matter and it seems that according to this opinion we need no other preparation to approach the Altar and holy Table than for to eat at our common tables and that a man may go with the same pace and temper to receive the Communion as he would to a Feast to be debauched As for Priests who are the Ministers of the Eucharist and who consecrate the Body of Jesus Christ upon the Altar and who give it to the Faithful after they have taken it first themselves Emanuel Sa saith that for to say Mass they 1 Potest quis secundum quosdam in necessitate profanis linâ—eis uti eaque postea Domino reddere utenda Sa verbo Missa num 7. p. 501. may make use of the same Napery whereof they make use to spread common tables when they have no other and make use of them after Mass as they did before at table But if this Casuist be so liberal in this he will appear very severe in another of less moment when he supposes that it is a great sin to say Mass 2 Celebrare sine calceamentis si absit contemptus non est mortale est autem si celebretur corporalibus valde immundis Ibid. num 15. pag. 503. Azor existimavit mortifere eos peccare qui sine justa causa tertia horae parte ante auroram vel post meridiem faciunt Sacrum Ibid. n. 27. pag. 509. without shooes though he dare not say that it is a mortal sin when it is not done by comtempt as he assures us it is when the Consecration is celebrated on very foul Corporals But he is yet more rigorous afterwards when he saith it is not lawful to say Mass before day nor after noon without a dispensation adding that they who transgress Rule and say the Mass a quarter of an hour or at most half an hour sooner or later sin mortally grounding this opinion upon Azor. Amicus saith the same thing and acknowledging after Baronius that the Mass hath been heretofore celebrated in the Church at divers hours and many times in the evening it self he saith that this ancient custom hath been interrupted for some time and another new one introduced into use to say it only from the time it is day until noon And after he adds 3 Quod autem haec consuetudo vim habeat legis obligantis sub mortali colligitur tum ex privilegiis quae Pontifices concedunt Religiosis c. That this Custom is instead of a Law and hath a vertue to oblige upon pain of mortal sin as may be collected from the Priviledges that the Popes give unto Monks to say Mass before day and after noon He would say that if it were only a venial sin to say Mass before day or after noon there would be no need to demand a Dispensation for neither he nor his Companions make any great account of venial sins mortal ones only in their opinion requiring a Dispensation that they may be committed without fear or danger So that all Laws and Commandments that oblige not under mortal sin have not any need of a Dispensation according to these Doctors and we may boldly violate and contemn them We have seen hitherto in divers places of this Book and particularly in this Treatise of the Commandments of the Church that according to the Jesuits when the Church commands the Faithful to pray to assist at divine Service to say to hear Mass on the Feast and Lords-days to communicate at Easter to confess at least once a year we may satisfie and accomplish all its Commands by doing only the outward actions which it commandeth though we do them by compulsion in hypocrisie with a formal design not to obey it through any wicked motive and by committing in the very outward action of the obedience we render it crimes and Sacriledges It is now pertinent for us and as it were necessary in the prosecution of this Work to discover the cause of this mischief and to ascend unto the Spring and Principle from whence the Jesuits draw these Maxims so pernicious and contrary to all good Manners Christian Purity Sanctity of the Sacraments Authority and Conduct of the Church and of the Holy Ghost who animates and governs it in all things This we are about to do in the next Chapter where we shall shew that the Jesuits hold that the Church is no other than an humane Assembly and a Body Politick and by consequence that it hath no Power nor Authority over internal and spiritual actions which are out of its Jurisdiction because they are hid and without its cognizance Whence they infer that when it commands any practice of Vertue exercise of Religion or use of the Sacraments its Commandment reaches only to and stays at what is external in these actions without proceeding farther unto inward actions and obliges not to any other thing than to do simply what it ordaineth in some sort whatever it be and upon what design or motive soever it be done that we may represent the Opinions the Jesuits have of the Church its Authority and Commandments we will add this Article to the three former ARTICLE IV. That the Jesuits teach that the Church cannot command spiritual and internal Actions that its Laws and Guidance are humane that it is it self only a Politick Body IF you inquire of the Jesuits wherefore according to their Divinity we may be discharged of the Prayers ordained by the Church by praying with voluntary distraction and reciting the divine Service without intention Wherefore we may accomplish the Command of saying Mass on Feast and Lords-days by attending without devotion that of Fasting by fasting for vain-glory that of Confession by confessing without sufficient sorrow for sin that of Communicating at Easter by receiving with hypocrisie and knowing we are in mortal sin Wherefore we may acquit our selves of Penance injoyned us by a Confessor accomplish a Vow made unto God satisfie a Promise an Oath made unto men and God by doing only in outward appearance what we are obliged to do And why we may generally accomplish all sorts of Precepts by actions which in truth are sins by doing them without any design to discharge our duty and on the contrary with a formal design not to discharge it and by a formal contempt of the Commandment and those who made it having an express intention not to obey even then when we seem to obey it doing outwardly what is commanded If you demand I say of the Jesuits the reason of all these so strange things which we have already made appear that they teach for the most part some will answer you with Sanchez that this is because the Church hath not the power to make Laws which command other than the substance of a thing that is to say in his language what is external in the actions it wills you to do Quia leges praecipiunt solum substantiam actus non modum Sanchez opermor lib. 1. cap.
nomiur usurae acceptae ita miseeantur rebus usurarii fimilibus ut non possint ab eis distingui tunc dominium censetur transtatum Lessius de just jur l. 2. cap. 20. d. 18. num 136. pag. 354. if the things he has got by usury be so mingled with others their like which belong to the Vserer that one cannot distinguish them it must be presumed that the Vsurer is become a lawful possessor of them Escobar extends this answer so far as to reach a Merchant who hath received more than was due unto him saying that after he hath mingled other mens money which he hath received with his own if he to whom the money pertained demands it back again this Merchant is not obliged to restore it him according to Vasquez z Venditor accepit bona fide pecuniam cum sua commiscet teneturne comparente Domino restituere Escobar Ibid. n. 107. p. 362. A Seller saith he receives in simplicity more money than he ought and he hath mingled it with his own is he obliged to restore it when he who hath given it him comes to him to demand restitution thereof He does not ask if this Merchant be obliged to see and to certifie himself that he hath received more money than he ought he supposes without any difficulty that he ought not he enquires onely if this being true and known he be obliged to restore this money which is not his and which he hath already mingled with his own and he serves himself of the authority of Vasquez to add weight to his resolution a Negat Vasquez de restitutione c. 9. sect 2. dub ult quia non tenetur ratione iujustae acceptionis qui bona fide accepit nec rationâ—râ—i acceptae cum pecuniam acceperit in prest im bona fide assumpserit Ibid. Vasquez saith he denies it he is not obliged thereto neither by any unjust manner by which he hath received this money he having received it in honest simplicity nor by the substance of the thing which he received because he received it in payment and so took it on a good accompt and honest But if these two reasons founded upon simple good meaning which serves for a cloak to the greatest crimes that are according to the Divinity of the Jesuites as we shall shortly behold more clearly content you not and you answer this Casuist that this Merchant is destitute of honest simplicity because that he who gave him the the money came again and made him know that he had given him more then he ought to have done he will tell you for your last answer that he is come too late that the Merchant hath already mingled his money with his own and by this medley he is become thereof the legal possessour ET CUM SUA COMMISCENDO SUAM FECIT I know not what secret vertue he ascribes to the money of a covetous and unjust man to convert into his proper goods that which is anothers This is not according to that which they say commonly and most truly that those of another mingled with our own proper goods consume them and destroy them He had spoken more truly had he said that it was not the mixture but injustice and covetousness that had purchased and appropriated the others money unto this Merchant Covetousness and injustice shew themselves most manifestly 1. In doting upon ones own wealth 2. In the usurpation of that which is anothers by unlawful ways 3. When what is so obtained is retained without a will to restore it The Jesuits teaching their Disciples to love their own goods better then their Neighbours lives say that it is lawfull to kill him when he attempts to take them from us as we have already made appear and shall discover more largely when we come to speak of that commandment of God which forbids murder They teach to usurpe and unjustly to invade anothers goods in maintaining usury and in justifying or excusing the most part of the treacheries and fraud which are used in Merchandise or Traffique They teach to retain and not to restore them as I have made appear already and by thus much it is easie to judge with what exactness and fidelity they maintain the causes which they undertake being they have omitted nothing which might favour covetousness and gratifie the greedy desire which men have for the goods of this world ARTICLE VI. Unfaithfulness COvetousness carries to injustice and both the one and the other engage men in infidelity For as according to Scripture the just man lives by Faith that is to say that the exercise of Faith and fidelity is as it were the bread which nourishes us as the air which we breathe and which is the continual employment and entertainment of this life one may say on the contrary that the unjust man lives by infidelity and that if his life be well examined and we could pierce into the bottom of his heart there would nothing be found in his thoughts in his design and in all the conduct of his life but disguisements deceits and infidelity It is not onely true in the Church that just and honest men live by Faith but one may also say the same thing of all men who live together in any sort of humane Society Faith is not onely the foundation of religion and of Christian life but also that of Estates of Corporations and of civil life It is not properly to live to live amongst dissemblieg and treacherous persons no more than to live among enemies being obliged to keep our selves always upon our guard and to be in a continual distrust and disquiet for fear of being surprized upon every occasion and of losing our goods honor and life In the mean while we shall see our selves reduced to this point if we suffer our selves to be conducted by the advice of the Jesuits and if we regulate our lives by the maxime of their Divinity which doth openly allow and teach dissimulation deceit and infidelity as I shall make clearly appear by this Article Infidelity may be committed first of all in things by the sale and by the exchange of things 2. In contracts and promises 3. In discourses treaties and generally in words I will make three Points of this Article according to these three sorts of infidelity I. POINT Of diverse sorts of unfaithfulness and of deceit which may be committed in things by altering them selling them by false weights and measures and taking those which are anothers without his privity VNfaithfulness and deceit of which we speak here is a true theft disguised and covered with some false pretence of apparent reason There are many persons who are disposed to deceive but they to whom there remains some little conscience are troubled in doing it the light of nature alone which is not intirely exstinguish'd in them makes them to see clear enough in the bottom of their hearts that this is not lawfull they must needs first
veritatem Potest inun â—e se nescive Escobar Tract 3. exam 6. num 74. pag. 423. A Seller saith he knoweth that there will be shortly great store of Merchandise that money will rise or fall is he obliged to confess it He answers that he may affirm that he knows nothing of it And if this disguise suffice not to surprize him that does deal with him he holds w Aut potest negative respondere laesa quidem veritate sed non justitia he may openly affirm the contrary to that he knows And that in answering thus he may well injure the truth but not Justice As if a man could injure truth without wronging Justice in an action of justice and in the common fellowship of men which is ruined by these wickednesses and falsities which by consequence comprise under them many injuries against all men in general and against every one in particular who hath a right not to be cousened and not to be deceitfully used not onely when they deal about things of value but about simple discourses which lyers use as traps for those who distrust not their malice I know very well that this Author grounds himself upon this that he pretends x Quia non tenetur veritatem aperire that the Merchant is not obliged to tell him the truth But I know not what it is that can dispense with him in this case if it be not the disordered adherence to his own proper interest which seems so favourable to the Jesuits that they suffer them to conserve them at the charges of truth and sincerity that is to say at the expence of humane Society since without verity and sincerity the confederacy of thieves and robbers themselves cannot subsist It is many times lawful not to utter the truth But it is never lawful to tell a lie and if my Neighbour have not always right to be informed of those things which concern him not he hath always a right not to be couzened principally in those things which concern him 9. There is another sort of cheat among the Merchants which the same Author Justifieth also y Alios impedit quis ne merces ab alâ—is emant qui eas portant sed eas emit anticipatè itaut alii cogantur postea eas de manibus ipsius charius emere obligaturne ad restituendum Rebellius obligari docet licèt Molina alii eum posse excusari affirment Escobar ibid. num 81. pag. 415. A Merchant saith he hinders that others cannot buy Merchandise from them who bring them from far by forestalling them and buying them up at first hand so that others are constrained to buy them of him more dear afterwards is he obliged to restitution Rebellius holds that he is obliged but Molina and others assure us that he may be dispensed with herein This Author saith nothing what his particular opinion is herein he contents himself to note that the greater number are those that are of opinion to favour the deceiver that is to say according to his principles their opinion is safe in conscience as if he would shelter himself under the protection of these Jesuits authority from the reproach which he saw might be east upon him for having advanced the Doctrine which opens a door to all the monopolies which are practised this day which authorizeth the injustice of all those who make hoards of Merchandises Grain Provisions and other things necessarie for ones life for exhausting and ruining the Provinces 10. Courtiers also and the favorites of Princes may advance their affairs by making use of the expedient which Filliutius hath given them For supposing that it is lawful for them to buy a good debt a great deal more cheap than it is worth of him who is in trouble fearing not to be paid he draws from thence this consequence a Hinc infertur 1. posse aulicum gratiosum apud Principem emere creditum privati hominis quod habet adversus Principem dimidio mivoris vel etiam minus si prudeater aestimetur minus valere quia in illo privato creditore parva sit spes illud recuperandi ita arb triopâ—udent is judicetu Filliutius tom 2 tract 35. c. 5. n. 107. p. 457. That a Courtier who is near unto a Prince may buy a debt of a private person due to him from the Prince for half the value and yet at a lower rate if he thinks that it is not so much worth because of the little hope that this private person had for to be paid and because it is the opinion of wise persons Tamburin in his book upon the decalogue which was lately published by the order of the general of the Jesuits and with the approbation of the Divines of that Society holds that one may b Si illam facultatem satisfaciendi hospitali impetrasti postquam minori pretio emisti ab hospitali creditum licite praedictam industriam excogitasti Tambur in lib. 8. decalogi tract 3. c. 7. sect 8. n. 7. buy in this manner even the charity which a King hath granted to an Hospital provided that they be bought before the King give order to pay the summe which he hath promised to the Hospital adding that Lugo allows this purchase to be made even after the order is given to pay this intire summe 11. A Judge that sells justice for money or presents is discharged from restitution by Escobar who takes Lessius for his warrant He presupposes that c Circa litem ea est varietas sententiarum ut possit judex utramlibet par tem in judicando sequi unus litigâ—…tium uti gratum sibi magis conciliet ei offert munus Requiro num peccet Judex contra justitiam illud accipiens ut sequatur hanc partem potiuâ— quà m istam the opinions are so divided in some affair that it is in the Judges power to follow which he pleaseth In the mean time one of the parties makes him a present to gain him to his side it is demanded if the Judge sin against Justice in receiving that which is given him to follow one of the two parties rather then the other See here the case clearly propounded to which he answers as clearly in a few words d Ex sententia Lessit respondeo non peccare contra justitiam Escobar tract 6. Exam. 6. n. 44. I answer following the advice of Lessius that he sins not again Justice It is easie to see what gap this answer opens to the corruption of Justice there being scarcely any point so clear and indubitable which may not be made obscure and doubtful and whereupon consequently one may not imagine that he may take money to judge to the advantage of whether side he will without being obliged to restore it This Jesuit had before propounded the same question and had resolved it in the same manner in his 3. Tract e Suppono causam esse aequatem potestne judex aliquid accipere Docet
must be very dull who cannot make use of this invention since it is not of necessity no not to know in particular nor what he doth nor what he saith whether it be true or not indeed and that it is sufficient to believe or suppose in general that it may be so and that a nimble witted man may finde some sense in which he can make the words true which are false in their natural and onely sense and which by consequence are not equivocations though he who pronounces them cannot do it SECT V. The method of the same Jesuits to hinder their equivocations from being ever discovered and that no person may be deprived of his liberty to make use of them AFter they have made the use of equivocations so free so common and so easie that all the world may make use of them indifferently on all occasions there remains nothing for the Masters of this art that is to say the Jesuits to do but to establish well the practice and to fortify themselves in such sort against all opposition that whatsoever precaution they use no person may be able to hinder them from making use thereof when they will nor to discover it when they have used it This Sanchez hath attempted to do and in this he hath laboured with great care and he hath proceeded therein beyond all other who have written on this matter After he hath established many rules given many advices about equivocations and the manner to form and make use of them he concludes with this advice as the last and most important a Tandem id observandum est quotier licitum est ad se tuendum uti aliqua aequivocatione id quoque erit licitum etsi interrogans urgeat excludens illam aequivocationem Sanch. op mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 45. p. 30. That so often as it is lawful in our own defence to use equivocations they may be used though he who examines us do presse us to answer him without making use of this very equivocation That is to say that so often as you believe that you may use equivocations which is alway lawful according to this Casuist and his Fraternity as we have already reported on all occasions and even without necessity and reason though you be admonished not to make use of it when it is forbidden you when you are caused to promise and even to swear that you will make no use of it notwithstanding all these precautions these defences these promises and the oath that you have made you have always the liberty to make use thereof None can speak more clearly and more favourably Notwithstanding if the practice of this rule seem to you too hard or too large he will help your understanding by examples which he brings and your belief by the authority of other Casuists whom he cites for you in these terms b Atque idem docent de reo qui rogatus de delicto secreto urgetur ut dicat sive fecerit publice sive occulto sive ipse Judex juridice interroget sive noa dicentes posse adhuc respondere se non fecisse intelligendo non ut tu in iniquitate tua rogas sed ut teneris tanquam Judex rogare Ibid. The Casuists say the same thing of a man accused who being axamined upon any secret crime is prest to answer whether it be publiquely or privately whether it be before a Judge juridically or not For they hold in this very case that he may answer that he hath not done it intending his answer not in that manner as the Judge examines him maliciously but in the manner he ought to examine him in the quality of a Judge It is sufficient that a malefactor or a witness form within himself a probable opinion that the Judge who examine him juridically ought not to examine him in the manner that he doth for to mock him and to elude his interrogatories by equivocation or by confidently denying most clear and certain things so that this mischief cannot possibly be hindred or prevented by him what precaution soever he useth The Judge is malicious and he interrogates this malefactor maliciously according to Sanchez because that in examining he uses the precautions which he believes necessary to draw the truth out of his mouth This malefactor is not malicious he answers not malicously but reasonably and wisely according to the Divinity of this Father because he observes exactly the rules of the equivocations and omits no jugling slight of mind to obscure the truth and to deceive the Judge who interrogates him by lying and perjury He brings also another example of the same subject c Atque idem docet de rogato à custodibus urbis aliqaem locum peste infectum esse falso ex stimantibus rogantibus quempiam an ex co loco venerit sive infectus peste sit five non nempe posse ipsum respondere non venire ex eo intelligendo non ut vos rogatis sed ut deberetis rogare Ibid. He holds the same thing saith he speaking of Navarre touching him who is interrogated by a Town-guard who believe falsely that the Town from whence he comes is infected with the plague and demands from him if he came from thence whether it be infected or it be not infected he may answer that he came not thence making this mental restriction in his minde I came thence not according to the question you make but according to the question you ought to make This method is not very favourable to civil government nor gives it much weight to the authority of Magistrates and their Officers also it is not very favourable for the establishment of Laws and for assuring the obedience which people owe unto Princes When a Soveraign commands any thing to his subjects there is no private man who shall receive his orders who may not promise to obey him though he be resolved to do nothing of that he shall command him by making use of this mental restriction and saying in himself d Non ut tu imperas sed ut deberes imperare I will do this not according as you command me but as you ought to command me Also in like manner when he is demanded any thing whereunto he imagines that he is not obliged to answer according to truth he may speak contrary to that which he thinks and to that which is true by the favour of this equivocation and of this secret thought which he bears in his minde e Non ut tuâ—ogas sed ut debâ—es interragaâ—e In answer saith he in himself not to that which you demand of me but according to that you ought to have demanded of me One may say by proportion the same thing of a child in relation to a Father of a servant in relation to a Master of a Monk or any other inferiour in relation to his Superior and so this rule banisheth absolutely truth and sincerity out of
who are the first modules to all them that followed in that rule had no other then an humane conduct in instituting and establishing of themselves that which seemed unto them just and reasonable not as instruments animated by Jesus Christ but as the Authors and principals thereof following their own sences and thoughts The Jesuits perhaps will not be much troubled to agree to all those thing which are common enough in their Society and maintained by their most famous Writers who teach that the Laws of the Church are no other then humane that its power and conduct extends onely to the outward man and that the Church it self is onely a politick body as shall be proved elsewhere when we come to make known how pernicious these maximes are to all Religion and overturn the power and authority of the Church After Azor had spoken so basely and so unworthily of the Apostles and Apostolical constitutions we need not think that strange which he saith against the Ancients and Fathers of the Church and would have the opinions of the new writers of these times to have as much weight and credit as they so that if the Fathers sometimes prevail with them against the new Authors the new Authors do as often and more frequently prevail over the Fathers It is in the second Book of his Moral Institutions where after he had demanded q Prime quaeritur an opinio probabilior existimetur ita ut morito praeserri debeat co quod sit antiquorum sententia altera sit recentiorum whether we ought to hold an opinion more probable because it is from the ancient Fathers or Whether for this reason it ought to be preferred before that of the moderns He answers in these terms r Respondâ—o quondâ— revera opiniones sunt pares saepe antiquorum opinio juniorum sententiae praefeatur non tamen lege aut ratione efficaci compellimur ad cam semper anteferendam Inst Moral l. 2. c. 17. q. 1. p. 127. when the opinions are equal themselves those of the ancients are commonly preferred before new writers but there is neither law nor reason sufficient to oblige us to preferre them always This is no great honour to the Fathers to say that we may preferre their opinions before those of modern Authors when the reasons appear equal on both sides since as much may be said of all sorts of Writers following the Jesuits rule of probability But the contempt is more manifest in that which he adds that even in this case there is no obligation to subject our judgements to the opinions of the Holy Doctors of the Church who in important affairs say nothing but what they learned of it and that every one hath liberty to follow them or not to follow them so it shall be lawful to follow the moderns always and never to follow the Fathers when the reasons of the moderns are as likely as those of the Fathers which will easily appear so to those who judge by humane sense and natural reason rather then by the light of Faith as the Casuists of these times and the people of the world commonly do It will also be lawful to preferre the moderns before the Ancients even when the ancients are grounded on more strong and solid reasons according to that maxime of the Jesuits who say that we may prefer an opinion which is lesse before another which is more probable For this is an infallible consequence of this maxime joyned to that other which will have the Fathers and their opinions considered no otherwise then by reason and conformity to humane sense as the Parliament of Paris considers the Laws and opinions of the ancient Roman Lawyers or rather as the hereticks consider the holy Fathers to whom even they render a little more honour and respect in appearance saying that they are to be judged not by reason as all these new Doctors but by the Scriptures though they regard not Scripture but according to their reason and the preoccupation of their spirits But they both agree in the over throw they give the authority of the Fathers subjecting them to their reason and their fancy and giving them onely as much force as they please following the custom of all those who impugn the truths and most assured and inviolable rules of antiquity and Religion Reginaldus handling the same question whether the ancients or the moderns are rather to be believed when they are found in contrary opinions He distinguishes upon the Point saying that Å¿ Quae cirta sidem emergunt difficultates eae funt à veteribus bauriendae quoe vere circa mores homine Christiano dignâ—s à novitiis scriptoribus Reginald praefat ad Lect. in resolving difficulties that arise about faith the right thereof is to be drawn from the ancients but those which regard manners and the life of Christians are to be taken from the modern writers It is ordinary with those who have no right to a thing for which they contest unjustly to endeavour to have it divided to the end that they may have at least one half when they cannot carry all for themselves It was by this rule that Solomon knew that of the two women who disputed in his presence in the case of the Infant either pretending that it belonged to her that she who would have had it cut asunder in the middle ought to have none of it and was not the true Mother So the Jesuits cannot better testifie that they are deprived of truth then by their consenting to divide it in such manner that one half should be to the ancients and the other half to the moderns that is themselves But if it belong to the ancients to determine on questions which arise about matters of Faith it must needs be that they also decide difficult matters of conscience and manners since the faithful ought to live by Faith and if we ought to take from the moderns the rules of manners and not of faith we must have another rule of life given us then faith if faith be not the source and measure of good works nor the principle of Christian life Celot undertaking to defend the Casuists of his company testifies that Reginaldus hath done as he said and having taught moral Divinity twenty years he always made profession to follow the opinions of the newest Authors quidem recentiorum Which he approves and confirms relating that very passage of the Author which we have just now cited in the same terms as we have produced them Celot l. 8. c. 16. p. 714. Quia quae circa fidem emergunt difficultates sunt a veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos a novitiis Scriptoribus Which shews that this wicked DOctrine is not peculiar to one or two but comes from the genius of the Society In whose name this Author wrote who seemeth desirous to separate us from the ancients and to hinder us from acknowledging them for
Sanchez saith g Quotidie contingere subito inveniri solutionum quas quis insolubiles putabat aut ab aliis facile solvi It happens dayly that we meet with answers unto reasons which we believed invincible So these principles and these inventions are very proper to overturn all the truths of piety or Religion This same Author demands also h An autoritas unius Doctoris docti probi reddat opiaio tem probabil m Respondeo reddere posse quempiam amplecti opinionem quam à magistro audivit in iis quae ad mo es pertinent Sanch. Ibid. n. 7. whether the authority of one single Doctor who is learned and honest do make an opinion probable And he answers yea adding that in what concerns manners a man may hold to an opinion which he hath learned of his School-master and follow it His reason is the same with what Azor and Layman have alledged k Quia opinio probabilis est quae non levi innititur fundamento ita autoritas viri docti pii non est leve fundamentum Because an opinion established upon some foundation that is not sleight is probable But the authority of a learned and pious man is no sleight foundation Whence it is easie to conclude that there is no Jesuit especially who are regent amongst them whose opinion may not be followed and practised how new and peculiar soever it appear and be indeed because there are none of them who are not believed to have these two qualities of learned and pious and to whom the Society do not attribute them So that when P. Hereau taught in the Colledge of Clermont that it is lawful to kill a man secretly who slanders us or who persecutes us unjustly his Scholars may without fear of offending God make themselves executors of this horrible Doctrine though it were suspected by them to be false because it is so barbarous and inhumane For they hold that though a Doctor or Regent should be deceived by publishing errours for truths we may always in conscience follow his opinion even when he erreth against Divine right This is that which Sanchez maintains resolutely against them who would restrain this liberty to errours against humane right or Law l Nec limitatio Adriani Cordubae ut hoc intelligatur si sit error juris humani secus si sit divini Ducunturque quia in rebus humani juris indagandis non tanta diligentia ac in rebus juris divini exigitur sed non placet Ibid. num 7. I cannot approve saith he their restriction who would extend this to errours against humane but not Divine Law they build upon this that we are not obliged to inquire with so much care the things which are of humane as those which are of Divine Law But I cannot approve this reason And he is not content to say it once but he repeats it oft to shew how much this limitation displeaseth him And his reason is m Quippe in utrisque est magni ponderis momenti virigravis pii autoritas Ibid. Because in these sorts of things the authority of a grave and pious person is of great weight That is to say that the authority of a Regent Jesuit is great and strong enough to prevail above Divine and humane right and to carry us against the Law of God And that so we may follow in conscience the erroneous opinion of a Casuist though that which he permits atd approves be forbidden and condemned by God in the Scripture He also enquires n An ab opinione communi recedere liceat whether it be lawful to dissent from common opinions He answers with Vasquez and Azor o At melius Vasquez Azor dicunt licere viro docto qui non parum literis vacarit recte utriusque partis fundamenta expenderit suam singularem opinionem probabiliorem judicare illam sequi Ibid. n. 9. p. 29. that it is lawful for a learned man and well studied and who hath examined the reasons of both sides to maintain that his private opinion is more probable and to follow it though he be single and alone in his opinion being otherwise it should not be particular p Quod in to eventu non videatur prudenter operari Becaufe he seems not herein to act against prudence since he hath found some reason that pleaseth him and seems good unto him which will easily happen to a proud spirit who can have no greater pleasure then to imagine that he surpasseth others by his subtilty and his wit But this Jesuit so learned in this matter and this wisdom of probability discovers one of the principal foundations upon which it is established and from which many conclusions may be drawn saying q Nihil repugnat ut duas opiniones è diametro sibicontradicentes idem intellectus probabiles judicet aut aeque aut alteram probabiliorem Ibid. num 12. pag. 29. there is nothing which hinders that one and the fame person may judge two opinions directly opposite to be equally probable or that the one is more then the other Whence he concludes in this manner r His it a praemissis prima difficultas est an cuique lice at in fore conscientiae operari juxta aliorum opinionem minus tutam quam probabilem reputat contra propriam tutiorem quam sibi probabiliorem esse persuadet Ibid. n. 13. p. 29. These things being thus presupposed the first difficulty is to know whether it is lawful in conscience to regulate our actions by the opinion of another when it is not sufficiently safe and which we believe onely probable quitting our own which is more safe and which we believe assuredly to be probable He at first rejects many Authors who say that this is not lawful and a At multo probabilius est licere n. 14. declares that it is much more likely that it is lawful His reason is that which he hath already alledged many times and which he repeats commonly b Existimans opinionem esse probabilem juxta illam operans nec imprudentiae nec temeritatis notam incurret Ibid. That he who believes an opinion probable acting according to that opinion ought not be condemned as rash or imprudent And seeing it might be said that this man acting against his own proper light and quitting an assured opinion to follow one less safe puts himself in danger to violate the Law of God and indeed to offend him which is not to act prudently He answers c Nec sic se exponit periculo peccandi formaliter id est ita ut illud peccatum ei imputetur that he exposes not himself to danger of sinning formally that is in such manner that the sin which he commits should be imputed unto him believing that he need not care if the Law of God be violated and if God be dishonoured provided that we our selves be not blamed and receive no hurt
quit it to follow that of Sancius because that is also probable and that he is free to change in this manner because it is very natural and very reasonable a man not being in slavery to his own opinions no more than to those of others Homo non est suarum opinionum mancipium but he is rather their Master and may and ought hold his spirit elevated above them how probable soever they be and make himself Judge thereof or rather serve himself with them as he pleaseth or reject them without troubling himself so much as to judge of them or examine them Whence he concludes that this Ecclesiastick hath done well and prudently in all his carriage He saith also that though this Ecclesiastick even then when he took his Diurnal that he might say what was contained therein according to the opinion of Sanchez had an intention to quit this opinion of Sanchez as soon as he was got onward at Sea and to take up and hold that of Sancius that he might discharge himself of the obligation of saying what was in his Diurnal as well as that which was in his Breviary yet he did no evil testifying that it is no evil for an Ecclesiastick to sport himself with the Church and its Commands to elude them and to perswade himself that he is not obliged at all to say any thing of the whole Breviary and though this have not been lawfull heretofore because this opinion was not then invented it shall be lawfull in time to come according to the maxim of these Divines because Caramouel a considerable and learned man maintains it For he is of himself alone capable to make an opinion probable and though he have not of himself this credit and authority Sanchez and Sancius whom he cites and whom he follows will give it him by a Rule of this Science which holds That a Scholar may hold and teach an opinion which he hath learned of his Master and after that it is probable and safe in conscience and that the same will be also so much safer as it is pleasanter by this other Rule that d Benigniores etsi aliquando sint minus probabiles per accidens sunt semper utiliores securiores the more sweet are alwayes the more profitable and more safe though they are less probable 6. But if you make scruple of not saying all the Service and that you desire only to be discharged of some part of it because it seems to you to be too tedious these obliging Divines will bestow on you two Expedients for your contentment The first is e Sacerdos quidam quotiâ—te recitare consuevit Officium Romanum fello Resurrectionis Dominicae proprium modo quaerit an peccaverit si sic qualiter Respondetur 1. Illum Sacerdotem si quotidie citra ullam rationabilem causam Officium Resurrectionis recitet peccare solummodo vemaliter Respondetur 2. Sacerdotem illum si id quod in casu proponitur faciat quotidie ex mediocri ration ibili causa nunquam ullo modo ne venialiter quidem peccare Caram Theol. fund p. 520. that you may choose the shortest Office of all the year as is that of Easter and say it every day without changing if you have any the least pretence which may appear a little reasonable It will be say they no sin at all and if you have no pretence they hold that it will be only a venial sin So it will be lawfull for an Ecclesiastick to overturn the whole Order of the Church and Divine Service singing Allelujah in the dayes of Lent and on Good-Friday and saying before God that Jesus Christ is risen whilst yet he is suffering and nailed to the Cross and all this shall be lawfull for him for his pleasure only and for his convenience or upon the least pretence in the world 7. The other is to say Matines and Lauds in the Evening following the practice that is of late common enough with intention to satisfie at once the obligation of this day and the following See here how Caramouel propounds this case f Peto utrum ille qui Vespere Matutinas Laudes recitat duorum dierum satisfaciat obligationi Opinio pâ—ima affirmat simplicem Matutinarum Laudum lect onem si fiat sub Vesperum duorum dierum obligâ—tioni fatisfacere probat quia una eadem actione potest Philipâ—us satisfacere duobus praeceptis numero distinctis eodem tempore concurrentibus huic è diametro opponitur sententia altera osserens non posse eadem ratione satisfiers utrique obligationi Ibid. p. 217. I ask whether he that sayes the Matines and Lauds in the Evening satisfies the obligation of two dayes The first opinion holds that bare rehearsing the Matines and Lauds in the Evening satisfies the obligation of two dayes and it is proved because that a man may by one sole action satisfie two different commands which are directed for the same purpose and which fall out at one and the same time There is another opinion quite opposite hereunto which holds that in saying the Service once only two obligations cannot be satisfied See there 's the case and here 's the answer g Proposui hanc doctrinam eximio cuidam Doctori Jesuita Theologiae Moralis à multis annis Professori bic Pragae docenti respondit sibi videri sententiam benigniorem probabilâ—m Ejus nomen non exprimo Scio enim illum malle in pace vivere quam ab ingenii perspicaâ—itate collâ—udari Ergo pro illa sit iste primus author sit sâ—cundus Caramouel sorte alii accedent quae probabilis est ab intrâ—…seco ab extrinseco erit etiam aliquando probabilis forte etiam nunc est probabilis ab extrinseco benigna opinio Est enim nova solum à nobis tractata habet pro se duos authores contra se nullum quia hoc verum cur non erit probabilis Ibid. p. 222. I have proposed this question to an excellent Doctor a Jesuit as a Scholar to his Master who hath a long time taught Moral Divinity and who taught it also here at Prague who told me that the more pleasant opinion seemed to him probable I name him not because I know he had rather live in peace without being assailed by ignorant persons than be commended for the greatness of his wit Let this Author then be the first for this opinion and Caramouel the second as it is reasonable that the Master should go before and the Scholar follow after It may be others will follow hereafter and as it is probable of it self so it will be one day by the authority of men and perhaps it is so at present for it is wholly new and I am alone the proposer of it and it hath two Authors for it and there are none against it And being so why is it not probable This opinion discharges of one part of the Breviary
in a Collection which he hath made of the principal decisions which are drawn from the principles of the Doctrine of Probability where after he had reported a great quantity according to the order of the Alphabet he declares that there are an infinite of others which he hath not nor can report because that would be very difficult and tedious and the maxims and use of the Rules of Probability extending themselves in a manner unto all sorts of matters there would need an entire Volume wherein to collect and report them simply Operosum id ita est prolixum quippe per omnes fere materias est percurrendum ut integrum merito volnmen exposcat yet I cannot abstain from reporting here also three taken out of this Author which shew an extraordinary and palpable corruption and a very peculiar deprivation of reason in those who are capable to approve or follow them 1. n Probabile est v. c. hoc vectigal injuste esse impositum probabile item esse impositum juste possumne ego bodie quia sum exocto Regius vectigalium exigere ejusmodi vectigal sequendo opinionem asserentem illud juste esse impositum atque adeo licere mihi sine injustiâ—ia illud exigere cras imo etiam hâ—die quia sum Mercator illud occulte defraudare sequendo opinionem asserentem illud à justitia deficere It is probable saith he for example that an Excise is justly established it is probable on the other side that it is unjust may I being at present established by the King to raise this Impost exact it according to the opinion which maintains that it is just and therefore lawfull for me to levy without doing any injustice and to morrow or the same day being I am a Merchant may I secretly defraud this very Impost following the opinion which condemns it of injustice 2. o Secundo probabile rursus est ablationem famae pecunia compensari probabile non compensari Possumne ego bodie infamatus velle ab infamante compensationem in pecunia cras imo bodie ego ipse alium insamans nolle famam proximi à me ablatam compensare pecunia It is probable that the loss of reputation may and may not be compensated with money May I to day being defamed desire satisfaction in money and to morrow or this very day having defamed another not be willing to allow him the same compensation 3. In the third place p Tertio probabile item reo licere aequivocare in judicio probabile non licere Possumne ego reus bodie aequivocare cras vero creatus Judex urgere reum ut non aequivocet Haec innumerabilia ejusdem generis hic in controversiam narrantur In casibus relatis num 1. 2. 3. atque in similibus licitam esse ejusmodi mutationem concedimus Tamb. l. 1. Theol. c. 3. sect 5. num 1. 2. 3. 21. It is probable that a Defendant may use equivocations in Justice May I being this day Defendant use equivocations and to morrow being chosen Judge constrain the Defendants not to make use of them In the process he answers In this case and other such like I grant that it is lawfull to change opinion He believes therefore that these persons may do that justly unto others which they would not have done unto themselves and which they would free themselves from as much as possible and he sees not that this is to overturn the prime Law of Nature and the Gospel which ordains That we should do unto others that which we would they should do unto us and not to do unto others that which we would not they should do unto us and that this is at once to violate all the Commandments of God which are founded on this principle of Nature and all the Law and Prophets which according to Jesus Christ's saying depend upon this rule and all the Holy Scripture which are nothing else but an extension and explication of this same principle SECT IV. That the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability ruines entirely the Authority of the Church of Pastors and Superiors of all sorts TO make this truth appear we must observe that there are four sorts of Principles for ruining the Authority of Superiors 1. By corrupting or destroying the principle of it 2. By bounding it and encroaching upon it 3. By rejecting or weakning its commands 4. By hindring Subjects from obeying The Jesuits by the Doctrine of Probability corrupt the Authority of the Church in the original of it in attributing to it no other than a mere humane power They retrench and destroy it in not consenting that it may prescribe the inward actions of vertue they bound it and encroach upon it by the irregularity of their Priviledges which they abuse to the contempt of the commands and Ordinances of Bishops and invading their Jurisdiction they utterly abolish some of their Laws and they weaken others of them and there are hardly any unto which they have not given some assault by the multitude of inventions they have found out to defeat and elude them These points are entirely verified in the whole process of this Book and some of them in entire Chapters But that which is remarkable and very proper to justifie what I pretend here is this that the means and the armes which they and those who follow their opinion make use of to fight against the Authority of the Church in all these manners are the maxims of their Doctrine of Probability The Authority of the Church is of it self assured and uncontroulable being supported by the firm rock of Gods Word For this cause there cannot be found a means more ready or more infallible to ruine or weaken it than to undermine its foundation and to make it depend on humane reason and authority submitting its Jurisdiction and its power to the disputes and contests of the Schools and rendring in that manner every thing probable that respects its power that they may afterwards become the Arbitrators and Masters thereof It is not needfull here to repeat all that is found in the body of this Book to prove this truth it is sufficient only to report some passages of their Authors and their Disciples in which they avow themselves that the Doctrine of Probability doth absolutely ruine the Authority of the Church and of all sorts of Superiors and they make it so clear in the examples that they produce that after they are read it seems not that any person can doubt thereof Hereof see one manifest proof in the case which Caramouel propounds in these terms q Petrus secutus opinionem benignam probabilem non satissacit mandato sui Abbatis in casu in quo probabiliter non tenetur obedire probabilius tenebatur Praelatus supscribens sententiae severiori judicat illum debuisse obedire proinde peccasse Petitur an possit contra illum procedere punire tanquam inobedientem Caram in com in reg S. Bened. l. 1. n.
the malice of the action be demonstrative that is that they be such as whereto no probable answer can be given 2. And in the second place he ought also shew that the reasons which prove this same action to be good and lawfull be not so much as probable which cannot be done but by giving to every one in particular a solution which is indubitable and evident 3. In the third place he is also obliged to make appear that the opinion which maintains that this action is good hath not sufficient authority to be held probable He is obliged to prove these three things together and if he fails but in one though he prove the other two he will lose his cause There needs nothing more to make invincible all sorts of wicked opinions and which lead men unto looseness and vice it being certain that it is impossible to convince them by the rules and conditions which this Disciple of the â—efuits prescribes For there being no reasons so evident which the wit of man can not obscure and entangle by his passion and artifices it is clear that if evil mexionâ— must be judged by reason and dispute none will ever be convict because the animosity of men may alwayes maintain them by contrary reasons And if we cannot be assured of any truth unless we can entirely salve all the difficulties which occurre therein as this same Author pretends it will follow that there shall never be any thing assured in Morality nor in Doctrine nor in Faith nor in Nature since it is manifest that the greatest and most indubitable Truths are subject to innumerable difficulties which the most learned and the most ingenious know not oftentimes how to explicate And so every thing shall be uncertain and probable There shall be no difference betwixt good and bid Doctrine and it shall be lawfull for all men to follow what they please in every kind of matter which is the proper scope of these Doctors of Probabilities The evil Doctrine shall have even all sorts of advantage above the good because according to this Casuist he that maintains it needs prove nothing of that he saith nor answer to any thing that can be said against him but by Probabilities And on the contrary he that speaks for truth and who condemns errour looseness and vice is obliged to prove all that he saith by demonstrations and to answer and refute all that which his adversary can say with reasons so clear and cogent that he cannot reply any thing that hath so much as an appearance of truth And when he hath entirely disarmed him and destroyed all his reasons making him see clearly that they are of no value and that they are not so much as probable only he hath yet gained nothing at all For if you believe this Casuist he must besides this take from him all his Authority of every sort and reduce him to that pass that he may be able to find none sufficient to support his opinion and render it probable which is in a manner impossible because it suffices as to this to have one single Casuist that teaches it and though none have yet ever taught it he that invents and first maintains it may make it probable if he be accounted a man of learning and piety and there are none but such amongst the Masters of this Science So his opinion shall be alwayes probable and though false and pernicious it shall be shot-free under probability 5. This is one rule of these great Doctors that b Benigniores eisi aliquando sint minus probabilts per accidens sunt sempâ—r utiliores securiorâ—s Caram Theol. fued p. 134. the opinion more sweet is alwayes better and more safe though it be less probable By this rule the opinions which favour looseness and corrupt inclinations will be more safe and their probability alwayes invincible For if the reasons which are applyed against them be more forcible and pressing they will thereby become indeed less probable but they will not thereby become less pleasing and consequently they will become alwayes better and more sure according to the maxims of this marvellous Science 6. But if you oppose against them the authority of the Saints and Antient Fathers they will say that their opinions are very probable but those of the Casuists of these times are no less probable that the Moderns carry it even above the Antients c Quod ownia quae pulcbie cogitarunt jâ—m sunt à junioribus summo sludio ingenio elimata Ibid. p. 22. Quae circa sidem emergunt difficultates eae sunt à veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos à novitiis scriptoribus Celor l. 8. c. 16. p. 714. because their best thoughts are cleared up and perfected by those that followed them But though the opinion of the Antients be more probable that of the Moderns being more pleasant they conclude by their principles that it is better and more safe They maintain also that when the question is about Faith we may well have recourse unto the Antients and hold that which they have believed and taught in their Writings but in matter of manners and the conduct of life we must take our rules from the new Casuists 7. One of the most certain wayes to know that an opinion is bad are the bad consequences and pernicious effects which naturally follow thereupon but this is not capable to stay the defenders of the Jesuits probability They acknowledge the dangerous consequences and pernicious effects which issue infallibly from many Novel opinions which they teach and they for bear not to maintain them at all and protest that they will maintain them alwayes because they seem probable and no person can condemn them d Multa inoonvenientia suboriuntur ex restrictionibus mentalibus multae â—x occultis compensationibus multa ex licentia occidendi injustum Judicem aut teslem quam nonnulli concedunt multa ex illa opinione quae docer de occultis non judicare Reelesiam multa ex aliis Quibus tamen non obstantibus inconvenientibus illae sentensiae in terminis quibus bodie traduntur in Scholis sunt ut minimum probabilissimae à nemine damnari pessunt Caram Theol. fund p. 549. Hereupon follow many inconveniences saith Caramouel which arise from these mental restrictions secret compensations the liberty which some give to kill an unjust Judge or Witness the opinion which holds that the Church cannot judge of secret things and other like opinions and yet all these inconveniences hinder not but that these opinions so as they are taught at this day in the Schools are at the least very probable and cannot be condemned by any 8. If it be represented unto them that a good part of these Novel opinions are contrary to the Laws of the Church and some of them to the Civil Laws also they pretend that because they be Novel they are exempt from the censure
office and the other in being unwilling to answer doth nothing against his duty In a word they are both in equal safety of conscience the Penitent in disobeying his Confessor who holds the place of a Father unto him and of God himself and the Confessor in neglecting his Charge and betraying his own conscience to follow that of a sinner whom he sees to be both in errour and obstinacy The end and principal care of these Fathers as it appears by their discourse is to excuse the Penitent as much as they can from punishment and shame that is to hinder him from repenting truly which consists particularly in the punishment and confusion which he receive from his sin for repairing the pleasure which he hath had and the dishonour which he hath done to God in committing it It is also for this end and upon this design that Dicastillus furnisheth his Penitents with this new Method to make Confession by dividing one and the same sin into many parts and to accuse himself thereof at several times 3 Qui fecit votum v.g. servandi sextum decalogi praeceptum potest separatim in eadem confessione dicere se fornicatum fuisse subinde in decursu fateri se fregisse votum in re gravi Dicast n. 171. d. 2. d. 9. tract 8. de poenit He that hath made a vow to observe the Commandments of the Decalogue may in the same Confession say apart that he hath fallen into fornication and a while after not to have observed a vow which he made in a matter of consequence By this way the very great confusion which the Penitent might have by the enormity of his crime is diminished 5. There is another case in which according to these people a Penitent may also retain and conceal his sins to wit If he can reasonably apprehend that telling all to his Confessor without concealing any thing his friends or himself may at any time be concerned in their goods their bodies or their honour I believe that in this case saith Bauny in his Sum Chap. 4. pag. 655. It would be lawful for him to suppress and conceal the offence which being known of his Confessor might cause unto the Penitent such effect as he imagines ought to follow the confession thereof And a little after he gives the same liberty to him who fears that by declaring his sins his Confessor will be made to use him hardly to hate him therefore to be offended at him cause him to remove from the place where he dwells or deprive him of some convenience he receives by him This man shews himself here also very favourable to the Penitent he is not contented to excuse him from the shame which he might have had in discovering all his faults and his weaknesses he would not that for this he or any of his friends might one day that is at all be concerned in their goods bodies or honour And if he can have but some reason to fear that this may fall out or that his Confessor after the knowledge that he hath given him of his conscience and of his sins will use him ill and hate him or be offended with him that is to say will use him with more severity or ordain him to do something that may be displeasing to him though it be for the Salvation of his Soul or will remove him from the place where he dwelleth because perhaps it is the next occasion of sin unto him or will deprive him of some commodity that he may receive from him in all these cases and for all these reasons it shal be lawful for him according to the opinion of Bauny to suppress and conceal the offence which known to the Confessor might cause unto the Penitent the effects which he imagines ought to follow from his confession thereof if he chuse not rather to satisfie the duty of his confession and at the same time avoid all the inconveniences which may arrive upon the knowledge of his sin which he gives unto the Priest by making use of Dicastillus's expedient 1 Si dicat in genere aut specie non completa tacendo illam circumstantiam sic ergo possit dicere se fecisse peccatum mortale fortasse dicere in tali genere sed non recordari cujus speciei quod verum est intelligendo de notitia quae possit tunc deservire ad confitendum in ea occasione Dicast n. 180. d. 11. d. o tract 8. de poenit And tell his sins in general without particularizing their kind adding that he remembers not of what kind his sins were And all this he may say without any lye making use of the Doctrine of mental Reservation For it is true that he knows not the kind of his sin to declare it unto him upon this present occasion and he will not declare it and he believes that he hath a right not to do it because he would not that the Confessor should know his estate and his bad disposition to avoid correction penance and the confusion he might have sustained thereby So that the pride and vanity of this man give him a right to a twofold prophanation of the Sacrament of Penance in concealing his sins voluntarily and in covering this criminal silence and disguisement with an affected and artificial lye It is easie to perceive that it suffrceth to imagine that some one of these effects may arise from confession to have liberty to conceal sins from a Confessor or not to discover them but very generally the greatest sinners and persons most addicted to the world will always find some one of these reasons and pretences to speak noething but what they please in confession and to suppress their most notable crimes My design obliges me only to represent these excesses but if I had undertaken to refute them and to make these good Fathers see their extravagancies I should not desire to make use of other reason or authority against them and especially against Bauny than his own For speaking of the Confessor and of the Cognizance which he ought to have of his Charge and of the conscience of his Penitents in Chap. 38. pag. 589. Of a truth saith he as he holds the place of a Judge in this Sacrament as saith the Council in the 14. Session and 9. Canon he neither can nor ought pass sentence but upon that whereof he hath a full and entire cognizance And a little after making use also of the Authority of the Council he adds In the Canon omnis utriusque sexus he is called a Physitian of Souls if he know not their wounds how can he heal them and after the manner of a Physitian pour oyl into the wounds of the wounded more medicorum superinfundere vulneribus sauciati Whence he draws this consequence of the Council and with the Council it self He ought therefore saith the Council cited in the Chapter we last mentioned omnis utriusque sexus diligently enquire after the
statim confiteri Respondetur negative Ita Lugo num 150. est communis sententia quia Concllium solum loquitur de co qui ob urgentem necessitatem sine consessione celebrat Dicastill tract 4. de Euch. d. 9. d. 9. num 155. That it obligeth only Priests who have said Mass in some great and urgent necessity If then he say Mass being in mortal sin without necessity he shall not be obliged yea though he also did it maliciously he should not be obliged ex mera malitia And they find so little irreverence and so little evil in administring the Sacraments and offering Sacrifice in this manner that they even permit the Faithful to exact of them these Functions without any necessity although they also know that they are in an estate of sin 1 Licet cuicunque petere recipere Sacramentum Sicerdote existente in mortali etiam non Paroche nec parato allas ipsum conserre si perenti ea receprio futura sit commodior vel utillor quam si ab alio peteretur Idem tract 1. de Sacram. d. 3. d. 13. num 296. It is lawful for every one saith Dicastillus to demand and receive the Sacraments of a Priest who is in the estate of mortal sin though he be not his Parish-Priest nor be designed for it nor so much as disposed to administer them unto him if he find it more for his convenience and benefit than to demand it of others It is as casie a matter to receive the Sacraments as to administer them there is no more preparation for the one than for the other And if these Maxims were well grounded we might complain of the rigour and severity of the Jesuits seeing the Sacraments are not yet so frequented as they ought to be since in what estate soever we receive or give them there is so much to gain and nothing to lose THE SECOND PART OF THE SECOND BOOK Of the Outward Remedies of SIN That the Divinity of the Jesuits abolishes or corrupts them THE Physitian labours for his Patient when he prescribes what he ought to do as well as when he presents unto him what he ought to take for his Cure Whence it comes that they say commonly that he hath given him a good Remedy when he hath given him good advice how to remove the Disease whereof he is sick So that not only the things which he prescribes but the prescriptions themselves are remedies but with this difference that what he prescribes as Purges and Medicines are the inward remedies because they act upon the disease it self and have an internal vertue proper to destroy it when they are taken effectually but the prescriptions are as it were external remedies because they act not immediately upon the disease but only upon the mind of the discased by the knowledge they give him of his disease and of what he ought to do for his cure We must say the same thing holding the Rules of Proportion of our Souls diseases and remedies We have already observed that Grace Penance good Works and the Sacraments are the internal remedies of sin because they have a divine and internal vertue which the Spirit of God hath impressed upon them to expel sin from the Soul or to prevent its entrance thereinto And we say here that the holy Scripture the Commandments of God and those of the Church are the external remedies of the same sin because though they act not immediately upon sin they act upon the mind of the sinner and if they change not his will internally they touch his mind and conscience externally by the knowledge they give him of sin and by the fear which they impress upon him of the punishments with which God hath threatned those who commit them We have seen in the former Part of this second Book that the Jesuits destroy the internal remedies of sin we shall see here in this how they abolish or corrupt the external and so it will appear that they favour and cherish sin as much as they can This second Part shall have three Chapters The first shall be of the Corruption of Scripture The second of the Commandments of God And the third of the Commandments of the Church CHAPTER I. Of the Corruption of Scripture That the Jesuits corrupt the Scriptures divers ways THere are only three things to be considered in the holy Scripture the Letter the Sense and the Authority And accordingly we may distinguish three different manners of corrupting holy Scripture 1. In the Letter by adding taking away or changing something in the sacred Text. 2. In the Sense by false Expositions 3. In the Authority by debasing the Author and diminishing the belief that is due unto him Now let us see in what manner the Jesuits have corrupted and yet do every day corrupt the holy Scripture We might compose great Volumes of Passages which they have altered by false Interpretations yea may be of all places wherein Canonical Writers and Jesus Christ himself have spoken with any vehemence and vigour concerning the Holiness of our Mysteries the Duties of a Christian and the narrow way to Salvation we should be troubled to find one whereunto they have not given some blow haling them from their natural sense by Expositions false and contrary to the general Consent of the Fathers and Tradition of the Church that they might accommodate them to the relish and lusts of worldly men I will relate only some few to serve for Example S. Paul saith writing to the Corinthians 1 Si habutro omnem fidem Ita ut montes transferam charitatem autem non habuero nihil sum Et si distribuero in cibos pauperum omnes facultates meas si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardesm charitatem autem non habuero nihil mihi prodest 1 Cor. cap. 15. Though I had faith to remove mountains and had not charity I were nothing And though I should distribute all my goods to the relief of the poor and though I should give my body to be burnt if I had not charity it would avail me nothing But Father Celot being resolved to maintain the contrary saying that we may suffer Martyrdom profitably and do those other works whereof the Apostle speaks like a Christian without any motion from Charity to defend himself from this passage so strong and so manifest he corrupts and subverts it in this manner He saith that this must be extended to the habit and not to the act and motion of Charity meaning that the actions of which S. Paul speaks may be meritorious holy and perfect though they be done without love to God and though we never think of him provided we be in an estate of Grace So that he maintains that a man who is in the estate of Grace cannot act otherwise than by this Charity whereof the Apostle speaks See his words 2 Eo loco habitum charitatis postulari ab Apostolo aio ego 3
contained in the rest he saith on the contrary that other Precepts are contained in this of love and depend on it He saith not that to love God is to serve him and do what he commands in any sort though it be without love he testifies rather that to love him with all our heart is to serve him and fulfil all his Commandments because the desire to discharge our duty which is contained in love supplies the place of all outward services which we cannot but would perform if we were able The Jesuits on the contrary teach that the Command to love God depends on is comprised in and confounded with the rest They say that to love God so much as we are or can be obliged by God himself is only to obey him in his other Commands though it be done without love That it is sufficient love of God to do nothing against him That to discharge our duty and what the Holy Scripture ordains in this point it suffices not to hate him As to what remains it is left to every ones liberty in particular to love him if he list and when he pleases so that no person in the whole course of his life can ever be obliged by the Precept of loving God above all things so that he should not sin at all against this Commandment who never put forth any inward act of love as Father Sirmond affirms in his Book of the Defence of Vertue tr 2. pag. 15. So that though indeed it would be a happiness to love God actually more than all things yet provided we offend him not he will not damn us pag. 16. And finally that it is in this manner that God might and ought command us his holy love pag. 24. These passages and many others besides which I have related in the former Chapter which treats of the Corrupting of Holy Scripture by the Jesuit-Authors are so clear that there needs no explication for understanding them They are so express and formal that without drawing any consequences from them which they do contain they that read or hear them only may easily perceive that they tend directly to abolish the Command of loving God Nevertheless because we have to do with a people who pretend to measure all by and attribute very much to their own reason I will also make use of it as they do and I will imploy their own against them or rather with them that I may the better detect their opinions upon this Point and make appear more clearly the false Principles whereupon they teach that there is no absolute Command to love God The first Discourse of Father Anthony Sirmond is this If there be a Command to love it obligeth to the observation thereof by its own Authority I mean it obligeth us to love God Now during the whole life of man there is neither time nor occasion wherein we are obliged to love God because as he saith pag. 16. God commanding us to love him contents himself as to the main that we should obey him in his other Commands and that because God hath not obliged us absolutely to testifie our affection to him otherwise than by yielding obedience unto him pag. 18. And because though we have no love for him effectually we cease not for all that to fulfil in rigour the command of love by doing good works so that we may see here the goodness of God He hath not commanded us so much to love him as not to hate him pag. 19. And because a God so loving and lovely commanding us to love him is finally content that we obey him pag. 28. And by consequent according to this Jesuit there is no absolute Commandment to love God since we are not bound to the observation of it by any Authority of its own as he pretends Another Argument taken also out of Father Sirmond is this Every Command carries some threatning with it to keep them in their duty to whom it is made and then some penalty or punishment against those who violate it Now the Commandment which God gave us to love him contains neither threat nor punishment at least no grievous one And by consequence we cannot say that this is a Commandment truly so called The first Proposition of this Syllogism is certain and evident of it self But beyond this you shall find also in Father Sirmond tr 2. pag. 20. 21. where he distinguishes of two sorts of commands the one of indulgence which requires something without strict obligation thereto the other of rigour which absolutely obligeth to what it hath ordained And to express himself more fully he adds afterwards that he commands as much as is possible but without threats without adding any penalty at least any grievous one to him who disobeys His command is all honey and sweetness or to speak more properly this is only an advice when he adds a penalty or commination of death then it is given in rigour The second Proposition is his also and more expresly than the former in the 14. page of the same Treatise where after he had said by way of inquiry If there be any command to love God it must oblige by its own Authority to its observation He puts this Question And some one may demand And to what is he obliged by his transgression Sins he mortally against this Precept who never exercises this inward act of love And he answers thereupon in these terms I dare neither affirm nor deny it of my self Indeed the answer he was about to give to this question was too impious to proceed from the Mouth or Pen of a Jesuit He had need to use or rather to abuse the Authority of some great Saint to cover it and to make him say by force and against his judgment what he durst not propound of himself S. Thomas saith he 22. q. 44. a. 6. seems to answer no and to be content for avoiding damnation that we do nothing otherwise against sacred love though we never in this life produce any formal act thereof S. Thomas speaks not of this in the place he quotes but speaks rather the contrary And how could S. Thomas say that no man is ever obliged to love God at all in his whole life since the whole world knows that he held That all men are obliged to turn unto God and to love him as soon as they begin to have the use of reason Notwithstanding this he forbears not to repeat the same thing and to confirm it also in these terms speaking of Charity and the Love of God He commands us not as we have said if S. Thomas may warrant us to love God under pain of damnation It is sufficient for him to save us that we habitually cherish it in us by the observation of his other Laws pag. 77. and in the 24. pag. God would be loved freely if he threats it is that he may be obeyed And also pag. 16. To love God actually more than all O the
without herein making himself guilty of any fault He saith also the same thing of them who make profession of living well and of all those who of deliberate purpose reject the inspirations and graces by which God inclines them to do any good work though both the one and the other knew that their Salvation would depend upon these inspirations and that through neglect of receiving them and complying with them they might be lost eternally 1 Fateor certe in hujus acceptatione usuque consilii salutis cardinem non raro versari Quo tempore dicss oportet gravissimo se obstringere peccato qui omittar Ego nullum praecise agnosco Celot lib. 9. cap. sect 7. pag. 816. I acknowledge saith he that Salvation depends many times of this counsel and the use that is made of it you must say he speaks to his Adversary that in this case he that will not follow it commits a great sin But as for me I hold that he commits none at all A man that suffers himself to dye of hunger without being willing to take bread or any other nourishment that is presented unto him when he might easily do it would pass in the judgment of all the world for a self-murderer and he that suffers his Soul to dye or rather who kills it by refusing knowingly and even resolvedly the graces and inspirations sent him by God on which he knows that his eternal life and Salvation depend shall be innocent in the judgment of these Jesuits Quo tempore dicas oportet gravissimo se obstringere peccato ego nullum praecise agnosco THE SUM Of the Doctrine of the Jesuits concerning the Love of Charity which a man owes unto God and to himself THey say that when God commands us to love him he intends only that wâ— should serve him though it be without love that he desires no other thing but that we obey him by doing outwardly that which he injoyns us that he would have us also to keep the other Commandments though in keeping them we love him not that it is sufficient not to hate him to fulfil the Commandment of loving him and by consequence to be saved God hath commanded us to love him with all our heart and all our might that is to say so much as we can The Jesuits say on the contrary that it is lawful to love him as little as we will and much less than we might if we would and that this suffices because according to them the least degree of love may satisfie this Commandment As God loves us always and doth us good without intermission so he would also that our love and acknowledgments should be continual and without bounds But the Jesuits maintain that we may pass over whole years without loving him and that by bethinking our selves thereof once in five or seven years we are quit yea that though we have never actually loved him at all through our whole life it suffices to discharge us from this obligation we have to love him to think thereof at the point of death nay there be some who do hardly acknowledge even this obligation God is not content to be loved in a slight way he will be loved as God and as he deserves above all things The Jesuits say on the contrary that we may love all things more than God because according to their Divinity the least degree of love suffices to acquit us of what we owe him And when God saith that he will be loved above all things they hold that he would say only above all things that are evil and contrary to his friendship that is to say above all sorts of mortal sins which only can overturn and destroy the friendship which men have with God As man cannot find his bliss but in God so he loves not himself truly but so far as he loves God seeks adheres and is united to him by love but the Jesuits dispense with him for this genuine love which he owes himself by discharging him of that which he is obliged to bear towards God They say moreover that being departed from God he may continue in that estate without troubling himself about returning to God and himself and that when God seeks him first by his inspirations he may refuse and reject them and abide in this estate of enmity and voluntary aversion from God until the point of death and so expose himself to the danger of perishing eternally without making himself by this guilty of any fault and without being deficient in the love he owes himself any more than in that he owes God III. POINT Of the Command to love our Neighbour that the Jesuits utterly destroy it FAther Bauny in his Sum Chap. 7. pag. 81. expounds the Command to love our Neighbour in these terms By Charity we are obliged to testifie unto him who may have offended us that we retain no animosity against him and according to the convenience of times and persons give him proofs of the love we bear him He quotes some Divines from whom he hath taken what he saith and he adds reason grounded on the Example and Authority of the holy Fathers For love saith he which we bear towards our brethren ought to resemble that which the members have one towards another as writes S. Austin in the 15. of his 50 Homilies Si enim sic nos amare voluerimus quomodo se invicem amant membr nostri corporis perfecta in nobis charitas potest oustodiri And making application of this Example taken out of S. Austin and which S. Austin took out of S. Paul Let us see then saith he what it is the members of the body do naturally one for another They love and agree mutually and sympathize with one another in misery Quando sanum est caput congaudent omnia membra placent sibi de singulis caetera membra c. See here the duties of Charity towards our Neighbour which he acknowledgeth with the Divines and holy Fathers and then he establisheth the command and obligation It is even hereunto that God and Nature obligeth us saith S. Ambrose in the first Book of his Offices Chap. 28. And therefore Secundum Dei voluntatem naturae copulam invicem nobis auxilio esseâ—debemus certare officiis velut in medio omnes utilitates ponere adjumentum ferre alter alteri vel studio vel officio vel pecunia vel alio quolibet modo ut inter nos societatis augeatur gratia Perhaps it will be wondred at at first that I having undertaken to represent only the Errours of the Jesuits have rehearsed these places of Father Bauny as if I had something to reply against them But I do not pretend to reprove him for producing the opinion of the holy Fathers with those of the School-Divines that he might establish one of the principal points of Christian Morality I have no other design than to make him see clearly the excess wherewith he is
is altogether equal to a Lay-mans Cum in hoc Religiosus Secularis fint omnino pares But Escobar forgot these words or rather left them out purposely though they seemed favourable enough to the design he had of establishing unto Monks the right of killing for honour Without doubt he believed that this would debase too much the right of the Monks in this point to make them equal to Lay-men For the right of the Monks being grounded according to him on their Profession and Vertue as the Laicks on their valour and dexterity in managing their Arms being the Profession and Vertue of Monks is more elevate and more to be esteemed than the Exercise of Arms it must necessarily follow by this reason of Amicus that the right which the Religious have to kill for honour being better grounded should also be stronger and greater than the Laicks And by consequence he ought not to have said that the condition of the one and the other was altogether equal but it must be concluded by the Principle and Argumentation of these Jesuits that in this the Monks ought to have advantage over the Laicks and that they may kill with more liberty and upon less occasion those who invade their honour And the reason hereof is clear Because the more precious honour is the more easie it is to hurt it and the fault of him that doth it is the greater and as offences which are slight being done against private persons are very great and deserve exemplary chastisement being done against the honour of a Prince or a King so an injury which would not be considerable against the person of a Laick would be criminal being done against a Monk to blast his or his Orders reputation By this Rule it is easie to judge how far this pretended right may be extended or rather it will be hard to judge of its so great extent As it will be at the pleasure of Monks to set their honour vertue and the respect due unto their Profession at what rate they please so it will also be in their power to judge of the greatness of the faults which are committed against them in this point and consequently of the penalty they deserve who commit them And if it be lawful for a Lay-man to kill for a matter of small value licet sit res parvi pretii as Vasquez saith by example for an Apple or a Crown ut pro pomo vel etiam uno aureo servando as saith Lessius as we have seen when a mans honour is concerned in the taking these things from him we must confess that a yet lesser occasion if a less can be had than an Apple or a Crown will suffice according to this Divinity to give the same toleration to a Monk We need only look surlily upon him do or say the least thing to offend him to incur his displeasure and thereupon to dye by his hand if he please to make use of this right which the Jesuits attribute unto him as they also usurp it themselves and pretend they may use it as we shall see in the following Point where we relate the Opinion of Father Petavius upon this matter V. POINT The Conformity of the Jesuits who in our days have taught in their Colledges with the more Ancient in the Doctrine of Murder THis Doctrine having been invented and established partly by the most ancient and most considerable Divines of the Company of Jesuits as we have now seen in the preceding Points their Authority hath given such credit and such a current to it amongst their Fraternity that passing thus from one to another as a Tradition of the Society it hath been ever since maintained by their Schools and is propagated unto our days without any interruption On the contrary it hath by succession of time received a notable increase and far greater Authority by the multitude of those who have followed it the later always endeavouring to add something and to augment the inheritance of their Fathers by expounding and extending more and more the bloody and inhumane Maxims which they had left them on this subject For some years this Doctrine hath also been taught in divers places of this Realm in many Colledges of the Jesuits at the same time and many years together in the same Colledges Father Flachaut and Father Le Court have taught it at Caen and in teaching it have been transported to all excess which therein could be committed I will only report here one or two passages of one of these two Casuists faithfully extracted out of his Writings which have been verified by publick Authority by the diligence of the Rector of the University of Paris wherein he hath heaped together and said in short a great part of what Lessius and others have propounded upon this subject See here his own words 1 Dico 5. probabiliter licitum esse cuivis etiam Clerico Religioso per se loquendo semoto scandalo occidere furem fugientem etiam non resistentem ferentem res tuas pretiosas puta equum praesertim Ecclesiae si aliter recuperare nequces I say that it is probably lawful for all sorts of persons even for Clergie-men and Monks speaking absolutely and setting aside scandal to kill a Thief who flyes though he make no resistance when he takes away some precious thing as a Horse especially Church-goods and which he cannot otherwise recover 2 Itemque licitum esse occidere fugientem si id necessarium sit ad defensionem honoris tui notabiliter amittendi I say moreover that it is lawful to kill a Thief who flyes if it be necessary to the preservation of mine honour therein notably concerned 3 Denique licet volentem te percutere leviter occidere ubi id insignis est injuria praesertim in Nobilibus nimirum accepta alapa gladio percutere statim ad vitandam ignominiam conservandumque honorem Ita docti permulti Finally it is lawful especially for Gentlemen to kill him who is minded to smite them though slightly if the injury and dishonour they receive thereby be remarkable so after they have received a box on the ear they may presently strike with the Sword to avoid disgrace and preserve their honour This is the opinion of many learned men These learned men are Molina Lessius Sanchez and others whom we have produced in the fore-going Points as the Authors and Fathers of this Doctrine since they have confessed themselves that they found it not in the Books of other Divines at least as to certain the most important Propositions The same Casuist saith that a man who fears lest another should lay some Indictment against him or accuse him unjustly that he might destroy him because he hath affirmed that he hath such a design may justly kill this his enemy challenge him into the field or rid his hands of him by secret means as he judges it convenient And then he advises rather to
very pressing occasions which cannot be said in any wise It is easie to see whither this reasoning tends 1 Dari posse ignorantiam invincibilem circa praeceptum non fornicandi saltem apud Barbaros incultos probabile est Ita Azor Fagundes quia non admodum manifeste illud deducitur ex primis principils luminis naturalis num 10. It is probable saith he that one may be invincibly ignorant of the precept which forbids fornication at least amongst barbarous and gross-witted persons This is the opinion of Azor and Fagundez The reason is because this precept is not drawn manifestly from some first principle of natural light He saith first of all that many Doctors whom he cites hold that Fornication is forbidden only by positive Law and by consequent this opinion is probable according to him being supported by the Authority of these Doctors who without doubt are not destitute of reasons to prove it In the second place he saith the Principle from whence we may infer that Fornication is evil in it self and forbidden by the Law of Nature is not evident that it cannot be found or at least wise not clearly discovered Whence it follows that this Conclusion is no more evident than its Principle but is it self only probable And though it be more probable at this day than the contrary opinion which hath not so many Partizans and Casuists on its side nevertheless as it is the more sweet that is to say hath more liberty and canformity to the corrupt inclinations of Nature it may perhaps shortly prevail above the other by suffrages and the greater number of these new Casuists who profess a complacent Divinity and follow voluntarily the most indulgent opinions In the third place though it should continue always less probable it is enough that it is simply probable since the least or last degree of probability suffices to be followed with a safe conscience according to these Doctors 4. Whence it follows evidently that he who shall be of Tambourins opinion may absolutely demand and receive a dispensation for Fornication as well as for fasting because it is at least probable according to him that neither the one nor the other is forbidden but only by positive Law and where things are not evil save only in regard they are forbidden one may with some reason and even without any reason according to some Casuists obtain and make use of a dispensation for it 5. Tambourin hath foreseen this inconvenience and disorder and confesseth openly enough that it follows from his opinion in the manner he propounds and that he maintains it when he saith 2 Si non esset jure naturali prohibits inâ—liquo tandem urgentissimo casu posset in ea dispensari Tambur lib. 7. decal cap. 1. sect 2. num 1. That if for want of an evident Principle which he confesses it hath not one would prove it by consequences it may be proved manifestly enough from this principally that if it were not forbidden by the Law of Nature he speaks of Fornication it might be indulged by dispensation He produces here as a principal reason which may prove it or rather as a conjecture which may make it believed that Fornication is forbidden by the Law of Nature because we cannot have a dispensation to commit it And some other time if the world be better disposed than at present he himself or his Society building upon the same Principles with him may easily prove that it may be dispensed with because it is not evident that it is forbidden by the Law of Nature and that it is even probable that it is only by positive Law as he declares it himself And so Fornication shall be in the number of things indifferent and it may be lawful when it pleases them to employ their Authority and their reasons to take away the prohibition which alone renders it evil and criminal And it seems that he would prepare before hand as it were at distance mens minds one day to receive this unhappy Doctrine when he saith in the end of the Section 1 Dari posse ignorantiam invincibilem circa praeceptum non fornicandi salcem apud Barbaros incultos probabile est Ita Azor Fagundez quia non admodum manifeste illud deducitur ex primis principils luminis naturalis num 10. That it is probable that there may be invincible ignorance of the precept which forbids Fornication at least amongst Barbarians and gross-witted people This is the opinion of Azor and Fagundez The reason whereof is because this precept is not manifestly drawn from the first Principles of the light of Nature He also said once that it is neither evident nor certain by way of Principle or by natural Reason that Fornication is evil of it self and forbidden by the Law of Nature And from thence he infers that a man may be invincibly that is innocently ignorant that Fornication is a sin Whence it follows that in such a disposition it may be committed innocently and without sin because according to the Principles of his Divinity and Society that which is done by invincible ignorance is no sin This permission which he grants to commit Fornication by ignorance is as it were a presumption and proof that Fornication may be committed according to him by dispensation since the one follows as well as the other from his reasoning and is grounded upon the same foundation which he establisheth or supposeth here in this place That there is no evident Principle drawn from the light of Nature by which it may be demonstrated that Fornication is evil in it self and forbidden by the Law of Nature And this same reason proves also that he holds Fornication not to be forbidden by the Law of God For no man can dispense any more with the Law of God than with the Law of Nature So that if Fornication were not forbidden by the Law of Nature nevertheless it could not be dispensed with if it were forbidden by the Law of God and so whilst he maintains that if the Law of Nature forbad it not it might be lawful in some case by dispensation from men he testifies clearly that he believes not that it is forbidden by the Law of God Bauny in his Sum Chap. 46. pag. 717. assures us That they who in the places of their Trade and Commerce are obliged to see speak and treat with young Maids and Women whose sight and company causeth them oftentimes to fall into sin are capable in this perpetual danger of being in a state of Grace and of receiving the Sacrament Layman affirms indeed in general that we are obliged to flye the next occasions of sin but he adds thereto these exceptions 2 Excipe nisi proquinquum periculum seu occasio mortaliter peccandi sine gravi incommodo corporis famae aut fortunarum tolli non possit tunc consilium quidem est minorem illam jacturam majori bono securitatis animae posthabere Layman lib.
taking from him what is his Let us see how the Jesuits Divinity excuses These in all these different manners Emanuel Sa amongst his Aphorisms puts this concerning Thest 1 Qui damnum nullum dedit rem aliquam accipiens quia ca dominus non utebatur non tenetur restituere si nulli est Domino usui futura Sa verbo furtum cap. 6. pag. 292. He who in taking what is anothers doth him no prejudice because he made no use of it and was not like to use it is not obliged to restitution There are no Thefts almost which may not be cloaked with this pretence it being casie to be perswaded that what we would take is for no use to him from whom we take it especially if he be rich and well to live And indeed there are abundance of things whereof the owners make no use and it may be never will which by this Principle it will be lawful to take away without scruple and without fear of being obliged unto restitution This Maxime opens a great gap unto poor people and to houshold-servants of Persons of Quality and well to pass to commit many Thefts boldly without fear of punishment by taking away things which they see are not made use of but are many times suffered to perish He saith a little after speaking after the common opinion 1 Qui per vices pauca alicui furatur cum ventum est ad notabilem summam tenetur restituere Ibid. num 8. That he who steals frequently by little at a time so as to gather together a notable sum is obliged unto restitution but he adds afterwards in favour of these Thieves 2 Etsi quidam probabiliter negant quando non fit ex intentione furandi totam summam Ibid. That there are some who hold the contrary when it is not done with intention to steal this great sum Escobar proposes the same difficulty in the same terms 3 An qui ultimum obolum arripuit fit ideo gravis furti reus tenetur totam illam quantitatem quae ex minimis illis furtis coaluit restituere Escobar tract 1. Ex. 4. num 23. pag. 161. If a man after many small thests hath taken the last half-penny which makes up a great theft whereof he thereby becomes guilty be obliged to restore all the sum which was composed of these petty thefts He answers 4 Non ad totam quantitatem tenetur sub mortali sed ad illam qua ablata furtum grave non remanet He is not obliged under mortal sin to make restitution of all the sum but only part which being taken off the theft would be no more criminal Amicus before had said the same thing almost in the same terms 5 Qui notabilem quantitatem furatus est non teneri sub mortali totam restituere sed sat esse si restituatur quantum sufficit ad tollendum notabile damnum illatum proximo Amicus tom 5. disp 38. num 47. pag 441. That he who had stoln some notable sum is not obliged under mortal sin to restore it all but that it is enough that he restore what suffices to make the wrong done unto his neighbour not to be notable The same Author in another place draws from these Principles another consequence very different from this though he be upon the same subject saying that 6 Tertio cum quis per singula furta ad notabilem quantitatem pervenit quoties deinde ab ecdem Domino levem materiam usurpat toties peccat mortaliter Amicus tom 3. disp 23. sect 7. n. 233. p. 257. Bauny in his Sum chap. 10. pag. 143. When a man hath by many petty thefts proceeded unto a notable sum he sins mortally every time after this that he takes any little thing from the same person This might seem severe after the sweetness and complacence which he had testified in his other Answer but such is the property of mens spirits that they cannot observe moderation but are transported into excesses passing from one extreme unto the other when they quit the conduct of Faith and the support of Authority to follow their own private light Bauny handling the same Question saith that it is the common opinion amongst Divines that he who hath at divers times stoln many small sums loses Gods grace when he attains to a sum sufficient to constitute a mortal sin And then he adds by way of correction to these Authors Nevertheless by their permission I dare say 1. That the last theft which is supposed to be a small one even as those which went before is only venial And a little after intermingling his own discourse with Emanuel Sa's and speaking part Latine part French as if he feared to be understood of all people he draws this Conclusion from this Authors Argumentation Sa verbo furtum num 8. saith he relying on this foundation that he qui per vices pauca alicui furatus est cum ad notabilem quantitatem pervenerit is not obliged under pain of eternal damnation to restore any of it That which above all things in the world toucheth men most and hinders them most from doing wrong to their neighbour is an apprehension of being obliged to restore but this is to give them all kind of liberty to steal and commit all sorts of injuries to take from them this fear dispensing with them for restitution and for all punishment not only of this life but also of the other and eternal damnation as doth this Jesuit And the reason is a strong one saith he For to repair the wrong whereof we have happened to be the cause none is obliged under pain of eternal damnation when in doing it we have only sinned venially because such an obligation is not the effect of other than mortal sin So that according to Bauny a man may feather his own nest and even enrich himself with the goods of another provided he take not too much at once and proceed thereto only by small Thefts which yet all together at length make up a notable sum without obliging the Thief to any restitution on the pain of undergoing eternal damnation So restitution and damnation belong only to Thieves that are not crafty enough or covetous over-much There are Merchants Bankers Confederates and other Traders who may heap up extraordinary riches by this method by taking in many parcels small sums which together produce very great ones and they need not cease for all that to live in repose without fear of damnation or restitution which is to them many times more severe and afflicting if they will relye upon Bauny's word and the Divinity of his Society This same Casuist speaking of things that are found demands what must be done with them that his conscience may be set at quiet He answers that according to the common and true opinion they belong unto the poor But he adds Bauny in his â—um chap. 13. pag. 185. 186. according to
Church and Nature it self since it can prevail without incurring any penalty against the Laws of the one and the other And since the Laws of the Church are also the Holy Ghost's who by it hath given us them and who guides it in all it doth and ordains if custom carry it against the Laws of the Church as this Casuists pretends it must needs be according to him that it hath more power than the Holy Ghost and that the Authority it hath in their School is more to be considered than that of 〈◊〉 himself since he believes that we ought to yield to the abuses it hath introduced into the Church to the prejudice of the primitive Orders and Laws which the Holy Ghost hath established But if these things seem extraordinary and incredible in themselves and considered according to the Rules of Truth and natural Sense alone yet they are not so in the Maxims of these new Doctors For it is not in this case only but in occasions of all other sorts that the custom being sound opposed and contrary to the Laws of God and the Church it ordinarily gains the cause by their Judgment as hath been observed in many places of these Writings Escobar follows the same Rules with Layman to determine what labour is lawful or forbidden on Feast-days that is 1 Servile opus est ad quod servi deputati sunt Nec opus servile fit quia â—b lucrum est factum si de se servile ante non erat Escobar tract 7. exam 5. cap. 2. num 4. pag. 99. Servile work saith he which is for servants and slaves And he adds as Layman that if a work be not servile in it self it doth not become servile when it is done for gain He afterwards sets down in the number of actions which are not servile studying writing travelling dancing And although he affirm that hunting and painting are servile actions he forbears not to say afterwards 2 Pingere ex suo genere servile est Venatio si fist ex officio servile est ut pictura ob voluptatem recrcaâ—ionem minime Ibid. num 8. Mundare scopis tapetibus vestire parietes Ecclesiarum hujusmodi nisi aliqua intercedat excusatio saltem venislia sunt Ibid. n. 6. Num misericordiae opera exercenda De se servilia non licent ut consuere vestem pauperi deferre ligna eidem c. Ibid. num 7. That if hunting be followed upon obligation and of duty as when a Hunts-man or a servant hunts at the command of his Master it is servile as well as painting but that it is not so if it be pursued of pleasure and for pastime That is to say that a servant may not go on hunting in obedience to his Master when he sends him but the Master may go for his pleasure and the servant also and by consequence that obedience in labour profanes a Holy day but pleasure in the same work profanes it not Speaking in the same place of those who labour in cleansing hanging and trimming Churches on Feast-days he saith that they sin at the least venially if they have not some lawful cause He saith the same thing of the outward works of mercy which are exercised towards our neighbour as to mend the cloaths of the poor to carry them wood or other things whereof they have need these actions according to him are servile and forbidden on Feast-days He would have it lawful to paint and hunt for pleasure on Feast-days and he will not have it lawful to sweep hang and adorn the Church for the Service of God He would have us have power to walk dance travel and go whither we will for our pastime but he will not have it lawful to visit the poor and sick and to give them some assistance pretending that works of mercy are more contrary to the Sanctification of Feasts than the sports and pastimes of the world He will not have it lawful to carry alms themselves unto the poor on Feast-days as he saith expresly a little after For having put the Question if those who by a motive of piety do actions which are called servile sin against this Commandment of the Church he answers in these terms 3 Excuiandine aliqui ratione pietatis Aliqui liberant à reatu exercentes die Festo opera servilia ad templa aedificanda vel resicienda gratis ad â—lâ—emosynam gerendam ad ornanda delubra c. At ego cum illis sentio qui laborantes vel hoc praetextu sint necessitate non excusant There are some who exempt them from sin who busie themselves in servile works on Feast-days to build or re-edifie Churches gratis to carry alms to the poor to adorn Temples c. But as for me I am of the opinion of those who exempt them not who labour without necessity on Feast-days though they do it under this pretence that is to say by a motive of piety He believes then that it is lawful to play dance walk abroad without necessity and for pleasure only on Feast-days because according to the Jesuits Divinity these actions are not servile He pretends also though painting and hunting be servile of themselves yet the motive of pleasure and contentment which we look for in them hinders them from being so and makes them lawful And yet he maintains that to sweep a Church for devotion or to take delight to dress an Altar to hang a Chappel to carry alms unto the poor are actions prohibited on Feast-days and that necessity only not pleasure can hinder them from being servile As if the pleasure taken in hunting or painting were more noble and holy â—…an that which is taken in serving the poor and God himself in the Churches He finds it difficult to exempt these actions of Piety and Religion from mortal fin so rigorous would he appear in this point They are saith he at the least venial sins Saltem venialia sunt Filliutius had said it before him in the same terms and yet more clearly 1 Mundate scopis templum vestice parietes tapetibus hâ—jusmedi vidertur servilia nisi aliqua excusatio intercedat erit saltem peccatum veniale non motrale secluâ—o contemptu Filliutius qq moral tom 2. tract â— cap. 9. n. 156. pag. 267. It seems that to sweep Churches to hang them and other such like actions are servile and to do them without lawful excuse is at least a venial sin though not mortal if not done through contempt Strange Divinity that we need not to fear to contemn the Command of God forbidding us to work on the Feast and Lords-days by working for our selves because we take our pleasure in the work as in hunting and that we ought to fear contempt and mortal sin in working only for the Service of God and the Church So that these days which God hath ordained particularly for his Service may be employed according to this Divinity to serve any thing but