Suspended were Seniors to the Consenting Scholars Then they find that after this Sentence Painter was elected into the Rectorship Concurrentibus omnibus requisitis si praedict ' Officium Rectoris eo tempore fuit vacans and that Dr. Bury 1 June Anno Jac. 2. semper postea usque sententiam praedict ' si sententia in contrar ' non valeat semper postea fuit adhuc est verus legitimus Rector Collegij praedict ' That William Painter as Rector and the Scholars of the said Colledge did make the Demise in the Declaration and thereon the Plaintiff entred and Dr. Bury enters on him and holds and yet doth hold him out modo forma prout in nar ' c. sed utrum super totam materiam praedict ' locus Rectoris per privation ' praedictam praed ' Arthuri legitime vacavit nec ne the Jury are ignorant si per inde locus praedict ' legitime vacavit tunc pro quaerent ' si non tunc pro Defendent ' It was argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That this Judgment was illegal and the general Question was Whether this Sentence of Deprivation thus given by the Visitor against Dr. Bury did make the Rectorship void as to him and so consequently gave a Title to the Lessor of the Plaintiff But upon this Record the Questions were two 1. Whether or no by the Constitution of this Colledge the Bishop had a Power in this Case to give a Sentence 2. Supposing that he had such a Power Whether the Justice of that Sentence were examinable in Westminster-hall upon that Action And 1. 't was argued That the Bishop had such a Power to give a Sentence and it was agreed that he could make his Visitation but once in five Years unless he be called by the Request of the Colledge and if he comes uncalled within the five Years his Visitation would be void But yet the Visitation of the 24th of July was a good Visitation and consequently the Sentence upon it is good that there was no colour to make Dr. Masters's coming in March to examine Colmer's Appeal upon the Visitor's Commission to be a Visitation and that because it was a Commission upon a particular Complaint made by a single expelled Fellow for a particular Wrong and Injury supposed to be done to him and not a general Authority to exercise the Visitatorial Power which is to inquire into all Abuses c. Colmer complains that he was expelled without just Cause and seeks to the Visitor for redress they having expelled him for an Offence of which he thought himself innocent and the Visitor sends his Commissary to examine this particular matter Then 't was urged That tho' a Visitor be restrained by the Constitutions of the Colledge from visiting ex officio but once in five Years yet as a Visitor he had a constant standing Authority at all times to hear the Complaints and redress the Grievances of the particular Members and that is part of the proper Office of a Visitor to determine particular Differences between the Members and thus is Littleton's Text sect 136. that complaint may be made to the Ordinary or Visitor praying him that he will lay some Correction and Punishment for the same and that such Default be no more made c. And the Ordinary or Visitor of right ought to do this c. and so was it held in Appleford's Case in the Court of King's Bench who was expelled upon a like occasion as Colmer was he appealed to the Bishop of Winton who was Visitor and he confirmed the Expulsion and held to be good upon the Appeal for the hearing of Appeals is a standing fixed constant Jurisdiction Visiting is one Act or Exercise of his Power in which he is limited as to time but redressing of Grievances is another and his proper Office and Business at all times 'T is the Case of all the Bishops of England they can visit by Law but once in three years but their Courts are always open to hear Complaints and Determine Appeals so that here tho' but one Visitation can be in five years without request yet the Power and Authority to hear and examine any difference between the Members and to relieve against any particular Injury that 's continual and not limited Then 't was argued That tho' what was done upon the 16th of June was with an Intention to Visit yet being denied to enter the Chappel where the Visitation was appointed to be held it was none and his Calling over the Names was only to know who hindred the Visiting and his making an Act of it afterwards or administring an Oath at the time can never be called one tho' it hath been below said to be a tacking that of June to that of July but that cannot be for then it continued much longer than was intended nay much longer then it can by the Statutes of the Colledge for that is to cease in three days It turns rather the other way having been hindred in June he makes an Act of it in July in order to call them to an account for it as for a Conturnacy and to bring them to Judgment at his Visitation 'T was no more then taking an Affidavit of the Service of a Citation The appointment of a Visitation in the Hall was occasioned by the Obstruction met with at the Chappel and 't would be a very strange Construction that when he designed a Visitation and was hindred that the Hinderance and his Inquiry about it should be called a Visitation and a former Contumacy in opposing an intended Visitation should prevent their being subject to an actual true one Then 't was argued That there was no necessity that there should be the Consent of the four Senior Fellows to the Deprivation of the Rector and by one of the Counsel 't was owned that if such Consent had been necessary the Sentence had been a Nullity But as this Statute is framed 't was argued that the Bishop might deprive tho' they did not concur for these Reasons 1. By the Statutes the Bishop for the time being is made the ordinary Visitor of Exeter Colledge and that where any one is Visitor of a Colledge he hath full and ample Authority to Deprive or Amove any Member of the Colledge quatenus Visitor 2. There is an express Power given to the Bishop to proceed to the Deprivation of the Rector or the Expulsion of a Scholar and this in his Visitation And 3. The qualifying words do not restrain it to be with the Consent of the four Fellows the word is Deprivatio as to the Rector and Expulsio as to the Scholar tho' they are synonymous as to real Sense yet by this Statute they are differently applied Then it says If the Bishop do proceed c. that only relates to the Case of a Scholar because the word there used is Expulsio which is never applied but to the amotion
and he may Expel and as it is 8 Assis ' 29 30. he may deprive the only Query is if he were Visitor at this time for it hath been and must be agreed on all hands that Quatenus Visitor he might deprive if he be a Visitor as Ordinary there lieth an Appeal from his deprivation but if as Patron there 's none and then that deprivation whether right or not must stand As to the Objection that 't is not the Sentence of a Court and therefore not Conclusive 't is not material whether it be a Court or not but the Query is if he had jurisdiction and conusance of the Person and thing and if he had then his sentence holds and where the Founder hath not thought fit to direct an Appeal no appeal lies nay not to the Common-Law Courts the Founder having put all under the Judgment of the Visitor it must continue so He might have ordered it that the Rector should continue only during the pleasure of the Visitor but now he hath left it to his wisdom according to the Statutes He is a Judge not only in particular by appointment but as he is Constituted a Visitor in general then in pleading of a Sentence of deprivation there is no necessity of shewing the cause the cause is not traversable even in a Visitation so is Rastal 1.11 Hen. 7.27 7 Rep. Kenne's Case 9 Edw. 4.24 Suppose this Rectory had been a sole Corporation and not part of a Corporation aggregate as it is Consisting of Rector and Scholars and Dr. Bury had brought an assize and this deprivation had been pleaded it had been good to have said that the Visitor certis de Causis ipsum adinde moventibus had deprived him every thing that is traversable must be expressed with certainty but the cause need not be so in this Case Now 't is strange that pleading a Sentence without a Cause should be good and the finding of a Sentence in like manner in a special verdict should not be good If in Pleading it be not traversable 't is the strongest Argument that the Cause is not to be inquired into the having no Appeal doth not lessen the validity of the Sentence it doth only shew the Rector's place not to be so certain and durable as in other cases they are where Appeals are allowed The Case of Caudrys in the High Commission Court is as strong a Sentence of deprivation no Appeals and the Sentence found and no cause shewn yet held good 't is no Answer to say that that was by the Ecclesiastical Law how is it the Ecclesiastical Law that a Man shall be concluded by one Sentence without Appeal no it was because 't was by a Court that had Jur ' and the Sentence was not the weaker or the cause of it more inquirable because there 's no Appeal 'T was by the Ecclesiastical Constitution that the Commissioners had that Power but that was established by the Law of the Land and so is the Visitatorial Power the one Authority is as much derived from the Law as the other Bird and Smith's Case in Moore 's Rep. deprivation for not conforming to the Canons held good in like manner As to the Case of Coueney in Dyer 209. and that in Bagges's Case 11 Rep. 99. they are the same as to this matter though in Two Books an assize because no Appeal he quotes Books for it but upon a perusal they will not warrant the distinction for the party is as much concluded in the one Case as in the other 't is reasonable to suspect that Case not to be Law because that is impracticable which it is brought to prove The Head of a College cannot maintain an Assize for his Office of Headship He hath not such an Estate as will maintain that writ therefore to give that instance against us is hard the Rector hath no such sole Sezin the whole body of the College have an interest therein He hath no Title to the Money in his own Right till by consent they are distributed and after such distribution 't is not the Rector's Money but Dr. Bury's He is the only visible head of the Body in deed but has no single right In Appleford's Case the like Argument was drawn from this Case for a Mandamus and insisted that he might have an assize but said by the Lord Hales that that was impossible and in truth there 's no difference between this Case and that of a Mandamus there was a return that he was removed pro crimine enormi and Appealed to the Bishop of Winton who confirmed the amotion and the particular cause was not at all returned and held good because there was a local Visitor who had given a Sentence and all parties were concluded by it the same being done by the Power of that Government which the Founder had thought sit to put them under Now 't was argued from hence That this was an express Case If the Cause of the Deprivation be examinable in the Courts of Common Law why not upon a Mandamus as well as in an Ejectment The Lord Hales in that Case of Appleford took it for clear Law That the Sentence was as binding as a Judgment in an Assize He is made a Judge and his Person particularly designed by the Founder but he hath his Authority from the Law and since the Founder hath trusted the Matter to his Discretion 't is not to be suspected that he hath done or will do otherwise than right Then in the next place 't was argued That there doth not appear any Injustice in the Sentence and consequently it ought to be presumed Just Credence is to be given to a Person that exerciseth Judicial Power if he keep within his Jurisdiction The Law hath respect not only to Courts of Record and Judicial Proceedings in them but even to all other Proceedings where the Person that gives his Judgment or Sentence hath a Judicial Authority and here 's no Fault found in the Sentence the Jury have not so much as found the Matter and Ground of it to be untrue in Fact or insufficient in Law Then 't was urg'd That the Cause of Deprivation here was just it being for Contumacy If the Bishop had power to visit in June as he had and was hindred by their shutting the Doors whereupon he went away without doing any thing and came again in July when he held his Visitation and they behaved themselves Contumaciously and refused to submit to his Authority this was contra officii sui debitum 't is reasonable that both Head and Members should submit to the Visitor Contumacy is a good Cause of Deprivation and upon good reason because it hinders an Inquiry into all other Causes 'T was held so in Bird and Smith's Case and in Allen and Nash's Case quia fuit refractarius Now tho' Contumacy be not one of the Causes mentioned in the Statutes yet 't was certainly contrary to their Duty turning their Backs upon the
Court recommitted which is the same Assault Taking and Imprisonment and Traverses absque hoc that he was guilty of the Assaulting Taking or Imprisoning him within the time last mentioned at London or elsewhere then in the Isle of Barbadees or otherwise or in other manner then as before The Plaintiff demurred and the Defendant joyn'd in Demurrer and Judgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Venire awarded tam ad triand ' exitum quam ad inquirend ' de dampnis c. and the Issue was found pro quaerent ' and 6 d. Damages and on the Demurrer 500 l. Damages and Judgment for Damages and Costs amounting in the whole to 590 l. The Plaintiff Sir J. Witham dying Trin. 2 Wil. Mar. the Judgment was revived by Scire Facias brought by Howel Gray and Chaplain Executors of Sir J. W. quoad omnia bona catalla sua except one Debt due by Bond from Henry Wakefield And at the Return of the Scire Fac ' the Defendant appears and demurs to the Scire Facias and there is an Award of Execution and thereupon a Writ of Error is brought in the Exchequer Chamber and the Judgment was affirmed Then a Writ of Error is brought in Parliament and the General Error assigned And here it was argued on the behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that this Action did not lye against him because it was brought against him for that which he did as a Judge and so it appeared on the Record according to 12 Rep. 25. that the Rule seems the same for one sort of Judge as well as for another that this Person was lawfully made a Governour and so had all the Powers of a Governour that this was a Commitment only till he found Security tho' not so Expressed that this is not counsable here in Westminster-hall that he was only censurable by the King that the Charge is sufficient in that Sir J. W. had not taken the Oaths that male arbitrarie executus fuit is Charge enough to warrant a Commitment that this was a Charge before a Councel of State and there need not be all the Matters precisely alledged to justifie their Acts and by the same reason Actions may lye against the Privy Counsellors here and enforce them to set forth every particular which would be of dangerous Consequence the Plea might have been much shorter as only that he was committed by a Counsel of State and the addition of the other Matters shall not hurt and that the Charge was upon Oath shall be intended no Presumption shall be that the Supream Magistracy there did irregularly 't is a power incident to every Council of State to be able to commit This action cannot lye because the Fact is not triable here the Laws there may be different from ours Besides no Action lies unlefs 't were a malicious Commitment as well as causeless and that no Man will pretend that an Action can lye against the chief Governour or Lieutenant of Ireland or Scotland and by the same reason it ought not in this Case he had a power to make Judges and therefore he was more than a Judge and they have confessed all this Matter by the Demurrer The Statute of Car. 1. which restrains the power of our Councel of State supposes that they could Commit that in case of Crimes there they are punishable in that place and in Sir Ellis Ashburnham's Case there was a Remanding to be tried there and if so it can't be examinable here and if not this Action will not lye And further that what was done here was done in a Court for so is a Councel of State to receive Complaints against State Delinquents and to direct their Trials in proper Courts afterwards that there was never such an Action as this maintain'd and if it should it would be impossible for a Governour to defend himself First For that all the Records and Evidences are there 2. The Laws there differ from what they are here and Governments would be very weak and the Persons intrusted with them very uneasie if they are subject to be charged with Actions here for what they do in those Countries and therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment should be reversed On the other side 't was argued for the Plaintiff in the Original Action That this Action did lye and the Judgment on 't was legal That supposing the Fact done in England the Plea of such Authority so executed at Plymouth or Portsmouth or the like had been ill for that Liberty of Person by our Law is so sacred that every Restraint of it must be justified by some lawful Authority and that Authority must be expresly pursued That here was no Authority to commit for that must be either as a Court of Record or as Justices of Peace Constable or other Officer constituted for that purpose that the Letters Patents are the only Justification insisted on and that gives none 't is true the power of Committing is incident to the Office of a Court here 's only the Government of the Place committed to Sir Richard Dutton with a power to erect Courts and appoint Officers but none to himself He in Person is only authorized to manage and order the Affairs and the Law of England takes no notice of such an Officer or his Authority and therefore a Court of Law can take notice of it no further or otherwise then as it doth appear in pleading The Councel is not constituted a Court they are by the Letters Patents only to advise and assist the Governour and the Governour hath no power to commit or punish but to form and establish Courts to do so which imports the direct contrary that he had no such power The Ends of appointing the Councel as mentioned in the Letters Patents are quite different viz. to aid the Regent by their Advice not to act as of themselves and if neither the Governour of himself nor the Councel of it self had such a power neither can both together have it A Court of Justice is not to be intended unless the same be specially shewn Excepting the Case of the common known general Courts of Justice in Westminster-hall which are immemorial if any thing be justified by the Authority of other Courts the same must be precisely alledged and how their Commencement was either by Custom or Letters Patents Here it appears by the Plea it self that they had Justices of Oyer and Terminer appointed It doth not appear that he or the Councel were Judges of things of this kind Besides when a Councel is constituted as here was Twelve by Name that must be the Majority as is the Dean and Chapter of Femes Case Davis's Rep. 47. and that 's Seven at least which are not in this Case There must be a Majority unless the Erection did allow of a less Number The practise of the Courts of Westminster-hall do not contradict this for there 't is a Court whether more or less and so
to be the same i.e. in general the Common Law to govern in both places from the difference assigned between Ireland and Scotland it lies not to Scotland because a distinct Kingdom and governed by distinct Laws and it lies to Ireland because ruled by the same and consequently if a Writ of Error lies on the final Judgment there it 's a good Argument that the same Law prevails there These Plantations are parcel of the Realm as Counties Palatine are Their Rights and Interests are every day determined in Chancery here only that for necessity and encouragement of Trade and Commerce they make Plantation-Lands as Assets in certain Cases to pay Debts in all other things they make Rules for them according to the common Course of English Equity The distance or the contiguity of the thing makes no alteration in the Case And then 't was said as at first That this then was the same case as if the Imprisonment had been in England or on Shipboard as to the Rules of Justification that if there were another Law which could justifie it the same ought to have been certainly pleaded As to the Instructions those do not appear and therefore are not to be considered in the Case and they should have been set forth and no extraordinary Power is to be presumed unless shewn for every Man in pleading is thought to make the best of his own Case and consequently that if 't would have made for him the same would have been shewn and because they are not shewn they must be thought directive of a Government according to the Laws of England since 't is to a Subject of this Realm to govern other Subjects of this Realm living upon a part of this Realm and from the King thereof who must be supposed to approve those Laws which make him King and by which he reigns Then 't was argued Suppose this Governour had borrowed Money of a Man in the Island and then had returned to England and an Action had been brought for it and he had pretended to ustifie the receipt of it as Governour he must have shewn his Power the Law and how he observed that Law the like for Goods the same reason for Torts and Wrongs done vi armis Now the Court below could consider no other Power or Law to justifie this act but the Common Law of England and that will not do it for the Reasons given and if it be justifiable by any other it must be pleaded and what he hath pleaded is not pursued c. As to the Commitment by a Council of State what it means is hardly known in the Law of England and that Authority which commits by our Law ought to be certain and the Cause expressed as all the Arguments upon the Writ of Habeas Corpus in old time do shew but here 's no Councel and 't is not said so much as that he was debito modo onerat ' And as to the Demurr ' that confesses no more then what is well pleaded And as to Consequences there 's more danger to the Liberty of the Subject by allowing such a Behaviour then can be to the Government by allowing the Action to lye And therefore 't was prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed It was replyed on behalf of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That notwithstanding all that had been said the Laws there were different tho' the Foundation of them was the Common Law that they would not enter into that Question What sort of Title at first gave Right to these Lands but that this was a Commitment by a Councel of State And as to the Objection of too general Pleadings in male arbitrarie exercendo c. tho' the inducement of the Plea was so There were other Matters more particularly pleaded the altering the Decrees in his Chamber which was sufficient And as to the Objection That 't is not alledged in the Pleadings that the Charge in Councel against Wytham was upon Oath they answered That 't is not effential tho' prudent to have the Charge upon Oath before Commitment Matters may be otherwise apparent And as to the Objection That the Warrant of the Councel for the Commitment was not shewn they said that it lay not in their power because 't was delivered to the Provost Marshal as his Authority for the Capture and Detention of him and therefore did belong to him to keep And that the Councel tho' they were not a Court yet they had Jurisdiction to hear the Complaint and send him to another Court that could try the Crime and tho' it did not appear that the King gave any Authority to the Governour and Councel to commit yet 't is incident to their Authority as being a Councel of State the Councel here in England commit no otherwise and where the Commitment is not authorized by Law the King's Patent gives no power for it But the Government must be very weak where the Councel of State cannot commit a Delinquent so as to be forth-coming to another Court that can punish his Delinquency And therefore prayed that the Judgment should be reversed and the same was accordingly reversed Philips versus Bury WRit of Error to reverse a Judgment given for the Defendant in the Court of King's Bench where the Case upon the Record was thus Ejectione firme on the Demise of Painter as Rector and the Scholars of Exeter Colledge in Oxon for the Rector's House The Defendant pleads specially That the House in question is the Freehold of the Rector and Scholars of the Colledge but he says That he the said Dr. Bury was then Rector of that Colledge and that in right of the Rector and Scholars he did enter into the Messuage in question and did Eject the Plaintiff and so holds him out absque hoc That Painter the Lessor of the Plaintiff was at the time of making the Lease in the Declaration Rector of that Colledge hoc paratus est verificare c. The Plaintiff replys That the Messuage belongs to the Rector an Scholars but that Painter the Lessor was Rector at the time of the Lease hoc petit quod inquiratur per Patriam c. and thereon Issue is joyned and a Special Verdict The Jury find that Exeter Colledge is and was one Body Politick and Corporate by the Name of Rector and Scholars Collegij Exon ' infra Vniversitat ' Oxon ' that by the Foundation of the Colledge there were Laws and Statutes by which they were to be governed and that the Bishop of Exeter for the time being and no other at the time of founding the Colledge was constituted by virtue of the Statute concerning that Matter hereafter mentioned ordinary Visitor of the same Colledge secundum tenorem effectum statut ' eam rem concernent ' That the Bishop of Exeter who now is is Visitor according to that Statute Then they find the Statute for the Election of a Rector prout c. Then they find
Visitor not appearing upon Summons refusing to be examined was an Offence and contrary to what the Statutes require He is to inspect the state of the Colledge and each Member's particular behaviour and now when the Visitor comes to make such an Inquisition and the Head or the Members withdraw themselves and will not appear to be examined if this be not a good Cause of Deprivation nothing can be for that nothing else can ever be inquired into As for that Statute which refers to the Causes for which a Rector may be deprived it doth not relate to a Deprivation in a Visitation but shews the manner how the Colledge is to proceed if he be guilty of such Offences they may complain at any time to the Visitor if he wasts the Revenues or behave himself scandalously and upon request will not resign and they may Article against him out of a Visitation but when he comes to execute his Power in his quinquennial Visitation he is not confined to proceed only upon the Information of the Fellows but is to inquire into all the Affairs of the Colledge and may proceed to deprivation as he sees Cause Now Contumacy is a causa of a Forfeiture of his Office which is subject to the power of the Visitor by the original Rules of the Foundation and to evade or contumaciously to refuse or deny a Submission to that Power is an Offence against the Duty of his Place and consequently a just Cause of Deprivation so that upon the whole Matter 't was inferred and urged that the Bishop hath a Visitatorial Power vested in him to deprive the Rector without consent of the four Senior Fellows And 2. that the Justice of the Sentence is not examinable in Westminster-hall And 3. that if it were and the Cause necessary to be shewn here was a good one an affronting the very Power of Visiting and fetting up for Independency contrary to the Will of the Founder and therefore it was prayed that the Judgment should be reversed On the other side 't was argued by the Counsel with the Judgment That this Sentence was void that 't was a meer Nullity that this proceeding had no Authority to warrant it and that it being done without Authority 't is as if done by a meer Stranger and whether it be such an Act or not is examinable at Law for that the Power of a Visitor must be considered as a meer Authority or a Trust and it is one or rather both and then either way 't is examinable for every Authority or Trust hath or ought to have some Foundation to warrant it and if that Foundation which warrants it hath limited any Rules or Directions by which it is to be executed then those Directions ought to be pursued and if they are not 't is no Execution of the Authority given or Trust reposed and if not 't is a void Act a meer Nullity and consequently 't is that of which every Man may take notice and advantage Then 't was said That it must be agreed that of a void thing all Persons may take advantage and contest it in a Collateral Action and that altho' it have the form and semblance of a Judicial Proceeding and for this was cited the Case of the Marshalsea's 10 Rep. 76. as a full Authority the Resolution was That when a Court hath no Jurisdiction of a Cause there all the proceeding is coram non judice and Actions lye against any Person pretending to do an Act by colour of such Precept or Process without any regard to its being a Precept or Process and therefore the Rule qui jussu judicis aliquid fecerit non videtur dolo malo fecisse quia parere necesse est will not hold where there is no judex for 't is not of necessity to obey him who is not Judge of the Cause and therefore the Rule on the other side is true judicium a non suo judice datum nullius est momenti and so was it held in the Case of Bowser and Collins 22 Edw. 4.33 per Pigot and 19 Edw. 4.8 And therefore if the Court of Common Bench held Plea of an Appeal of Felony 't is all void but it must be owned that the meer erroneous procedure of a Court which hath a General Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter is not examinable in a Collateral Action whether upon true Grounds or not and yet if it be a limited Jurisdiction and those limits are not observed even that is coram non judice and holds with respect to Courts held by Authority of Law which are much stronger then the Cases of Power created or given by a private Person A Sheriff is bound by Law to hold his turn within a Month after Michaelmas and he holds it after the Month and takes a Presentment at that time if that be removed into the King's Bench the Party shall not answer it but be discharged because the Presentment was void coram non judice for that the Sheriff at that time had no Authority and yet in that Case his Authority and Jurisdiction extended to the Person and Thing The same Law for a Leet unless Custom warrants the contrary and then that Custom must be pursued The Commissioners of Sewers have a limited Authority and if the number of Persons or other Requisites mentioned in their Commission be not pursued what they do which exceeds it is void and yet they have a kind of Legislative Authority so is it in Sir Henry Mildmay's Case 2 Cro. 336. and there they had an Authority both of Thing and Person but did not observe the Rules prescribed in the Gift of that Authority according to the 23 Hen. 8. cap. 5. and no reason could or can be given for that Resolution but that it was a particular limited Authority And then to apply this to the present Case the Sentence in question can no more aggrieve the Defendant then an Order pronounced or made by a non Judex if it be not agreeable to the Power given by the Statutes and this appears further from Davis's Rep. 46. where the same Distinction is allowed Nay in some Cases the Award of a wrong Process is void as if by a Steward of a Mannor Court that a Capias should issue where the same doth not lye but only an Attachment Turville and Tipper's Case Latch 223. A Court of Pypowders hath Jurisdiction of an Action of the Case yet if it holds Plea of Case for Slander 't is all void tho' the words were spoken within the Boundaries of the Fair because the Jurisdiction is limited so that if the Thing the Time the Person or the Process be not regarded according to the Authority given 't is all void and an Advantage may be taken of it by any Body where the Plaintiff Claims or makes his Demand by colour of such Act. 'T was further argued That the Reason given in that Case of Latch is because the Custom which gave him his Authority gave him
CASES IN PARLIAMENT Resolved and Adjudged UPON Petitions and Writs of Error Quicquid sum Ego quamvis Infra Lucili censum ingeniumque tamen me Cum Magnis vixisse invita fatebitur usque Invida Horat. LONDON Printed for A. and J. Churchill at the Black Swan in Pater-noster-Row MDCXCVIII TO THE READER NO Collection of Cases adjudged in Parliament having been yet published a Preface seems necessary to bespeak the Reception of that which is now presented to the World To commend or excuse the Collector will not perhaps be a method to introduce it most to advantage what may be spoken in favour of his diligence or capacity will be censured vain and if any excuse be offered for his inability to have done it better some will be ready to take him at his word and think the Performance comes from a careless or unskilful Hand Whatever the Author is there needs no Apology to be made for the nature or design of the Work it self for the Subject Matter will be useful and entertaining to all Ranks of English Men to whom Books are so that is to all such as understand and love Literature Here is our Municipal Law and the reason of it Equity and the Law of Nations interspersed here is the manner of arguing and the language of the Bar briefly toucht here are the Forms of Proceedings sometimes mentioned but then again those Forms are superseded by the Original and Eternal Rules of Justice By the Debates and Arguments here reported you may be acquainted in some measure with the Rights of the Peers and their incapacity to alien such their Rights with the nature of Slander and some Rules concerning it the Course of Equity in respect of Penalties and Costs The Law of Average in the Case of Partial Losses at Sea the Circumstances upon which Relief may be had in Equity against hard or unreasonable Agreements the Construction of Wills to charitable Uses where the Estate intended is greater in value then the particular Bequests amounts unto the Power of a Council of State to commit with variety of Matter concerning Pleading and the Plantations belonging to England and the Priviledges and Birthrights of the English Subject by the Common Law and how far that Law extends The nature of Colledges Hospitals and other Elemosynary Foundations and the Authority and Power of Visitors and the Methods of their Proceedings the Court of Chivalry or Honour the extent and boundaries of its Jurisdiction before whom held and when and in what Cases a Prohibition lyes to it the power of Lords of Copyhold Mannors to refuse Petitions for the Reversal of Recoveries in their Courts and the Judgment of Equity upon such occasions the right of Dower and the efficacy of a Term attending the Inheritance to prevent its enjoyment and the opinion of Equity thereupon The Preference of an Outlawry upon mesne Process to a Judgment not extended and the practise and reason of the practise of the Court of Exchequer in that case the Consideration which a Court of Equity ought to have of Bonds Bills or Promises made or given upon Condition or Consideration of promoting and procuring Matches The dependency which Ireland hath upon England and her subordination to it and the Authority of the House of Peers in This over the Proceedings in the Chancery of That Kingdom the opinion of Equity upon Conditional Limitations and what will be a Performance of such Conditions and to whom the Profits shall go during the intermediate time c. The qualification requisite in a Presentee to a Benefice and the power of the Ordinary to refuse for defect of Knowledge and how that defect is to be tried the Construction of Law upon a Deed leading the Uses of a Fine of the Wives Land to the Heirs of the Husband's Body the Husband dying afterwards before the Wife the right of the half Blood in the distribution of an Intestates Estate and unto what Share the right of nominating to the Office of chief Clerk for inrolling of Pleas in B.R. and to whom it belongs the nature of a Bill of Exceptions and the Proceedings thereupon and in what Cases the same may be refused and if any Authority in the Lords over the Judges in case of such refusal The Punishment of Treason by the English Laws and the Form of Judgments in that case the nature of contingent Limitations after a Fee and if they may be allowed upon Contingencies to happen at any time after the decease of Persons then in being the manner of declaring the Uses of a Fine and by what Deed or Writing the nature of Wills and of the revocations of them and if a Will whereof the Contents are unknown may revoke a former the efficacy of the acts of one that is Non compos mentis and if and how far void what Deeds altering the Estate of a Testator shall revoke a solemn Will The nature of the Office of a Clerk of the Peace and by whom grantable and for what Interest and how removeable the Prerogative of Presenting to Benefices made void by Promotion and if such Prerogative be served or fulfilled by a Commendam and whether it can operate upon a new created Parish or Rectory the formal reason and essence of Treason and wherein it consists and what is necessary to be alledged in Indictments for that Offence the right of Tythes for Herbage or Agistment of Cattle grazed and fed for Sale tho' formerly used to the Plough The Exposition of a Will of a Native of France and by what measures a Judgment ought to be made of the meaning of Phrases used by such Persons in that Language upon such an occasion the Construction of the word Share in a Will concerning the New-River Water the force or validity of a Grant or Assignment of Land in which the Grantor had a very long term to hold from and after the Grantor's decease the Title of Knight if and how part of the Name and what Allegations in a Count in a Quare Impedit are not needful to be answered to and what may be traversed and what Grants of the Crown shall be good notwithstanding some and what Misrecitals These and many other Particulars worthy of most Mens notice are here debated and it may reasonably be supposed that none will be Enemies to the Design and Publication but those who mislike the small Remainders we have left us of the Aristocratical part of our Government the Gentlemen who do so must be unacquainted with the Grecian and Roman Story as well as with our own or else have read it but superficially for even the most perfect of the Grecian Common-wealths were somewhat Aristocratical That which may be called such is Sparta which tho' it had some Laws we cannot account for yet during several Centuries it maintained its own Liberty and assisted its Neighbours to preserve theirs And notwithstanding some Men may think the contrary Democracy was not the only Favourite Model of the
Witham deceased WRit of Error on a Judgment given in B. R. for Sir John Witham and Sir Richard Dutton and the Award of Execution thereof upon Scire Fac ' brought by the Defendants as Executors of Sir John Witham and affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber in Trespass and False Imprisonment The Case on the Record was thus The Plaintiff William did declare versus Dutton for that he with Sir Robert Davis Baronet Sir Timothy Thornhill Henry Walrond Thomas Walrond and Samuel Rayner did 14 Octob. 36 Car. 2. at L. in Par ' Ward ' c. assault beat and wound the Plaintiff and imprisoned him and his Goods then found did take and seize and the Plaintiff in Prison and the Goods and Chattels from the Plaintiff did detain and keep for three Months next following by which the Plaintiff lost the Profit he might have made of his Goods and was put to Charges c. Contra pac ' ad damp ' 13000 l. The Defendant pleads Not Guilty as to the Venir ' vi armis and all the Assault Imprisonment and Deteiner in Prison before the Sixth of November and after the Twentieth of December in the same Year and as to the beating and wounding and taking seizing and detaining his Goods and thereupon Issue is joyned and as to the assault taking and imprisoning the Plaintiff the Sixth of November and detaining him from thence until in and upon the Twentieth of December The Defendant doth justifie for that long before viz. the 28th of Octob. 32 Car. 2. by his Letters Patents shewn to the Court did constitute and appoint the Defendant his Captain General and Chief Governour in and upon the Islands of Barbadoes and c. and the rest of the Islands lying c. and thereby commanded him to do and execute all things that belonged to that Government and the Trust in him reposed according to the several powers and directions granted to the Defendant by the Letters Patents and Instructions with them given or by such other powers or instructions as at any time should be granted or appointed the Defendant under the King's Sign Manual and according to the reasonable Laws as then were or after should be made by the Defendant with advice and consent of the Councel and Assembly of the respective Islands appoints twelve Men by name viz. Sir P. L. H. D. H. W. S. N. T. W. J. Witham the Plaintiff J. P. J. S. R. H. E. S. T. W. and H. B. to be of the King's Counsel of the Island during the pleasure of the King to be assistant to the Defendant with their Counsel in the management of the Things and Concerns of the Government of the said Island in relation to the King's Service and good of his Subjects there and gives power to the Defendant after he himself had taken the Oath of Office to administer to every Member of the Councel and Deputy Governour the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy and the Oath of Office with further power to the Governour by advice and consent of Counsel to summon and hold a General Assembly of the Freeholders and Planters there and to make Laws Statutes and Ordinances for the good Government of the Island and to be as near and consonant as convenlently may to the Laws and Statutes of England which Laws were to be transmitted to be allowed by the King here with power also by advice and consent of Counsel to erect and establish such and so many Courts of Judicature as he shall think fit for hearing and determining all Causes as well Criminal as Civil according to Law and Equity and to appoint Judges Justices of Peace Sheriffs and other necessary Officers for administring of Justice and putting the Laws in execution provided Copies of such Establishments be transmitted to the King to be allowed and with further power to the Governour to constitute and appoint Deputy Governours in the respective Islands and Plantations which then were or should be under his Command to all and every which respective Governours the King by these Letters Patents gave power and authority to do and execute what should be commanded them by the Governour according to the power granted to him by this Commission And the Governor's Authority to continue during the good will and pleasure of the King The Defendant further pleads That after the making of the Letters Patents and before the time of the Assault and Imprisonment viz. 1 Mart. 33 Car. 2. he arrived at Barbadoes and by virtue of the Letters Patents aforementioned he took upon him and exercised the Government of that and the other Islands and continued to do so till the first of May 35 Car. 2. when he had license to return to England That he before his departure by virtue of the said Letters Patents by a certain Commission under his Hand and Seal did constitute the Plaintiff in his absence to be his Deputy Governour in the said Islands of Barbadoes to do and execute the Powers and Authorities granted to the Defendant by the said Letters Patents That the first of August following the Defendant arrived at London in England that the fourth of May 35 Car. 2. after the Defendants departure the Plaintiff took upon himself the Administration of the Government of the Island of Barbadoes that the Plaintiff not regarding the Trust reposed in him by the Defendant nor the Honour of that Supreme Place and Office did unlawfully and arbitrarily execute that Government and Office to the Oppression of the King's Subjects viz. apud Lond ' praed ' in Par ' Ward ' praed ' That after the Return of the Defendant to the Barbadoes viz. 6 Nov. 35 Car. 2. at a Councel holden for the Island of Barbadoes at St. Michael's Town before the Defendant H. W. J. P. E. S. T. W. F. B. which five are of the twelve named Councel in the Letters Patents and Sir Timothy Thornhill and Robert Dawes Counsel for the Island aforesaid the Plaintiff then and there was charged that he in the absence of the Defendant misbehaved himself in the Administration of the Government of the said Island Non tantum in not taking the usual Oath of Office and not observing the Act of Navigation And by his illegal assuming the Title of Lieutenant Governour and altering and changing Orders and Decrees made in Chancery of the said Island according to his own will and pleasure at his own Chamber and altering the Sense and Substance of them from what was ordered in Court by and with the consent of the Councel upon which it was then and there ordered in Councel by the Defendant and Councel that the Plaintiff Sir John Witham should be committed to c. until he should be discharged by due Course of Law by virtue of which Order the Plaintiff the said sixth of Nov. was taken and detained until the 20th of Dec. upon which day he was brought to the Court of the General Sessions of Oyer and Terminer and then by
of a Scholar and it is impossible to relate to the Rector for then he must consent to his own Deprivation for his particular Consent is mentioned and required and that is not to be expected And in this case the Consent of the Senior Fellows without that of the Rector is not sufficient But then the subsequent words are That if the Rector be deprived by the Bishop's Commissary with the Consent of the Senior Fellows he may appeal to the Bishop 'T is true the Rector hath that liberty if the Commissary do deprive him but there are no words that do abridge the Bishop's own Power The Commissary's Power is restrained by those words To have the Consent c. but the Bishop's own Power hath no such qualification It is objected That 't is unreasonable to imagine a greater Power in the Visitor over the Rector then over the Scholars But the Question is not What was fit and reasonable for the Founder to have done but to consider upon perusal of the Statutes what he hath done Suppose he doth give such an absolute Authority 't is what he had over the thing granted he might have reserved to himself a Power of Revocation or what other Power he thought fit and by the same reason he might give the like to a Visitor of his appointment and having done so it must be supposed that he had some Reasons for so doing The Rector hath a Priviledge not to be deprived without the benefit of Appeal if 't were by the Commissary The Scholars have no Appeal He might think fit to trust the Rector with his Visitor the Bishop as supposing more care would be taken by him of the Head of the Colledge then of Inferiour Members But the Query is not What Reason induced the Founder to make those Appointments He was Master of his own Charity and might qualifie it as he pleased and he hath given it under this qualification That the Bishop is made Visitor and might deprive the Rector as he hath done according to the Statutes and Constitutions of this Colledge Then 2. the sufficiency of the Cause of this Deprivation is never to be called in question nor any Inquiry to be made in Westminster-hall into the Reasons or Causes of such Deprivation if the Sentence be given by him that is the proper Visitor created so by the Founder or by the Law 'T was urged That there are in Law two sorts of Corporations aggregate consisting of many Persons such as are for Publick Government and such as are for Private Charity Those that are for Publick Government of a City Town Mystery or the like being of Publick Concern are to be governed according to the Laws of the Land and to be regulated and reformed by the Justice of Westminster-hall of these there are no private Founders and consequently no particular Visitors There are no Patrons of these they only subsist by virtue of the King's Letters Patents or Custom and Usage which supposes Letters Patents and are supported and ruled by the Methods of Law Therefore if a Corporation be made for the Publick Government of a Town or City and there is no Provision in the Charter how the Succession shall be the Law supplies the Defect of that Constitution and says it shall be by Election as Mayor Aldermen and Common-Council-men and the like and so is 1 Rolls Abridg. 513. But private and particular Corporations for Charity Founded and Endowed by private persons are subject to the particular Government of those who Erect them therefore if there be no visitor appointed in all such cases of Elemosmary Corporations the Law doth appoint the Founder and his Heirs to be Visitors They are Patrons and not to be guided by the common known Laws and Rules of the Kingdom but such Corporations are as to their own Affairs to be governed by the particular Laws and constitutions assigned them by the Founder Though some have said that the Common-Law doth not appoint any Visitation or Visitor at all yet 't is plain that it doth in defect of a particular appointment it makes the Founder Visitor and it is not at his pleasure whether there shall be a Visitor or not but if he is silent during his Life-time the right will descend to his Heirs and so is Yelv. 2 Cro. where it is admitted on all hands that the Founder is Patron and as Patron is Visitor if no particular Visitor be assigned 8. Edw. 7 8. 8 Assis ' 29.9 Hen. 6.33 1 Inst 96. so that Patronage and Visitation are necessary consequents one upon another for this Visitatorial Power was not introduced by any Canons or Constitutions Ecclesiastical it is an appointment of the Law it ariseth from the property which the Founder had in the Lands assigned to support the Charity And as he is the Author of the Charity the Law gives him and his Heirs a Visitatorial Power i.e. an Authority to inspect their Actions and regulate their Behaviour as he pleaseth For it is not fit that the Members who are indowed and that have the Charity bestowed upon them should be left to themselves but they ought to pursue the intent and designs of him that bestowed it upon them Where the Poor are not incorporated i.e. they who are to have the Charity but Trustees are appointed there is no Visitatorial Power because the interest of the Revenue is not vested in them but when they who are to enjoy the benefit of the Gift are incorporated there to prevent all perverting of the Charity there the Law doth not establish a Visitatorial Power and it being a Creature of the Founders 't is reasonable that he and his Heirs should have that Power unless it were devolved elsewhere 'T was further argued that in our Old Books deprived by Patron and deprived by Visitor are all one for this Authority to visit is a benefit that naturally springs out of the Foundation and it was in his power if he pleased to transfer it to another and where he hath done so the other will have the same right and Authority as the Founder had There 's no manner of difference between an Hospital and a College except only in degree An Hospital is for those that are poor and mean or Sick c. a College is for another sort of persons and to another intent the former is to maintain and support them this is to Educate them in Learning that have not otherwise wherewithal to do it But still it is much within the same reason of that of an Hospital and if in an Hospital the Master and Poor are incorporated 't is a College having a common Seal to act by though it bears not that name because it is of an inferiour degree and in both cases there must be a Visitor as both are Elemosinary A Visitor being then of necessity created by the Law as 8 Edw. 3.69 70. Every Hospital is visitable if lay by the Patron if Spiritual by the Ordinary he is to Judge
without the assent of the Dominion Superiour And 2. Judgments or Decrees might be there made or given to the disadvantage or of lessening that Superiority which cannot be reasonable or to make the Superiority to be only in the King not in the Crown of England as King Jac. 1. would have had it and consulted Selden upon the point Now though the Writ of Error be only mentioned yet the same reason holds to both and the true cause why we have not so many Ancient precedents of Equity Cases as of Law ones is for that in Ancient time the Equity Courts were not so high meddled with few matters and in a Summary way but since their Authority is so advanced and their Jurisdiction so enlarged that most questions of property are become determinable there and almost every suit begins or ends with them to the entire subversion of the Old Common-Law It is and must now be reasonable to have the Examination of their final Sentences in the Parliament of England as well as of the other Suppose non-residence in Ireland should be pretended a Forfeiture of the Estate to the next remainder Man or to the King Can it be safe for to intrust them with a conclusive Opinion in this matter When Calais was in our hands Writs of Error lay thither 21 Hen. 7. fol. 3. As to the pretence that the orders of this House cannot be executed there 't is very vain for if the King's Bench Command their Judgments to be executed there this House may order theirs and in like manner as they do to the Chancery here In 15 Rich. 2. numb 17. in the Abbot of St. Osithe's Case the Lords here made an Order and charged the Lord Chancellor that he see it performed and this hath been constant practice It hath been imagined That the Jurisdiction of this House in matters of this kind is dated from the 21 Jac. 1. as to the proceedings in Chancery but that is not now to be disputed for the Commons in Parliament Assembled did agree it to be the Right of this House in the Case of Skinner and the East-India Company and in the Book about it supposed to be written by that Noble Lord the Lord Hollis 105. 't is said that where the King 's Sovereigntydoth not reach the Jurisdiction of this House cannot the contrary is implied that where the King of England's Sovereignty doth extend the Jurisdiction of this House doth so too and no Man will affirm That Ireland is out of or beyond the limits of the Sovereignty of the English Crown And as to the exercise of this Judicature by the Lords here nothing can be stronger for it then the 1 Hen. 4. numb 79. So 't is in the Record though in Cotton's Abridg 't is 80. the Commons declare that all Judgments Appertain to the King and Lords and not to them Skinner's Case 199 200. 4 Inst 349 353 354. It was further argued That Protection commands a due Subjection and that these people who insisted upon this independency had forgot the English Treasure and Bloud which had been spent for their preservation That they are part of England and subject to its Laws appears from the common Case of an incumbency here being made void by acceptance of a Bishoprick in that Colony Besides that in Ancient time the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury was Primate of Ireland and had the Confirmation and Consecration of Bishops there Cambden's Britt pag. 735. and 765. 4 Inst 360. then 't was urged that the Question now was whether it were a Dominion inferiour or equal to and independant upon the Realm of England That the constant practice had been for the Lords here to examine the Decrees in their Court of Chancery that the refusing of this Appeal would shake all those Cases thus determined that every Appeal-here from their Equity Sentences which have been very many was an Argument against the Order of their Lords and for the receiving of this Appeal here That this thing hath been acknowledged even by the Rebels there for in Sir John Temple's History of the first Progress of the Irish Rebellion written 1641. pag. 141. amongst the several propositions made by the Irish then in a general Rebellion these two are mentioned 1. That by several Acts of Parliament to be respectively passed in England and Ireland it should be declared that the Parliament of Ireland had no subordination to the Parliament of England but should have supreme Jurisdiction in that Kingdom as Absolute as the Parliament of England here hath 2. That the Act of 10 Hen. 7. called Poyning's Act and all other Acts expounding or explaining that Law should be Repealed both which with their other dangerous propositions were justly rejected however it shews their Opinion that at that time the Law was or was taken and deemed to be against them in this point and there is as much reason for keeping the final Judicature here as there is for maintaining the Superiority and Obligatory Power over them in the legislature 'T was farther urged That the with holding the Irish Lords from having the like Jurisdiction in their Parliament as the Lords in England have in Judging upon Appeals and Writs of Error was absolutely necessary for the preserving of the Possessions of the English in Ireland for those of that Country must be suppos'd to incline to their own interest and cannot be suppos'd so much inclined to love and affect the English amongst them And that this Power of Judging here is Co-eval with the very Constitution of the Government 'T was further urged That their Precedents returned did or concern the point in Question except the two or three Cases in 1661 and 1662. and two Appeals lately in 1695. that their Case of the Prior of Lauthony in 8 Hen. 6. Prynnes Animadversions 313 314 was against them the Prior having removed a Judgment in the King 's Bench in Ireland into the Parliament there which affirmed it did bring a Writ of Error in the King 's Bench in England and they refused to meddle with it the reason was because the Writ of Error before the Lords there did not lie and that it ought to have come hither immediately and all the rest of their Quotations in their Printed Case either prove nothing at all or too much for they are against the allowance of Writs of Error in the King 's Bench in England and against the Legislature of England's being able to oblige the people of Ireland both which have been approved by constant practice and therefore it was prayed that the Appeal here might be allowed and the Order of the Irish Lords might be vacated On the other side it was argued from 1 Inst 141. Prynne's Animadversions 286. and 4 Inst 12. that their Parliaments had the same Authority there in respect of making Laws for that Country as the Parliaments have for England that they have ever since 10 Hen. 7. Re-enacted there such subsequent Acts of England as they thought
yet then they would have over-ruled the Plea and not have wrote to the Arch-Bishop at all This is the sole cause of that Judgment and then the consequence will be as was observed before But their own reason fails in this Case for here the sufficiency of Learning is Traversable for as hath been shewn it hath often been Traversed and as to the ea Ratione inhabilis no Objection can be to that for the old Authorities Cited do warrant nay require it and all Pleas of Special non est fact ' as by breaking of a Seal and the like are in the same manner Then besides the very words of the Law of Articuli Cleri are very much worthy of consideration it impowers the Bishop to refuse a Clerk propter defectum scientiae alias Causas rationabiles now all these Causes of Refusal mentioned in their cases comes under the causas Rationabiles and causa vaga in certa estnon Rationabilis now want of Learning is not included by intendment but by express words and therefore need not otherwise be set forth take it for granted that as they would have it the Temporal Judges are to Judge what is a reasonable cause of Refusal yet they are not to Judge if defect of Learning be a cause or not for in that the Statute is positive then if said to be deficient in Learning ea ratione inhabilis they had nothing to Judge upon they were only to write to the Arch-Bishop to know if the Fact were true if he were deficient and therefore it need not be set forth any otherwise then as the Statute expresses it tho' in that case they say there are divers sorts of Schisms and Heresies in Doctrines on which the Bishop might warrant his Refusal yet 't is not so much as once pretended there are any Opinions delivered in those cases that deficiency of Learning is subject to the same Rules of Pleading Then the Plea is in the Negative as was shewed before which is more than enough to make a good difference and Negatives in a Bar are always allowed to be more general because most favoured and especially here where the matter and person to which the words are applied do sufficiently restrain and determine the seeming uncertainty of it Nothing can be pretended to reduce this to a greater certainty but the Canons or the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 12. or other Laws of the same nature 1 Canons of King Jac. 1. made in 1602. and they were made pursuant to Canons made 1562. by which no Man was to be admitted nisi rationem fidei juxta Articulos Religionis in Synodo Episcoporum Cleri Anno 1562. approbatos Latine reddere eandem Scripturae testimonio Corroborare possit Can. 3 4. Conditiones in ordinandis requisit ' this is merely a Negative injunction on the Bishop never to confer Orders upon any Man that cannot do this it is not mandatory upon him to ordain every Man that can do this nor does it any way lessen or diminish the Authority or Judgment of the Ordinary in Examination of the fitness and Learning requisite So is the Statute of 13 Eliz. the same induces an incapacity on those that shall not subscribe the Articles but it leaves all things else to the Ecclesiastical Law neither the Canon nor the Statute are Derogatory from the Old Ecclesiastical Law they both leave it in Statu quo to the Ecclesiastical Judges no Man will pretend that these are a Repeal of the Statute of Articuli Cleri so that the Law remained as it did with more Latitude indeed to the Bishop but not with more favour to the Clerk They objected that here was not convenient notice to the Patron and the usual pleading of it is the same day But surely that 's well enough and so was it held by all the Judges that favoured their side in this case and 't is apparent that he had above four Months time to have presented another besides the Judges declared below that if not a convenient time it ought to have come on their side but they admit notice by their Replication and insist upon his Orders as an Estoppel to say that he was Illiterate They pretend That he is still under the Bishop's Jurisdiction and that he may deprive him for the same Cause if sufficient after Institution but that 's a great mistake for there may be a cause of Refusal which is not of Deprivation for he may become Learned that was not so and besides the Rule is false after induction they would then be discoursing about Freehold c. a Man may be refused because non compos but he cannot be deprived for that Cause though the Bishop may provide a Curate c. As to the pretence of six Months notice from the time of the Refusal 't was never insisted on at the Bar in C. B. or B. R. and the Judge who doubted did only say he was not fully satisfied with the current Opinion of the Books his doubt arose upon this That the cause of Refusal was not within the Partron's knowledge Suppose the Man had not Episcopal Orders but pretended to them and the Patron knew nothing of the matter should this Presentation prevent lapse and the rest were all of another Opinion and the Books are full to this effect for the Patron ought to present a Man qualified otherwise 't is as no Presentation and then lapse in course Suppose he had presented a mere laicus 't is as none suppose he had presented a Woman as idonea persona 't is as none and these instances may seem Trivial but our Books do mention them 2 Roll's Abridg. 364. Kelway 49.59 34 Hen. 7.21 14 Hen. 7.21 and Dyer 227. and Sir Symon Degges Parson's Gounsellor Upon the whole the Question is whether a Court of Law shall Repeal the Statute of Articuli Cleri whether the Plea shall be adjudged ill which is in the very words of that Statute when the same Fact was never pleaded otherwise nay when it hath been pleaded thus often times and never excepted against till now Wherefore it was prayed that the Judgment might be Reversed On the other side 't was argued That the Bishop's Plea below was too general and the Plaintiffs Replication good that his being Ordained a Priest and a Licensed Preacher is enough that this is an Answer to the Allegation of the Minus Literatus his being a Priest is a kind of a supersedeas to his Examination that there was no Learning requisite to his having a Cure of Souls which was not Antecedently necessary to his receiving of Orders That he ought not to be admitted into Orders unless he be assured of or named to some Curacy all which supposes the Qualifications Requisite for a Benefice with Cure of Souls then 't was urged that here was not notice sufficient for 't is not till many days after the Refusal for this might have put Hele the Patron beyond the possibility
another Subject 2. If this Commendam Retinere and to take the Profits to his own use was not a Service of this Prerogative turn 3. Supposing that there be such a Prerogative and that the Commendam makes no Alteration in the Case then if this Vacancy of this Church be subject to this Prerogative As to the first it was argued That where an Incumbent is promoted to the Order and Degree of a Bishop his Living or Benefice becomes void and that where a Bishop is Patron and the Advowson and Bishoprick are become void at a time there the King shall present because while the Temporalties are in his hands he is lawful Patron for that time and consequently had a Right to present but not by virtue of any Special Prerogative but only as a Temporary qualified Patron like a Dominus pro Tempore of a Mannor may do Acts of Necessity which regularly belong to the very true Lord himself and this perhaps gave the Colour for this pretended Prerogative and in truth it answers every thing that can be suggested from any ancient Authority whether President Book Case or Opinion It is otherwise where a Subject is Patron and the King hath no Possession of or a Right to the Patronage at that time In such case he cannot present and there is no Prerogative given by our Law for to warrant such a Right to that Presentation All Prerogatives are founded upon some reason of Benefit to the People either in respect of the Government in general or else of some particular Subjects but this hath neither And in 3 Cro. 527. 't is agreed that there is no Reason for such a Prerogative but 't is added and the Addition is somewhat strange that many Prerogatives have no reason in them or for them and that 't is unmannerly to Enquire or Doubt if they are reasonable whereas it might be thought that unreasonableness in the Matter contended for had been an Argument against any thing but an Act of Parliament In Dyer 228. Sir Henry Sidney's Case versus the Bishop of Glocester by Dyer 't was agreed That the Queen had no such Prerogative and he adds quod sic alij Socii mei sentiebant so that 't was not his single Opinion against it but the whole Court of C. B. Then 't was said that the ancient Law knew nothing of his Prerogative all the Records Law Books and even Histories have been searched for the Maintenance of it and no footsteps can be found for it No Bracton or Fleta no Dr. and Student or Stamf. that treats of the Prerogative hath any thing of it Now all Prerogatives are and must be time out of mind or not at all And then if this be not so it must be an Usurpation and being not time out of mind it cannot be a Prerogative because not part of the Common Law In the great Case which they so much insist on of Woodley in 2 Cro. 691. Justice Hutton who was an ingenious Man a good Lawyer and a true English Judge that argued against Ship-money he expresly denies that there was any such Prerogative that the King had no Title to present but where himself is Patron and that there was no such Presentment till of late days nor any Book of Law to warrant it but that Case which is in Bro. Abr. Presentment al' Esglise 61. Then 't was urged That a few years Practise can no more make a Prerogative then it can Repeal an Act of Parliament 'T is true that in the Report of that Case Crook seems to admit that Winch was of Opinion for the Prerogative and only Hutton against it for he makes Winch to say That the King has an Absolute Title by his Prerogative as well in the Case of Common Persons Patronage as where himself is so But as 't is in Winches Reports 96. where the Case is reported again there they are both of Opinion against it and Winch ridiculed the Opinion of Bro. Presentment 61. as the saying of the Bishop of Ely who was then Chancellor and might have right to present to it by force of his Place if the King had such a Prerogative And indeed Bro. himself makes a Remark upon it as a thing never heard of before by a quod nota The King hath presented to Livings of other Mens Patronages but that was not by force of this Prerogative but on other grounds as 40 Ed. 3.40 the King presented to a Prebendary when the Prebend was made a Bishop And the reason of that Case makes for the Plaintiff in Error i.e. because the Temporalties of the Bishop who was Patron of that Prebendary was then in the King's Hands and then the King was Patron so long and he did present as such So is the 41 Edw. 3.5 the same as Patron having the Temporalties in his hand So is 44 Edw. 3.24 upon another reason a Parson is made a Bishop and the King presented not Jure Prerogative but because that the Patron was the King's Tenant in Capite and the Heir was in Ward to the King and so he had Jus Patronatus in him The King hath it where he has the Temporalties so is Fitzh Grand Abridgment Title Quare Impedit pl. 35. the King claimed Title to present to the Provostry of Wells in the Gift of the Bishop void upon the Provost being made Dean because the Temporalties of the Bishop were in the King's hands at that time The 11 Hen. 4.37 59 and 76. tho' cited on the other side below is a full Authority 't is a noted Case the ancientest Case in our Law concerning Commendams The Case in short is thus The King brings a Quare Impedit and makes his Title by the Creation of the Incumbent to be a Bishop There was some Debate on the Declaration but the Defendants plead that the King granted the Temporalties to the new Bishop before the Living became vacant Then the King waives that Declaration and betakes himself to another Title and Declares on the Statute of Provisors because the Pope had usurped a Power which that Statute denied him and there 's no Judgment in the Case upon the first point but 't is most clear that the King's Counsel in that Case were of Opinion against this Prerogative because they did not stand to that Title but amended their Declaration and took to another This Point was directly to have been judged in the Case if they had thought fit to abide by it So that 't is plain that they took the Plea to be good if the Temporalties were in the King's hands then the King was to present if not that he had no such Prerogative And this is a great Authority that the King had no such Prerogative because he waives that Title and goes to another 5 Edw. 2. Maynard 148. Hugh de Courtney brings a Quare Impedit against Thomas de Hutwet for the Church of Bingham and sets forth that Isabel de Force Countess of Aumerle presented such a one
good for them and that they had the like Power of Appeals Writs of Error and Impeachments c. and that the Cognizance of such Appeals in England would produce great inconveniencies by making poor people to attend here whereas they might with less trouble and expence have Justice at home that this did agree with the reasons of that Ancient Statute 4 Inst 356. that persons having Estates in Ireland should Reside in that Kingdom else half of their Estates should go to maintain the Forts there That this practice of receiving Appeals here would be vexatious to the people of that place and that no Court could have Jurisdiction but by grant or prescription and that there could be no pretence for either in this place Then was it ordered in these or the like Words Whereas a Petition and Appeal was offered to the House the Day of last from the Society of the Governour and Assistants London of the New Plantation in Ulster in the Kingdom of Ireland against a Judgment given by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of Ireland in Parliament there Assembled on the day of last upon the Petition and Appeal of William Lord Bishop of Derry against the Decree or Orders made in the said Cause in the Court of Chancery there Whereupon a Committee was appointed to consider of the proper method of Appealing from Decrees made in the Court of Chancery in Ireland and that pursuant to the Orders of the said Committee and a Letter sent to the Lords Justices of Ireland by Order of this House several precedents have been transmitted to this House by the said Lord Justices Copies whereof were ordered to be delivered to either side After hearing Counsel upon the Petition of the said Society of London presented to this House praying that they might be heard as to the Jurisdiction of the House of Lords in Ireland in receiving and judging Appeals from the Chancery there as also Counsel for the Bishop of Derry after due Consideration of the Precedents and of what was offered by Counsel thereupon It is ordered and adjudged by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament Assembled That the said Appeal of the Bishop of Derry to the House of Lords in Ireland from the Decree or Orders of the Court of Chancery there made in the Cause wherein the said Bishop of Derry was Plaintiff and the said Society of the Governour and Assistants London of the New Plantation in Ulster in Ireland were Defendants was coram non judice and that all the proceedings thereupon are null and void and that the Court of Chancery in Ireland ought to proceed in the said Cause as if no such Appeal had been made to the House of Lords there and if either of the said Parties do find themselves Agrieved by the said Decree or Orders of the Chancery of Ireland they are at liberty to pursue their proper Remedy by way of Appeal to this House Sir Caesar Wood alias Cranmer versus Duke of Southampton APpeal from a Decree in Chancery the Case was thus Sir Henry Wood the Appellant's Unkle makes a Settlement in Consideration of a Marriage to be had between his Daughter Mary and the Duke c. to the uses following i.e. in Trust to Receive and Pay out of the Profits 450 l. a Year to the Lady Chester for the Education and Maintenance of his Daughter till twelve years of Age then 550 l. a year till Marriage or Seventeen years of Age which should first happen and in Trust to pay the Residue of the Profits to the Duke after Marriage he first giving Security to the said Trustees to provide Portions and Maintenance for the Daughters of the Marriage equal to the Sum he should receive and in case there should be none then the same Money to remain to the Respondent and if the said Mary should die before Marriage or Age of Seventeen years to such Uses as Sir H. W. should appoint And if Mary after Sir Henry's death die under Sixteen the Respondent then unmarried to any other Woman or after and before Seventeen the Respondent then living and unmarried or if before Seventeen she should marry any other or if she should refuse the Respondent then 20000 l. out of the Profits to the Duke But if the said Marriage shall take effect after Mary's Age of Sixteen years and she shall have Issue Male by the Respondent then for the better Settlement of the Premisses upon the Issue Male and a more ample Provision and Maintenance for the Respondent and his Wife and the longest Liver of them in Trust for the said Duke and Mary for and during their Lives and the Life of the longer liver of them and after their Deaths to the first Son c. in Tail Male and for default of Issue Male to the Daughters And for default of such Issue in Trust for such Persons only as Sir Henry should appoint and in default thereof to the right Heirs of Sir Henry Sir Henry W. at the same time makes his Will tho' dated after the Settlement reciting that he had settled the Premisses upon the Duke and Mary for their Lives and the Life of the Longer liver of them c. and confirms it and in Case the said Martiage should not take effect according to the Limitations of the Settlement or if the said Respondent should die without Issue by Mary or if he have Issue by her and that Issue die without Issue then the Remainder to Mary for Life and afterwards to her first Son and after several mediate Remainders then to the Appellant for Life c. and after to Thomas Webb c. Sir Henry Wood dies the Marriage between Mary and the Duke afterwards takes effect upon her arrival to years of Consent and they lived in that state till she was near Seventeen years of Age and then she dies without Issue The Court of Chancery decreed the Profits of the Estate to the Duke for Life It was argued for the Appellant That here was a precedent Copulative Condition that if the Marriage take effect after Sixteen and there be Issue then to the Duke and neither of these being in the Case the Decree is not consistent with the positive words of the Settlement for that the Duke was to have it upon no other terms That by this Settlement the Duke was thus provided for 1. If the Marriage did not take effect by Mary's refusal or taking another Husband the Duke was to have 20000 l. 2. If the Marriage did take effect and Issue was had then the Duke was to have an Estate for Life but not otherwise that the words are plain and certain that there must not only be a Marriage but Issue Male between them that tho' it should be agreed to be a good Marriage within the intention of the Settlement she living till after Sixteen years of Age yet when a Condition Copulative consisting of several Branches as this doth is made precedent to any Use or