amongst the Cretians He was the first Law-giver amongst them whose Laws they retained until after-ages as is said already As amongst the Egyptians and Grecians we find Monarchy in the dayes of the Heroes in like manner we find it to have been regulated also in other Kingdoms The Ethiopian Kings were so much restricted to Law that it can hardly be determined whether they or the Egyptian Kings were most subjected thereto As Diodore telleth us of the subjection of the one to Law so doth he story of the subjection of the other thereto In expresse termes he faith That the Ethiopian King according to statute and ordination leadeth his life according to the Laws doing every thing according to the Country-fashion neither rewarding nor punishing any but according to the Law of his Ancestors And which is more to be wondered at the Priests have such power over the King that at their command and pleasure he suffereth death And for this they alledge it to have been an old custom amongst all their Kings from the beginning to undergo death at the desire of the Priests Rer. ant lib. 4. cap. 1. I shall not stand here to dispute whether or not Monarchy amongst the Indians in the dayes of the Heroes was regulated and subjected to Law Albeit there be some probability for the non-absoluteness thereof yet we think it good to leap it over because the matter is not clear enough And we shall begin with the Indian Kingdom to shew that in after-times in it Kings were of a non-arbitrary and regulated power It is reported that the Indians established those Laws which they received from their ancient Philosophers the Gymnosophists Who taught that all were free and none were servants This they established by Law And so the Indians like the Lacodemonians had their Ephori and overseers chosen-out from amongst the common people and beside them there were some few chosen who in nobility and prudence exceeded all the rest who were interested in governing and ordering all the great affairs both of King and Kingdom Diod. rer an t lib. 3. cap. 10. In like manner the Egyptians as in the heroick times so in after-times they most precisely subjected their Kings to Law Diod. ant lib. 2. cap. 3. For as in old both the King and the Kingdom were governed and regulated by Pretors so afterward out of their chiefest Cities Heliopolis Memphis and Thebes the best men were chosen to sit in Judgment and to over-rule all not inferiour to the Athenian Areopagites nor to the Lacedemonian Senatours Amongst the Grecians there were severall Kingdoms wherein the Regall power was hemmed-in by the hedges of Law in after-times after the dayes of the Heroes Which maketh Aristotle say that in after-times the power of Kings was weakned and subjected to the People partly by the peopl's detracting from their power and partly by the King 's own voluntary dimission Polit. 3. cap. 10. We have examples of these not only amongst the Grecians but also among other nations The Athenians diminished the power of their Kings after the Codrids had become lecherous soft and effeminate At that time they changed their Kings into Princes whom they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Heracl de Pol. Ath. But it seemeth very probable that then they rather changed the name then the power of their Kings for long before the race of Codrus was extirpated Theseus had restored liberty to the Athenians and as is said already had erected a Commonwealth amongst them Which appeareth to have lasted during both the time of the Kings and likewise of the Princes And consequently seeing there was a Common-wealth in both their times there could be no difference in their power But that we may give an exact and punctuall answer to this pre-occupation you shall take notice of the different condition of the Athenian Commonwealth and of the changes thereof First before Theseus reign we do not imagine otherwise but that the Athenians were governed not onely by a Kingly government Ber. art lib. 5. Maneth de reg Egypt lib. Heracl de Pol. Ath. but also their Kings then were of a vaste and absolute power according as the power of the Kings used to be in the dayes of the Heroes Arist Pol. 3. cap. 10. and 11. Secondly under Theseus reign the power of the Kingly government was much impaired Then the people were restored to liberty and got power in their hand as is said already Therefore Euripides faith that the Athenians under Theseus did not come under the yoke of one man but the people as free men governed like a King by course In Thes Yet we must not imagine that then there was a perfect and entire Commonwealth erected No verily for Theseus remained notwithstanding as their Prince and as one having greater authority then any Patriot and Commonwealth's-man I will not say that Theseus retained a power in his hand equall to the power of the People and their Representative That is expresly against what Euripides and others above-cited do report But this much I may say that he retained as much power in his own hand as made him superior and of greater authority then any one at-least whether of the Councel or of the People And that he was the first man in dignity and authority in the Commonwealth is clear 1. Because as both Aristotle and Plutarch report he remained notwithstanding the Prince of the Commonwealth Therefore even unto this day he is reckoned-up in the Catalogue of the Athenian Kings 2. Because he differenced between the Patricians whom we call gentle-men tillers of the ground and Crafts-men giving to them power according to their ranks and stations investing some of them with greater and some of them with lester power and consequently seing he differenced one kinde of persons from another in the Commonwealth making some of them in authority Superiour to others much more hath he retained a power in his own hand whereby he was differenced from any amongst all the rest 3. Because the Codrids and those who succeeded him were properly called Kings and therein they are contra-distinguished from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Princes and diametrally opposed to them But I conceive that there was greater reason why Theseus was a King then they were He was heroick and not so were they Yea Heraclid in plain terms faith that Kings were not abrogated from amongst the Athenians till the posterity of Codrus became effeminate and lecherous At which time faith he they were taken-away and Princes put in their room Observe therefore that from Theseus untill the last of the Codrids the Athenian Monarchy was regulated We establish the point thus 1. Because Theseus himself as is proved already was regulated Ergo far more Codrus and his posterity were regulated Theseus was of an heroick temper such as were not the Codrids And so by nature he was more disposed for an absolute way of governing then they He lived in an heroick time wherein Monarchy was most in request
perpetuall title from blood-right because he opinionateth that the Lacedemonian Kings were not properly Kings but because the greatest authority the Lacedemonian Kings had was in leading-forth the Army There indeed they were primi above the Senat and Ephorie Whereupon he also calleth the Laconick Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power of leading forth the Army by it's own power He is so far from being of Salmasius opinion that contrariwise he reckoneth up the Laconick Monarchy amongst the proper species and and kindes of royall power Polit. 3. cap. 10. and 11. And whileas he speaketh of the Lacedemonian Kings he doth so call them Pol. 2. cap. 7. and 9. Inst 2. Aristotle doth so faith Salmasius 1. Because the power of the battell was hereditary to the Lacedemonian Kings 2. Because the Lacedemonian Kings in battell had a full free and Kingly power Aye faith he they had also a power in those things which related to the ceremonies wherewith Kings in old were solemnly entrusted Def. Reg. cap. 8. Ans The first reason is forthwith nought 'T is a bad consequence The Laceà emonian Kings were hereditary Commanders of the Army in chief Ergo Aristotle because of that calleth them Kings Zuasi vero he had had no such reason for him to call them Kings if they had onely been entrusted with the power of the battell by election Friend you are a-little mistaken in this 1. Because Aristotle divideth the power of the battell into hereditary and elective power Pol. 3. cap. 10. Thus he contra-distinguisheth the one from the other as two different species properly and specifically differencing the power of the battell in generall 2. Because a Kingly power is not therefore Kingly because it is hereditary Yea which is more a Kingly power cater is requisitis is properly and formally elective And therefore Aristotle should have had more reason to have called them Kings if their power had been by election and not by succession So the man himself judgeth whileas he faith that the Carthaginian and Cretian kings were better ordained then the Laconick Because faith he the Laconick kings are ordained by succession and they by election And he addeth a reason to this because faith he by election the best are choosed whereas by blood-right the like cannot be had Whereupon faith he the heriditary title of Kings amongst the Lacedemonians hath brought great hurt and detriment unto the Commonwealth Polit. 2. cap. 9. And as for his second reason it plainly contradicteth himself for so he confesseth that in the battell they had a Kingly power And he hath little reason to say that Aristotle called them Kings because they had a power of over-seeing the sacrifices So had the Athenian annuall Princes whom properly he will not admit to be called Kings Howsoever it cannot be denied but properly they were Kings albeit they were subjected to Law 1. Because it doth not follow that a King properly is not a King because he is a regulated King We have shewed already that GOD no otherwise mouldeth the King but as he subjecteth him to Law Assert 2. And afterward we shall shew how that the Kings of the Jews were regulated Kings And yet who will deny but they were proper Kings 2. The King is not properly King unlesse he be a regulated King and subjected to Law as both already and afterward is shewed And therefore the Lacedemonian Kings were Kings properly the rather because they were regulated 3. Because Salmasius himself confesseth that in the battell the Lacedemonian Kings had a full and Kingly power And yet then their power was not absolute and arbitrary They had not then a full power to act against Law but according to Law as you may learn from Conclus 6. in comparing their power with Agamemnon's power Therefore either Salmasius will contradict himself or else he must needs say that Kings are properly Kings though they be regulated 4. Because all that write of the Lacedemonian Commonwealth of whom we have cited many already do call the Captain-Generals of their Armies Kings And 't is remarkable that Lylander in an oration which was found after his death perswaded the Lacedemonians to shake-off the Kingly government and elect a Captain-Generall for governing the battell Plut. Aemyl prob in Lyâ— This he speaketh of the Lacedemonian Kings as contradistinguished from Captain-Generalls of Armies O but faith Salmasius Lysander onely deherted the people from setting over their Armies Captain-Generalls by succession and perswaded them to take from them the name of Kings Def. reg cap. 8. See how the man bewrayeth himself for Lysander was Captain-Generall of the Lacedemonian Army And yet he was not their King Therefore amongst the Lacedemonians it was one thing to be King and another thing to be Captain Generall of the Army I confesse their King had also the power of the Army But he had not onely other power beside but also he had power of the battell in a more intense way then any deputed and substituted Captain amongst the people Otherwise there had been no difference between Lysander and the King who was but onely Captain of the Army Yea which is more Lysander doth not speak of shaking-off regium nomen but regiam potestatem as is clear out of Probus But sure I am regia potestas is not nomen regis but res regis Salmasius shall have no need to deny that the Carthaginian annuall Kings were Kings properly so called But in the interim he shall give us leave to consider and take a light view of the nature of the word susetes Which is taken in a twofold sense 1. Largely And so the word may be derived from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sapha Whence sufes is all one with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophe speculator inspector episcopus or ephorus Thus sufetes may be referred to judges of any sort And in this sense Alexander ab Alexandro referreth it to the Graecian â—symnetâ— the Egyptian dioecetes the Persian megistanes the Oscian medix c. Geni di lib. 4. cap. 23. Him Julius Scaliger followeth whileas he faith Porro qui Hebraïce sciunt non ignorant Poenos Tyrorum colonos esse concedent mihi Sufes idem esse quod 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And so the man supplying Festus words saith Sufes dictus est Pocnerum lingua summus magistratus ut Oscorum medix c. 2. Strictly and by limitation And so it is derived from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saphat Whence sufes is all one with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophet Which in the Greek is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a judge In this sense it is applyed to the Carthaginian yearly Kings and Roman Consuls Alex. ab Al. gen di lib. 3. cap. 3. The word sufes by Festus and T. Livius is rendered consul So it is by Sabellicus Aen. 5. lib. 5. It cannot be denâ—ed but as sufetes is a Puâ—ick Word so in it 's most strict and rigorous acceptation it is only
relative to the Carthaginian annuall Kings Yet I must needs say that as it is taken strictly and by way of limitation with very good reason it may be referred to the Roman consuls for they had that same power which the Carthaginian Kings had and both of them were yearly Magistrates Having thus discussed the grammary of the word you may observe that in it's first acceptation it is not onely relative to those who in old were above Kings but also to those who were inseriour to them And in the second acceptation it is relative to such who amongst the Carthaginians were both re and nomine Kings and amongst the Romans to such who were Kings not nomine but re But if we take sufetes precisely for sophetim unlesse you take sophetim in a larger sense then it is taken in the book of the Judges you must needs say that it is onely relative to such who were Kings neither re nor nomine for afterward I shall make it appear that the Judges of Israel were so far from being of a Kingly power that contrariwise they were but of equall authority with any of the Sanhedrin At least it is easy to prove that they were not of a Kingly power or of such power as had the Roman consuls and the Carthaginian sufetes albeit we should say that they were the first of the Sanhedrin having greater power then any of the rest for the Athenian annuall Princes had more power then any member of the Athenian councel and yet they were not properly Kings We may say the like also concerning the decennal Princes and those Princes who amongst the Athenians did govern for their life-time I deny not but these may be yea and were called Kings who were not so indeed as the Judges of Israel Judg. 18 And we deny not as Salmasius will have it Def. reg cap. 8. but many both of old and new also were and are not called Kings who were and are of greater honour authority then they What then This will never conclude that the Carthaginian sufetes were not of a Kingly power Though the word sufetes may be taken for sophetim yet shall we never conclude therefrom that the Carthaginian sufetes had no more Power then the Judges of Israel At the most it concludeth that they had not a kingly power in a full and intense measure And therefore the word in its most native signification is all one with Consules who had a kingly power though not in the highest degree And for my-self I can find no essential difference between the Carthaginian Sufetes and the Lacedemonian Kings Whereupon I am made to conclude That as the one so the other also were of a kingly power This man looketh upon the off-cutting of Kings as a thing of another world even as if such a thing had never been practised before since the world began He telleth us of Agis how that amongst all the Lacedemonian Kings none was cut-off but he But in the interim he shall observe that though in the examples which we shall alledge to this purpose there be some of them which speak nothing of the off-cutting of Kings Yet all of them do speak of the punishment of Kings either one way or other And know likewise that in old Kingdoms in punishing of capital faults used diverse wayes of punishment Amongst the Indians the delinquent though guilty of the greatest crime got no more for his punishment but to be shaved at the King's command This was thought amongst them a capital punishment Nicol. Damasc de Mor. gent. Ind. Some Nations who dwelt about Cancasus on capital transgressours did execute banishment as a capital punishment They executed it instead of death It is reported That the Trallians thought it punishment enough to inflict upon a murderer if he did give a bushel or measure of Pulse to the friends of the defunct The Druids and Cercets for the greatest faults did no more but interdicted the delinquent from being accessory to the sacrifice The like punishment was also executed upon sacrilegious persons in Elephantine Ethiopia Alex. ab Al. gen di lib. 3. cap. 5. Where if the Reader shall be pleased a little to trouble his eyes he shall see how that some Nations in old according to the Laws of the kingdom in their punishments were most severe though against the smallest faults and some were not so but were most remisse in their punishment though against the greatest crimes Therefore Salmasius shall not think that those who did not punish their Kings with death were any more favourable to them then those who did bring them to the scaffold and cut-off their heads for he may see that amongst some Nations even a small punishment was thought capital We shall therfore think that the Egyptians of old in with-holding stately and glorious burials from their delinquent Kings did esteem that as great if not a greater punishment then if they should have brought them forth and caused cut-off their head Diod. rcr an t lib. 2. cap. 3. In Meros they withdrew themselves from the society of their delinquent Kings till through want of company they consumed away in languish This they esteemed a greater punishment and indeed so it was then if they should have brought him to the scaffold Alex. ab Alex. lib. 3. cap. 5. And how the Egyptians plagued Amasis their King is storied already Prop. 1. Ans The Senate amongst the Cumâ—ans which they called Phylactus holding their Kings by the hand still detained them till they either rewarded them or punished them according to their deserts Alex. ab Alex. ib. The heroick Theseus was banished by the Athenians Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Diod. Sic. rev an t lib. 5. cap. 5. Plut. in Thes Sardanapalus because of his beastliness and sensuality was dethroned by his subjects Arist Po. lit lib. 5. cap. 10. Metasth an Pers lib. Just lib. 1. Diod. Sic. ant lib. 3. cap. 7. And as Herodotus lib. 1. storieth after Sardinapalus was put out of the way both the Assyrians and Medes for a long time were governed without Kings by Popular government The Athenians did cut-off Cylon together with his complices who intruded himself upon the Kingdom or at least endeavoured to do so So did they cut-off Hipparchus son to Pisistratus and also endeavoured the off-cutting of Thessalus another of his sons who succeeded to him in the Kingdom They did also cut-off Cleon together with 1500 with him who had destroyed the Commonwealth Herac. de Pol. Ath. They caused Miltiades to die in ptison although he was King of Chersonesus Hered lib. 6. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Aemil. Prob. in vit Miltiad Plut. in vit Cim And you will find Aristotle tell you in the general concerning Pisistratus and his posterity who were Kings in Athens how they were punished and shut from their Kingdom Pol. 5. cap. 10. Leonidas King of Lacedemonia was banished So was Cleombrotus And Agis was imprisoned and cut-off in
lawfully be declined that one better may be set-up 180 SECT V. We are tied by League and Covenant to maintain and espouse Christ's interest absolutely notwithstanding any thing may ensue thereupon Ibid. By no Oath or Covenant can we be absolutely tied to espouse the King's interest and preserve Monarchy involably Ibid. A SURVEY of POLICY OR A Free VANDICATION of the COMMON-VVEALTH of ENGLAND PROEME COURTEOUS READER I Beseech thee judge of me impartially Do not imagine I speak my mind more freely then is pertinent Let me tell thee my freedom is upon a good accompt I may hold my face toward Heaven and say what I speak it is from the simplicity of my spirit My record is from on high I do not speak from a by-assed principle and if I do so shall not my Lord try it out Why I pray thee wilt thou stumble at my freedome in expressing my mind against Kingly Government in behalf of that which is popular Verily I desire thee not to cleave to my judgment implicitly Yet would I have thee duly examining without prejudice what I speak and embrace that which is good wilt thou learn so much of that which the world cals Scepticisme as to suspend thy judgment a little and not sentence against me at the first Be not wedded to thine own opinion but try all things and hold that which is good Do thou kindly embrace any thing which is of GOD in this Book I do ingenuously profess I shal forthwith be of thy judgment if thou shew me better grounds inforcing the contrary of what I maintain Well the main subject in hand resolveth upon this Question Whether or not is the Commonwealth of ENGLAND an usurped power These Questions being put aside that follow it is easily answered 1. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute 2. Whether or not is Royall Government the choicest of Governments 3. Whether or not is a Commonwealth the best of Governments 4. Whether or not is it lawfull to resist the Royall Person and decline the Royall Authority 5. Whether or not doth the Covenant tye us to preserve Monarchy inviolably Of these as followeth SECT I. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute THe Court-Parasits and Nation of Royalists do plead much for an arbitrary and illimited power to the Royall Person But in this matter we do freely offer our judgment ASSERT I. The power of the King as it commandeth just and lawful things is absolute and in such a notion cannot be lawfully contraveened It is made good firstly from that which Solomon saith for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him Where the word of a King is there is power and who may say unto him what dost thou Eccl. 8. These words by Writers are diversly expounded 1. Some expound them concerning the absolutenes of the Kings power whether in things lawfull or unlawfull good or bad And in this we find none more willing then Salmasius the Humanist Defens Reg. cap. 2. 2. Others again who are no friends to absolute and unlimited Monarchy do interpret the words not de jure but de facto Regis i.e. they opinionat that Solomon doth not speak here of the power of Kings which according to Law and Reason doth belong to them but concerning the absolute way of governing which one way or other is conferred upon Kings whether by usurpation or tyranny or by a voluntary and free subjection of the people to an absolute and arbitrary power in the Kingly Person Yet 3. I do choose a way distinct from either of these And I expound the words concerning an absolute power in the King in things lawfull and honest This I make good from the Contexts 1. The Preacher saith I counsell thee to keep the Kings commandment and that in regard of the oath of GOD. Now what power the Holy Ghost here giveth to Kings is such a power whose ordinances he exhorteth to obey and that under an obligation being tyed to obey it by a lawfull oath the oath of GOD. But we cannot obey the unjust Acts and Ordinances of an arbitrary and illimited power Unless you will say that it is lawfull for us to sin against the LORD and to do the will of man rather then the will of GOD which is contrary to that which is spoken Act. 4. and 5. Yea as afterward is shewed arbitrary Monarchy invested with a boundlesse power to do both good evill is sinful and unlawfull And therefore we cannot tye our selves by the oath of GOD to maintain it Sure we are we can not lawfully swear to maintain and obey a sinfull and unlawfull power Unlesse you may also say that we may lawfully engage our selves by oath and Covenant to maintain and obey the ordinance of Satan 2. He speaketh of such a power which is not for maintaining vice and allowing that which is evill but for correcting and punishing of evill-doers Be not hastie to go out of his sight to do knaves who hate the light stand not in an evil thing Why for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him c. Would the Holy Ghost say ye must not dare to do evill and with draw your selves preposterously from the Kings presence for he hath a power conferred on him that cannot be contraveened in executing justice on malefactors And therefore if ye transgresse be sure the King will punish you So then this manifestly holdeth out to us that the Holy Ghost speaketh in this place of such a power in Kings which exerciseth good and performeth that which according to the Law of GOD is incumbent to the Kingly power to do But sure I am illimited Monarchy whose power is also to do evill can spare the malefactour and punish the righteous The Holy Ghost speaketh of a Kingly power that produceth contrary effects 3. The Holy Ghost subjoyneth Whose keepeth the commandment shal feel no evil thing Then this must be a just and lawfull commandment otherwise obedience to it would bring forth death Rom. 6. But sure we are this cannot be spoken concerning a boundlesse and arbitrary Regall power for as Solomon here speaketh of the Regall power so he speaketh of the effects thereof and of our obedience thereto And as we find he speaketh onely of good effects so he onely speaketh of an obedience and subjection thereto which according to the oath of GOD and in conscience we are tyed to perform But as we cannot lawfully give up our oath of Allegiance to boundless and arbitrary Regall power so there is a vast dis-proportion between it and the effects of that power which Solomon speaketh of here Solomon speaketh of a power which only produceth good effects But arbitrary Monarchy is in a capacity of producing both good and bad effects Secondly we establish the point from reason it self the Kingly power as it produceth good effects not onely in it self is the Ordinance of GOD but also it executeth the purpose of GOD both on good and bad But as the Ordinance of GOD
a stranger over thee who is not thy Brother Ibid. 3 He must not tyrannize over the People by Leavying Forces and by strength of hand drawing them into Egyptian slavery He shall not multiply horses to himself nor cause the People to return to Egypt to the end that he should multiply horses forasmuch as the LORD hath said unto you Ye shall henceforth return no more that way Ibid. These words properly and in their emphatick sense can import nothing else but a discharging of the King by Forces and Armies to tyrannize over his People that bringing them into bondage and upon their ruines he may not strengthen himself and multiply his Forces So the King of Egypt did with the People of Israel whileas they were in Egypt under his tyrannous yoke 4 Not a Leacherous King given to women for drawing him on into temptation Neither shall he multiply wives to himself that his heart turn not away Ibid. 5 Nor Covetous given to enrich himself and to build-up his own estate upon the ruins of his People Nether shall he greatly multiply to himself Silver and Gold Ibid. 6 But he must be a King acquiring the Scriptures of GOD meditating on them his whole life-time thereby learning to fear the LORD to observe his Commandments and to practise them that he may be humble and lowly not turning aside either to the right-hand or to the left And it shall be when he sitteth upon the Throne of his Kingdom that he shall write him a Copy of this Law in a Book out of that which is before the Priests the Levits And it shall be with him and he shall reade therein all the dayes of his life that he may learn to fear the LORD his God to keep all the words of this Law and these Statutes to do them That his heart be not lifted up above his Brethren and that he turn not aside from the Commandment to the right-hand or to the left Ibid. Herefrom we draw this Argument The power of him is not Arbitrary and beyond the bounds of Law whose power according to the Law and Word of GOD is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law But the power of the King according to the Law and Word of God is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law Ergo the Power of the King is not Arbitrary and beyond the bonnds of Law The Major cannot be denyed unlesse men will be so bold as to deny a Regulating and squaring of their Acts and Institutions according to the Word and Law of God Sure I am none will deny it but such as will contradict Scripture it self and decline it as the rule and pattern of their Actions The Minor is manifest from the Text above Cited Barclay the Royallist distinguisheth between the Office and power of the King and so the man endeavoureth to elude our Argument thus The Office of the King quoth he is set down Deut. 17. and the King's power is spoken of 1 Sam. 8 where saith he an Arbitrary power is conferred upon the King and laid upon his shoulders But this distinction serveth not for his purpose For either the power of the King is according to the Word and Law of God or not If it be then as the Office of the King is regulated in like manner his power also is kept within the compasse of Law For his Office spoken of Deut. 17. admitteth bounds and is kept within marches That which is spoken concerning the King Dent. 17. in terminis doth subject the King to Law and taketh-away Arbitrarines in his Government So then that which is spoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. doth either contradict that which is spoken Deut. 17. or else it giveth him no power and liberty of governing above Law at random If it be not then it is not a Divine but a diabolick power Moreover what the King doth according to his power either he doth it by vertue of his Office or contrary to it If by vertue of his Office Ergo the Kingly power cannot be absolute unlesse his Office be also absolute for so the exercise of his power dependeth from his Office In such a case he can do nothing according to his power but what he hath Authority for from his Office But his Office Deut. 17 is not absolute but Regulated according to Law If contrary to it Ergo it is not the Kings Office to exercise an absolute power and consequently the Kings Authority is not absolute Furthermore either the King as King is absolute or not If he be absolute as King Ergo the Royall Office is absolute For the King is formally King by vertue of his Royall Office If not absolute as King then we gain the point For so it followeth that the Kingly Government in it-self is not absolute and illimited and if the Kingly Government in it-self be not of a vast and absolute extent we Demand in what notion the Authority of the King is Arbitrary and illimited Either ab intrinscco i.e. As it is essentially a Kingly Authority or ab extrinseco i.e. according to some cadent and accident of the Regall Office If the former ergo the Office of the King it-self is absolute which is not onely repugnant to that Deut. 17. but also to that which Barclay confesseth himself If the latter ergo the King as King and according to his Office is not absolute for quod convenit rei accidentaliter ei non convenit formaliter Then we demand if the King as King be not absolute whether or not he be absolute as he is a Judge or as he is a Man If as he is a Judge ergo all Judges no lesse then Kings are of an absolute and Arbitrary power which Royallists themselves do altogether deny yea they make the King essentially different from other Judges under this notion because the Kings power is absolute and their's is not And consequently seing according to the Doctrine of Royallists the King is essentially differenced from other Judges as he is absolute then nolint velint the King as King is absolute Thus the Gentlemen do contradict themselves If as he is a Man ergo all men let-be Kings are of an Arbitrary and boundlesie power but sure I am no Royallist will say so Next to Barclay in-steppeth Salmasius on the floor as one minding to cut the knot if he cannot loose it This Gentleman labourreth though in vain to reconcile that of Deut. 17. with that which is spoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. The Israelites saith he did not seek from God one King onely but a change of the government by Judges and in stead of that they required a Regall Government But quoth he the Prophet to disswade them therefrom propounded to them these incommodities which ensue upon the Kingly government this the Prophet calleth jus Regum which I quoth he call the Arbitrary licence which is granted as a lawfull power to these who govern after a Kingly manner This jus Regum saith
Publick and legall way Extraordinary The Prophets rebuked the Kings of Israel and Judah for their faults and transgressions And what is rebuke but a degree of punishment And so Kings not having immunity from the lesser degree of punishment why are they not also lyable to the greater according to their delinquency Magis minus non variant speciem Yea Jehu executing the purpose of the Lord on the house of Ahab slew both the King of Israel and the King of Judah 2 King 9. and withall he caused cut-off all the sons of Ahab 2 King 10. O but you will say These practises of the Prophets and of Jehu were extraordinary And then It is a very bad Argument The Apostles preached by the extraordinary instinct of the Spirit Ergo Ministers who have nothing but an ordinary spirit should not preach So it doth not follow The Prophets and Jehu acted against delinquent kings through an extraordinary call thereto Ergo those who have nothing but an ordinary call thereto should not do so It may be you will say The People can have no ordinary call to act against their kings Be not mistaken 1 Extraordinary things supply the room of ordinary things whileas they are wanting So Samuel killed Agag because Saul the ordinary Judge was wanting in his duty 1 Sam. 15. 2 At least it followeth that the same thing which is done extraordinarily may also be done lawfully in an ordinary way Otherwise many absurdities and blasphemies should follow 3 Datounâ— oppositorum datur alterum And consequently seing there is an extraordinary call for punishing Kings there is also an ordinary call for doing it The reason of this is because esse extraordinarioe vocationis is so called and is so in it-self because it standeth in opposition to esse ordinaria vocationis as we have shewed at length curs Philosophico-theolog disp 4. Sect. 6. And therefore there can be no extraordinary call for punishing Delinquent Kings unlesse there be also an ordinary call for doing so 4 Punishing of delinquent Kings either in it-self is sinfull and unlawfull or not If sinfull and unlawfull then neither ordinarily nor extraordinarily may Kings lawfully be punished for no sin can be committed by an extraordinary Divine providence Otherwise God should extraordinarily sin But we have shewed already that Kings may be punished by vertue of an extraordinary call And consequently it is not a sin in it-self to punish delinquent Kings If lawfull and unsinfull I see no reason why a thing which is in it-self lawfull and honest may not lawfully be done by ordinary as well as by extraordinary midses for either the exercise of ordinary midses is in it self lawfull or not None I am sure will say that the exercise of ordinary midses is unlawfull Otherwise every thing that is done ordinarily is done sinfully Which to say is absurd And if you say that the exercise of them in it self is lawfull then it is lawfull in it self by vertue of an ordinary call to punish delinquent Kings But if there be any fault and escape in the way and manner of imploying that cal that no whit hindereth but the call in it self is lawfull and commendable for such things are meerly extrinsecall to the nature of the call it-self And ab extrinseco ad intrinsecum non est sequela 5 Jehu and the Prophets had no other reasons for them in speaking and acting by vertue of an extraordinary call against delinquent Kings but what those may have in proceeding against them by vertue of an ordinary call They no otherwise proceeded against them by vertue of their extraordinary call but as it was for the good of the LORD's People and for executing Justice on their delinquency that others might learn not to offend But sure we are such grounds are competent to an ordinary call foâ— proceeding against delinquent Kings And 't is an undoubted maxim Idem est jus ubi eadem est ratio juris Iâ—st That example concerning Athaliah saith Salmasius deserveth not an answer for saith he she usurped the kingdom and killed the whole Royall Family And so there was lesse executed against her then she deserved And with all according to the Jewish Lawes it was not permitted to women to sway the Scepter and sit on the Throne for it is not said Deut. 17. Thou shalt set a Queen over thee but a King over thee Def. Reg. cap. 4. Ans That the example concerning Athaliah very much concludeth our purpose we argue thus Either Athaliah had the right and authority of a King or not If the had the right and authority of a King ergo if the King be of an absolute power and not subject to Law then Athaliah was no more subject to Law then any other King for as Salmasius and all Royallists will have it the King is of an absolute power and not subject to Law And consequently Athaliah being invested with the right of a Kingly power and authority she was no more subject to Law then any other of the Kings of Judah Therefore if you say that Athaliah was invested with the right and authority of a King you must either commend the practice of Jehojadah and the people in killing her or else you must charge your opinion and not imagine Kings to be absolute and not subject to Law If she had not the right and authority of a King then either because she usurped the Kingdom and intruded her-self upon it contrary to the consent of the People or because she did cut-off the righteous heirs of the Kingdom and set up her-self in the Kingdom or else because according to the Law women ought not to govern Not the first because according to the Doctrine of Royallists conquest is a lawfull title to the Crown But Athaliah conquered the Crown of Judah to her-self What more I pray you did she in intruding her-self upon the Kingdom of Judah then unjust Conquerers do in thrusting themselves in upon the kingdoms which they subdue As she intruded her-self without the free consent and election of the People so do they And yet Salmasius with the rest of his Brethren will have such Conquerers lawful heirs and absolute kings over these kingdoms which they subdue Nor can you say the second because conquerers who subdue other men's kingdoms cut-off all those who by pretended blood-right claim a title to the Crown And yet Royallists will have such lawfull heirs and absolute kings over these kingdoms to which they have no title but the sword Nor can you say the third because all Royallists admit Royal birth a just and absolute title to the Crown But women no less then men may be and are of the Royall Off-spring And consequently if the doctrine of Royallists be true and unless Salmasius will contradict himself women may as lawfully govern as men Therefore it doth not follow that because Athaliah was a woman she had not right to govern the People of the Jews and reign over them I confesse
But their time was of another stamp wherein Monarchy was wearing-out of request 2. Because whileas the Grecians carried-on an Engagement against Troy at that time the Athenian Monarchy remained regulated also Justin faith that Demophoon son to Theseus was Captain of the Athenian navy which went out with Agamemnon against the Trojans lib. 2. But we believe other more antient Writers rather then him who say that the Captain of the Athenian navy then was Mnestheus Theseus son Dict. cret de bel Tro. lib. 1. Dar. Phr. de exs Tro. lib. and Homer Iliad 2. Howsoever Plutarch gathereth from the way of Homer's speaking of the Navy which came from Athens under the conduct of Mnestheus that Theseus government was regulated and much impaired for faith he Homer doth call these ships as belonging to the People in Thes Just so say Dictys Cretensis Dares Phrygius And so Plutarch's way of reasoning holding good the Athenian Monarchy whether under Mnestheus as some say or under Demophoon as Justin faith was not absolute but limited for the ships which were rigged out of Athens against Troy were not called Mnestheus or Demophook's ships but ships belonging to the people of Athens Well I reverence this consequence not for it-self for Homer speaketh that same way of the out rigging of ships in other Grecian Kingdoms where I do not think but there was absolute Monarchy though in some things peradventure circumscribed but for Plutarch's authority And so in this matter resting upon it I conclude that seing the Atheni an Monarchy was kept within the bounds of Law in the dayes of Mnestheus and Demophoon two brave Heroes much more was it of a circumscribed power in the dayes of Codrus and his posterity who were but of an ordinary and non-heroick temper And as for Codrus himself I do not think that such a man would have endeavoured the away-taking of those liberties wherewith Theseus priviledged the Athenians whereas in maintainance of their liberties he exposed himself to the undergoing of death it-self Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 6. Just lib. 2. Plut. in Codr Aye and which is more whileas the Codrids became lecherous loft and effeminate the Athenians did abrogate Kings from amongst them and changed their Kings into Princes Which beareth us this much in hand that the Athenians did retain a power in themselves whereby they might either keep-in or shut-out their Kings And it is remarkable that it is not said they did abrogate their Kings because of the tyranny of the Codrids Heracl de Pol. Ath. Which insinuateth that notwithanding their personall escapes and out-breakings they acted nothing for diminishing the peoples Power Thirdly after the Codrids had become effeminate and had abused their power the people took-away Kings from amongst them and in their room set up Princes Now the question may be moved whether or not had these Princes as great power as had Theseus and Codrus For removing of this difficulty observe that there were some who did govern onely as Princes and some did rule as Kings Those who governed as Princes are of a threefold kind 1. Some of them were appointed to govern for their whole lifetime Who were thirteen in number each of them reigning after another 2. Some of them were decennal Princes seven in number who governed every one of them for the space of ten years The last of the decennall Princes was Erixias whose government left-off an mun 3282 before the reign of Pisistratus about 128. years 3. Some of them were annuall and yearly Magistrates Some would think it strange to say that these three kinds of Princes had that same power and authority which Theseus and Codrus or any other of the Athenian Kings had But if you take along with you this distinction you shall find the matter clear There is a twofold non-absolute and circumscribed power 1. Intensive and substantiall 2. Extensive and circumstantiall It cannot be denied but these Princes in all the three kindes had one and the same power intensively and essentially which Theseus and the Codrids had The reason of this is because the power of the Athenian Kings in itself and at the utmost was but a regulated power subjected to the Law of the people as is proved already Therefore saith Euripià es bringing-in Theseus speaking of the power of the Athenians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In English Athens A city free is not govern'd by one As King by course the people reign alone Whence it is more then evident that Theseus was no lesse subjected to Law then any of the people Thence it is that Diodore reporteth that the Athenians taking it in an evill part that Helen by lot had fallen to be wife to Theseus he feared them and therfore transported her into Amphidria Rer. ant lib. 5. cap. 5. And how they keeped both him and the Codrids in subjection to Law is already proved at length Which maketh us say that formally and according to the essentiall frame of non-absolute and limited power they had no more power then any of these Princes above-said who did govern onely as Princes for both of them were subjected to Law and neither of them had a prerogative over it and an exemption from it We have shewed already that the Athenian Kings had no such priviledge Ergo far lesse had the Athenian Princes any such priviledge 1. Because Princes as Princes are ever one way or other inferiour to Kings 2. Because the Athenians changed their Kings into Princes because their Kings became lecherous soft and effeminate And consequently unlesse they had changed their power as well as their name they had wrought to no purpose for reforming the abuses and enormities of their Kings 3. The annuall and yearly Princes whereof nine did govern together six of them being Thesmothites were solemnly sworn to the people that they should govern according to Law And he who was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King amongst these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Princes had no more power but to provide for the sacrifices and to order and govern the battell Her act de Pol. Ath. This commeth just to that which Aristotle saith concerning the detracting of the power of Kings in after-ages Then saith he the people detracted so much from their Kings that they entrusted them with no more power but to govern the battell and to oversee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sacrifices Polit. 3. cap. 10. This is reckoned-up by him as the lowest degree of Monarchy which he calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most according to law and of the Laconick kind Pol. 3. cap. 10. and 11. But if you shall alledge that the yearly Princes amongst the Athenians had not such power as the decennal Princes and those Princes who keeped the government for their life-time I shall not stand much to yeeld that for I suppose that as in some accidental and circumstantial way in the matter of power the
And why shall we think other wayes of it seing the Conquerour came not to the Crown of England by blood-right but by meer Conquest having the whole Kingdom of England against him And Polydore saith Hinc colligere licet vel Edovardum non servasse sidem Gulielmo quam à principio de hereditate regni non satis considerate dedisset vel nullum qnod verisimilius est fecisse promissum Angl. hist lib. 8. This he gathereth from that which Edward spake to Haraldus whileas he prayed GOD that either he would avert the comming of England into the Conquerours hand or else that he would keep him back from it so long as he lived Therefore to me it is more then apparent that the Confessour did not in his Testament assigne the Conquerour to the Crown albeit Salmasius alledgeth the contrary Def. Reg. cap. 8. What Doth not Polydore tell us that because Edgarus was of young and tender years he was not admitted by the people to reigne And fearing lest the Conquerour should succeed to the Crown they rejoyced greatly that Harald took upon him to reigne in Edward's room Whereat as may be learned from Polydore Edward was not displeased himself but very well satisfied that Harald should succeed to him Whereupon we fear not to say that not onely the power of enkinging was in the people's hands but also that the Confessour did not promise the Kingdom to the Conquerour after him although the contrary be alledged And is it likely that the people would have so much declined and withstood the Conquerour if Edward had assigned him to the Crown as his heir No verily for they adored him as their Law-giver It is known that Rufus was but third son to the Conquerour and yet he was created King Him the people preferred before Robert his eldest brother What Would they have done so if blood-right by the Law of the Kingdom had been the title to the Crown No verily It is remarkable that Rufus was ordained King and it was not so much as objected that Robert was elder then he he being but the third son to the Conquerour and Robert being the eldest Yea Rufus dying without children they appointed Henry the Conquerours fourth son King as yet passing-by Robert the eldest And which is more though Henry 1. had left in his Testament his daughter Mathildis together with her sons as heirs of the Kingdom yet not withstanding the people created Steven Nephew to Henry 1. By the authority of Parliament it was ordained that Steven so long as he lived should enjoy the Kingdom of England and that Henry 2. son to Marthilais daughter to Henry 1. should succeed to Steven in the Kingdom of England passing by any that was begotten by Steven Likewayes the people created John King although K. Richard dying without heirs had lest Arthure son to Gaufredus who was elder then John heir to the Crown I might speak more for clearing this putpose but I forbear judging this sufficient Whence it is more then evident that the Crown of England since the dayes of Edward the Confessour by no Law of the Kingdom is hereditary I confesse since that time now and then the Kings eldest son did succeed and was holden as Heir of the Kingdom But this was onely by custome through favour of the Race in which according to the manner of Nations which I must needs call an abuse very ordinarily the first-born is preferred as the onely lawfull Heir of the Crown Therefore seing the Crown of England since that time hath not been at least precisely hereditary to me it seemeth very probable that for that time it hath not been absolute and arbitrary for so the original and fountain-power of enkinging is in the People's hands And consequently in this respect the People are simply above the King as the cause is simply above its effect Philosophers say That can a est nâ—bi◠〈◊〉 effect 〈◊〉 And so seing the King of England dependeth from the People no question they have simply a power over him and not he an absolute power over them Secondly Because according to these Laws the liberty of the subject is vindicated and the Prince is subjected to Law Because in Henry 1. his time a Parliament was holden At which time Parliamentary Power by the Law of the Kingdom was declared the Supream and highest Authority for any thing of weight was referred to it So that whatsoever was done either by the command of the King or of the People it was holden null unlesse it had been ratified by the Parliament In it every one whether King or other Members thereof have alike and equal power of speaking And withall nothing spoken in it is of validity and force unlesse it be concluded on by the major part together with the approbation of the King Polyd. Ang. hist lib. 11. It is observable That by the authority of the Parliament it was ordained That Steven so long as he lived should remain King of England and that Henry 2. afterward should succeed him By whose mediation and authority the debate between Henry and Steven touching the Crown was decided And I pray you how could these things have been unlesse the Parliament had been above the King Inst 4. But saith Salmasius the power of convocating and dissolving the Parliament belongeth to the King of England The power of the Parliament is extraordinary and pro-tune But the power of the King is ordinary and perpetual And likewise the King of England in Parliament hath a negative voice And therefore in many Acts of Parliament he is called the King and Lord of the Parliament and what is ordained is enacted in his Name And so saith he though the King of England doth act according to the Laws of the Kingdom and concurrence of his Parliament yet notwithstanding he is an absolute King Otherwise the Kings of the Jews had not been absolute who had power to do nothing without the consent of the Sanhedrin And Artaxerxes had not been absolute who could not be reconciled to Vasthi because the Law discharged it Yea if Kings were not absolute because they act according to the Law and the advice of their Parliament then Cambyses had not been absolute who conveened a Councel whileas he intended to marry his german sister and demanded of them if there was any such law for allowing such a marriage Def. Reg. cap. 8. 9. Answ Salmasius shall do well to consider these few things 1. What the power of the English Parliament is Which is defined by Camdenus to be made-up of three Estates having the highest and most sovereign power in making Laws confirming Laws annulling Laws interpreting Laws and in doing every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is concerned Brit. chorog de Tribun Ang. This is far from Salmasius mind who Def. Reg. cap. 9. opinionateth that the Parliament hath not power over every thing in the Kingdom But Polydore summeth-up the power of the Parliament under these notions First
Every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is interested is referred to it Secondly Whatsoever is done at the command whether of King or People is of none effect unless it be authorized by the Parliament Thirdly It establisheth and taketh away Laws as it judgeth fit Fourthly Every Member of it hath a-like power and freedom in voicing And what is decreed and enacted by Parliament he calleth it the proper and municipal Law of the Kingdom Seing then the Parliament is the most sovereign and supream power in the Kingdom of England according as it was in old how can it be said That the King of England hath power over it If it be so then you admit two Supream powers and a power above a Supream power which is contradicent The Lacedemonian Ephori were no otherwise above their Kings but because they were invested with the highest and supream power All things were referred to the Parliament even as the Roman Consuls as Festus out of Coelidus saith did refer every thing to the Senate Now because of this the Senate had the highest power and was above the Consuls Ergo seing all matters of the Commonwealth in old in the Kingdom of England were referred to the Parliament no question it had power above the King The Roman Senate is therefore said to have been of the supreamest power Fenest de Magistrat Rom. cap. 1. because neither Kings nor Consuls nor Dictators nor any other Magistrate could do any thing without their advice and counsel Ergo seing whatsoever the King of England or any other of that Kingdom did in old was to no purpose without the authority and approbation of Parliament without all controversie the King of England was subjected to the Parliament Salmasius concludeth the King to be above the Parliament because he alledgeth the Parliament can do nothing without the King Why may not I then conclude the Parliament to be above the King because re ipsa and according to the Law of the Kingdom the King can do nothing without the authority and consent of the Parliament Where then I pray you is the King 's negative voice There is not a Member in Parliament cui oequa loquendi potesias non competit So saith Polyd. Angl. hist lib. 11. What Do you imagine that ever the Parliament could by their authority have drawen-up the foresaid agreement between Steven and Henry 2. unlesse they had had power above the King What they did therein was a direct acting both over Steven their present King and Henry 2. their future King But will you tell me whileas the States of England did seek of K. John to be governed by the ancient Lawes made by Edward the Confessour whether or not were these Lawes Acts of meet pleasure giving the King a liberty to do as he would either to tyrannize over the people or not You can not hold the affirmative because what they demanded of the King was to be restored to liberty to be freed of tyranny Polyd. Vir. Angl. hist lib. 15. And if you hold the negative part then do the ancient Laws of England pull absolutenesse out of the king's hands and subject him to Law Magna charta saith The King can do nothing but by Lawes and no obedience is due to him but by Law And the States of England were so far from permitting John to rule at randome and not according to the ancient Lawes of the kingdom that contrarywise they combined against him entering in oath together to pursue him still on till he should govern according to Law and establish the ancient Lawes of the kingdom Yea albeit that Pope Innocent commanded them to lay-down arms and though upon their deniall thereof they were declared enemies by the Pope they notwithstanding followed-on their purpose and cryed-out that they would be avenged by fire and sword on such a wicked tyrant who did so much slight the people Aye which is more they sent into France and from thence brought Ludovick the French king's son and created him king notwithstanding any thing either John or the Pope could do in the contrary Thus they never rested till in sorrow they brought John's head into the grave Where I pray you is the absolutenesse of the king of England whenas the States would not suffer him to govern but according to Law and in denying to do so pursued him in arms unkinging him enkinging another in his room and bringing himself in sorrow to the grave This is far from the arbitrary and infinite power of kings Salmasius speaketh of And whereas he saith the parliament is but extraordinary and pro tunc this is either because Kings were long before Parliaments or because the Parliament hath not power to intermeddle in every businesse of the Common-wealth but is conveened pro re nata for ordering the weightiest Affairs of the kingdom If you say the former we do not deny it We heartily confesse that of all Governments Monarchy was first established And Aristotle giveth the reason of it because saith he in the beginning it was hard to find-out many men fit and able to govern And therefore necessity moved them to lay the government on one for though in the beginning it was hard to finde-out many yet was it easie to finde-out one endowed with qualities and gifts for governing Polit. 3. cap. 11. lib. 4. cap. 13. But though this be granted yet doth it not follow but Senats or Parliaments being established they have even according to the custome of the Nations more power then kings as is shewed already And therefore Aristotle saith in the places fore-cited that by processe of time the number of Common-wealth's-men increasing kings at last went close out of request and were denuded of all power And Pol. 3. cap. 10. he saith that in after-times the power of kings was extremely lessened partly because of their own voluntary demitting and partly because of the people's detracting from their greatnesse Nay any king Aristotle alloweth he alloweth no more power and greatnesse to him but to be greater and more powerful then every one separatim and many conjunctim but to be of lesse power and greatnesse then the peoople Pol. 3. cap. 11. But I pray you what is the Parliament but the Representative of the people If you say the other we deny it as is shewed already And it seemeth very strange to me that the Parliament hath not power in small matters and yet hath power to manage and go about matters of highest concernment If Salmasius will ask Philosophs they can tell him Qui potest majus potest minus He imagineth that he gaineth the point because the King of England had power to conveen and dissolve the Parliament as he judged fit This is but a singing of the triumph before the victory for the Roman Consuls had the same power over the Senat. Alex. ab Alex. gen di lib. 3. cap. 3. But who will say that they had an absolute power over the Senat
Estates who in maintenance of their Liberties and the ancient Laws of the Kingdom did rise in armes against their Kings and caused them nilled they willed they to subject their necks to the yokes of Law Amongst other of their practices this is very remarkable that albeit they had saluted Ludovick as their King and put him in the room of John yet notwithstanding in the end they declined him and in his stead crowned Henry 3. John's son This speaketh much of the States power above the King 2. Virtually It cannot be denied but in this notion all temporall power dependeth from the King And that two wayes effectively and vindicatively Effectively because the King of England had not onely power of conveening dissolving the Parliament of ordaining inferior Judicatories but also by him the Parliament of England was firstly instituted and ordained Vindicatively because it was his part to patronize and execute the acts of Parliament at least as the main and prime man of maintaining and defending them The like power the Kings of Scotlana had also as is clear from their Acts of Parliament But as for the spirituall power of the King of England I stand not much to confesse that he had a formall and Ecclefiastick power in Church-matters and that what power the Church so called had was derived from him It cannot be denied but before the conquest there were Ecclesiasticall Laws made by many Kings of England as Inas Alfred Edward the elder Gythrum Ethelstane Edmund Edgar Aetheldred Canutus and others In the interim this Gentleman shall do well to observe that the King of England had not alwayes this power It cannot be denied but Lanfrancus Anselmus and Berket going to complain on their Kings and Governours firstly brought the Pope's judiciall authority from Rome into England both over King and people Which supremacy of the Pope over the Church of England untill in and about Henry 8. his dayes who did shake-off the Pope's yoke did continue And so Edward 6. succeeding to him to me it is more then probable that by the scresaid sanction made in his time the ancient power of the Kings of England in Church-matters was taken out of the Pope's hands and put upon the King And it cannot be denied but according to Edward the Confessour's Lawes the King of England had a primary formall and Ecclesiastick power in Church-matters I stand not to grant that But what though I should say that according to this statute made in Edward 6. his time the King of England had a primary and originall power and that formally both in respect of spirituall and temporall jurisdiction yet will it onely conclude an absolutenesse of the King according to Law but not against it It no wayes denudeth the people of a fountain-power to desend themselves against the unjust decrees and actings of the King The Roman dictatour had an absolute power in judging and yet it was lawfull for the people to repeal his acts in their own just defence Many times have the People of England defended themselves from their King and stood by their own liberties notwithstanding the King 's acting against them What I pray you is it for me to say that the King of England by this act is called the originall both of spirituall and temporall power under a formall notion Is he not called also the King and Sovereign Ford of the Parliament Is not the Parliament called his Parliament Is not every thing ordinarily acted and emitted under his name Is it not ordinarily said It is ordained by the King With the eonsent or at the desire of the three Estates It is very seldome said It is ordained by the King and Parliament But I pray you what be these but Court-complements They are words and nothing but words Go conser them with the practice of the Parliament and you shall finde the one just contrary to the other No wonder forsooth because the King getteth more honour then he hath power Trie this and you will find it an ordinary practice Aye which is more cannot a corrupt Parliament through the defection of the times give the King more then what is due to him either by the Law of GOD or by the law of the Nation Know we not that Parl. 18. K. Jam. 6. through the backsliding of the times did advance him to greater priviledges then the King of Scotland by the Law of the Kingdome had or can be warranted by the Law of GOD Indeed I will not say so of Henry 8. for it is known that in his young years he did put the managing of the Kingdom into the hands of the Princes as did others of his predecessors before him And as for Edward 6. I must needs say his times were better then any times of his predecessors But it appeareth to me that as both Henry and he have encroached very far upon the liberties of the Church so called so did they encroach too far upon the liberties of the State But leaving Henry of whose power I find not so much spoken as of Edward I must tell you one thing concerning Edward and it is this Those who write of him and namely Foxe do crie him up beyond all the Kings of England for piety wisdom and learning And Foxe runneth so far out in his commendation that he esteemeth him inferiour to no King though worthy to be preferred to many Whereupon he feareth not to match him with Josiah and put the qualifications of both in one ballance Which maketh me imagine that the foresaid act emitted in Parliament under Edward's reign did passe in his behalfe because of his personall endowments The like act upon that same ground though in respect of him it was meerly pretended without any reality in his person did passe Parl. 18. upon K. Iam. 6. Thus the case is extraordinary We denâ—e not but because of personall endowments Kings may be and have been advanced to greatest power What will this conclude an ordinary president thereof and a standing law therefore No verily There is no consequence from extraordinaties to ordinaties The standing ancient lawes both of England and Scotland are against absolute Princes Of scotland and of England we have spoken already at length Verily the example of Edward 1. though there were no more may serve to clear oâ—r purpose He to repair what was done amisse by his father Henry 3. who was at variance with the people touching the liberties of Magna charta and de foresta did much gratifie the people restoring them to great liberty and abrogating all lawes which did make for the bondage and slavery of the people Howsoever the matter be five sic five non these sanctions above-cited by Salmasius do conclude the Parliament to have power above the King The reason is because if we look precisely on these acts what power the King hath is from them They not onely declare but also they enact and ratifie his power to be such such And so the
according to or against Law That doth militate against the ground and motive of their call They are no otherwise called to govern according to their pleasure but as people expect their will shal bring forth the choicest Laws Whence precisely and formally their power both according to the subject and object thereof is restricted and kept within the bounds of Law But we cannot say so of absolute Monarchy acquired and conferred by extraordinary heroicism and such like And consequently we may very justly say that Aristotle referreth absolute Monarchy obtained because of personal endowments to the third species of Regal government and doth not refer absolute Monarchy because of extraordinary heroicism and such like to any species or kind of Monarchy he speaketh of The reason we say is this because any kind of Monarchy he speaketh of doth not exceed the bounds of Law But illimited Royal power conferred because of extraordinary qualifications precisely and formally doth not exceed the bounds of Law Whereas being conferred upon grounds of extraordinary heroicism purchase and such like precisely and formally the power thereof out-reacheth all Laws Thus we judge Aristotle's mind to be cleared concerning all the species and sorts of Monarchy summed-up by him I confesse Salmasius imagineth that Aristotle by Pambasilick or all-governing Monarchy doth mean arbitrary Monarchy having power to govern at random either according to or against Law But the Gentleman in this is a little mistaken for otherwise in the moulding of the King he had not required such conditions and limitations as he doth Which be these 1. That he should descend of such a race which in vertue and goodnesse should exceed all others Pol. 3. cap. 1 2. Whence is it that both there and Polit. 1. cap 3. he saith that the best according to nature over-ruleth that which is worse and lesse good 2. That the King himself should exceed the rest in vertue and goodnesse Yea but for a King to govern according to his own hearts lust even against Law and Reason there is no necessity of vertue and goodnesse seing illegality and injustice flow from a vicious and corrupt principle Therefore Aristotle in opposing Monarchy or Government laid upon one to Government carried-on and managed according to Law doth not insinuate an arbitrary power in the King having immunity and freedom from Law but in so doing he only opposeth the power of Government laid upon one to its power being laid upon many implying that as in this respect the Governour is subject to the rest and cannot act any thing of Law without their consent and assistance so in the other respect the Governour in carrying on things according to Law hath immunity from subjection to any other beside and in doing things legally may perform them without the interposition of any other man's authority Whence we see that Aristotle alloweth an absolute power in the king to act according to Law but not to act either according to Law or against it And therefore in so far he taketh these by the hand who deny Monarchy to be according to nature in as far as they contend that to be against Nature which is against Law Which maketh him conclude Tyranny to be against Nature it being against Law and Reason And consequently he doth not allow arbitrary power in the king to do either good or bad according to his pleasure He only pleadeth for power to the King which is according to Nature Justice and Utility He will have him a man excelling others in vertue and governing according to Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 12. Moreover it is contrary to the nature of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Aristotle expresseth cap. 11. to render it an arbitrary power There is a very great difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Howsoover he expoundeth it himself cap. 10. and defineth it to be a power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to govern the city and all the publick matters whether at home or abroad thus the man speaketh of a governing power but arbitrary power is a misgoverning power he speaketh of a power ordering and doing all things but arbitrary power is a power of misordering and undoing all things it doth not follow that because kings of old had power over all things Ergo they had power to dispose on them according to their pleasure Quasibero there were not an all-commanding power according to Law This consequence doth not immediately follow from the Antecedent It is a fallacy ab homonymia for there is a twofold all-commanding power one according to and another above Law 'T is therefore a poor shift to conclude an arbitrary power from an all-commanding power The original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth bear an arbitrary power only by way of analogy and it is known that the Roman Dictator had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power though not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing power Well let it be so that Aristotle saith That kings in ancient times had an arbitrary power a power above Law But I pray you what kings then doth he understand Either they are the Founders of the primary Colonies or the after-Heroes and Founders of the secondary Colonies If of the first kind ergo you gain just nothing We have granted that already Concl. 2. Their power was extraordinary If of the second kind we might also therein take you by the hand Howsoever with some distinction or other you have our mind cleared in this ibid. Therfore howsoever you understand the latter part of the fourth Species I lose nothing If you say that Aristotle only meaneth in it an all-commanding power according to Law then do I gain my purpose And if you suppose his meaning to be otherwise you learn from what foregoeth that I lose nothing Thus the case is extraordinary And I deny not but Royal power that way hath been arbitrary Yet you cannot deny but the first second third and fourth or the former part thereof Species of Monarchy do not speak a word of Royal power above Law Although Aristotle's words may bear this construction yet do we judge it were corresponding to his sense and meaning to put this sense upon them In the former part of the fourth Species he contradistinguisheth the times of the Heroes from the ancient times which he expresseth in the latter part thereof But the one being opposed to the other if we speak rigorously and properly by the ancient times can be nothing understood but the golden age which after the flood Ethnick Writers know no time before the flood lasted as some say 250 years and as others say with better warrant 131 years All which time if we speak properly and rigorously there was no kingly government at all for as is shewed already Concl. 3. there was no government then but natural and oeconomick In qua nullo ferente legem natura ipsa vivebatur Mnes Phoen. Damasc lib. 97. bist
tyrannous and usurping kings delight in cruelty They seek nothing but their own ease and if they act any thing according to Law it is only for the fashion as the tyrant Cambyses did in seeking his german sister in marriage What Such hold will for Law They know nothing but Hoc volo sic jubeo sit pro ratione voluntas Juv. Satyr 6. Such Kings do not judge according to the Law of the Kingdom Neither is there power according to the Law of the Kindom laid upon such What they do is done by themselves unanswerable to any They act will-way and not Law-way They were not judged because they did take power to themselves above all Law It cannot be denied but Salmasius concludeth well from 1 Son 8. and 2 Sam. 8. that the King of Israel judged Def. Reg. cap. 2. But he will do well to advert that though this be true Rex judicat concerning the King of Israel according to God's institution the Law of the Nation and the practice of some of their Kings yet this is as true Rex non judicat concerning the ordinary practice of their Kings And it is very observable that Jannoeus whom they called Alexander all the while he did reign over the people of the Jews acted nothing according to Law but tyrannized over them fos an t Jud. lib. 13. cap. 21.22 But in Gem. tract de Syned cap. 11. it is said that because of Jannoeus it was enacted that the king should neither judge nor be judged And if it be true that it was enacted then then do I not think that it was upon that fabalous ground which doth not so much as relish to Salmasius of which the Rabbinick writers speak but because of the tyranny and cruelty of the man who did not govern law-way but will-way And as Alexander so the tyrant Herod had an arbitrary power though we suppose it did depend much from the concession of Antonius Jos Ant. lib. 15. cap. 4. Conclus 3. The good Kings of the Jews because of personall endowments had exemption and immunity from Law This is manifest in the examples of David and Solomon There were two things chiefly in David which were against the Law 1. Multrplication of wives Whereof David had very many 1 Chr. 3. and 14.2 Murder upon the back of adultery 2 Sam. 11. And Solomon did many things contrary to the Law 1. He multiplied gold and silver 2. Horses and Charets 1 Kin. 10.2 Chron. 9.3 Wives And 4 he fell into adultery 1 Kin. 11. And yet we read no that either David or Solomon were judged therefore by the 〈◊〉 And what I pray you could be the reason of this Not because the king de jure hathimmunity from Law Nor because they over-awed the Sanhedrin by force of armes We read nothing of that And you shall not make me believe that the Sanhedrin durst not attempt the executing of justice upon them 1. You thereby put a great note of reproach upon David and Solomon You do no lesse then insinuate a disposition in them for rebellion if you alleadge that the Sanhedrin which de jure as both already and afterward doth appear had power over them durst not for fear of their resistance execute judgment on them That had been a disposition to resist the higer powers Which the Holy Ghost condemneth Rom. 13. And I will not think that such men had the Spirit of rebellion to repine against the execution of justice 2. We find that the Sanhedrin did execute justice on Amaziah And the people did so against Athaliah 2 Kin. 11.2 Chr. 23. Which maketh me think that it was not for want of power that David and Solomon were spared Other Kings of Judah were punished for their faults The Sanhedrin and people had power to execute justice on them And why not also on David and Solomon They were all Kings alike And it is very remarkable that after Solomon's death ten tribes declined the house of David because of Solomon's heavy exactions and tributes he laid upon the people 1 Kin. 12.2 Chr. 10. I believe they were as powerfull to revolt from Solomon as from Rehoboam And seing the people took so heavily with Solomon's yoke that therefore they did revolt from his son it maketh me think that the Sanhedrin did not spare him for fear of his power Verily both they and the people have born patiently with his slips and heavy impositions because of his rare and singular qualifications Otherwise I can see nothing for it why the people did not make a mutiny against and revolt from Solomon as against and from Rehoboam 3. Because as both already and afterward doth appear the Sanhedrin both according to GOD's institution and the Law of the nation had authority and jurisdiction above the king But sure I am it had been a very uselesse power if they durst not have exercised it It had been all one to have wanted that authority with wanting power to have put it in execution as occasion served And this had been a having and a non-having power Which is ridiculous and repugnant Neither can you alleadge that they were spared because then judicatories were altogether turned corrupt and knew not what it was to exerctse justice for that doth directly militate against the eminent Reformation both of Church and State that was under the reign of both these Kings Therefore seing David and Solomon were spared not because they were absolute nor because the people durst not execute judgement on them nor because the people and judicatories under their reign were altogether dissolute not knowing the way of exercising justice to me it is more then manifest that their delinquency was past-by because of their personall endowments The shining vertues and eminent graces that did appear in them no question have kept back the Sanhedrin from putting hand on them O! what a temptation would it be to me to voice for a David's off-cutting O! how much would my soul be grieved to sentence against a Solomon And shall not I think but those of the Sanhedrin were much taken up with the qualifications of these men as well as I could be with the vertues of such-like I cannot think that I am singular in this In the interim observe that my meaning is not that they had such a vast power as Salmasius dreameth of I do not think that ever the Sanhedrin would have spared them unlesse they could not have done otherwayes if they had turned positive and even-down tyrants and destroyers of the Commonwealth But onely my meaning is that because of their eminent qualifications they had immunity from Law in some notes of delinquency Neither do I speak that they had this priviledge de jure but de facto Thus you see that this is no argument for Royallists who object the Sanhedrin's sparing of David and Solomon as a ground of the King 's arbitrary power And in this none is more ready then Salmasius Def. Reg. cap. 5. But they shall
by the State for committing adultery with a privat woman and committing murder against a privat man And what if I should hold the negative of the Question as indeed I make it a great case and do spare to determine upon either of the parts at this time yet would Royallists gain just nothing The Question between them and us is this Whether or not the King is unpunishable by man though turned a positive tyrant and forthwith a destroyer of the Commonwealth Friends shew me the like practice in David and the Sanhedrin's sparing him notwithstanding and I shall yeeld to you Ye are so far from being able to do so that weighing David's murder in a square ballance you will find it lighter then is supposed for neither he nor his had formally but virtually a hand in the murder of Uriah This is far from a destroving of the People 'T is not like Nero's wish that all Rome had but one Neck that he might cut it off Now Royallists must object from the Sanhedrin's sparing a Nero. Otherwise they beat the air and change the state of the Question Conclus 4. The Kings of the Jews de jure had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power This we make good firstly from divine institution and God's moulding of the King Deut. 17. from which is already proved Subsect 1. Assert 2. That the power of the Jewiâ—h king is hedged-in by Law And Josephus on the place saith That he should do nothing without the consent and advice of the Priest and Sanhedrin Antiq. Jud. lib. 14. cap. 8. 'T is but vanity in Salmasius to clude Josephus speech saying That his meaning is only concerning the Kings of the Jews after the captivity Def. Reg. cap. 2. Is he not blind that seeth not this man's deceit Sure I am that which is spoken of the King Deut. 17. was spoken long before the Kings of the Jews after the captivity yea long before there was any King in Israel 'T is the very positive rule and pattern of all Kings And Josephus in the place above cited as it were commenting on Moses words giveth the meaning of them Nay but you shall further observe the fallacy of this Gentleman He studieth to put his own construction as most beseemeth his honour upon Josephus words And yet notwithstanding he refelleth Josephus and cannot rest satisfied with his own construction Yea which is more he sleeth cap. 9. to what Josephus saith as to a main ruth in respect of all the Kings of Israel both before and after the Captivity Then tell me what manner of man can he be who cap. 2. declineth from and cap. 9. enclineth to Josephus In the one place he plainly denieth That the Kings of the Jews whether before or after the Captivity were tied to do nothing without the consent of the high-Priest and Sanhedrin And yet in the other place he affirmeth the contrary But he loseth all his labour whether to deny what Josephus saith or to glosse it according to his own humour for as afterward is shewed Josephus was no friend to Monarchy And which is more what Josephus faith is the common judgment of Jewish Writers Rex obediat curioe senatus majoris i. e. The King let him be obedient to the authority of the higher Sanhedrin Deut. 17. Senatus major intersiciendi gladio jus habeat i.e. Let the higher Sanhedrin have the right and power of killing by the sword Exod. 21. Nemo sese opponat decretts sanctioris Senatus i.e. Let none withstand and resist the Statutes of the greater Sandedrin Deut. 17. R. Mos Egypt proec aff 176. and 225. proec neg 316. It cannot be denied but the Jewish King was regulated seing not only he was oblidged to give obedience to the higher Sanhedrin but also every one without exception was tied not to contraveen the Acts and Sentence thereof He had not so much as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 much lesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The power of the sword was not in his hand but in the Sanhedrin's Thus his power was restricted as was the authority of the Lacedemonian king and the power of other Kings as is spoken-of already at length Yea Maimonides faith Qui ex familia Davidis sunc judicant judicantur And so in expounding that Rexneque judicat neque judicatur cod San. cap. 11. he saith That it is true in respect of the Kings of Israel but not in respect of the Kings of Judah And in what sense it is true concerning the Kings of Israel is already explicated by us The Gematick Writers from these words Ob house of David execute judgment in the morning and deliver him that is spoiled out of the band of the oppressour Jerem. 21. move this Question Nisi in jus vocari póssent quomodo judicarent i. e. How could the house of David judge unlesse they were judged This they prove because in Scripture we are commanded to search and try our wayes i.e. as they say Corrige te ipsum deinde alios corrige Salmasius rageth at this and he denieth what they infer I shall not take it upon me to make good their consequences Let Salmasius impugn them as much as he will My purpose is only to shew That they are not of his opinion They are contented not only to say That the king of the Jews at-least of Judah as Salmasius himself out of Sichardus R. Lakises hath was subjected to Law but also they dispute for that and endeavour to enforce it by Arguments Secondly from their acting with the concurrence of their Princes And David consulted with the Captains of thousands and hundreds and with every leader And David said uuto all the Congregation of Israel If it seem good unto you let us send abroad unto our brethren that they may gather themselves unto us 1 Chron. 13. There is much in this If it seem good unto you This insinuateth that as David would not act without the advice and counsel of his people so his acting depended from their determination For the King had taken counsel and his Priests and all the Congregation in Jerusalem to keep the Pass-over in the second moneth He doth it not of his own head without advice And the thing pleased the King and all the Congregation It is a thing done by common consent So they established a decree Mark it is not said So the King established a decree But the Authority both of King and Princes is interposed The decree floweth from the joynt-authority of both Therefore it is added So the posts went with Letters from the King and the Princes 2 Chron. 30. They go not forth as commissioned only from the King but also from the Princes And it is most remarkable that which Zedekiah said unto the Princes The King is not he that can do any thing against you Jerem. 38. Ergo if the King could do nothing against the will of the Princes he had not an arbitrary power to dispose upon matters as he pleased Inst The
likewise of the other Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text and it proporteth a ravenous and cruel away-taking but hear Josephus Kings will make confectionaries of your daughters for their own use kitchen-women dressers of cloath and they shall compel them to do any other service which dainsels for fear of strokes do perform Lec cit Nay but Brent loc cit is more full and plain Thirdly in order to the King 's a way-taking of their poslessions And be will take your fields c. It may be you think that your sons and your daughters will be well taken-off your hands and though he should wrong them he will not wrong your selves Peradventure you imagine his tyranny will take a stand there Nay but I 'll tell you if he take-away your sons and daughters he will also takeaway your substance And well know I if you get any courtesie at his hand ye'll have little reason to boast of it He will take the tenth from you Sure I am he will have so little respect to you to your children that serve him and to your pains in gathering riches together that what ye gain through the sweat of your brows he willet it out to any base fellow in his Court and ye dare not say it is evil done If this be not an act of tyranny saith Piscator then had not God punished Abâ—b for taking-away Naboth's vinevard Abab according to Law should have possessed it Schol in 1 Sam. 8. See Josephus Brent lcc cit Fourthly In order to his away-taking of the people's servants And he will take you men-servants and your maid-servants and your goodliest young-men and put them to his work 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text his tyranny shall not end at your sons and daughters and at your possessions but he shall violently rob you of your servants and if he take not all of them be sure he will take the chiefest of them sce plain Brent thid Fifthly In relation to his away-taking of their theep He will take away the tâ—nth of your sheep He will not leave you so much as a sheep's tail At least he will take the tenth of them 3. The consequent and event both of the general and particular part of the description is the effect of tyranny not of lawful authority Ye shall cry-out in that day because of your King whom ye shall have 〈◊〉 you We are sure that the people would never cry-out for exercising the just and lawful Acts of Regal Authority Thereby justice is promoted and vice is punished Which is a blessing and not a bondage for people to make them cry out in bitternâ— of spirit Thus it is abundantly made good that Samuel here doth not describe the power but the tyranny of the King Now in-starceth another question Whether or not doth the Prophet in this place 〈◊〉 Jews from secking a King as a King To which we answer affirmatively and prove it thus If the Prophet doth not disswade the people from seeking a King under the notion of a King then either because he only taxeth carnal confidence in them or arogancy and pride or precipitation only or else because they sought a King after the manner of the Nations But none of these Reasons whether conjunctly or severally are the aâ—aequat object of the Prophet's disswasion Firstly Because it is said That Samuel was displeased because they sought a King The text is not But the thing displeased Samuel when they said We will have confidence in a King c. But it is The thing displeased Samuel when they said Give us a King 'T is wrong Logick to take to King in esse accidentali At least 'c is very far setch'd Philosophy to take it under some extrinsecal and adjunctive notion or other Sce Josephus loc cit Brent hom 27. in 1 Sam. 8. Secondly Because God expresly commandeth Samuel solemnly to protest against the election of a King But if the Prophet should only have taxed them for incredulity arrogancy c. then should the Lord only have given Sa nuel orders to disswade them from these evils in laying out before them the wickednes thereof But the Prophet only layeth out before them the danger of Monarchy expresly disswadeth them therefrom Who can imagin if his main only purpose had been for disswading them from these evils and not from setting-up Royal Government amongst them but he would rather have turned his Royal Government amongst them but he would rather have turned his face against these evils in spreading-out the dangers thereof before their face then in pointing-out to them the evil of Monarchy Verily were it so he had harped upon the wrong string Thirdly the people's answer is in reference to Samuel's reasoning Nay but say they we will have a king over us This had been a very uncategorick answer yea plain non-sense if Samuel had been only taxing them for carnal confidence arrogancy sc. and dehorting them therefrom Fourthly Because we have shewed already That Samuel according to God's Commandment draweth motives from acts of tyranny that the King would exercise to disswade the people from seeking after him Would he say Ye think your King will ' fight your battels and save you from forrain invasion Well let it be so But I 'll tell you the King himself will tyrannize over you Get him when you will I warrant ye shall not be free of intestine trouble Nothing is so evil as that It is worse then sorrain war Therefore ye will do well to keep your selves free of him so long as ye want him Fifthly Whileas the Lord tacitly rebuketh them of carnal confidence in these words They have rejected Me that I should not reign over them he likewise in them insinuateth a reproof in order to their shaking-off the Government which he had instituted amongst them I was God's Ordinance yea the chiefest of its own kind But whosoever shaketh-off though the least of God's Ordinances doth shake-off God Himself Rom 13. I mean in a preposterous and carnal way delighting in change and going from the better to the worse So did the people of the Jews at this time Therfore God reproving them as rejecters of Democracy by way of consequence he checketh them as suiters of Monarchy for he could no waies have rebuked them for rejecting the one if he had not altogether allowed them in seeking after the other Sixthly They are reprehended and taxed expresly for seeking after a King I wil ' call unto the LORD that ye may perceive and see that your wickedness is great which ye have done in the fight of the LORD in asking you a King And all the people said unto Samuel Pray for thy servants unto the LORD thy God that we die not for we have added to all our sins this evil to ask us a king Ye have done al this wickedness 1 Sam. 12. Let the indifferent Reader
conducted them thorow the Red Sea he was as the mouth of God to them and by his favour with the Lord he furnished them with all necessaires in the wildernesse And it is known that the man was most eminently endowed matchlesse in his time Thus what Kingly power Moses had was not only accidentall but extraordinary Therefore it can be no ground to Royallists to build upon Conclus 2. After the institution of the seventy elders and the accomplishment of Jethro's counsell neither Moses nor any other of the Judges had a Kingly power Firstly The people desired Gideon to reign over them and offered to devolve the Kingdom over into the hands of his posterity And Gideon refused to do so and embraced not their offer Judg. 8. And he addeth this as the reason of his deniall The LORD shall rule over you As if he had said Neither I nor any of my posterity can take upon us to reign over you as your Kings Ye are the LORD' 's peculiar people Of whom the LORD hath a most special care Any that rule over you must be deputed by God in an extraordinary way They must take the word at his mouth ruling over you by an immediat dependency from him Now tell me whether or not was Gideon King at this time If he was King ergo he refused to embrace the power which he had And that is ridiculous If he was not King I obtain the point Again either they offered to Gideon a Kingly power or not If a Kingly power ergo either Gideon was not King or else by way of gratification they offered him the power which he had already And that had been in them greater impertinency then courtesie Yea they had dealt altogether ridiculously And sure I am Gideon had never answered them so as he did if he had had such power He had positively denied to enjoy that which really he did enjoy And that they did offer him a Kingly power is manifest 1 Because the word in the Originall text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth to lorde and govern in a kingly way Gon 4 37. Dan. 11. Mic. 5. and in many other places It hath affinity with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the Graecians changing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signisieth to reign in a kingly way 2 It could be no other then kingly power because Gideon wanted no power but that He judged them led forth their Armies and commanded in chief And consequently either he was not King or else the people offered no other power to him then what formerly he had And I cannot imagine that ever they would have been so impertinent to gratifie his labours with the offer of just nothing If they had done so they had forth with befooled themselves And if Gideon had not kingly power neither had any other of the Judges He had that same power and no losse which they had They were all Judges alike Secondly Abimelcch had different power from the Judges What power he had was kingly This is evident 1. From the question he putteth-up unto his mother's brethren whereby he pleadeth to reign over the people of Israel He useth there the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the people used in offering to Gideon and his posterity power to reign over them And as is said already it implieth a kingly-ruling power 2. From Jotham's parable wherein the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used and this under a parabolick notion he alludeth to Abimelech And it cannot be denied but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is seldome or never used under any other signification then King Precisely and ordinarily it is onely attributed to one of a kingly power You will finde it so in innumerable places of Scripture 3. From Jotham's application of the paâ—able to Abimelech In it is used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence is deâ—ived 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both of them ordinarily are onely applied to persons of kingly authority See Judg. 9. This is according as it is written in Chron Alex. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i.e. this is Abimelech who made himself King in the Kingdom or who tyrannously made himself King I pray you why doth the Holy Ghost call the Judges 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Judges and Abimelech 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King if he had not been of a Kingly and different power from them I confesse Judg. 17 18 19 and 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is spoken concerning the judge yet not properly but metaphorically it is spoken so moeroris gratia to expresse the dolefulness of the want of Authority or of persons in Authority And I must needs say that authoritativeness 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is competent whether to the kingly person or to the kingly power therefore the holy ghost in these places expresseth his purpose by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and this he doth not apply to one particular judge as to Abimelech but to the whole incorporation of Judges Then hear Either Abimelech had different power from the Judges or not If different ergo the Judges were not Kings and had not Kingly power The greatest power Abimelech had was Kingly And therein he was differenced from the Judges You cannot say that his power was not different from theirs as is shewed already And consequently his power at the most being kingly and notwithstanding different from the authority of the Judges it necessarily followeth that the Judges had not kingly power Thirdly If the Judges had had kingly power then there had been no change in the Government after Saul was ordained King Thus there had been change nomine but not re And so the people in vain had sought a King and Samuel in vain had denied them a King Thus they sought nothing and he denied nothing but what they had before Bellarmine de Rom. pont lib. 1. cap. 2. though to no purpose laboureth to elude this distinguishing between Rex Prorex Indeed we cannot but much commend him because he saith That God in the time of the Judges was the proper and peculiar King of the Jews This is shewed already And so implieth Gideon's answer Judg. 8. And this cutteth the back of what Bellarmine saith for so they being but Viceroys and God the only King then had they not properly kingly power This is what I crave Yet in the interim I demand whether or not they could extend their power as the Kings And that they could not is manifest Because they had no more power then any of the Seventy and higher Sanhedrin The Seventy were chosen to bear equal burden with Moses and the Judge in all the weightiest and most publick matters Num. 11. Now either conjunctively or disjunctively they had equal power with Moses and the Judge If but conjunctively these two absurdities will follow Firstly that the Judge was not subject to the Sanhedrin for the equal is not subject
native liberty to him though in a larger measure he be capable of it But Democracy giveth people their full liberty which they had in the state of perfection in so much as they are capable of it It withholdeth nothing of it from them which in conveniency and without violation of the Law it can give unto them It cannot conveniently give them the whole liberty which they had in their primary condition Otherwise they should be without government And so they should become out-laws loose and dissolute Thus they should come under the dominion of sin Which is not liberty but slavery To prevent the incurable and extreame contagion of which Nature hath provided Government as a remedy And that government which advanceth Nature in the state of fallen man in as much as it is capable of to the liberty which it had in the state of innocency and before the fall no question must be the chiefest temedy against such contagion Thus Nature in the state of Corruption is advanced so neer as is possible to it's state it was in in the case of perfection But Democracy a mongst all Governments is that which advanceth Nature neerest to the liberty which it had in the state of perfection It giveth liberty not onely to one and some few but also to all It with-holdeth liberty from none in so far as it can consubsist with obedience to the Law to which Man was subjected in the very state of innocency It no otherwise with-holdeth liberty but as it preventeth Corruption's slavery Ergo of all Governments it is simply best No wonder for it advanceth Man neerest the condition he was in in the state of perfection SECT IV. Whether or not is it lawful to resist the Royal Person and decline the Royal Authority IT will be greater ease for us to remove this difficulty then those which formerly by the Lords abundant help we have fully discussed You learn our mind in this matter from that which followeth Assert 1. It is not lawful to resist the King as King nor the Kingly Power as the Kingly power There is very good reason for this for the King as King is ordained by God and Kingly Government in it self is God's Ordinance Therefore formally positively and directly we cannot resist the King nor the Kingly power unlesse we be found fighters against God This is at length made good by us sect 1. ass 1. Assert 2. It is lawful and commendable to resist the tyranny of the King and the abuse of his power This we make good from several examples in Scripture 1. From the example of Saul's Army which in resisting him rescued Jonathan from his fury 1. Sam. 14. Royallists such as Mr. Symons and Ferne do opinionate this was done by no violence but by prayers and tears But this is salse There is not a word of prayers and tears in the text The people without and contrary to the King's consent enter in oath for rescuing Jonathan Yea which is more contrary to the King's oath they laid their heads together and did bind themselves by oath to rescue him The King's oath is God do so and more also for thou shalt surely die Jonathan The People's oath is contrary to that As the Lord liveth there shall not one hair of his head fall to the ground They go not behind his back but they tell it him in his face the people said unto Saul Shall Jonathan die Thus they withstand him to his face The very highest degree of resistance 2. David resisted and withstood Saui's sury 1 Sam. 22.23 c. 1 Chr. 12. Nay but Arnisaus saith Davi's fact in resisting Saul and defending himself by arm against him was extraordinary He was anointed and designed by God as successour to Saul But the man is far mistaken for if it be lawful in an extraordinary case to resist Kings no question in it self it is lawful to resist them And so it being in it self a thing lawful it may be put in action both in an extraordinary and ordinary case See subsect 2. prop. 1. And though David was designed King by the Lord yet was he not formally called thereto by the People in the time of Saul's reign Will any deny but Saul so long as he lived was King over Israel and that David was his subject Otherwise David was very far out of it in calling him The Lords Anointed his Master Lord and King We say no more but refer you to Lex Rex quoest 32 Salmasius finding-out another starting-hole faith David with arms only defended himself against Saul's tyranny but not to cut him off as the English Rebels and bloody butchers did in cutting-off Charls 1. Def. Reg. cap. 4. This is all we say concerning David And there was very good reason for it why David did not cut him off though he was several times at his mercy Firstly because he could not do it legally Though he had power legally to resist him yet had he not power legally to cut him off The very Law of Nature teacheth self-defence though by the sinallest means But the off-cutting of the Delinquent only belongeth to the Magistrate and Judge unlesse it be in an extraordinary cafe Nature hath alwaies Law enough for self-defence but not so for punishing Delinquents The one is natural the other political Secondly no question David by extraordinary impulsion was carried-by the off-cutting of Saul Whileas Abishai went about to kill him David forbade him And told him he should be cut-off and perish another way 1 Sam. 26. Where you shall find David dehorting Abishai from laying hands on Saul from these two grounds Firstly from the non-legality of the fact He is the Lords Anointed Thus he holdeth Saul as his superiour And therefore he had not power to cut him off 'T is usurpation in the inseriour to rise against the superiour Secondly from the assurance of Saul's perishing another way As the Lord liveth the Lord shall smite him or his day shall come to die or he shall descend into battel and perish Would David say It is needlesse either for me or for thee Abishai to lay hands on Saul Assure thy self he shall be cut off another way But I belceve this man cannot say the Representative of the English Commonwealth had such reasons for them for keeping them back from cutting off Charles Stuart 3. Elishah commanded to shut the door upon Jehoram's teeth He calleth him the son of a murderer See ye how the son of a murderer hath sent to take-away mine head Look when the messenger cometh shut the doer and hold him fast at the door 2 Kin. 6. Thus he giveth orders to the Elders those who did fit in the Sanhedrin being with him in the house violently to keep it out against Jehoram and his messenger The word in the original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proporteth a most violent way of resisting it signifieth a holding fast at the door with pressing so the seventy Chaldee paraphrast Avenarius and
THE Survey of Policy OR A FREE VINDICATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND AGAINST Salmasius and other Royallists And ye have this day rejected your God and ye have said unto Him Nay but set a King over us 1 Sam. 10.19 I will call unto the Lord and he shall send thunder and rain that ye may perceive and see that your wickedness is great which ye have done in the sight of the Lord in asking you a King 1 Sam. 12.17 And all the People said unto Samuel we have added unto all our sins this evil to ask us a King Ibid. ver 19. But if ye shall still do wickedly ye shall be consumed both ye and your King Ibid. ver 29. The Lord of hosts hath purposed it to stain the pride of all glory and to bring into contempt all the honourable of the earth Isa 23.9 By PETER ENGLISH a friend to Freedom LEITH Printed in the Year 1653. Feb 2d TO THE Very Honourable and truly Godly the LORD-GENERAL CROMWELL Greeting My LORD WHile I was thinking to whom I might dedicat this Book in which is asserted the Authority and Non-usurpation of the Commonwealth of England I judged none more fit then him to whose patronage I might commit it who hath most promoted the Liberty lately obtained under the power and protection of the God of Israel And thus among many I made choice of your Lordship Albeit I look upon Kingly Government as that which is inconsubsistent with just Freedom and Liberty nevertheless under what Power and Authority I am be what it will I am willing to give unto Caesar that which is Caesar's And therefore I will humbly offer my judgment to your Lordship in this case which I hope will be useful to abate the seditiousness of spirit to which many as is at least pretended upon a conscientious accompt are bent It will not be amiss to distinguish between the case of Superiority and Inferiority Now the Word of God will have the inferiour subject to the superiour without any resistance not only for wrath but also for conscience-sake Rom. 12.1 The higher can never be without the lower the one necessarily pre-supposing the other And therefore that which is lower and inferiour ought to be subject to the higher and superiour Hence it is Jesus Christ his Apostles subjected themselves to the greatest of tyrants even to such whose title and right depended meetly from the sword So then put me under the Turk's command I shall not dispute his power Shew me where Christ or any of his Apostles dispute the authority of any power they lived under It is undeniable they spoke and preached against all manner of sin and vice bearing faithful witness against it And thus they witnessed against the sins of Princes aswel as of the People Howsoever there is a great difference between a Magistrate as a Magistrate and as a man As a Magistrate he cannot fail but either in tyranny or in injustice or else in bribery As a man he is subject to personal infirmities as others arâ— I must confess the Gospel witnesseth abundantly against all these failings But as I understand the Gospel doth not allow the inferiour to speak directly and by way of application against the Magistrate as he faileth in his office I do not read where Christ or his Apostles charged any Ruler with tyranny injustice or bribery in the discharge of his trust Sure I am there were many unjust Judge in their time I made that Christ called Herod a Fox and Paul called Nero a Lion But the Law could not conclude from hence that any thing was spoken against them as Magistrates Because as men they were 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 as Foxes and cruel as Lion And thus the Law could make no other but their speaking against personal taults in the Magistrate And I judge it not unlawful upon some serious accompts though not by all persons and at all occasions to speak against the personal sins of the Magistrate in a down-right way as did the Baptist to Herod If this will not satisfie then observe that Christ was not at that time subject to Herod but to Pilate And may not I speak against any tyrannous Magistrate to whose Law Government I am not subjected Yea against the great Turk though I might not being under his Authority Nâ—y but I choose rather to say as the scope of Christ's words insinuate in opposition to the disdainful bragging of the Pharisees that Christ opposeth his divine and kingly power to Herod's tyranny upon which accompt he defieth his despiaht as being impossible for him to act any thing to in s prejudice or alteration of his purpose And as for that of Paul it is not clear what he meaneth by the Lion Only this much he is pleased to be a little free with his dear friend Timothy And truly I may use so much freedom with my dear friend as with mine own heart But what is all this for the subject to call the Magistrate to his face A tyrannous and partial Judge granting he be so Shall I therefore both in private and publick speak what I will making an ordinary trade of it against his unfaithfulness in managing his office Scripture doth not allow me to think any thing against him in my Bed-chamber Eccles â—0 20 Is it fit to say to a King thou are wicked and to Princes ye are ungodly Job 34 18. Surely It is not good to 〈◊〉 Princes for equty Pro. 17.26 We must not revile the Judges nor curse to Ruler of the People Exod. 22.28 Acts 23.5 And we see how that Paul in all his arraignments maketh his constant plea that in his preaching the Gospel he spake nothing whether against the Magistrate or the Law of the Nation whereupon many times he escaped Yea John the Baptist doth not dispute the quarrel of the Romon Souldiers but waving State-matters exhorteth them to their duty as is pertinent to a Gospel-Preacher Notwithstanding I would have it seriously minded that I only speak of the duty of the inferiour toward the superiour so that whatsoever is really and properly inferiour ought without disputing the matter give due obedience to the superiour not resisting the higher power Now say I every individual subject seorsim or any inconsiderable number thereof is inferiour to the Magistrate And therefore ought not to resist his power I admire how any person or persons who are not in a capacity yea not so much as in a probability of withstanding the Mastistrat's power dare adventure to do so unless miraculously and extraordinarily assisted as were the Prophets of old even though not only to them but also revera his power is tyrannous and his commands unjust Will any rational man say I ought to resist an hundred high-way Robbers and not give them that which they seek though unjustly If I did so whatsoever evill befell me in resisting I should be accessory to it my self as none in reason can deny But if it
cannot be contraveened so it is laid on us as a necessary duty to subject our selves for conscience sake to him who executeth the purpose of GOD according to the prescript of GOD'S wil Rom. 13. So then in such cases as GOD can not be contraveened no more can the Kingly power be withstood but what it enacteth according to equity reason should absolutely be obeyed In this sense the Holy Ghost commandeth obedience and subjection not onely to Kings but also to all other Rulers Tit. 3.1 Per. 2. Kings and all Magistrats in this sense are called Gods GOD'S Deputies and Lieutenants upon Earth Ex. 4. and 22. Ps 82. feeders of the LORD'S people Ps 78. the shields of the Earth Ps 47. nursing Fathers of the Church Is 49 Captains over the LORD'S people 1. Sam. 9. Their Throne is the Throne of GOD 1. Chr. 19 their judgment is the judgment of the LORD 2. Chr. 19. The Land lyeth under great judgment when it wanteth them Is 3. Who then dare adventure in such respects any way to contraveen the Kingly power and to decline his authority for so there is a divine sentence in his lips his mouth transgresseth not in judgment his Throne is established by righteousnesse righteous lips are his delight and he loveth him that speaketh right his wrath is as messengers of death but in the light of his countenance is life and his favour is as a cloud of the latter rain Prov. 16. In such cases his wrath is as the roaring of a Lion but his favour is as dew upon the grasse he sitteth in the Throne of judgment scattering away all evill with his eyes scattering the wicked and bringing the wheel over them So mercy and truth preserve him and his Throne is upholden by mercy Yea his fear is as the roaring of a Lyon so that he who provoketh him to anger sineth against his own soul Prov. 19 and 20. Upon these grounds and in these respects Solomon exhorteth us to honour the King Proverb 24. and not to strike Princes for equity Prov. 17. Therefore the Kingly power as it is in it self and as it executeth the purpose of the just LORD of Heaven and Earth according to the LORD' 's good will and pleasure neither his power nor the just Acts thereof can be any more contraveened then the power of GOD and that which he commandeth to be performed for so the King's power is GOD'S power and what he doth is according to divine authority And in these notions we hold the Kingly power to be absolute for so as his power in such respects can not be contraveened in like manner he may lawfully execute every thing that is good and expedient with a full and vast power according to Law and reason So the power of the King of kings is vast and absolute not because he may do both justly and unjustly according to his pleasure but because he may do every thing that seemeth good in his eyes according to justice In this sense I confess Salustius his Author saith very well Impune quidvis facere id est Regem esse Indeed the King may do every thing that is just and equitable according to Law and Reason and deserveth not to be punished therfore This is the same which Solomon saith Eccl. 8. v. 3. and 4. compared with Prov. 17.26 Albeit we may put such a favorable construction upon these words yet do we doubt much if Salustius his Author's meaning be such Indeed I take him to be of Aristotle's opinion who saith concerning the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pol. 1. 3. c. 12. The Law also saith concerning the King Tanta est ejus celsitudo ut non posset ei imponi Lex in Regne suo Curt. in consol 65. col 6. ad F. Petr. Rebuf notab 3. repet L. un c. Omnia sunt possibilia Regi Imperator omnia potest Bald. in Sect. F. de no. for fid in F. in 1 Constit C. col 2. Chass catal glor mun part 5. consid 24. All these go no other wayes saith our learned Country-man but thus The King can do all things which by Law he can do and that holdeth in him Id possumus quod jure possumus Lex Rex 9.26 ass 3. This is a very quick and noble glosse But for my self as I judge their meaning to be nothing such so I am indifferent whether it be so or not No question there be many who do plead for absolute and arbitrary Monarchy beside the Nation of Royallists And those to whose temper absolute Monarchy doth most relish we find to be attended with these qualifications 1 They are meerly heroick and ambitious So were the Giants before the Flood Gen. 6. Beros Antiq. l. 1. Nimrod after the Flood Gen. 10. Bern. Antiq. l. 4. and all the rest of the great Heroes Arist pol. 3. c. 10. 2 They are meerly tyrannous and cruel So we find that Pharaoh had an arbitrary power over the People of Israel Exod. 1 and 5. Nebuchad-nezzar had the like power over his Kingdoms Dan. 2. and 3. By vertue of Ahasuerus absolute power Haman was licenced to exercise tyranny on the People of the Jews Est 3. We might alledge many examples to this purpose But the point is most clear in it self for those who are of a tyrannous disposition can endure no Law but their will Otherwise they could never get their tyranny exercised 3 Those whom we find chief pleaders for absolute Monarchy are either concerned therein themselves as Alexander M. and M. Aurelius and such like or else Flatterers and Court-Parasites as Lyricus Rom. Virgil and such like And of this sort we find none more violent in this matter than Dr. Fern Hugo Grotius Arnisaeus Spalato c. whose foot-steps with his ful-speed Salmasius doth trace But although men by way of flattery and by-respect may act and plead for arbitrary Monarchy yet let me tell you I do not imagin but they may act and plead for it through simple error and delusion And so I conclude that Aristotle Xiphilin Salust and the foresaid Lawyers do much run this way though they be more moderate in the matter then the rest And as afterward is shewed we find the Talmudick and Rabbinick Writers this way somewhat inclining to the lawless and arbitrary power of absolute Monarchy Assert 2. The King hath not a power above Law and a Prerogative Royal to dispose upon things according to his pleasure whether with or against Law and Reason Firstly Such an arbitrary and vast power is repugnant to the first Institution and Scripture-mould of Kings According to the Holy Ghost's way of moulding the King he is thus qualified 1 He is an Elective King chosen by the People in subordination to God Thou shalt in any wayes set him King over thee whom the LORD thy God shall choose Deut. 17. 2 A Brother-King and not a stranger-King One from amongst thy Brethren shalt thou set King over thee thou mayest not set
death The eminency of the man and the way of his falling would put me to my second thoughts albeit I should endeavour nothing therein but justice Well call it injustice in the Sanhedrin to have spared David and Solomon yet would I not have you to wonder too much thereat There is great difference between a David and an Ahab a Solomon and a Jeroboam Such are not all dayes men And therefore I must needs say that as the Sanhedrin spared David and Solomon from thoughts of the singularity and eminency of the men far more would Noah's posterity in the golden age have spared Noah though in many things delinquent for as the man was most eminent and singular and could not have fallen but by an extraordinary desertion and for most good and noble ends so he had a priviledge from Nature above all in his time Yea in David and Solomon's time people were well seen in Laws and politick Constitutions The Sanhedrin needed not to have spared David and Solomon through ignorance and want of skill But it was far otherwise in the golden age in Noah's time Then men were but Apprentises and spelling the first side of the Catechisme of Policy Every thing was but in its beginnings in its first rudiments Let it be so that de facto and not de jure in the golden age Noah's posterity denied not to him an absolute and uncircumscribed power I seek no more but that And I may say that though at that time de facto Noah should have had immunity from the exercise of Law against him though much delinquent yet shall I not think that ever Noah claimed such a priviledge to himself as competent to him de jure and according to the Law As for Noah's authority and power after his posterity was divided into factions before we can determin upon it you shall mark with me immediatly after the golden age that there were three divided and dist not parties 1. The godly party 2. The heroick party 3. The politick party The godly party was of the posterity of Shem. These followed Noah and walked in his wayes The heroick and politick party were of the posterity of Ham and Japhet And as the heroick party followed Nimrod so the politick party followed Ham whom the Chaldeans call Chemesenuus No question Noah immediatly after the golden age had a vast and absolute power over the godly and those who walked in his wayes You may learn the reasons of this from what is above-written And as for the heroick and politick party it would seem probable that they contemned Noah and slighted his Authority for they walked contrary to his wayes Gen. 10.11 It is known how that Ham the head of the politick yea and of the magical party did mock Noah Gen. 9. Beros an t lib. 3. Yea Nimrod the head of the heroick party contrary to the mind and purpose of Noah caused Babel to be built Gen. 10.11 Ber. ant lib. 4. But notwithstanding this we may say that at the most it concludeth that such were disobedient to Noah and walked contrary to his will But it will not conclude that such denied to Noah immunity from the Law V. g. A prodigal and riotous son may work and act contrary to his father's will But it doth not follow ergo sach a child doth strike and punish his father Nay a debording child may act contrary to his father's wil and be so far from eclipsing his power over him that he may in patience endure his correction over him So we read that Ham did not repine against his father's reproving and cursing him Gen. 10. Yea Berosus storieth that Noah did shut him out from his presence and he did so accordingly ant lib. 3. And beside that he telleth us that Noah Nin. an 19. gave him liberty to stay beside him three years in Italy But finding how he did corrupt the Colonies there he commanded him to be gone and he did so And yet at this time he was the Saturn of Egypt a mighty King and of great power both in Egypt and in Italy Ant. lib. 5. I think there is very good reason for it to say that Noah in so far had an absolute power over them as that none of them in a direct and positive way would have acted against his commandment despising him as an enemy and as one on whom they would and did execute their fury The most we can call them is disobedient but not rebels to Noah They acted against his will but not in despight of his will They took not liberty from him to do his will though they took liberty to do their own will also We can not think that the light of Nature was so far extinguished in them that they did not honour him as their father A debording son as Esau can entertain Isaac with Venison though he walk not in his wayes And I do not think if they had not honoured him as their common father unlesse they had been extraordinarily restrained they had destroyed him and all his followers Sure I am they wanted not power to do so The godly party was but an handful in respect of them What then I pray you could be the ordinary mean of their restraint but their natural respect and affection toward him Nay they honoured him so much that they esteemed him their Coelum their Sol their Chaos the semen mundi yea and the father both of the greater and lesser gods Ber. ant lib. 3. And what we have spoken of Noah the like also may be said of Adam Before the Flood there was also a golden age 1556 years Wherein men lived as under one common father each of them knowing the intimate relations one to another until Monarchy was erected till the close of the 500 year of Noah's age as is shewed already Before which time Adam had died 626 years and Seth 514 years But so long as Adam lived what superiority Noah had over his posterity in the golden age after the Flood Adam had it rather in a more then leste measure then he Adam was not onely their common father but also he was their first and primary father As we have evinced the truth of this point from examples in Scripture so we may evidence it from examples in humane Histories V. G. The Mitylenians gave to Pittacus an absolute power of governing because of his personal endowments Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. de Pit Arist Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. The like power did the Athenians confer upon Solon upon the same accompt Diog. La. de Sol. Plut. in Sol. So it is alledged that James 6. because of his pretended personal endowments obtained an absolute power and a negative voice in Parliament In the interim observe That those who allow absolute Monarchy because of personal endowments do not imagine that Kings have an absolute power because they are Kings but as they are such Kings i. e. Kings not only in respect of station but also in
Athenian Kings were differenced from the Athenian Princes so it is most probable that after such a manner these three foresaid kindes of Athenian Princes were differenced each-one from another and therefore it is alledged that a Commonwealth was not erected amongst the Athenians till annuall Princes were set over them Which maketh the Princes of the first and second kinde though not of the third to be reckoned up as Kings Yet they must give me leave to say that though the Athenian Common-wealth was not fully and compleatly established till the up-setting of annuall and yearly Princes notwithstanding in some degree or other there was ever a Commonwealth amongst them from the dayes of Theseus untill some of their annuall Princes began to usurp and brought them under bondage for not onely as is said already their Princes of the third kinde but also their Kings and Princes of the first and second fort were subjected to Law and the people had a ruling power over them And so all of them had the like power according to the effentiall frame of a regulated and non-absolute power though the Kings had a more vaste authority and might extend their power further according to Law then the Princes and those of the first kinde then the Princes of the second or at least of the third kinde Even-as Majors v. g. have greater power then Alder-men and Alder-men then Counsellours Howsoever we find that the Princes of the third kinde are also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as well as the rest They are said to have had the power of the battell and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the sacrifices He who had this power is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King Thus we finde that he had that same power which the Lacedemonian Kings had But it is afterward shewed that such were proper though not absolute Kings Well I regard not though you esteem not such as Kings properly so called I lose nothing by this If we argue from examples of former and ancient Commonwealths then have we the Athenian and Lacedemonian Republicks as presidents of a popular government and Common-wealth Friend this is the mark we drive most at in the matter in hand Those Princes who governed as Kings did usurp a greater power then what according to the fundamentall government of the Kingdome and the institution of Theseus did belong to them So Cylon endeavoured but his attempt was choked in the bud Herod lib. 5. Thucid. lib. 1. Herac. de Pol. Ath. Cic. de leg Phutar de Sol. But what he intended Pisistratus acted as is storied by the same authors together with Diogenes Laertius Valerius maximus and Diodore And that usurpation continued untill Thrasybilus and Rhinon's dayes These did vindicate the liberty of the Athenians against those tyrants who did keep them under bondage Herac. de Pol. Ath. Val. max. lib. 4. cap. 1. lib. 5. cap. 6. Aemil. Prob. de Thras And so their government turned meerly popular and became an even-down Commonwealth Alex. ab Alex. lib. 4. cap. 23. And as for these Princes we deny not nor can we say otherwise but they had not onely as great but also greater power then any of the Athenian Kings whether Theseus or any King that succeeded him And that they were of equall power at-least is evident for they did reign not as Princes but as Kings Her de Polit. Ath. And Pisistratus one of these usurping Kings in his Epistle to Solon saith plainly that he walked according to Solon's Lawes differing in nothing from the people but in honour and dignity But he addeth that he took upon him that power which the Athenians conferred upon Codrus and his posterity And in this he acknowledgeth that he sailed and had such a power not by the Law of the Kingdom but by a Law of his own making Whence it is evident that Pisistratus by usurpation took upon him as great power as did Codrus or any of his race Yea and that they had greater power is also clear for Justine storieth That after Codrus while-as the Administration of the Republick vvas given over into the hands of yearly Magistrates the King's lust became the People's law Thus he telleth us that in the times of defection and vvhile-as corruption entered the State of Athens Kings became absolute and vvere of an arbitrary povver Post Codrum administratio Reipublicae annuis Magistratibus permissacst Sed Civitatinnullae Leges tune erant quia libido Regum pro legibus habebatur And aftervvard he speaketh how they vvere reformed by Solon and hovv Pisistratus and others vvho succeeded him did tyrannize over them Lib. 2. Solon looked upon the Athenians under Pisistratus reign albeit he governed according to Solon's Lavvs as under the yoke of bondage 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. And it is reported that Cleon and those who followed him destroyed the Commonwealth Great tyranny there indeed and arbitrariness of power Her de Pol. Ath. Thus we see clearly how that not onely Kings in after-times were regulated and in all things subjected to Law but also as some of the Athenian Princes were inferiour so some of them were superiour to the Athenian Kings In Corinth the Kingly Government was also regulated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Herac. de Pol. Corinth i.e. Periander first changed the Commonwealth taking to himself a guard and at last appointing to himself a Senate Now you must not think that this Senate had not power over Periander 1. Because that Senate cannot properly be called a Senat wherein the King hath a negative voice It is but at the most a cypher far from the nature of Senates that were in old amongst the Athenians Carthaginians c. 2. Because Periander in his Epistle to Solon advised at him what he should do in securing himself from those who went about to kill him And Solon in his Epistle to him advised him to lay-down his lording power It is very easie to know what hath been the cause why his own subjects endeavoured to cut him off for it is reported of him that he was the first King who went conveyed with a guard of Souldiers Whereupon he suffered none to live in the City This could not but irritate his subjects against him and make them conspire against his life See Herod lib. 5. Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. Periand Herac. de Pol. Corin. Thra. sibulus counsel was just contrary to Solon's He desired him to spare none whether friend or foe but cut all off Which he did indeed as Herodot reporteth But we must think that he advised with Solon after he had put in execution Thrasibulus counsel for Solon in his Epistle to him telleth him That the way to secure himself in his Kingdom was not to cut-off any but to lay-down his lording power over them This infinuateth that he had followed Thrasibulus counsel and had cut-off his subjects before either Solon wrote to him or he had
lording and tyrannick power to be given to the King nor did he put such power in the people's hand as to beget jealousie and envie against the kingly power And Aristotle saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 10. i.e. The Kingly Power in the Laconick Commonwealth is most restricted to Law for it hath not a vaste and arbitrary power This maketh him say Pol. 2. cap. 7 9. That the Kingly Power was subjected to the People and the Ephori had the greatest power in the Commonwealth Which commeth just to that which Heraclid saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 De Pol. Laced i.e. The Lacedemonian Ephori had the greatest power in the Commonwealth Xenophon likewise faith That the King did swear monethly to the People to govern according to Law De Rep. Lac. lib. And Nicolaus Damascenus That he did swear to govern according to Law before he got the Crown 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 De Mor. Gent. Laced And how great the power of the Ephori the Representative of the People was over all the rest of the Magistrates in the Commonwealth you may learn it from Plat. de Leg. lib. 4. Isoc Pan. Plut. de Civil Instit Whereupon faith Xenophon they had power of deposing imprisoning and judging even to the sentence of death the rest of the Magistrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 De rep Laced lib. And because of the vastness of their power over the rest of the Magistrates they did at their own hand imprison and condemn Agis their King Plut. in Ag. In this they went against the Law of the Nation because according to it they had only power to judge and sentence their King while-as the King of the other family did sit upon the Bench with them Pausan Lacon But they without the concurrence of any at their own hand did imprison and sentence Agis The power of the Lacedemonian King is taken-up in these notions 1. At home he had charge of the sacrifices Arist Pol. 3. cap. 10. Herod lib. 6. Xenoph. de rep Lac. lib. of ordaining Magistrates and Priests and of dismissing Messages whether friendly or hostile See Herod Xenoph. ibid. But Xenophon faith That at home he had but the honour of a private man 2. From home and in the battel he was first and had the chief hand in managing the matters of the war So say the forecited Authours Inst 1. The Lacedemonian Monarchy saith Salmasius was peculiar All other Monarchies beside were absolute and of an uncircumscribed power though some were more intense and some more remisse And saith he the Lacedemonian Kings were rather General Captains then Kings Therefore Aristotle defineth their power to be a power of commanding the battel from a perpetual title of birth-right Pol. 3. cap. 10.14 Yea and though the Lacedemonian Ephori did cut-off Agis yet not withstanding the people did abominate and detest that fact Def. Reg. cap. 8. Wherefore the man doth esteem the annual Carthaginian Kings properly not to have been Kings Otherwise saith he the Judges of Israel may also properly be called Kings for they had that same power which the Carthaginian Kings had The one were called Sophetim and the other Sufetes Both which come to one purpose And yet saith he the Scripture calleth the Judges of Israel Kings Judg. 18. But this must be taken in an improper sense And so he concludeth that Probus doth call the Carthaginian Sufetes Kings improperly Def. Reg. cap. 7. Ans We do much wonder at the man who is not ashamed to say that all Monarchies besides the Lacedemonian were absolute and unsubjected to Law We have evinced the contrary of that already having shewed from the examples of many Commonwealths that Kings were no lesse subjected to Law then any of the people And in this the manner of Royall Power amongst the Romans is not wanting The power of the King was subjected to the Senate Rex ad Senatum referebat Pomp. Let. de mag Rom. i.e. The King had his referres to the Senate Penes hoc quidens senateres adeo semper totius Reipublicae summa innixaest ut ne Reges quidem Consules aut Dictatores aut alius quispiam magistratus inconsulto Senatu quippiam moliretur Fenest de mag Rom. i.e. The sum and head of the whole Commonwealth did ever so depend from these senatours that even Kings Consuls or Dictators or any other Magistrate did not enterprise any thing without consulting the Senat. Senatores velutipresides Reipublica custodes tanta authoritatisfuere ut si populus Regem aut magistratum quempiam jussisset id sic ratum foret si Senatus author fieret Alex. ab Al. lib. 4. cap. 11. i.e. The Senatours as Praesidents and keepers of the Republick were of so great authority that if the people had commanded the King or any Magistrate that accordingly should be ratified if the Senat authorized it See also Liv. lib. 1. Dionys lib. 2. Digest lib. 1. tit 9. Luci. Ann. lib. 1. cap. 1. Plut. in Romul Aye which is more Dictatours whereof Julius Caesar was one who amongst the Romans were of greater power then Kings were subjected to the Tribunes for it is reported that M. Fabius appealing from L. Papyrius Dictatour to the Tribunes by their authority exempted his son 2. Fabius from pun shment Alex. de Alex. lib. 1. Well we shall not alledge that the Tribunes the Representative of the people had greater authority positively in exercising acts of Law then the Dictatours for not onely Alexander ab Alex. lib. 1. Geni di cap. 3. lib. 4. cap. 23. lib. 5. cap. 2. but also Pomponius Let. de magist Rom. and Fenestella de mag Rem lib. alt do plainly say that in respect of positive authority the Dictatours were above the Tribunes and there was no appellation from them Yet all of them say that in respect of negative authority the Tribunes were above Dictatours Consuls and all the rest of the Roman Magistrates because they had power of interdicting and discharging all the rest of the Magistrates Dictatours or any other from undertaking any thing as they judged sit and expedient should neither be acted-for nor against And so having this power de jure as is condescended upon by Alexander himself and all others I admire why Alexander maketh any question concerning M. Fabius appellation from the Dictatour to the Tribunes for so he did not appeal to them as to judges of greater authority then the Dictatour but as to propugnatours and defenders having a power of inhibiting what was done as they judged amisse by the rest of the Magistrates Albeit they had not a main voice in judging wherein the power of the Dictatour was above their's and in descerning yet had they a main voice in defending approving and disapproving And whereas this man alledgeth that Aristotle is of his judgement he is close mistaken For Aristotle doth not define the Laconick Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the power of the battell according to a