Selected quad for the lemma: authority_n
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A35857
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A dialogue at Oxford between a tutor and a gentleman, formerly his pupil, concerning government
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1681
(1681)
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Wing D1290; ESTC R20617
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14,276
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23
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which that Tacit principle of having frequent Parliaments was litterally explain'd by subsequent Statutes made in the time of Edward the 3d and ascertain'd to the having Annual ones And now Sir when you have made all these suppositions in your mind I am confident you have very much of the model and platform of our Government Tu. If this he our Constitution I cannot wonder at your being so much in love with it for certainly it provides for all Interests with the greatest Justice and Equity in the world and to me it seems evident that though the convocating the Estates and bringing them into existence has such a formal dependance on the Kings Writ as you have declared yet existing and when convocated they work by an innate Authority and by the priviledges of their original Institution their Acts then being not Commissionated like those of other Courts but proceeding in conjunction with the Kings which makes me the better understand that usual clause in our Acts of Parliament which tells us that such and such a thing is enacted c. not only by and with the advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons in Parliament Assembled but also by the Authority of the same But you 'l say I ought not to comment upon a Text I have learnt so lately therefore pray proceed for I cannot doubt but you have yet more to say upon this Subject Pu. What would you have more does not this Scheme of our Government give you full satisfaction Tu. By no means Sir except it includes something that is not literally exprest for though our Ancestors have taken care that there shall be frequent meetings of the Estates yet if they have not provided for the continuance of their Sessions when met that so their coming together may possibly answer its end what does all the rest signifie and therefore pray tell me your opinion in that point Pu. Nay hold a blow there good Tutor I had rather you had ask't me all the hard questions in Euclid not so much for any difficulty in the solution as because it 's an ill time of the year to discourse of such matters therefore I think we had best stop here And yet I find I am a little like Sir Martin now my hand is in I can't forbear fumbling with the strings though I don't care to play out wherefore I will not promise you an Answer but when I have said what I think convenient if you please you may give your self one there are wise and learned men and who upon a good occasion may be spoke with that do conceive there is a Statute made in the time of Richard the Second See the Statute verbatim with the Clause Roll. and now in being though not in Print which provides that no Parliament shall be dismist till all the Petitions are answered which I think comes home to the point Bills in those days many times appearing in the form of Petitions as not long since we had an excellent Law made called the Petition of Right subsequent to this Statute and particularly in the Reigns of Henry the 4th Henry the 5th and Henry the 6th it was usual for Proclamations to be made in Westminster-Hall before the end of every Sessions that all those that had any matter to present to the Parliament should bring it in by such a day for otherwise the Parliament at that day would determine And all this being bare matter of fact there can be no other Question about it but whether it be so or no. But for discourse sake Let 's suppose this Statute and subsequent practise all out of doors and that there is no memorial of Record extant of any such matter and then it will be impossible in this or any other like case to make a true Judgment without having recourse to some fixed and standing Rule which in matters of Government where positive Laws are silent can be no other than the fundamental Architecture and original frame of the Constitution some particulars whereof relating to our present discourse I must be forced to call over again upon this occasion you must mind then that our wisae Ancestors in modelling our Government had not only an eye to the Power and Authority of the Monarch but also to the Liberties and Properties of the People things easily consisting in themselves and mutually aiding and assisting each other and foreseeing that the most exact prudence could not make particular provision for all occurrences that might happen and that if time that great Innovator as the Lord Bacon calls it would of course and knavery and folly by their influence by degrees make things worse and worse and if wisdom and counsel were not as constantly watchful to make them better and better the best founded Government in the world must in tract of time infallibly come to ruin they therefore laid it as the Basis of our Policy that there should be frequent meetings of the States to supply all defects and stop up all Crannies or violent Fractions as they should happen to the prejudice of the original Constitution In the next place consider what part the Monarch was to bear in these Conventions not to have a sole power but to go in conjunction with the Nobles and Commons all acting by the principles and authority of the first Institution and what that Learned Prince King Charles the 1st says of Royal Power in general may be well applied to it in this particular viz. the Law is the measure of the Kings Power and if it be the measure of it then is the Power limited by it and the fundamental Law saying There shall be Conventions of the Estates to encounter and provide against publick and destructive mischiefs whenever they happen By necessary consequence a time for them to meet and a convenient time of sitting to do something when they are met are included according to the known Rule in your Schools He that commands a thing to be done does with the same breath command all such circumstances as without which the thing commanded cannot take effect And indeed common reason speaks the same and because time of meeting and a convenient time of sitting are necessary to the very ends and beings of Parliaments therefore must the Execution or bringing them into Act be lodged somewhere and though with the best Decorum and convenience it fell to the share of the chief Magistrate to be intrusted with the honorary and formal part of Summoning and pronouncing the Dissolutions of Parliaments yet the Law which is his rule as well as ours has plainly enough determined how and when he shall do it In the last place the design and wisdom of the first Architects of our Government is very apparent in contriving a Monarchy in the Prince mixed with Aristocracy in the House of Peers and Democracy in the House of Commons whereby all the advantages were secured and inconveniences avoided which are ordinarily to be found in
in the People to the end of the Chapter But where the People are not bound by contract to any other Lawful Prince it s then in their choice whether they will come into a moral Condition of Subjection to the Conqueror or no If they will not they dye or remain a Free People as to any moral Obligation But if on the one side the People be unwilling any longer to suffer the miseries they are under or have no Ability to make resistance and the Conqueror on the other side finds his forceable Dominion over them insecure and uneasie I say if upon such Considerations as these they mutually agree upon a Contract and Composition of Rule and Subjection upon such and such terms the Conqueror now has lost that name and his Government thenceforward must be such as the fundamental Contract makes it to be and the Rightful Dominion in the Prince and Duty of Subjection in the People will be so stated and limited as was concluded upon in the Original Agreement And I am persuaded it will appear an uncontrollable Truth in Policy that the Consent of a People either by themselves or their Ancestors is the only means without special Revelation whereby Magistracy is conferred on any Person or Family neither can God's Ordinance be conveyed and People engaged in Conscience any other way Tu. I confess I now begin to think that the Communities of Mankind have more to do in these matters than I was aware of and it 's more than probable that all Government whatever is very much for their sakes Pu. To me it seems plain That the Common Good of Humane Societies is the First and Last End of all Government for nulla potestas datur ad malum so in effect saies St. Paul in the 13th to the Romans speaking of Rulers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is the Minister of God to thee for good And Salus Populi c. has often been frownd upon but never answered And whoever shall Affirm that the Absolute Monarchies in Asia the many limited ones in Europe together with multitudes of Aristocracies and Common-wealths now extant in the world were constituted by God Almighty purely out of a partial Regard to those Persons and Families inconsiderable in the number to the Rest of Mankind to whom the Administration of those Powers is committed I believe he will find Few of his mind and not many that can debase themselves to so mean a Flattery as to own so sensless a position Tu. You have satisfied me that only Government in general is of Divine Right and that the particular Forms and Limitations of it are from humane Compact pray now inform me how you suppose our Government here in England first began and particularly what you think to be the Form and Essence of it whereby it differs from that of other Nations Pu. Now you put it hard upon me Tutor and I dare not undertake to give you full Satisfaction in so thoughtful a matter but you shall have more than my Guess And how I cannot choose but own the Goodness of Almighty God in the Architecture of our Government whereof I do declare my self so great an admiror that whatever more than humane Wisdom had the contrivance of it whether done at once or by degrees found out and perfected I conceive it unparallel'd for exactness of true Policy in the whole world Such care for the Authority of the Monarch such provision for the Liberty and Property of the People and that one may be justly allaid the other upheld and yet consist without Impeachment of each other that I wonder how our fore-fathers in those esteemed rude and unpolisht times could ever attain to such an accurate Composure First then Suppose a People compelled to it by the necessity of Conquest or agreeing to it by free consent Nobles and Commons setting over themselves by publick compact one chief Magistrate and resigning up themselves to him and his Heirs to be governed by such and such fundamental Laws whereby the chief Magistrates power is radically limited to one legal course of exercise Secondly Because in all Governments after-causes will arise not within the prospect of humane fore-sight requiring additional Laws pro re natâ and also because the original frame it self may in some cases stand in need of an Authentick Interpretation or would of course and by degrees moulder away and decay if not carefully repaired and look't after suppose them therefore covenanting with their Prince that if there be occasion in order to any of the aforesaid purposes there should be conventions of all degrees of men amongst them to provide suitable remedies and expedients for all the several exigencies and diseases of the State and if at any time there should be need of new Laws that the Prince himself should not have the sole power of making them but they reserve at first or afterwards it 's granted them which is all one an hand of concurrence therein and that they will be bound by no Laws but what they joyn with him in the making of Thirdly Because though the Nobles may personally convene yet the Commons being so many cannot all of them come together it 's therefore agreed that each County and Corporation shall have power to depute some particular persons to be instead of the whole that so the Nobles being present in person the Commons by their Deputies there may be representatively the whole body of the Kingdom having Commission by the original constitution to make new Laws or to guard and repair the old ones Fourthly Because the causes of their meeting would not be constant and perpetual they therefore did not form these Estates to be constantly existent but occasionally yet intentionally and virtually provided for their meeting whenever there should be occasion Fifthly Because a Monarchy was intended therefore as great power as was consistent with other parts of the Government was invested in the Prince in order to his better discharging the executive part of the Law and conculding that he who was to govern by Law and for the furtherance of whose Government for the good of the people the new Laws were to be made would thereby be engaged to see the convention of these Estates take place as of right it ought to do whenever there is occasion they therefore aptly plac't the formal part of nominating the time of Convention in the executive Power to be made use of as the reason of its being lodged there should require Sixthly It being found by experience in process of time that Princes not caring to have the male-administration of their Ministers look't into or to have any power in act but their own did therefore take advantage of this their nomination of time when the Estates should meet and made use of it seldomer than need required an inconvenience which had it not been provided for would have beaten down the Government at once and utterly defac't the whole frame of the Constitution to prevent