Degree is the expresse Consent of the People to a Law propounded to them by the Prince and they consent unto it being asked that is when a Prince having prepared at home the matter of the Law by the Counsel of wise men and though not perfectly drawn it up yet he hath run it over and put it into some Form and transmitted it to his Subjects to be further examined that nothing may openly be contained in it that is either inconvenient or absurd requiring withall that they or a great part of them if they find it to be advantagious to the Common-wealth would confim it with their Suffrages that so by their Consents it may pass into a Law and this in some manner was heretofore the Custom of the Romans their Common-wealth yet standing And from this asking the Rogation of their Laws received its original A word most frequent amongst the best of the Writers of the Roman affairs XXVII The last and highest Degree which is the greatest and indeed the true Liberty of the People by which we Brittans have so long been happy even unto envy under excellent Kings and had we not out of our stupid Ingratitude made our selves unworthy of so great a blessing we had continued still most happy is the expresse Consent of the People before the enacting of the Law when the prescribed Form thereof a just and deliberate Debate being first had of the words and the matter of it and approved by the House of Peers the Suffrages of the House of Commons conjoined with them is at last exhibited to the Kings Majesty to whom alone the chief Power of making Laws doth belong that being by him confirmed if it seem good unto him it may have the Power and Vertue of a Law or otherwise it may be made void and be esteemed no Law which manner of enacting of Laws being most prudently devised by our Forefathers and brought even unto our times by so long a Series of Kings and years hath been found by the Use and Experience of all Ages past so profitable to the Common-wealth that if unseasonable Counsels had not been taken to speak no more of it for the removing of the old Marks and Limits from their right Places our Churches Universityes The King The People The Common-wealth and every private Family had by the blesâ—â—ng of God yet flourished which now by his most just Judgment do goe to wrack and every day do suffer more and more And I do believe that a better way cannot easily be thought upon by the wit of man to moderate on the one side the Power of Kings and to check and to restrain on the other side the Licence of the People XXVIII The fourth Doubt followeth of the Laws of lesse Commonalties for examples sake of Cities Universities Colleges and Schools which besides the Laws common to all the Subjects of the Kingdom do rejoice in their own private Laws Rights and Statutes The Question is to what Persons the Power of making their Laws doth pertain and being made whom and to what they oblige The answer is not difflcult I say therefore in the first place these Societies Corporations and Colleges being all Members of the great Body of the Kingdom and are contained in it as the inferiour orbes of the Heavens are contained in the Superiour it is not lawfull for any College or Society or for the Governours or Oversers of them to make private Laws for their own use which may be contrary or any ways prejudicial to the publick Laws of the whole Kingdom I say in the second place that seeing by the grant of Princes and their special grace and indulgence these societies are incorporated enjoy no other Rights Privileges or prerogatives besides those which it is manifest have been granted to them by a long praescription of time or by the Charters Letters Patents of the King it is to be concluded that all the Legislative power which is derived from them is a derived not a primitive power is at last to be resolved into the supreme power of the King as the true original of it and therefore the said Societies and Governors of them cannot according to their own will either constitute or actually exercise any power in the making of Laws unlesse according to the manner and the measure of that power vouchsafed by the indulgence of the Prince I say in the third place that Laws made by private Colleges and corporated Societies according to the tenor of the power granted them by the King do oblige all the Members of the said Societies and of all those that are under their jurisdiction or Government and none but those directly of it self and by its own force but by the Virtue of the Kings supreme Majesty on whose authority they rely and from which they receive all their force they do in some sense and indirectly oblige all and every Subject of the whole Kingdome but there is not the one and same account nor degree of these two obligations For these Laws oblige those of their own Society to the diligent observation of them but the others unto this that they do no ways violate or diminish them or hinder the observation of them XXIX The fifth Doubt is of Ecclesiastical Laws in the Species of them And that new Laws may be made concerning Rites and Ecclesiastical things and persons and of all Circumstances of outward external worship belonging to Order Honesty and Edification besides those delivered by Christ and his Apostles in the word of God is a thing so manifest and consentanious to Reason that he will hardly clear himself from the suspition of a perverse and obstinate Spirit who being dry and sober will deny it but since the time that the Divines have divided themselves into several parties it cannot easily be agreed upon amongst them to understand unto whom it doth belong to make Ecclesiastical Laws The Papists who would have the Clergy to be exempted from all jurisdiction of the Civil Magistrate of which controversy we cannot here dispute do affirm that Bishops only and amongst them the chief Bishop especially whom they call the Bishop Oecumenical hath the right and power to make Laws which may not only oblige the Consciences of the Clergy but of the Laity also and that without any consent or licence of the politick Magistrate There are some who the person only but not the opinion being changed do embrace this Tenet as also many others of the Papists who notwithstanding do professe themselves most bitter enemies unto Popery but in the mean time the Disciplinary Reformers our new Davusses do disturb all things and having taken away all Power Authority and Ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the King they do challenge it only to themselves and to their own Classes and Conventions The Erastians on the other side and our new Reformers no lesse than they under the pretence of Reformation having altogether disinvested the Clergy of all Ecclesiastical
Democraty the chief and Soveraign power consisteth in many Magistraâ—es yearly chosen by popular Suffrages or by certain other Intervalls of time and this heretofore was the state of the people of Rome when they were governed by Consulls Praetors Tribunes of the people Aedils and other yearly Magistrates and from hence proceed those Expressions which oftentimes we find in Tully Populi Romani Majestas laesa populi Majestas Visum est Senatui populoque Romano The Majesty of the Romane people The injured Majesty of the people it seemed good to the Senate and the people of Rome c. In a state Aristocratical the same Majesty resideth amongst some of the Lords and Nobles whom in some places they call Illustrissimoes in others the Peers of the Land and in other places again they receive other titles and appellations according to the custom of the Nation Amongst whom although peradventure but one as in the Common-wealth of Venice or more of them may have a preheminence of place and dignity above the rest being as it were a certain Primacy of Order which heretofore was the Honour of the Bishops of Rome and some Patriarchs in their Councils yet no man was so superiour above the rest in power that by his own authority he could judge any one of them neither could he himself be judged unlesse it were by all of them altogether Some form of this Government is still retained by our Mayors and Aldermen in our Cities and by the Heads and Fellows of Colleges in our Universities and although as it were but in a shadow yet in some manner they do represent it to us But in a Monarchial Government as the Name it self implies the chief Power is resident in the Person of the King alone whereupon St. Peter a most excellent Interpreter of St. Paul doth admonish the Christian People to obey the King as their superior that no man might any more doubt of whom St. Paul speaketh when he maketh mention of the higher Powers Ro. 1. 3. 1. Samuel also the Prophet of God doth so propound unto the people the fulness of the Kingly Power to be considered of by them 1 Sam. 8. That if a King the supreme in his Kingdom should act all those things which in that Chapter it is manifest that it is lawful for him to do upon no just Cause but upon the meer desire of Domination and to show himself a Tyrant and not a King although he wanted not Sin before God yet he ought not to have any force to be put upon him by the People nevertheless he may justly be said to have abused his Power but his own Power Amongst us English what more certainly or more cleerly can appear unless at noon we choose rather to be blind than open our eyes than that the supreme Power of the three Kingdoms doth intirely appertain to the Kings most excellent Majesty whom we are accustomed to render more remarkable by the title of Majesty not only according to the common use of speaking but in our solemn Ordinances and in all our forms actions of Law in the taking of an oath laying our hands upon the Gospel of the eternal God we acknowledg him the supreme yea the only supreme Governour of all persons and Causes in his Kingdoms VIII In the fourth place we are to understand That when we say the Power of making Lawes is in the King alone It is not so to be understood as if we meant that whatsoever the King is pleased to command shall immediatly obtain the force of a Law for by and by I will show unto you that some Consent of the People themselves and many other things are required to the Constitution of Law but this is that which I would hold forth unto you that the Counsels of the People Senate and other Demands of the Peers People or any whomsoever doe not oblige the Subjects nor do carry with them the Power of a Law unlesse they are strengthened and established by the Authority of the King to which being maturely and duely prepared as soon as the Consent of the King accedeth they immediatly receive the Name the Form and Authority of a Law and forthwith begin as soon as they are published to oblige the Subjects Therefore seeing that only is to be esteemed to be the Principal and the efficient Cause of any thing which by it self and immediatly produceth and into a prepared matter introduceth that Form which giveth to that Thing both the Name and the Being although other things ought to concurre to the production of that Effect or to go before it as so many praevious dispositions that so the matter may be rendred more apt to receive the Form intended by the Agent It is most manifest whatsoever those things are which antecedently are required to the Constitution of a Law yet the will of the Prince from whose Arbitration and Command alone all Rogations of Lawes are either established or made void is the only adaequate and efficient Cause of Publick Laws IX These things being premised The Position is confirmed by many Arguments And first by the Testimony of Holy Scripture First Gen. 49. 10. in that remarkable Testament of the Patriarch Jacob being about to dye The Scepter shall not be taken away from Judah nor a Law-giver from his Thigh is a Prophecy of the future Royal Dignity of that Tribe which the holy old man doth periphrastically describe and to the Confirmation of it he mentioned the Scepter the most remarkable witnesse of Kingly Authority and the Legislative Power the chiefest Perogative of it Secondly Deut. 33. 4 5. Moses was said to be a King in Israel because having gathered together all the Tribes of the People he gave them a Law to observe Thirdly Psal 60. 7. Judah is my Law-giver that is King And the vulgar Interpretation reads it Judah is my King In the Text now in hand Prov. 8. 15. By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree just things where which is usual with Solomon in the whole Book of the Proverbs that the latter part of the verse doth contain an Amplification or Antithesis the very same Persons who in the beginning of the verse are called Kings in the latter part by way of Amplification are called Makers of Lawes Fiftly In the new Testament St. James also maketh mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Royal Law X. Secondly It is confirmed by the Testimonies of Philosophers and Historians and by the Authority of the Civil Laws and the municipal Laws of our Nation The thing being so manifest we shall be content to give you but few Examples Aristotle Plutarch and almost an infinit Number of other Authors of great Estimation do all affirm that we must have a Law and the Law of the Prince But that of Ulpian is very remarkable which he hath in his Book of the Roman Laws Quod principi placuit Legis vigorem habet What pleaseth the Prince hath the
jurisdiction do wholy attribute the universal right of the external Government of the Church to the Civil Magistrate And moreover as for these our own Disciplinarians at home Good God! what Monsters of names and opinions as full of Deformity as of Difformity have these last seven years fruitful of prodiges brought forth and nursed under the pretence of Reformation XXX I have neither the leisure nor resolution unless I should appear too troublesom to you to grapple at this time with both these Adversaries But in these as in many other Debates that opinion seemeth to be the truer and is truly the safer which is lodged in the middle betwixt the two extremes and I am confident you will be so much the more willing to imbrace it by how much it is more agreeable to the Doctrine of the English Church as also to the Laws of the Kingdom which is That the Right of making Ecclesiastical Laws is in the Power of Bishops Elders and other Persons duely elected by the Clergy of the whole Kingdom But so nevertheless that the Exercise of the same Right and Power in all Christian Common-wealthâ— ought to depend on the Authority of the supreme Magistrate both a Parte ante as the Schoolmen have it a parte post on the part precedent on the part subsequent to wit that they ought not of themselves to assemble for the making of Ecclesiastical Canons Laws unless they be called to it by his Mandate or Command or at least defended by his Authority a fâ—ll free leave being both asked obtained and being thus called and warranted their Laws or Canons to which they have consented are not ratified not have any Power of obliging untill the Assent of the supreme Magistrate be obtained by whose approbation and Authority as soon as they are confirmed they are presently to pass for Laws and do oblige the Subject And these things may suffice to be spoken of the Cause Efficient THE EIGHTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws from the Formal Cause where Of 1 The Promulgation of Laws 2 Of Laws Penal Ezra 10. 7 8. 7. And they made proclamation throughout Judah and Jerusalem unto all the Children of the Captivity that they should gather themselves together unto Jerusalem 8. And that whosoever would not come within three days according to the Counsel of the Princes and the Elders all his substance should be forfeited OF the obligation of humane Lawes as to their material and efficient Causes we have spoke enough and as much as conduceth to our present purpose in those points which have already been handled by us In this place we are to speak of such as may be reduced to the Formal kind of Causes and although peradventure not so properly if examined according to the acurate and exact Method yet in my Judgment not altogether incongruous to our Discourse on this present Subject They may all of them be reduced to two Heads The one of the publication of Lawes and the other of the penalty adjoined to them to be inflicted on Delinquents Both of which as they are expressly contained in the Text above cited The Publication of the Law in the seventh verse and the penalty of it in the eighth verse so the use of them is very necessary both by the Nature of the Law it self and to obtain the Effect of the Law For seeing the Law by its own Nature and as it is a rule of things to be done ought to have a double Power viz. A Power of Directing by shewing unto the Subjects what is to be done and what is not to be done and a Power of obliging by suggesting into their minds a necessity of obeying The Law could not duely and effectually exercise this twofold Power unless the Subject were informed what is the will of the Prince which is done by publication and understood withall by the penalty annexed to it how much it doth concern him to perform it II. Concerning the Publication of the Law the first Doubt is Whether this publication be meerly on the Account of and as it were intrinsecal to the Law That is to enquire Whether that as the Law hath the Power of directing and obliging the promulgation of it be so necessary that it wanteth of that Power unless it be promulgated Now in all this Discourse you are to understand that I take not this word Promulgation as it is used in Cicero other Roman writers but according to the received manner of speaking amongst the Schoolmen the Canonists of the latter Ages for in that Promulgation of the Antients the Law not yet established or fully made was propounded to the people publickly on three Market days of their approbation of it But the Publication of which we now speak is the Promulgation of a Law already made that the People may take notice of it I therefore shall briefly answer to the Doubt proposed and say That this Publication is so necessary and so intrinsecal to the Law that in some manner it may be called the Form of it and thereupon amongst many Authors it is a part of the Definition of it and indeed it is absolutely necessary to this that the Law may exercise the Office of a Law which is to direct and to oblige the Subjects whom it cannot direct much less oblige although made by never so just and undoubted Authority unless it be known to them and it cannot be known unless it be published For that which properly induceth the obligation is the Will and Authority of the Prince or Governor not as a single but as a publick Person and the Head of the Commonalty But unless by some publick means he shall cause his Will to be propounded and made known unto the People it cannot by any Law be manifest at least according to the interpretation of the Law that it is his Will and proceedeth from his Authority as he sustaineth a publick Person Dist 4. Sect. In isâ—is And from hence is that of the Canon Law Leges constituuntur cùm promulgantur Lawes are constituted when they are published And that also of the Civil Law Leges quae constringunt vitas hominum ab omnibus intelligidebent The Laws which do bind the lives of men ought to be understood by all which being approved by the Common Consent of all Doctors and the Dictates of Reason we need not here for the confirmation of iâ— to instance the Example of God him self solemnly pronouncing his Law unto the Israelites from the Mount of Sinai or the Practice of the most flourishing Common-wealths and Cities in the whole world who as soon as their Laws were made did in the most publick places expose them to the observation of the people engraven in Tables of Brass or Wood the words are most known which every where we meet with amongst antient Authors and to this classis pertain the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifie nothing
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of whom mention is made in the fourth verse of this 2 of the Galatians who pretending that they came from James did indeed creep in privily of themselves to observe the liberty of St. Paul and other Christians as some do think or rather as others are of opinion and more probably whether they were weak Brethren sent indeed by St. James but as yet not throughly instructed concerning the cessation of the Rites and Ceremonies of the Law St. Peter desiring to be gracious with them or rather fearing to give them an offence did immediately and altogether abstain from the Tables and the society of the Gentiles and from the meats forbidden in the Law of Moses by whose example the Jews of Antioch being induced who by the Sermons of Paul and his fellow labourers in Christ had been taught the Christian â—iberty a little better than those that came from Jerusalem and more fully understood the abolishing of the ceremonial Law yet being but weak themselves and more addicted to the ceremonies to which a long time they had been accustomed they easily suffered themselves to be seperated from the communion of their brethren the believing Gentiles not without some suspition as it is probable that Peter the chief of the Apostles was the more compent judge of these things what was to be done that themselvs were hitherto drawn in by Paul with the gratefull but the empty shew of liberty and what is more to be admired for it is not strange or unaccustomed for the weaker sort to stumble even Barnabas himself who was St. Pauls collegue and his daily companion in his journeys who constantly asserted the Doctrine of Christian liberty against the Jews being overcome by the authority of so great an Apostle did stoop with him into the same fellowship of dissimulation not without a great offence to the believing Gentiles III. Paul doth here declare that for this fact St. Peter was reprehended by him and that vehemently openly and deservedly Not only that he himself to the scandal of so many of the brethren out of too great desire of complacence or thâ— fear of offence had shewed himself more favourable to the Jewish ceremonies than did become him but that he drew others by his example into the same participation of Hypocrisie with him and by the same example had endeavouted to enforce the believing Gentiles although unwilling and against their Consciences unto Judaisme I am not ignorant that St. Hierom having alleged some other Authors that jump with him in that opinion doth give a far different interpretation of this reproof than what I here have specified viz. That this affair was not carryed seriously and as indeed it was betwixt these two chiefest of the Apostles but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by contrivance the benefit of the Church at that time so requiring it Indeed he would perswade us that this dissimulation of St. Peter was necessary to retain the good opinion of the Jews which that it might not be too dangerous to the Gentiles this counterfeit reproof of St. Paul was altogether as necessary by which the errour of the Jews concerning the continuing force of the ceremonial Rites might be so corrected that by the same endeavour provision should be made that no danger of scandal should be given to the Gentiles And thus by the conjoyned dissimulation of both the Apostles it was so effected that the Jewes as well as the Gentiles should by this pious fraud be more easily retained in the faith of Christ which not long they had imbraced These words therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are so handsomly interpreted by him to maintain his own opinion as above all other of the Fathers he is accustomed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to serve those assertions which are but his own conjectures that the words he withstood him to the face do not in his construction signifie openly and before the people or to his own face but only under a pretence and shew and according to the outward appearance in which construction these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are by him usurped also as it is manifest 2 Cor. 10. 7. IV. This opinion of St. Hierome was nothing pleasing to St. Augustine who denieth that any thing was here done by contract or contrivance but that St Paul most sincerely and exprssely did oppose himself to this unseasonable combination he therfore in a letter did very friendly admonish St. Hierome of his errour Inter Epist Hierou Epist 97. who persisting more obstinate in his opinion letters being often sent from the one to the other the question began to be disputed betwixt them as became the contestation of two such great wits with much acutenesse on both sides and with solid weights of reason at the last in the judgment of most men the victory stood on St. Augustines side and his arguments being conceived to be more sound and more considerable but very few did adhere to the opinion of Chrysostome in which it is not to be wondred at if Cardinall Baronius were one who being carefull that the affairs of Rome should not suffer any diminution and that the infallibility of his Jove of the Capitoll should not grow into contempt if any stain of rashness or error should blemish the reputation of St. Peter or if any man should be so bold to reprove him or to dare to open his mouth against him by saying Master why do you so doth here use all his art and industry to crown with applause the exploded opinion of St. Hierome and to restore it unto honor though banished and begging for reputation all the world over but truly this is that Baronius as every where he doth betray himself to be partiall who in his voluminous and laborious Chronicles did make it all his busines to gratify the Bishop of Rome and to measure the faith and Authority of all monuments and the great moments of all opinions and testimonies by the dignity and Advancement of the Sea of Rome But Paul to return from whence I have digressed did most iustly reprove St. Peter his fellow Apostle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is face to face as the same phrase is read in the 15 of the Acts and in other places of importunate dissimulation and this he did boldly and openly before all and more especially because that by his example he had drawn Barnabas into an error and the Jewes of Antioch and given a great and a greiveous offence to the Gentiles who had newly imbraced the Christian faith to the great danger and scandal of the liberty of the Gospel V. I have more willingly inlarged my self upon this as well to give some light to a place heretofore obscure and much controverted as to make more manifest the force of the argument which for the confirmation of our position is deduced from this discourse of the Apostle For St. Paul judged that not only St. Peter who was the leading example but that
Conscience that the said obligation doth not signifie any compulsion for to speak properly the Conscience can no more be compelled than the free-Will but a power rather and authority which she is bound to obey to urge her to the performance of that which belongs unto her duty In the very same manner altogether as a King who hath the Legislative power by enacting lawes doth oblige his subjects to the observation of them As therefore in the external Courts Subjects properly and formally are obliged to obedience not so much by the law it self as by the power of the Law-giver howsoever the Law it self is said to oblige but when it is so spoken it is to be understood improperly and as it were materially and terminatively because the obligation is made by it and to it so the Law is said to judge John 7. 5. Doth our Law judge any one although the Law it self doth not judge but the Magistrate because the Magistrate ought to judge according to the Law so in the internal Court the Rule or the Law imposed on Conscience doth not properly oblige it but the power and authority of the Imposer yet so as by the Consequent truly and not unaptly although not so properly the Rule it self may be said to carry with it an obliging Virtue When therefore it is demanded what is that which obligeth Conscience to the performance of her duty At the same time both these questions are propounded First and principally who is the Lord of Conscience who hath right and power to impose a Rule or Law upon it to which it ought to conforme it self And then secondly and consequently what is that Rule of Conscience or that Law which is imposed on it by the Lord thereof and to which by his dominion and Empire over it it is bound to conform it self VI. In the fifth place it is to be understood when any thing is attributed to another it is attributed either by it self or not by it self that is to say by accident Those things therefore to which the power of obliging the Conscience is any ways to be attributed do fall under a threefold consideration For in the first place they either oblige the Conscience simply by themselves that is they do directly oblige by themselves and by their own power not only as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident but as it opposed also to this Term by another Or in the second place they do oblige by themselves respectively that is as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident and not as it is opposed to the Term per aliud that is by another The meaning is they do not oblige by their own proper power but by the vertue of another having a power to oblige Or thirdly they do oblige by accident only and in neither of the considerations by it self It is besides observable that in those things which do oblige the Conscience in the second consideration there is some difference to be made according to the different account of the cause from whence the obligation doth arise For it is one thing when the obligation is forcibly imposed by the authority of another and another thing when it is willingly contracted and of its own accord By this that hath been spoken it is manifest that there are four degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience For examples sake to give you a short view of what hath been already spoken and of what as yet remaineth to be spoken you are to understand in the first place that the express Commandment of God doth oblige properly by it self and by its own force In the second place the Laws of men and the mandates and orders of our Superiours do oblige the Conscience but by no power or authority but by the vertue of the Commandement of God Thirdly Vows and promises being made of our own accord when it was wholy in our own choice to do otherwise do in their proper fact and freedom of election oblige our Consciences to the performance of them Fourthly and lastly the Law of consideration of Scandal and offence doth by accident oblige the Conscience VII We are here to understand that only that obligation which consisteth in the first degree is absolute and universal the other three are relative and particular I say it is absolute because it doth directly and alwayes oblige and because it obligeth all persons and the obligation of it is never to be cancell'd The others may be said to be relative both because they do not bind of themselves or by their own power but by a relation to some precept or institution of God as also because they do not always or every where oblige and in every case but when those considerations do require which they do bear a reference and respect unto The obligation therefore of the first degree is predominant over any obligation whatsoever in the other three insomuch that it is able to make them of no effect but it is impossible for them to render it frustrate Nay if we take it universally the obligation in any superiour degree the other being equall is more valid than the obligation in any inferiour degrees whatsoever and doth judge over them either by taking away what was done and contracted as oftentimes or at least by hindring what was to be done as always Therefore as to the power of obligation the Laws of men must give place to the Laws of God private contracts and promises to publick constitutions and the Law or consideration of offence or scandal to them both VIII These things being thus premised that we may be happy in a certain Rule by which we may know how to live I will according to my promise comprehend in some few conclusions those which are most necessary to be understood concerning the Rule of Conscience and the passive obligation of it The first conclusion is That God alone hath a most proper and direct command on the Consciences of all men So that none but God alone hath power to impose a Law upon the Conscience of any man to which it ought to be subjected as obliging by it self I say by it self for we are all bound in our Consciences to observe the just Laws of men to keep our vows and promises made to God or men and to be careful that we become not a scandal or an offence unto others But we are bound unto all these things upon no other tye but as they are reduceable to the will of God commanding them as in its due place we shall give an account unto you of the particulars thereof IX This Conclusion is proved first by the words of the Apostle already mentioned There is but one Law-giver who can both save and destroy In which words two arguments do prefer themselves to our observation In the first place they assert there is but one Legislator not one picked out amongst many not one above many but one
written Law of God although both of them by themselves are most perfect in their own kind and being joyned do contain the particular Principles of supernatural faith and the general Principles of things to be done accommodated to all parts of life yet neither of them doth descend to all those particulars which either may be or for the most part are necessary for the preservation of Peace and Order in Cities and Governments For examples sake the Law of reason which is the same with the Law of Nature doth dictate and the Scripture also in the next verse of this Chapter doth teach that Tribute is to be paid for the maintainence of Princes and of the charges of Wars and other publick uses but unlesse it be by a Lâ—w determined how much is to be payed and by what proportion and by whom and in what space of time and other circumstances either thâ—â— payment will miscarry or not be made timely enough or else it will not be enough for the use of the Common-wealth If you say that by this Argument the necessity of Laws is proved indeed but the obligation of them is not determined for Subjects may be enforced to their duties by the â—â—nunciation of punishments We confesse indeed the truth of this if we should go no higher but it furthermore we shall consider without selves how headlong man is burryed to forbidden sins and how bold to venture through them all how 〈…〉 a Keeper Fear is of Duty unlesse that withall there be some sense of Religion to contain men in their duties it will most easily appear how wisely Almighty God the most prudent Moderator of all things hath provided for the affairs of men who hath endued their Consciences with a certain religious reverence to the Law which doth grow up together with their use of Reason From hence it comes to passe that amongst the Heathâ—â—â— ignorant of the true God there were scarce any one found of the antient Legislators but pretended to the people that the Laws which â—e made were delivered to him by some God to 〈…〉 need not give you the names of 〈…〉 Lycuâ—gus and many others whoâ— the 〈◊〉 make mention of it being a truth so well known to all XXVII The third argument is this What is to be done for the Lord we are bound in Conscience to the performance of it But we are bound to be subject to Humane Laws rightly established that is so constituted by the supreme power or by others receiving their Authority from it for the Lord â— Pet. 2. 13. Be subject to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake whether it be to the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Supreme which sufficiently expounds the meaning of St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Higher Powers in the first verse of 〈◊〉 Chapter or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him c. And that these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Lord or for the Love of God as the French Translation hath it doth imply the obligation of Conscience is manifest in the first place by the use of the same expressions in other places of the Scripture as Eph. 6. 1. where speaking of the Duty of Children towards their Parents the words of the Text are Liberi obedite Parentibus vestris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Domino Children obey your Parents in the Lord And by the Duty of Servants to their Masters in the same Chapter v. 7. With good will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serving the Lord and not men which in the third of the Col. v. 23. is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Lord and not to Men as if he should say For Conscience and not for Wrath only or for the fear of God rather than the dread of Men. It is manifest Secondly from the following words in that place of St. Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for so is the will of God And â—o St. Paul in the said sixth chapter of the Ephesians and the sixth verse speaking of the Duty of Servants he exhorts them to obey their Masters in the sincerity of Heart 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doing the will of God from the Heart Now the will of God is the very same Rule of Conscience which I have said to be the Rule Adaequate XXVIII The fourth Argument What Natural Reason doth so prescribe to be done that both the fault and the guilt of the fault are contracted if it be not done we are without all doubt obliged in Conscience to the doing of it For since the sense of Sin pertaineth to the Conscience as also doth the fear of Punishment which ariseth from it whatsoever it is that the Mind rightly conceiveth doth induce the stain of a fault and a guilt of punishment for that fault it doth directly appertain to the obligation of the Conscience Now Natural Reason whose Judgement cannot be indirect doth so far command us to obey Humane Laws that if that obedience be not performed we are immediately conscious to our selves that it is meerly by our own fault that we fayl in that Duty XXIX The fifth Argument â—he Violation of that which necessarily draweth along with it the Violation of the Laws of God doth oblige the Conscience because no man with a safe Conscience can violâ—te the Law of God which is the Rule of the Conscience but the violation of every particular Law solemnly constituted by Men doth necessarily draw along with it the violation of the Law of God to wit of that General Commandment by which God commandeth obedience to the Magistrate Therefore the said Violation of the particular Law of Men doth oblige the Conscience XXX The sixth Argument We are bound in Conscience not to Act that which if it were acted is in a manner to resist God himself For we are bound to be subject and to submit our selves unto God and therefore not to resist him for Subjection and Resistance are contrary unto one another neither can any Man at the same time be subject unto and resist the same person But not to obey Humane Laws solemnly constituted is interpretatively to resist God For he who obeyeth not the Laws doth disobey the Legislative power of the Magistrate which whosoever he is that doth it the said power being ordained by God he doth oppose himself against Gods Ordinance and by Consequence interpretatively he doth oppose God himself which is the Determination of St. Paul in the second verse of this chapter and from whence he orderly concludes the necessity of Subjection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording to Conscience in this veâ—se XXXI From what hath been already spoken it will be no great difficulty to answer to the Arguments which commonly are objected by the Adversaries to this Truth The first and chiefest whereof is taken from Christian Liberty and to the Confirmation of it many places of Scripture are alleged with much pomp circumstance which seem to adstipulate to that Liberty
God which they call positive and from which they would have us freed by the death of Christ whether they be ritual or judicial were only imposed on the Jews but not on us who are Christians Again where it is manifest what God would have done it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too saucily to determine what ought to be done Now it is manifest that God would have both he would have that his positive Laws delivered to the Israelits by Moses should not oblige the Christians and that the Laws of men rightly and solemnly constituted by the Magistrates should oblige the people under their Authority Thirdly If this Argument indeed were of any force those that make use of it do not observe that by it they do not only take away the obligation but altogether the use also of all humane Lawes For Christ hath no otherwise freed us from the obligation of the Mosaâ—ck Laws than so by taking away the use of them that by us they are no more to be esteemed as Laws Therefore if in the same manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws it must of necessity follow that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongst us So wild a proposition is this of the Anabaptists and other fanatick persons neither is it admitted by themselves who do propound it XXXVI Again they object that of Saint James Chapter the fourth there is but one Law-giver to wit God and Christ who is only Lord of the Conscience He is an invader thereof of Christs right and thrusts himself into the Throne of God whosoever he is that assumeth unto himself a power of obliging the Consciences of other men I answer There is indeed but one supreme Law-giver who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Consciences of men as by himself and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them which Law-giver is God and Christ as the Apostle hath it But this hinders not but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree who by a power granted and derived to them from that supreme Lawgiver have of themselves a right of making Laws which may consequently oblige the Conscience Just as a King who solely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legislative power yet notwithstanding by his Charter he may give to some College or Corporation a right of making Laws which may oblige all the members of that body not by their own power but by the force of the royal Donation and the Authority granted to them from the King Our Universities as you all know are happy and rejoice in this privilege that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes and ordain punishments for Delinquents and if it be expedient they may abrogate again and cancel the same Statutes Now there is no man of a sober understanding who will conceive that the excercise of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legislative right of the King or can be any deceit or prejudice unto it unless it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter Nay it is rather an excellent and a singular mark of the royal autocrasy that the King hath not only the Legislative power himself but that he can vouchsafe it unto others to be had and used his own right being notwithstanding safe and entire into himself XXXVII The other objections relying on one the same Foundation may be resolved by one a and the same labour I will briefly run them over In the third place they object that the Civil power is meerly temporal therefore belongeth not unto the Conscience which is spiritual Fourthly the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth and not the internal peace of the Conscience therefore the Laws themselves do only oblige the outward man and not the Conscience which lyeth within Fifthly the Magistrate cannot judge of Consciences and therefore can make no Laws over them it being the same extent of power to give Laws and to judge according to them Sixtly the Magistrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Consciences of the people but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth which if it be done it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth whether it be done out of any Conscience of duty or not and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commensurated to the intention of the Agents and they ought not further to be extended XXXVIII I answer and first universally to them all By all these Arguments this only is obtained that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themselves or by their proper force which of our own accord we grant for we assert no other obligation but what comes to them ex consequenti by Consequence and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers And from this ground I answer to the particular objections And as the to third I say that the Civil power being meerly temporal cannot of it self and in respect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verseth have a spiritual effect and therefore of it self cannot induce a spiritual obligation neverthelesse by consequence it may have a spiritual effect by a derivation from the power of some superiour cause in the virtue whereof it worketh Now every Magistrate as long as rightly and dâ—ely he doth exercise the Legislative Power which God hath put into his hands he worketh in the virtue of God himself and by ordination of him who is himself a Spirit and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men XXXIX I answer to the fourth that although peace be an external blessing of a Commonalty yet the internal Conscience is obliged to the uttermost to the procuring and preserving of it by all lawful and honest means because that God the Lord of Conscience hath commanded us to love and follow peace and if private certainly much more publick peace Neither is it any way inconsistent that although Conscience be internal yet it is obliged to a thing external for the obligation of Conscience doth not arise from the Nature or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging that is God himself XL. I answer to the fifth that the Legislative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the same person that is to him who hath the supreme jurisdiction over the Subjects nevertheless dispensatively and by the will of the supreme Magistrate it may both of them and both ways be administred by other persons as he shall think expedient Therefore although God alone hath in himself a peculiar power over the Consciences of the Creature and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original proper and absolute right yet
not on another For by the force of Free will a man is master only of his own will and of his own Acts and not of anothers Now on the contrary he who layes a precept upon or who doth command another if he hath right to command he obligeth by commanding that man whom he commandeth but he doth not oblige himself Because a command is an Act of power and Authority and of right upon another and is fit and proper unless peradventure there be something that hinders it to induce an obligation so the Father with Authority commands the Son the Master the Servant the General the Souldier the King the people and God as a Superior commandeth man to such and such duties and by commanding doth oblige him to the performance of them IV. In the second place I suppose that the Legislative power is a power of publick Jurisdiction for it sufficeth not to the power of making Laws that a man hath a Right and power over others to prescribe unto them what is to be done unless he be invested with an external power to compel them to the performance of it and to afflict punishments on the Refusers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Aristotle Ethick 10. The Law hath a necessitating power The Schoolmen therefore do distinguish that power which a Superior hath over an Inferior into that power which they call Dominative or the power of Masterdome and the power of Jurisdiction The first whereof is less and more private and not admitting an external Jurisdiction the other greater and of a more inforcing Authority These two powers do not a little differ between themselves and that in a three-fold consideration First in respect of the matter or object for the Power Dominative or of mastery is properly exercised on the more imperfect and private Commonalty as a House a School or a Family but the power of Jurisdiction on the more perfect and publick Commonalty as a City an Army a Common-wealth Secondly in respect of the End for the power Dominative by it self and Primarily is ordinated to the profit of the person indued with that power that is the master and but Secondarily and by Consequence to the good of the Commonalty as it is profitable for a Family that the master of it should grow rich Now the power of publick Jurisdiction is Primarily ordinated to the publick good of the Commonalty it self and but Secondarily and Consequently to the good of the person indued with that power which is the Magistrate himself it being profitable for a Prince that the Common-wealth should flourish Thirdly in the respect of the more effectual Administration which is greater in the power of jurisdiction than in the Power Dominative by reason of a greater coactive Power for examples sake The Master of a Family cannot so efficaciously prevail that his Commands may be put in Execution by his Sons or Servants whom he cannot correct but with a rod or Cudgel as may the civil Magistrate who by his Power may enforce his Subjects to Obedience by imprisonment or banishment by confiscating their Goods or by Death it self 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The fatherly Authority hath nothing in it that is enforcing nothing that is necessating saith Aristotle in the place newly quoted Therefore to the making of Laws every superiority is not sufficient but besides that Dominative there is required the power of Jurisdiction so properly called for the Laws cannot be made or established unless by a Person that hath a publick coactive power by this time you understand I believe that I may need no more to admonish you of it that what here hath been spoken by me concerning Laws doth absolutely pertain to the chief Laws of a Nation and not to any others unless analogically after their way the proportion that is due unto them as they come near or are more remote from their perfection V. To these two suppositions which to what sense they tend you shall easily understand from those things which presently I shall represent unto you I in the third place do now adde a responsive position viz. That the power Legislative is a power autocraâ—ical That is the power of making Laws which may oblige the Commonalty doth consist in him alone whether he be a single person as in the state of Monarchical Government or whether they be more as in other Governments who exerciseth the chief power over the whole Commonalty I will in the first place explane this position and afterwards I will confirm it And for the explication of it we are in the first place to understand that for the happiness of humane societies and the more commodious Adminstration of Commonwealths it hath pleased Almighty God the Author of Order not only to constitute a political Government that there may be Magistrates to be set over the people but also in that very Government to constitute a political Order that amongst the Magistrates themselves there might be divers degrees as well of Dignity as of Power And it is likely that the military word of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the Apostle useth in the Romans hath a relation to this sence to show that there is not only an ordination of Magistrates from God but a subordination also such as is seen in a military Army VI. In the second place we are to know that in all things in which there is order to avoid a proceeding to an infinitenesse which Nature doth abhor we must at the last come necessarily to something which is the first and chiefest in that Order where we are to make a stand Therefore seeing that Magistrates of the same Commonalty are some of them superiour unto another in Dignity and power it must of necessity so come to passe that some one of them must be transcendent above the rest that the others may depend on him and he on none In the same construction the head is the highest in the body the Admiral in a Fleet and the Emperour in an Army The supreme Magistrate is only less than God himself and in governing the people committed to his charge hath neither a Superiour nor an Equal St. Peter calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Superiour St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the higher power 1 〈…〉 13. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 1. the man in Authority And the Schoolmen 1 Tim. 〈◊〉 2. caput communitatis the head of the Commonalty in whom solely the chief command and the Majesty of the Empire doth consist and to whom all inferiour Magistrates do owe all that power which they do exercise over the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as being sent from him 1 Pet. 2. 14. VII In the third place we are to know that this supreme power which we call Majesty or Autocratical that is governing all by it self according to the diverse form of Commonwealths is placed either in some one person or in more In a popular state which is called
oblige the Subjects nor have the Power of a Law unless they be received by the Commonalty themselves and are allowed by the Customs and Suffrages of those that use them According to Demosthenes the Law is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Common Ingagement of a City and if peradventure his authority be of lesse value because he lived in the popular Common wealth of the Athenians will you be pleased to hear the great Lawyer Julian who lived when the Roman Emperours had the fulness of command his words in his two and thirtieth Book de legib are these Ipsae Leges nulla alia ex causa nos tenent quam quod judicio populi receptae sunt The Laws do oblige us for no other cause than that they are received by the judgement of the people XIV But though all acknowledge the necessity of that reception or consent yet all men do not derive it from the same Fountain There are some who think that the consent of the People is therefore required in the making of Laws because that Princes have all their power flowing to them from the people which if they do abuse as they are to be esteemed to abuse it if they shall extend it further or longer than it shall please the people the people by their own right may again re-assume that power which before they had granted to them This is a most erronious and a dangerous position and which all those who are not enemies to mankind and the publick peace ought deservedly to abhominate All their reason relyeth on a double foundation but both of them very weak and abhorring to sober sence The first is that Princes do owe unto the people for all their power the other that whosoever he is who granteth power to another it lyeth in his power to revoke that power when he pleaseth O most egregious Sophistry if this were so Were Samuel more to be condemned for his Oratory who the more to affright the people being weary of their Theocracy or Government immediately from God and to deterre them from their perverse affectation of innovation had enough to do to lay before their eyes the vast extent of the power of Kings Or were the people of Israel more to be condemned for their folly who ignorant of their own right would suffer themselves to be circumvented and baffled by so gross a pretence and return nothing back unto the Prophet no not so much as a word Were they all so dumb and stupid and void of resolution as well as understanding that not one in so great a multitude could be found as had either so much acuteness or confidence as readily to make answer to these objections of Samuel it being so easy for them to give such a sudden check unto them Tell Boys these tales who have the leisure to hear them and not the wit to understand them We if our King shall thus begin to domineer will use our own privileges and presently take away that right from him which we have given to him In how few words had they done the whole work and stopped for ever the mouth of the Prophet if these fictions of new Magistrates had been so much believed in former ages as they now are confidently suggested to new Disciples and willingly entertained by the unadvised multitude XV. But to be in earnest and to draw more near unto the thing it self 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Homer in hymn I say in the first place That the power of Governing in a Common-wealth by what means soever men arrive unto it proceedeth only and immediately from God himself The Testimonies of holy Scripture to prove this are most manifest b Non alio animo populus rectorem suum intuetur quà m si Dii immortales potestatem visendi sui faciant Seneo 1. de clemâ—â— 19. By me Kings reign Prov. 8. That is by my authority alone and not by any authority of men The Powers ordained are ordained by God and not by the people Rom. 13. 1. The Magistrates themselves which are set over the people are the Ministers of God Rom. 13. 4 6. And therefore they are called Gods Psal 82. 6. because they are his Vice-gerents on Earth God himself and not the suffrages of any people conferring this honour on them I have said you are Gods Can any people constitute Gods unto themselves without the filthy Crime of Idolatry Seeing it belongs to men by their own authority to make choice of their own Vice-gerents and to intrust them with places and power according to their own and not anothers arbitration Will any mortal man be so bold as to arrogate that right unto himself as to affirm that the Minister of God on Earth and as it were a Vice-God is made so by his authority and by a power which his wretchedness hath conferred on him although peradventure there may be some references or parts of the people concerning the person of the King as he is the Subject of Power as by and by you shall see just so as in the Generation of natural things there are some praevious alterations which may prepare and dispose of the matter to receive the Form to be introduced yet the conferring of the Kingly Power and the application of it to the Person is not the work of the People but immediatly of God himself as the Production of a Form into the matter subjected is the immediate work of the Agent or Person generating Lib. 5. contra haeres cap. 20. That is elegantly spoken of Irenaeus Cujus jussu homines nascuntur hujus jussu et Reges constituuntur By whose Command men are born by his Command Kings are also constituted XVI I say in the second place to point directly to the Fountains Head that political Domination at the beginning was only the off-spring of paternal power Those who have the leisure to look more diligently after the beginning of things will find that the Nations did not grow up into Kingdoms and Commonwealths by the mutual consent of the people but that all Empire amongst the posterity of Noah did for a while consist within the bounds of paternal Authority At that time there were neither Kings nor petty Kings much lesse Monarchs of vast Continents nor so much as the least signes of any Aristocratical Government or popular State a word not heard of throughout all the world in those antient times and first of all brought into Greece a moving Nation and desirous of novelty by the ambition or fury of some who industriously affected new things All Domination at that time consisted in the power of Heads of Familyes amongst which he who was the first born of every Family 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 7. Eudem 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Id. 1. Polit. â— without any suffrages or election was by a certain Right and privilege of Nature the Governour of all things both Holy and Civil and as it were the Prince of all that alliance who
according to his Arbitration did chastise Delinquents first with moderate punishments and Families afterwards increasing into greater multitudes he afflicted the guilty with more grievous Chastisements till at the last the numbers of Men still increasing and Vices increasing with them there was a necessity of condemning notorious Offenders unto Death From hence it came to passe that heretofore the Father had the power of Life and Death over his Children and his Family Pater jussi Hoc nomen â—mni lege Majus est Jus nobit vitae necisque concessum est Quintil. declam 6. of which power there remained a long time some Impressions after the Constitutions of Kings amongst the Nations And from hence amongst the Persians the too much severity of the power of the Fathers over their Children was so much observed but nevertheless disproved by Aristotle And that old and solemn form of the Romans of arrogating their Children which Aulus Gellius maketh mention of Noct. Attic. lib. 5. cap. 19. UTI EI. VITAE NECIS QUE IN. EO POTEST AS SIET That he hath the power over him both of Life and Death c. From these beginnings by the increase of Families Kingdoms by degrees did every where arise And those who commanded over them were called Kings and in their Dominions although but of a short extent peradventure but one little City with the Hamlets and Villages bâ—longing to it they exercised an absolute Authority and Command Principio rerum gentium Nationumque Imperia penes Reges erant In the beginning of things the Governments of People and Nations were in the Power of Kings Justin 1. hist 1. Cic. 3. Legib. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 1. Polit. so Justine begins his History And Cicero before him saith Omnes antiquae Gentes regibus quondam paruerunt All antient Nations did heretofore obey Kings And Aristotle more antient than both of them doth testify that those Cities which were free in his times he means the Cities of Greece and others which followed their Examples were at the first under the Command of Kings Amongst many other things this is no light Argument of this original which I have spoken of that the Dominions of Kings were heretofore inclosed in such narrow limits that in Canaan alone which is no great Country we do read that there were one and thirty Kings overthrown by Josuah the Captain General of the Host of Israel Jos 12. And probably we may conjecture that he left above as many more unfought with for not long after the death of Josuah we find that Adonibezek did exercise a barbarous cruelty on seventy Kings whom he had Conquered Judg. 1. 7. What need many words so little is the difference betwixt the Prince of a great Family and a King of a small Territory 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gregor Presb. in vita Greg. Nazianzeni that they seem to differ more in Name and Bulk than in Deed and Power so that it is not to be doubted if a true Calculation be made but that the Domination of a Family in the processe of Time did by degrees and by an unperceived inlargement grow up into a Kingly Name and Power And the Original of the greatest Empire is no where else to be extracted but from this Head And thus far there is nothing more plain nothing more sure than that in the conferring of Kingly power the people had no part at all neither indeed could have XVII From these things as I conceive we safely may conclude to note that by the way which is worthy your observation That the form of Government by which the first-born of the whole Family doth succeed into his Fathers rights as the next Heir is justly to be preferred above the rest for many considerable reasons but especially for this because it best of all answers to that Original to which it seems that Nature it self in some sort hath made man From which most antient and congruous Form of Nature when once we have departed the impotent and unruly lust of Domination attempting forbidden wayes to ascend to the height of Soveraignty all things are thereby laid open to Tyranny and popular Indeavours For they who arrive to Soveraignty otherwise than by a legitimate succession must necessarily be promoted to it by one of these three ways either by open Force and strength of Arms or by Craft and Policy or thirdly by a free Election Those who by force of Arms have obtained the Soveraign Power whether it were by meer Usurpation without any pretence of Right or by War made upon their Enemies who unjustly have provoked them for both wayes it comes to passe it is certain do owe no more their Authority to their Subjects than those who succeed in their Kingdoms by Hereditary Right nay much less For the one do govern over their willing Subjects and used to the yoak and the other over an unwilling people and if they were equal to him in strength ready to make resistance and to fight against him So that in this consideration also in conferring of the chief Power the people have no interest at all XVIII But in the establishing of the Power of those Men who by Tyranny and Deceit do exercise a Tyrannical Power it cannot be denyed but that the people have a great interest For those who affect Tyranny are accustomed above all things to court the favor of the people potentiam ex vulgi adulatione quaerentes seeking after power by flattering of the Vulgar Justin 13. 3. The Histories of divers Nations do afford us many Examples to confirm this Truth I will make use only of the Abridgement of Trogus Pompeius where we may find by what Arts Pisistratus of the Athenians Ibid. 2. 8. Clearchus of the Heraclians Ibid. 16. 4. Dionysius Junior of the Sicilians and others of other Countryes did allure the people to side with their factions Ibid. 21. 1. With invective and envious orations they would incense the Spirits of the credulous multitude against the best of the Citizens they would Act and Inact many things publickly to be praysed and which carried a face of Clemency Justice and Benignity to the people they would insinuate themselves into the affections of the Citizens as if they were the only assertors vindicators and patrons of the publick liberty with all kind of flatteries and allurements with which the Vulgar love and are accustomed to be trepanned Their pretences and dissembling of duties their often-repeated promises the hopes they throw in of happier times and of the change of Government into a better are those egregious artifices by which they who by deceit do arise to Soveraignty do solicite and bend and lead which way they will the moving and unwary people flattering them with fair words to serve their foul Ambition And Hòs equidem per-rarò haec alea fallit These are the men who have the Dice that alwayes run upon the Sice for relying on the favour of the
which is spoken of the people in the first sence to be accommodated to them in the latter There is no sober man will deny that the safety of the people that is of the whole Commonalty as that word comprehends the King together with the Subjects is the supreme Law But that the Safety of the People that is of the Subjects the King being excluded is the supreme Law there is no man will affirm it unless he be a fool or an Imposter A fool if he doth believe what he himself saith and an Imposter if he doth not believe it But if any man will seriously look into the original of this Aphorism I do believe he will more easily grant that it ought more precisely to be understood of the safety of the Prince than of the safety of the Subjects This saying so tossed up and down in the mouths of all men came to us from the Romans and was then used by them when their Republick did flourish most of all under a popular State And there is no great Reason that any man should wonder that the peoples Safety was the supreme Law with them with whom the people themselves were the supreme Power In the Judgment therefore of those wise Antients who were the first Authors of this Aphorism the safety of the supreme Power was the supreme Law of the people indeed in a Democracy but of a King in Monarchy XVIII I say in the second place it being admitted but not granted that this Aphorism is properly understood of the Safety of the People that is of the Subjects it is nevertheless perversly wrested to the prejudice of Regal Dignity which even so doth render its Power more ample and illustrious In this sence A King that gives Lawes and Statutes to his people will not be so bound up by his Laws that it shall not be lawful for him the Safety of the Common-wealth being in an apparent danger to provide for the Safety of Kingdom and people committed to him by God even against the words of the Law Not that it is lawful for Subjects under the pretence of the defence of their liberty to break all the bonds of Laws and fidelity and by an intollerable presumption to trample on the Authority of their King but that it is lawful for the Prince in the preservation of his own his Subjects Safety to lay aside for a while all strict observance of the Laws to make use a little of an arbitrary Right lest by a too unseasonable and superstitious Reverence of the Laws he may suffer both his own person and his people that are subject to him and even the Laws themselves to fall into the Power of his Enemies XIX I say in the third place it being again admitted but not granted that by this Aphorism some licence were indulged to the Subjects themselves as necessity so requiring to lay by the Laws to provide for the publick Safety yet from hence that cannot be inferred which may would conclude For it is not lawful for the Subjects when they find their liberty in any thing to be injured or when they cry out they are sensible of it to break through all Bars of Laws and Duty and without the knowledge of their Prince to have immediately their recourse to Arms and to fill all things with tumults seditions But when the defence of their Princes their own liberties against all forein or domestick Enemies upon an urgent necessity doth so call them to it that a pious a prudent man would make no doubt of it but if the Law-maker himself was present he would dispense with his own Laws it is then lawful for the Subjects to have a greater regard of the Common safety which is the supreme Law and the end of all Laws than to be fearful to prejudice any particular Laws which were therefore made to be subservient only to the publick safety XX. The sum of all is The safety of the Common-wealth that is to say of the Prince and of the Subjects is the supreme Law to which all inferiour Laws are so to submit that present necessity so requiring it is lawful for the Prince by the prerogative of his own power yea and it is lawful for the Subjects the consent of their Prince being according unto reason presumed to recede sometimes from the words of particular Laws to assist their indangered Country and to be careful of its safety as the supreme Law but so that unless the will and consent of the supreme power be expresly obtained or according unto reason presumed they are not to attempt any thing under the pretence of the publick safety and liberty but what the Laws do permit them to XXI There are not a few Doubts that are yet remaining which in some manner do pertain to this Final Cause as concerning Privileges and Dispensations and the Relaxation of the obligation in the danger of life and others of the same nature which unto some may peradventure appear not altogether to agree with the End of Humane Laws The Solution whereof I have thought it more expedient for to deferre unto another time although never so long than by too much prolixity to tire and to torment so attentive and so courteous an Auditory THE TENTH LECTURE In which that most vulgar Speech The safety of the People is the Supreme Law is more largely examined and unfolded that it may more rightly be understood 1 TIM 2. 2. For Kings and for all that are in Authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godliness and Holiness I At this time and place if peradventure you do remember it Courteous Readers did intend to finish compleat this Treatise concerning both the obligations of Conscience to wit the Passive and the Active In the unfolding of the former having in first place and in a Scholastical manner excussed the Definition of Conscience I was as elabourate as I could be in examining and discovering that proper and Adequate Rule of Conscience from the directions whereof it ought to exercise all and every one of its Acts both of Dictating and Judging It was then represented to you that the Holy Scripture was the principal part of that Rule we held forth but the Adaequate part was that Will of God which the School-men call the Will of the sign in some degree made manifest to every man whether first by an inbred light by Practical Principles preserved in the Synteresis and known by themselves which the Philosophers 〈◊〉 Common Notions and the Apostle the Law of God written in our hearts Or secondly by an inferred Light by some external Revelation partly extraordinary and private to some single persons by visions dreams c. at sundry times and in sundry manners Partly ordinary and made publick to all mankind in the written word Or lastly by an acquired light by conclusions rightly and duely drawn from those practical principles or from the written word of God or