action be lawful to me and not onely whether it be lawful in it self or not forbidden by some Law unknown to me I say If this be the doubt the Principle will be true and the Resolutions upon it certain without any prejudice to this Hypothesis These cautions premised I shall proceed to give an instance or two of the Case 1. Some Divines have asserted the second Commandment to forbid all manner of Ceremonies not expresly commanded in Scripture to be used in Divine Worship Suppose this assertion should be true can it be said to be sufficiently evident to oblige my belief or to convict me of any culpable ignorance whilst I understand it not being no otherwise declared than in the terms of that Commandment forbidding nothing expresly besides the making and worshipping of Images and having no evidence for this comprehension of uncommanded Ceremonies other than from the interpretation of those Divines contradicted by most other Divines of equal judgement at least whether now is the interpretation of those Divines that affirm the Prohibition of un-instituted Ceremonies from that Commandment a sufficient Promulgation of that Law to me If it be it must certainly be such as obligeth my belief for I cannot be bound to obey a Law which I am not bound to believe to be a Law because then my obedience could not be grounded upon my faith as all obedience ought to be But how can I in reason be obliged to believe this interpretation upon the account of their assertion whilst I know it to be denyed by others of equal credit and greater Authority And if that Interpretation be not a sufficient Promulgation of this supposed Law how am I that have either no other or no better evidence for it obliged by it though it were a Law And if I be not why may I not act in Faith especially when I am commanded by just Authority to the Act notwithstanding my doubt whether that interpretation may not possibly be true Why may I not perswade my self that if this should be the sence of the Commandment I am not at all obliged by it till I have some better evidence thereof Or 2. Let the Question be whether it be lawful to use any set Forms of Prayer It is certain this is no where expresly forbidden in Scripture But some Divines have judg'd it unlawful and given some reasons for their opinion depending upon uncertain Principles or unnecessary consequences Suppose now a weak judgement be induced to doubt the lawfulness of any forms upon the account of these Divines Opinion and Arguments against them This doubt must necessarily suppose ignorance because if the truth were known the doubt could not remain is then this ignorance culpable or inculpable If it be culpable then the doubt is so too and then the party was bound to believe that Opinion without any doubt notwithstanding whatever reasons he might have to the contrary If it be inculpable whilst he hath no better evidence to determine his belief how can he be hound to forbear the use of Forms by any Law whereof he is thus ignorant notwistanding his doubt which doth not take away but necessarily infer the ignorance which would be impossible without it May be not therefore notwithstanding this doubt make use of Forms with perswasion that to him it is yet lawfulâ— to do whatever be true concerning the question in general I am very sensible how much these Discourses â— want of those enlargements of illustration and conâ—imation which they might and perhaps ought to havâ— if the occasion would bear it But I must not forgâ— that I am writing a Preface to a small Book where I have already exceeded the bounds of a just proportion and therefore am to leave the modest proposal of thâ— Problems to them that are best able to consider aâ— judge of them hastening to a conclusion of these prely minary Discourses which I shall finish with the addtion of a few things concerning the second Tract tâ— wards the further clearing of the Doctrine there delivered from appearance of contradiction to that St. Paul concerning justification by Faith withoâ— works I say therefore 1. That the business of that Discourse upon â— proposed Text was not to determine what particulâ— Act it is which God in the New Covenant doth prinâ— pally require as the special condition of justification But to inquire what that intire Work is whereby aâ— cording to the direction of Scripture the Salvation 〈◊〉 a Christian was to be wrought out 2. Yet in the Method of the same Discourse a prâ—critie is given to Faith as that which gives the first rigâ— to justification or a right to the first justification beforâ— and therefore without any such works as are consequâ— to that Faith Vndoubtedly Faith is the Root of â— such Works as are truely goâ—d in a Theological sencâ— that is of all such as are done upon any account of â— ligion because it is plain Faith is the first act of Reâ— gion and the ground of all the rest He that comâ— to God must believe that he is and that he is thâ— Rewarder of them that diligently seek him Heb. 11.6 Whatever good Works can be done by a man without Faith or not proceeding from Faith can have no respect at all to God and therefore are not respected by him St. Paul therefore in that Chapter by many Examples proves Faith to be the principle of all good Works Vers 5. By faith saith he Enoch was translated that he should not see death and was not found because God had translated him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he had this testimony that before his translation he pleased God So the words I am sure may and I think should be read because it is certain that Enoch pleased God before his translation but the testimony thereof he had not before but long after his translation being that which was given him by Moses above a thousand years after in the words of that Text Gen. 5.24 which the Apostle refers to as appears by his using the same words which are there used by the Septuagint 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And Enoch pleased God and was not found c. The same translation is quoted by the Son of Syrach Ecclus 44.16 We read according to the Hebrew he walked with God which imports the same sence For they are said to walk with God in Scripture phrase whose life is pleasing unto God or agreeable to his Will Amos 3.3 But so can no mans life be without Faith as the Apostle adds But without faith it is impossible to please God That which makes any mans works pleasing to God is his Faith without which as they could not be done to any such end so neither would they have any such effect For he that cometh to God must believe at least so much that he is and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him This is the shortest Creed that can be and
doubt makes it a sin to him Or suppose a man to doubt whether it be lawful to lend money to Vsury or to play at Cards or Dice or to drink a health upon the reflections of the Fathers upon those things as not agreeable to Christian sobriety or as things scandalous and of no good report He that doubts the lawfulness of those things though whilst he doth no more he cannot condemn the use of them in others that are free from that doubt yet is bound to abstain from them himself because he is perfectly free so to do as he is not in the use of them by reason of his doubt In the second Case where the doubt is whether the action in question be commanded or not commanded the action is to be done by the same Principles because the onely doubt supposed in this Case is whether the action be commanded or not and not at all whether it be lawful so that it is supposed out of doubt to be lawful to do it and doubted onely whether it be lawful to omit it In this Case I say a man is bound to do the action because if he doth it he supposeth himself not to sin because he doubts not the lawfulness of it But if he doth it not he must needs sin by the 2. Principle Either doubly by omitting that which is commanded and so obliging him before and without his doubt and also by omitting the same Duty doubtingly Or at least he must needs sin singly by acting doubtfully without necessity and where a safer course was in his choice As for Example Suppose a man doubts whether the Canon or Custom of the Church to keep the Lent-fast or other Fast-daies appointed by Law do binde his Conscience or not having no reasonable excuse for the omitting those observances but doth not at all doubt but that it is lawful for him to keep them whether in compliance with the Church or upon other accounts The resolution of this doubt is plain to wit that the Fasts ought to be kept in this Case because they cannot be omitted without sin whereas it is supposed they may be kept without any doubt of sin In these two Cases the resolution is demonstrated by the foremention'd Principles The onely difficulty is in the third Case where the doubt is double viz. whether the action in question be commanded or forbidden In this Case the doubt remaining it seems impossible to avoid the necessity of sinning because the action in it self must either be forbidden or commanded or neither commanded nor forbidden Now if it be forbidden and I do it with this doubt I sin doubly as before was shewed if I do it not and it be commanded I sin likewise doubly upon the same account If it be neither commanded nor forbidden yet I cannot but sin whether I do it or no because I either do or leave undone a thing which I doubt whether I may lawfully omit or do For if a man must not chuse to do a thing which he doubts whether he may do or not for that onely reason because he doubts then neither may be omit an action which he doubts whether he may omit or no. If then the Case be as is supposed that the doubt is whether a thing be commanded or forbidden either directly and immediately by God himself in his Word or the Law of right Reason or indirectly and mediately by his Authority vested in lawful Governours not exceeding their Commission the same reason that makes it unlawful to do it viz. the doubt whether he may do it or no will make it equally unlawful to omit it As for instance Suppose a man doubts of a ceremony in Gods Worship commanded by the Church whether it be not forbidden by God In this Case the doubt must needs fall in both ways For first the Command of the Church is reason enough to doubt whether it be not commanded of God because that Authority by the Law of God extends to all things not forbidden by God and the doubt whether it be forbidden or no supposeth him not to know or believe that it is and therefore must needs leave him in doubt whether it be not commanded because if it be not forbidden it is commanded 2. The reason of the doubt whether it be not forbidden by God may be various taken from the Opinion of some Learned and good men or grounded upon some dubious interpretation of some Texts of Scripture or upon some mistaken Principle or seeming consequence from a true one The question is what is to be done in this Case it being concluded by the third Principle that it is absolutely necessary for a man either to do or not do it neither of which elections can be made without sin by reason of the doubt both ways as is supposed The common answer to this streight is That a man ought to depose his doubt which answer is perfectly unreasonable in most Cases because it is for the present impossible It being not in the power of any man to cease his doubting the truth of any proposition immediately and arbitrarily without removing or solving the reasons of his doubt So that this advise to a distracted Conscience is no better than if a Physitian called to a sick Patient should prescribe for the onely remedy of his Distemper an Exhortation to shake off his sickness or not to entertain it any longer which would be taken for no better than a plain mocking the Patient The onely reasonable meaning that this advice can have is That a man should do what in him lies to resolve his own doubt by labouring to understand the true resolution of the Question on either part But this advice may be impracticabe in many Cases and is in all Extempore where neither means nor time is allowed sufficient to effect it The Question then is What other advice may be given for the present and what resolution is to be made thereupon This Question is onely capable of being resolved by the fourth and the last Principles which may be thus applied in all actions and therefore in this notwithstanding my doubt I am to act as reasonably as I can and it being supposed that whether I do this action or omit it at this time I must necessarily sin because I cannot depose my doubt nor avoid sin if I act or not act with it I am to inquire what reason I have to adventure upon one of these sins rather than upon the other and if I can finde any sufficient to turn the Scale that must determine my choice by the last Principle And in this disquisition the most considerable Reason of the Election to be made on either part will consist in the degree of the sin if any such may appear or be justly suspected For seeing the greatest Reason that can be for the abstaining from any action is the avoidance of sin the dehree of the sin doth proportionably augment the Reason If then the action whereof
I doubt whether I should do it or not hath to me an appearance of a greater sin in the doing it than it can be in the omission that Reason is very sufficient to restrain me from the action and oblige me to the forbearance till I can be otherwise informed to the better satisfaction of my Conscience For 2 Thess 5.22 when we are commanded to abstain from all appearance of evil it is most reasonable to conclude that the appearance of the greatest Evil doth most strongly oblige my abstinence As for Example Suppose the action whereof I am in doubt hath an appearance of Idolatry as in the Corinthians case the eating things sacrificed to Idols had and as the worshipping a piece of bread or the invocation of Saints departed may justly have In such cases I say it is most reasonable to abstain from the action because it is most safe so to do because by the doing of this action I do at least suspect I may be guiltie of Idolatry which is a far greater sin than a bare omission of an Act of obedience to any humane authority can be The same resolution upon parity of reason is to be made where the omission upon due consideration may appear to be a greater sin than the performance of the action which seems to be the case of refusing obedience to authoritie causing disorder and having at least an appearance of Schism in matters of meer ceremony or circumstance in the publick worship of God upon a bare suspition of their want of allowance from God or being some way forbidden I say That the disobedience in this case if the action should prove not to be forbidden by God is a greater sin than the action would be in obedience to authority though it should prove to be forbidden whilst we have so much reason to doubt whether it be or no For it cannot with reason be conceived that the Transgression of a Divine Precept in a matter of circumstance so obscurely revealed as hath not been discover'd by the Catholick Church for many Ages nor yet is by the Rulers and most learned and pious Doctors and Pastors of the present Church can be so great a sin as is the transgression of so plain a Precept as that of obedience to authoriâ—ie especially when that disobedience produceth the effects of Disorder Schism Scandal with separation from the publick Worship of God and privation of the means of his Grace These things considered I say it is not reason able to think but that the sin of disobedience in case the thing should prove to be not forbidden as by this doubt is supposed possible is far greater than the doing of the act though it should prove to be forbidden And therefore in this case the action is to be done notwithstanding the doubt by way of caution against a greater sin It being a greater sin to disobey doubtingly than to obey doubtingly in such a matter But if for ought appears to me there is no such difference but that it may be as great a sin to omit thâ— action as to do it considering my doubt as well whether it be not commanded as whether it be not forbidden I am then to consider what other reasons may incline me either to the action or to the omission in respect of advantage or disadvantage to my self or other on either side As for Example Suppose on the on-side if I forbear the action I do not onely sin againâ— God upon one or both of the foremention'd accounts that is as doing that which is forbidden in it self 〈◊〉 forbidden to me because I doubt the lawfulness of it but I also deprive my self of many advantages which might have by the doing it and incur considerable damage in my Libertie Estate Reputation with otheâ— incommodations to my friends On the other side if do the action I do onely sin against God by acting doubtfully or it may be by transgressing some unknown command abstracted from that doubt which inconveniences are equally supposed in the forbearance But I avoid the forementioned disadvantages without incurring any other of equal concern In this case I say it will be perfectly unreasonable to chuse the more hazzardable resolution with rejection of the less And therefore the resolution will be as clear what is reasonable to be done in this case as is in any of the former with this onely difference That the practice under this duplicitie of doubt cannot be without a necessitie of sin What then can I or should I do more in this case than this commit my self to the Mercie of God with a cautionary profession of my desire to obey him And that if I could any way possibly avoid the hazzard of transgressing his Will I would do it notwithstanding any motives whatever respecting my self or mine own interest But because I cannot so do at this time for want of present means to understand his Will I act according to the general Rule and law of my Nature that is my reason as far as it will afford me any direction begging his pardon of my present ignorance and the inevitable effect thereof Against this resolution if it be objected as was before intimated that there can be no such necessitie of sinning against God Whilst every man is bound to depose his doubt and imbrace his Dutie I answer first That this destroyes the supposition of the Cose and therefore is no just Objection to the answer which is given upon the admission of it 2. That it is not true that there can be no such necessitie of sinning or that every man is bound immediately to depose his doubt though it be not in his power so to do For though God doth not put a man upon any such necessitie of sinning against himself yet a man may by his own fault and by his culpable ignorance bring himself into this streight But here it must needs be observed that the intire resolution is grounded upon that Principle That whatsoever is done doubtingly is a sin Which Principle I take up in this Discourse onely upon the account of its common reception grounded upon the words of the Apostle He that doubteth is damned if he eat And therefore the resolution that supposeth this Principle can be serviceable to such onely as receive it But whether this Maxime be universally true or can be inferr'd from the Apostles Words by the necessary sence of them and whether it ought to be extended to such actions as fall under the command of Authority and not rather to be restrained to such actions as the Apostle speaks of in that Chapter viz. such as are indifferent in themselves and wherein a man is sui juris not supposed to be under command of authority either way is a just Problem For the Apostle in the Discourse of that Chapter wherein he delivers that conclusion He that doubteth is damned if he eat c. speaketh onely of such actions wherein a man is sui juris at
perfect libertie on one side at least that is either to eat or not to eat For though he might have reason to doubt whether it was lawful for him to eat such meats yet he is supposed to have none at all to doubt but that it was clearly lawful for him to forbear and therefore by the premised resolution of the first question he ought not to eat with this doubt I shall not insist upon the objection from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the vulgar Latine translates discernit that is maker difference or distinction of meats thinking it not indifferent to eat of that meat this variation of sence was thought fit to be put in the Margent of our English Bibles by the last Translators In which Case it is evident he must needs sin and that presumptuously against his Conscience and so is damned that is condemned by his own Conscience if he eats But from hence there can be no such conclusion made as that he must needs sin if he onely doubts that being not the Apostles meaning by this translation And it is certain that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is so used in many Texts of scripture as Act. 15.9 1 Cor. 4.7 Jude 22. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And of some have compassion making a difference But because the same word doth elsewhere as oft signifie to doubt and is so renderd in this Text by the Syriack and most other Translators I adhere to that Translation and the rather because the following words are most consonant to this sence Seeing he eateth not of faith For though it be true indeed that he that makes difference of meats and eateth that which by such difference he esteemeth to be unlawful cannot cat of Faith because he eats directly contrary to it yet is this a more jeune sence and not so proper as to say he that doubteth eateth not of faith Omitting therefore this Objection from the variety of translation I advance another more considerable that is whether because he that eateth when he doubteth whether it be lawful for him to eat but is at perfect liberty not to eat is damned it will follow that whosoever doth any action wherein he hath no such liberty of forbearance with any doubt be in like manner condemned As for Example He that is commanded by lawful Authority to do an action whereof he doubts whether it be lawful by the law of God or no to do it It is certain this person if he were free ought not to do this action because of his doubt whilst he might forbear it without any doubt But under this command he hath no more libertie to forbear this action than he hath to do it And therefore it will not follow by this instance of the Apostle wherein the case is so different that he must necessarily sin if he do it more than if he do it not But it may be urged that although from the first words of that Text he that doubteth is damned if he eat this Vniversal conclusion cannot be inferred yet from the next words which are added as a reason thereof it may Seeing he eateth not of faith and whatsoever is not of faith is sin For thus it may be urged Whatsoever is not of faith is sin But whatsoever is done doubtingly is not of Faith Ergo whatsoever is done doubtingly is sin The 1. of these Proposit ons is expresly asserted by the Apostle and the second seems to be rightly collected from the connection of those words 〈◊〉 quoniam ac quia He that doubteth is damned if he eat seeing or because he eateth not of faith Which reason would not be true if it were possible notwithstanding the doubt to eat of Faith And if that be not possible in this instance it may seem to be so in all others whence the universal conclusion will be inferred rightly To this Argument a rejoynder may be offer'd to this sence That there is no necessary consequence in the deduction of the universal Proposition from the particular Case admitting the truth of that universal Proposition whatsoever is not of faith is sin without any limitation in the matter and understanding Faith as in that Text it can onely be meant to signifie no more than a perswasion of the lawfulness of the action to him that doth it May it not be said that although in that Case he that doubteth onely whether it is lawful to eat and not at all whether it be lawful to forbear cannot eat of Faith because it is at his free choice to forbear the action that he doubts and to determine himself to that wherein he hath no doubt yet in another Case where the action is doubful both waies it may be possible notwithstanding his doubt to act in Faith For as many things may be lawful to be done whilst they are left free being not forbidden by authoritie which are not lawful when they are forbidden though but by men So may some things be unlawful to be done when they are not commanded that yet may be lawful when they are It may be as great a sin to disobey an unlawful command as to give it if he that disobeys knows no better for his disobedience than he that gave the command did for his giving it Of this kinde are doubtful actions which are not to be done when a man is free for that onely reason because they are doubtful The doubt being a sufficient reason to bar the lawfulness of the action as before hath been said But when a man is not free but under the obligation of Authoritie every doubt is not a sufficient reason to make a thing unlawful So that in such a Case a man may notwithstanding his doubt be perswaded of the lawfulness of-his action unless that doubt be grounded upon reasons more credible than is the judgement of the persons by whom that action is recommended to us as not onely lawful but expedient But further that it may be possible for a man notwithstanding his doubt concerning the lawfulness of an action in it self to have a just perswasion that it is lawful for him in a present Case I offer these grounds of Reason 1. That all manner of doubts do proceed from ignorance 2. That some ignorance may be inculpable as well as culpable and that not onely in matters of meer Faith but also in practical matters For as there are many divine verities contained in the true sence of holy Scripture and the necessary consequences thereof which are not understood by the Learned much less by the Vnlearned and yet that ignorance is inculpable in the Learned and much more in the unlearned So may there be divers practical conclusions inferring the Obligation of just Precepts to them that do or are bound to understand them which persons unlearned may be inculpably ignorant of for want of that understanding of the Original Texts or that faculty of deducing consecuences by
Art of Logick or extraordinary perfection of Reason which they are not obliged to have In this Case the ignorance of those practicab Precepts so obscurely revealed in holy Scripture may be inculpable as I suppose 3. Where the ignorance is inculpable the doubt is so too 4. Inculpable ignorance as well concomitant as causal doth excuse the Act that is done with it though contrary to a Precept from sin not onely a tanto but à toto I use the term inculpable rather than invincible because it is more clear and less liable to cavil Nor are those terms equivalent For both some ignorance may be invincible in some circumstances which is not inculpable and some ignorance may be inculpable which is not simply invincible for to render ignorance inculpable it is not necessary that it was not to be prevented by any possible industry but it sufficeth that it doth not proceed from the neglect of any means that a man was bound to have used or from any other fault of the ignorant person Inculpable ignorance I say excuseth any action that is done with it from sin as well à tanto as à toto and as well when it is barely concomitant as when it is causal This conclusion is disagreeable to the ordinary resolution of the Schools and yet seems to be true upon this reason because inculpable ignorance barreth the Obligation of a positive law which cannot oblige till it be so promulged as obligeth all them that are to be bound by it to the knowledge thereof And though actual knowledge of a law be not necessary to the obligation of it yet promulgation is and that such as is sufficient to take off all excuse of ignorance and therefore to render it not inculpable And where there is no law actually obliging there can be no sin Therefore inculpable ignorance as well of the law as of the fact excuseth from sin and that not onely when that ignorance is a cause sine qua non of the action which a man would not do if he knew of the law but also when the ignorance doth onely accompany the action which a man would have done though he had known the Law The disposition of the will to do such an evil action though it were known to be so is indeed a sin but the action it self cannot be a sin whilst it is not forbidden to the Agent by any obliging law To apply these Propositions to the Question premised seeing all manner of doubt proceeds from ignorance and that ignorance may be inculpable and where the ignorance is inculpable so is the doubt and inculpable igrance of a law takes away the Obligation and therefore excuseth from sin it seems to follow that when a man is inculpably ignorant of any such law as forbids the action which he deliberates about he may act with perswasion concerning the lawfulness thereof to him Though he should have some reason to doubt whether such a Law may not be For whether there be or there be not if he be inculpably ignorant of it it obliges him not And therefore he is at libertie to act or forbear according to reason and may do either of Faith that is though he doubts upon some uncertain account not obliging his belief whether the action to be done be not forbidden by some Law of God yet if he be inculpably ignorant of the Law it doth not oblige him and therefore leaves him free till he be so far instructed as he can plead no inculpable ignorance As for Example Suppose the Law forbidding an action be no where in Scripture set forth expresly and the onely evidence thereof depends upon doubtful interpretations of Scripture or subtle consequences disputed and denyed by good and learned men of equal credit and not declared or determin'd by any Authoritie of the Church In this Case I being no competent judge of the Controversie may suppose myself inculpably ignorant of that Law as well as I am of other verities and points of belief that have no other or no better evidence of Scripture whilst yet pretensions of reasons not cogent together with the Opinions of Learned men may be sufficient to make me doubt as well of the uncertain Precepts as of other verities I inquire now whether notwithstanding this doubt I may not act in Faith that is believing it still lawful for me to do this action whether in it self it be forbidden or not forbidden because the Law whereby it is forbidden if it be so under this inculpable ignorance doth not yet oblige me and if I believe my self not obliged by a law I may act in Faith that is with perswasion that I am free whether my ignorance be in truth inculpable or not yet if I be perswaded that it is so its certain I may have the same perswasion concerning the lawfulness of the action that I do against no other law than that whereof I think my self inculpably ignorant It is true if my ignorance be not inculpable I shall sin in this action but shall notwithstanding act in Faith notwithstanding my doubt whilst that doubt is not whether it be lawful for me to do this action in this case of ignorance for that would impart a contradiction to my Faith or perswasion that it is but onely whether there be not some law forbidding the action in general and obliging all that know it or should know it but not obliging me as I suppose because I am as yet ignorant thereof and that as I believe inculpably But here it is to be considered that although it be certain by the express words of the Apostle That whatsoever is not of faith is sin yet it doth not follow that whatsoever is of faith is not sin For then St. Paul had not sinned whilst he persecuted the Church for he saith I verily thought with my self that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus Acts 26.9 And therefore though a man notwithstanding such a doubt as hath been declared may act in Faith which was the onely thing indeavoured to be proved yet it will not follow that he sins not except his ignorance be inculpable And if he onely believes that it is so he may likewise for that reason believe that it is no sin but can have no more certainly of the innocencie of his act than he hath of the inculpableness of his ignorance If this Hypothesis seem to destroy the second Principle before delivered with the resolutions of the Cases made upon it I answer 1. As before was intimated that that Principle in those indefinite termes wherein it is first laid down was taken up upon the common presumption of the universal truth of it and the respective resolutions supposing it were accordingly framed But 2. If that Principle be restrained as I understand it to such a doubt as is made not onely concerning the being of a positive Law but concerning the Obligation of it to me that is if I doubt whether the
Thou that makest thy boast of the Law through breaking the Law dishonourest thou God More particularly first by all such Actions as are evil in themselves or secondly by such as being good or indifferent in themselves are evilly performed in respect of the manner circumstances or ends of them or thirdly by such as have an appearance of evill 1. By such actions as are clearly evil in themselves in respect of the matter of them by all such actions God is dishonoured aswell such as are committed against our neighbour as such as are committed immediately against God himself whether the eidence of that evil proceeds from any written Word of God or only from the common Law of reason and humane understanding For that same Effect of the Law wittten in the heart Rom. 2.15 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Saint Paul attributes to the Heathen being equally common to Christians doth equally bind them and cannot be superseded or made void by the knowledg of the Written Law which serves to perfect it So that whiles the defect of that Law in the heart is only supplied by the Word the Effect of it still remaines And if a Heathen shall be judged for things done by him only against the Law of reason his own conscience accusing him as the Apostle saith though he knows of no written Law of God against it then doubtless so shall a Christian be for all such Actions as he shall do against the same Law of his Reason and Conscience notwithstanding he either knows not or cannot remember any written word against it For this Ignorance as to such particular Actions is the same in both For although the Law of God which is written in the Scriptures be said to be perfect and thereupon is supposed to declare in the Latitude of it's Sense and the just Consequences thereof the whole Will of God that is his preceptive Will in whatsoever he requires or forbids men to do yet because this perfection of Sense with the Consequences is not perfectly understood by any man much less by all therefore may there be many things therein required and forbidden which will not from thence be particularly understood much less remembred at all times If therefore the Conscience of a man from clear light of Reason shall condemn any Action which he is any way tempted to do although he doth not remember any particular Text of Scripture whereby it is forbidden he is nevertheless bound to abstain from it by that Law written in the Heart and cited by the Conscience But to return to the matter in hand which is the Consideration of God's Dishonour in that which is done It is manifest that God is dishonoured only by such Actions as are contrary to his Will because no Act which is either agreeable to his Will by way of Command or Approbation or allowed by his Will by way of Permission can be dishonourable to him unless he can be supposed to command approve or allow of his own Dishonour From hence it follows that God is not dishonoured by any such Acts as are purely indifferent in their individual existence because that Dishonour imports a Contradiction to such an indifferency and so destroyes it For it cannot be indifferent to dishonour God But whether there be any such individual Acts as are absolutely indifferent is a disputable point which I may not here stand to examine But in general every Act of Transgression of the known Will of God is a manifest derogation to his Glory especially that of his Soveraign Authority And especially every presumptuous i. e. wilful Transgression for that imports a plain Contempt of God and his Authority Therefore by this Rule Christians are especially to be careful to abstain from all presumptuous Transgressions of God's Will which way soever made known unto them whether by the written Word or by the light of Reason as before was said Now those Actions are most apparently contrary to the Will of God which are evil in respect of the matter of them 2. But it is no less manifest that some Actions both which are indifferent and which are good in respect of the Matter of them may be evil in respect of the Manner Circumstances and Ends of their Doing as was said before and is too evident to need any proof only this may be added that as there are some kinds of Actions which cannot be made good or indifferent by any Circumstance whatsoever as to hate God to blaspheme or curse him to take his Name in vain by false Swearing c. which Actions certainly are evil not by any Arbitrary Law or Will of God but by their very Nature and this Evil such as no possible determination of God's Will can or could have acquitted them from So are there some Acts of the Soul especially which are so intrinsecally Good as that they cannot become Evil by any Circumstance or End that is consistent with their Being as to love God above all to reverence him to defire his Glory above all things c Yet I deny not but that even in such Actions as they are now performed by men in the flesh there is some Imperfection and that is an Evil but not such as denominates the Act to be so except we will say that it is impossible for the holiest man that can be to do any such good Act as is not a Sin And then it were indeed a vain Question to dispute Whether any single Act can be indifferent For if all such Acts as have any or the most goodness in them be Sins it were a great absurdity to imagine that those which being supposed indifferent have no Goodness in them should have no Evil for then it would be apparent that one Evidence at least of their not being Evil should be because they are not Good because by this Conclusion if they were Good they would be Evil. 3. God is dishonoured by such Actions as have an appearance of Evil and therefore by this Rule also Christians are to abstain from all appearance of Evil. This being the ground of that Precept of S. Paul 1 Thess 5.22 as it is rendred in our own and most other Translations For there is another possible Translation of the words which seems to be favor'd by the Syriack Translator and is accepted by some Interpreters viz. from all kind or sort of Evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ab omni specie mali But besides that this is a notable abatement of the sense of the Precept I doubt much whether the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without Example else where in the New Testament or the Septuagint may be taken in such a Philosophical sense Certainly Christians ought to abstain not only from such things as are really Evil but also from all things that may give a Suspition or carry an appearance of Evil As for Instance we ought not only to abstain from Pride and Vain-glory from Covetousness Deceit Intemperance and all manner of Unchastness
but also from all things that may give any suspicion or have any appearance of these Vices for this Reason especially because God is thereby liable to be dishonoured Now that God may be dishonoured by such Actions as have an appearance of Evil in them is evident because look how much appearance of Evil there is in an Action so much appearance there is of Repugnancy to the Will of God and consequently so much appearance of Contempt or neglect of that Will of God in him that voluntarily doth it Now this appearance of Evil in any Action may be either to a man's self only or to others also or to others only For a Christian to do any thing willingly which hath a probable appearance to his own Conscience of being Evil though in truth it be not so in it's self is therefore a Sin because it implies a neglect or want of respect to the Honour of God Wherefore St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans where he also speaks as he doth here of Eating and Drinking with distinction of Meats gives this general Rule He that doubteth is condemned viz. of his own Conscience and therefore also by St. John's Rule 1 John 5.21 by God also if he Eat For whatsoever is not of Faith is Sin i.e. whatsoever is done without a just and reasonable perswasion of the lawfulness thereof is Sin Faith here being put for such a Perswasion is called Knowledge in the same Matter 1 Cor. 8.7 A Christian ought to be so tender and jealous or zealous of God's glory as not willingly to do any thing that he doubts to be offensive to him God himself in the second Commandment is said to be a jealous God in reference to his own Glory and therefore forbad the Jews as is conceived the making of any manner of Images of their own Invention to a sacred use and especially all manner of outward appearance of worshipping them And when we thus know him to be so jealous of his own glory it concerns us to be as jealous of any thing that hath any reasonable appearance of prejudice or opposition thereto He that much honours or loves any Person will be fearful of doing any thing willingly which he suspects may disparage or displease him or that hath any appearance of dishonour or disrespect to him And this as I shall shew afterwards is a special importance of that general Duty of fearing God that is a reverend and awful fear of doing any thing that may appear to be dishonourable or offensive to God 2. But if this appearance or suspition of Evil in an Action be not only such to the Actor himself but to others also before whom it is to be done the doing of it will be the more dishonourable to God because it is scandalous he is doubly guilty that Sinn 's openly because he doth not only act but teach a Sin For all visible or known Actions are exemplary in their own nature though there be no such Intention yea though there be a contrary desire in the Actor that is that his doing should not be imitated But the main Question is What is to be done in case this appearance of Evil in an Action be only to others and none at all to him that is to do it but being to his certain knowledge or perswasion a lawful Action I Answer that if this be known such Actions are ordinarily for that time and that reason to be abstained from by the Rule of the Text. For such was the particular Case of Instance with the Corinthians to whom the eating of things offered to Idols was indifferent in it self so it were done without respect to the Idol but is forbidden by the Apostle only upon the account of Scandal as appears not only by the fore-going Verses but also by the words following my Text Give none Offence i.e. Scandal or occasion of Stumbling neither to the Jews nor to the Gentiles nor to the Church of God i.e. neither to Christians The same Reason is urged to the same purpose more fully by the Appostle in the 8. Chap. 8. v. to the end of the Chapter God is dishonoured by all manner of Scandal whether it be taken only and not given or given and not taken but especially by such as is given and taken or by such as is so given as is likely to be taken And because by this Text we are required as much as in us lies to prevent all manner of dishonour to God which may be occasioned by our Actions therefore ought we to take heed of all Scandal that may be taken thereby that is to prevent it as far as we may Now Scandal in the ordinary sense that is insisted upon by Practical Divines is Something done by any man that is an occasion of Sin in another I say something because every thing that may be an occasion of Sin in another is not a Scandal in their sense though in Scripture-phrase the word is sometime so used But Scandal is given either by some known Sin which a man doth or seemeth to do before others or by such indifferent Actions as a man doth before others by whom he knows or hath reason to suspect they are reputed Evil. To incourage others by Example as well as otherwise to the omitting of any Duty or committing any Sin is Scandal From which a Christian is to abstain in or upon a double Respect First to the glory of God according to the Rule oâ— the Text lest he should be dishonoured by the Siâ— of his Neighbour Secondly to the good of his Neighbour lest he should be thereby induced tâ—â— Sin to the hurt of his Soul So the Two greaâ— Commandements of loving God above all and 〈◊〉 Neighbour as our selves do joyntly concurr to in hiâ— bit a Christian from all such Actions such I say as though they be not sinful in themselves noâ— yet have any appearance of Evil to him that doth them yet will occasion another man's Sin by doing that by the incouragement of his Example which will be a Sin in him because he judgeth iâ— to be so For he that doth an Act which he thinketh to be a Sin doth therefore sin because he intendeth to Sin by the consent of his Will to that Action notwithstanding the apprehension of Sin Q. 1. But it may be demanded What is to be done in case the Action that hath this appearance of Evil to others be not indifferent but commanded either immediately by God or by such as have Authority under God over a man Whether is a Christian in such a Case to omit that Action to avoid the scandal of his Brother I answer No surely The reason is plain because such an omission is a sin and so a direct dishonouring of God in it self But one Sin is not to be prevented by another As a man is not to do Evil that good may come of it so neither may he omit the doing of that Good which is commanded to