a sinfull and unlawfull power Unlesse you may also say that we may lawfully engage our selves by oath and Covenant to maintain and obey the ordinance of Satan 2. He speaketh of such a power which is not for maintaining vice and allowing that which is evill but for correcting and punishing of evill-doers Be not hastie to go out of his sight so do knaves who hate the light stand not in an evil thing Why for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him c. Would the Holy Ghost say ye must not dare to do evill and with-draw your selves preposterously from the Kings presence for he hath a power conferred on him that cannot be contraveened in executing justice on malefactors And therefore if ye transgresse be sure the King will punish you So then this manifestly holdeth out to us that the Holy Ghost speaketh in this place of such a power in Kings which exerciseth good and performeth that which according to the Law of GOD is incumbent to the Kingly power to do But sure I am illimited Monarchy whose power is also to do evill can spare the malefactour and punish the righteous The Holy Ghost speaketh of a Kingly power that produceth contrary effects 3. The Holy Ghost subjoyneth Whose keepeth the commandment shal feel no evil thing Then this must be a just and lawfull commandment otherwise obedience to it would bring forth death Rom. 6. But sure we are this cannot be spoken concerning a boundlesse and arbitrary Regall power for as Solomon here speaketh of the Regall power so he speaketh of the effects thereof and of our obedience thereto And as we find he speaketh onely of good effects so he onely speaketh of an obedience and subjection thereto which according to the oath of GOD and in conscience we are tyed to perform But as we cannot lawfully give up our oath of Allegiance to boundless and arbitrary Regall power so there is a vast dis-proportion between it and the effects of that power which Solomon speaketh of here Solomon speaketh of a power which only produceth good effects But arbitrary Monarchy is in a capacity of producing both good and bad effects Secondly we establish the point from reason it self the Kingly power as it produceth good effects not onely in it self is the Ordinance of GOD but also it executeth the purpose of GOD both on good and bad But as the Ordinance of GOD cannot be contraveened so it is laid on us as a necessary duty to subject our selves for conscience sake to him who executeth the purpose of GOD according to the prescript of GOD'S wil Rom. 13. So then in such cases as GOD can not be contraveened no more can the Kingly power be withstood but what it enacteth according to equity reason should absolutely be obeyed In this sense the Holy Ghost commandeth obedience and subjection not onely to Kings but also to all other Rulers Tit. 3. 1. Pet. 2. Kings and all Magistrats in this sense are called Gods GOD'S Deputies and Lieutenants upon Earth Ex. 4. and 22. Ps 82. feeders of the LORD'S people Ps 78. the shields of the Earth Ps 47. nursing Fathers of the Church Is 49 Captains over the LORD'S people 1. Sam. 9. Their Throne is the Throne of GOD 1. Chr. 19 their judgment is the judgment of the LORD 2. Chr. 19 The Land lyeth under great judgment when it wanteth them Is 3. Who then dare adventure in such respects any way to contraveen the Kingly power and to decline his authority for so there is a divine sentence in his lips his mouth transgresseth not in judgment his Throne is established by righteousnesse righteous lips are his delight and he loveth him that speaketh right his wrath is as messengers of death but in the light of his countenance is life and his favour is as a cloud of the latter rain Prov. 16. In such cases his wrath is as the roaring of a Lion but his favour is as dew upon the grasse he sitteth in the Throne of judgment scattering away all evill with his eyes scattering the wicked and bringing the wheel over them So mercy and truth preserve him and his Throne is upholden by mercy Yea his fear is as the roaring of a Lyon so that he who provoketh him to anger sineth against his own soul Prov. 19 and 20. Upon these grounds and in these respects Solomon exhorteth us to honour the King Proverb 24. and not to strike Princes for equity Prov. 17. Therefore the Kingly power as it is in it self and as it executeth the purpose of the just LORD of Heaven and Earth according to the LORD' 's good will and pleasure neither his power nor the just Acts thereof can be any more contraveened then the power of GOD and that which he commandeth to be performed for so the King's power is GOD'S power and what he doth is according to divine authority And in these notions we hold the Kingly power to be absolute for so as his power in such respects can not be contraveened in like manner he may lawfully execute every thing that is good and expedient with a full and vast power according to Law and reason So the power of the King of kings is vast and absolute not because he may do both justly and unjustly according to his pleasure but because he may do every thing that seemeth good in his eyes according to justice In this sense I confess Salustius his Author saith very well Impune quidvis facere id est Regem esse Indeed the King may do every thing that is just and equitable according to Law and Reason and deserveth not to be punished therfore This is the same which Solomon saith Eccl. 8. v. 3. and 4. compared with Prov. 17.26 Albeit we may put such a favorable construction upon these words yet do we doubt much if Salustius his Author's meaning be such Indeed I take him to be of Aristotle's opinion who saith concerning the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pol. l. 3. c. 12. The Law also saith concerning the King Tanta est ejus celsitudo ut non posset ei imponi Lex in Regno suo Curt. in consol 65. col 6. ad F. Petr. Rebuf notab 3. repet L. un c. Omnia sunt possibilia Regi Imperator omnia potest Bald. in Sect. F. de no. for fid in F. in 1 Constit C. col 2. Chass catal glor mun part 5. consid 24. All these go no other wayes saith our learned Country-man but thus The King can do all things which by Law he can do and that holdeth in him Id possumus quod jure possumus Lex Rex q. 26. ass 3. This is a very quick and noble glosse But for my self as I judge their meaning to be nothing such so I am indifferent whether it be so or not No question there be many who do plead for absolute and arbitrary Monarchy beside the Nation of Royallists And those to whose temper absolute Monarchy doth most relish we find
saith so because God only could pardon him But saith Salmasius this cannot be for the remission of sins obtained by the blood of Christ under the new Testament unto life eternal had no place under the old Testament O! saith he what ignorance and wickednesse go hand in hand in these knaves Def. Reg. cap. 3. This glosse which Salmasius so much hisseth-at is the very words of Lyra. And it is cited by our dear Country-man Lex Rex quaest 26. Well then let that Anonymus be what he will whom I take not to be the authour of Lex Rex Salmasius hath no reason for that interpretation to call him ignorant unlesse he call Lyra ignorant also And I must needs say Hell and the Devil never invented worse then what now Salmasius speaketh I wonder if he dare deny but Christ was also mediatour under the old Testament aswell as under the new Dare he say That under the old Testament remission of sins unto life eternal was not centred upon Christ and acquired by him Hath this man a face to deny Christ to be the Redeemer of Beleevers under the Law By whose mediation I pray you did they pass from death to life if not by the righteousness of Christ who is the only Advocat before the Father for the sins of all the Elect I confesse those who were under the Law beleeved in Christ who was to be incarnated and who was about to shed his blood on the Crosse for the Redemption of Beleevers But doth this take-away Christ's blood shed under the new Testament as the ground and center of Salvation and remission of sins to Beleevers under the old Testament Howsoever sure I am this Gentleman cannot deny but under the old Testament God only could pardon sin Now this Authour whom he calleth an ignorant and pestilent knave saith no more but this And I shall let any indifferent Reader judge between Salmasius and him whether or not Salmasius hath reason to fail so much against him because he saith That under the old Testament GOD only could pardon David's sin Oh! that this poor wretch is not ashamed to speak so blasphemously This truth is old enough and can speak for it self And sure I am there is no honest heart who will allow Salmasius in this Royallists need not to brag much because David was unpunishable by man for his murder and adultery Arguing from this the state of the Question between us and them is changed And thus the Question is moved Whether or not a man according to God's own heart one worth ten thousand and as in qualification so in station above every one of the People should be cut-off and punished by the State for committing adultery with a privat woman and committing murder against a privat man And what if I should hold the negative of the Question as indeed I make it a great case and do spare to determine upon either of the parts at this time yet would Royallists gain just nothing The Question between them and us is this Whether or not the King is unpunishable by man though turned a positive tyrant and forthwith a destroyer of the Commonwealth Friends shew me the like practice in David and the Sanhedrin's sparing him notwithstanding and I shall yeeld to you Ye are so far from being able to do so that weighing David's murder in a square ballance you will find it lighter then is supposed for neither he nor his had formally but virtually a hand in the murder of Uriah This is far from a destroying of the People 'T is not like Nero's wish that all Rome had but one Neck that he might cut it off Now Royallists must object from the Sanhedrin's sparing a Nero. Otherwise they beat the air and change the state of the Question Conclus 4. The Kings of the Jews de jure had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power This we make good firstly from divine institution and God's moulding of the King Deut. 17. from which is already proved Subsect 1. Assert 2. That the power of the Jewish king is hedged-in by Law And Josephus on the place saith That he should do nothing without the consent and advice of the Priest and Sanhedrin Antiq. Jud. lib. 14. cap. 8. 'T is but vanity in Saâ—nasius to clude Josephus speech saying That his meaning is only concerning the Kings of the Jews after the captivity Def. Reg. cap. 2. Is he not blind that seeth not this man's deceit Sure I am that which is spoken of the King Deut. 17. was spoken long before the Kings of the Jews after the captivity yea long before there was any King in Israel 'T is the very positive rule and pattern of all Kings And Josephus in the place above cited as it were commenting on Moses words giveth the meaning of them Nay but you shall further observe the fallacy of this Gentleman He studieth to put his own construction as most beseemeth his honour upon Josephus words And yet notwithstanding he refelleth Josephus and cannot rest satisfied with his own construction Yea which is more he fleeth cap. 9. to what Josephus saith as to a main truth in respect of all the Kings of Israel both before and after the Captivity Then tell me what manner of man can he be who cap. 2. declineth from and cap. 9. enclineth to Josephus In the one place he plainly denieth That the Kings of the Jews whether before or after the Captivity were tied to do nothing without the consent of the high-Priest and Sanhedrin And yet in the other place he affirmeth the contrary But he loseth all his labour whether to deny what Josephus saith or to glosse it according to his own humour for as afterward is shewed Josephus was no friend to Monarchy And which is more what Josephus saith is the common judgment of Jewish Writers Rex obediat curiae senatus majoris i. e. The King let him be obedient to the authority of the higher Sanhedrin Deut. 17. Senatus major interficiendi gladio jus habeat i. e. Let the higher Sanhedrin have the right and power of killing by the sword Exod. 21. Nemo sese opponat decretis sanctioris Senatus i. e. Let none withstand and resist the Statutes of the greater Sandedrin Deut. 17. R. Mos Egypt praec aff 176. and 225. praec neg 316. It cannot be denied but the Jewish King was regulated seing not only he was oblidged to give obedience to the higher Sanhedrin but also every one without exception was tied not to contraveen the Acts and Sentence thereof He had not so much as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 much lesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The power of the sword was not in his hand but in the Sanhedrin's Thus his power was restricted as was the authority of the Lacedemonian king and the power of other Kings as is spoken-of already at length Yea Maimonides saith Qui ex familia Davidis sunt judicant judicantur And so in expounding that Rex neque judicat neque judicatur
he did not protest against the power but whereas he should have disswaded the the people from seeking after it he tacitely perswadeth them thereto for how much more the excellency and goodnesse of a thing is pointed-out so much more it is desired-after And to say that Samuel did not disswade them therefrom but perswaded them thereto is to avouch that either he did argue against himself and militate against his own purpose or else that he acted contrary to his Commission from GOD. The LORD commanded him solemnly to protest and disswade them from their purpose He would have him to lay-out before their eyes the dangerousnesse of Kingly power to strike terrour in their hearts that they might forbear longer to desire it If you come to my hand and say that the Prophet in this place onely speaketh of unlawfull power or of the bad of a lawful power I obtain my desire I seek no more then that you say he speaketh here of the abuse and not the use of Kingly power And I trow the abuse of Kingly power is not the right but the wrong of it 2. Because the Prophet in describing the manner of the King setteth down acts of tyranny not of lawfull authority We take up the description it-self under a general and particular notion The generall Ye shall be his servants He shall beslave you and make you serve him according to his pleasure Which made Josephus say And that I may speak it in a word ye together with all yours shall serve the King no otherwaies then his own domestick servants Ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. See plain language in Brent to this purpose hom 27. in 1 Sam. 8. The particular notion hath several parts in it Firstly in order to the King 's tyrannizing over the sons of the people He will take your sons c. As if he had said your King shall make you sonlesse He shall beslave them to his service imploying some in one office and some in another And in all these employments whether base or not neither ye nor your sons shall be holden as free-men but all the fruits of your labours shall turn-over into the King's privat advantage Whereupon Josephus himself bringeth-in Samuel speaking that he would declare to them who should be their king but adding that he would first shew them what things they would suffer under a king and with how great disadvantages they would live under him Therefore ye shall firstly know that he will take from you your children and he shall make some of them drivers of Chariots c. So that there shall be nothing which he shall not constrain them to do after the manner of bought slaves Ant. Jud. lib. 6. cap. 4. In this Josephus much agreeth with these words in the original text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which in their proper rigorous signification are rendered he will quite take-away your sons But we judge it not to be an Act of Regal power but of meer tyranny to denude the parent altogether of his child and the King to dispose of him at his pleasure For this Brent gallantly speaketh loc cit Secondly In order to the King 's away-taking of the daughters of the people He will take your daughters to be confectionaries and to be cooks and to be bakers As if he had said He shall not only make you sonlesse but daughterlesse also And as he will make slaves of the one so likewise of the other Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text And it proporteth a ravenous and cruel away-taking But hear Josephus Kings will make confectionaries of your daughters for their own use kitchen-women dressers of cloath and they shall compel them to do any other service which damsels for fear of strokes do perform Loc. cit Nay but Brent loc cit is more full and plain Thirdly in order to the King 's away-taking of their possessions And he will take your fields c. It may be you think that your sons and your daughters will be well taken-off your hands and though he should wrong them he will not wrong your selves Peradventure you imagine his tyranny will take a stand there Nay but I 'll tell you if he take-away your sons and daughters he will also take-away your substance And well know I if you get any courtesie at his hand ye'll have little reason to boast of it He will take the tenth from you Sure I am he will have so little respect to you to your children that serve him and to your pains in gathering riches together that what ye gain through the sweat of your brows he wil let it out to any base fellow in his Court and ye dare not say it is evil done If this be not an act of tyranny saith Piscator then had not God punished Ahab for taking-away Naboth's vineyard Ahab according to Law should have possessed it Schol. in 1 Sam. 8. See Josephus Brent loc cit Fourthly In order to his away-taking of the people's servants And he will take your men-servants and your maid-servants and your goodliest young-men and put them to his work 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also in the original of this text His tyranny shall not end at your sons and daughters and at your possessions but he shall violently rob you of your servants And if he take not all of them be sure he will take the chiefest of them See plain Brent ibid. Fifthly In relation to his away-taking of their sheep He will take away the tenth of your sheep He will not leave you so much as a sheep's tail At least he will take the tenth of them 3. The consequent and event both of the general and particular part of the description is the effect of tyranny not of lawful authority Ye shall cry-out in that day because of your King whom ye shall have chosen you We are sure that the people would never cry-out for exercising the just and lawful Acts of Regal Authority Thereby justice is promoted and vice is punished Which is a blessing and not a bondage for people to make them cry-out in bitternesse of spirit Thus it is abundantly made good that Samuel here doth not describe the power but the tyranny of the King Now in-starteth another question Whether or not doth the Prophet in this place disswade the Jews from seeking a King as a King To which we answer affirmatively and prove it thus If the Prophet doth not disswade the people from seeking a King under the notion of a King then either because he only taxeth carnal confidence in them or arogancy and pride or precipitation only or else because they sought a King after the manner of the Nations But none of these Reasons whether conjunctly or severally are the adaequat object of the Prophet's disswasion Firstly Because it is said That Samuel was displeased because they sought a King The text is not But the thing displeased Samuel when they
Heroicism and gallantry of old some were of a simply vast and absolute power and in nothing subject to Law 29 The first erecters of Kingdoms and planters of Colonies were of an absolute power altogether unsubject to Law 34 Personal endowments and extraordinary gifts have drawn-on People to devolve an absolute and full power without all reservation upon some men 40 Conquering Kings in old were of an absolute power 47 Vsurping and tyrannous Kings in old had an absolute power 47 Except for some of these causes there was never any King so absolute but his power one way or other according to Law was restricted Ibid. SUBSECT 2. The wicked Kings of the Jews had an arbitrary power both over Religion and the People of GOD. 120 The tyrannous and usurping Kings of the Jews in all probability had an arbitrary power over the Republick Ibid. The good Kings of the Jews because of personal endowments had exemption and immunity from Law 121 The Kings of the Jews de jure had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power 125 SECT II. Royal Power ectypically is the choicest of Governments 135 Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the best Government 136 Monarchy demotically in respect of the disposition of people is the choicest Government Ibid. Kingly Government consecutively in respect of its fruits and consequences may be hic nunc the best of all Governments 138 Regulated and mixed Monarchy per se and in it self is the sweetest Government 140 Monarchy consecutively in respect of the fruits and effects it may and doth produce simply absolutely is of all Governments most dangerous and least to be desired 141 SECT III. Democracy arightly constituted simply absolutely is the sweetest Government and most for the good of the People 152 Moses before the counsel of Jethro had a Kingly power 155 After the accomplishment of Jethro's counsel and the institution of the seventy Elders neither Moses nor any of the Judges had a Kingly power 157 No man by Nature in a formal and antecedent way is born subject to Government 165 Nature per accidens and in a secondary way intendeth Government 169 SECT IV. It is not lawful to resist the King as King nor the Kingly power as the Kingly power 171 It is lawful and commendable to resist the tyranny of the King and the abuse of his power Ibid. Kingly Government may very lawfully be declined that one better may be set-up 180 SECT V. We are tied by League and Covenant to maintain and espouse Christ's interest absolutely notwithstanding any thing may ensue thereupon Ibid. By no Oath or Covenant can we be absolutely tied to espouse the King's interest and preserve Monarchy involably Ibid. A SURVEY of POLICY OR A Free Vâ—NDICATION of the COMMON-VVEALTH of ENGLAND PROEME COURTEOUS READER I Beseech thee judge of me impartially Do not imagine I speak my mind more freely then is pertinent Let me tell thee my freedom is upon a good accompt I may hold my face toward Heaven and say what I speak it is from the simplicity of my spirit My record is from on high I do not speak from a by-assed principle and if I do so shall not my Lord try it out Why I pray thee wilt thou stumble at my freedome in expressing my mind against Kingly Government in behalf of that which is popular Verily I desire thee not to cleave to my judgment implicitly Yet would I have thee duly examining without prejudice what I speak and embrace that which is good wilt thou learn so much of that which the world cals Scepticisme as to suspend thy judgment a little and not sentence against me at the first Be not wedded to thine own opinion but try all things and hold that which is good Do thou kindly embrace any thing which is of GOD in this Book I do ingenuously profess I shal forthwith be of thy judgment if thou shew me better grounds inforcing the contrary of what I maintain Well the main subject in hand resolveth upon this Question Whether or not is the Commonwealth of ENGLAND an usurped power These Questions being put aside that follow it is easily answered 1. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute 2. Whether or not is Royall Government the choicest of Governments 3. Whether or not is a Commonwealth the best of Governments 4. Whether or not is it lawfull to resist the Royall Person and decline the Royall Authority 5. Whether or not doth the Covenant tye us to preserve Monarchy inviolably Of these as followeth SECT I. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute THe Court-Parasits and Nation of Royalists do plead much for an arbitrary and illimited power to the Royall Person But in this matter we do freely offer our judgment ASSERT I. The power of the King as it commandeth just and lawful things is absolute and in such a notion cannot be lawfully contraveened It is made good firstly from that which Solomon saith for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him Where the word of a King is there is power and who may say unto him What dost thou Eccl. 8. These words by Writers are diversly expounded 1. Some expound them concerning the absolutenes of the Kings power whether in things lawfull or unlawfull good or bad And in this we find none more willing then Salmasius the Humanist Defens Reg. cap. 2. 2. Others again who are no friends to absolute and unlimited Monarchy do interpret the words not de jure but de facto Regis i. e. they opinionat that Solomon doth not speak here of the power of Kings which according to Law and Reason doth belong to them but concerning the absolute way of governing which one way or other is conferred upon Kings whether by usurpation or tyranny or by a voluntary and free subjection of the people to an absolute and arbitrary power in the Kingly Person Yet 3. I do choose a way distinct from either of these And I expound the words concerning an absolute power in the King in things lawfull and honest This I make good from the Contexts 1. The Preacher saith I counsell thee to keep the Kings commandment and that in regard of the oath of GOD. Now what power the Holy Ghost here giveth to Kings is such a power whose ordinances he exhorteth to obey and that under an obligation being tyed to obey it by a lawfull oath the oath of GOD. But we cannot obey the unjust Acts and Ordinances of an arbitrary and illimited power Unless you will say that it is lawfull for us to sin against the LORD and to do the will of man rather then the will of GOD which is contrary to that which is spoken Act. 4. and 5. Yea as afterward is shewed arbitrary Monarchy invested with a boundlesse power to do both good evill is sinful and unlawfull And therefore we cannot tye our selves by the oath of GOD to maintain it Sure we are we can not lawfully swear to maintain and obey
to be attended with these qualifications 1 They are meerly heroick and ambitious So were the Giants before the Flood Gen. 6. Beros Antiq. l. 1. Nimrod after the Flood Gen. 10. Bern. Antiq. l. 4. and all the rest of the great Heroes Arist pol. 3. c. 10. 2 They are meerly tyrannous and cruel So we find that Pharaoh had an arbitrary power over the People of Israel Exod. 1 and 5. Nebuchad-nezzar had the like power over his Kingdoms Dan. 2. and 3. By vertue of Ahasuerus absolute power Haman was licenced to exercise tyranny on the People of the Jews Est 3. We might alledge many examples to this purpose But the point is most clear in it self for those who are of a tyrannous disposition can endure no Law but their will Otherwise they could never get their tyranny exercised 3 Those whom we find chief pleaders for absolute Monarchy are either concerned therein themselves as Alexander M. and M. Aurelius and such like or else Flatterers and Court-Parasites as Lyricus Rom. Virgil and such like And of this sort we find none more violent in this matter than Dr. Fern Hugo Grotius Arnisaeus Spalato c. whose foot-steps with his ful-speed Salmasius doth trace But although men by way of flattery and by-respect may act and plead for arbitrary Monarchy yet let me tell you I do not imagin but they may act and plead for it through simple error and delusion And so I conclude that Aristotle Xiphilin Salust and the foresaid Lawyers do much run this way though they be more moderate in the matter then the rest And as afterward is shewed we find the Talmudick and Rabbinick Writers this way somewhat inclining to the lawless and arbitrary power of absolute Monarchy Assert 2. The King hath not a power above Law and a Prerogative Royal to dispose upon things according to his pleasure whether with or against Law and Reason Firstly Such an arbitrary and vast power is repugnant to the first Institution and Scripture-mould of Kings According to the Holy Ghost's way of moulding the King he is thus qualified 1 He is an Elective King chosen by the People in subordination to God Thou shalt in any wayes set him King over thee whom the LORD thy God shall choose Deut. 17. 2 A Brother-King and not a stranger-King One from amongst thy Brethren shalt thou set King over thee thou mayest not set a stranger over thee who is not thy Brother Ibid. 3 He must not tyrannize over the People by Leavying Forces and by strength of hand drawing them into Egyptian slavery He shall not multiply horses to himself nor cause the People to return to Egypt to the end that he should multiply horses forasmuch as the LORD hath said unto you Ye shall henceforth return no more that way Ibid. These words properly and in their emphatick sense can import nothing else but a discharging of the King by Forces and Armies to tyrannize over his People that bringing them into bondage and upon their ruines he may not strengthen himself and multiply his Forces So the King of Egypt did with the People of Israel whileas they were in Egypt under his tyrannons yoke 4 Not a Leacherous King given to women for drawing him on into temptation Neither shall he multiply wives to himself that his heart turn not away Ibid. 5 Nor Covetous given to enrich himself and to build-up his own estate upon the ruins of his People Nether shall he greatly multiply to himself Silver and Gold Ibid. 6 But he must be a King acquiring the Scriptures of GOD meditating on them his whole life-time thereby learning to fear the LORD to observe his Commandments and to practise them that he may be humble and lowly not turning aside either to the right-hand or to the left And it shall be when he sitteth upon the Throne of his Kingdom that he shall write him a Copy of this Law in a Book out of that which is before the Priests the Levits And it shall be with him and he shall reade therein all the dayes of his life that he may learn to fear the LORD his God to keep all the words of this Law and these Statutes to do them That his heart be not lifted up above his Brethren and that he turn not aside from the Commandment to the right-hand or to the left Ibid. Here from we draw this Argument The power of him is not Arbitrary and beyond the bounds of Law whose power according to the Law and Word of GOD is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law But the power of the King according to the Law and Word of God is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law Ergo the Power of the King is not Arbitrary and beyond the bounds of Law The Major cannot be denyed unlesse men will be so bold as to deny a Regulating and squaring of their Acts and Institutions according to the Word and Law of God Sure I am none will deny it but such as will contradict Scripture it self and decline it as the rule and pattern of their Actions The Minor is manifest from the Text above Cited Barclay the Royallist distinguisheth between the Office and power of the King and so the man endeavoureth to elude our Argument thus The Office of the King quoth he is set down Deut. 17. and the King's power is spoken of 1 Sam. 8 where saith he an Arbitrary power is conferred upon the King and laid upon his shoulders But this distinction serveth not for his purpose For either the power of the King is according to the Word and Law of God or not If it be then as the Office of the King is regulated in like manner his power also is kept within the compasse of Law For his Office spoken of Deut. 17. admitteth bounds and is kept within marches That which is spoken concerning the King Deut. 17. in terminis doth subject the King to Law and taketh-away Arbitrarines in his Government So then that which is spoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. doth either contradict that which is spoken Deut. 17. or else it giveth him no power and liberty of governing above Law at random If it be not then it is not a Divine but a diabolick power Moreover what the King doth according to his power either he doth it by vertue of his Office or contrary to it If by vertue of his Office Ergo the Kingly power cannot be absolute unlesse his Office be also absolute for so the exercise of his power dependeth from his Office In such a case he can do nothing according to his power but what he hath Authority for from his Office But his Office Deut. 17 is not absolute but Regulated according to Law If contrary to it Ergo it is not the Kings Office to exercise an absolute power and consequently the Kings Authority is not absolute Furthermore either the King as King is absolute or not If he be absolute as King Ergo the Royall
purpose we argue thus Eâ—ther Athaliah had the right and authority of a King or not If she had the right and authority of a King ergo if the King be of an absolute power and not subject to Law then Athaliah was no more subject to Law then any other King for as Salmasius and all Royallists will have it the King is of an absolute power and not subject to Law And consequently Athaliah being invested with the right of a Kingly power and authority she was no more subject to Law then any other of the Kings of Judah Therefore if you say that Athaliah was invested with the right and authority of a King you must either commend the practice of Jehojadah and the people in killing her or else you must change your opinion and not imagine Kings to be absolute and not subject to Law If she had not the right and authority of a King then either because she usurped the Kingdom and intruded her-self upon it contrary to the consent of the People or because she did cut-off the righteous heirs of the Kingdom and set up her-self in the Kingdom or else because according to the Law women ought not to govern Not the first because according to the Doctrine of Royallists conquest is a lawfull title to the Crown But Athaliah conquered the Crown of Judah to her-self What more I pray you did she in intruding her-self upon the Kingdom of Judah then unjust Conquerers do in thrusting themselves in upon the kingdoms which they subdue As she intruded her-self without the free consent and election of the People so do they And yet Salmasius with the rest of his Brethren will have such Conquerers lawful heirs and absolute kings over these kingdoms which they subdue Nor can you say the second because conquerers who subdue other men's kingdoms cut-off all those who by pretended blood-right claim a title to the Crown And yet Royallists will have such lawfull heirs and absolute kings over these kingdoms to which they have no title but the sword Nor can you say the third because all Royallists admit Royal birth a just and absolute title to the Crown But women no less then men may be and are of the Royall Off-spring And consequently if the doctrine of Royallists be true and unless Salmasius will contradict himself women may as lawfully govern as men Therefore it doth not follow that because Athaliah was a woman she had not right to govern the People of the Jews and reign over them I confesse by Royall birth she had no title to the Crown But she conquered the Crown to her-self and did reign six years with the consent of the People But sure I am Salmasius and all the Royallâ—sts as they hold the consent of the People as a necessary ingredient to make-up the lawfulness of the title to the Crown so they maintain conquest without all exception to be a just and lawful title thereto But what need I thus to stand do not I know that Salmasius and the whole nation of Royalists will have the formall and essentiall being of the King to consist in an absolute and illimited power But any person whether man or woman usurper or non-usurper is capable of such a power and may be invested therewith And consequently though Athaâ—iah was but a woman and an usurper it doth not follow that because she was such therefore she was not of an absolute and arbitrary power The greatest of Tyrants and the worst of women is capable of such a power And the power is not changed because of the change of the person and of such and such qualifications in him Such things are meerly extrinsecal to the nature of the power it-self So then if the King be formally a King because he is of an illimited and arbitrary power I see no reason why Athaliah did not reign as a King for she was capable of such a power wherein according to the doctrine of Royallists the essentiall frame of a King doth consist And consequently seing she did reign in stead of the King of Judah and exercised his authority there is no reason why she was not absolute and unsubject to Law as well as he Therefore Salmasius must either leave-off his opinion and not imagine that the Kings of Judah were absolute and not subject to Law or else he must cry-down the laudable practice of Jehojadah and of the People in killing Athaliah For shame he will not do this Propos 2. Except the Lacoedemonian kingdom there was no kingdom in old wherein absolute and uncircumscribed Monarchy was not erected though in some more remiss and in others more intense For proof of this Salmasius sheweth what was the condition of Monarchy in the Assyrian Egyptian Jewish Median Persian Grecian and Roman kingdoms Of the Jewish kingdom we have spoken already and more of it afterward in a more convenient place As for the Assyrian kingdom together with the Median he proveth that kings in them were absolute and un-subject to Law because such was the condition of the kings of Persia This he maketh good from Ottanes the Persian who defineth Monarchy to be that to which every thing is lawful unpunishably Herod lib. 3. Yea Artabanus averreth That no Law amongst the Persians was more commendable then that whereby they enacted that the King should be honoured as the Image of God Plut. in vit Themist And Claudian saith That they gave a like obedience to cruel and tyrannous Kings Therefore saith Salmasius seeing the Medians succeeded to the Assyrians and the Persians to the Medians it appeareth that as the Kings of Persia so the Kings of Assyria and Media were absolute and not subject to Law And though the Egyptian Kings before they were subdued by the Persians were hemmed-in by the bonds of Law in every thing that they did yet notwithstanding we never reade that at any time they brought any of their Kings upon the stage and caused them to suffer for their Delinquencie They did bear the yoke of two cruel tyrants Busiris and Cambyses most patiently without reluctancie Which Cambyses because of his cruelty the Jews called Nebuchodonozor He desired in marriage his german sister and so calling a Councel he demanded at his Counsellors if there was any Law in Persia which did permit such a marriage They desirous to gratifie their King told him That they found a Law whereby the King of Persia was permitted to do any thing he pleased Herod lib. 3. As for the Grecian Empire it is known saith Salmasius that Agamemnon had an absolute power over that Army which be led on against the Trojans And therefore he is called Rex Regum And Aeschylus calleth the King of the Argives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an uncensurable Governour So Homer calleth the Grecian Kings Kings made by Jupiter reigning by and holding their Crown of him He calleth them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 divine Kings trained up by Jupiter Philip saith that the King hath equal power
Therefore Euripides saith that the Athenians under Theseus did not come under the yoke of one man but the people as free-men governed like a King by course In Thes Yet we must not imagine that then there was a perfect and entire Commonwealth erected No verily for Theseus remained notwithstanding as their Prince and as one having greater authority then any Patriot and Commonwealth's-man I will not say that Theseus retained a power in his hand equall to the power of the People and their Representative That is expresly against what Euripides and others above-cited do report But this much I may say that he retained as much power in his own hand as made him superior and of greater authority then any one at-least whether of the Councel or of the People And that he was the first man in dignity and authority in the Commonwealth is clear 1. Because as both Aristotle and Plutarch report he remained notwithstanding the Prince of the Commonwealth Therefore even unto this day he is reckoned-up in the Catalogue of the Athenian Kings 2. Because he differenced between the Patricians whom we call gentle-men tillers of the ground and Crafts-men giving to them power according to their ranks and stations investing some of them with greater and some of them with lesser power and consequently seing he differenced one kinde of persons from another in the Commonwealth making some of them in authority Superiour to others much more hath he retained a power in his own hand whereby he was differenced from any amongst all the rest 3. Because the Codrids and those who succeeded him were properly called Kings and therein they are contra-distinguished from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Princes and diametrally opposed to them But I conceive that there was greater reason why Theseus was a King then they were He was heroick and not so were they Yea Heraclid in plain terms saith that Kings were not abrogated from amongst the Athenians till the posterity of Codrus became effeminate and lecherous At which time saith he they were taken-away and Princes put in their room Observe therefore that from Theseus untill the last of the Corids the Athenian Monarchy was regulated We establish the point thus 1. Because Theseus himself as is proved already was regulated Ergo far more Codrus and his posterity were regulated Theseus was of an heroick temper such as were not the Codrids And so by nature he was more disposed for an absolute way of governing then they He lived in an heroick time wherein Monarchy was most in request But their time was of another stamp wherein Monarchy was wearing-out of request 2. Because whileas the Grecians carried-on an Engagement against Troy at that time the Athenian Monarchy remained regulated also Justin saith that Demophoon son to Theseus was Captain of the Athenian navy which went out with Agamemnon against the Trojans lib. 2. But we believe other more antient Writers rather then him who say that the Captain of the Athenian navy then was Mnestheus Theseus son Dict. cret de bel Tro. lib. 1. Dar. Phr. de exc Tro. lib. and Homer Iliad 2. Howsoever Plutarch gathereth from the way of Homer's speaking of the Navy which came from Athens under the conduct of Mnestheus that Theseus government was regulated and much impaired for saith he Homer doth call these ships as belonging to the People in Thes Just so say Dictys Cretensis Dares Phrygius And so Plutarch's way of reasoning holding good the Athenian Monarchy whether under Mnestheus as some say or under Demophoon as Justin saith was not absolute but limited for the ships which were rigged-out of Athens against Troy were not called Mnestheus or Demophoon's ships but ships belonging to the people of Athens Well I reverence this consequence not for it-self for Homer speaketh that same way of the out rigging of ships in other Grecian Kingdoms where I do not think but there was absolute Monarchy though in some things peradventure circumscribed but for Plutarch's authority And so in this matter resting upon it I conclude that seing the Athenian Monarchy was kept within the bounds of Law in the dayes of Mnestheus and Demophoon two brave Heroes much more was it of a circumscribed power in the dayes of Codrus and his posterity who were but of an ordinary and non-heroick temper And as for Codrus himself I do not think that such a man would have endeavoured the away-taking of those liberties wherewith Theseus priviledged the Athenians whereas in maintainance of their liberties he exposed himself to the undergoing of death it-self Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 6. Just lib. 2. Plut. in Codr Aye and which is more whileas the Codrids became lecherous soft and effeminate the Athenians did abrogate Kings from amongst them and changed their Kings into Princes Which beareth us this much in hand that the Athenians did retain a power in themselves whereby they might either keep-in or shut-out their Kings And it is remarkable that it is not said they did abrogate their Kings because of the tyranny of the Codrids Heracl de Pol. Ath. Which insinuateth that notwithanding their personall escapes and out-breakings they acted nothing for diminishing the peoples Power Thirdly after the Codrids had become effeminate and had abused their power the people took-away Kings from amongst them and in their room set up Princes Now the question may be moved whether or not had these Princes as great power as had Theseus and Codrus For removing of this difficulty observe that there were some who did govern onely as Princes and some did rule as Kings Those who governed as Princes are of a threefold kind 1. Some of them were appointed to govern for their whole lifetime Who were thirteen in number each of them reigning after another 2. Some of them were decennal Princes seven in number who governed every one of them for the space of ten years The last of the decennall Princes was Erixias whose government left-off an mun 3282 before the reign of Pisistratus about 128. years 3. Some of them were annuall and yearly Magistrates Some would think it strange to say that these three kinds of Princes had that same power and authority which Theseus and Codrus or any other of the Athenian Kings had But if you take along with you this distinction you shall find the matter clear There is a twofold non-absolute and circumscribed power 1. Intensive and substantiall 2. Extensive and circumstantiall It cannot be denied but these Princes in all the three kindes had one and the same power intensively and essentially which Theseus and the Codrids had The reason of this is because the power of the Athenian Kings in itself and at the utmost was but a regulated power subjected to the Law of the people as is proved already Therefore saith Euripides bringing-in Theseus speaking of the power of the Athenians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In English Athens A
consulting the Senat. Senatores voluti praesides Reipublicae custodes tantae authoritatis fuere ut si populus Regem aut magistratum quempiam jussisset id sic ratum foret si Senatus author fieret Alex. ab Al. lib. 4. cap. 11. i. e. The Senatours as Praesidents and keepers of the Republick were of so great authority that if the people had commanded the King or any Magistrate that accordingly should be ratified if the Senat authorized it See also Liv. lib. 1. Dionys lib. 2. Digest lib. 1 tit 9. Luci. Ann. lib. 1. cap. 1. Plut. in Romul Aye which is more Dictatours whereof Julius Caesar was one who amongst the Romans were of greater power then Kings were subjected to the Tribunes for it is reported that M. Fabius appealing from L. Papyrius Dictatour to the Tribunes by their authority exempted his son Q Fabius from punishment Alex. de Alex. lib. 1. Well we shall not alledge that the Tribunes the Representative of the people had greater authority positively in exercising acts of Law then the Dictatours for not onely Alexander ab Alex. lib. 1. Geni di cap. 3. lib. 4. cap. 23. lib. 5. cap. 2. but also Pomponius Laet. de magist Rom. and Fenestella de mag Rom. lib. alt do plainly say that in respect of positive authority the Dictatours were above the Tribunes and there was no aâ—pellation from them Yet all of them say that in respect of negative authority the Tribunes were above Dictatours Consuls and all the rest of the Roman Magistrates because they had power of interdicting and discharging all the rest of the Magistrates Dictatours or any other from undertaking any thing as they judged fit and expedient should neither be acted-for nor against And so having this power de jure as is condescended upon by Alexander himself and all others I admire why Alexander maketh any question concerning M. Fabius appellation from the Dictatour to the Tribunes for so he did not appeal to them as to judges of greater authority then the Dictatour but as to propugnatours and defenders having a power of inhibiting what was done as they judged amisse by the rest of the Magistrates Albeit they had not a main voice in judging wherein the power of the Dictatour was above their's and in descerning yet had they a main voice in defending approving and disapproving And whereas this man alledgeth that Aristotle is of his judgement he is close mistaken For Aristotle doth not define the Laconick Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the power of the battell according to a perpetuall title from blood-right because he opinionateth that the Lacedemonian Kings were not properly Kings but because the greatest authority the Lacedemonian Kings had was in leading-forth the Army There indeed they were primi above the Senat and Ephorie Whereupon he also calleth the Laconick Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power of leading forth the Army by it's own power He is so far from being of Salmasius opinion that contrariwise he reckoneth up the Laconick Monarchy amongst the proper species and and kindes of royall power Polit. 3. cap. 10. and 11. And whileas he speaketh of the Lacedemonian Kings he doth so call them Pol. 2. cap. 7. and 9. Inst 2. Aristotle doth so saith Salmasius 1. Because the power of the battell was hereditary to the Lacedemonian Kings 2. Because the Lacedemonian Kings in battell had a full free and Kingly power Aye saith he they had also a power in those things which related to the ceremonies wherewith Kings in old were solemnly entrusted Def. Reg. cap. 8. Ans The first reason is forthwith nought 'T is a bad consequence The Lacedemonian Kings were hereditary Commanders of the Army in chief Ergo Aristotle because of that calleth them Kings Quasi vero he had had no such reason for him to call them Kings if they had onely been entrusted with the power of the battell by election Friend you are a-little mistaken in this 1. Because Aristotle divideth the power of the battell into hereditary and elective power Pol. 3. cap. 10. Thus he contra-distinguisheth the one from the other as two different species properly and specifically differencing the power of the battell in generall 2. Because a Kingly power is not therefore Kingly because it is hereditary Yea which is more a Kingly power caeteris requisitis is properly and formally elective And therefore Aristotle should have had more reason to have called them Kings if their power had been by election and not by succession So the man himself judgeth whileas he saith that the Carthaginian and Cretian kings were better ordained then the Laconick Because saith he the Laconick kings are ordained by succession and they by election And he addeth a reason to this because saith he by election the best are choosed whereas by blood-right the like cannot be had Whereupon saith he the heriditary title of Kings amongst the Lacedemonians hath brought great hurt and detriment unto the Commonwealth Polit. 2. cap. 9. And as for his second reason it plainly contradicteth himself for so he confesseth that in the battell they had a Kingly power And he hath little reason to say that Aristotle called them Kings because they had a power of over-seeing the sacrifices So had the Athenian annuall Princes whom properly he will not admit to be called Kings Howsoever it cannot be denied but properly they were Kings albeit they were subjected to Law 1. Because it doth not follow that a King properly is not a King because he is a regulated King We have shewed already that GOD no otherwise mouldeth the King but as he subjecteth him to Law Assert 2. And afterward we shall shew how that the Kings of the Jews were regulated Kings And yet who will deny but they were proper Kings 2. The King is not properly King unlesse he be a regulated King and subjected to Law as both already and afterward is shewed And therefore the Lacedemonian Kings were Kings properly the rather because they were regulated 3. Because Salmasius himself confesseth that in the battell the Lacedemonian Kings had a full and Kingly power And yet then their power was not absolute and arbitrary They had not then a full power to act against Law but according to Law as you may learn from Conclus 6. in comparing their power with Agamemnon's power Therefore either Salmasius will contradict himself or else he must needs say that Kings are properly Kings though they be regulated 4. Because all that write of the Lacedemonian Commonwealth of whom we have cited many already do call the Captain-Generals of their Armies Kings And 't is remarkable that Lysander in an oration which was found after his death perswaded the Lacedemonians to shake-off the Kingly government and elect a Captain-Generall for governing the battell Plut. Aemyl prob in Lys This he speaketh of the Lacedemonian Kings as contradistinguished from Captain-Generals of Armies O but saith Salmasius Lysander onely dehorted the people
either by the command of the King or of the People it was holden null unlesse it had been ratified by the Parliament In it every one whether King or other Members thereof have alike and equal power of speaking And withall nothing spoken in it is of validity and force unlesse it be concluded on by the major part together with the approbation of the King Polyd. Ang. hist lib. 11. It is observable That by the authority of the Parliament it was ordained That Steven so long as he lived should remain King of England and that Henry 2. afterward should succeed him By whose mediation and authority the debate between Henry and Steven touching the Crown was decided And I pray you how could these things have been unlesse the Parliament had been above the King Inst 4. But saith Salmasius the power af convocating and dissolving the Parliament belongeth to the King of England The power of the Parliament is extraordinary and pro tunc But the power of the King is ordinary and perpetual And likewise the King of England in Parliament hath a negative voice And therefore in many Acts of Parliament he is called the King and Lord of the Parliament and what is ordained is enacted in his Name And so saith he though the King of England doth act according to the Laws of the Kingdom and concurrence of his Parliament yet notwithstanding he is an absolute King Otherwise the Kings of the Jews had not been absolute who had power to do nothing without the consent of the Sanhedrin And Artaxerxes had not been absolute who could not be reconciled to Vasthi because the Law discharged it Yea if Kings were not absolute because they act according to the Law and the advice of their Parliament then Cambyses had not been absolute who conveened a Councel whileas be intended to marry his german sister and demanded of them if there was any such law for allowing such a marriage Def. Reg. cap. 8. 9. Answ Salmasius shall do well to consider these few things 1. What the power of the English Parliament is Which is defined by Camdenus to be made-up of three Estates having the highest and most sovereign power in making Laws confirming Laws annulling Laws interpreting Laws and in doing every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is concerned Brit. chorog de Tribun Ang. This is far from Salmasius mind who Def. Reg. cap. 9. opinionateth that the Parliament hath not power over every thing in the Kingdom But Polydore summeth-up the power of the Parliament under these notions First Every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is interested is referred to it Secondly Whatsoever is done at the command whether of King or People is of none effect unless it be authorized by the Parliament Thirdly It establisheth and taketh away Laws as it judgeth fit Fourthly Every Member of it hath a-like power and freedom in voicing And what is decreed and enacted by Parliament he calleth it the proper and municipal Law of the Kingdom Seing then the Parliament is the most sovereign and supream power in the Kingdom of England according as it was in old how can it be said That the King of England hath power over it If it be so then you admit two Supream powers and a power above a Supream power which is contradicent The Lacedemonian Ephori were no otherwise above their Kings but because they were invested with the highest and supream power All things were referred to the Parliament even as the Roman Consuls as Festus out of Coelidus saith did refer every thing to the Senate Now because of this the Senate had the highest power and was above the Consuls Ergo seing all matters of the Commonwealth in old in the Kingdom of England were referred to the Parliament no question it had power above the King The Roman Senate is therefore said to have been of the supreamest power Fenest de Magistrat Rom. cap. 1. because neither Kings nor Consuls nor Dictators nor any other Magistrate could do any thing without their advice and counsel Ergo seing whatsoever the King of England or any other of that Kingdom did in old was to no purpose without the authority and approbation of Parliament without all controversie the King of England was subjected to the Parliament Salmasius concludeth the King to be above the Parliament because he alledgeth the Parliament can do nothing without the King Why may not I then conclude the Parliament to be above the King because re ipsa and according to the Law of the Kingdom the King can do nothing without the authority and consent of the Parliament Where then I pray you is the King 's negative voice There is not a Member in Parliament cui aequa loquendi potestas non competit So saith Polyd. Angl. hist lib. 11. What Do you imagine that ever the Parliament could by their authority have drawen-up the foresaid agreement between Steven and Henry 2. unlesse they had had power above the King What they did therein was a direct acting both over Steven their present King and Henry 2. their future King But will you tell me whileas the States of England did seek of K. John to be governed by the ancient Lawes made by Edward the Confessour whether or not were these Lawes Acts of meer pleasure giving the King a liberty to do as he would either to tyrannize over the people or not You can not hold the affirmative because what they demanded of the King was to be restored to liberty to be freed of tyranny Polyd. Vir. Angl. hist lib. 15. And if you hold the negative part then do the ancient Laws of England pull absolutenesse out of the king's hands and subject him to Law Magna charta saith The King can do nothing but by Lawes and no obedience is due to him but by Law And the States of England were so far from permitting John to rule at randome and not according to the ancient Lawes of the kingdom that contrarywise they combined against him entering in oath together to pursue him still on till he should govern according to Law and establish the ancient Lawes of the kingdom Yea albeit that Pope Innocent commanded them to lay-down arms and though upon their deniall thereof they were declared enemies by the Pope they notwithstanding followed on their purpose and cryed-out that they would be avenged by fire and sword on such a wicked tyrant who did so much slight the people Aye which is more they sent into France and from thence brought Ludovick the French king's son and created him king notwithstanding any thing either John or the Pope could do in the contrary Thus they never rested till in sorrow they brought John's head into the grave Where I pray you is the absolutenesse of the king of England whenas the States would not suffer him to govern but according to Law and in denying to do so pursued him in arms unkinging him enkinging another in his room
all men what I please Sueton. in Calig cap. 29. Thus he putteth a difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing power And beside this even ordinary Heroes namely the founders of primary Colonies had an absolute power without al restriction Con. 2. Where also is shewed that Heroes in after-times as founders of after-Colonies had an absolute power though not so intense and uncircumscribed as founders of primary Colonies Such indeed had power to do all things though not to undo all things And so according to the rules of proportion as the after-Heroes were of lesse power then the former so the last of them had lesser power then any of them Aristotle saith That at last the power of Kings became exceedingly lessened This was after the flower of heroicism was quite faded This could not be at the first but hath come on by degrees After 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the erectors of primary Colonies had in-stepped 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which Aristotle saith was in ancient times i. e. in the times of the after-Heroes in and about the dayes of the founders of the secondary Colonies And then toward the close or in and about the middle time of Heroicism the Kingly power in some things became restricted as Aristotle saith And so he subjoyneth that at last it became exceedingly lessened Now you see that in reason no better construction can be put upon this fourth species of Monarchy assigned by Aristotle And for reverence of the man's memory I suppose that the third species of Royal power is taken by him both in an ordinary and extraordinary acceptation And he only illustrateth it as it is taken in an extraordinary sense because that way it is more material then the other way He passeth the illustration thereof as it is taken in an ordinary notion because so it is not only lesse material but also that way it is more clear then the other way Or I may say that Aristotle confoundeth these two notions together because comparitively aesymnetick Monarchy taken in an extraordinary notion may be called ordinary The reason of this is because men at least may be because of personal endowments more frequently called to govern in an absolute and ordinary way then for extraordinary Heroicism and such like Howsoever this I know that Aristotle reckoned-up no other kinds of Monarchy but such as have power to and do govern according to Law But these who are advanced to an illimited power because of personal endowments are not precisely called thereto to govern whether according to or against Law That doth militate against the ground and motive of their call They are no otherwise called to govern according to their pleasure but as people expect their will shal bring forth the choicest Laws Whence precisely and formally their power both according to the subject and object thereof is restricted and kept within the bounds of Law But we cannot say so of absolute Monarchy acquired and conferred by extraordinary heroicism and such like And consequently we may very justly say that Aristotle referreth absolute Monarchy obtained because of personal endowments to the third species of Regal government and doth not refer absolute Monarchy because of extraordinary heroicism and such like to any species or kind of Monarchy he speaketh of The reason we say is this because any kind of Monarchy he speaketh of doth not exceed the bounds of Law But illimited Royal power conferred beeause of extraordinary qualifications precisely and formally doth not exceed the bounds of Law Whereas being conferred upon grounds of extraordinary heroicism purchase and such like precisely and formally the power thereof out-reacheth all Laws Thus we judge Aristotle's mind to be cleared concerning all the specics and sorts of Monarchy summed-up by him I confesse Salmasius imagineth that Aristotle by Pambasilick or all-governing Monarchy doth mean arbitrary Monarchy having power to govern at random either according to or against Law But the Gentleman in this is a little mistaken for otherwise in the moulding of the King he had not required such conditions and limitations as he doth Which be these 1. That he should descend of such a race which in vertue and goodnesse should exceed all others Pol. 3. cap. 12. Whence is it that both there and Polit. 1. cap 3. he saith that the best according to nature over-ruleth that which is worse and lesse good 2. That the King himself should exceed the rest in vertue and goodnesse Yea but for a King to govern according to his own hearts lust even against Law and Reason there is no necessity of vertue and goodnesse seing illegality and injustice flow from a vicious and corrupt principle Therefore Aristotle in opposing Monarchy or Government laid upon one to Government carried-on and managed according to Law doth not insinuate an arbitrary power in the King having immunity and freedom from Law but in so doing he only opposeth the power of Government laid upon one to its power being laid upon many implying that as in this respect the Governour is subject to the rest and cannot act any thing of Law without their consent and assistance so in the other respect the Governour in carrying on things according to Law hath immunity from subjection to any other beside and in doing things legally may perform them without the interposition of any other man's authority Whence we see that Aristotle alloweth an absolute power in the king to act according to Law but not to act either according to Law or against it And therefore in so far he taketh these by the hand who deny Monarchy to be according to nature in as far as they contend that to be against Nature which is against Law Which maketh him conclude Tyranny to be against Nature it being against Law and Reason And consequently he doth not allow arbitrary power in the king to do either good or bad according to his pleasure He only pleadeth for power to the King which is according to Nature Justice and Utility He will have him a man excelling others in vertue and governing according to Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 3. cap. 12. Moreover it is contrary to the nature of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Aristotle expresseth cap. 11. to render it an arbitrary power There is a very great difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Howsoover he expoundeth it himself cap. 10. and defineth it to be a power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to govern the City and all the Publick matters whether at home or abroad Thus the man speaketh of a governing power But arbitrary power is a misgoverning-power He speaketh of a power ordering and doing all things But arbitrary power is a power of misordering and undoing all things It doth not follow that because kings of old had power over all things Ergo they had power to dispose on them according to their pleasure
of his power Verily both they and the people have born patiently with his slips and heavy impositions because of his rare and singular qualifications Otherwise I can see nothing for it why the people did not make a mutiny against and revolt from Solomon as against and from Rehoboam 3. Because as both already and afterward doth appear the Sanhedrin both according to GOD's institution and the Law of the nation had authority and jurisdiction above the king But sure I am it had been a very uselesse power if they durst not have exercised it It had been all one to have wanted that authority with wanting power to have put it in execution as occasion served And this had been a having and a non-having power Which is ridiculous and repugnant Neither can you alleadge that they were spared because then judicatories were altogether turned corrupt and knew not what it was to exercise justice for that doth directly militate against the eminent Reformation both of Church and State that was under the reign of both these Kings Therefore seing David and Solomon were spared not because they were absolute nor because the people durst not execute judgement on them nor because the people and judicatories under their reign were altogether dissolute not knowing the way of exercising justice to me it is more then manifest that their delinquency was past-by because of their personall endowments The shining vertues and eminent graces that did appear in them no question have kept back the Sanhedrin from putting hand on them O! what a temptation would it be to me to voice for a David's off-cutting O! how much would my soul be grieved to sentence against a Solomon And shall not I think but those of the Sanhedrin were much taken up with the qualifications of these men as well as I could be with the vertues of such-like I cannot think that I am singular in this In the interim observe that my meaning is not that they had such a vast power as Salmasius dreameth of I do not think that ever the Sanhedrin would have spared them unlesse they could not have done otherwayes if they had turned positive and even-down tyrants and destroyers of the Commonwealth But onely my meaning is that because of their eminent qualifications they had immunity from Law in some notes of delinquency Neither do I speak that they had this priviledge de jure but de facto Thus you see that this is no argument for Royallists who object the Sanhedrin's sparing of David and Solomon as a ground of the King 's arbitrary power And in this none is more ready then Salmasius Def. Reg. cap. 5. But they shall do well shortly to observe these things 1. They were spared because of their personal endowments They were extraordinary men Therefore they were extraordinarily priviledged They got an inch to the yard and piece beyond common Now ab extraordinariis ad ordinaria non est sequela 2. It cannot be denied but they got a dispensation for some points of delinquency But Royallists have to prove that they positively tyrannized over the Commonwealth and destroyed it and notwithstanding had exemption and immunity from law This I am sure they can never make good 3. This speaketh something of the exemption of Kings from Law de facto But Royallists when they have said this have as yet to prove that this factum is de jure Inst O but say they de jure David and if he then also Solomon and all other kings beside had immunity from Law for he saith Against thee thee only have I sinned Psal 51. And they take this to be the meaning of the place as if David had been subject to none but to God And for this namely they cite Ambrose in Apolog. Dav. cap. 10. l. 2. Epist 7. See Deus Rex and Salmasius def reg cap. 3. But this is the main prop that all Royallists have for setting-up the arbitrary and lawless power of the King Ans I shall not stand here to repeat the judgment of Interpreters Our learned and dear Countryman Lex Rex quaest 26. of this speaketh abundantly But in few words I expound the words thus They are to be taken 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insinuating that David had mainly sinned against the LORD and that David was more grieved for his sins in so far as they offended GOD then in so far as they offended man No question they are to be considered in an hyperbolick sense They must not be taken in an exclusive but in an inclusive notion Just so as are these words I am the LORD and there is none else Isa 45. Deut. 4. Now this cannot be taken literally and simply as it is propounded Otherwise it should follow that there were no creature beside the Creator and no other thing beside the LORD And yet it is known that there are Angels men and many other creatures Therefore their sense is meerly figurative and hyperbolick pointing-out the eminency of GOD's essence Even so David thereby aggravateth his grief for his offence done against the LORD He only repeateth his sin done against GOD. But he speaketh nothing expresly of it as it was done against Bathshebah and Uriah No reason can be given for this but because it more grieved him that he had offended God then man And so as a man only taken-up with thoughts of guiltiness and miscarriage in order to God he only harpeth upon that string As a man over-charged with sorrow for sin done against God can take no time to think upon his offence to man So David carrieth himself just so here And yet it cannot be denied but he sinned both against Bathshebah and Uriah Otherwise in so far as he committed adultery with the one and murder against the other in so far he did not sin And consequently he was excusable both before God and man Where there is no sin there is no Law Our godly and dear Country-man would fain put a fair construction upon Ambrose saying that his meaning is There was none above David de facto ibid. But the simple truth is Ambrose is altogether of Salmasius opinion Rex utique erat saith he nullis ipse legibus tenebatur c. Any man that speaketh so plain language to this purpose as he doth 't is but lost travel to glosse it But if we compare Ambrose's practice with his judgment we will find the one contrary to the other It is reported of him That he did excommunicate Emperour Theodosius and would not suffer him to enter the Church so called till firstly he did satisfie for his slaughter committed amongst the Thessalonians Theodor. lib. 5. cap. 17. Sozom. lib. 7. cap. 24. Hondorf Lonic theatr hist exempl 5. praec We admire how Ambrose could do so much against the Emperour in action seing to his practice he is contrary in profession I cannot over-leap an interpretation which Salmasius citeth out of one whom he calleth Anonymus He alleadgeth that David
cod San. cap. 11. he saith That it is true in respect of the Kings of Israel but not in respect of the Kings of Judah And in what sense it is true concerning the Kings of Israel is already explicated by us The Gemarick Writers from these words Oh house of David execute judgment in the morning and deliver him that is spoiled out of the hand of the oppressour Jerem. 21. move this Question Nisi in jus vocari possent quomodo judicarent i. e. How could the house of David judge unlesse they were judged This they prove because in Scripture we are commanded to search and try our wayes i. e. as they say Corrige te ipsum deinde alios corrige Salmasius rageth at this and he denieth what they infer I shall not take it upon me to make good their consequences Let Salmasius impugn them as much as he will My purpose is only to shew That they are not of his opinion They are contented not only to say That the king of the Jews at-least of Judah as Salmasius himself out of Sichardus R. Lakises hath was subjected to Law but also they dispute for that and endeavour to enforce it by Arguments Secondly from their acting with the concurrence of their Princes And David consulted with the Captains of thousands and hundreds and with every leader And David said unto all the Congregation of Israel If it seem good unto you let us send abroad unto our brethren that they may gather themselves unto us 1 Chron. 13. There is much in this If it seem good unto you This insinuateth that as David would not act without the advice and counsel of his people so his acting depended from their determination For the King had taken counsel and his Priests and all the Congregation in Jerusalem to keep the Pass-over in the second moneth He doth it not of his own head without advice And the thing pleased the King and all the Congregation It is a thing done by common consent So they established a decree Mark it is not said So the King established a decree But the Authority both of King and Princes is interposed The decree floweth from the joynt-authority of both Therefore it is added So the posts went with Letters from the King and the Princes 2 Chron. 30. They go not forth as commissioned only from the King but also from the Princes And it is most remarkable that which Zedekiah said unto the Princes The King is not he that can do any thing against you Jerem. 38. Ergo if the King could do nothing against the will of the Princes he had not an arbitrary power to dispose upon matters as he pleased Inst The King delivered Jeremiah into the hands of the Princes saith Salmasius not because he was inferiour to them but by way of courtesie and gratification and perhaps for fear of sedition Def. reg cap. 4. Ans I confesse Josephus ant lib. 10. cap. 10. doth insinuate as much But by your leave I must needs say that Zedekiah might have delivered Jeremiah into the hands of the Princes whether through gratification or through jealousie and yet he needed not to say that he could do nothing against them And sure I am if he had had an arbitrary power over them he would never have said so 1. Because it had been a known and manifest lie Which he would have been ashamed to have spoken in the presence of the Princes 2. He should have done altogether against gallantry and wisdom Against gallantry because if he should have denied his power by way of gratification then should he have been simple And if through jealousie then he had been base and cowardly Against wisedome because the high way of fomenting sedition is to dash upon suspition thereof The seditious party is encouraged upon the fainting and relenting of the other Well I do not dispute upon what grounds Zedekiah delivered Jeremiah into the hands of the Princes Whether it be the one way or the other it is not materiall Yet you must give me leave to add that you can assign no reason whether from gratification or from jealousie why he should have said that he could do nothing against the will of the Princes if he had had an arbitrary and boundlesse power Nay but the words are so clear that they need no commentary Thirdly from the councell of the old men given to Rehoboam who said to him If thou wilt be a servant unto this people this day and wilt serve them and speak good words to them then they will be thy servants for ever 1 Kin. 12. 2 Chr. 10. They perswade the king to keep himself within bounds and not to rule at randome They would have the King to carry himself as a servant toward the people This is far from an arbitrary and lording power It came to this that either Rehoboam behoved to govern according to Law and dimit of the power which his father had although it was not boundlesse and arbitrary in the full vastnesse of arbitrary power or else the people would leave him and revolt from him Thus it was not in Rehoboam's option to lessen or not to lessen the yoke of his father which he held upon the peoples neck No verily Neither did the old men counsell him to dimit any thing of his father's power as meerly depending from his own arbitriment but in relation to the people's desire And that not onely because of necessity but also because of conveniency Verily the old men had been far in the wrong to Rehoboam to have counselled him to dimit any thing of his power if he might have retained it justly No necessity lawfully could have moved the old men to perswade Rehoboam to dimit his power if he had had such a power of GOD and if the desire of the people had been unhonest and unjust No evill should be done that good may come of it Rom. 3. Verily the young mens counsell had been more just and reasonable then the counsell of the old men if Rehoboam lawfully might have kept the people under his fathers yoke and if the peoples desire had been unlawfull But it is known as Salmasius himself confesseth that Solomon unjustly keeped the people under heavy pressures 1 Kin. 11. and the counsell of the old men was just and reasonable yea and the desire of the people was honest and equitable 1 Kin. 12. 2 Chr. 10. Ios an t Jud. lib 8. cap. 3. Now tell me whether or not the Kings of the Jewes de jure had an arbitrary and lording power over the people If they had such a power de jure then did the people contra jus in desiring Rehoboam to dimit his father's power which of the most can be called nothing but absolute and uncircumscribed and the old men did also contra jus in desiring Rehoboam to satisfie the people's desire Salmasius himself will not say so But he acknowledgeth that the peopl's desire was just and the old mens counsell
never used under any other signification then King Precisely and ordinarily it is onely attributed to one of a kingly power You will finde it so in innumerable places of Scripture 3. From Jotham's application of the parable to Abimelech In it is used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence is derived 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both of them ordinarily are onely applied to persons of kingly authority See Judg. 9. This is according as it is written in Chron Alex. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. this is Abimelech who made himself King in the Kingdom or who tyrannously made himself King I pray you why doth the Holy Ghost call the Judges 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Judges and Abimelech 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King if he had not been of a Kingly and different power from them I confesse Judg. 17 18 19 and 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is spoken concerning the Judge Yet not properly but metaphorically It is spoken so moeroris gratia to expresse the dolefulnesse of the want of Authority or of persons in Authority And I must needs say that authoritativenes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is competent whether to the Kingly person or to the Kingly power Therefore the Holy Ghost in these places expresseth his purpose by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And this he doth not apply to one particular Judge as to Abimelech but to the whole incorporation of Judges Then hear Either Abimelech had different power from the Judges or not If different ergo the Judges were not Kings and had not Kingly power The greatest power Abimelech had was Kingly And therein he was differenced from the Judges You cannot say that his power was not different from theirs as is shewed already And consequently his power at the most being kingly and notwithstanding different from the authority of the Judges it necessarily followeth that the Judges had not kingly power Thirdly If the Judges had had kingly power then there had been no change in the Government after Saul was ordained King Thus there had been change nomine but not re And so the people in vain had sought a King and Samuel in vain had denied them a King Thus they sought nothing and he denied nothing but what they had before Bellarmine de Rom. pont lib. 1. cap. 2. though to no purpose laboureth to elude this distinguishing between Rex Prorex Indeed we cannot but much commend him because he saith That God in the time of the Judges was the proper and peculiar King of the Jews This is shewed already And so implieth Gideon's answer Judg. 8. And this cutteth the back of what Bellarmine saith for so they being but Viceroys and God the only King then had they not properly kingly power This is what I crave Yet in the interim I demand whether or not they could extend their power as the Kings And that they could not is manifest Because they had no more power then any of the Seventy and higher Sanhedrin The Seventy were chosen to bear equal burden with Moses and the Judge in all the weightiest and most publick matters Num. 11. Now either conjunctively or disjunctively they had equal power with Moses and the Judge If but conjunctively these two absurdities will follow Firstly that the Judge was not subject to the Sanhedrin for the equal is not subject to the equal And if not subject to the Sanhedrin I see no reason why he was not also unpunishable and absolute And so the Judge had greater power then the King Which I am sure none will admit Secondly before the institution of the Sanhedrin all the greater and hard matters were referred to Moses Ex. 18. And in this Moses power was greater then the power of those Judges which he appointed at the advice and counsel of Jethro But Moses finding that he alone was not able to manage all the weightiest matters therefore in greatest earnestnesse he besought the Lord to adde some to him who might help him therein and exonerate him of his burden Mark a little Either Moses as yet remained the only Judge of greatest matters or else every one of the higher Sanhedrin had equal power with him The reason is because Moses power was according to the object of it The greater matters the greater power Ex. 18. So proportion of Nature requireth If you say that notwitstanding the institution of the Sanhedrin and its intermedling with great and weighty businesses the greatest of matters were reserved for Moses and the Judge's managing I understand not that That is against Moses desire The thing which he prayeth for is That the Lord would ordain some to bear burden with him in discharging the weightiest matters We find no such distinction in his desire as that some might be appointed to oversee some weighty matters and himself notwithstanding to reserve in his own hand the managing of the greatest affairs Friend this had been but a little easing of Moses burden under which he did grievously groan Yea in this case there had been great by-respect and self-interest in Moses desire No lesse forsooth then he should be eased of his burden and notwithstanding reserve a lording power over his brethren There is no little carnality in this desire and as great absurdity to bind it upon Moses Yea were this true he had been in power above the Seventy for so his power did reach further then theirs and might do what they could not Tell not me that his desire was to be eased of his burden and notwithstanding to remain chief man in the Commonwealth There is great carnality and self-interest there also Moses desire is positive without distinction And if he or any of the Judges was major singulis I see no reason why they were not as essentially Kings as Saul David c. The Kings had no more power None of them according to Law was major universis So is demonstrated already And so in the ordination of Kings there was no essential and substantial change in the Common-wealth The people sought a King from Samuel Was it not a foolish desire to seek what they had already Samuel denied a King to them Was it not foolishnesse in him to deny them that which already they had and debate so much against it Verily there was nothing between them if this be true but pugna de lana caprina And verily Bellarmine wrongeth the people of the Jews very much in alleadging they sought a despotick heril and hereditary King There is no such thing in their desire as is shewed already They sought no more but a King According to the Law he was regulated And it is known that they did not give the kingdom to Saul's posterity Well let it be so the Judge had greater power then any one member of the Sanhedrin yet doth it follow that he only had such power as the annual Magistrate v. g. in the Athenian Commonwealth He had greater power then any one of the Councel And yet he had not a
accidens and in a secondary way intendeth government The reason of this is clearer then the light for in the state of corruption Nature lieth between two straits Either it must be altogether be slaveâ—â—o the predominant tyranny of it's corruption or else patiently submit it-self to Government 's yoke Thereby it mindeth to redintegrat that which by Corruption it losed It knoweth that it would be overcharged by the super-dominion of lording lusts if it did not come under the reverence of government It chooseth rather to take it's hazard of subjection to a friend then become captive to a foe and alwayes remain his prisoner Thus it no otherwise mindeth government but as in the case of fallen man it cannot be secure nor preserved from the rage of lust without it Therefore Writers do very pertinently call it naturall Arist Pol. 1. cap. 2. Ulp. Inst lib. 1. Just Dig. lib. 1. tit 1. loc 1. 3 4 5 6 7 9. Inst lib. 1. tit 2. loc 1. and 2. And the Lawyer Vasquez in plain terms saith that same which we do Illustr quaest lib. 1. cap. 41. The Law saith De jure gentium secundarius est omnis principatus I. fin ad med C. de long temp praest I. This being done you may abundantly learn herefrom what man's condition is in the state of perfection 〈◊〉 integrity 'T is a condition altogether unliable to any Politick subjection It rendereth all free unsubjected to government Yet we must not think that it giveth man immunity and exemption from the Morall Law That were a giving him power above his duty Thus he should be rendered an out-law But in the state of integrity man was most strictly engaged to all the duties of the Morall Law He was obliged to perform them under pain of highest censure He was answerable then to no humane Judicatory but only to the Judge of judges His case was such that he needed no governours to hedge-in his ways He needed nothing for that but his own nature It 's integrity and perfection was the best governor and government But since the fall Man is become exceeding labill and standeth in need of many things which he did not before Since the fall he is obliged no lesse then before it to observe GOD's Law And though before the fall he was free and subject to none but to GOD yet now he cometh under Tutory Before the fall he needed no Tutors having wit enough then to govern himself But since the fall he is become infirm and ignorant and standeth now in need of Tutors to help his infirmities And the best Tutor he can have is government Now tell me which of the governments is best No question that which advanceth him neerest his first and primary condition Nature no otherwise intendeth government but as it contributeth in some measure or other to make up what it hath losed in the state of corruption And as it hath losed integrity so likewayes liberty It had both these in the state of perfection Well will any deny but of all goverments Democracy is most for liberty Monarchy and Aristocracy draw people's liberty within a narrow compasse In the one the whole liberty of the people is devolved upon one and in the other upon some few Thus the liberty which Man had in the state of perfection is extreamly eclipsed It denieth his native liberty to him though in a larger measure he be capable of it But Democracy giveth people their full liberty which they had in the state of perfection in so much as they are capable of it It withholdeth nothing of it from them which in conveniency and without violation of the Law it can give unto them It cannot conveniently give them the whole liberty which they had in their primary condition Otherwise they should be without government And so they should become out-laws loose and dissolute Thus they should come under the dominion of sin Which is not liberty but slavery To prevent the incurable and extreame contagion of which Nature hath provided Government as a remedy And that government which advanceth Nature in the state of fallen man in as much as it is capable of to the liberty which it had in the state of innocency and before the fall no question must be the chiefest remedy against such contagion Thus Nature in the state of Corruption is advanced so neer as is possible to it's state it was in in the case of perfection But Democracy amongst all Governments is that which advanceth Nature neerest to the liberty which it had in the state of perfection It giveth liberty not onely to one and some few but also to all It with-holdeth liberty from none in so far as it can consubsist with obedience to the Law to which Man was subjected in the very state of innocency It no otherwise with-holdeth liberty but as it preventeth Corruption's slavery Ergo of all Governments it is simply best No wonder for it advanceth Man neerest the condition he was in in the state of perfection SECT IV. Whether or not is it lawful to resist the Royal Person and decline the Royal Authority IT will be greater ease for us to remove this difficulty then those which formerly by the Lords abundant help we have fully discussed You learn our mind in this matter from that which followeth Assert 1. It is not lawful to resist the King as King nor the Kingly Power as the Kingly power There is very good reason for this for the King as King is ordained by God and Kingly Government in it self is God's Ordinance Therefore formally positively and directly we cannot resist the King nor the Kingly power unlesse we be found fighters against God This is at length made good by us sect 1. ass 1. Assert 2. It is lawful and commendable to resist the tyranny of the King and the abuse of his power This we make good from several examples in Scripture 1. From the example of Saul's Army which in resisting him rescued Jonathan from his fury 1 Sam. 14. Royallists such as Mr. Symons and Ferne do opinionate this was done by no violence but by prayers and tears But this is false There is not a word of prayers and tears in the text The people without and contrary to the King's consent enter in oath for rescuing Jonathan Yea which is more contrary to the King's oath they laid their heads together and did bind themselves by oath to rescue him The King's oath is God do so and more also for thou shalt surely die Jonathan The People's oath is contrary to that As the Lord liveth there shall not one hair of his head fall to the ground They go not behind his back but they tell it him in his face the people said unto Saul Shall Jonathan die Thus they withstand him to his face The very highest degree of resistance 2. David resisted and withstood Saul's fury 1 Sam. 22.23 c. 1 Chr. 12. Nay but Arnisaeus saith David's fact in resisting
Saul and defending himself by arms against him was extraordinary He was anointed and designed by God as successour to Saul But the man is far mistaken for if it be lawful in an extraordinary case to resist Kings no question in it self it is lawful to resist them And so it being in it self a thing lawful it may be put in action both in an extraordinary and ordinary case See subsect 2. prop. 1. And though David was designed King by the Lord yet was he not formally called thereto by the People in the time of Saul's reign Will any deny but Saul so long as he lived was King over Israel and that David was his subject Otherwise David was very far out of it in calling him The Lords Anointed his Master Lord and King We say no more but refer you to Lex Rex quaest 32. Salmasius finding-out another starting-hole saith David with arms only defended himself against Saul 's tyranny but not to cut him off as the English Rebels and bloody butchers did in cutting-off Charls 1. Def. Reg. cap. 4. This is all we say concerning David And there was very good reason for it why David did not cut him off though he was several times at his mercy Firstly because he could not do it legally Though he had power legally to resist him yet had he not power legally to cut him off The very Law of Nature teacheth self-defence though by the smallest means But the off-cutting of the Delinquent only belongeth to the Magistrate and Judge unlesse it be in an extraordinary case Nature hath alwaies Law enough for self-defence but not so for punishing Delinquents The one is natural the other political Secondly no question David by extraordinary impulsion was carried-by the off-cutting of Saul While as Abishai went about to kill him David forbade him And told him he should be cut-off and perish another way 1 Sam. 26. Where you shall find David dehorting Abishai from laying hands on Saul from these two grounds Firstly from the non-legality of the fact He is the Lords Anointed Thus he holdeth Saul as his superiour And therefore he had not power to cut him off 'T is usurpation in the inferiour to rise against the superiour Secondly from the assurance of Saul's perishing another way As the Lord liveth the Lord shall smite him or his day shall come to die or he shall descend into battel and perish Would David say It is needlesse either for me or for thee Abishai to lay hands on Saul Assure thy self he shall be cut-off another way But I beleeve this man cannot say the Representative of the English Commonwealth had such reasons for them For keeping them back from cutting-off Charles Stuart 3. Elishah commanded to shut the door upon Jehoram's teeth He calleth him the son of a murderer See ye how the son of a murderer hath sent to take-away mine head Look when the messenger cometh shut the door and hold him fast at the door 2 Kin. 6. Thus he giveth orders to the Elders those who did sit in the Sanhedrin being with him in the house violently to keep it out against Jehoram and his messenger The word in the original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proporteth a most violent way of resisting It signifieth a holding fast at the door with pressing So the Seventy Chaldee paraphrast Avenarius and others do render it 'T is a vain thing in Royallists to imagine Elishah and the Elders with him did not resist the King but his messenger 1. The text maketh clear against this Is not the sound of his masters feet behind him Thus Elishah commandeth the door to be shut upon the messenger because the King was backing him and coming-in immediatly after the cut-throat This intimateth to us the shutting of the door and the out-keeping of the house was mainly against Jehoram himself His immediate approaching upon the back of the messenger is the ground of shutting the door and keeping-out the house They alleadge also this to be an extraordinary act Quasi vero self-defence were not a thing most natural and ordinary Away with this elusion 2. Because what the King's emissary doth in the King's name is done by him as in the King's person and authority And so virtualiter at least it is all one to resist the King's emissary and to resist the King himself Salmasius would loose the knot another way And saith he the impure Puritans can conclude nothing from this for cutting-off the head of Charles 1. The Prophet did not take it on him to cut-off Jehoram That was done by Jehu whom God extraordinarily stirred-up thereto Def. Reg. cap. 4. Who ever saw such a man as this He only raileth and shifteth the Question The Question between us now is not concerning the off-cutting but the simple act of resisting Kings And though Elishah did not cut-off Jehoram yet he cannot deny but he withstood him and defended himself against his violence This is all for the present we crave Neither can he deny but Elishah gave orders to one of the children of the Prophets to anoint Jehu King Whereupon he went forth and did cut-off Jehoram executing the purpose of God on the house of Ahab From which example is shewed already to be lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings It is the Magistrat's part and not the Prophet's unlesse it be by extraordinary impulsion to cut-off the delinquent And so as from the example of Elishah it is lawful to resist so from the example of Jehu whom Elishah caused to be anointed for cutting-off the house of Ahab it is lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings 4. Libnah made defection from Jehoram and revolted from him 2 Kin. 8. 2 Chr. 21. Salmasius studieth to elude this yet he saith nothing against it but what others of his own tribe said before him And saith he Libnah's revolt in respect of God the Judge of all the earth was a just punishment of Jehoram 's sins But in respect of the revolters it is no where justified in all the text Def. Reg. cap. 4. But with his leave the text insinuateth the contrary This you may learn from comparing the revolt of Libnah with the revolt of the Edomites So the Edomites revolted from under the hand of Judah unto this day There is nothing added to that The same time also did Libnah revolt from under his hand This is added as a reason because he had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers Thus is abundantly holden-out unto us that Edom and Libnab revolted from Jehoram in a different way No question in respect of God the cause and ground of the revolt of both is one God caused both to revolt to punish the sins and transgressions of Jehoram But in respect of the Revolters there are different causes The Edomites revolted because they disdained to live under the yoke of the King of Judah The text saith they chose a King of their own And from that which is added as a ground of Libnah's revolt it
to over-rule all according to Law with a vast and full power His government was extraordinary and by necessity And therefore we can conclude no ordinary government from it absolutely to govern according to Law devolved-over upon the shoulders of one man or of some few Much lesse can there be concluded therefrom a power of governing contrary to Law without all bounds of limitation Albeit I make it no question whether Noah took upon him an absolute power of governing whether against or according to Law yet do I think it very probable that none at this time would have taken it upon them to have judged him accused him or condemned him 1. No question drunkenness is punishable by Law But we hear of none that did so much as rebuke him for it but wicked Cham who therefore derided him and was therefore accursed 2. He was the common father of all at that time 3. Of all at that time he was the most reverend wise and eminent 4. They knew little what it was to hold Assizes and call Consistories All which move us to apprehend that none at that time would have dared to judge him even albeit he should have desired them David far inferiour to him wanting many priviledges over his People which Noah had over his in the golden age notwithstanding both his adultery and murder was spared and over-leaped by the Sanhedrin So Solomon was not judged by it notwithstanding his idolatry and multiplication of wives horses which were punishable and inhibited by Law And yet Solomon had no such priviledges over his people as Noah had over his posterity And I do verily beleeve that the emency of David and Solomon and because they were extraordinary persons moved the Sanhedrin to spare them Yea it is to be considered that such eminent men do not fal through a preposterous and malignant humour but through an extraordinary desertion of God for noble and high ends best known to God himself No question this hath been taken to heart by the Sanhedrin And this being conferred with the eminency and singularity of the men hath carried the Sanhedrin by from inflicting punishment upon them I shall not stand to dispute whether they did this de jure or not But sure I am as they did it de facto so they have been much moved thereto from pregnant considerations of the men's personal endowments And for my self though I think a David subject to Law yet would I think it a great temptation to me though as Judge to sentence such a man with death The eminency of the man and the way of his falling would put me to my second thoughts albeit I should endeavour nothing therein but justice Well call it injustice in the Sanhedrin to have spared David and Solomon yet would I not have you to wonder too much thereat There is great difference between a David and an Ahab a Solomon and a Jeroboam Such are not all dayes men And therefore I must needs say that as the Sanhedrin spared David and Solomon from thoughts of the singularity and eminency of the men far more would Noah's posterity in the golden age have spared Noah though in many things delinquent for as the man was most eminent and singular and could not have fallen but by an extraordinary desertion and for most good and noble ends so he had a priviledge from Nature above all in his time Yea in David and Solomon's time people were well seen in Laws and politick Constitutions The Sanhedrin needed not to have spared David and Solomon through ignorance and want of skill But it was far otherwise in the golden age in Noah's time Then men were but Apprentises and spelling the first side of the Catechisme of Policy Every thing was but in its beginnings in its first rudiments Let it be so that de facto and not de jure in the golden age Noah's posterity denied not to him an absolute and uncircumscribed power I seek no more but that And I may say that though at that time de facto Noah should have had immunity from the exercise of Law against him though much delinquent yet shall I not think that ever Noah claimed such a priviledge to himself as competent to him de jure and according to the Law As for Noah's authority and power after his posterity was divided into factions before we can determin upon it you shall mark with me immediatly after the golden age that there were three divided and distinct parties 1. The godly party 2. The heroick party 3. The politick party The godly party was of the posterity of Shem. These followed Noah and walked in his wayes The heroick and politick party were of the posterity of Ham and Japhet And as the heroick party followed Nimrod so the politick party followed Ham whom the Chaldeans call Chemesenuus No question Noah immediatly after the golden age had a vast and absolute power over the godly and those who walked in his wayes You may learn the reasons of this from what is above-written And as for the heroick and politick party it would seem probable that they contemned Noah and slighted his Authority for they walked contrary to his wayes Gen. 10.11 It is known how that Ham the head of the politick yea and of the magical party did mock Noah Gen. 9. Beros an t lib. 3. Yea Nimrod the head of the heroick party contrary to the mind and purpose of Noah caused Babel to be built Gen. 10.11 Ber. ant lib. 4. But notwithstanding this we may say that at the most it concludeth that such were disobedient to Noah and walked contrary to his will But it will not conclude that such denied to Noah immunity from the Law V. g. A prodigal and riotous son may work and act contrary to his father's will But it doth not follow ergo sach a child doth strike and punish his father Nay a debording child may act contrary to his father's wil and be so far from eclipsing his power over him that he may in patience endure his correction over him So we read that Ham did not repine against his father's reproving and cursing him Gen. 10. Yea Berosus storieth that Noah did shut him out from his presence and he did so accordingly ant lib. 3. And beside that he telleth us that Noah Nin. an 19. gave him liberty to stay beside him three years in Italy But finding how he did corrupt the Colonies there he commanded him to be gone and he did so And yet at this time he was the Saturn of Egypt a mighty King and of great power both in Egypt and in Italy Ant. lib. 5. I think there is very good reason for it to say that Noah in so far had an absolute power over them as that none of them in a direct and positive way would have acted against his commandment despising him as an enemy and as one on whom they would and did execute their fury The most we can call them is
city free is not govern'd by one As King by course the people reign alone Whence it is more then evident that Theseus was no lesse subjected to Law then any of the people Thence it is that Diodore reporteth that the Athenians taking it in an evill part that Helen by lot had fallen to be wife to Theseus he feared them and therfore transported her into Amphidria Rer. ant lib. 5. cap. 5. And how they keeped both him and the Codrids in subjection to Law is already proved at length Which maketh us say that formally and according to the essentiall frame of non-absolute and limited power they had no more power then any of these Princes above-said who did govern onely as Princes for both of them were subjected to Law and neither of them had a prerogative over it and an exemption from it We have shewed already that the Athenian Kings had no such priviledge Ergo far lesse had the Athenian Princes any such priviledge 1. Because Princes as Princes are ever one way or other inferiour to Kings 2. Because the Athenians changed their Kings into Princes because their Kings became lecherous soft and effeminate And consequently unlesse they had changed their power as well as their name they had wrought to no purpose for reforming the abuses and enormities of their Kings 3. The annuall and yearly Princes whereof nine did govern together six of them being Thesmothites were solemnly sworn to the people that they should govern according to Law And he who was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King amongst these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Princes had no more power but to provide for the sacrifices and to order and govern the battell Heracl de Pol. Ath. This commeth just to that which Aristotle saith concerning the detracting of the power of Kings in after-ages Then saith he the people detracted so much from their Kings that they entrusted them with no more power but to govern the battell and to over-see 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sacrifices Polit. 3. cap. 10. This is reckoned-up by him as the lowest degree of Monarchy which he calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most according to Law and of the Laconick kind Pol. 3. cap. 10. and 11. But if you shall alledge that the yearly Princes amongst the Athenians had not such power as the decennal Princes and those Princes who keeped the government for their life-time I shall not stand much to yeeld that for I suppose that as in some accidental and circumstantial way in the matter of power the Athenian Kings were differenced from the Athenian Princes so it is most probable that after such a manner these three foresaid kindes of Athenian Princes were differenced each-one from another and therefore it is alledged that a Commonwealth was not erected amongst the Athenians till annuall Princes were set over them Which maketh the Princes of the first and second kinde though not of the third to be reckoned up as Kings Yet they must give me leave to say that though the Athenian Common-wealth was not fully and compleatly established till the up-setting of annuall and yearly Princes notwithstanding in some degree or other there was ever a Commonwealth amongst them from the dayes of Theseus untill some of their annuall Princes began to usurp and brought them under bondage for not onely as is said already their Princes of the third kinde but also their Kings and Princes of the first and second sort were subjected to Law and the people had a ruling power over them And so all of them had the like power according to the essentiall frame of a regulated and non-absolute power though the Kings had a more vaste authority and might extend their power further according to Law then the Princes and those of the first kinde then the Princes of the second or at least of the third kinde Even-as Majors v. g. have greater power then Alder-men and Alder-men then Counsellours Howsoever we find that the Princes of the third kinde are also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as well as the rest They are said to have had the power of the battell and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the sacrifices He who had this power is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King Thus we finde that he had that same power which the Lacedemonian Kings had But it is afterward shewed that such were proper though not absolute Kings Well I regard not though you esteem not such as Kings properly so called I lose nothing by this If we argue from examples of former and ancient Commonwealths then have we the Athenian and Lacedemonian Republicks as presidents of a popular government and Common-wealth Friend this is the mark we drive most at in the matter in hand Those Princes who governed as Kings did usurp a greater power then what according to the fundamentall government of the Kingdome and the institution of Theseus did belong to them So Cylon endeavoured but his attempt was choked in the bud Herod lib. 5. Thucid. lib. 1. Herac. de Pol. Ath. Cic. de leg Phutar de Sol. But what he intended Pisistratus acted as is storied by the same authors together with Diogenes Laertius Valerius maximus and Diodore And that usurpation continued untill Thrasybilus and Rhinon's dayes These did vindicate the liberty of the Athenians against those tyrants who did keep them under bondage Herac. de Pol. Ath. Val. max. lib. 4. cap. 1. lib. 5. cap. 6. Aemil. Prob. de Thras And so their government turned meerly popular and became an even-down Commonwealth Alex. ab Alex. lib. 4. cap. 23. And as for these Princes we deny not nor can we say otherwise but they had not onely as great but also greater power then any of the Athenian Kings whether Theseus or any King that succeeded him And that they were of equall power at-least is evident for they did reign not as Princes but as Kings Her de Polit. Ath. And Pisistratus one of these usurping Kings in his Epistle to Solon saith plainly that he walked according to Solon's Lawes differing in nothing from the people but in honour and dignity But he addeth that he took upon him that power which the Athenians conferred upon Codrus and his posterity And in this he acknowledgeth that he failed and had such a power not by the Law of the Kingdom but by a Law of his own making Whence it is evident that Pisistratus by usurpation took upon him as great power as did Codrus or any of his race Yea and that they had greater power is also clear for Justine storieth That after Codrus while-as the Administration of the Republick vvas given over into the hands of yearly Magistrates the King's lust became the People's law Thus he telleth us that in the times of defection and vvhile-as corruption entered the State of Athens Kings became absolute and vvere of an arbitrary povver Post Codrum administratio Reipublicae annus Magistratibus permissa est Sed Civitati nullae Leges tunc erant quia
from setting over their Armies Captain-Generalls by succession and perswaded them to take from them the name of Kings Def. reg cap. 8. See how the man bewrayeth himself for Lysander was Captain-Generall of the Lacedemonian Army And yet he was not their King Therefore amongst the Lacedemonians it was one thing to be King and another thing to be Captain Generall of the Army I confesse their King had also the power of the Army But he had not onely other power beside but also he had power of the battell in a more intense way then any deputed and substituted Captain amongst the people Otherwise there had been no difference between Lysander and the King who was but onely Captain of the Army Yea which is more Lysander doth not speak of shaking-off regium nomen but regiam potestatem as is clear out of Probus But sure I am regia potestas is not nomen regis but res regis Salmasius shall have no need to deny that the Carthaginian annuall Kings were Kings properly so called But in the interim he shall give us leave to consider and take a light view of the nature of the word sufetes Which is taken in a twofold sense 1. Largely And so the word may be derived from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sapha Whence sufes is all one with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophe speculator inspector episcopus or ephorus Thus sufetes may be referred to judges of any sort And in this sense Alexander ab Alexandro referreth it to the Graecian aesymnetae the Egyptian dioecetes the Persian megistanes the Oscian medix c. Geni di lib. 4. cap. 23. Him Julius Scaliger followeth whileas he saith Porro qui Hebraïce sciunt non ignorant Poenos Tyrorum colonos esse concedent mihi Sufes idem esse quod 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And so the man supplying Festus words saith Sufes dictus est Poenorum lingua summus magistratus ut Oscorum medix c. 2. Strictly and by limitation And so it is derived from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saphat Whence sufes is all one with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sophet Which in the Greek is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a judge In this sense it is applyed to the Carthaginian yearly Kings and Roman Consuls Alex. ab Al. gen di lib. 3. cap. 3. The word sufes by Festus and T. Livius is rendered consul So it is by Sabellicus Aen. 5. lib. 5. It cannot be denied but as sufetes is a Punick word so in it 's most strict and rigorous acceptation it is only relative to the Carthaginian annuall Kings Yet I must needs say that as it is taken strictly and by way of limitation with very good reason in may be referred to the Roman consuls for they had that same power which the Carthaginian Kings had and both of them were yearly Magistrates Having thus discussed the grammary of the word you may observe that in it's first acceptation it is not onely relative to those who in old were above Kings but also to those who were inferiour to them And in the second acceptation it is relative to such who amongst the Carthaginians were both re and nomine Kings and amongst the Romans to such who were Kings not nomine but re But if we take sufetes precisely for sophetim unlesse you take sophetim in a larger sense then it is taken in the book of the Judges you must needs say that it is onely relative to such who were Kings neither re nor nomine for afterward I shall make it appear that the Judges of Israel were so far from being of a Kingly power that contrariwise they were but of equall authority with any of the Sanhedrin At least it is easy to prove that they were not of a Kingly power or of such power as had the Roman consuls and the Carthaginian sufetes albeit we should say that they were the first of the Sanhedrin having greater power then any of the rest for the Athenian annuall Princes had more power then any member of the Athenian councel and yet they were not properly Kings We may say the like also concerning the decennal Princes and those Princes who amongst the Athenians did govern for their life-time I deny not but these may be yea and were called Kings who were not so indeed as the Judges of Israel Judg. 18. And we deny not as Salmasius will have it Def. reg cap. 8. but many both of old and new also were and are not called Kings who were and are of greater honour authority then they What then This will never conclude that the Carthaginian sufetes were not of a Kingly power Though the word sufetes may be taken for sophetim yet shall we never conclude therefrom that the Carthaginian sufetes had no more Power then the Judges of Israel At the most it concludeth that they had not a kingly power in a full and intense measure And therefore the word in its most native signification is all one with Consules who had a kingly power though not in the highest degree And for my-self I can find no essential difference between the Carthaginian Sufetes and the Lacedemonian Kings Whereupon I am made to conclude That as the one so the other also were of a kingly power This man looketh upon the off-cutting of Kings as a thing of another world even as if such a thing had never been practised before since the world began He telleth us of Agis how that amongst all the Lacedemonian Kings none was cut-off but he But in the interim he shall observe that though in the examples which we shall alledge to this purpose there be some of them which speak nothing of the off-cutting of Kings Yet all of them do speak of the punishment of Kings either one way or other And know likewise that in old Kingdoms in punishing of capital faults used diverse wayes of punishment Amongst the Indians the delinquent though guilty of the greatest crime got no more for his punishment but to be shaved at the King's command This was thought amongst them a capital punishment Nicol. Damasc de Mor. Gent. Ind. Some Nations who dwelt about Caucasus on capital transgressours did execute banishment as a capital punishment They executed it instead of death It is reported That the Tratlians thought it punishment enough to inflict upon a murderer if he did give a bushel or measure of Pulse to the friends of the defunct The Druids and Cercets for the greatest faults did no more but interdicted the delinquent from being accessory to the sacrifice The like punishment was also executed upon sacrilegious persons in Elephantine Ethiopia Alex. ab Al. gen di lib. 3. cap. 5. Where if the Reader shall be pleased a little to trouble his eyes he shall see how that some Nations in old according to the Laws of the kingdom in their punishments were most severe though against the smallest faults and some were not so but were most remisse in their
scarcely be called it 's own Which maketh me in reason conclude that then there was little time left for exercising Policy and putting Lawes in execution This Polydorus Virgilius telleth in a word whileas he saith that before Henry 1. there were few Conventions made by the Kings amongst the people for ordering according to Law the businesse of the Kingdom Angl. hist lib. 11. Although in an absolute notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we may say that from Brutus unto Cassivelanus and from Cassivelanus unto William the Conquerour Kingly Government in England was non-absolute and without full power yet we cannot say so in a relative notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as afterward shall appear 3. As the Kingdom of England was about the dayes of the Conquerour whether a little before or afterward unto this time We deny not but under the reigne of the Conquerour himself Regall Government in England was of a most absolute and arbitrary power In this we take Salmasius by the hand He needed not Def. Reg. cap. 8. to have troubled himself to have cited any Authors for proof thereof Very reason it-self teacheth the point for he subdued England by strength of hand But sure I am a Conquerour may dispose upon a conquered Kingdom according to his pleasure It is an act of favour in him if he do not destroy all much more as an absolute Lord to rule over all In the interim I desire Salmasius to take a view of Polyd. Virg. Angl. hist lib. 9. where he shall find the point evidenced to his heart's desire beyond any Historian he citeth Although in this we go-along with him as we must needs do yet notwithstanding we cannot say so much whether concerning Edward who preceded or those who succeeded him Let it be so that those who succeeded the Conquerour had the same priviledges which the Conquerour did arrogat to himself Yet can it not be denied but according to Edward the Confessour his Lawes or as they are called the ancient Lawes of the Kingdom Kingly Government in England is regulated and not absolute We make the point good from these reasons Firstly because according to these Laws the King of England is not hereditary And therefore we read not that ever Edward did tie the Crown of England to Royall succession I confesse it is alledged that he promised the Crown after him to William the Conquerour who was of neer kinred and great credit with him if he had not children of his own But this is not only improbable in it-self but also it is so judged And why shall we think otherwayes of it seing the Conquerour came not to the Crown of England by blood-right but by meer Conquest having the whole Kingdom of England against him And Polydore saith Hinc colligere licet vel Edovardum non servasse fidem Gulielmo quam à principio de hereditate regni non satis considerate dedisset vel nullum quod verisimilius est fecisse promissum Angl. hist lib. 8. This he gathereth from that which Edward spake to Haraldus whileas he prayed GOD that either he would avert the comming of England into the Conquerours hand or else that he would keep him back from it so long as he lived Therefore to me it is more then apparent that the Confessour did not in his Testament assigne the Conquerour to the Crown albeit Salmasius alledgeth the contrary Def. Reg. cap. 8. What Doth not Polydore tell us that because Edgarus was of young and tender years he was not admitted by the people to reigne And fearing lest the Conquerour should succeed to the Crown they rejoyced greatly that Harald took upon him to reigne in Edward's room Whereat as may be learned from Polydore Edward was not displeased himself but very well satisfied that Harald should succeed to him Whereupon we fear not to say that not onely the power of enkiâ—ging was in the people's hands but also that the Confessour did not promise the Kingdom to the Conquerour after him although the contrary be alledged And is it likely that the people would have so much declined and withstood the Conquerour if Edward had assigned him to the Crown as his heir No verily for they adored him as their Law-giver It is known that Rufus was but third son to the Conquerour and yet he was created King Him the people preferred before Robert his eldest brother What Would they have done so if blood-right by the Law of the Kingdom had been the title to the Crown No verily It is remarkable that Rufus was ordained King and it was not so much as objected that Robert was elder then he he being but the third son to the Conquerour and Robert being the eldest Yea Rufus dying without children they appointed Henry the Conquerours fourth son King as yet passing-by Robert the eldest And which is more though Henry 1. had left in his Testament his daughter Mathildis together with her sons as heirs of the Kingdom yet notwithstanding the people created Steven Nephew to Henry 1. By the authority of Parliament it was ordained that Steven so long as he lived should enjoy the Kingdom of England and that Henry 2. son to Mathildis daughter to Henry 1. should succeed to Steven in the Kingdom of England passing-by any that was begotten by Steven Likewayes the people created John King although K. Richard dying without heirs had left Arthure son to Gaufredus who was elder then John heir to the Crown I might speak more for clearing this purpose but I forbear judging this sufficient Whence it is more then evident that the Crown of England since the dayes of Edward the Confessour by no Law of the Kingdom is hereditary I confesse since that time now and then the Kings eldest son did succeed and was holden as Heâ—r of the Kingdom But this was onely by custome through favour of the Race in which according to the manner of Nations which I must needs call an abuse very ordinarily the first-born is preferred as the onely lawfull Heir of the Crown Therefore seing the Crown of England since that time hath not been at least precisely hereditary to me it seemeth very probable that for that time it hath not been absolute and arbitrary for so the original and fountain-power of enkinging is in the People's hands And consequently in this respect the People are simply above the King as the cause is simply above its effect Philosophers say That causa est nobilior suo effectu And so seing the King of England dependeth from the People no question they have simply a power over him and not he an absolute power over them Secondly Because according to these Laws the liberty of the subject is vindicated and the Prince is subjected to Law Because in Henry 1. his time a Parliament was holden At which time Parliamentary Power by the Law of the Kingdom was declared the Supream and highest Authority for any thing of weight was referred to it So that whatsoever was done