good an innocents oppugning of the sword of Justice to rescue his owne life I dare confidently asfirme not the least title to this purpose No a man ought to discharge his Covenant though it be to his disadvantage And ruat Coelum fiat 〈◊〉 though heaven itselfe if it were possible should be destroyed yet let justice â—…ourish That were a way to open a gap for all disorder and breach of rule and society without which no common wealth can be of long subsistance If thou suffer unjustly God will abundantly remunerate thy sufferings and repay it upon the head of thine enemies wherefore much better it is for thee to submit to thy censure by patience than to incurr the breach of all society by dâ—…sobedience I but saith the Author If reason will not satisfie perhaps 〈◊〉 may Qâ—…i 〈◊〉 potestati ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt to resist the Magistrate 〈◊〉 And he saith that answer with which too many are deceived cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion this 〈◊〉 obliges private men but not Magistrates Since inferiour Magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as pirvate men and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to 〈◊〉 T is not usuall with mee to intrenâ—…h upon another mans profession but seeing I am here inforced to it give me leave a little to sayle out of my way to answer the Author First for the taking up of Armes or the waging of a warre in generall I never heard any man oppose the legâ—…timation of that warre that had these three requisites or ingredients A lawfull authotity commanding 〈◊〉 as the â—…agistrate A just and lawfâ—…ll end or cause occasioning it as the defence of our Religion liberties and the like And a good affection in following of it as not with rashnesse or temeritie but after all other meanes sirst endeavoured And now I appeale to any indifferent man whom neither feare nor affection hath ingaged to the contrary whether all these are not exactly made good in this great â—…taking of the Parliament I but saith the Author how doth this anâ—…wer the taking up of armes against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King for 〈◊〉 all o her 〈◊〉 are but as private men compared with him To this I â—…nswer 〈◊〉 under he Aâ—…ors favour â—…he suprâ—…am power as I have made it good before is the people represented by a Parliaâ—…ent and then no doubt that precept of the Apostle comprehending the King aswell as other persons doâ—…h according to his owne Argument justifie he Parliament in their proceedâ—…s and make good â—…heir taking up of Armes in their owne just defence I but hen the Author 〈◊〉 hat of the Apostle that the Magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum Gods minister to thee 〈◊〉 thy good and though thou suffer by him unjusty yet there he is 〈◊〉 in bonum for that by thy patient suffering thou shalt thereby gaine an eternall reward Cerâ—…inly God never made Magistrates on purpose to aâ—…ict and 〈◊〉 over their pâ—…ople thâ—…t they by patient 〈◊〉 might enjoy the greâ—…ter happinâ—… hereafter No that they provâ—… corrupt issues from hemselves not from any divine determination and therefore if the Mâ—…gistrate doe prove to be Minister nobis in malum a Minister to thee â—…or thy ill he is not then 〈◊〉 minister Gods Minister for that he doth transgresse and goe beyond his commission and in such case under the favour of M. Doctor Ferne conscience doâ—…h not only deny obedience but command and justifie 〈◊〉 But in all this conceive me 〈◊〉 t is the magistrates not any 〈◊〉 opposition that I justifie and this being undertaken with the due circumstance is not a meanes to destroy order and societie but maintaine them But yet I hope our Auâ—…hor will be here informed that this is not our case For doe we take up armes against our Soveraign may he perish who in his thoughts intends him the least ill No t is as the Parliament have often declared against his Malignant Councellors such who endeavour whatever their 〈◊〉 may be to his Majesty the subversion of our Religion and the destruction of the publike And I hope there is nothing in the word of God that opposeth this O yes in opposing hâ—…s authority you fight against him Strange if it should be so when neither the law of God nor man do oblige obedience to commands unlawfull He that obeyes the magistrate upon such termes doth it at his owne perill and I hope t is lawfull for the Parliament to depresse any civill or private combustion I but what if that authority have the Kings person accompanying it may you in such case make resistance No question we may for t is not the person of the King that can legitimate an action that is in it selfe unlawfull nor adde any greater force or vigour to their Commission that obey Besides the personall presence of the King doth or doth not countermand his authority if it do countermand his authority then they have no power to warrant their actâ—…on if it do not yet the act is 〈◊〉 So then let them take their choise they see their termes Unhappy people who having committed themselves to the government of one King onely might not oppose the unlawfull and tyrannicall regiment of so many It being in effect objected as appeares befoâ—…e That a â—…emporall power meaning the Parliament cannot bee greater than that which is lasting and unalterable intending the King Is this were so saith the Observator the Romanes have done impolitickly in creating Dictators when any great extremity assayled them and yet we know it was very prosperous to them sometimes to change the â—…orme of government Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger to trust to a Monarchy not 〈◊〉 Aristocâ—…y and much lesse to a Democracy What have we to do with Aristocracy or Democracy God be blessed we nor know nor desire any other government than that of Monarchy and we shall with all hâ—…mility cast our selvs upon his Majesties care and providence guided by his Parliament But if sedâ—…ced by malignant and destructive Counsell we are not bound to yeeld our selves as a prâ—…y to the ranâ—… and malice of his and our enemies The King objects if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than Councellors wee make them Comptrollers and this is not â—…ble to Royalty To which the Observator answers 〈◊〉 say saith he that to coâ—…t is more than to counsell 〈◊〉 yet not aâ—…es so much as to command and comptroll True saith the Author not alwayes but then it is when their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impose a necessity upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 the like Doth their consent impose a greater necessity or ingagement upon the King than the consent or declaration of law in cases of publike conâ—…nt by former Parliaments hath done or than the judgement of his Judges in inferiour Courts doâ—…h do who are so Counsellours for the King as that the King may
A REPLY TO THE ANSWER Printed by his Majesties Command at OXFORD to a Printed Booke Intituled OBSERVATIONS upon some of his MAIESTIES late Answers and Expresses By J. M. LONDON Printed for Matthew Walbancke Anno Dom. 1642. A reply to the Answer printed by his Majesties Command at Oxford to a printed booke intituled Observations upon some of his Maiesties late Answers and expresses THe Authour of the Answer to the Observator which was pâ—…inted aâ—…Oxford no place more fit to entertaine such cavils by his 〈◊〉 Command too good a Patron to be thus abused Begins his disâ—…urse by way of Preface and there would tell us the Originall of Regall Authority were it not a losse of time he has been to profuse prodigall of it in his Book he doth well to spare it in the Preface for that he sees t is granted to be at 〈◊〉 least mediately from God I shall not dispute whether God be the immediate donor of Royalty or no For I take it to be very cleare and evident that the Kings of Israel were of Divine instiâ—…tion But that Royall Authority should bee unto us or the sâ—…cceeding ages more of Divine right or Institution then Aristocraticall or Democraticall power that I deny 〈◊〉 were they of Divine institution it must of necessity be that all States must be fwayed and ruled by Kings and the execution of other power were sinne and that I hope 〈◊〉 man will dare to aâ—…rt Againe were they of Divine right they ought to have equall power and Dominion in all places and that they have not for as it is well known in some Kingdomes they have greater Authority in some lesse And all vary according to the severall Lawes and Constitutions of their Countries Why then if they bee of humane institution it must be agreed that no King hath at thiâ—… day any speciall Ordinance from Heaven by which to intitle himselfe to his Crowne and Regall authority And hence the consequence is just that Kings are bound by thâ—…se qualifications of compact and condition that were made with them by the people and ought to discharge and execute their Royall functions answerable thereunto But then he goes on anâ—… tels us that power or governement was oâ—…yned of God for the good of mankind which was not to bee obtained without preservation of order and therefore he hath commanded all to be subject to the Lawes of society not onely for wrath but for conscience sake With this limitation the Author saith true we must submitt to the Laweâ—… of society where they doe not oppose the Law of God otherwise not for how can a man obey for conscience against conscience And he saâ—…es we must submit not onely whilst we enjoy the benefit of Governors but 〈◊〉 whilst we dâ—…e suffer under some accidentall abuses I but what if those abusâ—… provâ—…â—…o be wilfull I know that is the Authors meaning though he will not expresse it for if his opinion miâ—…ht passe as Orthodox the cases would be all one I and what if thâ—…se abuses strike at our Religion at our lives libeâ—…ies and estates at all that God hath entrusted us with and made us happy in must wee here submitt and quietly surrender up all our happinesse at once a most strange Doctrine Well let him Preach it at Oxford to those whom a foolish zeale hath besotted with an unwarrantable devotion to their Soveraign But let us know that good subjects may preserve these yet not be the lesse but the more dutifull to their King Is it any breach of duty to deny that which the Law of God and my conscience tels mee that I ought not to grant or can that have the impuration of disloyalty to my Soveraigne which styles mee just before God well to passe this because I shall have occasion to speake more fully to it after those that maintaine this error misery will bee this portion here and a just judgement hereafter But he tels us that we cannot reape the constant fruits of an establâ—…shed policy unlesse by compâ—…ct we submit our selves to some possible inconveniences The Author would have done well to have explained 〈◊〉 what he meanes by those inconveniences bâ—…t 〈◊〉 this is his meaning for the whole sâ—…ope of his Booke speakes as mâ—…ch that it is possible a King may degenerate into a Tyâ—…ant and make his boundlesse Arbitrary will to be Law and if this fall out as too commonly it doth yet wee must patiently doe or sâ—…ffer what ever though never so unjustly and contrary to good conscience is imposed upon us and which is more wee must by solemne contract binde our selves beforehand this to doe and why so for that otherwise there can be no constant benefit of an established policy A most strange and unnaturall assertâ—…on was it ever heard or can it bee imagined that a people should contract to their owne ruine there is a mutuall compact betwixt King and People the King is to governe by a rule if he would have his people to obey and if he swerve from that this dissolâ—…es the contract and gives the people pâ—…wer to 〈◊〉 and preserve themselves And if this were not Law what benefit could we expect to reape of such an established destructive policy He hath made bad premiâ—…es and worse conclusion for marke what he has dâ—…uced from thence Hence saith he it followes after a people hath by 〈◊〉 contraâ—… divested it selfe of that power which was primarily in them they cannot upon what pretâ—…ce soever withoâ—…t manifâ—…st breach of Divine Ordinance and violation of publique saâ—…th resume that authority which they have placed in another This by the way power according to the Authors owne 〈◊〉 was primarily in the people a truth ingeniously acknowledged but the mischiefe 〈◊〉 they have by contract divestâ—…d themselves of that power how is that made good why thus they chose one to be King over them and contracted to obey him what in omnibus 〈◊〉 in all his commissions nothing lesse for that might be to disodey God and whether it bee lawfull to obey God or man judge you I but they have given him an absolute Authority and made him supreme and therefore not to be qâ—…stioned by â—…ny inferiour pâ—…wer and if this were true his Majesties counsell who too 〈◊〉 malâ—…ne â—…he haâ—…pinesse of King and peopâ—… and would worke oâ—… their owne 〈◊〉 desâ—…gnes by the ruine of boâ—…h wâ—…ld never have advised hâ—…s Majâ—…sty to have inserted this into many of his Declaratâ—…ons that his Royal power was committed unto him by God and the Law in trust for the well governâ—…ng and 〈◊〉 of his people committâ—…d to his charge And as a trust is for the benefit and behoofe of him for whose sake the convâ—…yance in trâ—…st was made nâ—…t of him who is the party intrusted So likewâ—…se every trust doth implâ—… a conditâ—…on that the party doe dâ—…ly perfâ—…rme and discharge thâ—… tâ—…st or if hâ—…e doe not that he bee 〈◊〉 so to doe Thâ—…s
Besides who can be so competent a Judge of any approaching danger or of any malignities or pressures in the Common wealth as they who speake out of the common sense and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 However this is certaine the Kingdome cannoâ—… suffâ—…r by a Parliament iâ—… may withouâ—… If the Parliament make any transition in other matters than what be pleases to propose they are lyable to imprisonment at his pleasure The sense of his inference is this that because they cannot justifie the medling with things which belong not to their cognizance therefore they may bee punished if they meddle with those that doe This is the Authors inference not the Observators He doth not say that for executing their due power they may be imprisoned no such inconsequent concluâ—…ious we leave to the Author But this he seemeth to speake that it should be very hard and unreasonable that the power of judging of the jurisdiction and authority of a Parliament should reside only in the Kings breast when that none can determine aright of them but themselves for if so if the King at any time shall say they exceed their power they may be imprisoned at pleaâ—…ure The Author telling the people how farre their ingagement goes with the Parliament saith That if they exceed their 〈◊〉 and Vote things not belonging to their cognizance the people by no meanes is ingaged in it as having no legall way of expressing of themselves in such cases This is in plain termes to tell the people in what cases they are to submit to and maintain and desend the Parliament in what not certainly people cannot be so 〈◊〉 as to thinâ—… that the illegall acts of a Parliament sâ—…ould bind them but on the other side I hope they will not be so foolish as to believe every thing to be illegall which the Author is pleased to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but rather cast themselves upon their care as in duty they are bound whom they have entrusted with the publike securitie But I hope the Author will now be advised that on the contrary the people are no more ingaged in the illegall proceedings of the Prince in those things that he is intrusted with for the publike than of the Parliament It is impossible saith the King that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to us and our heires for ever and the same trust and a power above that trust for such is the power they pretend to be committed to others It is true saith the Observator Two supreames cannot be in the same sense and respect This is a weake answer saith the Author So weake that the Author cannot reply to it for nothing is more knowne or assented to than this that the King is singulis major yet universis minor It seemes sayes the Author the King hath taken the Oath of Alligeance as well as we and we may call him 〈◊〉 fellow subject Did we ever speake of two Kings or can there be so in one common wealth But much lesse can there be any alligeance due from the Soveraigne to the subject certainly the Author was not himselfe But to prove his reasoning yet more absurd we doe not say that the King is singulis minor but that he is universis minor and I hope â—…he universe or body politike never swore alligeance or supremacy to the King neither is it possible that it should for that it is a body only in consideration of Law that hath neither life nor motion like other individuals and therefore not capable of doing of any act in that capacity so that notwithstanding this shallow reaâ—… the King is universis minor I but saith the Author You tell us that he is greater than one you doe not tell us that he is better than two this is no greater supremacy than probably he had before he was a King The Prince is singulis major as well as â—…ee nay may not any Lord in the Land chal 〈◊〉 the same supremacy over all the Knights any Knight over all Esquiâ—…es What a poore and senslesse cavill is this doe not we say that he is universis minor and doth it not then consequently follow that we allow him major to all that is lesse than the universe When you can reduce the universe to so small a number as two then will his Majesty be lesse than those two untill then he is greater for those slender instances to prove as great a supremacy in the Prince nay in every nobleman over all Knights and in Knights over all Esquires I must tell him had not his senses bâ—…ene ravished by and swallowâ—…d up in Monâ—…rchy he would never have so much forgot himselfe can there be any one singulis major but the King he that accounts himself so high 〈◊〉 to be made lower by the head the Prince himselfe is not singâ—…lis major till he survive his Father To be short all others are but comparatively great the King only is great in the superlative I but to take us off these corrupt glosses I would there were no more 〈◊〉 in himâ—… the Author 〈◊〉 us to 24. H. 8. ca. 12. which as he saith 〈◊〉 the King to be universis major the preface of which statute 〈◊〉 thus that this Kingdome hath beene alwayes acknowledged to be an Empire governed by one supreame head and King having the dignity and regall estate of the same unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people c. been bounden and owen next to God a naturall and humble obedience Doth this prove the King universis major under favour nothing lesse for wee must not understand this that the body politike doth owe obedience but that the severall sorts and degrees of people of which this body is compacted and made that they doe owe obedience for to take it otherwise were to make an absurd and impossible construction For as I have said before how is it possible that a body politike which is a body only in judgement of law or contemplation that hath neither life sense nor motion that that should owe homage or obedience to any one much lesse a naturall obedience as the Statute speaketh so that cleerly this doth not aâ—… all disprove the former position If there were no King at all in England you would call this government an Aristocracy and why I beseech you do you not confâ—…sse the name now seeing the thing is altogether the same for if they give his voyce t is all one as if he had no voyce if their pâ—…wer must over-rule his t is all one as if he were 〈◊〉 of all Certainly Monarchy hath committed a Rape upon the Authors reason and understanding or els he could not bee thus overseene Doth the Parliament go about to take away the Kings voyce or to disrobe him of his power more than the knowne law of the land doth approve of Did they even declare or publish such a power to be in them that they
thâ—…n being thus hâ—…w hâ—…ve the people totaâ—…ly divestâ—…d themselves of their power I dâ—…e nâ—…t speake this to defend the peoples 〈◊〉 of their Authority or to 〈◊〉 that poâ—…tion of depoâ—…ng Princes so farre I concurre wâ—…th the Author but that thâ—…y should haâ—…e a boundlâ—…sse 〈◊〉 power that I denie Againe for he maketh a second conclusion oâ—…t of the former premisses hence it 〈◊〉 saith hee though â—…he peâ—…ple should 〈◊〉 thâ—…y â—…ght live more hapiâ—… if the Kiâ—…gs 〈◊〉 were morâ—… 〈◊〉 his revenues diminishâ—…d it were hâ—…gh sinne to 〈◊〉 upon his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Stâ—…e when that the Kâ—…ngs Prerogative doth not invade the subâ—…ects 〈◊〉 nor their 〈◊〉 entrench 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but eaâ—…h keepe within their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and circumference But thâ—…s wee must â—…ow that as the Kings Crowne and 〈◊〉 â—…ower was committed to him in trust fâ—…r the good of his 〈◊〉 so likewise wâ—…re his 〈◊〉 and Prerogatives and if these bâ—… abused to the 〈◊〉 of lâ—…berty and the 〈◊〉 or the destâ—…uction of his peoâ—…le t is no entrenching upon Prerogative to qâ—…estion this abâ—…se and indeavour our owne preservation I but then he saies it doth no way prejudice regall Authority that God is the Author of Aristocrat call or Democraticall power Doth the observators saying that God is the auhor of those powers any way conclude against regall authority where the powers are various and no way contradictory or opposite one to another for a man to conclude the illegality of the one from the legality of the other were a very simple and fallacious kinde of reasoning But our Authour will not bee thus satisfied for he doth here charge the Observator with â—…reading in the steps of Maâ—…iana and Buchanan sworne enemies â—…o 〈◊〉 And why so pray you why because the Observator doth shew how the infancy of the world was governed Most Nations being ruled by their Lords and their Arbitrary edicts which was not he saith in a long time digested And then for that he further sheweth the inconveniences which in more matâ—…re ages were â—…onnd to accompany unconditionate Royalty but concludes that since most Countries have soâ—…nd out an art for the regulating the exorbitances of Princes hee is very unjust that will oppose this Aâ—… and Order And now let any wise and indiffâ—…rent man jâ—…dge how falsely and maliciously this imputation of an enemy to Monarchy is cast upon the Observator for doth the dâ—…monstrating and disproving of other Governements any way strike at Monarchy or doth it not rather propp or support it doth not the disâ—…llowing of other powers if not commend yet tacitly allow and approve our owne Nay doth he not here as in other places exprâ—…sly applaâ—…de the order and constâ—…tution of 〈◊〉 Monarchy so well fenced in by the Art of Parliaments why then what colour or ground is thâ—…re for this imputation Is there not a wide dâ—…fference beâ—…wixt modification and extirpation had our Author consâ—…red this certainely he would not have beene thus unjust in his censure Buâ—… here we may learne what Doctirine is daily delivered to the King That it is the Kings Crown that is aimed at not onely so but even the very dethroning of him his whole posterity and in truth so it is but by his Majesties evill Câ—…ncellors who to magniâ—…ie themselves intend the ruine of tâ—…e Common-wealth and is not that in effect a dâ—…throning of his Majestâ—… all that I shall say is but this No Govenement more blest or happie if not abused by the advice of vile and malignant Coâ—…ellours After so long a Preface the Author tells us that hee will now take iâ—…to consideration the Observators grounds upon which hee would overthrow so ancient and well â—…unded a Monarchâ—… The false impâ—…tation of enmity against this great and well established power will not be thus shaken â—…ff The truth of it is he that resolves to say any thing be it never so scandalous and void of truth will againe 〈◊〉 to stand or fall upon the same principles But give him leave and he will shew you one of the grounds that strikes at Monarchie pâ—…ay observe what an unnecessary â—…nference is hâ—…re made by the Author Tâ—…e observator saâ—…th that The King aâ—…tributeth the originall of his Royalty to God and the Law making no mention at all of the grant consent or trâ—…st of man therein A groundâ—…sse cavile sâ—…th the Author and why so because when God is fiâ—…St named under what notion can he apprehend â—…aw but as an agâ—…eement oâ—… the people deriving of their power and committing the 〈◊〉 to his trust You charge the Observator with a â—…avile and you labour to maâ—…e it good by so large allowance that I could not have 〈◊〉 so much from Oxâ—…d What an agreement oâ—… the people in the 〈◊〉 of a King and a deriving of â—…heir power unto him and whiâ—…h hâ—…s yet more a 〈◊〉 of thâ—… 〈◊〉 to hâ—…s Maâ—…esty â—…n trâ—…st why then that is no absolute and 〈◊〉 power tâ—…s mâ—…ch all thâ—…s shâ—…ld bee granted but yet I feare â—…is yoâ—… not the Observator that deaâ—…es 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 tellâ—…ng him that the 〈◊〉 and agreement of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 obliterated and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is not now to be taken notice of or â—…hat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the â—…etter of thâ—… Law so what else can be the meaning 〈◊〉 thaâ—… fâ—…equent â—…xpression in many of his 〈◊〉 Declarations that he is responsible to God alone for his Actions not to man Is not this since no absolute power was transferred by the people as it is here confessed as I have made it good before a denying of the consent and agreement of the people and a granting of a boundlesse Authority And how can that and a trust stand together certainely a dependant and an independant governement are not Synonyma T is true that if a people doe erect a King over them that this is confirmed aâ—…d ratified in Heaven But being of humane institution this doth no way expunge those qualifications of trust and condition which are incident to and tacitly passe with this sacred function and if so we must of necessity allow a power in some to see the due discharge and execution of them nor will it derogate from the honour of God or the dignity of a Prince that the people exact the due execution of the Law and the performance of that compact trust and condition that followes Soveraignty By this time I hope our Author may be satisfied that it is he that cavils not the Observator since it is plaine that the word Law though it doe receive so candid an interpretation from the Observator may be and is denyed to be the consent and agreement of the people But now how doth this determine against Monarchy why yes thus or not at all The King denies the people their right therfore the people may take away his Is this one of the grounds upon which the Observator doth intend
argument of true absolute Soveraignty But I hope on the other side our Author will take notice that the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit or discharge Princes of their duty There is Onus aswell as honos that is a great burden charg and care aswell as honour and renowne thâ—…t is inseperably incident to this great function and therefore he that gaines the one be it by discent conquest or otherwise must discharge the other The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis major yet he is universis minor The author tels us that This inference is most weake and that the quite contrary may clearely be concluded pray heare his reason The people being the efficient cause of power which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power and uniting it in him since they cannot retaine what they have parted with nor have what they gave away it followes â—…e which 〈◊〉 their power I may adde his owne perticular besides must needs be greater and more powerfull then they The Authors argument to destroy the Observators inference is but this that though the people be the fountaine and efficient cause of power yet for that they have made a free Donation of all power to the King since they cannot be owners of that they have given away therefore it must needs follow that the King is greater then the people I doubt the Author will finde it a greater difficulty to maintaine this Argument then to make it for if it can be proved on that hangs the strength of his argument that the people have not divested themselves of all power oâ—…t of his premisses the consequence is just that the universe is greater then the King Now if trust and condition are inseparable incidents to Soveâ—…ty as I have shewed before it must follow that the people represented by a Parliament may call in question the breach of them for otherwise the power would be in effâ—…ct 〈◊〉 which hath been denied even by the King himself who acknowledgeth that his Kingdome is commited to him in trust and if so as no doubt pâ—…dents of that nature are not wanting to posterity for that no question that was one maine ground of the constitution of Parliaments the restraining of the exorbitancy of Princes why then how can it bee that the people should have divested themselves of all their power for it must be agreed that that power which may call in question the discharge of others is the supreame and superintendent for no inferiour power can doe it so that by this time I hope the Author is satisfied that the Obseâ—…ors inference is just and his reason weake and defective But the Observator tenders a proofe of the premisses for saith he If the people be the true â—…ent cause of poweâ—… it is a rule in naâ—…ure quicquid efficit tale est magis tale Sâ—…ange sayes the Author that men upon such palpable sophistry should endeavour to cast off Monarchy It is more strange to mee that men against cleare reason should make theâ—…selves so palpably ignorant can not the Author difference a reasonable modification or qualificatioâ—… from an extreame extirpation or eradication if my reason faile me not it is he that indeavoureth what ever he pretend the casting off of Monarchy for as Monarchy is never so secure as when fenced in by the wisdome of Parliaments it submits to their determinations so it is never so much in danger as when it exalts it selfe above and against them and endeavoureth an absolutenesse of Soveraignty hence it may be determined who are the greatest enemies to Monarchs But pray what is the sophistry the Observator stands accused of why it is this he hath given you a rule that is regularly not generally true that will maintaine the case in question not all others for instance he tels the Observator That he will be unwilling to follow the consequence of this rule and why for that saith he he hath an estate which no question 〈◊〉 would willingly improve let him bestow it upon me he will make me rich aâ—…d 〈◊〉 richer for quicquid 〈◊〉 tale est magis tale I this is thaâ—… â—…hat hath made this great combustion maâ—…r of â—…ight and estate could you perswade us out of our reason you would quickly seize upon these but I trust your sophistry shall not so captivate our sense as to betray our selves to ruine by a foolish prating with that which God dispenced unto our Ancestors and they through his mercy â—…queathed unto us If I should tell you that God made man therefore God is greater than man or that the Ocean distributing it selfe into severall streames or rivolets is greater than those rivolets and so conclude that therefore quicquid efficit tale est magis talâ—… you would presently say that this were no infallible way of reasoning why for you to conclude that it doth not hold in some cases therefore not in the case in question is not this the same fallacy but as befor s now I shall make good the Axiome in our case upon his owne grounds for he saith it doth hold in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is â—…erent and from whom it cannot be seperated not true in those who by way of donation dâ—…st themselves of power or wealth That power was origiâ—…lly inherent in the people that I thinke will not be questioned That the people 〈◊〉 not divested themselves of all their power is cleared thus as I have shewn before that power that is fiduciary and upon condition must needs bee subject to a power more supream to see the due discharge of this trust and condition or othâ—…rwise it would in effect prove absolute but I say the Royall dignite and authority is fiduciary only and upon condition therefore it must be subâ—…ect to a power more suâ—…e wâ—…h can bee no other than the people represented by a Parliament Besides what a groundlesse and unnaturall thing is it to think that a people in whom all power did origâ—…y reside should so totally and absolutely dispose that to one which being abused must without hope of redresse prove their owne inevitable destruction I but saith the Author If the King be universis minor then the people have pâ—…ced a King not over but 〈◊〉 them and 〈◊〉 doe ill to 〈◊〉 when they might command they may 〈◊〉 it from the Prince their subject The King is universis minor lesse than the Publike but he is singulis major over and above all individuals and therefore the Author in this doth not much mistake himselfe for that undutifull and â—…urable passage of commanding of his Majestie and of making him our subject I wish withall my soule that the Author of this booke and his associates were not more guilty of this then his Parliament could ever Parliament or â—…ple with more
his Majesty for the ordering of the Militia according to their advise â—…or the better security of his people and His Majestiâ—…s negative returne unto them before they according to their duty undertooke in his Majestiâ—…s and his people behalâ—…e the trust and maâ—…age of the same And now it must be in their power to command men 〈◊〉 horses seise on all the Ammunition send for what supples of money they thinke necessary for the repelling those dangers This is but a consequence of the other it were but in vaine to lay a foundation if they had not power â—…o raise the Structure I but here wee are fallen backe againe into what we so much complained of Arbitrary poweâ—… 'T is much that one who pretends to be Mâ—…ster of his reason should be thus mistaken Then belike all proceedings in cases according to equity and necessity which justice requireth should not be regulated by the strickt rule and severity of law as not being within the intention of it for that such constructive might prove destinction to the rule is a prosecution of an arbitrary power The manage of a businesse in case of necessity neede not keepe correspondence and agreement with the rule neithâ—…r that to be stileâ—… Arbitrary which necessitâ—… makes lawsull Was not this the very case of Ship-money there likewise was a pretence of danger and necessity and none so compelent a judge of this as the King and therefore for the securing of the people money must be immediatly raised without the Subjects consent With the Authors favour these cases do no way runne parallel for will it therefore follow that because the King cannot upon no pretence whatsoever take away the Subjects propâ—…rty without their consent that the Parliamâ—…ent may not take it with their conâ—…ent Most inconsequent The Parliament represent the people which the King doth not And therefore their conclusions do 〈◊〉 â—…he people whâ—…ch the Kings cannot But then he presles an Argument that was made against the ship-money which he saith will hold in our case It was then laid downe as a sure 〈◊〉 of reason that it was better for the Kingdome though it were in reall danger in arena 〈◊〉 capere to 〈◊〉 for it selfe as well as it wâ—…s able by a suddaine defence than that the King should prâ—…vide such a remedy which would be so easily so â—…quently abused upon every preâ—…ence of dâ—…nger to pâ—…event such an evill which could extremly seldome oâ—… almost never hapâ—…en for an Army and Navy could not be so 〈◊〉 provided but that we must have some intelligence of it So 〈◊〉 â—…aith in case of the Militia better suffer it in the old waâ—… and the Kingdome 〈◊〉 for it selfe in case of 〈◊〉 than to 〈◊〉 the hazzard of the 〈◊〉 abuse of it to the putting of the Kingdom into a combustion upon I know not what vaine pretences I beleive the Author preached a quite contrary Doctrine before the Parliâ—…ment O the power and vertue of this great Assembly that can so Metamorphize men as to makâ—… thâ—…m spâ—…ak accoâ—…ding to the dictate of reasâ—…n not affâ—…ction But for his Argument the ground of the obâ—…ection that was laid down against the Ship-money was the possible frequent abuse that might be of such a remedy upon eveâ—…y pretence of danger which without controversie carries a great deale of wait with it And when our Aâ—…thor can make it good as he hâ—…th strongly 〈◊〉 but much failed in it that a Communitâ—… maâ—… have those many private ends to mislead it that a King may then shâ—…ll we agree that the cases do in reason parrallel untill then we must â—…ell him thâ—…t there is â—…oure hundrâ—…d to one against him I 〈◊〉 the world judge whether the 〈◊〉 Sir Iâ—…hn Ho hams act Treason be not contrary to the cleareâ—…t 〈◊〉 of humane reason and the â—…trongest inclinations of nature for every private man may defind himselfe by force if 〈◊〉 though by the force of his Majestrate or his owne 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be not without all confidence by flâ—…ght Sir Iohn Hothams seising upon the Kings Towne and Ammunition was it seemes in his own defence who assaulted him Did his Majesty drive him into Hull No But his Mejesty would have driven him out he being possessed of it by the Authority of Parliament for the securing of him and his people And though it be not lawfull for a Subject to seise a towne in his owne defence yet having got it by a lawfull authority he may defend himselfe and it against any assault by the same power Neither can any other extrajudiciall power or command discharge him of that trust which was committed to him in a legall and judiciall way by another What can he thinke of the Gunpowder Traytors was their resistance a just defence Then certainely every rebellion is a just warre His conclusion is very just For questionles there can be no warre unlawfull if their resistance were a warrantable defence But I hope the Author will give us leave to tell him that the cases are more different then a Papist and a Protâ—…stant they agree in somewhat the cases in nothing for they had neither lawfull cause nor sufficient authority on their side to maintaine resistance as Sir Iohn Hotham had Againe they were Traytours before by their horrid unnaturall and cruell attempt But I hope Sir Iohn Hothams bare seising of the Towne could not proclaime him Traytor But enough of this in a case so manifest He may as soone convince a man of common sense that black and white are the same colour as that these cases runne parallel Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard being uncapable of flight must yeeld their throats and submit to Assassinates if their King will not allow them defence There is a great difference betwixt a Subjects defending of himselfe and offending his King His feaâ—…es are over witty if they will not permit him to thinke himselfe safe except he get into one of the Kings Forts for his better security Without question he that may defend may offend for how is it possible that I should defend my selfe if I may not offend my enemy What a sensles thing and void of reason is it to mainetaine that Subjects may take up Armes to defend themselves against the unlawfull Tyranny of their Prince but yet upon his approach they must not use any hostile act but stand like so many stocks immoveable what is this but opposiâ—…um in objecto a flâ—…t contradiction or a taking up of Armes in iest to make me capable of losing my life in earnest If this were all we could doe the most facile way for wicked Princes to accomplish their ends would be â—…his by Tyranny and oppression to ingage the people in this imaginary defensive warre thereby to disarme them and force obedience to their unjust desires or slay them with their owne weapons But to passe this If a King shall take up armes
hath a right of dissenting Confest out Author thinks hee hath here got a great advantage of us out of our owne confession why was it ever denyed that the Kings consent wâ—…s not necessary to the making of new lawes or to the altering or 〈◊〉 of the old Nay hath it not beâ—…ne agreed that his assent is so essentially necessary in such cases that if he will dissent as hee may nothing can be donâ—… without him why then a fortiori he shall have a nâ—…gative power where the alteration of thâ—… forme of Government is propoundâ—…d But he must understand that this doth no-way derogate or detract from the right of the Parliament in declaring the common law of the land in certaine cases before them without his Majesties consent for that that is a power incident to this great Court as well as others inferiour and in such case the King hath no negative voyce â—…xcept both King and people Heâ—…e saith hee a power is given to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and King If ever he make good this collection out of the Observators words I le râ—…nounce my understanding All that he 〈◊〉 to intimate unto us is but this that the changing of the auncient established forme of our Government is Casus omissus out of their Commission and therefore not to be accompliâ—…ed by them without the consent of both King and people 〈◊〉 doth not say that the Collective body may doe it without the consent of the 〈◊〉 Lords and Commons This happily might be a predominant power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consent is necessary for the introducting of a new frame of Government Now how this should be a transferring of a power to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and king I must confesse I apprehend not therefore the construction is either very forraigne or my capacitie extreame dull If the King be an affecter of true liberty he hath in Parliament a power as â—…xtensive as ever the Roman Dictators was for the preventing of publike dâ—…resses He saith that though the Romanes could not indure a King yet in effect they had the same thing for in any immiâ—…nt dangers necessitie of State forced them to chuse a Dictator which as he sayes had absolute power over them and to submit to his Authority which relieved them in their greatest extremities Hence he saith we may make the truest judgement what forme of Government the wisest Romanes esteemed most convenient And concludes that since they preferred the unbounded power of one to a popular sway we have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this Government c. May all the blessings of Heaven and Earth-inrich and incompasse his Royall Scepter May he for ever enjoy the utmost limit of his just and legall power And may this happy glo rious succesefull and never sufficiently to be encomiasted Government continue without the least interruption amongst us untill time hath spent its last period and brought a dissolution and finall conclusion on all things And I take him to be no true and faithfull member of the Common Wealth that will not say Amen If the Counsell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation If the Councell of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation That the Parliament and Court should be at varience t is no news there hath beene alwayes a secret enmity and antipathy bâ—…twixt them The Court never well digesting the happinesse and freedome os 〈◊〉 people nor they the oppression and publique disservice of the Court the one still contending for an absolutenesse of 〈◊〉 the other for the maintenance and desending of their liberty But I nâ—…ver heard before that the Counsell or advise of the Court was opposed to that of the Parliament or could any way ballance with that doubâ—…lesse they are not equâ—…ll competitors the Parliament represâ—…nt the publique and those counsellors themselves onely the one studies to augment the Common wealth the other their owne wherefore he is perfidious to himselfe and treacherous to hâ—…s countrey that can be so transported with words as to renounce the Parliament for my part I shall lay it down as one of the Articles of my beleife that the Counsell of â—…he Court is directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament evidently consonant thereunto good cause then of contestation in defence of 〈◊〉 publike The Observator having laid it downe as a ground that 〈◊〉 câ—…nnot reasonably be supposed the greatest counsell of the Kingdome should not giâ—… the most faithfull advise adds thereâ—…ore Princes if they may not be lead by their owne opinions rather than by the sacred and awefull counsells of whole Nations unreasonably complaine they are denied liberty of conscience and 〈◊〉 out of their owne undeâ—…standings I appeale to any mans judgment whether any thing can be â—…ged for the authority of a Lay councell that it 〈◊〉 to inâ—…orce a submission of judgment and a performance of duties arising from trust agreable thereâ—…o which may not with at least equall advantages be pressed for the same binding power in councels Eccleciasticall And yet theâ—…e he saith it would go hard but a man would find some answer as easily he mighâ—… wherby to iustifie his liberty of dissenting in some things which he saies we may with very little alâ—…eraton apply to civill counsells I confeâ—…e this is a point more 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 by a Divine than a Lawyer but t is 〈◊〉 frequent with me to trespasse upon another mans profession 〈◊〉 give me â—…ave a little that our Author may not passe uâ—…nswered to speake my 〈◊〉 in this perticular Now with the favour of the Author if my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 me not there is a wide 〈◊〉 as to our case betweâ—…ne lay and 〈◊〉 Counsells For I take this for a â—…rtaine and cleare truth in dâ—…vinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 counsell whatsoever be it of never so great ability or eminency 〈◊〉 oblige the conscience of a man by their dicisions or determinations for thâ—…t the conscience of a man is if I may so speake out of their jurisdiction t is God alone that hath power over that Besides he that opposes the dictates of conscience sins against God The Apostle in the 14. to the Rom. Shewing how men ought not to contemn or condemn one another for things indifferent sayes in the 5. verse one man esteemeth one day above another another estâ—…emeth every day alike let every man be fully perswaded in his owne minde By this t is manifest I ought not to be guided by the conscience of other men Againe ver. 14 there is nothing saith he uncleane of it selfe but â—…o 〈◊〉 that
esteemeth any thing to be uncleane to him it is uncleane by this likewise it is cleare that what my conscience perswâ—…des mee is unlawfâ—…ll be the judgement of other men what it will ought not to be inforced upon mee Againe the last verse He that doubteth is damned if he eate because he eateth not of faith for whatsoever is not of faith is finne So that for my part I take it as an unquestionable â—…ruth that no Ecclesiasticall authority whatsoever hath power over a mans conscience though it be but in things indifferent But now on the other side I take it to be as evident and as 〈◊〉 an assertion that any Lay counsell may in 〈◊〉 meerely civill or morall no way reflecting upon the word of God oblige the conscience which indeed is but the bare opinion and judgement of a man by their conclusions and determinations and in such ease t is no sin for a man to oppose his owne reason by submission to the judgement of oâ—…hers And if this were not a truth Justice would be but slow payed and the law as various as the severall dispositions of men and every man would have power to infringe the law upon every 〈◊〉 of opposition to conscience 〈◊〉 but the Author goes on and tells us that though amongst probable Aâ—…guments that drawne 〈◊〉 the Authority of wise men carry with it greatest weight yet it must give place to a greater reasoâ—… T is â—…rue where the greater or better reason is evident but 〈◊〉 are not bound to renounce our owne understanding and to believe that to be the better reason which you affirme to be so The Parliament must in strength of probability give the better reason and when you can prove the contrary which as yet you fall much short of then shall we be of your beliefe untill then you must give us leave to retaine our owne Now to every man belongs a judgement of 〈◊〉 which must decide for what concernes his perticular duty T is true where he is sole Arbiter and where it coâ—…cernes his owne particular onely but where the publique is interested there it is otherwise So hee â—…aith in the Kings case The Votes which carry in them the authority of of both Houses shall beare great sway and is it be in things extreamely dubious they may turne the Scales of the other â—…ide This truth if firmely stood to as it ought would suddainely perâ—…d this sad contestation But alas how quickly t is broken For he saith if greater reason seeme to contradict them his Majesty will not hoodwinke his understanding and blindly â—…ollow whether they please to lead him he will walke by the greater light greater reason very much that the reason of the Court should preponderate that of the Parliament For example he saâ—…h 〈◊〉 Majestie perceiving how much his people may suster under arâ—… power is resolved never to make use of it and thâ—…nks it lesse fitting any other should I would to God hâ—…s Majestic had never been wrought upon by his evill Counsell to break his resolution Is it not an arbitrary way of rule for to takâ—… away mens property without their consâ—…nt And is iâ—… not arbitrary for the King to preâ—…e his owne single exâ—…udiciall judgement before that of his Parliaments But it is told him now the use of it will bee for their good by reason of appâ—…ent imminent dangers Hath the Author thus informed his Majestie certainly never any one else did it were happy both for King and people that it were no more practised by tâ—…e Court than it is by the Parliamenâ—… Concerning the Action at Hull the Observator agreeth to take possâ—…ssion of the Kings Towne and shuâ—… the gates against hâ—…m is treason if circumstances doe not vary the nature of the act as in this case he sayes thâ—…y doe for the first thing to be lookt on is that the King was meerely dâ—…ed enâ—…ance for that time his generall right was not denyed If then a subject take up 〈◊〉 against his Soveraigne in a tâ—…mporall warre it must not come 〈◊〉 the compasse of 〈◊〉 No whether it be temporary or coâ—…nuing so he hath the same Commission to justifie his action And he may legâ—…lly possesse 〈◊〉 of the Kings 〈◊〉 and maintaine them against him so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath no 〈◊〉 in them T is not his confessing that he hath no right for that all thâ—… world can judge of but his doing no wrong that excuses him No deâ—…ing language was given If a man take away my puâ—…se shall he be acquitted from â—…elony because he did not give mee ill language too Inventio tua nomen imponit operi 〈◊〉 t is the invention as we say in law that denominates the action And therefore though I cannot acquit him of felony that shall take away your purse and in exchange give you only good words yet if he shall rescue your purse out of the hands of Robbers or take it from your ownâ—… person being in danger for its better security and shall againe faithfully â—…ore it when you have liberty to enjoy your owne if he be felon 〈◊〉 dye for him No act of violence was used This he may say who hath picked anothers pocket but it is no sufficient plea against the Law Yes if he can shew a lawfull commission for it 〈◊〉 he used no violence though the King for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 together did stand within Musket sâ—…t c. It is no argument of innocence that he had 〈◊〉 to be more highly guilty and abstained T is true had he beene guilty at all The King used termes of desyance c. and this makes the Act mâ—…ely desensive or rather passive If this were true there was never any warre but defensive For those who by some great injustice oâ—…ed provoke a nation to right it sâ—…e fight aswell to maintaine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as what they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that offer any injustice or wrong though they take up aâ—…mes to secure themselves 〈◊〉 on the offensive pâ—…t nâ—…t the defensive But this rests to prove in our case How 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 to the King any grounds to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yorke many men wonâ—… or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seeme the same 〈◊〉 to the King as if he had beene pursued to the gates 〈◊〉 â—…ke Certainly it was a 〈◊〉 ground not only to raise a guard for his safety but an Armie to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aâ—…d to right his 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 for his safety why Sir 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not advance towards York nor ever〈◊〉 â—…sed it An army to punish thâ—…t hâ—…gh indignity Very just it should be sâ—… had there beene 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to right his 〈◊〉 veâ—…y reasonable had his Maâ—…esty been any way dishonoured 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Townesmen out of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 who acts only by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
what are they I but he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 This is but your bare assertion which is nâ—…t to be credited before the Paâ—…liament But if it had beene so that they had beene turned 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be sayes the same law would have justified this act as well as the 〈◊〉 So it would had the primer seisin of their estates beene of the like conâ—…equence and concernmeâ—…t â—…o the publike But he sayes since not only the Countrey about but the inhabitants within the towne have suffered in their estates and liberties If any have suffered without they may thank the unlawfâ—…ll assaults of others if within their unfaithfulnesse to the Common wealth Or if they clâ—…ymed any interest in it to themselves So much the lesse reason to 〈◊〉 on it if he cannot so much as pretend title to it T is sufficient if the common Wealth clayme an interest in it though he doth not Or have 〈◊〉 the king utterly denying his right for the future If any law can be produced to justifie the taking away the kings goods 〈◊〉 a time the 〈◊〉 will be cleared If any law or evidence can be produced to justifie the towne of Hull to be the Kings goods otherwise than with reference to the common wealth for the good of which he is intrusted with it then happily the case may not be so evident Or have made any other â—…se of their possession but meerely to prevent civill warre There is not any way more likely to create a civill 〈◊〉 than indeavours to prevent it by illegall courses Uery just if you could demonstrate any illegall courses that have beene taken If the Parliament the shutting of the King out of Hull was not their act if the Act of the substitute be not the Act of him that doth authorize him then I understaud no law be not vertually the whole kingdome it selfe The King exclâ—…ded it is not T is certaine but if he exclude himselfe then it is If it be not like supreame judicature as well in matters of State as matters of law Till new lawes be enacted the subject cannot justifie any act but what is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the old This is an unquestionable truth if the Author doe not corrupt it by this false glosse and interpretation he must know t is one thing to declare the common law another to â—…act a new law the subject may justifie an act by the authority of Parliament without his Majesties consent in the former not so in the latter If it be not the great Counsell of the kingdome as well as of the king to whom it belongeth by the consent of all nations to provide in all extraordinary cases ne quid detrimenti capiat respublica 〈◊〉 the brand of treason stick upon it No provisions are allowed but what are legall least the remedies prove worse than the disease Very right but circumstances may vary a case And that may and ought to be legall at one time that neiâ—…her will nor can be so at another And in extraordinary cases extraordinary provisions may bee made and ought not to beâ—… brâ—…nded with injustice or breach of Law Nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes unlesse petitioning would not have prevailed It is no just cause to take away a 〈◊〉 money and said he did first desire him to deliver it Cleare law and the cases will no way vary if the Author can prove that the King hath as absolute a property in the towne of Hull as any man hath in his money Or if their grounds of 〈◊〉 were 〈◊〉 vaine It is against all equitie to dâ—…e a wrong because there is a 〈◊〉 of suffering it Right but I hope you will prove now that there is a wrong done and not argue this by way of admission Besides it is against all reason that a whole Kingdome should be put to suffer a wrong out of a meere possibilitie of doing one Or if the 〈◊〉 of a 〈◊〉 kingdome can be coâ—…ted vaine Too large an expression much the greater paâ—…t of the kingdome apprehend unjust grounds of jealousies Very good is not this the Doctrine of division that I impeach our Auâ—…hor to be guilty of before The Parliament have formerly beene esteemed the representative body of the whoâ—… Kingdome But belike now â—…is otherwise they have I know not how lost this honour and priviledge or it is unjustly taken from them In the easing us of these many preâ—…ures which lay so heavin upon he Kingdome 〈◊〉 which we and our whole posterity are eternally ingaged unto them there they did represent us and their actions for our benefiâ—… had an influence upon the whole Kingdome But if they tell us through their vigilancy and great care of us that we are like to be reduced to a worse condition through the malicious counsâ—…ll of those men that wrought our former miseries if not timely prevenâ—…ed there they sit in a parsonall capacity only and we are not bound to believe that we 〈◊〉 in danger because they say so No alaâ—… they are a seditious factious and inconsidâ—…rable number who intend to raise tâ—…ir own fortunes upon vâ—…ine 〈◊〉 of danger out of the publike d stractionâ—… O the wit and power of 〈◊〉 that should thus work upon men to renounce their unde standing neglect their duty and incurre the publike ruine upon a meere possibility tha they may be seduced by the Parliament But t is very mâ—…ch â—…at the Author should dare to affirme â—…ha much the greater part of the Kingdome apprehâ—…nd no ground of jealousie bâ—…like he hath travailed the wâ—…ole Kingdom over and examined men by the Poles and takâ—…n every ones suffrage and so upon the to â—…l cast up on every side is able to render you this account or otherwise hee could never make good his assertion Oâ—… if they clâ—…yme any such right of judging of dangers and preventing of them without the Kings Consent as ordinary and perpetuall As ofâ—…en as they have a mind to make use of such a right t is easie â—…or them to call the case extraordinary and pretend publike dangâ—…rs If it shall be suffered that their soleâ—…ne judgements and determinations which are of so great waight and credit that they ought to awe us to a beliefe of them shall be blasted with the scandall of vaine and pretendâ—…d how can it possibly be â—…hat there should fall out any case 〈◊〉 I but the event ought to be Judge and he sayes they will never be câ—…nfuted by that if not now for certainly apparent dangâ—…s did never lesse appâ—…e Admirably ingenious were it not a pure contradiction for doubâ—…lesse if apparent dangers they must be seene But let me tell you that the issue or event is no certaine de ermiâ—… of an imminent danger a provident care
as now or an unexpected interposing providence as in case of the Gunpowder ploâ—… may prevent the blow shall we therefore conclude it was never oflâ—…red It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had beene frighted with secret plots and 〈◊〉 designes Douâ—…tlesse those whome apparent and visible dangers will not frighten secret and concealed cannot The King might have prevented the same repulse by sendâ—…ng of a messenger before hand That is if he had not come to gâ—…t in he had not bâ—…ene shut out if he would have stayed away he would not have denyed hâ—…m entrance A very apt conclusion and it had bâ—…ene happy his Majestie had found so good advise as to have saved hiâ—… labour Or by comming without any such considerable forces Let his forces be great he was not to give law to his Prince No nor any privie Counsell to the Parliamâ—…nt Bâ—…t nâ—…ither is it likely â—…ee would have â—…ave admitted him then for you 〈◊〉 a litâ—…le above 〈◊〉 offered to enter with twenâ—…y Horse only unarmed Whether his Maâ—…esty mâ—…de any such profer or no I know not nor is iâ—… materiall for t was not the paucitie of number th t could excuse his breach of trust The Scots in England tooke Newcastle but by private authority yet there wâ—…re other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The king and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an act of Oâ—…livion T is no wrong either to King or Parliament for a man to say that is no treason which they have adjudged not to be so Neither is that act of theirs so to be buriâ—…d in utter silence as not to acquit and discharge us if we can plead the same innocency Then the Observator instances at large in the example of â—…dward the second misted by 〈◊〉 It doth not â—…llow because one king hath hearkned to evill Counsâ—…ll therefore all must be denyed the liberty to hearken to good That is true but it doth clearely demonstrate thus much that oâ—…hers may be misled as well as he and when a Parliament shall declare as now that the King is misled by evill Counsell t is not your bâ—…re 〈◊〉 that can make good the contrary 〈◊〉 pâ—…tie was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the scales and ballancing their râ—…putations What odds may be gained in point of estate I know not though I am 〈◊〉 there will be nothing lost But without controversie their reputations cannot be very good whose cause and counsell is so bad An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withâ—…ut some meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted than not to perceive what is so obvious deny the King a negative and the thing is done Had the Parliament as in truth they never did denyed the King a negative yet the Author who pretends to be so quick sighted would find it a matter of greater weight and difficulty than to be so easie compassed and effected The power of the Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tyranny a mongst us is not disceâ—…able It is not thought this was the intent of those that intrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs for though their power depend upon a publike consent in the election yet not so after they are met together If the power of Parliament be meerely derivative as it cannot bee denyed and that not absolute and illimitâ—…d but qualified and circumscribed as it must bee agreed why then the consequence is very just that where they doe exceed that power this doth not â—…gage the consent and obedience of the people why then without â—…e shall allow that the peoples vote and consent may be had which is so far from improbable that it is almost impossible we may here judge what an idle fancie and vaine dreame this is of their labouring to introduct an Aristocracy He sayes that He believes they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdome Our Author must vent his contumacious and opprobrious conceipts against the Parliament though they be a contradiction to his owne reason What are their severall relations compared with the publike or what advantage can thâ—…r power of preferment yeeld them since but few can attaine to that in the ingaging of a whole Kingdome to erect so unlawfull and oidous a tyranny His Majesty expresses his indignation that they should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him To which the Observator answers This cannot bee collected from these words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modestie and duty because sayes he it may justly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the deposing of any king of England What was there asfirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of free in it What though it had not any candid and ingenious reader would supply it by a faire intendment we ought not to stand upon our captions with the Parliament whose words and actions ought if we will be guided by the rule of law to receive the most honourable and favourable construction of us Whâ—…refore we ought not so critically and unjustly to imagine when they doe generally mention the highest presidents of other Parliaments that they doe include forced parliaments because as they well know these are not presidents for free Parliaments to bee guided by And doe they not by their Declaration dated the second of November 1642. which I make no question the Author had a view of before the publishing of his booke say that in that Declaration to which this objection refers they delivered that they did never so much as suffer this to enter into their thoughts And further that some presidents were such as that they ought not to be rules for them to follow which very reasonably and probably might intend those of deposing Kings How dare then the Author though not expresly yet tacitly accuse the Parliament of being guilty of the maintaining that position contrary to their owne publike profession and vindication But I passe itover and leave him to his just censure He sayes that the King is offended