printed by his Majesties Command at Oxford to a printed booke intituled Observations upon some of his Maiesties late Answers and expresses THe Authour of the Answer to the Observator which was pâ—…inted aâ—…Oxford no place more fit to entertaine such cavils by his 〈◊〉 Command too good a Patron to be thus abused Begins his disâ—…urse by way of Preface and there would tell us the Originall of Regall Authority were it not a losse of time he has been to profuse prodigall of it in his Book he doth well to spare it in the Preface for that he sees t is granted to be at 〈◊〉 least mediately from God I shall not dispute whether God be the immediate donor of Royalty or no For I take it to be very cleare and evident that the Kings of Israel were of Divine instiâ—…tion But that Royall Authority should bee unto us or the sâ—…cceeding ages more of Divine right or Institution then Aristocraticall or Democraticall power that I deny 〈◊〉 were they of Divine institution it must of necessity be that all States must be fwayed and ruled by Kings and the execution of other power were sinne and that I hope 〈◊〉 man will dare to aâ—…rt Againe were they of Divine right they ought to have equall power and Dominion in all places and that they have not for as it is well known in some Kingdomes they have greater Authority in some lesse And all vary according to the severall Lawes and Constitutions of their Countries Why then if they bee of humane institution it must be agreed that no King hath at thiâ—… day any speciall Ordinance from Heaven by which to intitle himselfe to his Crowne and Regall authority And hence the consequence is just that Kings are bound by thâ—…se qualifications of compact and condition that were made with them by the people and ought to discharge and execute their Royall functions answerable thereunto But then he goes on anâ—… tels us that power or governement was oâ—…yned of God for the good of mankind which was not to bee obtained without preservation of order and therefore he hath commanded all to be subject to the Lawes of society not onely for wrath but for conscience sake With this limitation the Author saith true we must submitt to the Laweâ—… of society where they doe not oppose the Law of God otherwise not for how can a man obey for conscience against conscience And he saâ—…es we must submit not onely whilst we enjoy the benefit of Governors but 〈◊〉 whilst we dâ—…e suffer under some accidentall abuses I but what if those abusâ—… provâ—…â—…o be wilfull I know that is the Authors meaning though he will not expresse it for if his opinion miâ—…ht passe as Orthodox the cases would be all one I and what if thâ—…se abuses strike at our Religion at our lives libeâ—…ies and estates at all that God hath entrusted us with and made us happy in must wee here submitt and quietly surrender up all our happinesse at once a most strange Doctrine Well let him Preach it at Oxford to those whom a foolish zeale hath besotted with an unwarrantable devotion to their Soveraign But let us know that good subjects may preserve these yet not be the lesse but the more dutifull to their King Is it any breach of duty to deny that which the Law of God and my conscience tels mee that I ought not to grant or can that have the impuration of disloyalty to my Soveraigne which styles mee just before God well to passe this because I shall have occasion to speake more fully to it after those that maintaine this error misery will bee this portion here and a just judgement hereafter But he tels us that we cannot reape the constant fruits of an establâ—…shed policy unlesse by compâ—…ct we submit our selves to some possible inconveniences The Author would have done well to have explained 〈◊〉 what he meanes by those inconveniences bâ—…t 〈◊〉 this is his meaning for the whole sâ—…ope of his Booke speakes as mâ—…ch that it is possible a King may degenerate into a Tyâ—…ant and make his boundlesse Arbitrary will to be Law and if this fall out as too commonly it doth yet wee must patiently doe or sâ—…ffer what ever though never so unjustly and contrary to good conscience is imposed upon us and which is more wee must by solemne contract binde our selves beforehand this to doe and why so for that otherwise there can be no constant benefit of an established policy A most strange and unnaturall assertâ—…on was it ever heard or can it bee imagined that a people should contract to their owne ruine there is a mutuall compact betwixt King and People the King is to governe by a rule if he would have his people to obey and if he swerve from that this dissolâ—…es the contract and gives the people pâ—…wer to 〈◊〉 and preserve themselves And if this were not Law what benefit could we expect to reape of such an established destructive policy He hath made bad premiâ—…es and worse conclusion for marke what he has dâ—…uced from thence Hence saith he it followes after a people hath by 〈◊〉 contraâ—… divested it selfe of that power which was primarily in them they cannot upon what pretâ—…ce soever withoâ—…t manifâ—…st breach of Divine Ordinance and violation of publique saâ—…th resume that authority which they have placed in another This by the way power according to the Authors owne 〈◊〉 was primarily in the people a truth ingeniously acknowledged but the mischiefe 〈◊〉 they have by contract divestâ—…d themselves of that power how is that made good why thus they chose one to be King over them and contracted to obey him what in omnibus 〈◊〉 in all his commissions nothing lesse for that might be to disodey God and whether it bee lawfull to obey God or man judge you I but they have given him an absolute Authority and made him supreme and therefore not to be qâ—…stioned by â—…ny inferiour pâ—…wer and if this were true his Majesties counsell who too 〈◊〉 malâ—…ne â—…he haâ—…pinesse of King and peopâ—… and would worke oâ—… their owne 〈◊〉 desâ—…gnes by the ruine of boâ—…h wâ—…ld never have advised hâ—…s Majâ—…sty to have inserted this into many of his Declaratâ—…ons that his Royal power was committed unto him by God and the Law in trust for the well governâ—…ng and 〈◊〉 of his people committâ—…d to his charge And as a trust is for the benefit and behoofe of him for whose sake the convâ—…yance in trâ—…st was made nâ—…t of him who is the party intrusted So likewâ—…se every trust doth implâ—… a conditâ—…on that the party doe dâ—…ly perfâ—…rme and discharge thâ—… tâ—…st or if hâ—…e doe not that he bee 〈◊〉 so to doe Thâ—…s
the conclusion deduced thence he may finde as much difference between the tenses as betweene Democracy and Monarchy Give me leave to make the Premisses and doe you raise what conclusion you will The Observator who knew certainly to distinguish the Tenses as well as the Author seems to intend only thus much that if elegerit be taken in the future tense well and good it makes for him for then the King according to the very letter of his oath is bound under the heavy sinne of perjury to grant such lawes as aâ—…e requested of him by his people and then hee can have no negative voyce But admitting it be expounded in the preter perfect tense and not in the future why yet saith the Observator it matters not for by the oath and the Law of the land the king is bound to do justice and the granting of new laws unto his people upon their request is an act of justice necessary as well as the dispencing of the old therfore there being the same necessitity the publike trust must needs equally extend to both But the Aethor will shew us why elegerit must of necessity bee taken in the preterrerfect not in the future as this case is for saith he the word consuetudines which cannot referre to the future undenyably evinces it was meant of the time past Under favour this doth not infallibly conclude that elegerit must be taken in the preter perfect tense for no more then the King can grant such customes as the people shâ—…ll chuse for that it must be time not the Kings Patent that can create a custome so neither can the King grant such lawes or customs unto a people which they have already chosen and which have beene established and ratified unto them by all his predecessors for quod semel meum est ultra meum esse non potest that which is mine owne already cannot be given unto me So that the oath must bee construed reddendo singula singulis as we say in law that is that he will confirme their ancient customes which they doe already enjoy and that he will grant unto them such new laws as they shall hereafter make choyce of other reasonable construction the oath will not admit of and agreeing with this exposition is the first clause of his Magisties oath where demand is made whether his Majestie will grant and coâ—…firm unto his people their ancient lawes and customes who answers that he will And contrary to that which the Author doth assert the Parliament have made it clear and manifest by their declaration lately published how that elegerit hath been alwayes rendered in the future tense and not in the preter perfect tense So that I shall passe this over without any further trouble conceaving that the Author may if he have not resolved to the contrary upon these grounds be fully convinced in this particular The King is bound to consent to new Laws â—…f they be necessary as well as defend the old His Majestie never thought otherwise but he is not bound to an implicit faith to believe all necessary which is pretended to be so This is in plaine termes to invert the method for the King to chuse Lawes not the people for if he will consent to none be they of never so great necessity but such as hee himselfe holds convenient what then is become of the peoples election this is to prescribe and enforce lawes upon the people â—…ot to consent to them upon their election Besides who so proper a judge of the necessity or conveniency of a publiâ—…e law as the republike those that knowe the want of the benefit must needs be most sensible of the necessity The word elegerit if it be in the preterperfect tense yet shews that the peoples election had beene the ground of ancient â—…aâ—…es and customes and why the peoples election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever I cannot discover The election there spoken of is the election of the diffusive noâ—… of any representative body that with the tacit consent of the Prince and so os much other authority Under favour it is of no other authority for though it should be conâ—…essed that at first the diffusive body did chuse their Lawes which had the tacit consent of the Prince and that since the people have granted the King a negative voyce in his Parliaments which is the representative body of the Kingdome yet being with this qualification that his Majesty grant all necessary lawes desired by the people hence it followes that the representative body having as great power and as good judgement to discern of laws necessary as the diffusive have the same power of election which ought to be of as great moment and consequence as ever For the representative their ancient right is not denyed no law shall be abrogâ—…ted none â—…acted without their assenâ—… But there is a meane betweene doing nothing aâ—…d all I wonder at the Author that he dare utter such palpable and knowne falsities How often have the priviledges of Parliament beene infringed even to amazement and wonder that all foregoing ages cannot produce the like and is there not an illegall commission of Array though not enacted yet ordained and set up in opposition to the Parliament But whtch is yet above all and strikes at their very essence are they not because others doe neglect their duty and the trust reposed in them by the publike denyed even the very name of a Parliament and therein the power and vertue of it and whether this be not a denying of their right let the world judge The Author saith true that there is a meane betweene doing nothing and all But I would faine know how we shall be assured of this meane if his Majestie upon pretence of unnecessary shall have power to deny whatsoever is requested by the Parlament The result of all is Our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety in all tâ—…e subjects lives liberties and possessions or in any thing else to the Crowne appertaining as subjects have in the Kings dignitie The Author saith That what should be meant by subjects having an unconditionate and hâ—…gh 〈◊〉 in the Kings dignity surpasses his understanding 〈◊〉 not the Author loved division he would not have thus severed the Observators words thereby to puâ—… a dylemma upon himselfe and others for the Observator saith before that the King was made for the people and not the people for the King and thence raiseth this conclusion which under savour is very naturall that therefore the King hath not that absolute right of property in the people and their interest as they have in his Majestie and his possession and now will any man except our Author who understands not deny this for a truth I but he sa th it seemes to sâ—…eake this wicked doctrine that subjects may dispose of the
good an innocents oppugning of the sword of Justice to rescue his owne life I dare confidently asfirme not the least title to this purpose No a man ought to discharge his Covenant though it be to his disadvantage And ruat Coelum fiat 〈◊〉 though heaven itselfe if it were possible should be destroyed yet let justice â—…ourish That were a way to open a gap for all disorder and breach of rule and society without which no common wealth can be of long subsistance If thou suffer unjustly God will abundantly remunerate thy sufferings and repay it upon the head of thine enemies wherefore much better it is for thee to submit to thy censure by patience than to incurr the breach of all society by dâ—…sobedience I but saith the Author If reason will not satisfie perhaps 〈◊〉 may Qâ—…i 〈◊〉 potestati ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt to resist the Magistrate 〈◊〉 And he saith that answer with which too many are deceived cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion this 〈◊〉 obliges private men but not Magistrates Since inferiour Magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as pirvate men and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to 〈◊〉 T is not usuall with mee to intrenâ—…h upon another mans profession but seeing I am here inforced to it give me leave a little to sayle out of my way to answer the Author First for the taking up of Armes or the waging of a warre in generall I never heard any man oppose the legâ—…timation of that warre that had these three requisites or ingredients A lawfull authotity commanding 〈◊〉 as the â—…agistrate A just and lawfâ—…ll end or cause occasioning it as the defence of our Religion liberties and the like And a good affection in following of it as not with rashnesse or temeritie but after all other meanes sirst endeavoured And now I appeale to any indifferent man whom neither feare nor affection hath ingaged to the contrary whether all these are not exactly made good in this great â—…taking of the Parliament I but saith the Author how doth this anâ—…wer the taking up of armes against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King for 〈◊〉 all o her 〈◊〉 are but as private men compared with him To this I â—…nswer 〈◊〉 under he Aâ—…ors favour â—…he suprâ—…am power as I have made it good before is the people represented by a Parliaâ—…ent and then no doubt that precept of the Apostle comprehending the King aswell as other persons doâ—…h according to his owne Argument justifie he Parliament in their proceedâ—…s and make good â—…heir taking up of Armes in their owne just defence I but hen the Author 〈◊〉 hat of the Apostle that the Magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum Gods minister to thee 〈◊〉 thy good and though thou suffer by him unjusty yet there he is 〈◊〉 in bonum for that by thy patient suffering thou shalt thereby gaine an eternall reward Cerâ—…inly God never made Magistrates on purpose to aâ—…ict and 〈◊〉 over their pâ—…ople thâ—…t they by patient 〈◊〉 might enjoy the greâ—…ter happinâ—… hereafter No that they provâ—… corrupt issues from hemselves not from any divine determination and therefore if the Mâ—…gistrate doe prove to be Minister nobis in malum a Minister to thee â—…or thy ill he is not then 〈◊〉 minister Gods Minister for that he doth transgresse and goe beyond his commission and in such case under the favour of M. Doctor Ferne conscience doâ—…h not only deny obedience but command and justifie 〈◊〉 But in all this conceive me 〈◊〉 t is the magistrates not any 〈◊〉 opposition that I justifie and this being undertaken with the due circumstance is not a meanes to destroy order and societie but maintaine them But yet I hope our Auâ—…hor will be here informed that this is not our case For doe we take up armes against our Soveraign may he perish who in his thoughts intends him the least ill No t is as the Parliament have often declared against his Malignant Councellors such who endeavour whatever their 〈◊〉 may be to his Majesty the subversion of our Religion and the destruction of the publike And I hope there is nothing in the word of God that opposeth this O yes in opposing hâ—…s authority you fight against him Strange if it should be so when neither the law of God nor man do oblige obedience to commands unlawfull He that obeyes the magistrate upon such termes doth it at his owne perill and I hope t is lawfull for the Parliament to depresse any civill or private combustion I but what if that authority have the Kings person accompanying it may you in such case make resistance No question we may for t is not the person of the King that can legitimate an action that is in it selfe unlawfull nor adde any greater force or vigour to their Commission that obey Besides the personall presence of the King doth or doth not countermand his authority if it do countermand his authority then they have no power to warrant their actâ—…on if it do not yet the act is 〈◊〉 So then let them take their choise they see their termes Unhappy people who having committed themselves to the government of one King onely might not oppose the unlawfull and tyrannicall regiment of so many It being in effect objected as appeares befoâ—…e That a â—…emporall power meaning the Parliament cannot bee greater than that which is lasting and unalterable intending the King Is this were so saith the Observator the Romanes have done impolitickly in creating Dictators when any great extremity assayled them and yet we know it was very prosperous to them sometimes to change the â—…orme of government Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger to trust to a Monarchy not 〈◊〉 Aristocâ—…y and much lesse to a Democracy What have we to do with Aristocracy or Democracy God be blessed we nor know nor desire any other government than that of Monarchy and we shall with all hâ—…mility cast our selvs upon his Majesties care and providence guided by his Parliament But if sedâ—…ced by malignant and destructive Counsell we are not bound to yeeld our selves as a prâ—…y to the ranâ—… and malice of his and our enemies The King objects if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than Councellors wee make them Comptrollers and this is not â—…ble to Royalty To which the Observator answers 〈◊〉 say saith he that to coâ—…t is more than to counsell 〈◊〉 yet not aâ—…es so much as to command and comptroll True saith the Author not alwayes but then it is when their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impose a necessity upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 the like Doth their consent impose a greater necessity or ingagement upon the King than the consent or declaration of law in cases of publike conâ—…nt by former Parliaments hath done or than the judgement of his Judges in inferiour Courts doâ—…h do who are so Counsellours for the King as that the King may
thâ—…n being thus hâ—…w hâ—…ve the people totaâ—…ly divestâ—…d themselves of their power I dâ—…e nâ—…t speake this to defend the peoples 〈◊〉 of their Authority or to 〈◊〉 that poâ—…tion of depoâ—…ng Princes so farre I concurre wâ—…th the Author but that thâ—…y should haâ—…e a boundlâ—…sse 〈◊〉 power that I denie Againe for he maketh a second conclusion oâ—…t of the former premisses hence it 〈◊〉 saith hee though â—…he peâ—…ple should 〈◊〉 thâ—…y â—…ght live more hapiâ—… if the Kiâ—…gs 〈◊〉 were morâ—… 〈◊〉 his revenues diminishâ—…d it were hâ—…gh sinne to 〈◊〉 upon his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Stâ—…e when that the Kâ—…ngs Prerogative doth not invade the subâ—…ects 〈◊〉 nor their 〈◊〉 entrench 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but eaâ—…h keepe within their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and circumference But thâ—…s wee must â—…ow that as the Kings Crowne and 〈◊〉 â—…ower was committed to him in trust fâ—…r the good of his 〈◊〉 so likewise wâ—…re his 〈◊〉 and Prerogatives and if these bâ—… abused to the 〈◊〉 of lâ—…berty and the 〈◊〉 or the destâ—…uction of his peoâ—…le t is no entrenching upon Prerogative to qâ—…estion this abâ—…se and indeavour our owne preservation I but then he saies it doth no way prejudice regall Authority that God is the Author of Aristocrat call or Democraticall power Doth the observators saying that God is the auhor of those powers any way conclude against regall authority where the powers are various and no way contradictory or opposite one to another for a man to conclude the illegality of the one from the legality of the other were a very simple and fallacious kinde of reasoning But our Authour will not bee thus satisfied for he doth here charge the Observator with â—…reading in the steps of Maâ—…iana and Buchanan sworne enemies â—…o 〈◊〉 And why so pray you why because the Observator doth shew how the infancy of the world was governed Most Nations being ruled by their Lords and their Arbitrary edicts which was not he saith in a long time digested And then for that he further sheweth the inconveniences which in more matâ—…re ages were â—…onnd to accompany unconditionate Royalty but concludes that since most Countries have soâ—…nd out an art for the regulating the exorbitances of Princes hee is very unjust that will oppose this Aâ—… and Order And now let any wise and indiffâ—…rent man jâ—…dge how falsely and maliciously this imputation of an enemy to Monarchy is cast upon the Observator for doth the dâ—…monstrating and disproving of other Governements any way strike at Monarchy or doth it not rather propp or support it doth not the disâ—…llowing of other powers if not commend yet tacitly allow and approve our owne Nay doth he not here as in other places exprâ—…sly applaâ—…de the order and constâ—…tution of 〈◊〉 Monarchy so well fenced in by the Art of Parliaments why then what colour or ground is thâ—…re for this imputation Is there not a wide dâ—…fference beâ—…wixt modification and extirpation had our Author consâ—…red this certainely he would not have beene thus unjust in his censure Buâ—… here we may learne what Doctirine is daily delivered to the King That it is the Kings Crown that is aimed at not onely so but even the very dethroning of him his whole posterity and in truth so it is but by his Majesties evill Câ—…ncellors who to magniâ—…ie themselves intend the ruine of tâ—…e Common-wealth and is not that in effect a dâ—…throning of his Majestâ—… all that I shall say is but this No Govenement more blest or happie if not abused by the advice of vile and malignant Coâ—…ellours After so long a Preface the Author tells us that hee will now take iâ—…to consideration the Observators grounds upon which hee would overthrow so ancient and well â—…unded a Monarchâ—… The false impâ—…tation of enmity against this great and well established power will not be thus shaken â—…ff The truth of it is he that resolves to say any thing be it never so scandalous and void of truth will againe 〈◊〉 to stand or fall upon the same principles But give him leave and he will shew you one of the grounds that strikes at Monarchie pâ—…ay observe what an unnecessary â—…nference is hâ—…re made by the Author Tâ—…e observator saâ—…th that The King aâ—…tributeth the originall of his Royalty to God and the Law making no mention at all of the grant consent or trâ—…st of man therein A groundâ—…sse cavile sâ—…th the Author and why so because when God is fiâ—…St named under what notion can he apprehend â—…aw but as an agâ—…eement oâ—… the people deriving of their power and committing the 〈◊〉 to his trust You charge the Observator with a â—…avile and you labour to maâ—…e it good by so large allowance that I could not have 〈◊〉 so much from Oxâ—…d What an agreement oâ—… the people in the 〈◊〉 of a King and a deriving of â—…heir power unto him and whiâ—…h hâ—…s yet more a 〈◊〉 of thâ—… 〈◊〉 to hâ—…s Maâ—…esty â—…n trâ—…st why then that is no absolute and 〈◊〉 power tâ—…s mâ—…ch all thâ—…s shâ—…ld bee granted but yet I feare â—…is yoâ—… not the Observator that deaâ—…es 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 tellâ—…ng him that the 〈◊〉 and agreement of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 obliterated and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is not now to be taken notice of or â—…hat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the â—…etter of thâ—… Law so what else can be the meaning 〈◊〉 thaâ—… fâ—…equent â—…xpression in many of his 〈◊〉 Declarations that he is responsible to God alone for his Actions not to man Is not this since no absolute power was transferred by the people as it is here confessed as I have made it good before a denying of the consent and agreement of the people and a granting of a boundlesse Authority And how can that and a trust stand together certainely a dependant and an independant governement are not Synonyma T is true that if a people doe erect a King over them that this is confirmed aâ—…d ratified in Heaven But being of humane institution this doth no way expunge those qualifications of trust and condition which are incident to and tacitly passe with this sacred function and if so we must of necessity allow a power in some to see the due discharge and execution of them nor will it derogate from the honour of God or the dignity of a Prince that the people exact the due execution of the Law and the performance of that compact trust and condition that followes Soveraignty By this time I hope our Author may be satisfied that it is he that cavils not the Observator since it is plaine that the word Law though it doe receive so candid an interpretation from the Observator may be and is denyed to be the consent and agreement of the people But now how doth this determine against Monarchy why yes thus or not at all The King denies the people their right therfore the people may take away his Is this one of the grounds upon which the Observator doth intend
Besides who can be so competent a Judge of any approaching danger or of any malignities or pressures in the Common wealth as they who speake out of the common sense and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 However this is certaine the Kingdome cannoâ—… suffâ—…r by a Parliament iâ—… may withouâ—… If the Parliament make any transition in other matters than what be pleases to propose they are lyable to imprisonment at his pleasure The sense of his inference is this that because they cannot justifie the medling with things which belong not to their cognizance therefore they may bee punished if they meddle with those that doe This is the Authors inference not the Observators He doth not say that for executing their due power they may be imprisoned no such inconsequent concluâ—…ious we leave to the Author But this he seemeth to speake that it should be very hard and unreasonable that the power of judging of the jurisdiction and authority of a Parliament should reside only in the Kings breast when that none can determine aright of them but themselves for if so if the King at any time shall say they exceed their power they may be imprisoned at pleaâ—…ure The Author telling the people how farre their ingagement goes with the Parliament saith That if they exceed their 〈◊〉 and Vote things not belonging to their cognizance the people by no meanes is ingaged in it as having no legall way of expressing of themselves in such cases This is in plain termes to tell the people in what cases they are to submit to and maintain and desend the Parliament in what not certainly people cannot be so 〈◊〉 as to thinâ—… that the illegall acts of a Parliament sâ—…ould bind them but on the other side I hope they will not be so foolish as to believe every thing to be illegall which the Author is pleased to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but rather cast themselves upon their care as in duty they are bound whom they have entrusted with the publike securitie But I hope the Author will now be advised that on the contrary the people are no more ingaged in the illegall proceedings of the Prince in those things that he is intrusted with for the publike than of the Parliament It is impossible saith the King that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to us and our heires for ever and the same trust and a power above that trust for such is the power they pretend to be committed to others It is true saith the Observator Two supreames cannot be in the same sense and respect This is a weake answer saith the Author So weake that the Author cannot reply to it for nothing is more knowne or assented to than this that the King is singulis major yet universis minor It seemes sayes the Author the King hath taken the Oath of Alligeance as well as we and we may call him 〈◊〉 fellow subject Did we ever speake of two Kings or can there be so in one common wealth But much lesse can there be any alligeance due from the Soveraigne to the subject certainly the Author was not himselfe But to prove his reasoning yet more absurd we doe not say that the King is singulis minor but that he is universis minor and I hope â—…he universe or body politike never swore alligeance or supremacy to the King neither is it possible that it should for that it is a body only in consideration of Law that hath neither life nor motion like other individuals and therefore not capable of doing of any act in that capacity so that notwithstanding this shallow reaâ—… the King is universis minor I but saith the Author You tell us that he is greater than one you doe not tell us that he is better than two this is no greater supremacy than probably he had before he was a King The Prince is singulis major as well as â—…ee nay may not any Lord in the Land chal 〈◊〉 the same supremacy over all the Knights any Knight over all Esquiâ—…es What a poore and senslesse cavill is this doe not we say that he is universis minor and doth it not then consequently follow that we allow him major to all that is lesse than the universe When you can reduce the universe to so small a number as two then will his Majesty be lesse than those two untill then he is greater for those slender instances to prove as great a supremacy in the Prince nay in every nobleman over all Knights and in Knights over all Esquires I must tell him had not his senses bâ—…ene ravished by and swallowâ—…d up in Monâ—…rchy he would never have so much forgot himselfe can there be any one singulis major but the King he that accounts himself so high 〈◊〉 to be made lower by the head the Prince himselfe is not singâ—…lis major till he survive his Father To be short all others are but comparatively great the King only is great in the superlative I but to take us off these corrupt glosses I would there were no more 〈◊〉 in himâ—… the Author 〈◊〉 us to 24. H. 8. ca. 12. which as he saith 〈◊〉 the King to be universis major the preface of which statute 〈◊〉 thus that this Kingdome hath beene alwayes acknowledged to be an Empire governed by one supreame head and King having the dignity and regall estate of the same unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people c. been bounden and owen next to God a naturall and humble obedience Doth this prove the King universis major under favour nothing lesse for wee must not understand this that the body politike doth owe obedience but that the severall sorts and degrees of people of which this body is compacted and made that they doe owe obedience for to take it otherwise were to make an absurd and impossible construction For as I have said before how is it possible that a body politike which is a body only in judgement of law or contemplation that hath neither life sense nor motion that that should owe homage or obedience to any one much lesse a naturall obedience as the Statute speaketh so that cleerly this doth not aâ—… all disprove the former position If there were no King at all in England you would call this government an Aristocracy and why I beseech you do you not confâ—…sse the name now seeing the thing is altogether the same for if they give his voyce t is all one as if he had no voyce if their pâ—…wer must over-rule his t is all one as if he were 〈◊〉 of all Certainly Monarchy hath committed a Rape upon the Authors reason and understanding or els he could not bee thus overseene Doth the Parliament go about to take away the Kings voyce or to disrobe him of his power more than the knowne law of the land doth approve of Did they even declare or publish such a power to be in them that they
argument of true absolute Soveraignty But I hope on the other side our Author will take notice that the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit or discharge Princes of their duty There is Onus aswell as honos that is a great burden charg and care aswell as honour and renowne thâ—…t is inseperably incident to this great function and therefore he that gaines the one be it by discent conquest or otherwise must discharge the other The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis major yet he is universis minor The author tels us that This inference is most weake and that the quite contrary may clearely be concluded pray heare his reason The people being the efficient cause of power which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power and uniting it in him since they cannot retaine what they have parted with nor have what they gave away it followes â—…e which 〈◊〉 their power I may adde his owne perticular besides must needs be greater and more powerfull then they The Authors argument to destroy the Observators inference is but this that though the people be the fountaine and efficient cause of power yet for that they have made a free Donation of all power to the King since they cannot be owners of that they have given away therefore it must needs follow that the King is greater then the people I doubt the Author will finde it a greater difficulty to maintaine this Argument then to make it for if it can be proved on that hangs the strength of his argument that the people have not divested themselves of all power oâ—…t of his premisses the consequence is just that the universe is greater then the King Now if trust and condition are inseparable incidents to Soveâ—…ty as I have shewed before it must follow that the people represented by a Parliament may call in question the breach of them for otherwise the power would be in effâ—…ct 〈◊〉 which hath been denied even by the King himself who acknowledgeth that his Kingdome is commited to him in trust and if so as no doubt pâ—…dents of that nature are not wanting to posterity for that no question that was one maine ground of the constitution of Parliaments the restraining of the exorbitancy of Princes why then how can it bee that the people should have divested themselves of all their power for it must be agreed that that power which may call in question the discharge of others is the supreame and superintendent for no inferiour power can doe it so that by this time I hope the Author is satisfied that the Obseâ—…ors inference is just and his reason weake and defective But the Observator tenders a proofe of the premisses for saith he If the people be the true â—…ent cause of poweâ—… it is a rule in naâ—…ure quicquid efficit tale est magis tale Sâ—…ange sayes the Author that men upon such palpable sophistry should endeavour to cast off Monarchy It is more strange to mee that men against cleare reason should make theâ—…selves so palpably ignorant can not the Author difference a reasonable modification or qualificatioâ—… from an extreame extirpation or eradication if my reason faile me not it is he that indeavoureth what ever he pretend the casting off of Monarchy for as Monarchy is never so secure as when fenced in by the wisdome of Parliaments it submits to their determinations so it is never so much in danger as when it exalts it selfe above and against them and endeavoureth an absolutenesse of Soveraignty hence it may be determined who are the greatest enemies to Monarchs But pray what is the sophistry the Observator stands accused of why it is this he hath given you a rule that is regularly not generally true that will maintaine the case in question not all others for instance he tels the Observator That he will be unwilling to follow the consequence of this rule and why for that saith he he hath an estate which no question 〈◊〉 would willingly improve let him bestow it upon me he will make me rich aâ—…d 〈◊〉 richer for quicquid 〈◊〉 tale est magis tale I this is thaâ—… â—…hat hath made this great combustion maâ—…r of â—…ight and estate could you perswade us out of our reason you would quickly seize upon these but I trust your sophistry shall not so captivate our sense as to betray our selves to ruine by a foolish prating with that which God dispenced unto our Ancestors and they through his mercy â—…queathed unto us If I should tell you that God made man therefore God is greater than man or that the Ocean distributing it selfe into severall streames or rivolets is greater than those rivolets and so conclude that therefore quicquid efficit tale est magis talâ—… you would presently say that this were no infallible way of reasoning why for you to conclude that it doth not hold in some cases therefore not in the case in question is not this the same fallacy but as befor s now I shall make good the Axiome in our case upon his owne grounds for he saith it doth hold in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is â—…erent and from whom it cannot be seperated not true in those who by way of donation dâ—…st themselves of power or wealth That power was origiâ—…lly inherent in the people that I thinke will not be questioned That the people 〈◊〉 not divested themselves of all their power is cleared thus as I have shewn before that power that is fiduciary and upon condition must needs bee subject to a power more supream to see the due discharge of this trust and condition or othâ—…rwise it would in effect prove absolute but I say the Royall dignite and authority is fiduciary only and upon condition therefore it must be subâ—…ect to a power more suâ—…e wâ—…h can bee no other than the people represented by a Parliament Besides what a groundlesse and unnaturall thing is it to think that a people in whom all power did origâ—…y reside should so totally and absolutely dispose that to one which being abused must without hope of redresse prove their owne inevitable destruction I but saith the Author If the King be universis minor then the people have pâ—…ced a King not over but 〈◊〉 them and 〈◊〉 doe ill to 〈◊〉 when they might command they may 〈◊〉 it from the Prince their subject The King is universis minor lesse than the Publike but he is singulis major over and above all individuals and therefore the Author in this doth not much mistake himselfe for that undutifull and â—…urable passage of commanding of his Majestie and of making him our subject I wish withall my soule that the Author of this booke and his associates were not more guilty of this then his Parliament could ever Parliament or â—…ple with more
might enact any new lawes or abrogate the old without his Majesties consent Nay â—…ove they not frequently prosessed the contrary why then what have they done that should have the least colour of intitling them to an Aristocraticall Government O yes for they have voted and published it to the world that the power of declaring law 〈◊〉 Paul amento in case of any publike concernment doth refide in them and that though the King neither doth nor will consent yet he is obliged by their Votes And is this any greater power or priviledge than every other inferiour Court hath or is it more than they themselves formerly without the least scruple have exercised by declaring law in dubious points of Statâ—…s and erroneous judgements And is their ancient undoubted and unquestionable right now become a power Aristocraticall T is strange that the times should so vary the case and that long enjoyment or possession which doth usually confirme and strengthen a mans right should be a meanes to take it away But before I passe this over let me tell the Author that it is a most idle scandalous and false aspersion and if I do in all this wrong him let hee himself judge upon his owne inference which is this that the defending and maintaining of the ancient â—…ight and government is a labouring for an introducting of a new and if he chance to blush as he well may at his own inconsequent reasoning let him mend it hereaâ—…ter I but saith he I dare say that all Histories and Records except of such Parliaments which deposed their King which the Observâ—…or 〈◊〉 no free one ever did cannot produce an example of this nature that the two Howses should pretend to a power which must of necessity over-rule the King That there is not the least colour of a pretence to such a power I have before plainly evidenced it Kut I pray heare his reason why this power as to some respects may not be greater than the King Because saith he since the law hath given the King a power by dissolving of the Parliament to take away that power as is pretended greater than his owne if they had ever made claime to superiority over him he would quickly have put an end to that dispute This is in plaine termes to say that a power that is but temporary cannot be greater than that which is continuing and unalterable a strange fallacy why if the Kingmake one high Constable of England ad 〈◊〉 whom we know hath a power very extensive shall we conclude that his dignity or authority is inferiour to others of lesse qualitie and esteeme because dissolvable at the Kings pleasure Or if the King conferre the dignitie and Office of Lord Keeper to another by committing of the seale unto his custody is he therefore not superiour to the rest of the Nobility because removable at his Majesties will and discretion an absurditie to thinke it Before this power be challinged it would be fit to vote down that clause in a law made 2 H. 5 cited by his Majesty That it is of the Kings regality to grant or deny such of their petitions as pleaseth himselfe For that this is said to be cited by his Majesty I shall not question the truth of it though I have searched the Statutes and I cannot find any such clause But admitting it to be so did ever any one make a question whether that there were such a Prerogative in rerum natura as the Kings negative voyce certainly not The matter in debate is whether it be so absolute and uncircumscribed that the Parliament can doe nothing no not so much as declare what the common law is without his Majesties consent or whether it be boun ed and limited So that this great and most supreame Court may not be like a body without a soule or a numberlesse cypher And for thaâ—… of the Statute that he may deny their petitions can you thence deduce that he may deny their rights their right of declaring law in caâ—…e of publike concernment is not involved within the narrow compasse of a petition To the most absolute â—…mpire in the world this condition is most naturall and necessary that the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his It is against common sâ—…nse to suppose a King that is in his â—…its who â—…ll not provide for the safety of his people nay who will not part with some of his right rather than they should perish because in their destruction he looseth all I would to God that sad experience did not inform us that you speak severall languages one thing to us another to his Majesty if it were not so the setling of the Militia by his Parliament by reason of the abuse of that trust to the endangering of the Kingdom by â—…he advise of ill affected counsellors would not have caâ—…sed this great combustion I but then the Author saith This doth not prove a King should part with his rights as often as they will pretend to be in danger Nor can it be thought reaâ—…onable if that a Parliament and in that a whole kingdome can use pretences Was ever age guilty of such disrespects to a Parliament If this were once admitted what wild plots would be invented what strange 〈◊〉 would be received â—…rom invisible spies Strange that a Parliament should fancy and invent nâ—…series to themselves and should thus frighten the publike with Phantasmes or Chimaeraes I hope thâ—… Author will prove it by experience that it is not so easie a mâ—…tter to deceive a whole Common wealâ—…h I saith he and so often as crafty men were ambitious or covetous so ofâ—…n the silly people were to be frighted More strange yet that ambition and covetousnesse should at once possesse a whole Parliament and that a whole Common-wealth should be accounted but a silly people so easie to be wrought upon I hope this disparagement to the publike will work an answerable acceptance to the people Since all naturall power is in those who obey they which contract to obey to their owne ruine or having so contracted they which esteeme sucâ—… a contract before their owne preservation are sellonious to themselves and rebellious to nature For example sayes the Author an agreement patiently to submit themselves to the Ordinary tryall of law and to suffer if it should se fall out tâ—…ough under an undeserved sentence In this case bee that doth not make resistance and prerr his preservation to his contract is pronounced Felo de se and a rebell to nature And he puts other examples of the like nature as that of the Martyrs â—…nd of our saviour Christ and demands our thoughts of â—…hem whether they were selfe murtherers or no What a strange affected mistake is this of the Author can there be the least colourable inference out of what the Observator hath delivered to justifie any individuall opposition and infringment of contract or to make
have and desire more and t is 〈◊〉 they that have least are best 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 young men might in all probability have as great a portion to expose to hazard as the grave and sage 〈◊〉 and yet you see they preferred their vile and ambitioâ—… counsell before the good of the publique I bâ—…t then he saiâ—… they are knowne not to value their lives equall to their 〈◊〉 Very good if it were true yet for all this they may be to chuse their Religion Nay which is more they aâ—…e 〈◊〉 oâ—… as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as honesty it may be greater neither of which would permit them to be 〈◊〉 to make themselves miserable and pull upon their posterity and Countrey perpetuall slavery Doth the Author thinke that his iâ—…sinuating probabilities which are 〈◊〉 strongest Arguments shall evince us that the Sunne shines not though our eyes 〈◊〉 the contrary Might not this with the samâ—… strength of reason have beene urged in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 young 〈◊〉 and yet we see what wretched advise they gave the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not but 〈◊〉 that they did 〈◊〉 inslave their posterity and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it to â—…cuse the Kâ—…ng to intend that whâ—… the world sees how much 〈◊〉 â—…h sâ—…d â—…y to 〈◊〉 it What 〈◊〉 of expression is it to say we accuse the King of 〈◊〉 an arbitrary rule 〈◊〉 we labour nothing more than to 〈◊〉 his Majesty No nation that ever enjoyed a Municipall law evâ—… 〈◊〉 nâ—…rer to an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than wee not long since did and did wee in all our 〈◊〉 in the least 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or accuse his Majesty No wâ—… 〈◊〉 his evill 〈◊〉 who wrought that 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 and they as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to doâ—… who dare oppresse his pâ—…ple stick not to diâ—…charge themselves to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evill actions upon their Soveraigne and such is the subtilty of our Author here If you impâ—…ach him for any publike desservice he knowes whether to flie â—…or 〈◊〉 Could our Ancâ—…s ever have beleâ—…ved 〈◊〉 should come a King who would plead 〈◊〉 Mâ—…na Câ—…a who would â—…rd his Câ—…wne in the â—…nce of his Sâ—…bjects 〈◊〉 and dâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rule This 〈◊〉 be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Soâ—… â—…ut our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his evill 〈◊〉 pleai against Magna Charâ—…a and too apparently hazard his Crowne in the destruction of his Subjects and their liberties indeavouring nothing more than the introducting of an Arbitrary rule If the King 〈◊〉 parted from his Parliament meerely because they sought his oppression and he â—…d no 〈◊〉 meanes to withstand their 〈◊〉 let this proclayme them a void Assembly His 〈◊〉 never 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 charge to the Parliament the more impudent the Author that dare doe it when his Majesty decliâ—… it For he saith it is most evident there was too great reaâ—… to 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 when not withstanding his deepest 〈◊〉 to maintaine the true estaâ—… shâ—… they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 I dare not charge his 〈◊〉 with any thing I have no authority for it But this I say when justice 〈◊〉 be denied and the course thereof obstructed against such firebrands 〈◊〉 and engines of all 〈◊〉 as Jesuites Seminary Priests and the like When Papists shall approach so 〈◊〉 the Throne and none admitted into greater favour and affection than they certainly I may conclude without prejudice to my King that the Pope harbours in some of his Councels 〈◊〉 And this meanes being used what alteration future necessity or 〈◊〉 may impose 〈◊〉 cast upon us is not difficult to judge When notwithstanding 〈◊〉 utâ—… 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 happy 〈◊〉 on in Ireland c. and his frequent pressing them 〈◊〉 new 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the people were made 〈◊〉 he was a favourer of their bloody 〈◊〉 It must be acknowledged the King â—…n 〈◊〉 most wicked Councell that afterwards depressed it witnesse the many 〈◊〉 that did intervene suâ—…ly manifested to the World And which is above all the seizing of that poore supply that was sent unto them Whea the baser sort of the people were 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Parliament in clamourous and 〈◊〉 able 〈◊〉 c. And were there not many of them having neither offensive nor deâ—… weapons most 〈◊〉 inhumanely and barbarously 〈◊〉 and butchered for their paines punishment sufficient for their 〈◊〉 if they committed any When seditious Pamâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out and 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 day and night to abuse the King For my par 〈◊〉 there were any such I was never guilty of countenancing or abetting of them No not so much as by their reading However this I am certaine of that whatsoever the wit of malice could 〈◊〉 was dayly and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and vented against the Parliament 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 encouraged whilest they did cast publike 〈◊〉 upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and which if they bad 〈◊〉 duly executed would have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 us to our 〈◊〉 peace and quiet which we so long enjoyed as wee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 Whom our Author may 〈◊〉 wthin the compasse of this notion of factious Preachers 〈◊〉 â—…now not But I feare by the stile of his booke he comprehends all such as preach thâ—… word of God in â—…ruth and sincerity not fearing the face of men that will not be wrought upon to call evill gâ—…d or good evill Had Paul lived in these dayes I doubt our Author would 〈◊〉 like have accused hâ—…m for a pestilent fellow a mover of sedition and a 〈◊〉 of Sects and the like and for my part I think that those whom he intends and Paul were equally guil y of these offences And yet you heare what testimony Paul gives of himself after the way which 〈◊〉 call 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the God of my 〈◊〉 O the 〈◊〉 of these times that we are 〈◊〉 into that 〈◊〉 labouring for truth honesty and a good conscience that will noâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by every idle and 〈◊〉 innovation should 〈◊〉 accounted 〈◊〉 but I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 our Author when he speakes of faction to reflect upon himselfe by a serious 〈◊〉 But 〈◊〉 us that thâ—… Lawes have beene 〈◊〉 ed 〈◊〉 if he had 〈◊〉 an answer he would 〈◊〉 shewed us in what Delosus 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 noâ—… 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 aling to hide your â—…ders in generalls the more 〈◊〉 if 〈◊〉 that theâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reply The last vaine feare was when such seditious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 even 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 c. Contention with words makes no 〈◊〉 of blood 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this should be one cause of feare that should drive the King to so great a diâ—… Well 〈◊〉 is both 〈◊〉 and sedition in our Authors book had they 〈◊〉 as sure venâ—… in the 〈◊〉 they would not have gone unpunished but I believe he can sooner wriâ—…e sedition 〈◊〉 he can define it But to conclude this t is wonderfull that these Chymeraes which so 〈◊〉 the King at London should likewise cause him to raise an Army
his Majesty for the ordering of the Militia according to their advise â—…or the better security of his people and His Majestiâ—…s negative returne unto them before they according to their duty undertooke in his Majestiâ—…s and his people behalâ—…e the trust and maâ—…age of the same And now it must be in their power to command men 〈◊〉 horses seise on all the Ammunition send for what supples of money they thinke necessary for the repelling those dangers This is but a consequence of the other it were but in vaine to lay a foundation if they had not power â—…o raise the Structure I but here wee are fallen backe againe into what we so much complained of Arbitrary poweâ—… 'T is much that one who pretends to be Mâ—…ster of his reason should be thus mistaken Then belike all proceedings in cases according to equity and necessity which justice requireth should not be regulated by the strickt rule and severity of law as not being within the intention of it for that such constructive might prove destinction to the rule is a prosecution of an arbitrary power The manage of a businesse in case of necessity neede not keepe correspondence and agreement with the rule neithâ—…r that to be stileâ—… Arbitrary which necessitâ—… makes lawsull Was not this the very case of Ship-money there likewise was a pretence of danger and necessity and none so compelent a judge of this as the King and therefore for the securing of the people money must be immediatly raised without the Subjects consent With the Authors favour these cases do no way runne parallel for will it therefore follow that because the King cannot upon no pretence whatsoever take away the Subjects propâ—…rty without their consent that the Parliamâ—…ent may not take it with their conâ—…ent Most inconsequent The Parliament represent the people which the King doth not And therefore their conclusions do 〈◊〉 â—…he people whâ—…ch the Kings cannot But then he presles an Argument that was made against the ship-money which he saith will hold in our case It was then laid downe as a sure 〈◊〉 of reason that it was better for the Kingdome though it were in reall danger in arena 〈◊〉 capere to 〈◊〉 for it selfe as well as it wâ—…s able by a suddaine defence than that the King should prâ—…vide such a remedy which would be so easily so â—…quently abused upon every preâ—…ence of dâ—…nger to pâ—…event such an evill which could extremly seldome oâ—… almost never hapâ—…en for an Army and Navy could not be so 〈◊〉 provided but that we must have some intelligence of it So 〈◊〉 â—…aith in case of the Militia better suffer it in the old waâ—… and the Kingdome 〈◊〉 for it selfe in case of 〈◊〉 than to 〈◊〉 the hazzard of the 〈◊〉 abuse of it to the putting of the Kingdom into a combustion upon I know not what vaine pretences I beleive the Author preached a quite contrary Doctrine before the Parliâ—…ment O the power and vertue of this great Assembly that can so Metamorphize men as to makâ—… thâ—…m spâ—…ak accoâ—…ding to the dictate of reasâ—…n not affâ—…ction But for his Argument the ground of the obâ—…ection that was laid down against the Ship-money was the possible frequent abuse that might be of such a remedy upon eveâ—…y pretence of danger which without controversie carries a great deale of wait with it And when our Aâ—…thor can make it good as he hâ—…th strongly 〈◊〉 but much failed in it that a Communitâ—… maâ—… have those many private ends to mislead it that a King may then shâ—…ll we agree that the cases do in reason parrallel untill then we must â—…ell him thâ—…t there is â—…oure hundrâ—…d to one against him I 〈◊〉 the world judge whether the 〈◊〉 Sir Iâ—…hn Ho hams act Treason be not contrary to the cleareâ—…t 〈◊〉 of humane reason and the â—…trongest inclinations of nature for every private man may defind himselfe by force if 〈◊〉 though by the force of his Majestrate or his owne 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be not without all confidence by flâ—…ght Sir Iohn Hothams seising upon the Kings Towne and Ammunition was it seemes in his own defence who assaulted him Did his Majesty drive him into Hull No But his Mejesty would have driven him out he being possessed of it by the Authority of Parliament for the securing of him and his people And though it be not lawfull for a Subject to seise a towne in his owne defence yet having got it by a lawfull authority he may defend himselfe and it against any assault by the same power Neither can any other extrajudiciall power or command discharge him of that trust which was committed to him in a legall and judiciall way by another What can he thinke of the Gunpowder Traytors was their resistance a just defence Then certainely every rebellion is a just warre His conclusion is very just For questionles there can be no warre unlawfull if their resistance were a warrantable defence But I hope the Author will give us leave to tell him that the cases are more different then a Papist and a Protâ—…stant they agree in somewhat the cases in nothing for they had neither lawfull cause nor sufficient authority on their side to maintaine resistance as Sir Iohn Hotham had Againe they were Traytours before by their horrid unnaturall and cruell attempt But I hope Sir Iohn Hothams bare seising of the Towne could not proclaime him Traytor But enough of this in a case so manifest He may as soone convince a man of common sense that black and white are the same colour as that these cases runne parallel Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard being uncapable of flight must yeeld their throats and submit to Assassinates if their King will not allow them defence There is a great difference betwixt a Subjects defending of himselfe and offending his King His feaâ—…es are over witty if they will not permit him to thinke himselfe safe except he get into one of the Kings Forts for his better security Without question he that may defend may offend for how is it possible that I should defend my selfe if I may not offend my enemy What a sensles thing and void of reason is it to mainetaine that Subjects may take up Armes to defend themselves against the unlawfull Tyranny of their Prince but yet upon his approach they must not use any hostile act but stand like so many stocks immoveable what is this but opposiâ—…um in objecto a flâ—…t contradiction or a taking up of Armes in iest to make me capable of losing my life in earnest If this were all we could doe the most facile way for wicked Princes to accomplish their ends would be â—…his by Tyranny and oppression to ingage the people in this imaginary defensive warre thereby to disarme them and force obedience to their unjust desires or slay them with their owne weapons But to passe this If a King shall take up armes
to dâ—…stroy his people no question law reason and pollicy will warrant their seising of â—…ny fort or publique place of defence for their owne better security See if we are not left as a Prey to the same bloody hands as have done such diabolicall exploits in Ireland c. If we may not take up armes for our owne safety or if it be possible for us to take up armes without sâ—…me â—…otes or Ordinances to regulate the Militia Subjects upon invasiâ—…n would not have wanted Commission to take up armes But upon a civill combustion they might Hee that will give me power to fight against his enemy will not give me authority to oppose himself but doubtlesse this is no rule in the Politiqâ—…es for a man first to receive one blow and then to stand upon his guard to keepe off the second better by a vigilant providence to prevent both or to expect an invasion and then be to â—…eke our Commission enemies are more easie kept out than thâ—…y can be repelled when they are once in I but he saith this would be of ill consequence to subjects if they might have power to take up armes as often as ambitious cholerick men for their own ends shall perswade thâ—…m they are in danger For by this meanes being easily deceived whilest they endeavour to avoyd false they would run them selves beadlong upon true perils Thâ—…se ambitious men which he himselfe knowes not and these pretended dangers because he himselfe feares not have a strong influence upon the Authors whole booke T is very much that the reason and senses of a whole Nation should be so easily captivated But t is his onely plea and therefore you must give him leave to make use of hiâ—… prâ—…tences or you bid him silence Well to tell our Author once for all as no man can or will justifie a pretended cause of feare so no man can condemne a reall And without he will say that there can be no cause of feare without he be privy to it this aspersion is by no meanes to be suffered for by this we shall never know how to beleeve that we are in danger for that true feares may be blasted with the ignominie of feined and pretended carry the visage of true The King sayes the Parliament denyes c. to whether now in this uncertainty 〈◊〉 the subjeâ—â— bounded to adhere Wee may consider whether the Houses doe not barely say and whether his Majesty doth not descend so farre as to give reasons for what â—…e doth and to shew the Kingdome the ground of his actions by perticular citation of the Lawes which justifie them What the two Houses of Parliament barely say then belike if his suffrage be of any account they prove or make good nothing Was ever age guilty of so great irreverence or of offering so greaâ—… an afforoâ—…t anâ—… in â—…ignity to this great Assembly Of whom as the law saith we ought not to imagine a dishonourable thing much lesse to speake it I am confident that all Historiâ—…s that ever were cannot give you one example of so high disdaine and presumption What the two Hoâ—…ses barely say He hath a great measure of confidence that dare say it for my part I dare not returne the contrary but I leave it to the whole woâ—…ld to judge whether that they do not exactly prove and maintaine their owne assertion and utterly disprove and destroy the contrary objections and conclusions I but saith the Author we ought to agree whether swerâ—…ing from law be to be judged by the actions or by the auâ—…hors that is if the King should â—…ave done what ever they did and the Houses what ever he did whether all would not thâ—…n have beâ—…n lâ—…gall because don by them Certainly t is no good way of iudging to conclude the legality or illegality of an action from the Author or Actor t is the applying of the rule to the action that denominates it eithergood or bad However we ought not totally to reject these circumstâ—…nces of place and persons for no doubt that in some cases may be lawfull for one that will not be lawfâ—…ll for another And it is more than probable that the Parliament may in many cases have a more extensive powâ—…r than the King However certaine I am that it is but charity in our Author to grant them his beleife that they will not approve or maintaine that in themselves which they condemne as illegall in his Majesty The King doth not desire to captivate any mans understanding to his authority but is willing to make all the world the judge of his actions And have the Parliament withheld any thing that might give satisfaction to the people Neither â—…s a blind ob diencâ—… a part of any mans duty to the Houses Hee who after so great lâ—…ght and evidence of the integrity and justice of the Parliaments proceedings shall say he obeyes he knowes not upon what grounds may justly be concludâ—…d to be Non compos mentis robbed of his senses Some things he saith are matter of fact here we may be guided by senseâ—… and judge as wee see With the Authors favour this to an ordinary capacity may be a dangerous way of determining for though wee must alwayes judge according to the outward sâ—…nse in matter of fact yet wee must have this caution that we gâ—…e no further as for instance If I see one enter and seisea Castle or fort of the Kings put the case Hull that he did enter that my sense directs mee to discerne but whether he keepe the possession for or against the King that is examinable upon other circumstances and is matter of law depending upon reason and judgement and this every ordinary capacity cannot judge of But saith he this every one may â—…udge of whether the King hath seised on any thing wherein the subject hath a property That 〈◊〉 thupon the â—…ower and priviledges of Parliament the best evidence to maintaine the title that we have to â—…ll that ever we enjoy Or whether that the Subject hath not seized on something wherein the King hath a property That we must yeeld affirmative to that the Subject hath not seized on the Kings property but it is to his use and behoofe for the securing of him and his people So that the King looseth nothing but both gaine protection and safety thereby Whether the King hath raised warre against the Parliament that is whether his guard was an Army A very strang and unusuall guard of 15000. or 20000. And whether Hull is now London Very manifect it is not but the forces that â—…ound no bâ—…tter successe approaching London may for ought I know make a speedy retreat to Yorke againe Wee had a Maxime and it was grounded upon nature and never till this Parliament withstood tâ—…at a community can have no private ends to mislead it and make it injurious to it selfe True in a staâ—…e where a collective bodâ—… 〈◊〉 and