tollenda vitia quae regnant Now sith it is evident that a thorough reformation may not bee made without a mutation of auncient laws customes which are found evill in themselves or els by mutation and chaunge of times have now lost their first vigor and force it behoveth that we doe vnderstand what order and rule herein is to be observed for the more ready effecting thereof CAP. 3. Of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes and what things therein chiefly are to be considered EPI In all mutations made of auncient lawes and customes three matters especially fall into deliberation first the meanes secondly the forme and maner lastly the subiect and matter The meanes are in number five the first is authority the goodwill and consents of the people the seconde the thirde perswasions a sufficient power and force is the fourth the fifth and the last is a magistrate of rare and excellent vertues which may suppresse the envie and malice of such as shall oppose themselves against this intended reformation made by the mutation of auncient lawes and customes Sol But what authority is required for the better effecting of a reformation For this as the first matter you have well observed to be requisit herein Epi All authority herein graunted is after two sortes the one absolute the other limited by time and other circumstances This authoritie absolute was given sometime into your handes by the Athenians for after such time as they had well tasted of the lawe and ordinance called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they forthwith did choose you their generall reformer of the lawe and of the whole state of the common-weale without limiting this power then granted vnto you but referred all matters indifferentlye vnto your will as the offices of state common assemblies voices in election iudgments in iustice and the body of the Senate Finally they gave vnto you all power and authority to cease and taxe anie of them to appoint the number and what time the cease should continue and to keepe confirme and disanull at your pleasure anie of the auncient laws and customes then in being But this authority absolute without anie limitation of the power it selfe or of the time and continuance thereof hath sometimes turned to the great preiudice and danger of such as formerly have graunted the same for the Romaines after they had elected their Decemviri for the making of a thorough and absolute reformation of the common-weale of Rome they forthwith gave into their handes the sole and absolute power of Rome so as all other authorities and iurisdictions either of Consull Senate or Tribunes ceasing they wholy and only governed Rome without any provocation or appeale to bee made to any other Thus when no Magistrate remained which might observe the actions of such as were founde ambitious easily did Appius Claudius fall into the thoughtes of the principality of Rome he doeth strengthē himselfe with friendes clyēts and daily increaseth his wealth and nowe of a Citizen is become a fearefull enemy to the state of Rome in such sorte as they may neither endure his pride and insolencie neither may they safely suppresse the same without their common perill and daunger Therefore more wiselie did the Lacedemonians give great authority to their kinges and likewise did the Venetians to their Dukes but yet with certaine limits and bondes not lawfull for them to exceede and farther did appoint certaine watchmen as daily beholders and observers of all their actions and doings Sol But what limitation of time in granting this absolute authority may breede safety vnto him that giveth the same This is the seconde and last matter nowe remembred by you and worthie of consultation Epi The provinciall governement over the Gaules with an absolute power given into the handes of Caesar for the better reformation thereof was so long proroged and continued as at the last with the sword of the Romaines and the money of the Gaules he became terrible as well to the Gaules as to the Romaines returned not a Citizen now of Rome but as a fearefull enemie and conquerour as well of the Citie as of all the other territories and dominions thereof And was not also the provinciall governement of Spaine sometimes given into the handes of Pompey with an absolute authority for the reformation thereof so long proroged and continued as with one stampe of his foote he was able as himselfe reported to fill the Citie of Rome with weapons and armed men And did not Appius Claudius by proroging his authority but for one yeare become fearefull to the Citie of Rome And did not the Romaines by making a Dictator perpetuall loose the libertye of their Citie and doeth authority thus easily corrupt the maners of good subiectes and is the age also wherein we live free from such corruption Nay more then that is there not an enemie on foote that laboureth the corruption of the whole Then what authoritie here may be limited so straight as in this time may not be thought too large what time may be so shorte which may not be deemed too long Therefore let every good and faithfull councellour vnto the state with Cato resist here the proroging of Caesar his governement least too late with Pompey they acknowledge their errour it shall not suffice here to graunt but one yeare more vnto Appius Claudius neither is it sufficient that Caesar is holden in disgrace with the Citie of Rome neither may we here safely beleeve all which shall saie vnto Pompey Caesar is hated of the garrisons and souldiers for when Caesar commeth with his fortune he shall then force as well Pompey as the Citie of Rome to acknowledge their former follies and errours Sol. But nowe vnto what person may this authority be safely graunted is a matter herein not vnworthy of consultation Ep It is safely graunted vnto a man approved to be good and honest with this caution that he be not of such power and force as the state may stand in feare of his greatnes For the best sometimes have fallen by reason of honours and dignities into a generall corruption of manners and therefore we receive it as a proverbe honores mutant mores Sol. At no time then is it safely committed into the handes of personages of great might power and wealth Ep You have saide the trueth for what daunger did arise to the state of Athens by constituting Garralde Fitz Garralde attained Liuetenant of Salamina who having at once might power and soveraigne commaundement in his handes did eftsoones conspire and combine sundry treasons and rebellions Sol The recordes of Salamina doth witnes so much as you have saide for there it is alleadged that he did conspire with the French king and Emperour for the invading and possessing of Salamina he did also in proper person invade the Countie of Kylkennie there burning destroying murthering the kinges subiectes he did invade also with Oneyle and his forces O Coner and other of the
be not corrupted there a milde course of governement doth worke his office and carrieth with it allowance and commendations For this cause it is said that the patience of Peter Soderâ—n was profitable as well to the common-weale as to himselfe so long as the age and time continued milde and gentle but after the times were chaunged into an iron age the same then required a greater severitie then could be found in Peter Soderin which by no meanes nor occasions nor by the change of times could be ledde from his accustomed patience by the which he did not onely overthrow himselfe but did also perish his whole countrie Therefore very well saith a learned author for the better reformation of manners corrupted in the people and for the better reviving of the force of auncient lawes a severe Magistrate is requisite Sol But great is the hatred which in such cases followeth the person of a severe Magistrate and it draweth with it sometimes perill and daunger vnto Princes Epi This question admitteth one other distinction for an absolute Prince is to imitate the humanity of Cyrus described by Xenophon but such as shall governe by way of deputation are rather to follow the severitie of Manlius Torquatus least otherwise with Peter Lawredane we doe not onely make the Venetians ielous but also disable our selves by our lenitie and softnes to performe this difficult action of reformation wherein severitie is required To conclude it must be that grave and severe Tymasicheus that shall reforme the licentious citie of Lyparensis and drawe them from spoiling praying and rebelling Lastly wee must make a continuall succession of severe Magistrates as before I have remembred For Epaminondas with a iust severitie may reforme a corruption of manners in the Thebanes but if he once fortune to dye the Thebanes shall eftsoones returne to their former corruptions Sol Nowe fith you have at large discussed of the two partes and members of this vniversall and absolute reformation namely the reformation of auncient lawes customes and lastly the corruption of maners in the people there remaineth nowe a newe and better institution then before prescribed as the third and last member of your generall division Epi I will proceede then vnto the institution it selfe wherein forme matters are found worthie of consideration first the soveraintie and commaundement secondly the forme of governement thirdly the forme and manner of the institution it selfe lastly the severall endes and scopes of this institution For the first which is the soverainty and commaundement the same is given sometimes into the hands of one sometimes in the handes of fewe and sometimes into the handes of all in generall This one is termed a Democratia or a popular estate the other an Aristocratia the last a Monarchie Thus be common-weales properly distinguished by the soveraintie and commaundement and not by the diversity which sometimes appeareth in the forme and governement thereof for all institutions are made after the one of these kindes and all other are but corruptions of these estates and no proper or distinct common-weales Sol But which institution is to be preferred above others Epi The institution no doubt of the Monarchie is the most firme and durable and freest from al dissention mutinies and sedition And the wise men of Rome vvere not deceived when beholding the market place filled with bowes slings and swordes and the pulpit for orations sprinckled with bloud they said there remaineth nowe no other way to give helpe and remedie to these troubles of our common-weale but the authority of one man onely that may commaunde vs all And as this estate is freest from trouble as you have saide so is it of all others most honourable and glorious and even the very lively image of God and nature as Artibanus did sometimes faithfully deliver vnto Themistocles The next manner of institution in account seemeth to be the Aristocratia for that it acquiteth it selfe best of al other common-weals from corruption errours in their censures and iudgements for as the large and running waters are not so easily corrupted as the standing poole so many wittes and mindes are not so easily deluded and corrupted as one But worst of all others doeth this common-weale acquite it selfe of envie dissention and emulation amongest themselves which like vnto a mothe or worme gnaweth a sunder the heart and intralles of that common-weale and at the last confoundeth and destroieth the same But yet the popular estate is of all others least permanent especially where the common-weale is mere popular aswell in regard of the soveraintie and commaundement as of the forme manner of governement wherof the common-weale of Athens maie be vnto vs an example which was instituted by you Solon and after in the same age confounded by Pisistratus Solo So it was for wanting sufficient power and forces I was forced to make such lawes for the instituting of that common-weale as they vvere willing to receive and not such as I was willing to give for I must confesse that popular institution which is equallie tempered and compounded of the three sortes and formes of governement after the maner and institution of Rome to be more firme and durable and this forme of governement also doeth give a perfection and continuance to all other estates before remembred Therefore Romulus after the death of Remus and Tatius Sabinus did ayme at that forme of government in the institution of the common-weale of Rome for he reserved vnto himselfe the sole and kingly auctority over the armie onely and to convent the Senators for the affaires publicke the which forme of governement in his person was kinglike and after the forme of a Monarchie but in the person of the Senators who had auctoritie to consulte and publikely to perswade and disswade the attempts for wars and to discusse all other civill causes as the state of that common-weale required the forme of an Aristocratia was rightly by him observed and in the other partes of his governement as in framing of his lawes and such like he rather affected a popular liberty then a Monarchie Epi After this manner the king of France hath reserved vnto himselfe a kingly name stile honors authority and commandement over the Senate and to assemble them for the affaires publicke and a sole absolute and royall authority over the armie for making or finishing the warres lastly an authority for the levieng and receiving of the revenews belonging to the crowne but the execution of lawes he leaveth to the Senate and Iudges who governe by such lawes as respect a popular liberty and free estate in the making of which lawes the people have also their voices like as in popular estates where the people holde the soverainty and commaundement so as by this forme of governement as well to the king and the nobles as also to the people such power is graunted with so iust and equall proportion as either the dignitie of the one or the liberty of the
and ambition of Caesar least with the Romanes to late we repent the same let vs not as men overcome with the greatnes of the tempest desperately seeke our safety in the middest of the rockes and sands but rather let vs fighting for our Prince and country say we will overcome or die CAP. 14. The sundry waies and meanes lefte vnto vs for the suppressing of every distemperature raigning in this polliticke bodie SOL But what meanes are left vnto vs to suppresse this distemperature Epi First we are to give impediment vnto the forme and manner and vvith Valerius deny the embassadoures of Tarquine to speake vnto the people least by flatterie they be deluded with Brutus vve are to condemne and execute even our owne sonnes corrupted by Tarquine and with Valerius we ought to deny the deliverie of Vendicius vnto the traitoures thus we must give impediment vnto the forme wherein this caution is to be observed that the same be done in the beginning For the Romanes having sometimes laide a forme of their ambition for the disturbing and conquering of others the same was at the first litle regarded vntill they had advaunced their ambition so highly as to late their associates and neighboures did acknowledge their errour and when they much desired they founde themselves much vnable to suppresse the same Sol What other meanes remaine to suppresse this distemperature Epi First wee are to proceede by good and profitable lawes to the suppressing thereof for the Romanes being given to vnderstand that forty several nations had combined for their ruine and destruction they did forthwith create a Dictator to manage the affaires of their vvars vnto whome they gave an absolute power all which as well the manner of the creation as his authority and continuaunce was established by lawes fearing least when this distemperature should bee once thoroughly kindled in the bowels of the common-weale they might want either time to effect the same or that this innovation might then give occasion of mutiny Secondly we are to make preparation for the wars and with Themistocles daily to arme and exercise the Athenians to builde and vittaile our gallies for the battaile of Marathon saith he will not give an end vnto these warres but rather it doeth foretell vs of greater troubles Thirdly we are to resist this distemperature by the force and strength of our alies confederates and associates and herein above all others we are highly to esteeme and regarde the confederation of free Citties and estates for they doe not easily or for light causes depart the same in regarde they proceede iudicially by voices as well to establish as to dissolve the same the which caution Tusci olim observabant and therefore it is saide Multum negotij fuit populo Romano cum Tuscis hoc modo inter se confederatis by which observation they became as well by sea as by lande mighty commaunders so as it is saide Quod ante tempora Romanorum Tusci potentissimi fuerint terra marique After this manner doe the Helvetians at this day proceede in their warres and in times past Achaei atque Aetoli In like manner the Romaines the better to overcome all difficulties in their warres did make an association with other free Cities and states by the which manner of proceeding they did every where conquere and commaunde But the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians not making anie confederation or association with other free Cities did not long continue their greatnes Fourthly wee must bee able at all times to produce a collected power and strength of our proper subiectes well trayned and exercised in military discipline for the suppressing of this distemperature for otherwise the Thebanes and the rest of the Citties of Greece shall decline and revolte from the Lacedaemonians and Italy shall revolte from the Venetians Quoniam resp Spartanorum Venetorum populum habuit imbellem therefore saith one In promptu habeas exercitum egregium ad exemplum Romanorum quo motos liceat componere fluctus Fiftly necessarie it is that we doe possesse all the strong fortes and holdes the which although they shall litle availe vs against any general or strong assault made against them by such as commaunde the fielde for that either with the forte or rocke of Arazze they shall give place vnto the furie of the artillerie or with the towne and forte of Avon for want of succours or with the towne Valencey by the treason of Donate Raffaguin yet they beeing placed vpon the confines of the countrie may withstande all sodaine attemptes and give succour vnto the wounded and diseased Sixtly for the better suppressing of these distemperatures we are to take hostages and pledges vvith king Porsenna from such persons as are likely to departe from their obedience to the disturbance of the common peace and tranquillity of the subiectes by the vvhich way hee suppressed the malice of the Romaines then shall we safely with him dissolve our armie and vvithdrawe our strength The people of Salamina hath in all ages beene founde so factious and rebellious even in the times before Athens made their conquest over them as the whole kingdome being then devided into foure severall partes and provinces vvhich they tearmed kingdomes yet all beeing commaunded by the king of Vlster they did from time to time yeelde many of their best and chiefe personages for pledges and hostages of their obedience vnto the king of Vlster if then their native borne kinges alied fostered maried and continued even one in the others bosome did yeelde pledges for their obedience howe may we in this troubled age safely dismisse pledges and set them at liberty may we expect greater fidelity then they bare sometimes to their native kinges or doe these times offer more securitie or doth this nation vse more fidelitie who so looketh into the histories and recordes of their newe and late warres shall finde in them their olde disposition to rebell and that this vniversall obedience which nowe they yeelde is nothing but a sodaine heate or calme vvich is the true messenger of a tempestuous weather The seventh caution observed for the suppressing of this distemperature is speedily to disarme the people and not suffer them at all to be trained or exercised in militarie discipline especially where the people be not free but obedient and tributaries vnto vs for the vse knowledge and exercise of militarie discipline doeth render them bolde turbulent disobedient and rebellious against vs for what boldnesse and disobedience raigneth in the people of Salamina by trayning and exercising them in the feates of warres the same may lively appeare in their recordes and statutes where it is saide that diverse persons have assembled with banners displaied against the lievtenaunt and deputie of the saide lande whereby many times the deputie hath beene put to reproch and the common-weale set in adventure for this cause it is saide that Veneti Spartani opera plebis in bellis non vterentur and more wisely the
forraine warres they went about to frustrate the lawe of division and in these cases as Danta reporteth in his Monarchie even with open voice they embrace their ruine and abhorre their safetie and welfare But now let vs proceede vnto the fourth way and means namely sufficient forces which in such cases are to bee prepared whereby the Magistrate with greater safety and assurance may effect a reformation CAP. 12. Howe strength power and forces are necessarie for the better effecting of a reformation and how in good time the same ought to be applied EPI In the reformation of Athens you Solon found the necessity of forces when neither the good-wils and consents of the people neither the absolute auctoritie which they gave into your handes neither yet the art and skill of perswading vvhich then in the highest manner you retained vvas found sufficient to suppresse the ambition of Pisistratus or to confirme the reformation which you had newly established for that you wanted sufficient power and forces for the better effecting thereof Therefore this magistrate which shall intende this action of reformation must with Publicola have sufficient powre to execute his vertues and well disposed minde for by this meanes especially did hee alter chaunge and reforme a mighty kingdome vvhich had continued a long time and vvas thoroughly established Sol For this cause chiefely I must confesse that I was altogither vnprovident in taking vppon me the function and office of a king to decide all controversies and broyles at the instance of my friendes and citizens and yet refused the kingly name and powre the which then vvas offred vnto mee and vvithout the which I founde by experience that I coulde never safely execute that which seemed to me then profitable for the beter reformation of the common-weale of Athens Epi So it appeared for soone after you well vnderstoode your former errour the vvhich you did sometimes liberally confesse saying after this manner that with the authoritie and power then committed into your handes a man possiblie Could not controll the peoples mindes Nor still their braines that wrought like windes Sol You have saide the truth and for the same cause also at another time I coulde not appease the sedition vvhich did sometimes arise in Athens by reason of the inequality of landes and possessions after the example of Lycurgus by making an equall division thereof for that I had not then the power forces and authority of Lycurgus Howbeit I performed that which possiblie I might vvith the small power and forces then given into my handes by the Citizens of Athens Epi Surely this occasion of reformation is full of difficulties as you have saide and manie will still be founde which shal be discontented therewith the which hath beene espied by men of wisedome and such as have beene experienced in such cases and sometimes your selfe not without iust cause did acknowledge in these verses following Full harde it is all mindes content to have And speciallie in matters harde and grave Many and vniust are the accusations and attemptes of the multitude against such as have authority and commaundement over them great and many be they in number especially in common-weales corrupted in manners vvhich doe labour and travel so with envy against all excellent men as that they rather wish their countries destruction then by them a prosperous reformation thereof by the which occasions the faith and services of men are oftentimes sinisterly interpreted sometimes by opinion sometimes by malice as well to the overthrowe of great and profitable actions as also of worthie and faithfull servitors Sol Therefore Moyses before he coulde establish the lawes which God vnto him had delivered and commaunded founde it necessarie vvith forces to remove such as being pricked forwarde with envie did oppose themselves against his intended reformation And Hieronymus Savanarole vvanting sufficient forces was soone oppressed by the envie of others and fayled of his intended reformation as it may appeare by his sermons Contra sapientes huius mundi Ep Neither is it sufficient in these cases to have forces but as necessarie it is to make vse thereof and in due time to applie the same to the better furtheraunce of this action of reformation vvhereof Lycurgus fayling did establish his reformation with the losse of his eie and with no small daunger vnto his person for that he contended rather with perswasions then with forces to establish a reformation of auncient lawes and customes and of the landes and possessions of the Citizens In like manner Peter Soderin having sufficient forces that might well have overcome the envy and malice of such as were founde to oppose themselves against him did not in time applie the same and make vse thereof but rather contended with benefites and with a iust and honest course of life to overcome the envie and malice of such as vvithstoode his reformation whereby in a short time he did not onely perish and vndoe himselfe but also did overthrowe his country and regiment forgetting that which now is everie where in experience that the malice of the envious man may neither with offices nor benefites be pleased and reconciled Sol If the necessity of forces be great to effect a reformation as it plainely appeareth by that which hath bene saide in such common-weals especially where the manners of the people are found corrupted then much greater is the necessity thereof when reformation is to be made of a common-weale gained by the sword and conquest as also corrupted in manners for that the people having here sustained many iniuries by force and violence whereunto the conquerour is drawne oftentimes by their disobedience maie not at anie time after with newe benefites offices and rewardes be reconciled and pacified neither shall we finde here profitable lawes or any sufficient meanes to effect a reformation without sufficient forces to repell all daungers and difficulties all which Salamina may well witnes vnto the worlde for when as the governour there did contende to suppresse by publike proclamation thorough out the whole province of Mounster that detestable custome of Coiney and Livery and other extortions which had then consumed the marrowe and fatnesse of that common-weale of Salamina then it was founde not sufficient to have the same established by late lawes whereunto the whole parliament had agreed and consented neither vvas it sufficient that the same tended to the vniversall good of the common-weale but forces herein also were requisite to suppresse the Butlers and Garroldines which then on every side did arise in the mainteinaunce of that detestable custome of Coiney and Livery all which Sir Warram Sentlenger then provinciall governour can well witnes by whose care and diligence togither with the aide and assistaunce of the forces and garrisons of Salamina they were soone suppressed Forces being thus necessarie for the effecting of a reformation into whose handes the same is to be given is the fifth and last meanes worthy of consultation CAP. 13. Howe
at the least they might loose their honour and estimation amongest the Florentines for much evill ariseth vnto Salamina not onelie from the malice of the people but by the negligence of Magistrates in that they holde not their lawes inviolable for the vvhich causes they maye never confirme the mindes of the multitude vnto the state nor render them quiet and contented But what other meanes is now left vnto vs to deliver the multitude from oppression Epi Commissioners in every of the several Provinces are to be constituted which as iudges shall restraine and suppresse the ambition of the nobles and shall carefully defende the people from oppressors Therefore wisely the king of Fraunce hath constituted a iudge or arbitrator which as a third person sine regis invidia proceres caederet tenuiores tueretur Nihil melius nihil sapientius hoc decreto esse potuit nec regni aut ipsius regis potior securitatis causa Sol But what number of iudges may suffice herein Epi You say well for if one iudge bee ordained the mighty and great personages shall more easily corrupt him then manie Therefore the Florentines having entertained but one iudge for the suppressing of the ambition of the nobility whom they called Capitaneū seeing him seduced by the nobilitie in his place constituted eight iudges or Commissioners Sol But in this second institution they founde lesse security then in the first for vvhere a fewe are placed for the rule and governement there they be founde commonly ministers and pleasers of the nobility and contemners of the people the which the Venetians wisely foreseeing have not onely ordained their Decemviri but also other magistrates quos Quarantos vocant further for the same onely they have constituted Concilium Praegium qui summus est magistratus to this ende that neither iudges nor accusers should be wanting for the suppressing of the ambition of the nobilitie Epi As you have saide this must needes be the best forme of governement that may possibly be ordained in such cases for many iudges are not so easily corrupted as one againe many are founde to be of greater strength and integritie to resist the displeasure of the nobilitie then fewe and like as many eies discerne more perfectly then one and that which escapeth or deceiveth one eie maie be perceived and that without errour by many so many wits iudge more soundly and sincerely then one Lastly wee all obey more willingly the censures of many then the iudgements of a fewe or one person whatsoever Sol But vvhither are we in such cases more to endevour the favour of the nobility or the multitude Epi It is saide that a Monarchie governed popularlie is then secure and voide of perill for in the multitude or people consisteth the strength and force of every kingdome the vvhich Nabid king of the Lacedaemonians well vnderstanding endevoured wholie the love and favoure of the people so as with his proper forces hee was able to vvithstande and resist his enemies vvithout the aide of forraine princes And Appius Claudius on the contrarie neglecting the favoure of the people did vvholy cleave to the nobilitie and lost thereby the principalitie and commaundement vvhich then hee had obtayned Solo It must be confessed that in common-weales gained by conquest you shall advance your governement more assuredly by the favoure of the people then by the might of the nobilitie for nature it selfe by an inforcing necessitie hath taught the weaker part to adheare vnto that which is the strongest and for this cause the people diverse vvaies oppressed by the ambition of the mighty are forced thereby to hasten and runne vnto their conquerour as vnto a large palme tree to bee defended from the stormes and violence of the mighty so as delivering them from oppressions they vvillingly yeelde their obedience but of the contrarie the nobilitie are not so readily wonne nor so easily kept Therefore the Romaines in all countries by them conquered did labour nothing more then to humble and deiect the mightie to protect and defend the feeble weake and deliver the people from oppressions The like order of governement did the Graecians observe especially in provinces by them conquered which differed in language and maner of living for there the people if they be not carefully defended from the oppressions of the mighty by these outward differences as signes and badges of their former liberty doe hasten for the restitution thereof vnto all rebellions and doe provoke some forraine enemy to invade Farther in common-weales where generally the manners of the people are found corrupted there dangerous it is to advance the Lords chieftaines as it may appeare by the statuts records of Salamina for there it is declared that the L and chieftaines of that land in the times of iustice declinatiō by pretext of defending the people and their owne possessions arrogated vnto themselves absolute and roiall authority within large circuites by meanes wherof they grew vnto such greatnes as they acknowledged no superior nor obedience vnto Athens they held for laws their owne willes and desires and finallie they assembled and led the people vnto the accomplishing of all actes offensive and invasive without speciall authority as before we have at large discoursed Therefore in Salamina and in other common-weales gained by conquest where the manners of the people remaine corrupted we are to give impediment saith a learned authour vnto all the meanes wherby the nobles may raise themselves vnto such greatnesse as thereby they may become fearefull vnto the common-weale and providently shall we favour and deliver the people in such estates from oppression Ep For this cause wisely have the councel of Salamina suppressed and cut of al exactions and tributes by a firme and stable law before remembred as the meanes whereby the nobles and cheifetaines did raise themselves vnto such greatnesse as they became daungerous vnto the common-weale And to the same purpose have they made another statute wherby it is ordained and enacted that no Lorde nor gentleman of the said land retaine by liverie wages or promise signe or token by indenture or otherwise any person or persons but onely such as be or shal be his officers as baylifes stewardes learned counsels receivers and meniall servantes daily in householde at the saide Lordes proper costes and charges entertained Thus if wisely we give impediment vnto the meanes which raise the chiefetaines and nobles of Salamina vnto this greatnes if with Pompey we shall impeach the forces of Caesar by calling awaie two legions or regimentes if with Pompey we shal withdrawe from Caesar Labienus and other his friendes and commaunders if we shall cut off all exactions and tributes which Caesar leavieth vppon the people if we shall cut off all that infinite number of retainers followers and men which followe Caesar more then his menial housholde according to the statute of retainers if we shall suppresse all vnlawfull authorities of Captainship and
saide Earle his friends alies and servants by his commandement the County of Vriell wherein he was aided and assisted by Sir Iohn brother vnto the saide Earle The like or greater daunger did growe vnto the state of Athens by constituting Thomas Fitz Garralde sonne and heire to the saide Earle Lieutenant of Salamina who succeeding in the place of his father having the like might power forces lent vnto him by his friends alies and servantes and soveraine authoritie given from the king did eftsoones revile that famous Citie of Athens and his lawfull soveraigne and moved all rebellions against them and did therewith also addresse his letters vnto the Bishop of Rome the Emperour for the invading of Salamina and farther did put to death and cruelly murthered all those which were resident within the lande of Salamina being borne Citizens of Athens and amongst others did put to death that reverende father and faithfull counceller Iohn Allin Archbishoppe of Deublin and primate of Salamina More then this he constrained with his power and forces the subiectes of Athens to give vnto him an oath of obedience forthwith besieged the Castle of Deublin where with his whole armie by the sea coast he incamped for the better resisting destroying and murthering the army of Athens as they landed No lesse dangers then these formerly rehearsed appeared at such times when as the Duke of Yorke pretending himselfe Livetenant of the saide lande did with his power and forces occupie and possesse all the territories and dominions thereof Therefore of late daies hath the Counsell of Athens most providently committed this soveraine authority vnto such as may not be able with forces and power to vsurpe the same But if vnto this authoritie thus given to effect a reformation the consentes and good-wils of the people be founde agreeable no doubt the â—amâ— shall mightily further that action CAP. 4. The good-will and consent of the people is a readie meanes to effect a reformation EPI You have saide the truth for where the good-will of the people is first wonne and obtained there the mutation is made without difficultie and daunger All which may lively appeare in the history of Tarquine who having lost as well the good-will of the people as of the Senate by changing the auncient lawes customes of the Citie of Rome was easily expelled that kingdome Sol It is true that you have said for he did drawe vnto himselfe all the authority as well of the Senate as also of the liberty of the people which sometimes they inioied vnder their former kinges and for this cause chiefely he failed of the good-will of the people in this his mutation and alteration of thinges But Brutus on the contrary having wonne the good-wil of the people for the effecting of a reformation and expelling of Tarquine did chaunge the state of the common-weale without anie difficultie daunger or iniurie sustained by anie other then the expelling of Tarquine Likewise when the Medicei Vrbe Florentinorum Anno salutis M. CCCC.XL.IIII pellebantur the chaunge was made without daunger and difficultie for as much as the same was effected by the good-will and consentes of the people Sith therefore the consente of the people doth give so great furtheraunce vnto this action of reformation it seemeth a matter verie necessarie that everie Magistrate shoulde retaine the arte skill and knowledge of perswading and inducing the multitude as you have in the first chapter of this booke well remembred CAP. 5. The force of perswasions and how necessarie the same is to effect a reformation EPIMEN So it is indeede for the good-will and consente of the people doeth promise no small security vnto the Magistrate which intendeth this action of reformation and therefore not without cause Pythagoras was of all sortes of persons greatlie honoured for his singular arte and knoweledge in winning the affections of the multitude and in perswading and disswading the people all which Plutarch witnesseth after this manner Pythagoras which lov'd to dwell In highest dignitie And had a heart to glorie bent And past in pollicie Much like a man which sought By charming to inchaunt Did vse this arte to winne mens mindes Which vnto him did haunt His grave and pleasant tongue In sugred speech did flowe Whereby he drewe most mindes of men To bent of his owne bowe Though Lycurgus vvas the eleventh which descended from the right line of Hercules though a man of great authoritie of great force of long continuance a king yet indevoring a reformation of many disorders which did chiefely arise in that estate by the inequallitie of landes and possessions therein as Plutarch witnesseth he vsed more persuasions then force a good vvitnesse thereof was the losse of his eie You Solon also altered and reformed that in the common-wealth of Athens vvhich you thought by reason you shoulde perswade your citizens vnto or els by force you ought to compell them to accept Epi The Romaines therefore well vnderstanding the force of persuasions in all actions of reformation did institute the holy order of the Faeciales vvho retayning the art of perswading and disswading the people did much further the common-weale of Rome for they went many times in person to those that did the Romaines iniurie and sought to perswade them with good reason to keepe promise with the Romaines and to offer them no wrong they did also perswade the people to deliver Fabius Ambustus vnto the Gaules as one that had violated the lawes of armes and farther proved by manie reasons that a present reformation made of that disorder and iniustice woulde deliuer Rome from many calamities then like to insue by the power of the Gaules By this art and skill of persuading did Camillus appease the great sedition and mutinye raysed sometimes by the people of Rome against the Senators for that they had not their full minde and libertie to inhabite the citie of Vies By this art and skil you Solon have now of late induced the Athenians to make warres with the Megarians for the possessing of Salamina contrarie to their former liking publike lawes and proclamations made in that behalfe and the like honour did you sometimes winne by your oration made in the defence of the temple of Apollo in the citie of Delphos declaring that it was not meete to bee suffred that the Cyrrhaeians should at their pleasure abuse the sanctuarie of the oracle by force of which persuasions the councell of Amphictions was thoroughly mooved so that they sought a present reformation thereof By this your art and skill you also perswaded those which in Athens they sometimes called the abiectes and excommunicates to be iudged whereby you did quench and appease two mighty factions the one supported by the issues of the rebels that rose with Cylon and the other by the ofspring of Megacles Sol I acknowledge this your friendly reporte not as a testimonie of anie art or skill but of the office and duetie which I beare vnto
the occasions and causes of all declinations which is the fifte matter remembred by you worthy of consideration Epi You have well put me in remembrance thereof For as the declination of our natural bodies ariseth chiefely either from occasions as rest labour heate colde hunger thirst superfluity abundance or from the malice or distemperature of the disease or sickenes it selfe so the declination of this polliticke bodie groweth partely by occasions and partely from the malice and corruption of the subiect as from the vnnatural distemperature of that body Sol The truthe of your opinion neither wanteth proofe nor example for in the declination of the common-weale of Rome in the times and regiment of Tarquine we may behold first a generall distemperature bred in the body of that cōmon-weale by his misgovernment so as the people and Senatours did expect nothing more then a fitte occasion to execute the same And if the deflowring of Lucretia had not happened yet noe doubt this distemperature and malice of the subiect would have attended other occasions as they should conveniently have offered themselves But if this malice and distemperature had not proceeded with the occasion or if the occasiō had not accompanied this distemperature no doubt Brutus and Collatinus would have desired the iust punishment of this offence rather at the hands of Tarquine then by the aide helpe of the people Ep Therefore wisely saith one sine occasione frustra virtus sine virtute frustra occasio sese obtulit For in vaine shall occasions profer themselves where they finde not the malice of the subiect ready to rescue and assist them And in vaine likewise shall the malice of the subiect swel and overflow his bounds when all occasions shall be removed which are in place of the feete and legs that support this distemperature So To disclose therefore the chiefe principal occasions which may further and nourish any way the distemperature of this polliticke body seemeth a matter not vnworthy of deliberation Epi Nay it is a matter rather which should possesse the highest thoughts of the minde vnderstāding of Princes and Emperours Sol Let vs proceede to enumber them if we may and set them downe vnder the accompt of matters necessarie for the better sustaining and vpholding of this polliticke body Ep Occasions are vsually after two sortes either given or malitiously sought and suggested Sol You have saide the truth for when Darius preferred Daniell above all the other rulers and governours because the spirit in him was excellent they sought an occasion against Daniell concerning the kingdome but they coulde finde no fault and therefore it is saide we may finde no occasion against Daniell except we finde it against him concerning the lawe of God whereupon the rulers craftely conspired to go vnto the king and after this maner to advance their malice they spake vnto him king Darius live for ever all the rulers of thy kingdome the officers and governours the counsellers and dukes have consulted togither to make a decree for the king and to establish a statute that whosoever shall aske a petition of any God or man for thirty daies save of thee O king he shall be cast into the denne of Lions Nowe O king confirme the decree and seale the writing that it be not chaunged according to the lawe of the Medes and Persians which altereth not This request feeding the ambition of king Darius was eftsoones sealed by him he made a law and decree Then these men assembled and found Daniell praying and making supplication vnto his God The which eftsoones they embraced as a fit occasion lente for the destroying of Daniell and repayring to the king saide vnto him after this manner hast thou not sealed the decree that every man that shall make request to any God or man within thirty daies save to thee O king shall be cast into the denne of Lyons the king answered and saide the thing is true according to the lawe of the Medes and Persians which altereth not Then aunswered they and saide vnto the king this Daniell which is of the children of the captivity of Iudah regardeth not thee O king nor the decree that thou hast sealed but maketh his petition three times a day But vnderstande O king that the lawe of the Medes and Persians is that no decree or statute which the king confirmeth may be altered or broken Then forthwith by the kings commandement Daniell was cast into the Lyons denne This one example may suffice for occasions malitiously suggested CAP. 5. Of occasions given by misgovernement and such other meanes SOL Let vs now proceed to enumber the occasions given Ep Occasion of declining is then given when the nobility is not respected for Caesar by holding a light estimation of the Senanators and nobles at such time as they repayred to give vnto him honours and by depriving and abusing the Tribunes Marullus and Flavius did give the first occasion saith Plutarch of his fall declining Romulus intreating the Senators and nobles of Rome more severely and rigorosly then in former times they were accustomed was for this cause by treason murthered Sol And no lesse occasion is then given of falling and declining when either by the iniquity of times or the proper industry of princes the nobilitie is in so great measure advanced as they become thereby dangerous feareful vnto the state by the one occasion Salamina hath often sundry times declined Epi What by the iniquitie of times Sol Yea verily for vpon the division of the house of Lankaster Yorke iustice there declining the nobility helde as it were a soveraigne commandement over the cōmonalty they call their lands by the name of their cuntries their tenants by the name of their followers and men they give laws and prescribe vnto the people their manner of living they oppresse where they dislike they reward whom they favour they perish whom they hate and finally they make themselves iudges and arbitrators of the goods lands life liberty and of all the fortunes of the subiect The which over great power and commandement doth lively appeare in the act made for the taking awaye of the great authority of Captainship with all exactions vvherein it is declared that the Lordes of Salamina in the time of iustice declination vnder the pretence of defending the people of Salamina their own possessions arrogated vnto themselves absolute and regale authority within large circuits by the distributiō whereof each man had as much righte as force would give him leave by meanes whereof they grew vnto such greatnesse as they acknowledged no superiour no obedience vnto the counsels of Athens they holde for lawes there owne willes and desires by their proper authority they gather and assemble the people of the saide pretenced countries rules and Captaineships to treat conclude and agree for making of warre or peace roades iniuries granting of ceases bene volences finding of men of warre as horsemen