Selected quad for the lemma: authority_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
authority_n	absolute_a	king_n	law_n	2,395	5	5.2952	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A85293	The anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy. Or, A succinct examination of the fundamentals of monarchy, both in this and other kingdoms, as well about the right of power in kings, as of the originall or naturall liberty of the people. A question never yet disputed, though most necessary in these times.	Filmer, Robert, Sir, d. 1653.	1648 (1648)	Wing F910; Thomason E436_4; ESTC R202028	34,573	45

chooseth Lay Councelors and nominates the Bishops and whom He will have to be His Privy Counsell He is absolute disposer of the Revenews of the Crown He is absolute establisher of the decrees of the Diets it is in His power to advance and reward whom He pleaseth He is Lord immediate of His Subjects but not of His Nobility He is Soveraigne Judge of His Nobility in criminall causes The power of the Nobility daily encreaseth for that in respect of the Kings election they neither have law rule nor forme to do it neither by writing nor tradition As the King governs His Subjects which are immediately His with absolute Authority so the Nobility dispose immediately of their vassals over whom every one hath more then a regall power so as they entreat them like slaves There be certaine men in Poland who are called EARTHLY MESSENGERS or Nuntios they are as it were Agents of Jurisdictions or circles of the Nobility these have a certaine Authority and as Boterus saith in the time of their Diets these men assemble in a place neer to the Senate House where they choose two Marshals by whom but with a tribune-like authority they signifie unto the Counsell what their requests are Not long since their authority and reputation grew so mightily that they now carry themselves as heads and governours rather then officers and ministers of the publike decrees of the State One of the Counsell refused his Senators place to become one of these officers Every Palatine the King requiring it cals together all the Nobility of His Palatinate where having propounded unto them the matters whereon they are to treate and their will being known they choose four or six out of the company of the EARTHLY MESSENGERS these deputies meet and make one body which they call the order of Knights This being of late years the manner and order of the government of Poland it is not possible for the Observator to find among them that the whole community in its underived Majesty doth ever convene to do Justice nor any election or representation of the Community or that the people assume its owne power to do it self right The EARTHLY MESSENGERS though they may be thought to represent the Commons and of late take much upon them yet they are elected and chosen by the Nobility as their agents and officers The Community are either vassals to the King or to the Nobility and enjoy as little freedome or liberty as any Nation But it may be said perhaps that though the Community do not limit the King yet the Nobility do and so he is a limited Monarchy The Answer is that in truth though the Nobility at the choosing of their King do limit his power and do give him an oath yet afterwards they have alwayes a desire to please him and to second his will and this they are forced to do to avoid discord for by reason of their great power they are subject to great dissentions not only among themselves but between them and the order of Knights which are the earthly messengers yea the Provinces are at discord one with another and as for Religion the diversity of Sects in Poland bred perpetuall jars and hatred among the people there being as many Sects as in Amsterdam it self or any popular government can desire The danger of sedition is the cause that though the Crown depends on the election of the Nobility yet they have never rejected the Kings successour or transferred the Realme to any other family but once when deposing Ladislaus for his idlenesse whom yet afterward they restored they elected Wencelaus King of Bohemia But if the Nobility do agree to hold their King to his conditions which is not to conclude any thing but by the advise of his Counsell of Nobles nor to choose any wife without their leaves then it must be said to be a Common-weal not a Royalty and the King but only the mouth of the Kingdome or as Queen Christina complained that Her Husband was but the shadow of a Soveraigne Next if it be considered how the Nobility of Poland came to this great power it was not by any originall contract or popular convention for it is said they have neither Law rule nor forme written or unwritten for the election of their King they may thanke the Bishops and Clergy for by their holy admonitions and advise good and Religious Princes to shew their piety were first brought to give much of their Rights and Priviledges to their Subjects devout Kings were meerely cheated of some of their Royalties What power soever generall Assemblies of the Estates claime or exercise over and above the bare naked act of Counselling they were first beholding to the Popish Clergy for it it is they first brought Parliaments into request and power I cannot find in any Kingdome but onely where Popery hath been that Parliaments have been of reputation and in the greatest times of Superstition they are first mentioned As for the Kingdome of Denmarke I read that the Senators who are all chosen out of the Nobility and seldome exceed the number of 28 with the cheif of the Realme do choose their King They have alwaies in a manner set the Kings eldest Son upon the Royall Throne The Nobility of Denmarke withstood the Coronation of Frederick 1559 till he sware not to put any Noble man to death untill he were judged of the Senat that all Noble men should have power of life and death over their Subjects without appeal and the King to give no office without consent of the Councell There is a Chancelour of the Realme before whom they do appeal from all the Provinces and Islands and from him to the King himselfe I hear of nothing in this Kingdome that tends to popularity no Assembly of the Commons no elections or representation of them Sweden is governed by a King heretofore elective but now made hereditary in Gustavus time it is divided into Provinces an appeale lieth from the Vicount of every teritory to a Soveraigne Judge called a Lamen from the Lamens to the Kings Councell and from this Councell to the King himself Now let the Observator bethinke himself whether all or any of these three Countries have found out any art at all whereby the people ●r community may assume its owne power if neither of these Kingdomes have most Countries have not nay none have The people or Community in these three Realms are as absolute vassals as any in the world the regulating power if any be is in the Nobility Nor is it such in the Nobility as it makes shew for The election of Kings is rather a formality then any real power for they dare hardly choose any but the Heire or one of the blood Royall if they should choose one among the Nobility it would prove very factious if a stranger odious neither safe For the Government though the Kings be sworne to raigne according to the Laws and are not to do any thing without the consent of their Councell in publick affaires yet in regard they have power both to advance and reward whom they please the Nobility and Senators do comply with their Kings and Boterus concludes of the Kings of Poland who seem to be most moderated that such as is their valour dexterity wisdome such is their Power Authority and Government Also Bodin saith that these three Kingdomes are States changeable and uncertaine as the Nobility is stronger then the Prince or the Prince then the Nobility and the people are so far from liberty that he saith Divers particular Lords exact not only customes but tributes also which are confirmed and grow stronger both by long prescription of time and use of Judgements The End

how far the Parliament is able to create new formes and precedents and has a jurisdiction over it self All these doubts would be solemnly solved But in the first place the true priviledges of Parliament belonging not only to the being and efficacy of it but to the honor and complement of it would be clearly declared for the very naming of priviledges of Parliament as if they were chimeras to the ignorant sort and utterly unknown unto the learned hath been entertained with scorne since the beginning of this Parliament In this large passage taken out of the Observator which concernes the originall of all Government two notable Propositions may be principally observed First our Observator confesseth arbitrary or absolute government to be the first and the safest government for the world Secondly he acknowledgeth that the jurisdiction is uncertaine and the priviledges not cleerely declared of limited Monarchy These two evident truths delivered by him he labours mainely to disguise He seemes to insinuate that arbitrary Government was but in the infancy of the World for so he termes it but if we enquire of him how long he will have this infancy of the world to last he grants it continued above three thousand years which is an unreasonable time for the world to continue under age for the first opposers he doth find of arbitrary power were the ephori tribuni curatores c. The ephori were above three thousand years after the Creation and the tribuni were later as for his curatores I know not whom he meanes except the Master of the Court of Wards I cannot English the word curator better I doe not believe that he can shew that any curatores or et caeteras which he mentions were so ancient as the ephori As for the tribuni he mistakes much if he thinkes they were erected to limit and bound Monarchy for the state of Rome was at the least Aristocraticall as they call it if not popular when tribunes of the people were first hatched And for the Ephori their power did not limit or regulate Monarchy but quite take it away for a Lacedemonian King in the judgement of Aristotle was no King indeed but in name onely as Generalissimo of an Army and the best polititians reckon the Spartan Common-wealth to have been Aristocraticall and not Monarchicall and if a limited Monarchy cannot be found in Lacedemon I doubt our Observator will hardly find it any where else in the whole World and in substance he confesseth as much when he saith Now most Countries have found out an art and peaceable order for publique Assemblies as if it were a thing but new done and not before for so the word Now doth import The observator in confessing the Jurisdiction to be incertaine and the priviledges undetermined of that Court that should bound and limit Monarchy doth in effect acknowledge there is no such Court at all for every Court consists of Jurisdictions and Priviledges it is these two that create a Court and are the essentials of it If the admirably composed Court of Parliament have some defects which may receive amendment as he saith and if those defects be such as cause divisions both between the Houses and between the King and both Houses and these divisions be about so maine a matter as Jurisdictions and Priviledges and power to create new Priviledges all which are the fundamentals of every Court for untill they be agreed upon the act of every Court may not onely be uncertaine but invalid and cause of tumults and sedition And if all these doubts divisions have need to be solemnly solved as our Observator confesseth Then he hath no reason at all to say that Now the conditions of Supream Lords are wisely determined and quietly conserved or that Now most Countries have found out an art and peaceable order for publick affaires whereby the people may resume its own power to do it self right without injurie unto Princes for how can the underived Majesty of the people by assuming its own power tell how to do her selfe right or how to avoid doing injury to the Prince if her jurisdiction be uncertain and Priviledges undetermined He tels us Now most Countries have found an art and peaceable order for publick Assemblies and to the intent that Princes may not be Now beyond all limits and Laws the whole community in t is underived Majesty shall convene to do Justice But he doth not name so much as one Country or Kingdome that hath found out this art where the whole Community in its underived Majesty did ever convene to do Justice I challenge him or any other for him to name but one Kingdome that hath either Now or heretofore found out this art or peaceable order We do hear a great rumor in this age of moderated and limited Kings Poland Sweden and Denmark are talked of for such and in these Kingdomes or no where is such a moderated Government as our Observator meanes to be found A little enquiry would be made into the manner of the Government of these Kingdomes for these Northern people as Bodin observeth breathe after liberty First for Poland Boterus saith that the Government of it is elective altogether and representeth rather an Aristocracie then a Kingdome the Nobility who have great authority in the Diets chusing the King and limiting His Authority making His Soveraignty but a slavish Royalty these diminutions of regality began first by default of King Lewis and Jagello who to gaine the succession in the Kingdome contrary to the Laws one for his daughter and the other for his son departed with many of his Royalties and prerogatives to buy the voices of the Nobility The French Author of the book called the Estates of the world doth informe us that the Princes Authority was more free not being subject to any Laws and having Absolute Power not onely of their estates but also of life and death Since Christian Religion was received it began to be moderated first by holy admonitions of the Bishops and Clergy and then by services of the Nobility in war Religious Princes gave many Honours and many liberties to the Clergy and Nobility and quit much of their Rights the which their successors have continued The superiour dignity is reduced to two degrees that is the Palatinate and the Chastelleine for that Kings in former times did by little and little call these men to publike consultations notwithstanding that they had absolute power to do all things of themselves to command dispose recompence and punish of their own motions since they have ordained that these dignities should make the body of a Senate The King doth not challenge much right and power over His Nobility nor over their estates neither hath he any over the Clergy And though the Kings Authority depends on the Nobility for His election yet in many things it is absolute after he He is chosen He appoints the Diets at what time and place He pleaseth He

mixed Monarchy Machivell is the first in Christendome that I can find that writ of a Mixed Government but not one syllable of a Mixed Monarchy he in his discourses or disputations upon the Decades of Livy falls so enamored with the Roman Common-wealth that he thought he could never sufficiently grace that popular government unlesse he said there was something of Monarchy in it yet he was never so impudent as to say it was a mixed Monarchy And what Machivell hath said for Rome the like hath Contarene for Venice But Bodin hath layed open the errors of both these as also of Polibius and some few others that held the like opinions As for the Kingdome of England if it have found out a form of Government as the Treatise layeth it down of such perfection as never any other people could It is both a glory to the Nation and also to this Author who hath first decipher'd it I now make my approach to the Book it self The title is A Treatise of Monarchy The first part of it is of Monarchy in Generall Where first I charge the Author that he hath not given us any definition or description of Monarchy in Generall for by the rules of method he should have first defined and then divided for if there be severall sorts of Monarchy then in something they must agree which makes them to be Monarchies and in something they must disagree and differ which makes them to be severall sorts of Monarchies in the first place he should have shewed us in what they all agreed which must have been a definition of Monarchy in Generall which is the foundation of the Treatise and except that be agreed upon we shal argue upon we know not what I presse not this maine omission of our Author out of any humor of wrangling but because I am confident that had he pitched upon any definition of Monarchy in Generall his own definition would have confuted his whole Treatise Besides I find him pleased to give us a handsome definition of Absolute Monarchy from whence I may infer that he knew no other definition that would have fitted all his other sorts of Monarchy it concerned him to have produced it lest it might be thought there could be no Monarchy but Absolute What our Author hath omitted I shall attempt to supply and leave to the scanning And it shall be a reall as well as nominall definition of Monarchy A Monarchy is the government of one alone For the better credit of this definition though it be able to maintain it self yet I shall deduce it from the principles of our Author of the Treatise of Monarchy We all know that this word Monarch is compounded of two Greek words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is imperare to govern and rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies one alone The understanding of these two words may be picked out of our Author First for government he teacheth us it is Potestatis exercitium the exercise of a morall p. 1. power next he grants us that every Monarch even his limited p. 12. Monarch must have the Supream power of the State in him so that his power must no way be limited by any power above his for then he were not a Monarch but a subordinate Magistrate Here we have a fair confession of a supreame unlimited power in his limited Monarch if you will know what he meanes by these words supream power turn to his 26 page there you will find Supream power is either Legislative or Gubernative and that the legislative power is the chief of the two he makes both supream and yet one chief the like distinction he hath before where he saith The power of Magistracy in respect of its degrees is Nomotheticall or p. 5. Architectonicall and Gubernative or Executive by these words of Legislative Nomotheticall and Architectonicall power in plain English he understands a power of making Laws and by Gubernative and Executive a power of putting those Laws in execution by judging and punishing offenders The result we have from hence is that by the Authors acknowledgment every Monarch must have the Supream power and that supream power is a power to make laws and howsoever the Author makes the Gubernative and Executive power a part of the Supream power yet he confesseth the Legislative to be chief or the highest degree of power for he doth acknowledge degrees of Supream power nay he afterwards teacheth us that the Legislative power is the height of power to which the other parts p. 4● are subsequent and subservient if Gubernative be subservient to Legislative how can Gubernative power be supream Now let us examine the Authors Limited Monarch by these his own rules he tells us that in a moderated limited stinted conditionate ● 12. legall or allayed Monarchy for all these tearms he hath for it the Supream power must be restrained by some Law according to which this power was given and by direction of which this power must act when in a line before he said that the Monarchs power must not be limited by any power above his yet here he will have his Supream power restrained not limited and yet restrained is not a restraint a limitation and if restrained how is it supream and if restrained by some law is not the power of that law and of them that made that law above his supream power and if by the direction of such law only he must govern where is the Legislative power which is the chief of Supream power when the Law must rule and govern the Monarch and not the Monarch the Law he hath at the most but a Gubernative or Executive power if his authority transcends its bounds if it command p. 14. beyond the Law and the Subject is not bound legally to subjection in such cases and if the utmost extent of the Law of the land be the measure of the Limited Monarchs power and Subjects duty where shall we find the Supream power that Culmen or apex potestatis p. 16. that prime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which our Author saith must be in every Monarch The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies principality and power doth also signifie principium beginning which doth teach us that by the word Prince or principality the principium or beginning of Government is meant this if it be given to the Law it robs the Monarch and makes the Law the primum mobile and so that which is but the instrument or servant to the Monarch becomes the master Thus much of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The other word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 solus one alone the Monarch must not only have the Supream power unlimited but he must have it alone without any companions Our Author teacheth us He is no p. 15. Monarch if the Supream power be not in one And again he saith if you put the apex potestatis or supream power

a fundamentall variance betwixt the Monarch and the Community he is ashamed to put the question home I demand of him if there be a variance betwixt the Monarch and any of the meanest person of the Community who shall be the Judge for instance The King commands me or gives judgment against me I reply His commands are illegall and his judgment not according to law who must judge if the Monarch himself judge then you destroy the frame of the State and make it absolute saith our Author and he gives his reason for to define a Monarch to a law and then to make him judge of his owne deviations from that law is to absolve him from all law On the other side if any or all the people may judge then you put the Soveraignty in the whole body or part of it and destroy the being of Monarchy Thus our Author hath caught himself in a plaine dilemma if the King be judge then he is no limited Monarch If the people be judge then he is no Monarch at all So farewell limited Monarchy nay farewell all government if there be no Judge Would you know what help our Author hath found out for p. 14. this mischief First he saith that a Subject is bound to yeild to a Magistrate when he cannot de jure challenge obedience if it be in a thing in which he can possibly without subversion and in which his act may not be made a leading case and so bring on a prescription against p. 17. publike liberty Again he saith if the act in which the exorbitance or transgression of the Monarch is supposed to be be of lesser moment and not striking at the very being of that Government it ought to be borne by publick patience rather then to endanger the being of the p. 49. State The like words he uses in another place saying if the will of the Monarch exceed the limits of the law it ought to be submitted to so it be not contrary to Gods law nor bring with it such an evill to our selves or the publick that we cannot be accessary to ● by obeying These are but fig-leaves to cover the nakednesse of our Authors limited Monarch formed upon weak supposals in cases of lesser moment For if the Monarch be to govern only according to law no transgression of his can be of so small moment if he break the bounds of law but it is a subversion of the government it self and may be made a leading case and so bring on a prescription against publick liberty it strikes at the very being of the Government and brings with it such an evill as the party that suffers or the publick cannot be accessory to let the case be never so small yet if there be illegality in the act it strikes at the very being of limited Monarchy which is to be legall unlesse our Author will say as in effect he doth That his limited Monarch must governe according to law in great and publick matters onely and that in smaller matters which concerne private men or poor persons he may rule according to his own will p. 17. Secondly our Author tells us if the Monarchs act of exorbitancy or transgression be mortall and such as suffered dissolves the frame of Government and publick liberty then the illegality is to be set open and redresment sought by petition which if failing prevention by resistance ought to be and if it be apparent and appeale be made to the consciences of mankind then the fundamentall laws of that Monarchy must judge and pronounce the sentence in every mans conscience and every man so farre as concernes him must follow the evidence of Truth in his own soul to oppose or not to oppose according as he can in conscience acquit or condemne the act of the governour or Monarch Whereas my Author requires that the destructive nature of illegall commands should be set open Surely his mind is That each private man in his particular case should make a publique remonstrance to the world of the illegall act of the Monarch and then if upon his Petition he cannot be relieved according to his desire he ought or it is his duty to make resistance Here I would know who can be the judge whether the illegality be made apparent it is a maine point since every man is prone to flatter himselfe in his owne cause and to think it good and that the wrong or injustice he suffers is apparent when other moderate and indifferent men can discover no such thing and in this case the judgement of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any possible meanes or if it could it were like to be various and erronious Yet our Author will have an appeale made to the conscience of all Man-kind and that being made he concludes the fundamentall Lawes must judge and pronounce sentence in every mans conscience Whereas he saith The Fundamentall Lawes must judge I would p. 18. very gladly learne of him or of any other for him what a Fundamentall Law is or else have but any one Law named me that any man can say is a Fundamentall Law of the Monarchy I confesse he tells us that the Common Lawes are the foundation and the Statute Laws are superstructive yet I think he dares not say that there p. 38. is any one branch or part of the Common Law but that it may be taken away by an Act of Parliament for many points of the Common Law de facto have and de jure any point may be taken away How can that be called Fundamentall which hath and may be removed and yet the Statute Lawes stand firme and stable it is contrary to the nature of Fundamental for the building to stand when the foundation is taken away Besides the Common Law is generally acknowledged to be nothing else but common usage or custome which by length of time onely obtaines authority So that it followes in time after government but cannot goe before it and be the rule to Government by any originall or radicall constitution Also the Common Law being unwritten doubtful and difficult cannot but be an uncertaine rule to governe by which is against the nature of a rule which is and ought to be certaine Lastly by making the Common Law onely to be the foundation Magna Charta is excluded from being a Fundamentall Law and also all other Statutes from being limitations to Monarchy since the Fundamentall Lawes onely are to be judge Truly the conscience of all Man-kind is a pretty large Tribunall for the Fundamentall Lawes to pronounce sentence in It is very much that Lawes which in their owne nature are dumb and alwayes need a Judge to pronounce sentence should now be able to speak pronounce sentence themselves such a sentence surely must be upon the hearing of one party onely for it is impossible for a Monarch to make his defence and answer and produce his witnesses in every mans conscience

and decrees of the people he should neither be King nor Soveraigne and the Common-wealth neither Realme nor Monarchy but a meer Aristocracy So we see the principall point of Soveraigne Majesty and absolute power to consist principally in giving Laws unto the Subjects in generall without their consent Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. To confound the state of Monarchy with the popular or Aristocraticall estate is a thing impossible and in effect incompatible and such as cannot be imagined for Soveraignty being of it self indivisible how can it at one and the same time be divided betwixt one Prince the Nobility and the people in Common The first marke of Soveraigne Majesty is to be of power to give Laws and to command over them unto the subjects and who should those subjects be that should yeild their obedience to the Law if they should have also power to make the Laws who should he be that could give the Law being himself constrained to receive it of them unto whom himself gave it so that of necessity we must conclude that as no one in particular hath the power to make the Law in such a state that then the state must needs be a state popular Never any Common-wealth hath been made of an Aristocracie and popular estate much lesse of the three estates of a Common-weal such states wherein the rights of Soveraignty are divided are not rightly to be called Common-weals but rather the corruption of Common-weals as Herodotus has most breifly but truly written Common-weales which change their state the Soveraigne right and power of them being divided find no rest from Civill wars and broiles till they againe recover some one of the three formes and the Soveraignty be wholy in one of the states or other where the rights of the Soveraignty are divided betwixt the Prince and his Subjects in that confusion of state there is still endlesse stirs and quarrels for the superiority untill that some one some few or altogether have got the Soveraignty Id. lib. 2. c. 1. This Judgment of Bodins touching Limited and Mixed Monarchy is not according to the mind of our Author nor yet of the Observator who useth the strength of his wit to overthrow Absolute and Arbitrary Government in this Kingdome and yet in the main body of his discourse le ts fall such truths from his pen as give a deadly wound to the Cause he pleads for if they be indifferently waighed and considered I will not pick a line or two here and there to wrest against him but will present a whole Page of his Book or more together that so we may have an entire prospect upon the Observators mind Without society saith the Observator men could not live without Laws men could not be sociable and without Authority somewhere to judge according to Law Law was vaine It was soone therefore provided that Laws according to the dictate of reason should be ratified by common consent when it afterward appeared that man was yet subject to unnaturall distruction by the tyranny of entrusted Magistrates a mischief almost as fatall as to be without all Magistracy How to provide a wholsome remedy therefore was not so easie to be invented it was not difficult to invent Laws for the limiting of Supream Governors but to invent how those laws should be executed or by whom interpreted was almost impossible Nam quis Custodiet ipsos Custodes to place a Superior above a Supream was held unnaturall yet what a lifelesse thing would Law be without any Judge to determine and force it If it be agreed upon that limits should be prefixed to Princes and Judges to decree according to those limits yet an other inconvenience will presently affront us for we cannot restrain Princes too far but we shall dis-able them from some good long it was ere the world could extricate it selfe out of all these extremities or find out an orderly means whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded Prerogative on this hand and to excessive liberty on the other and scarce has long experience yet fully satisfied the minds of all men in it In the Infancy of the world when man was not so artificiall and obdurate in cru●lty and oppression as now and policy most rude Most Nations did chuse rather to subject themselves to the meer discretion of their Lords then rely upon any limits and so be ruled by Arbitrary Edicts then written Statutes But since tyranny being more exquisite and policy more perfect especially where learning and Religion flourish few Nations will endure the thraldome which usually accompanies unbounded and unconditionate Royalty Yet long it was ere the bounds and conditions of Supream Lords was so wisely determined or quietly conserved as now they are for at first when as Euphori Tribuni Curatores c. were erected to poise against the seale of Soveraignty much blood was shed about them and States were put into new broiles by them and some places the remedy proved worse then the disease In all great distresses the body of the people were ever constrained to rise and by force of the Major party to put an end to all intestine strifes and make a redresse of all publike grievances But many times calamities grew to a strange height before so cumbersome a body could be raised and when it was raised the motions of it were so distracted and irregular that after much spoile and effusion of blood sometimes only one tyranny was exchanged for another till some was invented to regulate the motions of the peoples molimenous body I think arbritrary rule was most safe for the world But Now since most Countries have sound an art and peaceable order for publick Assemblies whereby the people may assume its owne power to do it selfe right without disturbance to it self or injury to Princes He is very unjust that wil oppose this art or order That Princes may not be Now beyond all limits and laws nor yet to be tied upon those limits by any private parties The whole community in its underived Majesty shall convene to do justice and that the convention may not be without intelligence certaine times and places and formes shall be appointed for it reglement and that the vastnesse of its own bulke may not breed confusion by vertue of election and representation a few shall act for many the wise shall consent for the simple the vertue of all shall redound to some and the prudence of some shall redound to all and surely as this admirably composed Court which is now called a Parliament is more regularly and orderly formed then when it was called mickle Synod of Wittena gemot or when this reall body of the people did throng together at it so it is not yet perhaps without some defects which by art and policy might receive farther amendment some divisions have sprung up of late between both Houses and some between the King and both Houses by reason of incertainty of jurisdiction and some Lawyers doubt