to have in him a supreame power such as the Apostle Ro. 13. in his sence understands necessary for the Kingdome of England But in our sence of plenary possession which was the case of the Apostles time we can easily see first how our present power is the higher the whole Kingdome now receiving all law protection and subordinate Magistracy from them and how they may be in lawfull things obeyed according to the same Apostle and to the duty of our Creation and being in this world The case of conscience p. 3. acknowledgeth that a Government may be altered but it must be done still by the higher powers whom we ought equally to obey in submitting to an altered as to a continued for me But it is a sinne if a party forcibly lay the higher powers low and exact obedience as to the legall authority I thought that he who in his sence understood the Covenant in terminis Eternall would not have allowed a change of Government here no more then he might allow the Scots though upon never so much reason to themselves to change their Doctrine or discipline because we swore during all our lives to preserve that which was established among them at the time of our swearing But I now see we may well distinguish betwixt the Covenant it selfe and some Covenanters the Covenant being as open for one change as for the other Secondly If a Government though never so reasonably reformed or altered be never in any lawfull things to be obeyed termes which he did ill to leave out of his Argument unlesse by the concurrence of all the higher powers then farewell all the old consequences of Solis populi suprema lex and the Presbyterians formâ— Armes are unjustifiable How corrupt and Tyrannicall are most of the Governments of the world and yet how many of those supreame powers hath he observed to reforme themselves or diminish any thing in themselves to alter for the better although the taking away of something in a Government may be as necessary as continuing any old or new thing in it Certainly these Authors have read but few of Ionases who voluntarily renounce themselves to settle a Tempest Thirdly Our Alteration was made by the present supreame power of the people and the reason wherefore both Houses laid the exercise of Regall power aside for some yeares made the Commons as they have agrued it lay it aside for altogether viz. Salus populi suprema lex The laying of it aside for some yeares is argument enough to us of the people that it might be laid aside for more yeares and that one King might be laid aside as well as another For to us it seemes effectually all one Non esse non operari for a thing not to be at all and in this world to doe nothing at all If they sinned who did this is that any thing to any but themselves It is an Axiome of good Law Noxa sequitur caput Thus whilst his Argument should have been against our lawfull obedience it is against their exacting it as to the legall authority which yet is grosly false for they exact it not as to the old legall authority but as to the present supreame power of the people Non nomine Regis sed nominepopuli And yet in one good sence it may be still called the same legall Authority because we have still under it the same lawes for our properties as before and continued in life by them as our lives themselves are Case of Cons. p. 3. it is objected that this principle of obeying those onely who are in plenary possession of all supreame power is fit onely to destroy States for then should none Governe any longer then their swords and strengths could beare them up I conceive according to what is already proved that nothing can befound either more consonant to Christian charity or to the preservation of States then this our principle of obedience besides he knowes no Kingdome in the world where people doe not obey upon this same plenary possession Allegiance alwayes relating to protection And if according to his consequence we should suspend all obedience till we have infallibly found out that Perâ—on who derives a knowne and an undubitable right from him who was the first in compact because according to these Authors intermediate intrusions are violations of rights and may not be obeyed even in things lawfull then I pray you of what can we resolve lesse then certainly to extirpate one another which will come to passe ere we finde what we search for in such a blind scuffle and for feare of doing a lawfull thing under the inspection of one who is suppos'd to have done another thing unlawfully must we resolve of doing all unlawfull things by warre our selves and desert unnecessarily the cares of Wife and Children of Church and Neighbour For non-obedience in a State is but a Chimaera neutrality a State without relation there is no subsistence for it in any State and unlesse you will allow me to concurre with others and under others in lawfull things I must leave the world my subsistence being onely in a conjunction with others here in this jurisdiction The two Demurrers p. 3. p. 7. Except against this our present obedience beeause the present powers is yet new neither is there a totall cessation of all hopes of recovery Philosophers hold that the Definition of a man belongs to an infant as well as to one of many yeares Because after the Organization of the parts he is informed with the same principle of life and reason as a growne man is and having the same forme is the same thing Even so the present power hath possest all the parts of this Kingdome gives them life in the administration of publique justice and protection which are the soule of a State and the power which preceded this what did it infuse more vitall then this And now that that is taken away if this other did not presently enter into its place the Common-wealth were dead and each man were left in his naturals to subsist of himselfe and to cast how hee could in such a state of warre defend himselfe from all the rest of the world every man in this State having an equall right to every thing Wherefore let every man especially they who would informe consciences take heed of affecting popular revenge vvhich must also reach themselves at last for vvhen they have once frighted people from lawfull actions vvhat can they thâ—n commit but the un'avvfull Into what an unhappy transport are we fallen that such a principle should be derived from our Church the very Papists being ever ready to obey in things lawfull though the State seemed to them unlawfull These will judge better of the State now then of the Church the one inviting and incouraging us to lawfull things the other deterring us from them But to return to the Argument I
supreame Command we of the People may not obey any but the Husband or the King why then did the Presbyterian party for so many years oppose and not totally submit to their now supposed Husband Why did they Commissionate so many thousand Men who by accidents of Warre had the power though not the chance to kill him Nay in the Parliaments case it was alwaies conjoyntly argued by them that it was he the Husband that would have killed them the supposed Wife for which reason the Kirke of Scotland long ago sent him a bill of Divorce unlesse he satisfied for the blood of three Kingdoms Which of the two parties it was that at last killed him belongs not much to the satisfaction of us the people though here questioned because those parties as tot hat act differ'd no more if he will further argue it then dim nâ—tio and obtruncatio capitis doe for they who after a long Warre and by long imprisonment dispoyl'd him of that regall power here so much argued for did according to the terme of the civill Law diminuere caput Regis and they who in consequence of his civill Death tooke away his naturall life did obtrune are Caput Regis If he had been kill'd in an action of Warre before should the Souldier or he who gave the Souldier commission have answered for his life As for the submission of a Wife to a stranger as to her Husband which is indeed a sin I earnestly pray the Author seriously to consider whether he can excuse us and all our forefathers from sin ever since this Kingdome long agoe fell under the power of an usurping king if this his way of arguing be true As for the second Demurrer I consider he hath given account to another very worthy Pen which hath left little for my gleaning in such a field however I shall see what hath escaped his hand that the world may witnesse at last that truth hath lovers as well as errour and passion have Cham ions This Author and the grand case of Conscience begin with St. Paul Ro. 13. That wee must submit to higher powers not that wee may lawfully submit and that not for wrath onely but for Conscience sake which is of things necessary not of things lawfull Wherefore say they it is ill said that we may lawfully submit in lawfull things obedience as a matter of Conscience being a thing necessary I grant it either in lawfull or necessary things when obedience is required from those who actually have the whole Sepremacy of power in themselves If I hold this lawfull and he hold it necessary we are not contrary He onely makes what I allow more allowable But the reason wherefore the Apostle requires obedience to such Not onely for wrath which is onely in regard of the power which they who are supreà me have to destroy us but for Conscience sake is least by our resisting them we unnecessarily disturbe and draw calamity on others and likewise in regard of their Authority from God Tyrants even in title not arriving to the great Dominions of the Earth without Gods secret order God having clearly stated the Government of the world for ever in himselfe as his cheife Prerogative he not being known or feared any way so much as by Dominio n which made St. Augus in C. Dei rightly say Potestates omnes sunt a Deo non omnes voluntates so that the reason wherefore God permits sometimes such Princes to attaine to these powers is the same wherefore he permits Devils in his Government of the world a Nimrod or a Pharaoh a Caesar or a Herod an Antichrist or a Turke who as bad and as usurping as they are and seeme to us in exercising so severe though so secret a part of Gods Justice yet fulfill severall prophecies which shewes they come not to what they are meerely by humane contrivance by chance or accident The grand case of Conscience P. 3. distinguisheth betwixt Authority or Power and Rulers deputed to the exercise of that Authority The first is by Gods positive Ordinance the other buâ— by his permission Here he grants enough as to our case which is of obedience for if he can assure me that it is consonant to Gods permissive will that such persons be my Magistrates I am well satisfied then that Gods will is I must be their Subject Gods free admission of one being the necessary exclusion of all the rest so that subjection is not a thing now of my choice but of my necessity But the Demurrer P. 3 would know what difference there is in popular obedience to lawfull powers and unlawfull powers if obedience be necessary to both I answer If the powers here supposed by him agree equally in their supremacy and absolutenesse and differ onely as one is got lawfully the other unlawfully then the difference of our obedience to either is onely in the difference of things commanded as they are either lawfull or unlawfull neither can the Author now arguing so much for a lawfull power conscienciously tell us that the lawfulnesse of the civill power commanding can make our obedience necessary to an unlawfull thing commanded but rather that it makes that power then become to us in some manner unlawfull and worse to us of the People then if we were under the absolute command of an unlawfull power which exacts nothing but lawfull things The knot of this point lies here Whither a civill circumstance such as is the Magistrate either lawfull or unlawfull can vitiate an Act of morall duty I believe his distinction P. 2 of a Government constituted or constituting serves nothing for the discovery of a supreame lawfull power in it selfe For I hold that whatever was once a sin may alwaies be called a sin though with rooting or without rooting Not but that God and we may make good use of other mens bad actions if they be such for which reason poore beggers may in their extremities receive necessary Almes from those who came to their estates by wrong and oppression the receipt whereof they do not justify the Title of such Estates much lesse doe wee justifie the unlawfull Title of a supreame Magistrate from whose care we receive necessary protection I say much lesse because cases of Estates are juris privati and have Courts to judge of them but the other is so much juris publici that there is no mortall Court to judge of it for which reason how will these Authors what Governours soever they desire evidently prove that they originally had lawfull Titles or that they at first did not forcibly take the people to themselves but that the people voluntarily resigned themselves to them which was not in Nimrods Case From whence this may be inferd to the satisfaction of the grand case of Conscience p. 3. That if he had that desired Governour yet according to himselfe he would not owne him long because he were not sure
of Cons. answers obliquely still That notwithstaning such authority can never illegally get the legall pâ—wer nor can it exclude others from their authority In which answer he plainely contradicts himself p. 7. For Caesars power was according to himselfe legall and yet got by a Circumstance very illegall the Senate being empty and intimidated and not so much in their own as in his power This argument is so farre from concerning us that it is directed onely against those Princes who ab origin drive from illegall acquisitions Of which he will doe well to speake largelyer when he can assure my conscience by infallible evidence of right that I may safely sweare or destroy men upon it that there was ever such a man in England as William the Conquerour or any other ancient King from whom Titles are said to be derived either legally or illegally This is a proposition which I beleeve he in the midst of his peremptorines was not aware off no more then I now doubt in whose hands the present possession of the Kingdom is for which reason they assert their Authority and it is his part to shew how infallibly it appeares to be anothers by indubitable right ab origine But because it is argued that in the disquisition of a right Title none are so blind as the people who among other burthens have the imposition of other mens judgements cast upon them therefore an usurped Title to them is true enough to exact obedience Hence the grand case of Cons. answers p. 10. That then by the rule of contraries it followes That when titles are visibly unlawfull people are disengaged from obedience to them To this I reply that this answer is nothing but a meere repetition of the question and hath no medium of proofe annexed to it the very question being this conclusion viz. Whether obedience be lawfull to Titles visibly unlawfull Secondly It hath been shown that non-obedience and subsistence in a state are incompatible every man in a state stands in a Relation and must either command or obey and owes something to him by whose care heâ— sleepes quietly in his Bed Thirdly If by disengagement from obeying a lawfull Title he meanes that we may choose whither we will obey or no then though disengag'd wee maâ— obey These answers helpe us halfe way over the next dificulty We may not any way affirme the right of the Vsurper or deny interpretatively the just title of the Heire without the guilt of treachery lying and falsenesse if not of vow-breaking In suffering a Theife to take my purse I cannot helpe it If I must part with that or my life I chuse to loose my Purse not for feare least I breake the fifth or eight Commandement but least I breake the sixt in being guilty of selfe murther yet rather then say he hath authority to take it I must loose my life In point of protection among theeves I may desire some to preserve mee from others yet may I not say their robbery is just or joyne or ply with them in robbing others To say no more of the certaine evidence and of the indubitablenesse of ancient originall Titles which is here the maine of the Argument I answer that simple obedience to an establisht Vsurper doth not alwaies interpretatively affirme his right or deny anothers but affirmes rather the irresistibility of the possessors present power God is the supream magistrate of al the world and by reason of his Omnipotent presence every where we cannot exclude him from the cognizance of or right to any of our Actions but our earthly Magistrates may fall into such circumstances that they may have neither personall or virtuall presence with us and therefore may be said to be civilly dead according to the former Axiome Idem est non esse non operari to doe nothing and be nothing is to us the same thing motion being the chiefe evidence of life In his case of the Thiefe I desire any man to consider whether as he hath put it he hath not clearely broken one Commandement besides those which he hath named viz. the third because it is an untruth to say the Parliament requires not obedience from any of us unlesse we all acknowledge the lawfulnesse of their authority which is the second false supposition here When Officers gather Taxes for the State they have no commission to demand our Declarations of the States authority first but onely to receive the money Taxed which this Author knowes is a truth knowne to every one As for the peoples conjoyning and complying with the State to Robbe another by obeying to the prejudice of another he must meane it in a Robbery either of power or of Riches For power the people aime not at it their condition alwaies is lâ—rge who ever sits at top And for getting by the warre I hope the Presbyterian party which had the authorizing of Taxes as well as others knowes as well as the people themselves that this is a grosse prevarication Last of all there is difference betwixt willing compliance and necessary subjectiion which is the peoples case He objects againe p. 6. If obedience be necessary then a title once wrong'd can never be lawfully righted it will be sinne to helpe the weaker party or to rescue our selves from perpetuall slavery Here he is started suddainly into two other questions First how a Title may be recovered and secondly How we of the people may rescue our selves from the slavery of any Titles These two relate to the future which is of Gods secret disposing our question is of the present only But I pray you what doe people get when warres for recoveries of dubious rights are long and calamitous What are the people of France or the people of Spaine better for the long and hereditary anger of their two Kings Or what was the world better for Alexanders Conquering it The Houses which are burnt and the millions of bodies left dead in the field are the peoples and Princes scorning to derive from them still trample them to dung We talke of some Titles wronged as if their rights were so certaine and so necessary to live under as God almighties is who yet disposes of the changes which are made here among his chiefe Officers and not we Who is it then that can right wronged Titles but he alone who makes all Titles right To that case where it is argued that if the Masters mate had throwne him over-board and by power would suffer no other to guide the Ship but himselfe if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the Ship the Ship must needs perish and themselves with it It is answered by the Grand Case of Cons. p. 9 That the case should not have been of a Mate as a partner which is false but of a party of the Seamen who coming to shore should bring the other obeying party to punishment especially
which shall be proved here more evidently towards the conclusion But because I intend truth here in the simplicity of my Heart and no way to swell this Argument either with passion in my selfe or with scandall to any man else therfore I shall sincerely unfold what hath long been a mistery to my selfe and for confirmation of what I have asserted here so positively I shall give the reader the expresse word of our great English Covenant-champion and of Master Hinderson especially the Scotch Champion betwixt whose fingers the Covenant it selfe was moulded Oâ—â—t â—â—ind cafe of Oonscience p. 14 saith But they who are now for the right of the Son and continuance of the Government are as much against the vices in and about him as about the Father And should he doe as his Father hath done they who are now for the performance of this Oath and Covenant would as truly joyne against him as against the Father Who can call this Regall Language which yet will be lookt on as the English Presbyterian-alarum though but by one man Hee had done well in speaking of the performance of Covenant by us all if he had offered a Catalogue of all that which would fulfill the Covenant in all its termes without any further interpretation But that which is supposed eternall for time is likewise infinite as to the matter which it may relate to by the application of humane Logick Mr. Hinderson in his Newcastle conference with the King p. 24.25 saith That the reforming power is in Kings and Princes Quibus deficientibus it comes to the inferiour Magistrates Quibus deficientibus it descends to the grâ—sse of the people but yet supposing still as he saith that they be all of them rightly inform'd For which reason though he conceal'd it from the King yet he meant that the reformation of any of those three powers according to the Covenant must be judged reformed afterwards by some other body of men here not named For I conceive that he who is ultimatly to judge of the Reformation and of its publique obligation judgeth likewise of the reformers themselves though never so high or never so low and to this strange opinion he would faine intitle two English Episcopall Champions Bilson and Iewell Here I must confesse I was at a stand concerning the nature and interest of the Covenant and was sorry to see that I was no plainlyer told whether it would carry me laden with so great a curse nor where it would set me downe At last I found in the same Author 32.33 Speaking of the subordination of powers under which people were finally to obey That he would not willingly tell his Majesty whether the Church was subordinate to the civill power either to King or to Parliament or to both For quoth he I utterly desolâ—ima such a headship as the Kings of England have claimed or such a supremacy as the Houses of Parliament crave with appeales from Ecclesiastiall Iudicature to themselves No man may thinke but Mr. Henderson meant this for the jurisdiction of England as well as of Scotland for hee spake of Houses of Parliament which were plurall in England onely and though it may seeme strange at the first view to heare one say that the Scotch Nation state the supremacy of England in their Country or that they endeavour a direct change of Government here which they have indirectly attempted for a long while let every man judge not by our subtilties but by the Kirkes Declaration 27 July 1649 p. 11.12 Their words are That their King after his Oath of Coronation in Scotland shall assure them under his hand and seale to injoyne the solmne League and Covenant establish and practise the Prerbyteriall Government Directory Confession and Catechisme as they are approved by the severall Assemblies of their Kirke and Parliament in ALL HIS DOMINIONS and that he shall never endeavour any change thereof No man will say but States like judges ought to act ex bono aequo conjunctively So that though these things which here they would impose upon us perpetually were never so good yet they being unequitably deriv'd upon us from their supreame judicatory in whose possession we are not so fully now as they were last yeare in ours we ought to abominate their designe as much as they might the like obtrusion of their Presbitery from hence without power there to rectifie it ever after For these Presbiterians with us grant That good and lawfull things may not be practiz'd under a power unlawfull as they say the Scots would be here However here I at last found who was my supream right Magistrate in the Kirkâ— sence but then I conceiv'd I was in a great snare because I saw the jus publicum of a Kingdome totally though secretly changed I saw all things of direct religion and whatsoever related collaterally to its security lodged there and by the Kirke prejudged from the judgement of all other authorities in Scotland especially But because religion and its security draws in all humane concernments and that two supreame collaterall powers cannot stand in one and the same place in the same time for the same person but for contrary actions therefore I knew not whither of the two supreame powers the Ecclesiasticall or the Civill I should in this case throw away for they could not in this contest by the judgement of any be both obeyed together and I stood in a miserable case betwixt a Jaylour and a Devill the Kirke giving me to the Devill if I obeyed the Civill power and the Civill power giving me to the Jaylour if I obey'd the Kirke which was to speake the truth the State of the whole Kingdome of Scotland last yeare betwixt the the Kirkes excommunication and the Parliaments Order which authoriz'd Duke Hamiltons expedition in Vindication of the Covenant here In which difference we have no reason but to like the effect however we may dislike such a cause here Wherefore to answer this â—scruple I positively say That in whatsoever is of Pact betwixt man and man or of policy in the Covenant I ought solely to follow the civill Magistrate and the Church here ought to follow the Magistrate likewise as a case relating to the disquits to the warres and to the recovering the peace of earthly Kingdomes If otherwise then the civil jurisdiction ought clearely to be managed by the Ecclesiastique which is stated so no where that I know of but in Romagna and Dutchy of Ferrara and the other places belonging to the Pope This I speak not as desirous to detract any thing from the sacred function of the Ministery as it containes it selfe in its own function no man being able rationally to object any thing wherefore some might not ex Officio be deputed to excite others to vertue and sanctity of life But yet who can say they are not subject to the infirmities of ambition avarice and severe passions as well as other men or
have not our Antagonists whether they would or no observ'd them in these cases of worldly rights and interests to have as oppositly yet as peremtorily differ'd one from another as people of any family ever did The Devill not being able to get the Text on his side by his wiles oft got the commentary so that we are to be excus'd if we hold many things in Church-men to be but as an Apohrypha at best which yet for esteem sake is alloted a place before anything else next after the genuine Text Having thus openly stated the scruples of my own and of many more consciences and to take off maskes not from the faces but from the consciences of these three and the multitude of other Scotch Casnists who have talkt so speciously for our Covenant Vindication of an Heirs just Title our submitting to it and joyning with others immediately least right suffer wrong one day I cannot I say but aske the same men plainly What difference in effect they findâ— betwixt the Titles and right of the Prince of Wales and of the nâ—w King of Scotland notwithstanding all their obligation of Covenant to submit to him as such It is not enough by Covenant to preserve an aery Title onely to a Prince and by the same Covenant to suspend all the rest of his solid power and right certainâ—ly his Royall commands notwithstanding all this talke are no more obey'd in Scotland now then the Episcopall commands of our Countryman the Bishop of Câ—alcedon are now obey'd in Turkey But what hinders him from exercising any Kingly right in Scotland as yet The Covenant which is not yet satisfied How is it then that some of our Presbyterians say that the same Covenant indispensably opens the doore to him here If the â—ing aske the Scots why they put the Law of the Covenant so to his obedience 〈◊〉 the first thing which determines all his other rights afterwards They can onely say that they swore it in his Fathers raigne and it is now eternall Though I censure nothing here yet I cannot but conclude-hence That they of themselves as well as our Parliament have made a Law above all other Lawes and more then a reformable Magna Charta For the Government of the Kingdome which may be exercised according to it without Kings and against Kings The first thing which was ever offer'd to him from the Kingdome of Scotland was an authority by far transcending his own viz. that of excommunication For as their late proceedings with him at the Haguâ— shew hee was by that subtilty tryed whether he would refuse first to acknowledge Iames Graham alias Montrosse or that great power of the Churches by which he might be awed to greater things afterwards To backe this likewise the Commissioners of the Synode said p. 22 that they negotiated with him in a capacity altogether distinct from the Commissioners of Parliament as being persons commissioned by the Kirke which is commisioned with a Iusdivinum Our Bishops certainly never undertook such a jurisdiction supremacy and unlesse these had witnessed so much of themselves to all the world no one would believe that in such a poore Country and so much forme of Religion there could be such high passions of ambition Besides if it be a true rule That he who is the maker ought to be the interpreter of a Law then let all the world observe one thing That the Kirk having made the Covenant as the principle of all supream rights both of State and Religion then they alone ought to give the interpretation of it from time to time as they de facto did not onely last yeare contrary to the interpretation of their owne Parliament but also for many yeares together have peremptorily prest it upon ours So that it makes a fundamentall change of Government there though differently from what our Parliament hath made here the jus publicum both of Religion and security of State with them lying in the Covenant and that lying in the brests of Churchmen chosen by one another and our's lying in the power of Laymen chosen by the People and judging by the Common Lawes of equity and necessity and of the word of God It were in vaine to say the Kirke onely recommends their interpretation to the State For last yeare they did it with a Penalty upon the Parliament their whole Army and the body of the people which obey'd them if it be a penalty to bee given to the Devill and to bee put into a State of eternall death Wherefore they there are or else none are anywhere the true judges of right who make themselves judges of wrong and of punishment To conclude how practicable soever the Covenant was at first or how erroneously soever we may now conceive it to be extinct or to be a principle fitted to justify a change of Kingly Government which was actually made first of all by it and their Presbytery in Scotland yet it being originally but a Politicall or condition all Oath relating to our former Unions when Warre wâ— and to our cooperation under our respective Magistrates only not in a way contrary to the fifth Commandment and that all the Magistracy which we enjoy and by whom we are now fully possest if they have not laid it aside yet call us not out to act the remaining part of it and that it interprets not it selfe so that each private man is not made by it his owne Magistrate and that there is no penal Article in it obliging us private men to pursue a publique Warre upon the Magistrates or any other mens bare neglect or misinterpreting it to themselves who therefore can contrary to all this peremptorily warrant us now yea necessitate us to begin or assist to the desolation of warre and bloodshed upon it especially seeing it is made very dubious at least whither we be now tyed to it at all or no Further more how good so ever it was at first yea though that other Nation had not given it it 's mortall wound when they attempted to give us ours both in England and in Ireland which was the cause of this effect of change of Government here yet if when it was in force it should any other way have received a bad tincture of passion or ambitious policy among our selves why might it not by our Magistrates order have been as well carried out of our Churches as the brazen Serpent was out of the Temple after it was unhappily perverted to its wrong end If otherwise and that it must at all hazards be indirectly made a snare to peaceable consciences even after it is extinct as hath been proved I shall desire any pious spirit to judge whither it doth not in such a case deserve much of Campanellas censure which he gave upon the Spanyards India Treasury that it was gotten in blood sailes home in a sea of blood and never rests till it be all laid out in
have already shewed that new or old powers never can signifie good or bad powers The uncertaine hopes of recovering in the future proves that the thing is certainly lost for the present and it is our obedience at this time which this Qâ—estion relates to However the King of Portugals acquisition or Usurpation was presently acknowledged by our King and others although the King of Spaine then had and still hath great hopes of recovering it he being alwaies Hannibal ad portas and never removing out of his own Dominion into another Forreigne Magistracy The first Demurrer p. 7. concâ—ives our present condition like that of Israel betwixt David and Absalom at which time quoth he the people had grievously sinned had they rendrd obedience to Absaloms commands and substitutes so long as David was living This is very true but farre from the purpose For Absalom was not a fundamentall legislative party in the state of Israel as the House of Commons lately was and so could not pretend such a right of Warre Secondly David had his Army hard by in the same Kingdome with Absalom We have none here but the Parliaments all the Kings forces and adherents being dissipated Thirdly the Israelites scruples are supposed during the time of Warre in Israel our after the War is ended But if he mean by this fallacious paralell that the Israelites ought not to have opposed David at all in the way of Warre then how will he salue the scruples of his own breast who promoted the course of War as well as others against the King The Author of the grand case of Conscience is very ingenuous in his contest with his adversary to forme a Syllogisme with foure terms and their be able to finde them out and to answer the fallacy so that whilst he wrastles thus stoutly with himself he can have but a faire fall in his own shaddow to prevent which I shall take the pains to part them both His Syllogisme as he imputes it to his Adversary is p. 4.5 If the people of the Roman Empire did submit to the power of Claudius and Nero who by force were put upon them then the people of England may lawfully submit to a change of Government though beleeved unlawfull But they did submit Ergo those of England may Here he excepts against the equality of inference made betwixt those whose persons were without due Title forc't upon people but still in the same Government and those persons who without right of Title force themselves upon us now in another Government But what if the Syllogisme be indeed and vertually onely this If the people of the Roman Empire were required by the Apostle to continue obedience to Claudius and Nero then the people of England may lawfully continue obedience to their present Governours But those might Ergo these may His distinction of persons intruding wrongfully into the same Government and into a different Government according to his former position satisfies not conscience in either because both are supposed unlawfull and differ only secundum mâ—jus minus quae non varâ—ant speciem so that if obedience were not a sin in one it is not a sin in the other If he say obedience to intruders into the same Government is not a sin then he hath dispatcht all controversie concerning the exclusion of the Kings Line and that the Parliamens fault as to him was that they rather changed the Government then the Governours which he acknowledgeth more plainly P. 5. where speaking concerning the persons comming to power he saith it is not materiall who puts them in nor what men are put into powers ordained by God But to come nearer to the point he cannot say that of the usurping Caesars which may be said of the Parliament For these are the representers of the people of England and were lawfully a third part of the supreame power before the change of Government Caesar had no part of supreame right but what he rather usurped then acquired by any dicision of right or fundamentall legislative controversie betwixt the Senate and him To say as the Demurrer p. 4. That Caesar had gotten the consent of the Senate and added compact to his conquest is absurd unlesse he meanes he had gotten the Senate so into his power that he had them in a condition of Quarter in which case as the Law saith principum rogamina sunt mandata without doubt if the peoples submission to Caesar were lawfull upon his changing a Republique into a monarchy after the Senate had for bad the approach of his Army and that he had expelled many members from the Senate why may not a lawfuller obedience be given to those of a Senate it self who have changed Monarchy into a Republique These two changes are so farre alike that they frustrate this Authors distinction of persons intruding unlawfully into the same and into a different Government He followes his objection still p. 5. arguing that though people did de facto obey such false possessors and Vsurpers yet that proves not the lawfulnesse of our obedience nam a facto ad jus non valet consequentia their submission should have been proued legall If he hath a quarrell to us for our peaceablenesse yet why should he quarrell with St. Paul He bad the Romans submit in the same kinde and unlesse we had Prophets on purpose to tell Governours as well as us of the People who must alwaies succeed according to the minde of God then the state of the world the nature of politick justicâ— of society and Religion is such that we may ought to submit in obedience to those who plenarily possesse protect and command us lawfull things Surely he did not consider his Axiome well For a facto ad jus valet consequentia from fact wee inferre many civill rights as custome and prescription c. Neither is it necessary to prove their submission legall is it be prov'd absolutely necessary and equitable And yet we conceive another case besides that before mentioned wherein this submission to a new power may be call'd legall For the end of all law and Government is to preserve our persons and estates and they who are in supremacy of power have power to preserve or destroy both if they please and therefore have as great a power over our lawes which are lesse then our lives So soone as one supreame power is expelled by another law life and estate fall all into the hands of the succeeding power and what it doth not actually take away stands in effect as deriving from it and if that supreame power make a sanction for our obedience to it as alwaies is immediately done then we may say our submission is legall or else the supreame power cannot make a law To that argument where we assert that the Authority which excluds all other Authorities must be obey'd or else all authority falls to the ground The grand case